Additional thoughts related to issues #2 and #4

GDPR/information_sharing_and_cooperation_gdpr.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) aims to reduce legal uncertainty a
 
 National and governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team (n/g CSIRTs) are teams that serve the government of a country by helping with Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). They coordinate incident management with the relevant stakeholders at national level, and cooperate with the national and governmental teams in other countries.
 
-The [Malware Information Sharing and Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform (MISP)](https://www.misp-project.org/) is a software for sharing, storing and correlating indicators of compromise of targeted attacks, cybersecurity threats and financial fraud indicators, among which SHA1 hashes (a cryptographic function to fingerprint files), threat actor names and Bitcoin addresses.
+The [Malware Information Sharing and Threat Intelligence Sharing Platform (MISP)](https://www.misp-project.org/) is a software for sharing, storing and correlating indicators of compromise of targeted attacks, cybersecurity threats and financial fraud indicators, among which SHA1 hashes (a cryptographic function to fingerprint files), threat actor names and Bitcoin addresses. The MISP data model is composed of "events", which usually represent threats or incidents, which in turn are composed of a list of "attributes" (e.g. IP addresses, domain names etc..). Other data models exist in MISP such as "objects", which allow advanced combinations of attributes and "galaxies" which enable a deeper analysis and categorisation of events.
 
 Information sharing communities are enabled using tools like MISP. As a Computer Security Incident Response Team for the private sector communes and non-governmental entities in Luxembourg, CIRCL  created and operates several communities to automate information sharing at national, European and international levels.
 
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ It is particularly important to note that **IP addresses can be considered as pe
 
 In the specific case of MISP used by CSIRTs, the first purpose of the share information processing activity is not to share personal data but rather IOCs mostly related to threat actors or threat actor groups. However, in most cases these IOCs contain personal data. Therefore, when exchanging personal data, **CSIRTs should be aware of their mandate, the mandate of the involved parties, as well as the data processing purposes to the fullest possible extent**.
 
+One of the safeguards mentioned in the GDPR is pseudonymisation, defined as "the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information [..]". In MISP, event attributes are not linked to each other and usually do not enable the identification a data subject by themselves, without additional information. For example, having only an IP address, is usually not enough to identifiy a data subject without additional information from the ISP. As such, most of the event attributes can be considered as pseudonymised.
+This statement should however be balanced, as specific attributes can sometimes by themselves enable an easier identification than others, such as the attribute "passport-number" or even a domain name in case the whois public database contains enough information. Furthermore, the "object" data model in MISP enables linking attributes to each other. Specifically the "person", "victim" and even the "whois" objects to name a few, can break the MISP pseudonymisation characteristic for specific sets of data. Those attributes and objects should be used and shared more carefully, in line with the legitimate purpose of the processing activity.
+
 The figure below illustrates the MISP categories of data that could be exchanged through MISP which may include personal data in some cases.
 
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@@ -81,7 +84,14 @@ Second, the recital indeed points out that the processing of personal data is al
 
 The tasks to verify the correct application of recital 49 by CSIRTs is given primarily to the courts when they will assess the value of the evidence collected and exchanged by the CSIRTs. The Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) may be also confronted with this issue, e.g. in the framework of investigations. However, recital 49 is a guideline and a legal interpretation tool rather than a prescriptive provision.
 
-Additionally, for the processing activities for which CSIRTs act as data controllers, the lawful grounds for processing might be based on the Art. 6 (e) - processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. Moreover, Art. 6(1)(e) should be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Art. 6(1)(f) – (legitimate interest of the data controller) which states that "shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks".
+A processing activity should comply with the six principles in Art. 5, which could be summarized as: "lawfulness, fairness and transparency", "purpose limitation", "data minimisation", "accuracy", "storage limitation" and "integrity and confidentiality". The first step is to make sure the processing activity is lawful.
+
+For the processing activities for which CSIRTs act as data controllers, the lawful grounds for processing might be based on the Art. 6 (e) - processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. Entities in an information sharing community may have different lawful grounds as described in Art. 6. However, whenever sharing is lawful, it should not be discouraged by these differences, and entities should state clearly their lawful grounds to enhance sharing.
+
+In most cases, data input in MISP directly relate to an attack, and are already specifically selected from the large amount of data analysed during an incident, for being useful to detect and/or mitigate the attack. In those cases, MISP usage satisfies the **data minimisation principle and the purpose limitation principle**. MISP also includes features to assess the usefulness of IOCs for threat detection and/or mitigation. For example, the field "IDS" in the "attribute" data model allows attributes to be exported directly to the intrusion detection system of one's network. It is easily understandable that attributes marked as "IDS" are necessary to detect and/or mitigate the threat. Other fields can be mentioned such as "Sightings", allowing other organisations to react on the relevance of the specific attribute, and "Related Events" showing which event(s) also include the same attribute (if an attribute is included in several events, it is most likely not a false positive, and therefore relevant to mitigate the related threat).
+
+The **retention period** might be very different depending on the use-case of a sharing community. The GDPR states that personal data must be "kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed". In the case of MISP, as seen in the precedent chapter, personal data are in some cases already pseudonymised. Moreover, "personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes". MISP use cases also include research on threat actors and attacks and may need to keep data for long retention periods, longer after the last occurrence of specific attacks, in order for example to discover attack patterns and produce statistics.
+In the case where an entity no longer needs specific attributes in MISP, the entity has the possibility to delete the attributes (and events) on its local MISP instance. The creator of specific events or attributes can modify them, and other entities can amend events and attributes with information and corrections or propose the deletion of specific attributes, by creating a "Proposal Notification". These features could also be used in the scope of the **accuracy principle**.
 
 ## What are the grounds for processing information for the purpose of information sharing?
 
@@ -112,11 +122,12 @@ The GDPR provides a new data protection framework that will allow information sh
 1. [Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, O.J.E.U., L 119/1 of 4th of May 2016.](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/files/regulation_oj_en.pdf)
 2. [Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007L0064&from=en)
 3. [Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366&from=EN)
-5. [Judgement of the Court (Third Chamber) of 24 November 2011. “Scarlet Extented SA v SABAM »](http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-70/10)
+4. [Judgement of the Court (Third Chamber) of 24 November 2011. “Scarlet Extented SA v SABAM »](http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-70/10)
-6. [Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines.](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf)
+5. [Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines.](http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf)
-7. [ECJ, Patrick Beyer case](https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-10/cp160112en.pdf)
+6. [ECJ, Patrick Beyer case](https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-10/cp160112en.pdf)
-8. [Mandate for the "security made in Létzebuerg” (SMILE) gie.](https://www.circl.lu/assets/files/letter-circl-2015.pdf)
+7. [Mandate for the "security made in Létzebuerg” (SMILE) gie.](https://www.circl.lu/assets/files/letter-circl-2015.pdf)
-9. Cynthia Wagner, Alexandre Dulaunoy, Gérard Wagener, and Andras Iklody. Misp: The design and implementation of a collaborative threat intelligence sharing platform. In *Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security,* page 49-56. ACM, 2016.
+8. Cynthia Wagner, Alexandre Dulaunoy, Gérard Wagener, and Andras Iklody. Misp: The design and implementation of a collaborative threat intelligence sharing platform. In *Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security,* page 49-56. ACM, 2016.
+9. [Andrew Cormack. Incident Response: Protecting Individual Rights Under the General Data Protection Regulation, Dec. 2016](https://script-ed.org/article/incident-response-protecting-individual-rights-under-the-general-data-protection-regulation/)
 
 
 ## Acknowledgment