

Snake Oil Crypto:

How I stopped to worry and started to love crypto

Team CIRCL

<https://www.d4-project.org/>

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- Cryptography 101,
- Cryptography and Network captures,
- D4 passiveSSL Collection,
- Leveraging OpenPGP metedata,
- Checking for weak crypto.

Cryptography 101

- **Plaintext** P: Text in clear,
- **Encryption** E: Process of disguising the plaintext to hide its content,
- **Ciphertext** C: Result of the Encryption process,
- **Decryption** D: Process of reverting encryption, transforming C into P,
- **Encryption Key** EK: Key to encrypt P into C,
- **Decryption Key** DK: Key to decrypt C into P,
- **Cryptanalysis**: Analysis of C to recover P without knowing K.

- **Confidentiality** : Ensure the secrecy of the message except for the **intended** recipient,
- **Authentication** : Proving a party's identity,
- **Integrity** : Verifying that data transmitted were not altered in the process,
- **Non-repudiation** : Proving that the sender sent a given message.

- **In-transit encryption:** protects data while it is transferred from one machine to another,
- **At-rest encryption:** protects data stored on one machine.









Cryptography and Network captures

D4 passiveSSL Collection

Leveraging OpenPGP metadata

Checking for weak crypto

IoT devices **are often the weakest devices** on a network:

- Usually the result of cheap engineering,
- sloppy patching cycles,
- sometimes forgotten—not monitored,
- few hardening features enabled.

We feel a bit safer when they use TLS, but should we?

¹<https://github.com/d4-project/snake-oil-crypto>

Keep a log of links between:

- x509 certificates,
- ports,
- IP address,
- client (ja3),
- server (ja3s),

“JA3 is a method for creating SSL/TLS client fingerprints that should be easy to produce on any platform and can be easily shared for threat intelligence.”²

Pivot on additional data points during Incident Response

²<https://github.com/salesforce/ja3>

Collect and **store** x509 certificates and TLS sessions:

- Public keys type and size,
- moduli and public exponents,
- curves parameters.

Detect anti patterns in crypto:

- Moduli that share one prime factor,
- Moduli that share both prime factors, or private exponents,
- Small factors,
- Nonces reuse / common prefix or suffix, etc.

Focus on low hanging fruits that appeal to attackers

Researchers have shown that several devices generated their keypairs at boot time without enough entropy³:

```
prng.seed(seed)
p = prng.generate_random_prime()
// prng.add_entropy()
q = prng.generate_random_prime()
n = p*q
```

Given $n=pq$ and $n' = pq'$ it is trivial to recover the shared p by computing their **Greatest Common Divisor (GCD)**, and therefore **both private keys**⁴.

³Bernstein, Heninger, and Lange: <http://facthacks.cr.yp.to/>

⁴<http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/rsa/>

In Snake-Oil-Crypto we compute GCD⁵ between:

- between certificates having the same issuer,
- between certificates having the same subject,
- on keys collected from various sources (PassiveSSL, Certificate Transparency, shodan, censys, etc.),


“Check all the keys that we know of for vendor X”


⁵using Bernstein's Batch GCD algorithm

SNAKE OIL CRYPTO - MISP FEED

2019-11-08

Name: crypto-material 

References: 0 

Referenced by: 6 

uses Object 13800 (network: x509)

uses Object 13801 (network: x509)

uses Object 13802 (network: x509)

uses Object 13803 (network: x509)

uses Object 13804 (network: x509)

uses Object 13805 (network: x509)

<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	p: text	12732045980491482532629620809854872609730718866846479950748763 99251101386987265586481573653124576541684265313376164608426942 4192867704218331356123978614869
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	q: text	None
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	rsa-modulus-size: text	1024
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	type: text	RSA

The MISP feed:

- **Allows** for checking automatic checking by an IDS on hashed values,
- **contains** thousands on broken keys from a dozen of vendors,
- **will be accessible upon request (info@circl.lu).**

In the future:

- **Automatic** the vendor checks by performing TF-IDF on x509's subjects,
- **automatic** vendors notification.

- ✓ sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting ⁶: **Extracts** and **fingerprints** certificates, and **computes** TLSH fuzzy hash.
- ✓ analyzer-d4-passivessl ⁷: **Stores** Certificates / PK details in a PostgreSQL DB.
- snake-oil-crypto ⁸: **Performs** crypto checks, push results in MISP for notification
- lookup-d4-passivessl ⁹: **Exposes** the DB through a public REST API.

⁶github.com/D4-project/sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting





⁷github.com/D4-project/analyzer-d4-passivessl

⁸github.com/D4-project/snake-oil-crypto

⁹github.com/D4-project/lookup-d4-passivessl

GET IN TOUCH IF YOU WANT TO JOIN/SUPPORT THE PROJECT, HOST A PASSIVE SSL SENSOR OR CONTRIBUTE

- Collaboration can include research partnership, sharing of collected streams or improving the software.
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- <https://github.com/D4-Project> -
https://twitter.com/d4_project

-  ROSS J. ANDERSON, *SECURITY ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO BUILDING DEPENDABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS*, 2 ED., WILEY PUBLISHING, 2008.
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-  ALFRED J. MENEZES, SCOTT A. VANSTONE, AND PAUL C. VAN OORSCHOT, *HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY*, 1ST ED., CRC PRESS, INC., BOCA RATON, FL, USA, 1996.