

Mind your Ps and Qs:

Performing crypto sanity checks with D4.

Team CIRCL

<https://www.d4-project.org/>

November 12, 2019

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- CSIRTs (or private organisations) build their **own honeypot, honeynet or blackhole monitoring network**
- Designing, managing and operating such infrastructure is a tedious and resource intensive task
- **Automatic sharing** between monitoring networks from different organisations is missing
- Sensors and processing are often seen as blackbox or difficult to audit

- Based on our experience with MISP¹ where sharing played an important role, we transpose the model in D4 project
- Keeping the protocol and code base **simple and minimal**
- Allowing every organisation to **control and audit their own sensor network**
- Extending D4 or **encapsulating legacy monitoring protocols** must be as simple as possible
- Ensuring that the sensor server has **no control on the sensor** (unidirectional streaming)
- Don't force users to use dedicated sensors and allow **flexibility of sensor support** (software, hardware, virtual)


¹<https://github.com/MISP/MISP>

- D4 Project (co-funded under INEA CEF EU program) started - **1st November 2018**
- D4 encapsulation protocol version 1 published - **1st December 2018**
- vo.1 release of the D4 core² including a server and simple D4 C client - **21st January 2019**
- First version of a golang D4 client³ running on ARM, MIPS, PPC and x86 - **14th February 2019**

²<https://www.github.com/D4-project/d4-core>

³<https://www.github.com/D4-project/d4-goclient/>

D4 - OVERVIEW



IoT devices **are often the weakest devices** on a network:

- Usually the result of cheap engineering,
- sloppy patching cycles,
- sometimes forgotten—not monitored,
- few hardening features enabled,

We feel a bit safer when they use TLS, but should we?

Keep a log of links between:

- x509 certificates,
- ports,
- IP address,
- client (ja3),
- server (ja3s),

“JA3 is a method for creating SSL/TLS client fingerprints that should be easy to produce on any platform and can be easily shared for threat intelligence.”⁴

Pivot on additional data points during Incident Response

⁴<https://github.com/salesforce/ja3>

Collect and **store** x509 certificates and TLS sessions:

- Public keys type and size,
- moduli and public exponents,
- curves parameters.

Detect anti patterns in crypto:

- Moduli that share one prime factor,
- Moduli that share both prime factors, or private exponents,
- Small factors,
- Nonces reuse / common prefix or suffix, etc.

Researchers have shown that several devices generated their public keys at boot time without enough entropy⁵:

```
prng.seed(seed)
p = prng.generate_random_prime()
// prng.add_entropy()
q = prng.generate_random_prime()
n = p*q
```

Given $n=pq$ and $n' = pq'$ it is trivial to recover the shared p by computing their Greatest Common Divisor (GCD), and therefore both private keys⁶.

⁵Bernstein, Heninger, and Lange: <http://facthacks.cr.yp.to/>

⁶<http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/rsa/>

In Snake-Oil-Crypto we compute GCD⁷ between:

- between certificates having the same issuer,
- between certificates having the same subject,
- on keys from various sources (PassiveSSL, Certificate Transparency, shodan, censys, etc.),


“Check all the keys that we know of for vendor X”


⁷using Bernstein's Batch GCD algorithm

SNAKE OIL CRYPTO - MISP FEED

2019-11-08

Name: crypto-material 

References: 0 

Referenced by: 6 

uses Object 13800 (network: x509)

uses Object 13801 (network: x509)

uses Object 13802 (network: x509)

uses Object 13803 (network: x509)

uses Object 13804 (network: x509)

uses Object 13805 (network: x509)

<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	p: text	12732045980491482532629620809854872609730718866846479950748763 99251101386987265586481573653124576541684265313376164608426942 4192867704218331356123978614869
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	q: text	None
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	rsa-modulus-size: text	1024
<input type="checkbox"/>	2019-11-08	Other	type: text	RSA

The MISP feed

- **Allows** for checking automatic checking by an IDS on hashed values,
- **contains** thousands on broken keys from a dozen of vendors,
- **will be accessible upon request (info@circl.lu).**

In the future:

- **Automatic** the vendor checks by performing TF-IDF on x509's subjects,
- **automatic** vendors notification.

- ✓ sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting ⁸: **Extracts** and **fingerprints** certificates, and **computes** TLSH fuzzy hash.
- ✓ analyzer-d4-passivessl ⁹: **Stores** Certificates / PK details in a PostgreSQL DB.
- snake-oil-crypto ¹⁰: **Performs** crypto checks, push results in MISP for notification
- lookup-d4-passivessl ¹¹: **Exposes** the DB through a public REST API.

⁸github.com/D4-project/sensor-d4-tls-fingerprinting

⁹github.com/D4-project/analyzer-d4-passivessl

¹⁰github.com/D4-project/snake-oil-crypto

¹¹github.com/D4-project/lookup-d4-passivessl

- **Manage** your own sensors and servers, **find** shameful bugs and **fill** in github issues
- Even better, **send** Pull Requests!
- **Share** data to public servers to improve the datasets (and detection, response, etc.)
- **Feed** your MISP instances with D4's findings - **Share** yours
- **Leech** data, **write** your own analyzers, **do** research

GET IN TOUCH IF YOU WANT TO JOIN THE PROJECT, HOST A SENSOR OR CONTRIBUTE

- Collaboration can include research partnership, sharing of collected streams or improving the software.
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- <https://github.com/D4-Project>
- https://twitter.com/d4_project
- <https://d4-project.org>
 - ▶ Passive DNS tutorial
 - ▶ Data sharing tutorial