Removed everything in test/v21/stix2_data/

Bring back optional version parameter to datastores. Update
documentation. Update v21 test suite
master
Emmanuelle Vargas-Gonzalez 2018-12-06 15:11:30 -05:00
parent 3d099bec91
commit bfa49ce37a
34 changed files with 593 additions and 893 deletions

View File

@ -110,15 +110,15 @@ class MemoryStore(DataStoreMixin):
sink (MemorySink): MemorySink
"""
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True):
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None):
self._data = {}
if stix_data:
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom)
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom, version)
super(MemoryStore, self).__init__(
source=MemorySource(stix_data=self._data, allow_custom=allow_custom, _store=True),
sink=MemorySink(stix_data=self._data, allow_custom=allow_custom, _store=True),
source=MemorySource(stix_data=self._data, allow_custom=allow_custom, version=version, _store=True),
sink=MemorySink(stix_data=self._data, allow_custom=allow_custom, version=version, _store=True),
)
def save_to_file(self, *args, **kwargs):
@ -161,13 +161,16 @@ class MemorySink(DataSink):
allow_custom (bool): whether to allow custom objects/properties
when exporting STIX content to file.
Default: True.
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
Attributes:
_data (dict): the in-memory dict that holds STIX objects.
If part of a MemoryStore, the dict is shared with a MemorySource
"""
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, _store=False):
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None, _store=False):
super(MemorySink, self).__init__()
self.allow_custom = allow_custom
@ -176,10 +179,10 @@ class MemorySink(DataSink):
else:
self._data = {}
if stix_data:
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom)
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom, version)
def add(self, stix_data):
_add(self, stix_data, self.allow_custom)
def add(self, stix_data, version=None):
_add(self, stix_data, self.allow_custom, version)
add.__doc__ = _add.__doc__
def save_to_file(self, path, encoding="utf-8"):
@ -230,13 +233,16 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
allow_custom (bool): whether to allow custom objects/properties
when importing STIX content from file.
Default: True.
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
Attributes:
_data (dict): the in-memory dict that holds STIX objects.
If part of a MemoryStore, the dict is shared with a MemorySink
"""
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, _store=False):
def __init__(self, stix_data=None, allow_custom=True, version=None, _store=False):
super(MemorySource, self).__init__()
self.allow_custom = allow_custom
@ -245,7 +251,7 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
else:
self._data = {}
if stix_data:
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom)
_add(self, stix_data, allow_custom, version)
def get(self, stix_id, _composite_filters=None):
"""Retrieve STIX object from in-memory dict via STIX ID.
@ -284,9 +290,6 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
"""Retrieve STIX objects from in-memory dict via STIX ID, all versions
of it.
Note: Since Memory sources/sinks don't handle multiple versions of a
STIX object, this operation is unnecessary. Translate call to get().
Args:
stix_id (str): The STIX ID of the STIX 2 object to retrieve.
_composite_filters (FilterSet): collection of filters passed from
@ -356,9 +359,9 @@ class MemorySource(DataSource):
return all_data
def load_from_file(self, file_path):
with open(os.path.abspath(file_path), "r") as f:
def load_from_file(self, file_path, version=None):
with io.open(os.path.abspath(file_path), "r") as f:
stix_data = json.load(f)
_add(self, stix_data, self.allow_custom)
_add(self, stix_data, self.allow_custom, version)
load_from_file.__doc__ = MemoryStore.load_from_file.__doc__

View File

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ class TAXIICollectionSink(DataSink):
self.allow_custom = allow_custom
def add(self, stix_data):
def add(self, stix_data, version=None):
"""Add/push STIX content to TAXII Collection endpoint
Args:
@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ class TAXIICollectionSink(DataSink):
content in a STIX object (or Bundle), STIX object dict (or
Bundle dict), or a STIX2 json encoded string, or list of
any of the following.
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
"""
if isinstance(stix_data, _STIXBase):
@ -103,7 +106,7 @@ class TAXIICollectionSink(DataSink):
elif isinstance(stix_data, dict):
# adding python dict (of either Bundle or STIX obj)
if stix_data['type'] == 'bundle':
bundle = parse(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom).serialize(encoding='utf-8', ensure_ascii=False)
bundle = parse(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version).serialize(encoding='utf-8', ensure_ascii=False)
elif 'spec_version' in stix_data:
# If the spec_version is present, use new Bundle object...
bundle = v21.Bundle(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom).serialize(encoding='utf-8', ensure_ascii=False)
@ -113,12 +116,12 @@ class TAXIICollectionSink(DataSink):
elif isinstance(stix_data, list):
# adding list of something - recurse on each
for obj in stix_data:
self.add(obj)
self.add(obj, version=version)
return
elif isinstance(stix_data, str):
# adding json encoded string of STIX content
stix_data = parse(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom)
stix_data = parse(stix_data, allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version)
if stix_data['type'] == 'bundle':
bundle = stix_data.serialize(encoding='utf-8', ensure_ascii=False)
elif 'spec_version' in stix_data:
@ -165,12 +168,15 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
self.allow_custom = allow_custom
def get(self, stix_id, _composite_filters=None):
def get(self, stix_id, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
"""Retrieve STIX object from local/remote STIX Collection
endpoint.
Args:
stix_id (str): The STIX ID of the STIX object to be retrieved.
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
_composite_filters (FilterSet): collection of filters passed from
the parent CompositeDataSource, not user supplied
@ -203,7 +209,7 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
raise DataSourceError("TAXII Collection resource returned error", e)
if len(stix_obj):
stix_obj = parse(stix_obj[0], allow_custom=self.allow_custom)
stix_obj = parse(stix_obj[0], allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version)
if stix_obj.id != stix_id:
# check - was added to handle erroneous TAXII servers
stix_obj = None
@ -212,12 +218,15 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
return stix_obj
def all_versions(self, stix_id, _composite_filters=None):
def all_versions(self, stix_id, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
"""Retrieve STIX object from local/remote TAXII Collection
endpoint, all versions of it
Args:
stix_id (str): The STIX ID of the STIX objects to be retrieved.
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
_composite_filters (FilterSet): collection of filters passed from the parent
CompositeDataSource, not user supplied
@ -234,14 +243,14 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
all_data = self.query(query=query, _composite_filters=_composite_filters)
# parse STIX objects from TAXII returned json
all_data = [parse(stix_obj, allow_custom=self.allow_custom) for stix_obj in all_data]
all_data = [parse(stix_obj, allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version) for stix_obj in all_data]
# check - was added to handle erroneous TAXII servers
all_data_clean = [stix_obj for stix_obj in all_data if stix_obj.id == stix_id]
return all_data_clean
def query(self, query=None, _composite_filters=None):
def query(self, query=None, version=None, _composite_filters=None):
"""Search and retreive STIX objects based on the complete query
A "complete query" includes the filters from the query, the filters
@ -250,6 +259,9 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
Args:
query (list): list of filters to search on
version (str): If present, it forces the parser to use the version
provided. Otherwise, the library will make the best effort based
on checking the "spec_version" property.
_composite_filters (FilterSet): collection of filters passed from
the CompositeDataSource, not user supplied
@ -294,7 +306,7 @@ class TAXIICollectionSource(DataSource):
)
# parse python STIX objects from the STIX object dicts
stix_objs = [parse(stix_obj_dict, allow_custom=self.allow_custom) for stix_obj_dict in all_data]
stix_objs = [parse(stix_obj_dict, allow_custom=self.allow_custom, version=version) for stix_obj_dict in all_data]
return stix_objs

View File

@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
{
"type": "identity",
"id": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z",
"modified": "2018-11-01T23:24:48.446Z",
"name": "The MITRE Corporation",
"identity_class": "organization",
"labels": [
"version two"
]
}

View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--f64de948-7067-4534-8018-85f03d470625",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:58.226477Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "S0090",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090"
},
{
"description": "Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware \u2018Rover\u2019 Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.",
"source_name": "Palo Alto Rover",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
}
],
"id": "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
"labels": [
"malware"
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:58.226477Z",
"name": "Rover",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"type": "malware"
}
],
"spec_version": "2.0",
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
{
"type": "malware",
"id": "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:58.226Z",
"modified": "2018-11-01T23:24:48.456Z",
"name": "Rover",
"description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]",
"labels": [
"version two"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
"external_id": "S0090"
},
{
"source_name": "Palo Alto Rover",
"description": "Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware \u2018Rover\u2019 Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
}

View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
{
"type": "malware",
"id": "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:58.226Z",
"modified": "2018-11-01T23:24:48.457Z",
"name": "Rover",
"description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]",
"labels": [
"version three"
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
"external_id": "S0090"
},
{
"source_name": "Palo Alto Rover",
"description": "Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware \u2018Rover\u2019 Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
]
}

View File

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--f68640b4-0cdc-42ae-b176-def1754a1ea0",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Legitimate Credentials in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003"
},
{
"description": "Delpy, B. (2014, September 14). Mimikatz module ~ sekurlsa. Retrieved January 10, 2016.",
"source_name": "Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa"
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.73501Z",
"name": "Credential Dumping",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--b07d6fd6-7cc5-492d-a1eb-9ba956b329d5",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the Basic Input/Output System.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496201Z",
"name": "Rootkit",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--1a854c96-639e-4771-befb-e7b960a65974",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1020",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "exfiltration"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.45894Z",
"name": "Automated Exfiltration",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--33e3e33a-38b8-4a37-9455-5b8c82d3b10a",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system.\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1049",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.139269Z",
"name": "Local Network Connections Discovery",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--a87938c5-cc1e-4e06-a8a3-b10243ae397d",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "T1039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
}
],
"id": "attack-pattern--ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.022897Z",
"name": "Data from Network Shared Drive",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "attack-pattern"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--5ddaeff9-eca7-4094-9e65-4f53da21a444",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:32.662702Z",
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"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
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"description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
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"url": "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/"
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"url": "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf"
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"modified": "2017-05-31T21:33:27.051532Z",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"relationship_type": "uses",
"source_ref": "intrusion-set--f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"target_ref": "malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841",
"type": "relationship"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--d8826afc-1561-4362-a4e3-05a4c2c3ac3c",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "S0039",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2006, October 18). Net.exe Utility. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Microsoft Net Utility",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914"
},
{
"description": "Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015.",
"source_name": "Savill 1999",
"url": "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
}
],
"id": "tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23",
"tool_types": [
"tool"
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:31.601148Z",
"name": "Net",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "tool"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
{
"id": "bundle--7dbde18f-6f14-4bf0-8389-505c89d6d5a6",
"objects": [
{
"created": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
"external_references": [
{
"external_id": "S0005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005"
},
{
"description": "Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015.",
"source_name": "Amplia WCE",
"url": "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html"
}
],
"id": "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966",
"tool_types": [
"tool"
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:32:12.684914Z",
"name": "Windows Credential Editor",
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"spec_version": "2.1",
"type": "tool"
}
],
"type": "bundle"
}

View File

@ -1,10 +1,18 @@
import datetime
import errno
import json
import os
import shutil
import stat
import pytest
import pytz
import stix2
from stix2.datastore.filesystem import (AuthSet, _find_search_optimizations,
_get_matching_dir_entries,
_timestamp2filename)
from stix2.exceptions import STIXError
from .constants import (
CAMPAIGN_ID, CAMPAIGN_KWARGS, IDENTITY_ID, IDENTITY_KWARGS, INDICATOR_ID,
@ -96,7 +104,20 @@ def rel_fs_store():
yield fs
for o in stix_objs:
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, o.type, o.id + '.json'))
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, o.type, o.id,
_timestamp2filename(o.modified) + '.json')
# Some test-scoped fixtures (e.g. fs_store) delete all campaigns, so by
# the time this module-scoped fixture tears itself down, it may find
# its campaigns already gone, which causes not-found errors.
try:
os.remove(filepath)
except OSError as e:
# 3 is the ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND windows error code. Which has an
# errno symbolic value, but not the windows meaning...
if e.errno in (errno.ENOENT, 3):
continue
raise
def test_filesystem_source_nonexistent_folder():
@ -126,32 +147,36 @@ def test_filesystem_source_bad_stix_file(fs_source, bad_stix_files):
# this tests handling of bad STIX json object
try:
fs_source.get("intrusion-set--test-non-stix")
except TypeError as e:
assert "intrusion-set--test-non-stix" in str(e)
assert "could either not be parsed to JSON or was not valid STIX JSON" in str(e)
except STIXError as e:
assert "Can't parse object with no 'type' property" in str(e)
def test_filesytem_source_get_object(fs_source):
# get object
def test_filesystem_source_get_object(fs_source):
# get (latest) object
mal = fs_source.get("malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38")
assert mal.id == "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"
assert mal.name == "Rover"
assert mal.modified == datetime.datetime(2018, 11, 16, 22, 54, 20, 390000,
pytz.utc)
def test_filesytem_source_get_nonexistent_object(fs_source):
def test_filesystem_source_get_nonexistent_object(fs_source):
ind = fs_source.get("indicator--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38")
assert ind is None
def test_filesytem_source_all_versions(fs_source):
# all versions - (currently not a true all versions call as FileSystem cant have multiple versions)
id_ = fs_source.get("identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5")
assert id_.id == "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5"
assert id_.name == "The MITRE Corporation"
assert id_.type == "identity"
def test_filesystem_source_all_versions(fs_source):
ids = fs_source.all_versions(
"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5"
)
assert len(ids) == 2
assert all(id_.id == "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5"
for id_ in ids)
assert all(id_.name == "The MITRE Corporation" for id_ in ids)
assert all(id_.type == "identity" for id_ in ids)
def test_filesytem_source_query_single(fs_source):
def test_filesystem_source_query_single(fs_source):
# query2
is_2 = fs_source.query([stix2.Filter("external_references.external_id", '=', "T1027")])
assert len(is_2) == 1
@ -161,7 +186,7 @@ def test_filesytem_source_query_single(fs_source):
assert is_2.type == "attack-pattern"
def test_filesytem_source_query_multiple(fs_source):
def test_filesystem_source_query_multiple(fs_source):
# query
intrusion_sets = fs_source.query([stix2.Filter("type", '=', "intrusion-set")])
assert len(intrusion_sets) == 2
@ -173,6 +198,24 @@ def test_filesytem_source_query_multiple(fs_source):
assert len(is_1.external_references) == 4
def test_filesystem_source_backward_compatible(fs_source):
# this specific object is outside an "ID" directory; make sure we can get
# it.
modified = datetime.datetime(2018, 11, 16, 22, 54, 20, 390000, pytz.utc)
results = fs_source.query([
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "malware"),
stix2.Filter("id", "=", "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"),
stix2.Filter("modified", "=", modified)
])
assert len(results) == 1
result = results[0]
assert result.type == "malware"
assert result.id == "malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"
assert result.modified == modified
assert result.malware_types == ["version four"]
def test_filesystem_sink_add_python_stix_object(fs_sink, fs_source):
# add python stix object
camp1 = stix2.v21.Campaign(
@ -183,14 +226,16 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_python_stix_object(fs_sink, fs_source):
fs_sink.add(camp1)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id + ".json"))
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1.modified) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp1_r = fs_source.get(camp1.id)
assert camp1_r.id == camp1.id
assert camp1_r.name == "Hannibal"
assert "War Elephant" in camp1_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_object_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -202,18 +247,29 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_object_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
"aliases": ["Purple Robes"],
"id": "campaign--8e2e2d2b-17d4-4cbf-938f-98ee46b3cd3f",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
fs_sink.add(camp2)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2["id"] + ".json"))
# Need to get the exact "modified" timestamp which would have been
# in effect at the time the object was saved to the sink, which determines
# the filename it would have been saved as. It may not be exactly the same
# as what's in the dict, since the parsing process can enforce a precision
# constraint (e.g. truncate to milliseconds), which results in a slightly
# different name.
camp2obj = stix2.parse(camp2)
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2obj["id"],
_timestamp2filename(camp2obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp2_r = fs_source.get(camp2["id"])
assert camp2_r.id == camp2["id"]
assert camp2_r.name == camp2["name"]
assert "Purple Robes" in camp2_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp2_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_bundle_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -229,52 +285,73 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_stix_bundle_dict(fs_sink, fs_source):
"aliases": ["Huns"],
"id": "campaign--b8f86161-ccae-49de-973a-4ca320c62478",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
},
],
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
]
}
fs_sink.add(bund)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", bund["objects"][0]["id"] + ".json"))
camp_obj = stix2.parse(bund["objects"][0])
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp_obj["id"],
_timestamp2filename(camp_obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp3_r = fs_source.get(bund["objects"][0]["id"])
assert camp3_r.id == bund["objects"][0]["id"]
assert camp3_r.name == bund["objects"][0]["name"]
assert "Huns" in camp3_r.aliases
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp3_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_json_stix_object(fs_sink, fs_source):
# add json-encoded stix obj
camp4 = '{"type": "campaign", "id":"campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d",'\
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z", "name": "Ghengis Khan", "objective": "China and Russian infrastructure"}'
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "modified":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "name": "Ghengis Khan", "objective": "China and Russian infrastructure"}'
fs_sink.add(camp4)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d" + ".json"))
camp4obj = stix2.parse(camp4)
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign",
"campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d",
_timestamp2filename(camp4obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp4_r = fs_source.get("campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d")
assert camp4_r.id == "campaign--6a6ca372-ba07-42cc-81ef-9840fc1f963d"
assert camp4_r.name == "Ghengis Khan"
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp4_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_json_stix_bundle(fs_sink, fs_source):
# add json-encoded stix bundle
bund2 = '{"type": "bundle", "id": "bundle--3d267103-8475-4d8f-b321-35ec6eccfa37",' \
' "objects": [{"type": "campaign", "spec_version": "2.1", "id": "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b",' \
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z", "name": "Spartacus", "objective": "Oppressive regimes of Africa and Middle East"}]}'
' "spec_version": "2.0", "objects": [{"type": "campaign", "id": "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b",' \
' "created":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "modified":"2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",'\
' "name": "Spartacus", "objective": "Oppressive regimes of Africa and Middle East"}]}'
fs_sink.add(bund2)
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b" + ".json"))
bund2obj = stix2.parse(bund2)
camp_obj = bund2obj["objects"][0]
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign",
"campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b",
_timestamp2filename(camp_obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(filepath)
camp5_r = fs_source.get("campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b")
assert camp5_r.id == "campaign--2c03b8bf-82ee-433e-9918-ca2cb6e9534b"
assert camp5_r.name == "Spartacus"
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp5_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
@ -288,17 +365,26 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
camp7 = {
"name": "Napolean",
"type": "campaign",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"objective": "Central and Eastern Europe military commands and departments",
"aliases": ["The Frenchmen"],
"id": "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z",
"modified": "2017-05-31T21:31:53.197755Z"
}
fs_sink.add([camp6, camp7])
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6.id + ".json"))
assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a" + ".json"))
camp7obj = stix2.parse(camp7)
camp6filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp6["modified"]) +
".json")
camp7filepath = os.path.join(
FS_PATH, "campaign", "campaign--122818b6-1112-4fb0-b11b-b111107ca70a",
_timestamp2filename(camp7obj["modified"]) + ".json")
assert os.path.exists(camp6filepath)
assert os.path.exists(camp7filepath)
camp6_r = fs_source.get(camp6.id)
assert camp6_r.id == camp6.id
@ -309,8 +395,24 @@ def test_filesystem_sink_add_objects_list(fs_sink, fs_source):
assert "The Frenchmen" in camp7_r.aliases
# remove all added objects
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp6_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp7_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(camp6filepath)
os.remove(camp7filepath)
def test_filesystem_sink_marking(fs_sink):
marking = stix2.v21.MarkingDefinition(
definition_type="tlp",
definition=stix2.v21.TLPMarking(tlp="green")
)
fs_sink.add(marking)
marking_filepath = os.path.join(
FS_PATH, "marking-definition", marking["id"] + ".json"
)
assert os.path.exists(marking_filepath)
os.remove(marking_filepath)
def test_filesystem_store_get_stored_as_bundle(fs_store):
@ -326,8 +428,9 @@ def test_filesystem_store_get_stored_as_object(fs_store):
def test_filesystem_store_all_versions(fs_store):
# all versions() - (note at this time, all_versions() is still not applicable to FileSystem, as only one version is ever stored)
rel = fs_store.all_versions("relationship--70dc6b5c-c524-429e-a6ab-0dd40f0482c1")[0]
rels = fs_store.all_versions("relationship--70dc6b5c-c524-429e-a6ab-0dd40f0482c1")
assert len(rels) == 1
rel = rels[0]
assert rel.id == "relationship--70dc6b5c-c524-429e-a6ab-0dd40f0482c1"
assert rel.type == "relationship"
@ -350,9 +453,9 @@ def test_filesystem_store_query_single_filter(fs_store):
def test_filesystem_store_empty_query(fs_store):
results = fs_store.query() # returns all
assert len(results) == 26
assert "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966" in [obj["id"] for obj in results]
assert "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" in [obj["id"] for obj in results]
assert len(results) == 30
assert "tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966" in [obj.id for obj in results]
assert "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168" in [obj.id for obj in results]
def test_filesystem_store_query_multiple_filters(fs_store):
@ -364,7 +467,7 @@ def test_filesystem_store_query_multiple_filters(fs_store):
def test_filesystem_store_query_dont_include_type_folder(fs_store):
results = fs_store.query(stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "tool"))
assert len(results) == 24
assert len(results) == 28
def test_filesystem_store_add(fs_store):
@ -380,8 +483,11 @@ def test_filesystem_store_add(fs_store):
assert camp1_r.id == camp1.id
assert camp1_r.name == camp1.name
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1_r.modified) + ".json")
# remove
os.remove(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1_r.id + ".json"))
os.remove(filepath)
def test_filesystem_store_add_as_bundle():
@ -394,7 +500,10 @@ def test_filesystem_store_add_as_bundle():
)
fs_store.add(camp1)
with open(os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id + ".json")) as bundle_file:
filepath = os.path.join(FS_PATH, "campaign", camp1.id,
_timestamp2filename(camp1.modified) + ".json")
with open(filepath) as bundle_file:
assert '"type": "bundle"' in bundle_file.read()
camp1_r = fs_store.get(camp1.id)
@ -419,6 +528,26 @@ def test_filesystem_store_add_invalid_object(fs_store):
assert 'JSON formatted STIX bundle' in str(excinfo.value)
def test_filesystem_store_add_marking(fs_store):
marking = stix2.v21.MarkingDefinition(
definition_type="tlp",
definition=stix2.v21.TLPMarking(tlp="green")
)
fs_store.add(marking)
marking_filepath = os.path.join(
FS_PATH, "marking-definition", marking["id"] + ".json"
)
assert os.path.exists(marking_filepath)
marking_r = fs_store.get(marking["id"])
assert marking_r["id"] == marking["id"]
assert marking_r["definition"]["tlp"] == "green"
os.remove(marking_filepath)
def test_filesystem_object_with_custom_property(fs_store):
camp = stix2.v21.Campaign(
name="Scipio Africanus",
@ -540,3 +669,357 @@ def test_related_to_by_target(rel_fs_store):
assert len(resp) == 2
assert any(x['id'] == CAMPAIGN_ID for x in resp)
assert any(x['id'] == INDICATOR_ID for x in resp)
def test_auth_set_white1():
auth_set = AuthSet({"A"}, set())
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_set.values == {"A"}
def test_auth_set_white2():
auth_set = AuthSet(set(), set())
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_set.values) == 0
def test_auth_set_white3():
auth_set = AuthSet({"A", "B"}, {"B", "C"})
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_set.values == {"A"}
def test_auth_set_black1():
auth_set = AuthSet(None, {"B", "C"})
assert auth_set.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_set.values == {"B", "C"}
def test_optimize_types1():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "foo")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types2():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types3():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["B", "C", "D"])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B", "C"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types4():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["D", "E", "F"])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types5():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types6():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "foo"),
stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "bar")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_types.values == {"foo", "bar"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types7():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "foo")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types8():
filters = []
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types_ids1():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
stix2.Filter("id", "=", "foo--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"foo--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids2():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "=", "foo"),
stix2.Filter("id", "=", "bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_types.values) == 0
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert len(auth_ids.values) == 0
def test_optimize_types_ids3():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["foo", "bar"]),
stix2.Filter("id", "!=", "bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"foo", "bar"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.BLACK
assert auth_ids.values == {"bar--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids4():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
stix2.Filter("id", "in", [
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
])
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B", "C"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
}
def test_optimize_types_ids5():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("type", "in", ["A", "B", "C"]),
stix2.Filter("type", "!=", "C"),
stix2.Filter("id", "in", [
"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"C--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
"D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
]),
stix2.Filter("id", "!=", "D--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"B"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"B--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_optimize_types_ids6():
filters = [
stix2.Filter("id", "=", "A--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
]
auth_types, auth_ids = _find_search_optimizations(filters)
assert auth_types.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_types.values == {"A"}
assert auth_ids.auth_type == AuthSet.WHITE
assert auth_ids.values == {"A--00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"}
def test_search_auth_set_white1():
auth_set = AuthSet(
{"attack-pattern", "doesntexist"},
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
assert results == ["attack-pattern"]
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISREG)
assert len(results) == 0
def test_search_auth_set_white2():
auth_set = AuthSet(
{
"malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
"malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841"
},
{
"malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841",
"malware--96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
"doesntexist"
}
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "malware"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR
)
assert results == ["malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"]
def test_search_auth_set_white3():
auth_set = AuthSet({"20170531213258226477", "doesntexist"}, set())
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "malware",
"malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISREG, ".json"
)
assert results == ["20170531213258226477.json"]
def test_search_auth_set_black1():
auth_set = AuthSet(
None,
{"tool--242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", "doesntexist"}
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(
os.path.join(FS_PATH, "tool"),
auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR
)
assert set(results) == {
"tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23"
}
def test_search_auth_set_white_empty():
auth_set = AuthSet(
set(),
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
assert len(results) == 0
def test_search_auth_set_black_empty(rel_fs_store):
# Ensure rel_fs_store fixture has run so that the type directories are
# predictable (it adds "campaign").
auth_set = AuthSet(
None,
set()
)
results = _get_matching_dir_entries(FS_PATH, auth_set, stat.S_ISDIR)
# Should get all dirs
assert set(results) == {
"attack-pattern",
"campaign",
"course-of-action",
"identity",
"indicator",
"intrusion-set",
"malware",
"marking-definition",
"relationship",
"tool"
}
def test_timestamp2filename_naive():
dt = datetime.datetime(
2010, 6, 15,
8, 30, 10, 1234
)
filename = _timestamp2filename(dt)
assert filename == "20100615083010001234"
def test_timestamp2filename_tz():
# one hour west of UTC (i.e. an hour earlier)
tz = pytz.FixedOffset(-60)
dt = datetime.datetime(
2010, 6, 15,
7, 30, 10, 1234,
tz
)
filename = _timestamp2filename(dt)
assert filename == "20100615083010001234"

View File

@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ def test_apply_common_filters3():
assert len(resp) == 3
resp = list(apply_common_filters(real_stix_objs, [filters[3]]))
assert resp[0].id == real_stix_objs[0].id
assert len(resp) == 3
assert resp[0].id == real_stix_objs[0].id
def test_apply_common_filters4():
@ -343,14 +343,6 @@ def test_datetime_filter_behavior():
filter_with_dt_obj = Filter("created", "=", parse_into_datetime("2016-02-14T00:00:00.000Z", "millisecond"))
filter_with_str = Filter("created", "=", "2016-02-14T00:00:00.000Z")
# check that filter value is converted from datetime to str
assert isinstance(filter_with_dt_obj.value, str)
# compare datetime string to filter w/ datetime obj
resp = list(apply_common_filters(stix_objs, [filter_with_dt_obj]))
assert len(resp) == 1
assert resp[0]["id"] == "vulnerability--ee916c28-c7a4-4d0d-ad56-a8d357f89fef"
# compare datetime obj to filter w/ datetime obj
resp = list(apply_common_filters(real_stix_objs, [filter_with_dt_obj]))
assert len(resp) == 1