Add multi-version support to the filesystem datastore.

Factored out the _is_marking() function from the memory datastore
module to utils so it can be reused, and changed both filesystem
and memory datastore modules to import and use it.
master
Michael Chisholm 2018-10-25 21:03:27 -04:00
parent 7cc7431cb7
commit 0096835cfc
31 changed files with 1270 additions and 459 deletions

View File

@ -3,13 +3,367 @@ Python STIX 2.0 FileSystem Source/Sink
"""
import errno
import json
import os
import stat
import six
from stix2.base import _STIXBase
from stix2.core import Bundle, parse
from stix2.datastore import DataSink, DataSource, DataStoreMixin
from stix2.datastore.filters import Filter, FilterSet, apply_common_filters
from stix2.utils import deduplicate, get_class_hierarchy_names
from stix2.utils import deduplicate, is_marking
def _timestamp2filename(timestamp):
"""
Encapsulates a way to create unique filenames based on an object's
"modified" property value. This should not include an extension.
:param timestamp: A timestamp, as a datetime.datetime object.
"""
# Different times will only produce different file names if all timestamps
# are in the same time zone! (Should I convert to UTC just to be safe?)
return timestamp.strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M%S%f")
def _type_from_id(id_):
"""Extract the type from a STIX identifier"""
dd_idx = id_.find("--")
if dd_idx == -1:
raise Exception(
"Invalid ID: {}. Must have format <type>--<uuid>.".format(id_)
)
return id_[:dd_idx]
class AuthSet(object):
"""
Represents either a whitelist or blacklist of values, where/what we
must/must not search to find objects which match a query. (Maybe "AuthSet"
isn't the right name, but determining authorization is a typical context in
which black/white lists are used.)
The set may be empty. For a whitelist, this means you mustn't search
anywhere, which means the query was impossible to match, so you can skip
searching altogether. For a blacklist, this means nothing is excluded
and you must search everywhere.
"""
BLACK = 0
WHITE = 1
def __init__(self, allowed, prohibited):
"""
Initialize this AuthSet from the given sets of allowed and/or
prohibited values. The type of set (black or white) is determined
from the allowed and/or prohibited values given.
:param allowed: A set of allowed values (or None if no allow filters
were found in the query)
:param prohibited: A set of prohibited values (not None)
"""
if allowed is None:
self.__values = prohibited
self.__type = AuthSet.BLACK
else:
# There was at least one allow filter, so create a whitelist. But
# any matching prohibited values create a combination of conditions
# which can never match. So exclude those.
self.__values = allowed - prohibited
self.__type = AuthSet.WHITE
@property
def values(self):
"""
Get the values in this white/blacklist, as a set.
"""
return self.__values
@property
def auth_type(self):
"""
Get the type of set: AuthSet.WHITE or AuthSet.BLACK.
"""
return self.__type
def __repr__(self):
return "{}list: {}".format(
"white" if self.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE else "black",
self.values
)
# A fixed, reusable AuthSet which accepts anything. It came in handy.
_AUTHSET_ANY = AuthSet(None, set())
def _update_allow(allow_set, value):
"""
Updates the given set of "allow" values. The first time an update to the
set occurs, the value(s) are added. Thereafter, since all filters are
implicitly AND'd, the given values are intersected with the existing allow
set, which may remove values. At the end, it may even wind up empty.
:param allow_set: The allow set, or None
:param value: The value(s) to add (single value, or iterable of values)
:return: The updated allow set (not None)
"""
adding_seq = hasattr(value, "__iter__") and \
not isinstance(value, six.string_types)
if allow_set is None:
allow_set = set()
if adding_seq:
allow_set.update(value)
else:
allow_set.add(value)
else:
# strangely, the "&=" operator requires a set on the RHS
# whereas the method allows any iterable.
if adding_seq:
allow_set.intersection_update(value)
else:
allow_set.intersection_update({value})
return allow_set
def _find_search_optimizations(filters):
"""
Searches through all the filters, and creates white/blacklists of types and
IDs, which can be used to optimize the filesystem search.
:param filters: An iterable of filter objects representing a query
:return: A 2-tuple of AuthSet objects: the first is for object types, and
the second is for object IDs.
"""
# The basic approach to this is to determine what is allowed and
# prohibited, independently, and then combine them to create the final
# white/blacklists.
allowed_types = allowed_ids = None
prohibited_types = set()
prohibited_ids = set()
for filter_ in filters:
if filter_.property == "type":
if filter_.op in ("=", "in"):
allowed_types = _update_allow(allowed_types, filter_.value)
elif filter_.op == "!=":
prohibited_types.add(filter_.value)
elif filter_.property == "id":
if filter_.op == "=":
# An "allow" ID filter implies a type filter too, since IDs
# contain types within them.
allowed_ids = _update_allow(allowed_ids, filter_.value)
allowed_types = _update_allow(allowed_types,
_type_from_id(filter_.value))
elif filter_.op == "!=":
prohibited_ids.add(filter_.value)
elif filter_.op == "in":
allowed_ids = _update_allow(allowed_ids, filter_.value)
allowed_types = _update_allow(allowed_types, (
_type_from_id(id_) for id_ in filter_.value
))
opt_types = AuthSet(allowed_types, prohibited_types)
opt_ids = AuthSet(allowed_ids, prohibited_ids)
# If we have both type and ID whitelists, perform a type-based intersection
# on them, to further optimize. (Some of the cross-property constraints
# occur above; this is essentially a second pass which operates on the
# final whitelists, which among other things, incorporates any of the
# prohibitions found above.)
if opt_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE and \
opt_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE:
opt_types.values.intersection_update(
_type_from_id(id_) for id_ in opt_ids.values
)
opt_ids.values.intersection_update(
id_ for id_ in opt_ids.values
if _type_from_id(id_) in opt_types.values
)
return opt_types, opt_ids
def _get_matching_dir_entries(parent_dir, auth_set, st_mode_test=None, ext=""):
"""
Search a directory (non-recursively), and find entries which match the
given criteria.
:param parent_dir: The directory to search
:param auth_set: an AuthSet instance, which represents a black/whitelist
filter on filenames
:param st_mode_test: A callable allowing filtering based on the type of
directory entry. E.g. just get directories, or just get files. It
will be passed the st_mode field of a stat() structure and should
return True to include the file, or False to exclude it. Easy thing to
do is pass one of the stat module functions, e.g. stat.S_ISREG. If
None, don't filter based on entry type.
:param ext: Determines how names from auth_set match up to directory
entries, and allows filtering by extension. The extension is added
to auth_set values to obtain directory entries; it is removed from
directory entries to obtain auth_set values. In this way, auth_set
may be treated as having only "basenames" of the entries. Only entries
having the given extension will be included in the results. If not
empty, the extension MUST include a leading ".". The default is the
empty string, which will result in direct comparisons, and no
extension-based filtering.
:return: A list of directory entries matching the criteria. These will not
have any path info included; they will just be bare names.
:raises OSError: If there are errors accessing directory contents or
stat()'ing files
"""
results = []
if auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE:
for value in auth_set.values:
try:
filename = value + ext
s = os.stat(os.path.join(parent_dir, filename))
if not st_mode_test or st_mode_test(s.st_mode):
results.append(filename)
except OSError as e:
if e.errno != errno.ENOENT:
raise e
# else, file-not-found is ok, just skip
else: # auth_set is a blacklist
for entry in os.listdir(parent_dir):
if ext:
auth_name, this_ext = os.path.splitext(entry)
if this_ext != ext:
continue
else:
auth_name = entry
if auth_name in auth_set.values:
continue
try:
s = os.stat(os.path.join(parent_dir, entry))
if not st_mode_test or st_mode_test(s.st_mode):
results.append(entry)
except OSError as e:
if e.errno != errno.ENOENT:
raise e
# else, file-not-found is ok, just skip
return results
def _check_object_from_file(query, filepath):
"""
Read a STIX object from the given file, and check it against the given
filters.
:param query: Iterable of filters
:param filepath: Path to file to read
:return: The STIX object, as a dict, if the object passes the filters. If
not, None is returned.
:raises TypeError: If the file had invalid content
:raises IOError: If there are problems opening/reading the file
"""
try:
with open(filepath, "r") as f:
stix_obj = json.load(f)
if stix_obj["type"] == "bundle":
stix_obj = stix_obj["objects"][0]
# naive STIX type checking
stix_obj["type"]
stix_obj["id"]
except (ValueError, KeyError): # likely not a JSON file
raise TypeError(
"STIX JSON object at '{0}' could either not be parsed "
"to JSON or was not valid STIX JSON".format(
filepath))
# check against other filters, add if match
result = next(apply_common_filters([stix_obj], query), None)
return result
def _search_versioned(query, type_path, auth_ids):
"""
Searches the given directory, which contains data for STIX objects of a
particular versioned type (i.e. not markings), and return any which match
the query.
:param query: The query to match against
:param type_path: The directory with type-specific STIX object files
:param auth_ids: Search optimization based on object ID
:return: A list of all matching objects
:raises TypeError: If any objects had invalid content
:raises IOError, OSError: If there were any problems opening/reading files
"""
results = []
id_dirs = _get_matching_dir_entries(type_path, auth_ids,
stat.S_ISDIR)
for id_dir in id_dirs:
id_path = os.path.join(type_path, id_dir)
# This leverages a more sophisticated function to do a simple thing:
# get all the JSON files from a directory. I guess it does give us
# file type checking, ensuring we only get regular files.
version_files = _get_matching_dir_entries(id_path, _AUTHSET_ANY,
stat.S_ISREG, ".json")
for version_file in version_files:
version_path = os.path.join(id_path, version_file)
try:
stix_obj = _check_object_from_file(query, version_path)
if stix_obj:
results.append(stix_obj)
except IOError as e:
if e.errno != errno.ENOENT:
raise e
# else, file-not-found is ok, just skip
return results
def _search_markings(query, markings_path, auth_ids):
"""
Searches the given directory, which contains markings data, and return any
which match the query.
:param query: The query to match against
:param markings_path: The directory with STIX markings files
:param auth_ids: Search optimization based on object ID
:return: A list of all matching objects
:raises TypeError: If any objects had invalid content
:raises IOError: If there were any problems opening/reading files
"""
results = []
id_files = _get_matching_dir_entries(markings_path, auth_ids, stat.S_ISREG,
".json")
for id_file in id_files:
id_path = os.path.join(markings_path, id_file)
try:
stix_obj = _check_object_from_file(query, id_path)
if stix_obj:
results.append(stix_obj)
except IOError as e:
if e.errno != errno.ENOENT:
raise e
# else, file-not-found is ok, just skip
return results
class FileSystemStore(DataStoreMixin):
@ -77,15 +431,23 @@ class FileSystemSink(DataSink):
def _check_path_and_write(self, stix_obj):
"""Write the given STIX object to a file in the STIX file directory.
"""
path = os.path.join(self._stix_dir, stix_obj["type"], stix_obj["id"] + ".json")
type_dir = os.path.join(self._stix_dir, stix_obj["type"])
if is_marking(stix_obj):
filename = stix_obj.id
obj_dir = type_dir
else:
filename = _timestamp2filename(stix_obj.modified)
obj_dir = os.path.join(type_dir, stix_obj["id"])
if not os.path.exists(os.path.dirname(path)):
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path))
file_path = os.path.join(obj_dir, filename + ".json")
if not os.path.exists(obj_dir):
os.makedirs(obj_dir)
if self.bundlify:
stix_obj = Bundle(stix_obj, allow_custom=self.allow_custom)
with open(path, "w") as f:
with open(file_path, "w") as f:
f.write(str(stix_obj))
def add(self, stix_data=None, version=None):
@ -104,25 +466,18 @@ class FileSystemSink(DataSink):
the Bundle contained, but not the Bundle itself.
"""
if any(x in ('STIXDomainObject', 'STIXRelationshipObject', 'MarkingDefinition')
for x in get_class_hierarchy_names(stix_data)):
if isinstance(stix_data, Bundle):
# recursively add individual STIX objects
for stix_obj in stix_data.get("objects", []):
self.add(stix_obj, version=version)
elif isinstance(stix_data, _STIXBase):
# adding python STIX object
self._check_path_and_write(stix_data)
elif isinstance(stix_data, (str, dict)):
stix_data = parse(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version)
if stix_data["type"] == "bundle":
# extract STIX objects
for stix_obj in stix_data.get("objects", []):
self.add(stix_obj, version=version)
else:
# adding json-formatted STIX
self._check_path_and_write(stix_data,)
elif isinstance(stix_data, Bundle):
# recursively add individual STIX objects
for stix_obj in stix_data.get("objects", []):
self.add(stix_obj, version=version)
self.add(stix_data, version=version)
elif isinstance(stix_data, list):
# recursively add individual STIX objects
@ -176,9 +531,7 @@ class FileSystemSource(DataSource):
a python STIX object and then returned
"""
query = [Filter("id", "=", stix_id)]
all_data = self.query(query=query, version=version, _composite_filters=_composite_filters)
all_data = self.all_versions(stix_id, version=version, _composite_filters=_composite_filters)
if all_data:
stix_obj = sorted(all_data, key=lambda k: k['modified'])[0]
@ -206,9 +559,10 @@ class FileSystemSource(DataSource):
a python STIX objects and then returned
"""
return [self.get(stix_id=stix_id, version=version, _composite_filters=_composite_filters)]
query = [Filter("id", "=", stix_id)]
return self.query(query, version=version, _composite_filters=_composite_filters)
def query(self, query=None, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
def query2(self, query=None, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
"""Search and retrieve STIX objects based on the complete query.
A "complete query" includes the filters from the query, the filters
@ -341,3 +695,57 @@ class FileSystemSource(DataSource):
if filter_.property == "id" or filter_.property == "type":
file_filters.append(filter_)
return file_filters
def query(self, query=None, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
"""Search and retrieve STIX objects based on the complete query.
A "complete query" includes the filters from the query, the filters
attached to this FileSystemSource, and any filters passed from a
CompositeDataSource (i.e. _composite_filters).
Args:
query (list): list of filters to search on
_composite_filters (FilterSet): collection of filters passed from the
CompositeDataSource, not user supplied
version (str): Which STIX2 version to use. (e.g. "2.0", "2.1"). If
None, use latest version.
Returns:
(list): list of STIX objects that matches the supplied
query. The STIX objects are loaded from their json files,
parsed into a python STIX objects and then returned.
"""
all_data = []
query = FilterSet(query)
# combine all query filters
if self.filters:
query.add(self.filters)
if _composite_filters:
query.add(_composite_filters)
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(query)
type_dirs = _get_matching_dir_entries(self._stix_dir, auth_types,
stat.S_ISDIR)
for type_dir in type_dirs:
type_path = os.path.join(self._stix_dir, type_dir)
if type_dir == "marking-definition":
type_results = _search_markings(query, type_path, auth_ids)
else:
type_results = _search_versioned(query, type_path, auth_ids)
all_data.extend(type_results)
# parse python STIX objects from the STIX object dicts
stix_objs = [
parse(stix_obj_dict, allow_custom=self.allow_custom,
version=version)
for stix_obj_dict in all_data
]
return stix_objs

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from stix2.base import _STIXBase
from stix2.core import Bundle, parse
from stix2.datastore import DataSink, DataSource, DataStoreMixin
from stix2.datastore.filters import FilterSet, apply_common_filters
from stix2.utils import is_marking
def _add(store, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None):
@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ def _add(store, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None):
# Map ID directly to the object, if it is a marking. Otherwise,
# map to a family, so we can track multiple versions.
if _is_marking(stix_obj):
if is_marking(stix_obj):
store._data[stix_obj["id"]] = stix_obj
else:
@ -56,22 +57,6 @@ def _add(store, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None):
obj_family.add(stix_obj)
def _is_marking(obj_or_id):
"""Determines whether the given object or object ID is/is for a marking
definition.
:param obj_or_id: A STIX object or object ID as a string.
:return: True if a marking definition, False otherwise.
"""
if isinstance(obj_or_id, (_STIXBase, dict)):
id_ = obj_or_id["id"]
else:
id_ = obj_or_id
return id_.startswith("marking-definition--")
class _ObjectFamily(object):
"""
An internal implementation detail of memory sources/sinks/stores.
@ -255,7 +240,7 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
"""
stix_obj = None
if _is_marking(stix_id):
if is_marking(stix_id):
stix_obj = self._data.get(stix_id)
else:
object_family = self._data.get(stix_id)
@ -291,7 +276,7 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
"""
results = []
stix_objs_to_filter = None
if _is_marking(stix_id):
if is_marking(stix_id):
stix_obj = self._data.get(stix_id)
if stix_obj:
stix_objs_to_filter = [stix_obj]

View File

@ -1,42 +1,42 @@
{
"id": "bundle--f68640b4-0cdc-42ae-b176-def1754a1ea0",
"id": "bundle--f68640b4-0cdc-42ae-b176-def1754a1ea0",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Legitimate Credentials in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Legitimate Credentials in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003"
},
},
{
"description": "Delpy, B. (2014, September 14). Mimikatz module ~ sekurlsa. Retrieved January 10, 2016.",
"source_name": "Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa",
"description": "Delpy, B. (2014, September 14). Mimikatz module ~ sekurlsa. Retrieved January 10, 2016.",
"source_name": "Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa"
},
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
],
"id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"name": "Credential Dumping",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"name": "Credential Dumping",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}
}

View File

@ -1,37 +1,37 @@
{
"id": "bundle--b07d6fd6-7cc5-492d-a1eb-9ba956b329d5",
"id": "bundle--b07d6fd6-7cc5-492d-a1eb-9ba956b329d5",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the Basic Input/Output System.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the Basic Input/Output System.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014"
},
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
}
],
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],
"id": "attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
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{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"name": "Rootkit",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"name": "Rootkit",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
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View File

@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
{
"id": "bundle--1a854c96-639e-4771-befb-e7b960a65974",
"id": "bundle--1a854c96-639e-4771-befb-e7b960a65974",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1020",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1020",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
],
"id": "attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"name": "Automated Exfiltration",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"name": "Automated Exfiltration",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
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"type": "bundle"
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View File

@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
{
"id": "bundle--33e3e33a-38b8-4a37-9455-5b8c82d3b10a",
"id": "bundle--33e3e33a-38b8-4a37-9455-5b8c82d3b10a",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system.\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system.\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1049",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1049",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
],
"id": "attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"name": "Local Network Connections Discovery",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"name": "Local Network Connections Discovery",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
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"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}
}

View File

@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
{
"id": "bundle--a87938c5-cc1e-4e06-a8a3-b10243ae397d",
"id": "bundle--a87938c5-cc1e-4e06-a8a3-b10243ae397d",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
],
"id": "attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"name": "Data from Network Shared Drive",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"name": "Data from Network Shared Drive",
"object_marking_refs": [
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],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
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"type": "bundle"
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}

View File

@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
{
"id": "bundle--5ddaeff9-eca7-4094-9e65-4f53da21a444",
"id": "bundle--5ddaeff9-eca7-4094-9e65-4f53da21a444",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662702Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662702Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1027",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "T1027",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
],
"id": "attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662702Z",
"name": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662702Z",
"name": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}
}

View File

@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
{
"id": "bundle--a42d26fe-c938-4074-a1b3-50d852e6f0bd",
"id": "bundle--a42d26fe-c938-4074-a1b3-50d852e6f0bd",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.495974Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
"id": "course-of-action--95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.495974Z",
"name": "Rootkit Mitigation",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.495974Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
"id": "course-of-action--95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.495974Z",
"name": "Rootkit Mitigation",
"type": "course-of-action"
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],
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
{
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"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
"id": "course-of-action--d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022744Z",
"name": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022744Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
"id": "course-of-action--d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022744Z",
"name": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation",
"type": "course-of-action"
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@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
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"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-06-01T00:00:00Z",
"id": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
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"modified": "2017-06-01T00:00:00Z",
"name": "The MITRE Corporation",
"type": "identity"
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{
"id": "bundle--81884287-2548-47fc-a997-39489ddd5462",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-06-01T00:00:00Z",
"id": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"identity_class": "organization",
"modified": "2017-06-01T00:00:00Z",
"name": "The MITRE Corporation",
"type": "identity"
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View File

@ -1,54 +1,54 @@
{
"id": "bundle--7790ee4c-2d57-419a-bc9d-8805b5bb4118",
"id": "bundle--7790ee4c-2d57-419a-bc9d-8805b5bb4118",
"objects": [
{
"aliases": [
"Deep Panda",
"Shell Crew",
"WebMasters",
"KungFu Kittens",
"PinkPanther",
"Deep Panda",
"Shell Crew",
"WebMasters",
"KungFu Kittens",
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"Black Vine"
],
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:49.412497Z",
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"description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
],
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:49.412497Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "G0009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "G0009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009"
},
},
{
"description": "Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"source_name": "Alperovitch 2014",
"description": "Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"source_name": "Alperovitch 2014",
"url": "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/"
},
},
{
"description": "DiMaggio, J.. (2015, August 6). The Black Vine cyberespionage group. Retrieved January 26, 2016.",
"source_name": "Symantec Black Vine",
"description": "DiMaggio, J.. (2015, August 6). The Black Vine cyberespionage group. Retrieved January 26, 2016.",
"source_name": "Symantec Black Vine",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
},
},
{
"description": "RSA Incident Response. (2014, January). RSA Incident Response Emerging Threat Profile: Shell Crew. Retrieved January 14, 2016.",
"source_name": "RSA Shell Crew",
"description": "RSA Incident Response. (2014, January). RSA Incident Response Emerging Threat Profile: Shell Crew. Retrieved January 14, 2016.",
"source_name": "RSA Shell Crew",
"url": "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf"
},
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.",
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Anthem",
"description": "ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.",
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Anthem",
"url": "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
}
],
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"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:49.412497Z",
"name": "Deep Panda",
],
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"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:49.412497Z",
"name": "Deep Panda",
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],
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View File

@ -1,44 +1,44 @@
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"id": "bundle--96a6ea7a-fcff-4aab-925b-a494bcdf0480",
"objects": [
{
"aliases": [
"DragonOK"
],
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"id": "relationship--592d0c31-e61f-495e-a60e-70d7be59a719",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.021562Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
],
"relationship_type": "mitigates",
"source_ref": "course-of-action--d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"target_ref": "attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
"type": "relationship"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
{
"id": "bundle--15167b24-4cee-4c96-a140-32a6c37df4b4",
"id": "bundle--15167b24-4cee-4c96-a140-32a6c37df4b4",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.044387Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"id": "relationship--70dc6b5c-c524-429e-a6ab-0dd40f0482c1",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.044387Z",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.044387Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"id": "relationship--70dc6b5c-c524-429e-a6ab-0dd40f0482c1",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.044387Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064",
"target_ref": "malware--96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
],
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064",
"target_ref": "malware--96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
"type": "relationship"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
{
"id": "bundle--ff845dca-7036-416f-aae0-95030994c49f",
"id": "bundle--ff845dca-7036-416f-aae0-95030994c49f",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.051532Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"id": "relationship--8797579b-e3be-4209-a71b-255a4d08243d",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.051532Z",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.051532Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"id": "relationship--8797579b-e3be-4209-a71b-255a4d08243d",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.051532Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a",
"target_ref": "malware--b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b",
],
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a",
"target_ref": "malware--b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b",
"type": "relationship"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,39 +1,39 @@
{
"id": "bundle--d8826afc-1561-4362-a4e3-05a4c2c3ac3c",
"id": "bundle--d8826afc-1561-4362-a4e3-05a4c2c3ac3c",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "S0039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "S0039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039"
},
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2006, October 18). Net.exe Utility. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Microsoft Net Utility",
"description": "Microsoft. (2006, October 18). Net.exe Utility. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Microsoft Net Utility",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914"
},
},
{
"description": "Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Savill 1999",
"description": "Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Savill 1999",
"url": "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
}
],
"id": "tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23",
],
"id": "tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23",
"labels": [
"tool"
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"name": "Net",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"name": "Net",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "tool"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}
}

View File

@ -1,34 +1,34 @@
{
"id": "bundle--7dbde18f-6f14-4bf0-8389-505c89d6d5a6",
"id": "bundle--7dbde18f-6f14-4bf0-8389-505c89d6d5a6",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "S0005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"external_id": "S0005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005"
},
},
{
"description": "Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015.",
"source_name": "Amplia WCE",
"description": "Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015.",
"source_name": "Amplia WCE",
"url": "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html"
}
],
"id": "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966",
],
"id": "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966",
"labels": [
"tool"
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"name": "Windows Credential Editor",
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"name": "Windows Credential Editor",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
],
"type": "tool"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}
}

View File

@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
import errno
import json
import os
import shutil
import stat
import pytest
from stix2 import (Bundle, Campaign, CustomObject, FileSystemSink,
FileSystemSource, FileSystemStore, Filter, Identity,
Indicator, Malware, Relationship, properties)
Indicator, Malware, Relationship, parse, properties)
from stix2.datastore.filesystem import (AuthSet, _find_search_optimizations,
_get_matching_dir_entries,
_timestamp2filename)
from stix2.test.constants import (CAMPAIGN_ID, CAMPAIGN_KWARGS, IDENTITY_ID,
IDENTITY_KWARGS, INDICATOR_ID,
INDICATOR_KWARGS, MALWARE_ID, MALWARE_KWARGS,
@ -97,7 +102,20 @@ def rel_fs_store():
yield fs
for o in stix_objs:
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, o.type, o.id + '.json'))
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, o.type, o.id,
_timestamp2filename(o.modified) + '.json')
# Some test-scoped fixtures (e.g. fs_store) delete all campaigns, so by
# the time this module-scoped fixture tears itself down, it may find
# its campaigns already gone, which causes not-found errors.
try:
os.remove(filepath)
except OSError as e:
# 3 is the ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND windows error code. Which has an
# errno symbolic value, but not the windows meaning...
if e.errno in (errno.ENOENT, 3):
continue
raise e
def test_filesystem_source_nonexistent_folder():
@ -182,14 +200,16 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_python_stix_object(fs_sink, fs_source):
fs_sink.add(camp1)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id + ".json"))
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1.modified) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp1_r = fs_source.get(camp1.id)
assert camp1_r.id == camp1.id
assert camp1_r.name == "Hannibal"
assert "War Elephant" in camp1_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_object_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -200,19 +220,30 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_object_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
"objective": "German and French Intelligence Services",
"aliases": ["Purple Robes"],
"id": "campaign--8e2e2d2b-17d4-4cbf-938f-98ee46b3cd3f",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
fs_sink.add(camp2)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2["id"] + ".json"))
# Need to get the exact "modified" timestamp which would have been
# in effect at the time the object was saved to the sink, which determines
# the filename it would have been saved as. It may not be exactly the same
# as what's in the dict, since the parsing process can enforce a precision
# constraint (e.g. truncate to milliseconds), which results in a slightly
# different name.
camp2obj = parse(camp2)
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2obj["id"],
_timestamp2filename(camp2obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp2_r = fs_source.get(camp2["id"])
assert camp2_r.id == camp2["id"]
assert camp2_r.name == camp2["name"]
assert "Purple Robes" in camp2_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_bundle_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -228,53 +259,74 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_bundle_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
"objective": "Bulgarian, Albanian and Romanian Intelligence Services",
"aliases": ["Huns"],
"id": "campaign--b8f86161-ccae-49de-973a-4ca320c62478",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
]
}
fs_sink.add(bund)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", bund["objects"][0]["id"] + ".json"))
camp_obj = parse(bund["objects"][0])
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp_obj["id"],
_timestamp2filename(camp_obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp3_r = fs_source.get(bund["objects"][0]["id"])
assert camp3_r.id == bund["objects"][0]["id"]
assert camp3_r.name == bund["objects"][0]["name"]
assert "Huns" in camp3_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp3_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_json_stix_object(fs_sink, fs_source):
# add json-encoded stix obj
camp4 = '{"type": "campaign", "id":"campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d",'\
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z", "name": "Ghengis Khan", "objective": "China and Russian infrastructure"}'
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "modified":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "name": "Ghengis Khan", "objective": "China and Russian infrastructure"}'
fs_sink.add(camp4)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d" + ".json"))
camp4obj = parse(camp4)
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign",
"campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d",
_timestamp2filename(camp4obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp4_r = fs_source.get("campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d")
assert camp4_r.id == "campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d"
assert camp4_r.name == "Ghengis Khan"
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp4_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_json_stix_bundle(fs_sink, fs_source):
# add json-encoded stix bundle
bund2 = '{"type": "bundle", "id": "bundle--3d267103-8475-4d8f-b321-35ec6eccfa37",' \
' "spec_version": "2.0", "objects": [{"type": "campaign", "id": "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b",' \
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z", "name": "Spartacus", "objective": "Oppressive regimes of Africa and Middle East"}]}'
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "modified":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "name": "Spartacus", "objective": "Oppressive regimes of Africa and Middle East"}]}'
fs_sink.add(bund2)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b" + ".json"))
bund2obj = parse(bund2)
camp_obj = bund2obj["objects"][0]
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign",
"campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b",
_timestamp2filename(camp_obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp5_r = fs_source.get("campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b")
assert camp5_r.id == "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b"
assert camp5_r.name == "Spartacus"
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp5_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -289,13 +341,23 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
"objective": "Central and Eastern Europe military commands and departments",
"aliases": ["The Frenchmen"],
"id": "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
fs_sink.add([camp6, camp7])
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6.id + ".json"))
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a" + ".json"))
camp7obj = parse(camp7)
camp6filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp6["modified"]) +
".json")
camp7filepath = os.path.join(
FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a",
_timestamp2filename(camp7obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(camp6filepath)
assert os.path.exists(camp7filepath)
camp6_r = fs_source.get(camp6.id)
assert camp6_r.id == camp6.id
@ -306,8 +368,8 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
assert "The Frenchmen" in camp7_r.aliases
# remove all added objects
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp7_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(camp6filepath)
os.remove(camp7filepath)
def test_filesystem_store_get_stored_as_bundle(fs_store):
@ -375,8 +437,11 @@ def test_filesystem_store_add(fs_store):
assert camp1_r.id == camp1.id
assert camp1_r.name == camp1.name
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1_r.modified) + ".json")
# remove
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_store_add_as_bundle():
@ -387,7 +452,10 @@ def test_filesystem_store_add_as_bundle():
aliases=["Ragnar"])
fs_store.add(camp1)
with open(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id + ".json")) as bundle_file:
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1.modified) + ".json")
with open(filepath) as bundle_file:
assert '"type": "bundle"' in bundle_file.read()
camp1_r = fs_store.get(camp1.id)
@ -527,3 +595,334 @@ def test_related_to_by_target(rel_fs_store):
assert len(resp) == 2
assert any(x['id'] == CAMPAIGN_ID for x in resp)
assert any(x['id'] == INDICATOR_ID for x in resp)
def test_auth_set_white1():
auth_set = AuthSet({"A"}, set())
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_set.values == {"A"}
def test_auth_set_white2():
auth_set = AuthSet(set(), set())
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_set.values) == 0
def test_auth_set_white3():
auth_set = AuthSet({"A", "B"}, {"B", "C"})
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_set.values == {"A"}
def test_auth_set_black1():
auth_set = AuthSet(None, {"B", "C"})
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_set.values == {"B", "C"}
def test_optimize_types1():
filters = [
Filter("type", "=", "foo")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types2():
filters = [
Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
Filter("type", "=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types3():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
Filter("type", "in", ["B", "C", "D"])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B", "C"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types4():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
Filter("type", "in", ["D", "E", "F"])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types5():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
Filter("type", "!=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types6():
filters = [
Filter("type", "!=", "foo"),
Filter("type", "!=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_types.values == {"foo", "bar"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types7():
filters = [
Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
Filter("type", "!=", "foo")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types8():
filters = []
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types_ids1():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
Filter("id", "=", "foo--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"foo--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids2():
filters = [
Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
Filter("id", "=", "bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types_ids3():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
Filter("id", "!=", "bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo", "bar"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_ids.values == {"bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids4():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
Filter("id", "in", [
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B", "C"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
}
def test_optimize_types_ids5():
filters = [
Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
Filter("type", "!=", "C"),
Filter("id", "in", [
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
]),
Filter("id", "!=", "D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids6():
filters = [
Filter("id", "=", "A--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"A"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"A--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_search_auth_set_white1():
auth_set = AuthSet(
{"attack-pattern", "doesntexist"},
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
assert results == ["attack-pattern"]
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISREG)
assert len(results) == 0
def test_search_auth_set_white2():
auth_set = AuthSet(
{
"malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
"malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841"
},
{
"malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841",
"malware--96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
"doesntexist"
}
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "malware"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR
)
assert results == ["malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"]
def test_search_auth_set_white3():
auth_set = AuthSet({"20170531213258226477", "doesntexist"}, set())
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "malware",
"malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISREG, ".json"
)
assert results == ["20170531213258226477.json"]
def test_search_auth_set_black1():
auth_set = AuthSet(
None,
{"tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", "doesntexist"}
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "tool"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR
)
assert set(results) == {
"tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23"
}
def test_search_auth_set_white_empty():
auth_set = AuthSet(
set(),
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
assert len(results) == 0
def test_search_auth_set_black_empty(rel_fs_store):
# Ensure rel_fs_store fixture has run so that the type directories are
# predictable (it adds "campaign").
auth_set = AuthSet(
None,
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
# Should get all dirs
assert set(results) == {
"attack-pattern",
"campaign",
"course-of-action",
"identity",
"indicator",
"intrusion-set",
"malware",
"marking-definition",
"relationship",
"tool"
}

View File

@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import json
from dateutil import parser
import pytz
import stix2.base
from .exceptions import (InvalidValueError, RevokeError,
UnmodifiablePropertyError)
@ -364,3 +366,20 @@ def remove_custom_stix(stix_obj):
def get_type_from_id(stix_id):
return stix_id.split('--', 1)[0]
def is_marking(obj_or_id):
"""Determines whether the given object or object ID is/is for a marking
definition.
:param obj_or_id: A STIX object or object ID as a string.
:return: True if a marking definition, False otherwise.
"""
if isinstance(obj_or_id, (stix2.base._STIXBase, dict)):
result = obj_or_id["type"] == "marking-definition"
else:
# it's a string ID
result = obj_or_id.startswith("marking-definition--")
return result