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PyCIRCLean/filecheck/filecheck.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import os
import mimetypes
import shlex
import subprocess
import zipfile
import argparse
import random
import shutil
import time
import hashlib
import oletools.oleid
import olefile
import officedissector
import warnings
import exifread
from PIL import Image
from pdfid import PDFiD, cPDFiD
from kittengroomer import FileBase, KittenGroomerBase, Logging
class Config:
"""Configuration information for filecheck.py."""
# MIMES
# Application subtypes (mimetype: 'application/<subtype>')
mimes_ooxml = ('vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.',)
mimes_office = ('msword', 'vnd.ms-',)
mimes_libreoffice = ('vnd.oasis.opendocument',)
mimes_rtf = ('rtf', 'richtext',)
mimes_pdf = ('pdf', 'postscript',)
mimes_xml = ('xml',)
mimes_ms = ('dosexec',)
mimes_compressed = ('zip', 'rar', 'x-rar', 'bzip2', 'lzip', 'lzma', 'lzop',
'xz', 'compress', 'gzip', 'tar',)
mimes_data = ('octet-stream',)
mimes_audio = ('ogg',)
# Image subtypes
mimes_exif = ('image/jpeg', 'image/tiff',)
mimes_png = ('image/png',)
# Mimetypes with metadata
mimes_metadata = ('image/jpeg', 'image/tiff', 'image/png',)
# Mimetype aliases
aliases = {
# Win executables
'application/x-msdos-program': 'application/x-dosexec',
'application/x-dosexec': 'application/x-msdos-program',
# Other apps with confusing mimetypes
'application/rtf': 'text/rtf',
'application/rar': 'application/x-rar',
'application/ogg': 'audio/ogg',
'audio/ogg': 'application/ogg'
}
# EXTS
# Commonly used malicious extensions
# Sources: http://www.howtogeek.com/137270/50-file-extensions-that-are-potentially-dangerous-on-windows/
# https://github.com/wiregit/wirecode/blob/master/components/core-settings/src/main/java/org/limewire/core/settings/FilterSettings.java
malicious_exts = (
# Applications
".exe", ".pif", ".application", ".gadget", ".msi", ".msp", ".com", ".scr",
".hta", ".cpl", ".msc", ".jar",
# Scripts
".bat", ".cmd", ".vb", ".vbs", ".vbe", ".js", ".jse", ".ws", ".wsf",
".wsc", ".wsh", ".ps1", ".ps1xml", ".ps2", ".ps2xml", ".psc1", ".psc2",
".msh", ".msh1", ".msh2", ".mshxml", ".msh1xml", ".msh2xml",
# Shortcuts
".scf", ".lnk", ".inf",
# Other
".reg", ".dll",
# Office macro (OOXML with macro enabled)
".docm", ".dotm", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xlam", ".pptm", ".potm", ".ppam",
".ppsm", ".sldm",
# banned from wirecode
".asf", ".asx", ".au", ".htm", ".html", ".mht", ".vbs",
".wax", ".wm", ".wma", ".wmd", ".wmv", ".wmx", ".wmz", ".wvx",
# Google chrome malicious extensions
".ad", ".ade", ".adp", ".ah", ".apk", ".app", ".application", ".asp",
".asx", ".bas", ".bash", ".bat", ".cfg", ".chi", ".chm", ".class",
".cmd", ".com", ".command", ".crt", ".crx", ".csh", ".deb", ".dex",
".dll", ".drv", ".exe", ".fxp", ".grp", ".hlp", ".hta", ".htm", ".html",
".htt", ".inf", ".ini", ".ins", ".isp", ".jar", ".jnlp", ".user.js",
".js", ".jse", ".ksh", ".lnk", ".local", ".mad", ".maf", ".mag", ".mam",
".manifest", ".maq", ".mar", ".mas", ".mat", ".mau", ".mav", ".maw",
".mda", ".mdb", ".mde", ".mdt", ".mdw", ".mdz", ".mht", ".mhtml", ".mmc",
".mof", ".msc", ".msh", ".mshxml", ".msi", ".msp", ".mst", ".ocx", ".ops",
".pcd", ".pif", ".pkg", ".pl", ".plg", ".prf", ".prg", ".pst", ".py",
".pyc", ".pyw", ".rb", ".reg", ".rpm", ".scf", ".scr", ".sct", ".sh",
".shar", ".shb", ".shs", ".shtm", ".shtml", ".spl", ".svg", ".swf", ".sys",
".tcsh", ".url", ".vb", ".vbe", ".vbs", ".vsd", ".vsmacros", ".vss",
".vst", ".vsw", ".ws", ".wsc", ".wsf", ".wsh", ".xbap", ".xht", ".xhtm",
".xhtml", ".xml", ".xsl", ".xslt", ".website", ".msh1", ".msh2", ".msh1xml",
".msh2xml", ".ps1", ".ps1xml", ".ps2", ".ps2xml", ".psc1", ".psc2", ".xnk",
".appref-ms", ".gadget", ".efi", ".fon", ".partial", ".svg", ".xml",
".xrm_ms", ".xsl", ".action", ".bin", ".inx", ".ipa", ".isu", ".job",
".out", ".pad", ".paf", ".rgs", ".u3p", ".vbscript", ".workflow", ".001",
".ace", ".arc", ".arj", ".b64", ".balz", ".bhx", ".cab", ".cpio", ".fat",
".hfs", ".hqx", ".iso", ".lha", ".lpaq1", ".lpaq5", ".lpaq8", ".lzh",
".mim", ".ntfs", ".paq8f", ".paq8jd", ".paq8l", ".paq8o", ".pea", ".quad",
".r00", ".r01", ".r02", ".r03", ".r04", ".r05", ".r06", ".r07", ".r08",
".r09", ".r10", ".r11", ".r12", ".r13", ".r14", ".r15", ".r16", ".r17",
".r18", ".r19", ".r20", ".r21", ".r22", ".r23", ".r24", ".r25", ".r26",
".r27", ".r28", ".r29", ".squashfs", ".swm", ".tpz", ".txz", ".tz", ".udf",
".uu", ".uue", ".vhd", ".vmdk", ".wim", ".wrc", ".xar", ".xxe", ".z",
".zipx", ".zpaq", ".cdr", ".dart", ".dc42", ".diskcopy42", ".dmg",
".dmgpart", ".dvdr", ".img", ".imgpart", ".ndif", ".smi", ".sparsebundle",
".sparseimage", ".toast", ".udif",
)
# Sometimes, mimetypes.guess_type gives unexpected results, such as for .tar.gz files:
# In [12]: mimetypes.guess_type('toot.tar.gz', strict=False)
# Out[12]: ('application/x-tar', 'gzip')
# It works as expected if you do mimetypes.guess_type('application/gzip', strict=False)
override_ext = {'.gz': 'application/gzip'}
SEVENZ_PATH = '/usr/bin/7z'
class File(FileBase):
"""
Main file object
Created for each file that is processed by KittenGroomer. Contains all
filetype-specific processing methods.
"""
def __init__(self, src_path, dst_path):
super(File, self).__init__(src_path, dst_path)
self.is_archive = False
self.tempdir_path = self.dst_path + '_temp'
subtypes_apps = (
(Config.mimes_office, self._winoffice),
(Config.mimes_ooxml, self._ooxml),
(Config.mimes_rtf, self.text),
(Config.mimes_libreoffice, self._libreoffice),
(Config.mimes_pdf, self._pdf),
(Config.mimes_xml, self.text),
(Config.mimes_ms, self._executables),
(Config.mimes_compressed, self._archive),
(Config.mimes_data, self._binary_app),
(Config.mimes_audio, self.audio)
)
self.app_subtype_methods = self._make_method_dict(subtypes_apps)
types_metadata = (
(Config.mimes_exif, self._metadata_exif),
(Config.mimes_png, self._metadata_png),
)
self.metadata_mimetype_methods = self._make_method_dict(types_metadata)
self.mime_processing_options = {
'text': self.text,
'audio': self.audio,
'image': self.image,
'video': self.video,
'application': self.application,
'example': self.example,
'message': self.message,
'model': self.model,
'multipart': self.multipart,
'inode': self.inode,
}
def __repr__(self):
return "<filecheck.File object: {{{}}}>".format(self.filename)
def _check_extension(self):
"""
Guess the file's mimetype based on its extension.
If the file's mimetype (as determined by libmagic) is contained in
the `mimetype` module's list of valid mimetypes and the expected
mimetype based on its extension differs from the mimetype determined
by libmagic, then mark the file as dangerous.
"""
if not self.has_extension:
self.make_dangerous('File has no extension')
else:
if self.extension in Config.override_ext:
expected_mimetypes = Config.override_ext[self.extension]
else:
expected_mimetype, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(self.src_path,
strict=False)
expected_mimetypes = [expected_mimetype]
if expected_mimetype in Config.aliases:
expected_mimetypes.append(Config.aliases[expected_mimetype])
is_known_extension = self.extension in mimetypes.types_map.keys()
if is_known_extension and self.mimetype not in expected_mimetypes:
self.make_dangerous('Mimetype does not match expected mimetypes ({}) for this extension'.format(expected_mimetypes))
def _check_mimetype(self):
"""
Compare mimetype (as determined by libmagic) to extension.
Determine whether the extension that are normally associated with
the mimetype include the file's actual extension.
"""
if not self.has_mimetype:
self.make_dangerous('File has no mimetype')
else:
if self.mimetype in Config.aliases:
mimetype = Config.aliases[self.mimetype]
else:
mimetype = self.mimetype
expected_extensions = mimetypes.guess_all_extensions(mimetype,
strict=False)
if mimetype in Config.aliases:
expected_extensions += mimetypes.guess_all_extensions(Config.aliases[mimetype], strict=False)
if expected_extensions:
if self.has_extension and self.extension not in expected_extensions:
self.make_dangerous('Extension does not match expected extensions ({}) for this mimetype'.format(expected_extensions))
def _check_filename(self):
"""
Verify the filename
If the filename contains any dangerous or specific characters, handle
them appropriately.
"""
if self.filename.startswith('.'):
macos_hidden_files = set(
'.Trashes', '._.Trashes', '.DS_Store', '.fseventsd', '.Spotlight-V100'
)
if self.filename in macos_hidden_files:
self.add_description('MacOS metadata file, added by MacOS to USB drives and some directories')
self.should_copy = False
right_to_left_override = u"\u202E"
if right_to_left_override in self.filename:
self.make_dangerous('Filename contains dangerous character')
new_filename = self.filename.replace(right_to_left_override, '')
self.set_property('filename', new_filename)
def _check_malicious_exts(self):
"""Check that the file's extension isn't contained in a blacklist"""
if self.extension in Config.malicious_exts:
self.make_dangerous('Extension identifies file as potentially dangerous')
def _compute_random_hashes(self):
"""Compute a random amount of hashes at random positions in the file to ensure integrity after the copy (mitigate TOCTOU attacks)"""
if not os.path.exists(self.src_path) or os.path.isdir(self.src_path) or self.maintype == 'image':
# Images are converted, no need to compute the hashes
return
self.random_hashes = []
if self.size < 64:
# hash the whole file
self.block_length = self.size
else:
if self.size < 128:
# Get a random length between 16 and the size of the file
self.block_length = random.randint(16, self.size)
else:
# Get a random length between 16 and 128
self.block_length = random.randint(16, 128)
for i in range(random.randint(3, 6)): # Do a random amound of read on the file (between 5 and 10)
start_pos = random.randint(0, self.size - self.block_length) # Pick a random length for the hash to compute
with open(self.src_path, 'rb') as f:
f.seek(start_pos)
hashed = hashlib.sha256(f.read(self.block_length)).hexdigest()
self.random_hashes.append((start_pos, hashed))
time.sleep(random.uniform(0.1, 0.5)) # Add a random sleep length
def _validate_random_hashes(self):
"""Validate hashes computed by _compute_random_hashes"""
if not os.path.exists(self.src_path) or os.path.isdir(self.src_path) or self.maintype == 'image':
# Images are converted, we don't have to fear TOCTOU
return True
for start_pos, hashed_src in self.random_hashes:
with open(self.dst_path, 'rb') as f:
f.seek(start_pos)
hashed = hashlib.sha256(f.read(self.block_length)).hexdigest()
if hashed != hashed_src:
# Something fucked up happened
return False
return True
def check(self):
"""
Main file processing method.
First, checks for basic properties that might indicate a dangerous file.
If the file isn't dangerous, then delegates to various helper methods
for filetype-specific checks based on the file's mimetype.
"""
# Any of these methods can call make_dangerous():
self._check_malicious_exts()
self._check_mimetype()
self._check_extension()
self._check_filename() # can mutate self.filename
self._compute_random_hashes()
if not self.is_dangerous:
self.mime_processing_options.get(self.maintype, self.unknown)()
# ##### Helper functions #####
def _make_method_dict(self, list_of_tuples):
"""Returns a dictionary with mimetype: method pairs."""
dict_to_return = {}
for list_of_subtypes, method in list_of_tuples:
for subtype in list_of_subtypes:
dict_to_return[subtype] = method
return dict_to_return
@property
def has_metadata(self):
"""True if filetype typically contains metadata, else False."""
if self.mimetype in Config.mimes_metadata:
return True
return False
def make_tempdir(self):
"""Make a temporary directory at self.tempdir_path."""
if not os.path.exists(self.tempdir_path):
os.makedirs(self.tempdir_path)
return self.tempdir_path
#######################
# ##### Discarded mimetypes, reason in the docstring ######
def inode(self):
"""Empty file or symlink."""
if self.is_symlink:
symlink_path = self.get_property('symlink')
self.add_description('File is a symlink to {}'.format(symlink_path))
else:
self.add_description('File is an inode (empty file)')
self.should_copy = False
def unknown(self):
"""Main type should never be unknown."""
self.add_description('Unknown mimetype')
self.should_copy = False
def example(self):
"""Used in examples, should never be returned by libmagic."""
self.add_description('Example file')
self.should_copy = False
def multipart(self):
"""Used in web apps, should never be returned by libmagic"""
self.add_description('Multipart file - usually found in web apps')
self.should_copy = False
# ##### Treated as malicious, no reason to have it on a USB key ######
def message(self):
"""Process a message file."""
self.make_dangerous('Message file - should not be found on USB key')
def model(self):
"""Process a model file."""
self.make_dangerous('Model file - should not be found on USB key')
# ##### Files that will be converted ######
def text(self):
"""Process an rtf, ooxml, or plaintext file."""
for mt in Config.mimes_rtf:
if mt in self.subtype:
self.add_description('Rich Text (rtf) file')
self.force_ext('.txt')
return
for mt in Config.mimes_ooxml:
if mt in self.subtype:
self._ooxml()
return
self.add_description('Plain text file')
self.force_ext('.txt')
def application(self):
"""Process an application specific file according to its subtype."""
for subtype, method in self.app_subtype_methods.items():
if subtype in self.subtype: # checking for partial matches
method()
return
self._unknown_app() # if none of the methods match
def _executables(self):
"""Process an executable file."""
self.make_dangerous('Executable file')
def _winoffice(self):
"""Process a winoffice file using olefile/oletools."""
oid = oletools.oleid.OleID(self.src_path) # First assume a valid file
if not olefile.isOleFile(self.src_path):
# Manual processing, may already count as suspicious
try:
ole = olefile.OleFileIO(self.src_path, raise_defects=olefile.DEFECT_INCORRECT)
except Exception:
self.make_dangerous('Unparsable WinOffice file')
if ole.parsing_issues:
self.make_dangerous('Parsing issues with WinOffice file')
else:
if ole.exists('macros/vba') or ole.exists('Macros') \
or ole.exists('_VBA_PROJECT_CUR') or ole.exists('VBA'):
self.make_dangerous('WinOffice file containing a macro')
else:
indicators = oid.check()
# Encrypted can be set by multiple checks on the script
if oid.encrypted.value:
self.make_dangerous('Encrypted WinOffice file')
if oid.macros.value or oid.ole.exists('macros/vba') or oid.ole.exists('Macros') \
or oid.ole.exists('_VBA_PROJECT_CUR') or oid.ole.exists('VBA'):
self.make_dangerous('WinOffice file containing a macro')
for i in indicators:
if i.id == 'ObjectPool' and i.value:
self.make_dangerous('WinOffice file containing an object pool')
elif i.id == 'flash' and i.value:
self.make_dangerous('WinOffice file with embedded flash')
self.add_description('WinOffice file')
def _ooxml(self):
"""Process an ooxml file."""
self.add_description('OOXML (openoffice) file')
try:
doc = officedissector.doc.Document(self.src_path)
except Exception:
self.make_dangerous('Invalid ooxml file')
return
# There are probably other potentially malicious features:
# fonts, custom props, custom XML
if doc.is_macro_enabled or len(doc.features.macros) > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Ooxml file containing macro')
if len(doc.features.embedded_controls) > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Ooxml file with activex')
if len(doc.features.embedded_objects) > 0:
# Exploited by CVE-2014-4114 (OLE)
self.make_dangerous('Ooxml file with embedded objects')
if len(doc.features.embedded_packages) > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Ooxml file with embedded packages')
def _libreoffice(self):
"""Process a libreoffice file."""
# As long as there is no way to do a sanity check on the files => dangerous
try:
lodoc = zipfile.ZipFile(self.src_path, 'r')
except Exception:
# TODO: are there specific exceptions we should catch here? Or should it be everything
self.make_dangerous('Invalid libreoffice file')
for f in lodoc.infolist():
fname = f.filename.lower()
if fname.startswith('script') or fname.startswith('basic') or \
fname.startswith('object') or fname.endswith('.bin'):
self.make_dangerous('Libreoffice file containing executable code')
if not self.is_dangerous:
self.add_description('Libreoffice file')
def _pdf(self):
"""Process a PDF file."""
xmlDoc = PDFiD(self.src_path)
oPDFiD = cPDFiD(xmlDoc, True)
if oPDFiD.encrypt.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Encrypted pdf')
if oPDFiD.js.count > 0 or oPDFiD.javascript.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf with embedded javascript')
if oPDFiD.aa.count > 0 or oPDFiD.openaction.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf with openaction(s)')
if oPDFiD.richmedia.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf containing flash')
if oPDFiD.launch.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf with launch action(s)')
if oPDFiD.xfa.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf with XFA structures')
if oPDFiD.objstm.count > 0:
self.make_dangerous('Pdf with ObjectStream structures')
if not self.is_dangerous:
self.add_description('Pdf file')
def _archive(self):
"""
Process an archive using 7zip.
The archive is extracted to a temporary directory and self.process_dir
is called on that directory. The recursive archive depth is increased
to protect against archive bombs.
"""
# TODO: change this to something archive type specific instead of generic 'Archive'
self.add_description('Archive')
self.should_copy = False
self.is_archive = True
def _unknown_app(self):
"""Process an unknown file."""
self.make_dangerous('Unknown application file')
def _binary_app(self):
"""Process an unknown binary file."""
self.make_dangerous('Unknown binary file')
#######################
# Metadata extractors
def _metadata_exif(self, metadata_file_path):
"""Read exif metadata from a jpg or tiff file using exifread."""
# TODO: can we shorten this method somehow?
with open(self.src_path, 'rb') as img:
tags = None
try:
tags = exifread.process_file(img, debug=True)
except Exception as e:
self.add_error(e, "Error while trying to grab full metadata for file {}; retrying for partial data.".format(self.src_path))
if tags is None:
try:
tags = exifread.process_file(img, debug=True)
except Exception as e:
self.add_error(e, "Failed to get any metadata for file {}.".format(self.src_path))
return False
for tag in sorted(tags.keys()):
# These tags are long and obnoxious/binary so we don't add them
if tag not in ('JPEGThumbnail', 'TIFFThumbnail'):
tag_string = str(tags[tag])
# Exifreader truncates data.
if len(tag_string) > 25 and tag_string.endswith(", ... ]"):
tag_value = tags[tag].values
tag_string = str(tag_value)
with open(metadata_file_path, 'w+') as metadata_file:
metadata_file.write("Key: {}\tValue: {}\n".format(tag, tag_string))
# TODO: how do we want to log metadata?
self.set_property('metadata', 'exif')
return True
def _metadata_png(self, metadata_file_path):
"""Extract metadata from a png file using PIL/Pillow."""
warnings.simplefilter('error', Image.DecompressionBombWarning)
try:
with Image.open(self.src_path) as img:
for tag in sorted(img.info.keys()):
# These are long and obnoxious/binary
if tag not in ('icc_profile'):
with open(metadata_file_path, 'w+') as metadata_file:
metadata_file.write("Key: {}\tValue: {}\n".format(tag, img.info[tag]))
# LOG: handle metadata
self.set_property('metadata', 'png')
except Exception as e: # Catch decompression bombs
# TODO: only catch DecompressionBombWarnings here?
self.add_error(e, "Caught exception processing metadata for {}".format(self.src_path))
self.make_dangerous('exception processing metadata')
return False
def extract_metadata(self):
"""Create metadata file and call correct metadata extraction method."""
metadata_file_path = self.create_metadata_file(".metadata.txt")
mt = self.mimetype
metadata_processing_method = self.metadata_mimetype_methods.get(mt)
if metadata_processing_method:
# TODO: should we return metadata and write it here instead of in processing method?
metadata_processing_method(metadata_file_path)
#######################
# ##### Media - audio and video aren't converted ######
def audio(self):
"""Process an audio file."""
self.add_description('Audio file')
self._media_processing()
def video(self):
"""Process a video."""
self.add_description('Video file')
self._media_processing()
def _media_processing(self):
"""Generic way to process all media files."""
self.add_description('Media file')
def image(self):
"""
Process an image.
Extracts metadata to dest key using self.extract_metada() if metadata
is present. Creates a temporary directory on dest key, opens the image
using PIL.Image, saves it to the temporary directory, and copies it to
the destination.
"""
if self.has_metadata:
self.extract_metadata()
tempdir_path = self.make_tempdir()
tempfile_path = os.path.join(tempdir_path, self.filename)
warnings.simplefilter('error', Image.DecompressionBombWarning)
try: # Do image conversions
with Image.open(self.src_path) as img_in:
with Image.frombytes(img_in.mode, img_in.size, img_in.tobytes()) as img_out:
img_out.save(tempfile_path)
self.src_path = tempfile_path
except Exception as e: # Catch decompression bombs
# TODO: change this from all Exceptions to specific DecompressionBombWarning
self.add_error(e, "Caught exception (possible decompression bomb?) while translating file {}.".format(self.src_path))
self.make_dangerous('Image file containing decompression bomb')
if not self.is_dangerous:
self.add_description('Image file')
class GroomerLogger(object):
"""Groomer logging interface."""
def __init__(self, src_root_path, dst_root_path, debug=False):
self._src_root_path = src_root_path
self._dst_root_path = dst_root_path
self._log_dir_path = self._make_log_dir(dst_root_path)
self.log_path = os.path.join(self._log_dir_path, 'circlean_log.txt')
self._add_root_dir(src_root_path)
if debug:
self.log_debug_err = os.path.join(self._log_dir_path, 'debug_stderr.log')
self.log_debug_out = os.path.join(self._log_dir_path, 'debug_stdout.log')
else:
self.log_debug_err = os.devnull
self.log_debug_out = os.devnull
def _make_log_dir(self, root_dir_path):
"""Create the directory in the dest dir that will hold the logs"""
log_dir_path = os.path.join(root_dir_path, 'logs')
if os.path.exists(log_dir_path):
shutil.rmtree(log_dir_path)
os.makedirs(log_dir_path)
return log_dir_path
def _add_root_dir(self, root_path):
"""Add the root directory to the log"""
dirname = os.path.split(root_path)[1] + '/'
with open(self.log_path, mode='ab') as lf:
lf.write(bytes(dirname, 'utf-8'))
lf.write(b'\n')
def add_file(self, file_path, file_props, in_tempdir=False):
"""Add a file to the log. Takes a path and a dict of file properties."""
depth = self._get_path_depth(file_path)
try:
file_hash = Logging.computehash(file_path)[:6]
except IsADirectoryError:
file_hash = 'directory'
except FileNotFoundError:
file_hash = '------'
if file_props['is_symlink']:
symlink_template = "+- NOT COPIED: symbolic link to {name} ({sha_hash})"
log_string = symlink_template.format(
name=file_props['symlink_path'],
sha_hash=file_hash
)
else:
if file_props['is_dangerous']:
category = "Dangerous"
else:
category = "Normal"
size_string = self._format_file_size(file_props['file_size'])
if not file_props['copied']:
copied_string = 'NOT COPIED: '
else:
copied_string = ''
file_template = "+- {copied}{name} ({sha_hash}): {size}, type: {mt}/{st}. {cat}: {desc_str}"
log_string = file_template.format(
copied=copied_string,
name=file_props['filename'],
sha_hash=file_hash,
size=size_string,
mt=file_props['maintype'],
st=file_props['subtype'],
cat=category,
desc_str=file_props['description_string'],
)
if file_props['errors']:
error_string = ', '.join([str(key) for key in file_props['errors']])
log_string += (' Errors: ' + error_string)
if in_tempdir:
depth -= 1
self._write_line_to_log(log_string, depth)
def add_dir(self, dir_path):
"""Add a directory to the log"""
path_depth = self._get_path_depth(dir_path)
dirname = os.path.split(dir_path)[1] + '/'
log_line = '+- ' + dirname
self._write_line_to_log(log_line, path_depth)
def _format_file_size(self, size):
"""Returns a string with the file size and appropriate unit"""
file_size = size
for unit in ('B', 'KB', 'MB', 'GB'):
if file_size < 1024:
return str(int(file_size)) + unit
else:
file_size = file_size / 1024
return str(int(file_size)) + 'GB'
def _get_path_depth(self, path):
"""Returns the relative path depth compared to root directory"""
if self._dst_root_path in path:
base_path = self._dst_root_path
elif self._src_root_path in path:
base_path = self._src_root_path
relpath = os.path.relpath(path, base_path)
path_depth = relpath.count(os.path.sep)
return path_depth
def _write_line_to_log(self, line, indentation_depth):
"""
Write a line to the log
Pad the line according to the `indentation_depth`.
"""
padding = b' '
padding += b'| ' * indentation_depth
line_bytes = os.fsencode(line)
with open(self.log_path, mode='ab') as lf:
lf.write(padding)
lf.write(line_bytes)
lf.write(b'\n')
class KittenGroomerFileCheck(KittenGroomerBase):
def __init__(self, root_src, root_dst, max_recursive_depth=2, debug=False):
super(KittenGroomerFileCheck, self).__init__(root_src, root_dst)
self.recursive_archive_depth = 0
self.max_recursive_depth = max_recursive_depth
self.logger = GroomerLogger(root_src, root_dst, debug)
def __repr__(self):
return "filecheck.KittenGroomerFileCheck object: {{{}}}".format(
os.path.basename(self.src_root_path)
)
def process_dir(self, src_dir, dst_dir):
"""Process a directory on the source key."""
for srcpath in self.list_files_dirs(src_dir):
if not os.path.islink(srcpath) and os.path.isdir(srcpath):
self.logger.add_dir(srcpath)
else:
dstpath = os.path.join(dst_dir, os.path.basename(srcpath))
cur_file = File(srcpath, dstpath)
self.process_file(cur_file)
def process_file(self, file):
"""
Process an individual file.
Check the file, handle archives using self.process_archive, copy
the file to the destionation key, and clean up temporary directory.
"""
file.check()
if file.is_archive:
self.process_archive(file)
else:
if file.should_copy:
file.safe_copy()
file.set_property('copied', True)
if not file._validate_random_hashes():
# Something's fucked up.
file.make_dangerous('The copied file is different from the one checked, removing.')
os.remove(file.dst_path)
self.write_file_to_log(file)
# TODO: Can probably handle cleaning up the tempdir better
if hasattr(file, 'tempdir_path'):
self.safe_rmtree(file.tempdir_path)
def process_archive(self, file):
"""
Unpack an archive using 7zip and process contents using process_dir.
Should be given a Kittengroomer file object whose src_path points
to an archive.
"""
self.recursive_archive_depth += 1
if self.recursive_archive_depth >= self.max_recursive_depth:
file.make_dangerous('Archive bomb')
else:
tempdir_path = file.make_tempdir()
command_str = '{} -p1 x "{}" -o"{}" -bd -aoa'
# -p1=password, x=extract, -o=output location, -bd=no % indicator, -aoa=overwrite existing files
unpack_command = command_str.format(SEVENZ_PATH,
file.src_path, tempdir_path)
self._run_process(unpack_command)
self.write_file_to_log(file)
self.process_dir(tempdir_path, file.dst_path)
self.safe_rmtree(tempdir_path)
self.recursive_archive_depth -= 1
def _run_process(self, command_string, timeout=None):
"""Run command_string in a subprocess, wait until it finishes."""
args = shlex.split(command_string)
with open(self.logger.log_debug_err, 'ab') as stderr, open(self.logger.log_debug_out, 'ab') as stdout:
try:
subprocess.check_call(args, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr, timeout=timeout)
except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, subprocess.CalledProcessError):
return
return True
def write_file_to_log(self, file):
"""Pass information about `file` to self.logger."""
props = file.get_all_props()
if not file.is_archive:
# FIXME: in_tempdir is a hack to make image files appear at the correct tree depth in log
in_tempdir = os.path.exists(file.tempdir_path)
self.logger.add_file(file.src_path, props, in_tempdir)
def list_files_dirs(self, root_dir_path):
"""
Returns a list of all files and directories
Performs a depth-first traversal of the file tree.
"""
queue = []
for path in sorted(os.listdir(root_dir_path), key=lambda x: str.lower(x)):
full_path = os.path.join(root_dir_path, path)
# check for symlinks first to prevent getting trapped in infinite symlink recursion
if os.path.islink(full_path):
queue.append(full_path)
elif os.path.isdir(full_path):
queue.append(full_path)
queue += self.list_files_dirs(full_path)
elif os.path.isfile(full_path):
queue.append(full_path)
return queue
def run(self):
self.process_dir(self.src_root_path, self.dst_root_path)
def main(kg_implementation, description):
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog='KittenGroomer', description=description)
parser.add_argument('-s', '--source', type=str, help='Source directory')
parser.add_argument('-d', '--destination', type=str, help='Destination directory')
args = parser.parse_args()
kg = kg_implementation(args.source, args.destination)
kg.run()
if __name__ == '__main__':
main(KittenGroomerFileCheck, 'File sanitizer used in CIRCLean. Renames potentially dangerous files.')
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