Snake Oil Crypto:

How I stopped to worry and started to love crypto

Team CIRCL
https://www.d4-project.org/

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- Cryptography 101,
- Cryptography and Network captures,
- D4 passiveSSL Collection,
- Leveraging OpenPGP metedata,
- Checking for weak crypto.

Cryptography 101

CRYPTOGRAPHY CONCEPTS

Plaintext P: Text in clear,

- Encryption E: Process of disguising the plaintext to hide its content,
- **Ciphertext** C: Result of the Encryption process,
- Decryption D: Process of reverting encryption, transforming C into P,
- Encryption Key EK: Key to encrypt P into C,
- Decryption Key DK: Key to decrypt C into P,
- **Cryptanalysis**: Analysis of C to recover P without knowing K.

- **Confidentiality** : Ensure the secrecy of the message except for the **intended** recipient,
- Authentication : Proving a party's identity,
- Integrity : Verifying that data transmitted were not altered,
- Non-repudiation : Proving that the sender sent a given message.

- In-transit encryption: protects data while it is transferred from one machine to another,
- At-rest encryption: protects data stored on one machine.

It [cipher] should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands.

There is no security in obscurity.

Black Box - Attackers may only see inputs / outputs:

- **Ciphertext-Only Attackers (COA) :** see only the ciphertext,
- Known-Plaintext Attackers (KPA): see ciphertext and plaintext,
- Chosen-Plaintext Attacker (CPA): encrypt plaintext, and see ciphertext,
- Chosen-Ciphertext Attakers (CCA): encrypt plaintext, decrypt ciphertext.

Grey Box - Attackers see cipher's implementation:

- Side-Channel Attacks: study the behavior of the implementation, eg. timing attacks ¹:
 - Osvik, Shamir, Tromer [OST06]: Recover AES-256 secret key of Linux's dmcrypt in just 65 ms
 - AlFardan, Paterson [AFP13]: "Lucky13" recovers plaintext of CBC-mode encryption in pretty much all TLS implementations
 - Yarom, Falkner [YF14]: Attack against RSA-2048 in GnuPG 1.4.13: "On average, the attack is able to recover 96.7% of the bits of the secret key by observing a single signature or decryption round."
 - Benger, van de Pol, Smart, Yarom [BvdPSY14]: "reasonable level of success in recovering the secret key" for OpenSSL ECDSA using secp256k1 "with as little as 200 signatures"


Most recent timing attack: TPM-fail [24420]

We discovered timing leakage on Intel firmware-based TPM (fTPM) as well as in STMicroelectronics' TPM chip. Both exhibit secretdependent execution times during cryptographic signature generation. While the key should remain safely inside the TPM hardware, we show how this information allows an attacker to recover 256-bit private keys from digital signature schemes based on elliptic curves.

ATTACKERS MODEL IV


Invasive Attacks:

injecting faults [MFS⁺18],



ATTACKERS MODEL V

decapping chips ², reverse engineering ³ ⁴, etc.



¹https://cryptojedi.org/peter/data/croatia-20160610.pdf
² https://siliconpron.org/wiki/doku.php?id=decap:start
³ http://siliconzoo.org
⁴ http://degate.org

SECURITY NOTIONS

- Indistinguishability (IND): Ciphertexts should be indistinguishable from random strings,
- Non-Malleability (MD): "Given a ciphertext $C_1 = E(K, P_1)$, it should be impossible to create another ciphertext, C_2 , whose corresponding plaintext, P_2 , is related to P_1 in a meaningful way."

Semantic Security (IND-CPA) is the most important security feature:

- Ciphertexts should be different when encryption is performed twice on the same plaintext,
- To achieve this, randomness is introduced into encryption / decryption:
 - C = E(P, K, R)P = D(C, K, R)

SEMANTIC SECURITY




Figure: Image encrypted with AES-ECB

IND-CPA should not leak information about the PlainText as long as the key is secret:

- $C^1 = E(K, P^1)$, $C^2 = E(K, P^2)$, what are the couples?
- the same message encrypted twice should return two different CipherText,
- one way to achieve this is to introduce randomness in the encryption process: C = E(K, R, P) where R is fresh random bits,
- C should not be distinguishable from random bits.

No Semantic Security without randomness

RANDOMNESS

Random Number Generator:

Pseudo Random Number Generator:

ENTROPY

RSA 2048 is roughly 100 bits security.

- Symmetric encryption,
- Asymmetric encryption.

Some attacks requires less than CCA / CPA:

 Side Channel attacks as for instance Padding Oracle (Vaudenay Attacks)

Encryption and Law Enforcement

2016 ENISA / EUROPOL JOINT STATEMENT

- In the arms race between cryptographers and crypto-analysts. In terms of practical breaks, cryptographers are miles ahead.
- In a society that is ever more depending on the correct functioning of electronic communication services, technical protection of these service is mandatory,
- In the face of serious crimes, law enforcement may lawfully intrude privacy or break into security mechanisms of electronic communication,
- **proportionality** collateral damages (class breaks)
- Resolving the encryption dilemma: collect and share best practices to circumvent encryption.

ENCRYPTION WORKAROUNDS [KS17] I

Any effort to reveal an unencrypted version of a target's data that has been concealed by encryption.

Try to get the key:

Find the key:

- physical searches for keys,
- password managers,
- web browser password database,
- in-memory copy of the key in computer's HDD / RAM.
- seize the key (keylogger).


Guess the key:,

- Whereas encryption keys are usually too hard to guess (eg. 128bits security is 2¹²⁸ trials (universe is 2⁸⁸ ns old)),
- passphrases are usually shorter to be memorizable, and are linked to the key,
- some systems have limitations on sorts of passwords (eg. 4/6 digits banking application),
- educated guess on the password from context,

ENCRYPTION WORKAROUNDS [KS17] II

- educated guess from owner's other passwords,
- dictionaries and password generation rules (⁵).
- Offline / online attacks (eg. 13 digits pw: 25.000 on an iphone VS matter of minutes offline),
- + beware devices protection when online (eg. iphone erase on repeated failures).

Compel the key:



ENCRYPTION WORKAROUNDS [KS17] III

Try to access the PlainText without the key:

Exploit a Flaw:

- Weakness in the algorithm (more on that later),
- weakness in the random-number generator (more on that later),
- weakness in the implementation,
- bugs (eg. Gordon's exploit on android in 2015⁶),
- backdoors (eg. NSA NOBUS -Bullrun program- Dual EC-DRBG [BLN15]

Access PlainText when in use:

- Access live system memory,
- especially useful against Full Disk Encryption,
- Seize device while in use,
- remotely hack the device,
- "Network Investigative Technique" (eg. Playpen case against tor).

ENCRYPTION WORKAROUNDS [KS17] IV

Locate a PlainText copy:

- Avoid encryption entirely,
- cloud providers (eg. emails),
- remote cloud storage (eg. iCloud),

Takeaways:

- No workaround works every time: the fact that a target used encryption does not mean that the investigation is over.
- **some workarounds are expensive:** exploiting.
- expertise may be have to be found outside of the governments: vendors' assistance?

Technically, we can retain that crypto-systems have weaknesses:

- key generation,
- key length,
- key distribution,
- key storage,
- how users enter keys into the crypto-system,
- weakness in the algorithm itself / implementation,
- system / computer running the algorithm,
- crypto system used in different points in time,

users.

⁵https://hashcat.net/hashcat/ ⁶https://cve.circl.lu/cve/CVE-2015-3860

WHEN CRYPTOGRAPHY HELPS INVESTIGATIONS

crypto provides authentication mechanisms.

Hands-on: Understanding RSA

Several potential weaknesses:

 Key size too small: keys up to 1024 bits are breakable given the right means,

WITH A BUNCH OF KEYS

Hands-on: Exploiting Weaknesses in RSA

USING SAGE

Go into:

~/smallKey

- what is the key size of smallkey?
- what is n?
- what is the public exponent?
- what is n in base10?
- what are p and q?

Let's generate the private key.

USING SNAKE-OIL-CRYPTO

D4 passiveSSL Collection

Leveraging OpenPGP metedata

Checking for weak crypto

IoT devices are often the weakest devices on a network:

- Usually the result of cheap engineering,
- sloppy patching cycles,
- sometimes forgotten-not monitored,
- few hardening features enabled.

We feel a bit safer when they use TLS, but should we?

Keep a log of links between:

- x509 certificates,
- ports,
- IP address,
- client (ja3),
- server (ja3s),

"JA3 is a method for creating SSL/TLS client fingerprints that should be easy to produce on any platform and can be easily shared for threat intelligence."⁸

Pivot on additional data points during Incident Response

⁸https://github.com/salesforce/ja3

Collect and **store** x509 certificates and TLS sessions:

- Public keys type and size,
- moduli and public exponents,
- curves parameters.
- Detect anti patterns in crypto:
 - Moduli that share one prime factor,
 - Moduli that share both prime factors, or private exponents,
 - Small factors,
 - Nonces reuse / common preffix or suffix, etc.

Focus on low hanging fruits that appeal to attackers

Researchers have shown that several devices generated their keypairs at boot time without enough entropy⁹:

```
prng.seed(seed)
p = prng.generate_random_prime()
// prng.add_entropy()
q = prng.generate_random_prime()
n = p*q
```

Given n=pq and n' = pq' it is trivial to recover the shared p by computing their **Greatest Common Divisor (GCD)**, and therefore **both private keys**¹⁰.

⁹Bernstein, Heninger, and Lange: http://facthacks.cr.yp.to/ ¹⁰http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/rsa/

In Snake-Oil-Crypto we compute GCD¹¹ between:

- between certificates having the same issuer,
- between certificates having the same subject,
- on keys collected from various sources (PassiveSSL, Certificate Transparency, shodan, censys, etc.),

"Check all the keys that we know of for vendor X"

¹¹using Bernstein's Batch GCD algorithm

SNAKE OIL CRYPTO - MISP FEED

2019-11-08	Referenced Referenced uses Obje uses Obje uses Obje uses Obje uses Obje		
2019-11-08	Other	p: text	12732045980491482532629620809854872609730718866846479950748763 99251101386987265586481573653124576541684265313376164608426942 4192867704218331356123978614869
2019-11-08	Other	q: text	None
2019-11-08	Other	rsa-modulus-size: text	1024
2019-11-08	Other	type: text	RSA

The MISP feed:

- Allows for checking automatic checking by an IDS on hashed values,
- **contains** thousands on broken keys from a dozen of vendors,
- will be accessible upon request (info@circl.lu).

In the future:

- Automatic the vendor checks by performing TF-IDF on x509's subjects,
- **automatic** vendors notification.

- ✓ sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting ¹²: Extracts and fingerprints certificates, and computes TLSH fuzzy hash.
- ✓ analyzer-d4-passivessl ¹³: Stores Certificates / PK details in a PostgreSQL DB.
- snake-oil-crypto ¹⁴: Performs crypto checks, push results in MISP for notification
- lookup-d4-passivessl¹⁵: Exposes the DB through a public REST API.

¹²github.com/D4-project/sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting ¹³github.com/D4-project/analyzer-d4-passivessl ¹⁴github.com/D4-project/snake-oil-crypto ¹⁵github.com/D4-project/lookup-d4-passivessl

GET IN TOUCH IF YOU WANT TO JOIN/SUPPORT THE PROJECT, HOST A PASSIVE SSL SENSOR OR CONTRIBUTE

- Collaboration can include research partnership, sharing of collected streams or improving the software.
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- https://github.com/D4-Projecthttps://twitter.com/d4_project

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