mirror of https://github.com/MISP/PyMISP
1494 lines
96 KiB
JSON
1494 lines
96 KiB
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"message": "bgpd/security: Fix double free of unknown attribute\n\nSecurity issue: Quagga-2018-1114\nSee: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt\n\nIt is possible for bgpd to double-free an unknown attribute. This can happen\nvia bgp_update_receive receiving an UPDATE with an invalid unknown attribute.\nbgp_update_receive then will call bgp_attr_unintern_sub and bgp_attr_flush,\nand the latter may try free an already freed unknown attr.\n\n* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (transit_unintern) Take a pointer to the caller's storage\n for the (struct transit *), so that transit_unintern can NULL out the\n caller's reference if the (struct transit) is freed.\n (cluster_unintern) By inspection, appears to have a similar issue.\n (bgp_attr_unintern_sub) adjust for above.\n",
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