diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 11327fa3..d8790e98 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -20,13 +20,24 @@ to localized information (which is not shared) or additional information (that c
- [clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json](clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json) - Activity groups as described by Microsoft.
- [clusters/preventive-measure.json](clusters/preventive-measure.json) - Preventive measures.
- [clusters/ransomware.json](clusters/ransomware.json) - Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml
+- [clusters/rat.json](clusters/rat.json) - remote administration tool or remote access tool (RAT), also called sometimes remote access trojan, is a piece of software or programming that allows a remote "operator" to control a system as if they have physical access to that system.
- [clusters/tds.json](clusters/tds.json) - TDS is a list of Traffic Direction System used by adversaries.
- [clusters/threat-actor.json](clusters/threat-actor.json) - Adversary groups - Known or estimated adversary groups targeting organizations and employees. Adversary groups are regularly confused with their initial operation or campaign. MISP
- [clusters/tool.json](clusters/tool.json) - tool is an enumeration of tools used by adversaries. The list includes malware but also common software regularly used by the adversaries.
+- [clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json](clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json) - Attack Pattern - MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
+- [clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json](clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json) - Course of Action - MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
+- [clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json](clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json) - Intrusion Test - MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
+- [clusters/mitre_malware.json](clusters/mitre_malware.json) - Malware - MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
+- [clusters/mitre_tool.json](clusters/mitre_tool.json) - Tool - MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)
+
+
# Available Vocabularies
+A [readable PDF overview of the MISP galaxy is available](https://www.misp.software/galaxy.pdf) or [HTML](https://www.misp.software/galaxy.html) and generated from the JSON.
+
+
## Common
- [vocabularies/common/certainty-level.json](vocabularies/common/certainty-level.json) - Certainty level of an associated element or cluster.
@@ -50,7 +61,7 @@ In the world of threat intelligence, there are many different models or approach
Fork the project, update or create elements or clusters and make a pull-request.
-We recommend to validate the JSON file using [jq](https://stedolan.github.io/jq/) before doing a pull-request.
+We recommend to validate the JSON file using [jq](https://stedolan.github.io/jq/) and [validate_all.sh](https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy/blob/master/validate_all.sh) before doing a pull-request.
## License
diff --git a/clusters/exploit-kit.json b/clusters/exploit-kit.json
index c17e92d8..408e0881 100755
--- a/clusters/exploit-kit.json
+++ b/clusters/exploit-kit.json
@@ -1,587 +1,438 @@
{
- "values": [
- {
- "value": "Astrum",
- "description": "Astrum Exploit Kit is a private Exploit Kit used in massive scale malvertising campaigns. It's notable by its use of Steganography",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/09/astrum-ek.html",
- "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/06/readers-popular-websites-targeted-stealthy-stegano-exploit-kit-hiding-pixels-malicious-ads/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Stegano EK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Bingo",
- "description": "Bingo EK is the name chosen by the defense for a Fiesta-ish EK first spotted in March 2017 and targetting at that times mostly Russia",
- "meta": {
- "status": "Active"
- }
- }
-,
- { "value": "Terror EK",
- "description": "Terror EK is built on Hunter, Sundown and RIG EK code",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Terror-Exploit-Kit--More-like-Error-Exploit-Kit/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Blaze EK",
- "Neptune EK"
- ]
- ,
- "status": "Active"
- }
- }
-,
- { "value": "DealersChoice",
- "description": "DealersChoice is a Flash Player Exploit platform triggered by RTF",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-dealerschoice-sofacys-flash-player-exploit-platform/",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-ramps-up-spear-phishing-before-zero-days-get-patched/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Sednit RTF EK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "DNSChanger",
- "description": "DNSChanger Exploit Kit is an exploit kit targeting Routers via the browser",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html",
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "RouterEK"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- }
-,{
- "value": "Disdain",
- "description": "Disdain EK has been introduced on underground forum on 2017-08-07. The panel is stolen from Sundown, the pattern are Terror alike and the obfuscation reminds Nebula",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-disdain-exploit-kit-detected-wild/"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- }
-,
-
- {
- "value": "Kaixin",
- "description": "Kaixin is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in Asia",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2013/deobfuscating-the-ck-exploit-kit/",
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2012/new-chinese-exploit-pack/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "CK vip"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Magnitude",
- "description": "Magnitude EK",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/10/Magnitude.html",
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/A-Peek-Into-the-Lion-s-Den-%E2%80%93-The-Magnitude--aka-PopAds--Exploit-Kit/",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/02/and-real-name-of-magnitude-is.html",
- "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/02/09/magnitude-exploit-kit-under-the-hood"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Popads EK",
- "TopExp"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "MWI",
- "description": "Microsoft Word Intruder is an exploit kit focused on Word and embedded flash exploits. The author wants to avoid their customer to use it in mass spam campaign, so it's most often connected to semi-targeted attacks",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/a_new_word_document.html",
- "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/sophos-microsoft-word-intruder-revealed.pdf"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- }
-,
- { "value": "RIG",
- "description": "RIG is an exploit kit that takes its source in Infinity EK itself an evolution of Redkit. It became dominant after the fall of Angler, Nuclear Pack and the end of public access to Neutrino. RIG-v is the name given to RIG 4 when it was only accessible by \"vip\" customers and when RIG 3 was still in use.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/rig-exploit-pack/",
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/RIG-Reloaded---Examining-the-Architecture-of-RIG-Exploit-Kit-3-0/",
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/RIG-Exploit-Kit-%E2%80%93-Diving-Deeper-into-the-Infrastructure/",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "RIG 3",
- "RIG-v",
- "RIG 4",
- "Meadgive"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Sednit EK",
- "description": "Sednit EK is the exploit kit used by APT28",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-adobe-flash-zero-day-used-in-pawn-storm-campaign/"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Sundown-P",
- "description": "Sundown-P/Sundown-Pirate is a rip of Sundown seen used in a private way (One group using it only) - First spotted at the end of June 2017, branded as CaptainBlack in August 2017",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/promediads-malvertising-sundown-pirate-exploit-kit/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Sundown-Pirate",
- "CaptainBlack"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Bizarro Sundown",
- "description": "Bizarro Sundown appears to be a fork of Sundown with added anti-analysis features",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/exploits/2016/10/yet-another-sundown-ek-variant/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Sundown-b"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- }, { "value": "Hunter",
- "description": "Hunter EK is an evolution of 3Ros EK",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/Hunter-Exploit-Kit-Targets-Brazilian-Banking-Customers"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "3ROS Exploit Kit"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-02-06"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "GreenFlash Sundown",
- "description": "GreenFlash Sundown is a variation of Bizarro Sundown without landing",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Sundown-GF"
- ],
- "status": "Active"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Angler",
- "description": "The Angler Exploit Kit has been the most popular and evolved exploit kit from 2014 to middle of 2016. There was several variation. The historical \"indexm\" variant was used to spread Lurk. A vip version used notabily to spread Poweliks, the \"standard\" commercial version, and a declinaison tied to load selling (mostly bankers) that can be associated to EmpirePPC",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.sophos.com/2015/07/21/a-closer-look-at-the-angler-exploit-kit/",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/12/xxx-is-angler-ek.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/06/is-it-end-of-angler.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "XXX",
- "AEK",
- "Axpergle"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-06-07"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Archie",
- "description": "Archie EK",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/archie-just-another-exploit-kit"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "BlackHole",
- "description": "The BlackHole Exploit Kit has been the most popular exploit kit from 2011 to 2013. Its activity stopped with Paunch's arrest (all activity since then is anecdotal and based on an old leak)",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Blackhole-Exploit-Kit-v2/",
- "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/exploring-the-blackhole-exploit-kit/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "BHEK"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Bleeding Life",
- "description": "Bleeding Life is an exploit kit that became open source with its version 2",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/flash-used-in-idol-malvertisement/",
- "http://thehackernews.com/2011/10/bleeding-life-2-exploit-pack-released.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "BL",
- "BL2"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Cool",
- "description": "The Cool Exploit Kit was a kind of BlackHole VIP in 2012/2013",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/newcoolek.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/a-styxy-cool-ek.html",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/styx-exploit-pack-how-it-works/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "CEK",
- "Styxy Cool"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Fiesta",
- "description": "Fiesta Exploit Kit",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.0x3a.com/post/110052845124/an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-fiesta-exploit-kit-an",
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/neosploit-is-back/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "NeoSploit",
- "Fiexp"
- ]
- ,
- "status": "Retired - Last Seen: beginning of 2015-07"
- }
- }
-,
- { "value": "Empire",
- "description": "The Empire Pack is a variation of RIG operated by a load seller. It's being fed by many traffic actors",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "RIG-E"
- ]
- ,
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-12-29"
- }
- }
-,
- { "value": "FlashPack",
- "description": "FlashPack EK got multiple fork. The most common variant seen was the standalone Flash version",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/meet-critxpack-previously-vintage-pack.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/04/meet-safe-pack-v20-again.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "FlashEK",
- "SafePack",
- "CritXPack",
- "Vintage Pack"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: middle of 2015-04"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "GrandSoft",
- "description": "GrandSoft Exploit Kit was a quite common exploit kit used in 2012/2013",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/09/FinallyGrandSoft.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/neosploit-now-showing-bh-ek-20-like.html",
- "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/24/sophos-sucks-malware/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "StampEK",
- "SofosFO"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-03"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "HanJuan",
- "description": "Hanjuan EK was a one actor fed variation of Angler EK used in evolved malvertising chain targeting USA. It has been using a 0day (CVE-2015-0313) from beginning of December 2014 till beginning of February 2015",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.malwaresigs.com/2013/10/14/unknown-ek/",
- "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2014/08/shining-some-light-on-the-unknown-exploit-kit/",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/a-closer-look-at-the-exploit-kit-in-cve-2015-0313-attack",
- "https://twitter.com/kafeine/status/562575744501428226"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-07"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Himan",
- "description": "Himan Exploit Kit",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/10/HiMan.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "High Load"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-04"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Impact",
- "description": "Impact EK",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/inside-impact-exploit-kit-back-on-track.html"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Infinity",
- "description": "Infinity is an evolution of Redkit",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.talosintel.com/2013/11/im-calling-this-goon-exploit-kit-for-now.html",
- "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/the-resurrection-of-redkit/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Redkit v2.0",
- "Goon"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-07"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Lightsout",
- "description": "Lightsout Exploit Kit has been used in Watering Hole attack performed by the APT Group havex",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.talosintel.com/2014/03/hello-new-exploit-kit.html",
- "http://blog.talosintel.com/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html",
- "http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/09/unknown-ek-by-way-how-much-is-fish.html"
- ],
- "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2014-03"
- }
- },
- { "value": "Nebula",
- "description": "Nebula Exploit Kit has been built on Sundown source and features an internal TDS",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2017/03/nebula-exploit-kit.html"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-09"
- }
- }
- ,
- { "value": "Neutrino",
- "description": "Neutrino Exploit Kit has been one of the major exploit kit from its launch in 2013 till september 2016 when it become private (defense name for this variation is Neutrino-v). This EK vanished from march 2014 till november 2014.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/03/hello-neutrino-just-one-more-exploit-kit.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/11/neutrino-come-back.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Job314",
- "Neutrino Rebooted",
- "Neutrino-v"
- ]
- ,
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-04-10"
- }
- }
-,
- {
- "value": "Niteris",
- "description": "Niteris was used mainly to target Russian.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/cottoncastle.html",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/another-look-at-niteris-post.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "CottonCastle"
- ],
- "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2015-11"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Nuclear",
- "description": "The Nuclear Pack appeared in 2009 and has been one of the longer living one. Spartan EK was a landing less variation of Nuclear Pack",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/05/17/inside-nuclears-core-unraveling-a-ransomware-as-a-service-infrastructure/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "NEK",
- "Nuclear Pack",
- "Spartan",
- "Neclu"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-30"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Phoenix",
- "description": "Phoenix Exploit Kit",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malwareint.blogspot.fr/2010/09/phoenix-exploits-kit-v21-inside.html",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/now-exploiting-phoenix-exploit-kit-version-2-5/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "PEK"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Private Exploit Pack",
- "description": "Private Exploit Pack",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/pep-new-bep.html",
- "http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/07/unknown-ek-well-hey-hey-i-wanna-be.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "PEP"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Redkit",
- "description": "Redkit has been a major exploit kit in 2012. One of its specific features was to allow its access against a share of a percentage of the customer's traffic",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/A-Wild-Exploit-Kit-Appears----Meet-RedKit/",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/05/inside-redkit.html",
- "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/05/09/redkit-exploit-kit-part-2/"
- ],
- "status": "Retired"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Sakura",
- "description": "Description Here",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.xylibox.com/2012/01/sakura-exploit-pack-10.html"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-09"
- }
- }
- ,
- {
- "value": "Sundown",
- "description": "Sundown Exploit Kit is mainly built out of stolen code from other exploit kits",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/06/fast-look-at-sundown-ek.html",
- "https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2015/06/beta-exploit-pack-one-more-piece-crimeware-infection-road"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Beps",
- "Xer",
- "Beta"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-08",
- "colour": "#C03701"
- }
- }
-
- ,
- {
- "value": "Sweet-Orange",
- "description": "Sweet Orange",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/juice-sweet-orange-2012-12.html"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "SWO",
- "Anogre"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-05"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Styx",
- "description": "Styx Exploit Kit",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/crossing-styx-styx-sploit-pack-20-cve.html",
- "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/07/styx-exploit-pack-domo-arigato-pc-roboto/",
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/05/inside-styx-2013-05.html"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-06"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "WhiteHole",
- "description": "WhiteHole Exploit Kit appeared in January 2013 in the tail of the CVE-2013-0422",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/02/briefly-wave-whitehole-exploit-kit-hello.html"
- ],
- "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-12"
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Unknown",
- "description": "Unknown Exploit Kit. This is a place holder for any undocumented Exploit Kit. If you use this tag, we will be more than happy to give the associated EK a deep look.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://twitter.com/kafeine",
- "https://twitter.com/node5",
- "https://twitter.com/kahusecurity"
- ]
- }
- }
-],
- "version": 5,
- "uuid": "454f4e78-bd7c-11e6-a4a6-cec0c932ce01",
- "description": "Exploit-Kit is an enumeration of some exploitation kits used by adversaries. The list includes document, browser and router exploit kits.It's not meant to be totally exhaustive but aim at covering the most seen in the past 5 years",
- "authors": [
- "Kafeine",
- "Will Metcalf",
- "KahuSecurity"
- ],
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "type": "exploit-kit",
- "name": "Exploit-Kit"
-}
+ "values": [{
+ "value": "Astrum",
+ "description": "Astrum Exploit Kit is a private Exploit Kit used in massive scale malvertising campaigns. It's notable by its use of Steganography",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/09/astrum-ek.html",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/06/readers-popular-websites-targeted-stealthy-stegano-exploit-kit-hiding-pixels-malicious-ads/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Stegano EK"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bingo",
+ "description": "Bingo EK is the name chosen by the defense for a Fiesta-ish EK first spotted in March 2017 and targetting at that times mostly Russia",
+ "meta": {
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Terror EK",
+ "description": "Terror EK is built on Hunter, Sundown and RIG EK code",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Terror-Exploit-Kit--More-like-Error-Exploit-Kit/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Blaze EK",
+ "Neptune EK"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DealersChoice",
+ "description": "DealersChoice is a Flash Player Exploit platform triggered by RTF",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-dealerschoice-sofacys-flash-player-exploit-platform/",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-ramps-up-spear-phishing-before-zero-days-get-patched/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Sednit RTF EK"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DNSChanger",
+ "description": "DNSChanger Exploit Kit is an exploit kit targeting Routers via the browser",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"],
+ "synonyms": ["RouterEK"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Disdain",
+ "description": "Disdain EK has been introduced on underground forum on 2017-08-07. The panel is stolen from Sundown, the pattern are Terror alike and the obfuscation reminds Nebula",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-disdain-exploit-kit-detected-wild/"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Kaixin",
+ "description": "Kaixin is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in Asia",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.kahusecurity.com/2013/deobfuscating-the-ck-exploit-kit/",
+ "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2012/new-chinese-exploit-pack/"],
+ "synonyms": ["CK vip"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Magnitude",
+ "description": "Magnitude EK",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/10/Magnitude.html",
+ "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/A-Peek-Into-the-Lion-s-Den-%E2%80%93-The-Magnitude--aka-PopAds--Exploit-Kit/",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/02/and-real-name-of-magnitude-is.html",
+ "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/02/09/magnitude-exploit-kit-under-the-hood"],
+ "synonyms": ["Popads EK",
+ "TopExp"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MWI",
+ "description": "Microsoft Word Intruder is an exploit kit focused on Word and embedded flash exploits. The author wants to avoid their customer to use it in mass spam campaign, so it's most often connected to semi-targeted attacks",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/a_new_word_document.html",
+ "https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/sophos-microsoft-word-intruder-revealed.pdf"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RIG",
+ "description": "RIG is an exploit kit that takes its source in Infinity EK itself an evolution of Redkit. It became dominant after the fall of Angler, Nuclear Pack and the end of public access to Neutrino. RIG-v is the name given to RIG 4 when it was only accessible by \"vip\" customers and when RIG 3 was still in use.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/rig-exploit-pack/",
+ "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/RIG-Reloaded---Examining-the-Architecture-of-RIG-Exploit-Kit-3-0/",
+ "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/RIG-Exploit-Kit-%E2%80%93-Diving-Deeper-into-the-Infrastructure/",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["RIG 3",
+ "RIG-v",
+ "RIG 4",
+ "Meadgive"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sednit EK",
+ "description": "Sednit EK is the exploit kit used by APT28",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-adobe-flash-zero-day-used-in-pawn-storm-campaign/"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sundown-P",
+ "description": "Sundown-P/Sundown-Pirate is a rip of Sundown seen used in a private way (One group using it only) - First spotted at the end of June 2017, branded as CaptainBlack in August 2017",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/promediads-malvertising-sundown-pirate-exploit-kit/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Sundown-Pirate",
+ "CaptainBlack"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bizarro Sundown",
+ "description": "Bizarro Sundown appears to be a fork of Sundown with added anti-analysis features",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/exploits/2016/10/yet-another-sundown-ek-variant/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Sundown-b"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Hunter",
+ "description": "Hunter EK is an evolution of 3Ros EK",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/Hunter-Exploit-Kit-Targets-Brazilian-Banking-Customers"],
+ "synonyms": ["3ROS Exploit Kit"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-02-06"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "GreenFlash Sundown",
+ "description": "GreenFlash Sundown is a variation of Bizarro Sundown without landing",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-bizarro-sundown-exploit-kit-spreads-locky/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Sundown-GF"],
+ "status": "Active"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Angler",
+ "description": "The Angler Exploit Kit has been the most popular and evolved exploit kit from 2014 to middle of 2016. There was several variation. The historical \"indexm\" variant was used to spread Lurk. A vip version used notabily to spread Poweliks, the \"standard\" commercial version, and a declinaison tied to load selling (mostly bankers) that can be associated to EmpirePPC",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://blogs.sophos.com/2015/07/21/a-closer-look-at-the-angler-exploit-kit/",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/12/xxx-is-angler-ek.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/06/is-it-end-of-angler.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["XXX",
+ "AEK",
+ "Axpergle"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-06-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Archie",
+ "description": "Archie EK",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/archie-just-another-exploit-kit"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BlackHole",
+ "description": "The BlackHole Exploit Kit has been the most popular exploit kit from 2011 to 2013. Its activity stopped with Paunch's arrest (all activity since then is anecdotal and based on an old leak)",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Blackhole-Exploit-Kit-v2/",
+ "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/exploring-the-blackhole-exploit-kit/"],
+ "synonyms": ["BHEK"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bleeding Life",
+ "description": "Bleeding Life is an exploit kit that became open source with its version 2",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/flash-used-in-idol-malvertisement/",
+ "http://thehackernews.com/2011/10/bleeding-life-2-exploit-pack-released.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["BL",
+ "BL2"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cool",
+ "description": "The Cool Exploit Kit was a kind of BlackHole VIP in 2012/2013",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/newcoolek.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/a-styxy-cool-ek.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/styx-exploit-pack-how-it-works/"],
+ "synonyms": ["CEK",
+ "Styxy Cool"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-10-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fiesta",
+ "description": "Fiesta Exploit Kit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.0x3a.com/post/110052845124/an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-fiesta-exploit-kit-an",
+ "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/neosploit-is-back/"],
+ "synonyms": ["NeoSploit",
+ "Fiexp"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last Seen: beginning of 2015-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Empire",
+ "description": "The Empire Pack is a variation of RIG operated by a load seller. It's being fed by many traffic actors",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["RIG-E"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2016-12-29"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FlashPack",
+ "description": "FlashPack EK got multiple fork. The most common variant seen was the standalone Flash version",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/meet-critxpack-previously-vintage-pack.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/04/meet-safe-pack-v20-again.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["FlashEK",
+ "SafePack",
+ "CritXPack",
+ "Vintage Pack"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: middle of 2015-04"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "GrandSoft",
+ "description": "GrandSoft Exploit Kit was a quite common exploit kit used in 2012/2013",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/09/FinallyGrandSoft.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/10/neosploit-now-showing-bh-ek-20-like.html",
+ "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/24/sophos-sucks-malware/"],
+ "synonyms": ["StampEK",
+ "SofosFO"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-03"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HanJuan",
+ "description": "Hanjuan EK was a one actor fed variation of Angler EK used in evolved malvertising chain targeting USA. It has been using a 0day (CVE-2015-0313) from beginning of December 2014 till beginning of February 2015",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.malwaresigs.com/2013/10/14/unknown-ek/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2014/08/shining-some-light-on-the-unknown-exploit-kit/",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/a-closer-look-at-the-exploit-kit-in-cve-2015-0313-attack",
+ "https://twitter.com/kafeine/status/562575744501428226"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Himan",
+ "description": "Himan Exploit Kit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/10/HiMan.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["High Load"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-04"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Impact",
+ "description": "Impact EK",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/inside-impact-exploit-kit-back-on-track.html"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Infinity",
+ "description": "Infinity is an evolution of Redkit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.talosintel.com/2013/11/im-calling-this-goon-exploit-kit-for-now.html",
+ "http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/the-resurrection-of-redkit/"],
+ "synonyms": ["Redkit v2.0",
+ "Goon"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-07"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Lightsout",
+ "description": "Lightsout Exploit Kit has been used in Watering Hole attack performed by the APT Group havex",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.talosintel.com/2014/03/hello-new-exploit-kit.html",
+ "http://blog.talosintel.com/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html",
+ "http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/09/unknown-ek-by-way-how-much-is-fish.html"],
+ "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2014-03"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nebula",
+ "description": "Nebula Exploit Kit has been built on Sundown source and features an internal TDS",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2017/03/nebula-exploit-kit.html"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-09"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Neutrino",
+ "description": "Neutrino Exploit Kit has been one of the major exploit kit from its launch in 2013 till september 2016 when it become private (defense name for this variation is Neutrino-v). This EK vanished from march 2014 till november 2014.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/03/hello-neutrino-just-one-more-exploit-kit.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/11/neutrino-come-back.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["Job314",
+ "Neutrino Rebooted",
+ "Neutrino-v"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-04-10"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Niteris",
+ "description": "Niteris was used mainly to target Russian.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/cottoncastle.html",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/another-look-at-niteris-post.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["CottonCastle"],
+ "status": "Unknown - Last seen: 2015-11"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nuclear",
+ "description": "The Nuclear Pack appeared in 2009 and has been one of the longer living one. Spartan EK was a landing less variation of Nuclear Pack",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/05/17/inside-nuclears-core-unraveling-a-ransomware-as-a-service-infrastructure/"],
+ "synonyms": ["NEK",
+ "Nuclear Pack",
+ "Spartan",
+ "Neclu"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-30"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Phoenix",
+ "description": "Phoenix Exploit Kit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malwareint.blogspot.fr/2010/09/phoenix-exploits-kit-v21-inside.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/now-exploiting-phoenix-exploit-kit-version-2-5/"],
+ "synonyms": ["PEK"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Private Exploit Pack",
+ "description": "Private Exploit Pack",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/pep-new-bep.html",
+ "http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/07/unknown-ek-well-hey-hey-i-wanna-be.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["PEP"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Redkit",
+ "description": "Redkit has been a major exploit kit in 2012. One of its specific features was to allow its access against a share of a percentage of the customer's traffic",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/A-Wild-Exploit-Kit-Appears----Meet-RedKit/",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/05/inside-redkit.html",
+ "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/05/09/redkit-exploit-kit-part-2/"],
+ "status": "Retired"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sakura",
+ "description": "Description Here",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://www.xylibox.com/2012/01/sakura-exploit-pack-10.html"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-09"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sundown",
+ "description": "Sundown Exploit Kit is mainly built out of stolen code from other exploit kits",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/06/fast-look-at-sundown-ek.html",
+ "https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2015/06/beta-exploit-pack-one-more-piece-crimeware-infection-road"],
+ "synonyms": ["Beps",
+ "Xer",
+ "Beta"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen 2017-03-08",
+ "colour": "#C03701"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sweet-Orange",
+ "description": "Sweet Orange",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/juice-sweet-orange-2012-12.html"],
+ "synonyms": ["SWO",
+ "Anogre"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2015-04-05"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Styx",
+ "description": "Styx Exploit Kit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/crossing-styx-styx-sploit-pack-20-cve.html",
+ "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/07/styx-exploit-pack-domo-arigato-pc-roboto/",
+ "http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/05/inside-styx-2013-05.html"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2014-06"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "WhiteHole",
+ "description": "WhiteHole Exploit Kit appeared in January 2013 in the tail of the CVE-2013-0422",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/02/briefly-wave-whitehole-exploit-kit-hello.html"],
+ "status": "Retired - Last seen: 2013-12"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Unknown",
+ "description": "Unknown Exploit Kit. This is a place holder for any undocumented Exploit Kit. If you use this tag, we will be more than happy to give the associated EK a deep look.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": ["https://twitter.com/kafeine",
+ "https://twitter.com/node5",
+ "https://twitter.com/kahusecurity"]
+ }
+ }],
+ "version": 5,
+ "uuid": "454f4e78-bd7c-11e6-a4a6-cec0c932ce01",
+ "description": "Exploit-Kit is an enumeration of some exploitation kits used by adversaries. The list includes document, browser and router exploit kits.It's not meant to be totally exhaustive but aim at covering the most seen in the past 5 years",
+ "authors": ["Kafeine",
+ "Will Metcalf",
+ "KahuSecurity"],
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "exploit-kit",
+ "name": "Exploit-Kit"
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json b/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
index e96d599b..5c771ea4 100644
--- a/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
+++ b/clusters/microsoft-activity-group.json
@@ -1,36 +1,49 @@
{
+ "version": 3,
+ "uuid": "28b5e55d-acba-4748-a79d-0afa3512689a",
+ "description": "Activity groups as described by Microsoft",
+ "authors": [
+ "Various"
+ ],
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "type": "microsoft-activity-group",
+ "name": "Microsoft Activity Group actor",
"values": [
{
- "value": "PROMETHIUM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
+ ]
+ },
"description": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.",
+ "value": "PROMETHIUM"
+ },
+ {
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "NEODYMIUM",
+ },
"description": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/14/twin-zero-day-attacks-promethium-and-neodymium-target-individuals-in-europe/"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "NEODYMIUM"
},
{
- "value": "TERBIUM",
- "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/12/09/windows-10-protection-detection-and-response-against-recent-attacks/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.",
+ "value": "TERBIUM"
},
{
- "value": "STRONTIUM",
- "description": "STRONTIUM has been active since at least 2007. Whereas most modern untargeted malware is ultimately profit-oriented, STRONTIUM mainly seeks sensitive information. Its primary institutional targets have included government bodies, diplomatic institutions, and military forces and installations in NATO member states and certain Eastern European countries. Additional targets have included journalists, political advisors, and organizations associated with political activism in central Asia. STRONTIUM is an activity group that usually targets government agencies, diplomatic institutions, and military organizations, as well as affiliated private sector organizations such as defense contractors and public policy research institutes. Microsoft has attributed more 0-day exploits to STRONTIUM than any other tracked group in 2016. STRONTIUM frequently uses compromised e-mail accounts from one victim to send malicious e-mails to a second victim and will persistently pursue specific targets for months until they are successful in compromising the victims’ computer. ",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/11/01/our-commitment-to-our-customers-security/",
+ "http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_A_Profile_Of_A_Persistent_Adversary_English.pdf",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2015/11/16/microsoft-security-intelligence-report-strontium/"
+ ],
+ "country": "RU",
"synonyms": [
"APT 28",
"APT28",
@@ -42,66 +55,62 @@
"Group-4127",
"Sofacy",
"Grey-Cloud"
- ],
- "country": "RU",
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/11/01/our-commitment-to-our-customers-security/",
- "http://download.microsoft.com/download/4/4/C/44CDEF0E-7924-4787-A56A-16261691ACE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_19_A_Profile_Of_A_Persistent_Adversary_English.pdf",
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2015/11/16/microsoft-security-intelligence-report-strontium/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "STRONTIUM has been active since at least 2007. Whereas most modern untargeted malware is ultimately profit-oriented, STRONTIUM mainly seeks sensitive information. Its primary institutional targets have included government bodies, diplomatic institutions, and military forces and installations in NATO member states and certain Eastern European countries. Additional targets have included journalists, political advisors, and organizations associated with political activism in central Asia. STRONTIUM is an activity group that usually targets government agencies, diplomatic institutions, and military organizations, as well as affiliated private sector organizations such as defense contractors and public policy research institutes. Microsoft has attributed more 0-day exploits to STRONTIUM than any other tracked group in 2016. STRONTIUM frequently uses compromised e-mail accounts from one victim to send malicious e-mails to a second victim and will persistently pursue specific targets for months until they are successful in compromising the victims’ computer. ",
+ "value": "STRONTIUM"
},
{
+ "description": "DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features.",
+ "value": "DUBNIUM",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "darkhotel"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/research/71713/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/06/20/reverse-engineering-dubniums-flash-targeting-exploit/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/07/14/reverse-engineering-dubnium-stage-2-payload-analysis/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "darkhotel"
]
- },
- "value": "DUBNIUM",
- "description": "DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features."
+ }
},
{
+ "description": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.",
+ "value": "PLATINUM",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/04/26/digging-deep-for-platinum/",
"http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf"
]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
+ ]
},
- "value": "PLATINUM",
- "description": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat."
- },
- {
- "value": "BARIUM",
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence associates Winnti with multiple activity groups—collections of malware, supporting infrastructure, online personas, victimology, and other attack artifacts that the Microsoft intelligent security graph uses to categorize and attribute threat activity. Microsoft labels activity groups using code names derived from elements in the periodic table. In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD. But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios. BARIUM begins its attacks by cultivating relationships with potential victims—particularly those working in Business Development or Human Resources—on various social media platforms. Once BARIUM has established rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros or exploits. Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C. Later stages of the intrusions rely upon Winnti for persistent access. The majority of victims recorded to date have been in electronic gaming, multimedia, and Internet content industries, although occasional intrusions against technology companies have occurred.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
- ]
- }
+ "value": "BARIUM"
},
{
- "value": "LEAD",
- "description": "In contrast, LEAD has established a far greater reputation for industrial espionage. In the past few years, LEAD’s victims have included: Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of textiles, chemicals, and electronics Pharmaceutical companies A company in the chemical industry University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems During these intrusions, LEAD’s objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans. LEAD also steals code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. In most cases, LEAD’s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware. In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "In contrast, LEAD has established a far greater reputation for industrial espionage. In the past few years, LEAD’s victims have included: Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of textiles, chemicals, and electronics Pharmaceutical companies A company in the chemical industry University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems During these intrusions, LEAD’s objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans. LEAD also steals code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. In most cases, LEAD’s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware. In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines.",
+ "value": "LEAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/03/27/detecting-and-mitigating-elevation-of-privilege-exploit-for-cve-2017-0005/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "In addition to strengthening generic detection of EoP exploits, Microsoft security researchers are actively gathering threat intelligence and indicators attributable to ZIRCONIUM, the activity group using the CVE-2017-0005 exploit. ",
+ "value": "ZIRCONIUM"
}
- ],
- "name": "Microsoft Activity Group actor",
- "type": "microsoft-activity-group",
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "authors": [
- "Various"
- ],
- "description": "Activity groups as described by Microsoft",
- "uuid": "28b5e55d-acba-4748-a79d-0afa3512689a",
- "version": 2
+ ]
}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json b/clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1d10d161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json
@@ -0,0 +1,3931 @@
+{
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "type": "mitre-attack-pattern",
+ "name": "Attack Pattern",
+ "description": "ATT&CK tactic",
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol",
+ "description": "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "User interface",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Network protocol analysis"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1071",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media",
+ "description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1092"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Data loss prevention"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1094",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness",
+ "description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1044",
+ "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34",
+ "https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Services"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Process Hollowing",
+ "description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093",
+ "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Scripting",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]\n\nDetection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.\n\nScripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [[Discovery]], [[Collection]], or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
+ "http://www.metasploit.com",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
+ "https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data from Removable Media",
+ "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1025"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Code Signing",
+ "description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1116",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code%20signing",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/security-policies/68593/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Binary file metadata"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rootkit",
+ "description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the Basic Input/Output System.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "BIOS",
+ "MBR",
+ "System calls"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Command-Line Interface",
+ "description": "Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms.cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line%20interface"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel",
+ "description": "Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.\n\nDetection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1041",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "User interface",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels",
+ "description": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from [[Discovery]] of the system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]] to the originating process may also yield useful data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1104"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Network device logs",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Input Capture",
+ "description": "Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Legitimate Credentials and information Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Legitimate Credentials or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.Legitimate Credentials in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056",
+ "http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Kernel drivers",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm",
+ "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvcs Regasm Whitelist Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx",
+ "http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2015/11/all-natural-organic-free-range.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MSBuild",
+ "description": "MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]] \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee MSBuild]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe. Compare recent invocations of MSBuild.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that MSBuild will be used by software developers, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after the MSBuild.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd722601.aspx",
+ "https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/09/bypassing-application-whitelisting.html",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Scheduled Task",
+ "description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation",
+ "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [[Discovery]] and remote [[Execution]] of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes",
+ "description": "Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]\n\nThe NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096",
+ "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Kernel drivers"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Process Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. An example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the Tasklist utility.\n\nInformation obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Basic Input/Output System",
+ "description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System), which underlies the functionality of a computer, may be modified to perform or assist in malicious activity.[[Citation: Wikipedia BIOS]]\n\nCapabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nThe Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is new specification for the interface between platform firmware and a computer operating system.[[Citation: About UEFI]]\n\nDetection: Firmware manipulation may be detected.[[Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement]] Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.[[Citation: MITRE Copernicus]] Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, extensible firmware interface (EFI) modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.[[Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog]][[Citation: Github CHIPSEC]][[Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1019",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/",
+ "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/HT-UEFI-rootkit.html",
+ "https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec",
+ "http://www.uefi.org/about",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIOS",
+ "http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research",
+ "http://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/copernicus-question-your-assumptions-about"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "BIOS"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder",
+ "description": "Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.\n\nDetection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nChanges to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Service Execution",
+ "description": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.\n\nDetection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Uncommonly Used Port",
+ "description": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Staged",
+ "description": "Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.\n\nInteractive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nDetection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "New Service",
+ "description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal",
+ "description": "Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\\\system\\share /delete command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DLL Injection",
+ "description": "DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process's memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLL%20injection",
+ "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Authentication Package",
+ "description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\ with the key value of \"Authentication Packages\"=. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1131",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Loaded DLLs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Multilayer Encryption",
+ "description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1079",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
+ "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Component Firmware",
+ "description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to Basic Input/Output System but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1109"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription",
+ "description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]\n\nDetection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: WMI Objects",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence",
+ "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "WMI Objects"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Disabling Security Tools",
+ "description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Services",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1120"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Compressed",
+ "description": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.\n\nDetection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\n\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Account Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. Example commands that can acquire this information are net user, net group , and net localgroup using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Pass the Hash",
+ "description": "Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]\n\nDetection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075",
+ "http://www.nsa.gov/ia/%20files/app/spotting%20the%20adversary%20with%20windows%20event%20log%20monitoring.pdf",
+ "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-hash/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Timestomp",
+ "description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099",
+ "http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Brute Force",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\nCredential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Legitimate Credentials. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password%20cracking",
+ "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Modify Registry",
+ "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Legitimate Credentials are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Screen Capture",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools",
+ "description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1066"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Change Default File Association",
+ "description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to [[Discovery]] actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Email Collection",
+ "description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1114"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "System Information Discovery",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, Systeminfo, and dir within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system.\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception",
+ "description": "Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nOther hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.\n\nDetection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1111",
+ "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF%20MTrends%202011.pdf",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Execution through API",
+ "description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1106",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
+ "https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/verifier.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking",
+ "description": "The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.\n\nDetection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\ may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\CLSID\\.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Loaded DLLs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Clipboard Data",
+ "description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]]\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "InstallUtil",
+ "description": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v\\InstallUtil.exe.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)].[[Citation: SubTee InstallUtil Whitelist Bypass]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx",
+ "http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2015/08/application-whitelisting-bypasses-101.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Obfuscation",
+ "description": "Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1001",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Network protocol analysis"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Shortcut Modification",
+ "description": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nDetection: Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.\n\nDetection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Malware reverse engineering"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Video Capture",
+ "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1125"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Masquerading",
+ "description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DLL Side-Loading",
+ "description": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa375365",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Loaded DLLs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Automated Exfiltration",
+ "description": "Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1020"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Replication Through Removable Media",
+ "description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information [[Discovery]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1091"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Data loss prevention"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol",
+ "description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for [[Persistence]].[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Scheduled Transfer",
+ "description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1029"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bypass User Account Control",
+ "description": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1088",
+ "http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7%20uac%20whitelist2.html",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx",
+ "https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/",
+ "http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass",
+ "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "System calls",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Logon Scripts",
+ "description": "Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Connection Proxy",
+ "description": "A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Packet capture"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Regsvr32",
+ "description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1117",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873",
+ "http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Loaded DLLs",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Windows Registry"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Example utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083",
+ "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port",
+ "description": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1043",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Encoding",
+ "description": "Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character%20encoding",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text%20encoding",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "Network protocol analysis"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Credentials in Files",
+ "description": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Legitimate Credentials for more information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx",
+ "http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PowerShell",
+ "description": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]\n\nDetection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\n\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1086",
+ "https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack",
+ "https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater%20visibilityt.html",
+ "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Security Software Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Modify Existing Service",
+ "description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1032",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
+ "https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2015/03/the-risks-of-ssl-inspection.html",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf",
+ "http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "SSL/TLS inspection"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Legitimate Credentials",
+ "description": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]\n\nDetection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "System Service Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "System Owner/User Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Multiband Communication",
+ "description": "Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1026",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Pass the Ticket",
+ "description": "Pass the ticket (PtT)Legitimate Credentials are captured by Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]\n\nDetection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1097",
+ "http://www.aorato.com/labs/pass-the-ticket/",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=556",
+ "http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf",
+ "http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Windows Remote Management",
+ "description": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the winrm command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028",
+ "http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Audio Capture",
+ "description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1024",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201018%20looking%20at%20the%20sky%20for%20a%20dark%20comet.pdf",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Graphical User Interface",
+ "description": "Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions. \n\nUnknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1061"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fallback Channels",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1008",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Malware reverse engineering",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability",
+ "description": "Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]\n\nDetection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1068",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Error Reporting",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Binary Padding",
+ "description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information [[Discovery]] or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Redundant Access",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Legitimate Credentials to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Legitimate Credentials and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1108",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Encrypted",
+ "description": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol\n\nDetection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022",
+ "http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List%20of%20file%20signatures"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking",
+ "description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx",
+ "https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary%20planting",
+ "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive",
+ "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1039"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "AppInit DLLs",
+ "description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103",
+ "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Loaded DLLs",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol",
+ "description": "Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nDetection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1095",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/170292",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL",
+ "description": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another [[Persistence]] technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]\n\nDetection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1128",
+ "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html",
+ "https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Credential Manipulation",
+ "description": "Account creation and manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of creating new credentials, modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\nDetection: Monitor for creation or modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.\n\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Remote System Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. Examples of commands that can list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup using the Net utility.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "File Deletion",
+ "description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Path Interception",
+ "description": "Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nDetection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as \"findstr,\" \"net,\" and \"python\"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious. \n\nData and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
+ "http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fd7hxfdd.aspx",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms687393",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/KB/103000",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/04/08/ms14-019-fixing-a-binary-hijacking-via-cmd-or-bat-file/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bootkit",
+ "description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-mbr-infections-back-fashion",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "MBR",
+ "VBR"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Indicator Removal on Host",
+ "description": "Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\nDetection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium",
+ "description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1011"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "User interface",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data from Local System",
+ "description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Web Shell",
+ "description": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client).Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.\n\nDetection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload:cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network.[[Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nEffective Permissions: User, SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1100",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Anti-virus",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness",
+ "description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1058",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Services",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Windows Admin Shares",
+ "description": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Legitimate Credentials to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using net use commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and [[Discovery]] techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server%20Message%20Block",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx",
+ "http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx",
+ "http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Authentication logs",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL",
+ "description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through [[Discovery]], and [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1004",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Remote Services",
+ "description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through [[Discovery]] techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1021"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Accessibility Features",
+ "description": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo of these accessibility programs are C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed, and C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times. The program \"sethc.exe\" is often referred to as sticky keys, and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nOn Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]\n\nDetection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1015",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Taint Shared Content",
+ "description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network [[Discovery]] techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1080"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "External Remote Services",
+ "description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Legitimate Credentials to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Legitimate Credentials for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1133",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Authentication logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Application Deployment Software",
+ "description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1017"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Automated Collection",
+ "description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Data loss prevention"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Security Support Provider",
+ "description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages and HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n[[Citation: Graeber 2014]]\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1101",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx",
+ "http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Loaded DLLs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rundll32",
+ "description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Network Sniffing",
+ "description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Network device logs",
+ "Host network interface",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Local Port Monitor",
+ "description": "A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in C:\\Windows\\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1013",
+ "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902",
+ "http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "API monitoring",
+ "DLL monitoring",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Software Packing",
+ "description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1045",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable%20compression"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Binary file metadata"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Application Window Discovery",
+ "description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1010"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Hypervisor",
+ "description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware.Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.[[Citation: Myers 2007]] A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present.[[Citation: virtualization.info 2006]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: System calls",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062",
+ "http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf",
+ "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor",
+ "http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "System calls"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Credential Dumping",
+ "description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Legitimate Credentials in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003",
+ "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa",
+ "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "PowerShell logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Web Service",
+ "description": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.\n\nPopular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nDetection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1102",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Host network interface",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Packet capture"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Query Registry",
+ "description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows%20Registry"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Third-party Software",
+ "description": "Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nDetection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Binary file metadata, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1072"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Third-party application logs",
+ "Binary file metadata",
+ "Windows Registry",
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process use of network"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Remote File Copy",
+ "description": "Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. \n\nAdversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.\n\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Network protocol analysis",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "File System Logical Offsets",
+ "description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1006",
+ "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1",
+ "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Shared Webroot",
+ "description": "Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.\n\nDetection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1051"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "File monitoring",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Indicator Blocking",
+ "description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1054"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Sensor health and status",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium",
+ "description": "In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1052"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Data loss prevention",
+ "File monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "System Time Discovery",
+ "description": "The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing net time \\\\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.\n\nDetection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings",
+ "https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process monitoring",
+ "Process command-line parameters",
+ "API monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Execution through Module Load",
+ "description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via %SystemRoot% and %ProgramFiles% directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1129",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Process Monitoring",
+ "API monitoring",
+ "File monitoring",
+ "DLL monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Install Root Certificate",
+ "description": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]\n\nDetection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1130",
+ "https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root%20certificate",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1",
+ "Linux"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "SSL/TLS inspection",
+ "Digital Certificate Logs"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits",
+ "description": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030",
+ "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd",
+ "x_mitre_platforms": [
+ "Windows Server 2003",
+ "Windows Server 2008",
+ "Windows Server 2012",
+ "Windows XP",
+ "Windows 7",
+ "Windows 8",
+ "Windows Server 2003 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2008 R2",
+ "Windows Server 2012 R2",
+ "Windows Vista",
+ "Windows 8.1"
+ ],
+ "x_mitre_data_sources": [
+ "Packet capture",
+ "Netflow/Enclave netflow",
+ "Process use of network",
+ "Process monitoring"
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+ ],
+ "version": 2,
+ "uuid": "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json b/clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8ba1cadb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json
@@ -0,0 +1,909 @@
+{
+ "uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086",
+ "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
+ "type": "mitre-course-of-action",
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
+ "name": "Course of Action",
+ "version": 3,
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e"
+ },
+ "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain DLL injection functionality by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "DLL Injection Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f"
+ },
+ "description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [[Technique/T1038|DLL Search Order Hijacking]]. \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[[CiteRef::Github UACMe]]",
+ "value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04"
+ },
+ "description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04"
+ },
+ "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
+ "value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe"
+ },
+ "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a"
+ },
+ "description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.",
+ "value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4"
+ },
+ "description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
+ "value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf"
+ },
+ "description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024"
+ },
+ "description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them[[CiteRef::Microsoft CreateProcess]]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate[[CiteRef::MSDN DLL Security]]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations[[CiteRef::Kanthak Sentinel]]. \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\\Windows\\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies,[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
+ "value": "Path Interception Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d"
+ },
+ "description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through [[Credential Access]] that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] and Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5"
+ },
+ "description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf"
+ },
+ "description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52"
+ },
+ "description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Data Staged Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425"
+ },
+ "description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]].\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
+ "value": "Credential Manipulation Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2"
+ },
+ "description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[[CiteRef::Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass]] Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.",
+ "value": "PowerShell Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3"
+ },
+ "description": "Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista. \n\nLimit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
+ "value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]]",
+ "value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb"
+ },
+ "description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [[Technique/T1077|Windows Admin Shares]]. \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2"
+ },
+ "description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [[Technique/T1111|Two-Factor Authentication Interception]] techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.",
+ "value": "External Remote Services Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e"
+ },
+ "description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]]. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform [[Lateral Movement]] between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.",
+ "value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Account Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0"
+ },
+ "description": "MSBuild.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used. Use application whitelisting configured to block MSBuild.exe to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.[[CiteRef::SubTee MSBuild]][[CiteRef::Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases]][[CiteRef::GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass]]",
+ "value": "MSBuild Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d"
+ },
+ "description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[[CiteRef::ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a"
+ },
+ "description": "Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]] if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[[CiteRef::Microsoft LSA]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not implemented by default and has hardware requirements.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Guard]]",
+ "value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432"
+ },
+ "description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]",
+ "value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions, including process hollowing, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Execution through API Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018"
+ },
+ "description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Redundant Access Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Audio Capture Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab"
+ },
+ "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "New Service Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6"
+ },
+ "description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.",
+ "value": "Scripting Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0"
+ },
+ "description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.",
+ "value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
+ "value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Timestomp Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Local Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf"
+ },
+ "description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.",
+ "value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5"
+ },
+ "description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.",
+ "value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd"
+ },
+ "description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Binary Padding Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae"
+ },
+ "description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Masquerading Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173"
+ },
+ "description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent [[Credential Access]] techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]] that can be used by existing services.",
+ "value": "Remote Services Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "File Deletion Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.",
+ "value": "Data Compressed Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5"
+ },
+ "description": "Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]",
+ "value": "Authentication Package Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.",
+ "value": "Local Port Monitor Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8"
+ },
+ "description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP NLA]]\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP Gateway]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]][[CiteRef::TechNet Secure Boot Process]]",
+ "value": "Bootkit Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf"
+ },
+ "description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [[Technique/T1003|Credential Dumping]] or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]]. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Theft]][[CiteRef::TechNet Least Privilege]]",
+ "value": "Legitimate Credentials Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.",
+ "value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Query Registry Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6"
+ },
+ "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]]",
+ "value": "Basic Input/Output System Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1"
+ },
+ "description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090"
+ },
+ "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer detection for all users by modifying registry key\n[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: \"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000; to disable installer detection, add: \"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]",
+ "value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Service Execution Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445"
+ },
+ "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]",
+ "value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782"
+ },
+ "description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935"
+ },
+ "description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e"
+ },
+ "description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
+ "value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362"
+ },
+ "description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
+ "value": "InstallUtil Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed"
+ },
+ "description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations.[[CiteRef::MSDN File Associations]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]].",
+ "value": "Input Capture Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac"
+ },
+ "description": "Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]",
+ "value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Process Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e"
+ },
+ "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739"
+ },
+ "description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.",
+ "value": "Hypervisor Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152"
+ },
+ "description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]] and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [[Technique/T1110|Brute Force]] techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Automated Collection Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145"
+ },
+ "description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Data Encoding Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908"
+ },
+ "description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.",
+ "value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Rootkit Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Modify Registry Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307"
+ },
+ "description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Local Network Connections Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55"
+ },
+ "description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Screen Capture Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5"
+ },
+ "description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf"
+ },
+ "description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for [[Privilege Escalation]] weaknesses.[[CiteRef::Powersploit]]\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
+ "value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930"
+ },
+ "description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]]. \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
+ "value": "Third-party Software Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d"
+ },
+ "description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Video Capture Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c"
+ },
+ "description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.[[CiteRef::Wikipedia HPKP]]",
+ "value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c"
+ },
+ "description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication.",
+ "value": "Brute Force Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7"
+ },
+ "description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Email Collection Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502"
+ },
+ "description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit.[[CiteRef::SRD EMET]]",
+ "value": "Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80"
+ },
+ "description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet Firewall Design]] These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6"
+ },
+ "description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.[[CiteRef::Berkley Secure]]",
+ "value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97"
+ },
+ "description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Web Service Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3"
+ },
+ "description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259"
+ },
+ "description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]",
+ "value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Data from Local System Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72"
+ },
+ "description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.[[CiteRef::Microsoft MS14-025]]",
+ "value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2"
+ },
+ "description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating [[Credential Access]] techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [[Technique/T1078|Legitimate Credentials]].\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
+ "value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08"
+ },
+ "description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.[[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]][[CiteRef::TechNet Trusted Publishers]][[CiteRef::Securelist Digital Certificates]]",
+ "value": "Code Signing Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025"
+ },
+ "description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[[CiteRef::NSA Spotting]]",
+ "value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]] to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through [[Credential Access]] and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.[[CiteRef::US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]",
+ "value": "Web Shell Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e"
+ },
+ "description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]",
+ "value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502"
+ },
+ "description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Software Packing Mitigation"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae"
+ },
+ "description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]",
+ "value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation"
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json b/clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e30a11eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json
@@ -0,0 +1,767 @@
+{
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "description": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]",
+ "value": "Poseidon Group",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0033",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73673/poseidon-group-a-targeted-attack-boutique-specializing-in-global-cyber-espionage/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Poseidon Group"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]",
+ "value": "Group5",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0043",
+ "https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Group5"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]",
+ "value": "PittyTiger",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0011",
+ "http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "fe98767f-9df8-42b9-83c9-004b1dec8647",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PittyTiger"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]",
+ "value": "admin@338",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0018",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "admin@338"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]",
+ "value": "RTM",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0048",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c416b28c-103b-4df1-909e-78089a7e0e5f",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RTM"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]",
+ "value": "APT16",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0023",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d6e88e18-81e8-4709-82d8-973095da1e70",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT16"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
+ "value": "APT28",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0007",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT28",
+ "Sednit",
+ "Sofacy",
+ "Pawn Storm",
+ "Fancy Bear",
+ "STRONTIUM",
+ "Tsar Team",
+ "Threat Group-4127",
+ "TG-4127"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
+ "value": "Winnti Group",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0044",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf",
+ "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c5947e1c-1cbc-434c-94b8-27c7e3be0fff",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Winnti Group",
+ "Blackfly"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
+ "value": "Deep Panda",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0009",
+ "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf",
+ "https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf",
+ "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Deep Panda",
+ "Shell Crew",
+ "WebMasters",
+ "KungFu Kittens",
+ "PinkPanther",
+ "Black Vine"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]",
+ "value": "Molerats",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0021",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "df71bb3b-813c-45eb-a8bc-f2a419837411",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Molerats",
+ "Gaza cybergang",
+ "Operation Molerats"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]",
+ "value": "Strider",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0041",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "277d2f87-2ae5-4730-a3aa-50c1fdff9656",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Strider",
+ "ProjectSauron"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]",
+ "value": "Sandworm Team",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0034",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf",
+ "http://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "381fcf73-60f6-4ab2-9991-6af3cbc35192",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sandworm Team",
+ "Quedagh"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[[Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016]]",
+ "value": "FIN6",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0037",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin6.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN6"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
+ "value": "Dust Storm",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0031",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ae41895a-243f-4a65-b99b-d85022326c31",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dust Storm"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]",
+ "value": "Cleaver",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0003",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/suspected-iran-based-hacker-group-creates-network-of-fake-linkedin-profiles/",
+ "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "8f5e8dc7-739d-4f5e-a8a1-a66e004d7063",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cleaver",
+ "Threat Group 2889",
+ "TG-2889"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]",
+ "value": "APT12",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0005",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html",
+ "http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c47f937f-1022-4f42-8525-e7a4779a14cb",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT12",
+ "IXESHE",
+ "DynCalc",
+ "Numbered Panda"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]",
+ "value": "Moafee",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0002",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2e5d3a83-fe00-41a5-9b60-237efc84832f",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Moafee"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]",
+ "value": "Threat Group-3390",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0027",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Threat Group-3390",
+ "TG-3390",
+ "Emissary Panda"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]",
+ "value": "DragonOK",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0017",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf",
+ "https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/MIRcon2014/MIRcon%202014%20R&D%20Track%20Insight%20into%20Symbiotic%20APT.pdf",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f3bdec95-3d62-42d9-a840-29630f6cdc1a",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DragonOK"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "value": "APT1",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0006",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT1",
+ "Comment Crew",
+ "Comment Group",
+ "Comment Panda"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]",
+ "value": "Taidoor",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0015",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "59140a2e-d117-4206-9b2c-2a8662bd9d46",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Taidoor"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]",
+ "value": "Night Dragon",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0014",
+ "http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Night Dragon"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
+ "value": "Naikon",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0019",
+ "http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2a158b0a-7ef8-43cb-9985-bf34d1e12050",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Naikon"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]",
+ "value": "Ke3chang",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0004",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ke3chang"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]",
+ "value": "Patchwork",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0040",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/patchwork-cyberespionage-group-expands-targets-governments-wide-range-industries",
+ "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Patchwork",
+ "Dropping Elephant",
+ "Chinastrats"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]",
+ "value": "APT30",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0013",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "f047ee18-7985-4946-8bfb-4ed754d3a0dd",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT30"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]",
+ "value": "MONSOON",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0042",
+ "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf",
+ "http://enterprise-manage.norman.c.bitbit.net/resources/files/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20Cyberattack%20Infrastructure.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9559ecaf-2e75-48a7-aee8-9974020bc772",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "MONSOON",
+ "Operation Hangover"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]",
+ "value": "APT17",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0025",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "090242d7-73fc-4738-af68-20162f7a5aae",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT17",
+ "Deputy Dog"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]",
+ "value": "FIN7",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0046",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FIN7"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT3 is a China-based threat group.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]",
+ "value": "APT3",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0022",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation%20doubletap.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT3",
+ "Gothic Panda",
+ "Pirpi",
+ "UPS Team",
+ "Buckeye",
+ "Threat Group-0110",
+ "TG-0110"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]",
+ "value": "GCMAN",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0036",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73638/apt-style-bank-robberies-increase-with-metel-gcman-and-carbanak-2-0-attacks/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "0ea72cd5-ca30-46ba-bc04-378f701c658f",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GCMAN"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. It was responsible for a campaign known as Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]",
+ "value": "Lazarus Group",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0032",
+ "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lazarus Group"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]",
+ "value": "Lotus Blossom",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0030",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/",
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "88b7dbc2-32d3-4e31-af2f-3fc24e1582d7",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lotus Blossom",
+ "Spring Dragon"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]",
+ "value": "Equation",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0020",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Equation"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]",
+ "value": "Darkhotel",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0012",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Darkhotel"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]",
+ "value": "Dragonfly",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0035",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "1c63d4ec-0a75-4daa-b1df-0d11af3d3cc1",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dragonfly",
+ "Energetic Bear"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]",
+ "value": "Suckfly",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0039",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "5cbe0d3b-6fb1-471f-b591-4b192915116d",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Suckfly"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]",
+ "value": "Stealth Falcon",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0038",
+ "https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "894aab42-3371-47b1-8859-a4a074c804c8",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Stealth Falcon"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
+ "value": "Scarlet Mimic",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0029",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Scarlet Mimic"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]",
+ "value": "Threat Group-1314",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0028",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "d519164e-f5fa-4b8c-a1fb-cf0172ad0983",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Threat Group-1314",
+ "TG-1314"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]",
+ "value": "Turla",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0010",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Turla",
+ "Waterbug"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]",
+ "value": "APT29",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0016",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT29",
+ "The Dukes",
+ "Cozy Bear"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]",
+ "value": "menuPass",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0045",
+ "https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "menuPass",
+ "Stone Panda",
+ "APT10"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
+ "value": "Putter Panda",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0024",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "5ce5392a-3a6c-4e07-9df3-9b6a9159ac45",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Putter Panda",
+ "APT2",
+ "MSUpdater"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
+ "value": "Axiom",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0001",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf",
+ "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/70991/games-are-over/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Axiom",
+ "Group 72"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]",
+ "value": "Carbanak",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0008",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carbanak",
+ "Anunak"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]",
+ "value": "APT18",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0026",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "38fd6a28-3353-4f2b-bb2b-459fecd5c648",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "APT18",
+ "Threat Group-0416",
+ "TG-0416",
+ "Dynamite Panda"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]",
+ "value": "Gamaredon Group",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Group/G0047",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2e290bfe-93b5-48ce-97d6-edcd6d32b7cf",
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Gamaredon Group"
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "name": "intrusion Set",
+ "type": "mitre-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
+ "version": 3,
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre_malware.json b/clusters/mitre_malware.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8b6f5bc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/mitre_malware.json
@@ -0,0 +1,1558 @@
+{
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "description": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0138",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "OLDBAIT",
+ "Sasfis"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "OLDBAIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0050",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CosmicDuke",
+ "TinyBaron",
+ "BotgenStudios",
+ "NemesisGemina"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CosmicDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0132",
+ "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "H1N1"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8b880b41-5139-4807-baa9-309690218719",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0035",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SPACESHIP"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0087",
+ "http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Hi-Zor"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]\n\nAliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4f6aa78c-c3d4-4883-9840-96ca2f5d6d47",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0146",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TEXTMATE",
+ "DNSMessenger"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "TEXTMATE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]\n\nAliases: Net Crawler, NetC",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fde50aaa-f5de-4cb8-989a-babb57d6a704",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0056",
+ "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Net Crawler",
+ "NetC"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Net Crawler"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]\n\nAliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0089",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BlackEnergy",
+ "Black Energy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BlackEnergy"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b96680d1-5eb3-4f07-b95c-00ab904ac236",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0124",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-new-wekby-attacks-use-dns-requests-as-command-and-control-mechanism/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Pisloader"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]\n\nAliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0093",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Backdoor.Oldrea",
+ "Havex"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Backdoor.Oldrea"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0144",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/",
+ "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ChChes"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4b62ab58-c23b-4704-9c15-edd568cd59f8",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0047",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-uses-uefi-bios-rootkit-to-keep-rcs-9-agent-in-target-systems/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e8268361-a599-4e45-bd3f-71c8c7e700c0",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0068",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "httpclient"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]\n\nAliases: Downdelph, Delphacy",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0134",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Downdelph",
+ "Delphacy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Downdelph"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "91000a8a-58cc-4aba-9ad0-993ad6302b86",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0142",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "StreamEx"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0078",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Psylo"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]\n\nAliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "007b44b6-e4c5-480b-b5b9-56f2081b1b7b",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0061",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HDoor",
+ "Custom HDoor"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "HDoor"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0004",
+ "http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "TinyZBot"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]\n\nAliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0031",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BACKSPACE",
+ "Lecna"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BACKSPACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ae9d818d-95d0-41da-b045-9cabea1ca164",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0048",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "PinchDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cbf646f1-7db5-4dc6-808b-0094313949df",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0054",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CloudDuke",
+ "MiniDionis",
+ "CloudLook"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CloudDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "22addc7b-b39f-483d-979a-1b35147da5de",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0059",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "WinMM"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "463f68f1-5cde-4dc2-a831-68b73488f8f4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0079",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "MobileOrder"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7f8730af-f683-423f-9ee1-5f6875a80481",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0060",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Sys10"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0038",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20duqu%20the%20precursor%20to%20the%20next%20stuxnet.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Duqu"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0076",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "FakeM"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b1de6916-7a22-4460-8d26-6b5483ffaa2a",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0028",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SHIPSHAPE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "876f6a77-fbc5-4e13-ab1a-5611986730a3",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0098",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "T9000"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "67fc172a-36fa-4a35-88eb-4ba730ed52a6",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0014",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BS2005"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "1d808f62-cf63-4063-9727-ff6132514c22",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0109",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "WEBC2"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0013",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PlugX",
+ "Sogu",
+ "Kaba"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "PlugX"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0083",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Misdat"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b143dfa4-e944-43ff-8429-bfffc308c517",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0011",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20the%20taidoor%20campaign.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Taidoor"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0149",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "MoonWind"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "326af1cd-78e7-45b7-a326-125d2f7ef8f2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0115",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Crimson",
+ "MSIL/Crimson"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Crimson"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0090",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/new-malware-rover-targets-indian-ambassador-to-afghanistan/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Rover"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0086",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ZLib"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "00c3bfcb-99bd-4767-8c03-b08f585f5c8a",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0139",
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "PowerDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]\n\nAliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0070",
+ "https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HTTPBrowser",
+ "Token Control",
+ "HttpDump"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "HTTPBrowser"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0037",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HAMMERTOSS",
+ "HammerDuke",
+ "NetDuke"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "HAMMERTOSS"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]\n\nAliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0012",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PoisonIvy",
+ "Poison Ivy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "PoisonIvy"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]\n\nAliases: Carbanak, Anunak",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0030",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carbanak",
+ "Anunak"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Carbanak"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0015",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolve-quickly.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Ixeshe"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0128",
+ "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BADNEWS"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]\n\nAliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ff6840c9-4c87-4d07-bbb6-9f50aa33d498",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0143",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Flame",
+ "Flamer",
+ "sKyWIper"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Flame"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ad4f146f-e3ec-444a-ba71-24bffd7f0f8e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0003",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "RIPTIDE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0046",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CozyCar",
+ "CozyDuke",
+ "CozyBear",
+ "Cozer",
+ "EuroAPT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CozyCar"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fbb470da-1d44-4f29-bbb3-9efbe20f94a3",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0080",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/the-black-vine-cyberespionage-group.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Mivast"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b2203c59-4089-4ee4-bfe1-28fa25f0dbfe",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0107",
+ "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Shining-the-Spotlight-on-Cherry-Picker-PoS-Malware/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Cherry Picker"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7343e208-7cab-45f2-a47b-41ba5e2f0fab",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0117",
+ "https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-the-russian-xtunnel/",
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "XTunnel",
+ "X-Tunnel",
+ "XAPS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "XTunnel"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "GeminiDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]\n\nAliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "96b08451-b27a-4ff6-893f-790e26393a8e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0074",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sakula",
+ "Sakurel",
+ "VIPER"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Sakula"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "40d3e230-ed32-469f-ba89-be70cc08ab39",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0092",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/virus-watch/58551/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Agent.btz"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0113",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Prikormka"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "53cf6cc4-65aa-445a-bcf8-c3d296f8a7a2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "NETEAGLE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]\n\nAliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0136",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "USBStealer",
+ "USB Stealer",
+ "Win32/USBStealer"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "USBStealer"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5a84dc36-df0d-4053-9b7c-f0c388a57283",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0025",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CALENDAR"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0019",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Regin"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f5352566-1a64-49ac-8f7f-97e1d1a03300",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0129",
+ "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "AutoIt"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5f9f7648-04ba-4a9f-bb4c-2a13e74572bd",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0147",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Pteranodon"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8c553311-0baa-4146-997a-f79acef3d831",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0055",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "RARSTONE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]\n\nAliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0063",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/operation-clandestine-wolf-adobe-flash-zero-day.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SHOTPUT",
+ "Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter",
+ "Pirpi"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SHOTPUT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "82cb34ba-02b5-432b-b2d2-07f55cbf674d",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0094",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/Dragonfly%20Threat%20Against%20Western%20Energy%20Suppliers.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Trojan.Karagany"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0088",
+ "http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Kasidet"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0023",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CHOPSTICK",
+ "SPLM",
+ "Xagent",
+ "X-Agent",
+ "webhp"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CHOPSTICK"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5e7ef1dc-7fb6-4913-ac75-e06113b59e0c",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0051",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "MiniDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0127",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BBSRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]\n\nAliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0081",
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Elise",
+ "BKDR_ESILE",
+ "Page"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Elise"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0017",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BISCUIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "80a014ba-3fef-4768-990b-37d8bd10d7f4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0022",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Uroburos"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]\n\nAliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "17e919aa-4a49-445c-b103-dbb8df9e7351",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0145",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html",
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "POWERSOURCE",
+ "DNSMessenger"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "POWERSOURCE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9e2bba94-950b-4fcf-8070-cb3f816c5f4e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0071",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "hcdLoader"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]\n\nAliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "552462b9-ae79-49dd-855c-5973014e157f",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0027",
+ "https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Zeroaccess",
+ "Trojan.Zeroaccess"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Zeroaccess"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "89f63ae4-f229-4a5c-95ad-6f22ed2b5c49",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0007",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Skeleton Key"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]\n\nAliases: Shamoon, Disttrack",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0140",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye%20respondsto.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Shamoon",
+ "Disttrack"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Shamoon"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8e461ca3-0996-4e6e-a0df-e2a5bbc51ebc",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0065",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "4H RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "da2ef4a9-7cbe-400a-a379-e2f230f28db3",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0114",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BOOTRASH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0020",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "China Chopper"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a19c49aa-36fe-4c05-b817-23e1c7a7d085",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0041",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/wiper-malware-analysis-attacking-korean-financial-sector/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Wiper"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0130",
+ "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Unknown Logger"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0032",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "gh0st"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "60c18d06-7b91-4742-bae3-647845cd9d81",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0137",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CORESHELL",
+ "SOURFACE"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CORESHELL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]\n\nAliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0125",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Remsec",
+ "Backdoor.Remsec",
+ "ProjectSauron"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Remsec"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "43213480-78f7-4fb3-976f-d48f5f6a4c2a",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0036",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "FLASHFLOOD"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "85b39628-204a-48d2-b377-ec368cbcb7ca",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0131",
+ "https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/resources/files/forcepoint-security-labs-monsoon-analysis-report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "TINYTYPHON"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]\n\nAliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0053",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SeaDuke",
+ "SeaDaddy",
+ "SeaDesk"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SeaDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]\n\nAliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0045",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ADVSTORESHELL",
+ "NETUI",
+ "EVILTOSS",
+ "AZZY",
+ "Sedreco"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ADVSTORESHELL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0085",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "S-Type"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0033",
+ "http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "NetTraveler"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "63c2a130-8a5b-452f-ad96-07cf0af12ffe",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0024",
+ "http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Dyre"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]\n\nAliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0016",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The%20Lifecycle%20of%20Peer%20to%20Peer%20Gameover%20ZeuS/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "P2P ZeuS",
+ "Peer-to-Peer ZeuS",
+ "Gameover ZeuS"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "P2P ZeuS"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0126",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf",
+ "https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ComRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0141",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/",
+ "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Winnti"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0148",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "RTM"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cb7bcf6f-085f-41db-81ee-4b68481661b5",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0077",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/scarlet-mimic-years-long-espionage-targets-minority-activists/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CallMe"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e669bb87-f773-4c7b-bfcc-a9ffebfdd8d4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0135",
+ "http://www.sekoia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rootkit-analysis-Use-case-on-HIDEDRV-v1.6.pdf",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "HIDEDRV"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0084",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/hubfs/2015%20cylance%20website/assets/operation-dust-storm/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf?t=1456259131512"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Mis-Type"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage [[persistence]] and [[exfiltration]] after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "95047f03-4811-4300-922e-1ba937d53a61",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0009",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Hikit"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]\n\nAliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "56f46b17-8cfa-46c0-b501-dd52fef394e2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0073",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ASPXSpy",
+ "ASPXTool"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ASPXSpy"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0018",
+ "http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments",
+ "https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/sykipot-variant-hijacks-dod-and-windows-smart-cards"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Sykipot"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]\n\nAliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "f2e8c7a1-cae1-45c4-baf0-6f21bdcbb2c2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0026",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GLOOXMAIL",
+ "Trojan.GTALK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "GLOOXMAIL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0f862b01-99da-47cc-9bdb-db4a86a95bb1",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0082",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Emissary"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]\n\nAliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0133",
+ "http://news.softpedia.com/news/cryptocurrency-mining-malware-discovered-targeting-seagate-nas-hard-drives-508119.shtml"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Miner-C",
+ "Mal/Miner-C",
+ "PhotoMiner"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Miner-C"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]\n\nAliases: DustySky, NeD Worm",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0062",
+ "http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Operation-DustySky2%20-6.2016%20TLP%20White.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DustySky",
+ "NeD Worm"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "DustySky"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]\n\nAliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "123bd7b3-675c-4b1a-8482-c55782b20e2b",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0043",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BUBBLEWRAP",
+ "Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BUBBLEWRAP"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "800bdfba-6d66-480f-9f45-15845c05cb5d",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0067",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "pngdowner"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0058",
+ "https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SslMM"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]\n\nAliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0118",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Nidiran",
+ "Backdoor.Nidiran"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Nidiran"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c5e9cb46-aced-466c-85ea-7db5572ad9ec",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0001",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Trojan.Mebromi"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0072",
+ "http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "OwaAuth"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cba78a1c-186f-4112-9e6a-be1839f030f7",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0112",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ROCKBOOT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b136d088-a829-432c-ac26-5529c26d4c7e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0052",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "OnionDuke"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "2a6f4c7b-e690-4cc7-ab6b-1f821fb6b80b",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0042",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "LOWBALL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d69c8146-ab35-4d50-8382-6fc80e641d43",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0069",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BLACKCOFFEE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0021",
+ "http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf",
+ "https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/TA%20Fidelis%20Turbo%201602%200.pdf",
+ "https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Derusbi"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]\n\nAliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0091",
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Epic",
+ "Tavdig",
+ "Wipbot",
+ "WorldCupSec",
+ "TadjMakhal"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Epic"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]\n\nAliases: Lurid, Enfal",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "251fbae2-78f6-4de7-84f6-194c727a64ad",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0010",
+ "http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp%20dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lurid",
+ "Enfal"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Lurid"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0066",
+ "http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "3PARA RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]\n\nAliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0044",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part1.pdf",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/",
+ "https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "JHUHUGIT",
+ "Seduploader",
+ "JKEYSKW",
+ "Sednit",
+ "GAMEFISH"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "JHUHUGIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "3cab1b76-2f40-4cd0-8d2c-7ed16eeb909c",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0064",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "ELMER"
+ }
+ ],
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "type": "mitre-malware",
+ "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4",
+ "version": 2,
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
+ "name": "Malware"
+}
diff --git a/clusters/mitre_tool.json b/clusters/mitre_tool.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..18592a45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/mitre_tool.json
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+{
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "value": "at",
+ "description": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]\n\nAliases: at, at.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "0c8465c0-d0b4-4670-992e-4eee8d7ff952",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0110",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "at",
+ "at.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "route",
+ "description": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]\n\nAliases: route, route.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c11ac61d-50f4-444f-85d8-6f006067f0de",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0103",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490991.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "route",
+ "route.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Tasklist",
+ "description": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0057",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491010.aspx"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2e45723a-31da-4a7e-aaa6-e01998a6788f"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Windows Credential Editor",
+ "description": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]\n\nAliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "242f3da3-4425-4d11-8f5c-b842886da966",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0005",
+ "http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/wcefaq.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Windows Credential Editor",
+ "WCE"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "schtasks",
+ "description": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]\n\nAliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "c9703cd3-141c-43a0-a926-380082be5d04",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0111",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490996.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "schtasks",
+ "schtasks.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "UACMe",
+ "description": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0116",
+ "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "102c3898-85e0-43ee-ae28-62a0a3ed9507"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ifconfig",
+ "description": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0101",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ifconfig"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "362dc67f-4e85-4562-9dac-1b6b7f3ec4b5"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Mimikatz",
+ "description": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0002",
+ "https://adsecurity.org/?page%20id=1821",
+ "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "xCmd",
+ "description": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0123",
+ "https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4fa49fc0-9162-4bdb-a37e-7aa3dcb6d38b"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Systeminfo",
+ "description": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]\n\nAliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "7fcbc4e8-1989-441f-9ac5-e7b6ff5806f1",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0096",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb491007.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Systeminfo",
+ "systeminfo.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "netsh",
+ "description": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]\n\nAliases: netsh, netsh.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "5a63f900-5e7e-4928-a746-dd4558e1df71",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0108",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "netsh",
+ "netsh.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "dsquery",
+ "description": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.\n\nAliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0105",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732952.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "dsquery",
+ "dsquery.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "gsecdump",
+ "description": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0008",
+ "http://www.truesec.com/Tools/Tool/gsecdump%20v2.0b5"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "b07c2c47-fefb-4d7c-a69e-6a3296171f54"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ping",
+ "description": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]\n\nAliases: Ping, ping.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b77b563c-34bb-4fb8-86a3-3694338f7b47",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0097",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490968.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ping",
+ "ping.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fgdump",
+ "description": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0120",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "4f45dfeb-fe51-4df0-8db3-edf7dd0513fe"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Lslsass",
+ "description": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0121",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "2fab555f-7664-4623-b4e0-1675ae38190b"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit",
+ "description": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0122",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FTP",
+ "description": "FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]\n\nAliases: FTP, ftp.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cf23bf4a-e003-4116-bbae-1ea6c558d565",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0095",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%20Transfer%20Protocol"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FTP",
+ "ftp.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ipconfig",
+ "description": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]\n\nAliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "294e2560-bd48-44b2-9da2-833b5588ad11",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0100",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490921.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ipconfig",
+ "ipconfig.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "nbtstat",
+ "description": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]\n\nAliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "b35068ec-107a-4266-bda8-eb7036267aea",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0102",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940106.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "nbtstat",
+ "nbtstat.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HTRAN",
+ "description": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]\n\nAliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "d5e96a35-7b0b-4c6a-9533-d63ecbda563e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0040",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-quantum-entanglement.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HTRAN",
+ "HUC Packet Transmit Tool"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "netstat",
+ "description": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]\n\nAliases: netstat, netstat.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "4664b683-f578-434f-919b-1c1aad2a1111",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0104",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490947.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "netstat",
+ "netstat.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "pwdump",
+ "description": "pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0006",
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pwdump"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "9de2308e-7bed-43a3-8e58-f194b3586700"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cachedump",
+ "description": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0119",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "c9cd7ec9-40b7-49db-80be-1399eddd9c52"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Net",
+ "description": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for [[Discovery]], moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using net use commands, and interacting with services.\n\nAliases: Net, net.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0039",
+ "https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa939914",
+ "http://windowsitpro.com/windows/netexe-reference"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Net",
+ "net.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PsExec",
+ "description": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0029",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx",
+ "https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/12/17/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-psexec-deep-dive"
+ ],
+ "uuid": "ff6caf67-ea1f-4895-b80e-4bb0fc31c6db"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Arp",
+ "description": "Arp displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]\n\nAliases: Arp, arp.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "30489451-5886-4c46-90c9-0dff9adc5252",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0099",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490864.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Arp",
+ "arp.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "cmd",
+ "description": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]\n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., dir[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., del[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., copy[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).\n\nAliases: cmd, cmd.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "bba595da-b73a-4354-aa6c-224d4de7cb4e",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0106",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490880.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490886.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771049.aspx",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc755121.aspx"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "cmd",
+ "cmd.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Reg",
+ "description": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]\n\nAliases: Reg, reg.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "uuid": "cde2d700-9ed1-46cf-9bce-07364fe8b24f",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0075",
+ "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx",
+ "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Reg",
+ "reg.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ }
+ ],
+ "type": "mitre-tool",
+ "authors": [
+ "MITRE"
+ ],
+ "version": 2,
+ "source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
+ "name": "Tool",
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "uuid": "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0"
+}
diff --git a/clusters/ransomware.json b/clusters/ransomware.json
index 28608c2e..e12d8195 100644
--- a/clusters/ransomware.json
+++ b/clusters/ransomware.json
@@ -1,869 +1,8545 @@
{
"authors": [
- "Various"
+ "https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml",
+ "http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar"
],
- "description": "Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml",
- "type": "ransomware",
- "version": 1,
- "name": "Ransomware",
- "uuid": "10cf658b-5d32-4c4b-bb32-61760a640372",
"values": [
{
- "description": "AES(256); .enc; ",
- "value": ".CryptoHasYou."
- },
- {
- "description": "Sevleg; XOR; .777; ._[timestamp]_$[email]$.777 e.g. ._14-05-2016-11-59-36_$ninja.gaiver@aol.com$.777; ",
- "value": "777"
- },
- {
- "description": "7ev3n-HONE$T; .R4A .R5A; ",
- "value": "7ev3n"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .7h9r; ",
- "value": "7h9r"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (256); .8lock8; ",
- "value": "8lock8"
- },
- {
- "description": ".bin; ",
- "value": "Alfa Ransomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(128); random; random(x5); ",
- "value": "Alma Ransomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "AlphaLocker; AES(256); .encrypt; ",
- "value": "Alpha Ransomware"
- },
- {
- "description": ".amba; ",
- "value": "AMBA"
- },
- {
- "description": ".adk; ",
- "value": "Angry Duck"
- },
- {
- "description": "Fabiansomeware; .encrypted .SecureCrypted .FuckYourData .unavailable .bleepYourFiles .Where_my_files.txt; ",
- "value": "Apocalypse"
- },
- {
- "description": ".encrypted .locked; ",
- "value": "ApocalypseVM"
- },
- {
- "description": ".locky; ",
- "value": "AutoLocky"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "BadBlock"
- },
- {
- "description": ".adr; ",
- "value": "BaksoCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "Rakhni; AES(256); .id-[ID]_[EMAIL_ADDRESS]; ",
- "value": "Bandarchor"
- },
- {
- "description": "BaCrypt; .bart.zip .bart .perl; ",
- "value": "Bart"
- },
- {
- "description": ".clf; ",
- "value": "BitCryptor"
- },
- {
- "description": "Base64 + String Replacement; .bitstak; ",
- "value": "BitStak"
- },
- {
- "description": "SilentShade; AES (256); .Silent; ",
- "value": "BlackShades Crypter"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (256); .blocatto; ",
- "value": "Blocatto"
- },
- {
- "description": "Salam!; ",
- "value": "Booyah"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .lock; ",
- "value": "Brazilian"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; ",
- "value": "BrLock"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Browlock"
- },
- {
- "description": "GOST; ; ",
- "value": "Bucbi"
- },
- {
- "description": "(.*).encoded.([A-Z0-9]{9}); ",
- "value": "BuyUnlockCode"
- },
- {
- "description": ".cry; ",
- "value": "Central Security Treatment Organization"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .cerber .cerber2 .cerber3; ",
- "value": "Cerber"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crypt 4 random characters, e.g., .PzZs, .MKJL; ",
- "value": "Chimera"
- },
- {
- "description": ".clf; ",
- "value": "CoinVault"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .coverton .enigma .czvxce; ",
- "value": "Coverton"
- },
- {
- "description": ".{CRYPTENDBLACKDC}; ",
- "value": "Cryaki"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Crybola"
- },
- {
- "description": "Moves bytes; .criptiko .criptoko .criptokod .cripttt .aga; ",
- "value": "CryFile"
- },
- {
- "description": "Cry, CSTO; .cry; ",
- "value": "CryLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); ",
- "value": "CrypMIC"
- },
- {
- "description": ".ENCRYPTED; ",
- "value": "Crypren"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .crypt38; ",
- "value": "Crypt38"
- },
- {
- "description": "Hidden Tear; AES(256); ",
- "value": "Cryptear"
- },
- {
- "description": "RSA; .scl; id[_ID]email_xerx@usa.com.scl; ",
- "value": "CryptFIle2"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crinf; ",
- "value": "CryptInfinite"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES and RSA; ",
- "value": "CryptoBit"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "CryptoDefense"
- },
- {
- "description": "Ranscam; ",
- "value": "CryptoFinancial"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (256), RSA (1024); .frtrss; ",
- "value": "CryptoFortress"
- },
- {
- "description": ".clf; ",
- "value": "CryptoGraphic Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Manamecrypt, Telograph, ROI Locker; AES(256) (RAR implementation); ",
- "value": "CryptoHost"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES-256; .crjoker; ",
- "value": "CryptoJoker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".encrypted .ENC; ",
- "value": "CryptoLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "[A-F0-9]{8}_luck; ",
- "value": "CryptoLuck / YafunnLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Zeta; .code .scl; .id_(ID_MACHINE)_email_xoomx@dr.com_.code .id_*_email_zeta@dr.com .id_(ID_MACHINE)_email_anx@dr.com_.scl; ",
- "value": "CryptoMix"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .crptrgr; ",
- "value": "CryptoRoger"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .locked; ",
- "value": "CryptoShocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".CryptoTorLocker2015!; ",
- "value": "CryptoTorLocker2015"
- },
- {
- "description": "no filename change; ",
- "value": "CryptoWall 1"
- },
- {
- "description": "no filename change; ",
- "value": "CryptoWall 2"
- },
- {
- "description": "no filename change; ",
- "value": "CryptoWall 3"
- },
- {
- "description": "., e.g., 27p9k967z.x1nep; ",
- "value": "CryptoWall 4"
- },
- {
- "description": "CryptProjectXXX; .crypt; ",
- "value": "CryptXXX"
- },
- {
- "description": "CryptProjectXXX; .crypt; ",
- "value": "CryptXXX 2.0"
- },
- {
- "description": "UltraDeCrypter UltraCrypter; .crypt .cryp1 .crypz .cryptz random; ",
- "value": "CryptXXX 3.0"
- },
- {
- "description": ".cryp1; ",
- "value": "CryptXXX 3.1"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "CTB-Faker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Citroni; RSA(2048); .ctbl ; .([a-z]{6,7}); ",
- "value": "CTB-Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); ",
- "value": "CTB-Locker WEB"
- },
- {
- "description": "my-Little-Ransomware; AES(128); .已加密 .encrypted; ",
- "value": "CuteRansomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Deadly for a Good Purpose"
- },
- {
- "description": ".html; ",
- "value": "DeCrypt Protect"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES-256; .ded; ",
- "value": "DEDCryptor"
- },
- {
- "description": "Based on Detox: Calipso We are all Pokemons Nullbyte; AES; ",
- "value": "DetoxCrypto"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "DirtyDecrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256) in ECB mode, Version 2-4 also RSA; ",
- "value": "DMALocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); ",
- "value": "DMALocker 3.0"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .domino; ",
- "value": "Domino"
- },
- {
- "description": "Cryptear; AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "EDA2 / HiddenTear"
- },
- {
- "description": "EduCrypter; .isis .locked; ",
- "value": "EduCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "Los Pollos Hermanos; .ha3; ",
- "value": "El-Polocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Trojan.Encoder.6491; ",
- "value": "Encoder.xxxx"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (128); .enigma .1txt; ",
- "value": "Enigma"
- },
- {
- "description": ".exotic; ",
- "value": "Exotic"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Fairware"
- },
- {
- "description": ".locked; ",
- "value": "Fakben"
- },
- {
- "description": "Variants: Comrade Circle; AES(128); .fantom; ",
- "value": "Fantom"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Fonco"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "FSociety"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Fury"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (256); .Z81928819; ",
- "value": "GhostCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "Purge; Blowfish; .purge; ",
- "value": "Globe v1"
- },
- {
- "description": "Purge; Blowfish; .. e.g.: .7076.docx.okean-1955@india.com.!dsvgdfvdDVGR3SsdvfEF75sddf#xbkNY45fg6}P{cg; ",
- "value": "Globe v2"
- },
- {
- "description": "Purge; RC4; .globe or random; ",
- "value": "Globe v3"
- },
- {
- "description": "Variants, from old to latest: Zyklon Locker WildFire locker Hades Locker; AES (256); .locked; .locked, e.g., bill.!ID!8MMnF!ID!.locked; ",
- "value": "GNL Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crypt; !___[EMAILADDRESS]_.crypt; ",
- "value": "Gomasom"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Goopic"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Gopher"
- },
- {
- "description": ".html; ",
- "value": "Harasom"
- },
- {
- "description": "Mamba; Custom (net shares), XTS-AES (disk); ",
- "value": "HDDCryptor"
- },
- {
- "description": ".herbst; ",
- "value": "Herbst"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .cry ; ",
- "value": "Hi Buddy!"
- },
- {
- "description": "removes extensions; ",
- "value": "Hitler"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; (encrypted); ",
- "value": "HolyCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "Hungarian Locky (Hucky); AES, RSA (hardcoded); .locky; [a-zA-Z0-9+_-]{1,}.[a-z0-9]{3,4}.locky; ",
- "value": "Hucky"
- },
- {
- "description": "hydracrypt_ID_[\\w]{8}; ",
- "value": "HydraCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crime; ",
- "value": "iLock"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crime; ",
- "value": "iLockLight"
- },
- {
- "description": "<6 random characters>; ",
- "value": "International Police Association"
- },
- {
- "description": "!ENC; ",
- "value": "JagerDecryptor"
- },
- {
- "description": "Encryptor RaaS, Sarento; RC6 (files), RSA 2048 (RC6 key); ",
- "value": "Jeiphoos"
- },
- {
- "description": "CryptoHitMan (subvariant); AES(256); .btc .kkk .fun .gws .porno .payransom .payms .paymst .AFD .paybtcs .epic .xyz; ",
- "value": "Jigsaw"
- },
- {
- "description": "TripleDES; .locked .css; ",
- "value": "Job Crypter"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .encrypted; ",
- "value": "KeRanger"
- },
- {
- "description": "keybtc@inbox_com ; ",
- "value": "KeyBTC"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "KEYHolder"
- },
- {
- "description": ".rip; ",
- "value": "Killer Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .kimcilware .locked; ",
- "value": "KimcilWare"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .암호화됨; ",
- "value": "Korean"
- },
- {
- "description": ".kostya; ",
- "value": "Kostya"
- },
- {
- "description": "QC; RSA(2048); .31392E30362E32303136_[ID-KEY]_LSBJ1; .([0-9A-Z]{20})_([0-9]{2})_([A-Z0-9]{4,5}); ",
- "value": "Kozy.Jozy"
- },
- {
- "description": ".kratos; ",
- "value": "KratosCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); ",
- "value": "KryptoLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".LeChiffre; ",
- "value": "LeChiffre"
- },
- {
- "description": "Linux.Encoder.{0,3}; ",
- "value": "Linux.Encoder"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(128); .locky .zepto .odin .shit .thor .asier .zzzzz .osiris; ([A-F0-9]{32}).locky ([A-F0-9]{32}).zepto ([A-F0-9]{32}).odin ([A-F0-9]{32}).shit ([A-F0-9]{32}).thor ([A-F0-9]{32}).aesir ([A-F0-9]{32}).zzzzz ([A-F0-9]{32}).osiris; ",
- "value": "Locky"
- },
- {
- "description": ".lock93; ",
- "value": "Lock93"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crime; ",
- "value": "Lortok"
- },
- {
- "description": "oor.; ",
- "value": "LowLevel04"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Mabouia"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .magic; ",
- "value": "Magic"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256), RSA (2048); [a-z]{4,6}; ",
- "value": "MaktubLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Crypt888; AES; Lock.; ",
- "value": "MIRCOP"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .fucked, .fuck; ",
- "value": "MireWare"
- },
- {
- "description": "\"Petya's little brother\"; .([a-zA-Z0-9]{4}); ",
- "value": "Mischa"
- },
- {
- "description": "Booyah; AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "MM Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Yakes CryptoBit; .KEYZ .KEYH0LES; ",
- "value": "Mobef"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "n1n1n1"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Nagini"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES (256), RSA; ",
- "value": "NanoLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "XOR(255) 7zip; .crypted; ",
- "value": "Nemucod"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "NoobCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "XOR; .odcodc; C-email-abennaki@india.com-(NOMBRE_ARCHIVO.ext).odcodc; ",
- "value": "ODCODC"
- },
- {
- "description": "Vipasana, Cryakl; .cbf; email-[params].cbf; ",
- "value": "Offline ransomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "GPCode; .LOL! .OMG!; ",
- "value": "OMG! Ransomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Onyx"
- },
- {
- "description": ".EXE; ",
- "value": "Operation Global III"
- },
- {
- "description": ".padcrypt; ",
- "value": "PadCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "XOR; ",
- "value": "PClock"
- },
- {
- "description": "Goldeneye; Modified Salsa20; ",
- "value": "Petya"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; .locked; ",
- "value": "Philadelphia"
- },
- {
- "description": ".id-[victim_id]-maestro@pizzacrypts.info; ",
- "value": "PizzaCrypts"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "PokemonGO"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .filock; ",
- "value": "Popcorn Time"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); ",
- "value": "Polyglot"
- },
- {
- "description": "PoshCoder; AES(128); .locky; ",
- "value": "PowerWare"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES, but throws key away, destroys the files; ",
- "value": "PowerWorm"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "PRISM"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crypt; ",
- "value": "R980"
- },
- {
- "description": "RAA; .locked; ",
- "value": "RAA encryptor"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .RDM .RRK .RAD .RADAMANT; ",
- "value": "Radamant"
- },
- {
- "description": "Agent.iih Aura Autoit Pletor Rotor Lamer Isda Cryptokluchen Bandarchor; .locked .kraken .darkness .nochance .oshit .oplata@qq_com .relock@qq_com .crypto .helpdecrypt@ukr.net .pizda@qq_com .dyatel@qq_com _ryp .nalog@qq_com .chifrator@qq_com .gruzin@qq_com .troyancoder@qq_com .encrypted .cry .AES256 .enc .hb15; .coderksu@gmail_com_id[0-9]{2,3} .crypt@india.com.[\\w]{4,12}; ",
- "value": "Rakhni"
- },
- {
- "description": "locked-.[a-zA-Z]{4}; ",
- "value": "Rannoh"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Ransom32"
- },
- {
- "description": "Asymmetric 1024 ; ",
- "value": "RansomLock"
- },
- {
- "description": ".vscrypt .infected .bloc .korrektor; ",
- "value": "Rector"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .rekt; ",
- "value": "RektLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".remind .crashed; ",
- "value": "RemindMe"
- },
- {
- "description": "Curve25519 + ChaCha; .rokku; ",
- "value": "Rokku"
- },
- {
- "description": "samsam.exe MIKOPONI.exe RikiRafael.exe showmehowto.exe; AES(256) + RSA(2096); .encryptedAES .encryptedRSA .encedRSA .justbtcwillhelpyou .btcbtcbtc .btc-help-you .only-we_can-help_you .iwanthelpuuu .notfoundrans .encmywork; ",
- "value": "Samas-Samsam"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256) + RSA(2096); .sanction; ",
- "value": "Sanction"
- },
- {
- "description": "Sarah_G@ausi.com___; ",
- "value": "Satana"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Scraper"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; ",
- "value": "Serpico"
- },
- {
- "description": "Atom; .locked; ",
- "value": "Shark"
- },
- {
- "description": ".shino; ",
- "value": "ShinoLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "KinCrypt; ",
- "value": "Shujin"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .~; ",
- "value": "Simple_Encoder"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "SkidLocker / Pompous"
- },
- {
- "description": ".encrypted; ",
- "value": "Smrss32"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .RSNSlocked .RSplited; ",
- "value": "SNSLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".sport; ",
- "value": "Sport"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "Stampado"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "Strictor"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .surprise .tzu; ",
- "value": "Surprise"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Survey"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "SynoLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".szf; ",
- "value": "SZFLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Telecrypt PDM:Trojan.Win32.Generic; .xcri; ",
- "value": "TeleCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "AlphaCrypt; .vvv .ecc .exx .ezz .abc .aaa .zzz .xyz; ",
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256) + ECHD + SHA1; .micro .xxx .ttt .mp3; ",
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 3.0+"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256) + ECHD + SHA1; ",
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.1A"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.2"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "Threat Finder"
- },
- {
- "description": "Crypt0L0cker (subvariant); AES(256) CBC for files RSA(1024) for AES key uses LibTomCrypt; .Encrypted .enc; ",
- "value": "TorrentLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "TowerWeb"
- },
- {
- "description": ".toxcrypt; ",
- "value": "Toxcrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "Shade XTBL; AES(256); .better_call_saul .xtbl .da_vinci_code .windows10; ",
- "value": "Troldesh"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .enc; ",
- "value": "TrueCrypter"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .locked; ",
- "value": "Turkish Ransom"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; umbrecrypt_ID_[VICTIMID]; ",
- "value": "UmbreCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; .H3LL .0x0 .1999; ",
- "value": "Ungluk"
- },
- {
- "description": ".CRRRT .CCCRRRPPP; ",
- "value": "Unlock92"
- },
- {
- "description": "CrypVault Zlader; uses gpg.exe; .vault .xort .trun; ",
- "value": "VaultCrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": "",
- "value": "VenisRansomware"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES(256); .Venusf .Venusp; ",
- "value": "VenusLocker"
- },
- {
- "description": ".exe; ",
- "value": "Virlock"
- },
- {
- "description": "Crysis; AES(256); .CrySiS .xtbl; .id-########.decryptformoney@india.com.xtbl; ",
- "value": "Virus-Encoder"
- },
- {
- "description": ".wflx; ",
- "value": "WildFire Locker"
- },
- {
- "description": "XOR or TEA; .EnCiPhErEd .73i87A .p5tkjw .PoAr2w .fileiscryptedhard .encoderpass .zc3791; ",
- "value": "Xorist"
- },
- {
- "description": ".xrtn; ",
- "value": "XRTN "
- },
- {
- "description": "Zcryptor; .zcrypt; ",
- "value": "Zcrypt"
- },
- {
- "description": ".crypto; ",
- "value": "Zimbra"
- },
- {
- "description": "VaultCrypt CrypVault; RSA; .vault; ",
- "value": "Zlader / Russian"
- },
- {
- "description": "GNL Locker; .zyklon; ",
- "value": "Zyklon"
- },
- {
- "description": "AES; ",
- "value": "Erebus"
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/nhtnwcuf-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OkiR6pVmYUw/WMFiLGPuJhI/AAAAAAAAEME/wccYzFDIzJYWKXVxaTQeB4vM-4X6h3atgCLcB/s1600/note-nhtnwcuf.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ "RANDOM 3 LETTERS ARE ADDED"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Nhtnwcuf Ransomware (Fake)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptojacky-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/838779371750031360"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-pSmSehFx0bI/WL8Rp7RoMHI/AAAAAAAAEKw/eyfsAjikl9sDHlcjdyQeRxZsLto4hxvGwCLcB/s1600/note-1-2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ "RANDOM 3 LETTERS ARE ADDED"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoJacky Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kaenlupuf-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-yTOgGw5v_vo/WMBUGHN7bnI/AAAAAAAAELY/8DDyxB4pSWgje_-iVbXgy2agNty1X6D6ACLcB/s1600/C6TUfkZWAAEewi_.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Kaenlupuf Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/enjey-crypter-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-10th-2017-spora-cerber-and-technical-writeups/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/embittered-enjey-ransomware-developer-launches-ddos-attack-on-id-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-rkOR4L9jDZc/WMG1uI6vqQI/AAAAAAAAEMk/SAu_FleTLHcagf_maS31xt3D_qnwAx2RQCLcB/s1600/note-enjey_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ "example:.encrypted.contact_here_me@india.com.enjey"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "EnjeyCrypter Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/dangerous-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DANGEROUS_RANSOM\nHacked.\nPlease contact\nhakermail@someting.com"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Dangerous Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ŧl๏tєгค гคภร๏๓ฬคгє"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/vortex-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/839778905091424260"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Vortex Ransomware\nCan not find the files on the hard drive? The contents of the files do not open?This is the result of the work of the program, which encrypts a lot of your data with the help of a strong algorithm AES-256, used by power structures to mask the data transferred in electronic form.The only way to recover your files is to buy a decryption program from us, using a one-time key created for you!When you decide to restore your data, please contact us by e-mail: rsapl@openmailbox.org or poiskiransom@airmail.cc2 files will be decrypted in vain to prove that we can do it, for the others, unfortunately, have to pay!\nPrice for the decryption of all files: $ 199\nAttention! Do not waste your time,time is money, after 4 days the price will increase by 100%!\nIP = ID ="
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".aes"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Vortex Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gc47-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-i4i0joM4qRk/WMO7sKLu4dI/AAAAAAAAENU/vLR4B1Xg39wduycHe2f0vEYSv_dtJ-gxwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fuck_you"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "GC47 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/rozalocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/840863070733885440"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "OUR FILES are encrypted (EVEN NOT LOOKING THAT THEY ARE PARTIALLY OPEN). WE HAVE YOUR LOGIN AND PASSWORD FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT, ONE-CLASSICS, ONLINE BANKS AND OTHERS.\nYOU HAVE 6 HOURS TO PAY FOR A PURCHASE FOR THEM, OTHERWISE WE SHOULD PUT INTO OPEN ACCESS!\nINSTRUCTION:\n1) Find 10 000 (10 thousand) rubles, not less. Suitable for the following - (Qiwi, Sberbank, Yandex.Money, Tinkoff Bank, VTB, but better Qiwi (faster)\n2) In the browser, open the site https://x-pay.cc/ - through this site you will transfer money\n3) In the column I DELETE where you will translate (according to item 1) and above enter the amount - 10,000 rubles.\n4) In the RIGHT I select Bitcoin and on top the amount should automatically be transferred tobtc\n5) In the column DATA ENTRY, fill in your requisites from where you will pay and where to transfer (Bitcoin wallet)\nATTENTION-ATTENTION,CORRECTly copy this number to a purse (yes, it's so strange)3FjtFZWjyj46UcfDY4AiUrEv7wLtyzZv5o After inserting, carefully, again check whether it is copied correctly.\n6) Click on GO TO PAY and follow the instructions on the site.\nIn a couple of hours we'll write you on the desktop and return everything to you.\nIf there are difficulties, then write on the mailbox - aoneder@mail.ru"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc",
+ ".ENC"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
+ "value": "RozaLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptomeister-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Blocked Your computer has been blocked All your files are encrypted. To access your PC, you need to send to Bitcoin at the address below loading Step 1: Go to xxxxs : //wvw.coinbase.com/ siqnup Step 2: Create an account and follow the instructions Step 3: Go to the \"Buy Bitcoins\" section and then buy Bitcoin Step 4: Go to the \"Send\" section, enter the address above and the amount (0.1 Bitcoin) Step 5: Click on the button below to verify the payment, your files will be decrypted and the virus will disappear 'Check' If you try to bypass the lock, all files will be published on the Internet, as well as your login for all sites."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoMeister Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gg-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".GG"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Hewlett-Packard 2016",
+ "value": "GG Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/project34-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "(TRANSLATED BY THE SITE EDITOR) YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN LOCKED WITH A PASSWORD TO GET THE PASSWORD WRITE TO US AT project34@india.com WE WILL RESPOND TO YOU WITHIN 20 HOURS IN A MESSAGE, SPECIFY YOUR IP ADDRESS. YOU CAN FIND OUT AT 2IP.RU",
+ "ПАРОЛЬ.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Project34"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Project34 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/petrwrap-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petrwrap-ransomware-is-a-petya-offspring-used-in-targeted-attacks/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/77762/petrwrap-the-new-petya-based-ransomware-used-in-targeted-attacks/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ZbWrN1LR-14/WMhPB7M8LBI/AAAAAAAAERQ/ZGG3RDHd8V0hwK_pf-vYChTn9VRpLBgNQCLcB/s1600/petya-based_ru_3.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "PetrWrap Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/karmen-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/841747002438361089"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OmuOKzLOHnw/WMl74fSSaJI/AAAAAAAAESg/4CsOYOSuUeEhsO4jSi6k10sbb_1NnfYxACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".grt"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. RaaS, baed on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "Karmen Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revenge-ransomware-a-cryptomix-variant-being-distributed-by-rig-exploit-kit/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/revenge-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KkPVDxjy8tk/WM7LtYHmuAI/AAAAAAAAEUw/kDJghaq-j1AZuqjzqk2Fkxpp4yr9Yeb5wCLcB/s1600/revenge-note-2.jpg",
+ "===ENGLISH=== All of your files were encrypted using REVENGE Ransomware. The action required to restore the files. Your files are not lost, they can be returned to their normal state by decoding them. The only way to do this is to get the software and your personal decryption key. Using any other software that claims to be able to recover your files will result in corrupted or destroyed files. You can purchase the software and the decryption key by sending us an email with your ID. And we send instructions for payment. After payment, you receive the software to return all files. For proof, we can decrypt one file for free. Attach it to an e-mail.",
+ "# !!!HELP_FILE!!! #.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".REVENGE"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoMix / CryptFile2 Variant",
+ "value": "Revenge Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake CTB-Locker"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/turkish-fileencryptor.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842034887397908480"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ccU4txzjpWg/WMl33c7YD3I/AAAAAAAAESU/moLHgQnVMYstKuHKuNgWKz8VbNv5ECdzACLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg",
+ "FILES NUMBERED Your local drives, network folders, your external drives are encrypted using 256-bit encryption technology, this means your files are encrypted with a key. They cannot be opened without buying a decryption program and a private key, after the purchase, our program decrypts all your files and they will work like before. If you do not buy the program within 24 hours, then all your files will be permanently deleted. See the \"My Documents\" folder for more information in the file \"Beni Oku.txt\". Contact address: d3crypt0r@lelantos.org BTC address: 13hp68keuvogyjhvlf7xqmeox8dpr8odx5 You have to pay at BTC to the above address $ 150 Bitcoin You can do this by purchasing Bitcoinat www.localbitcoins.co Information: Using a computer recovery does not help. Antivirus scanning does not help to recover files, but can lead to loss.",
+ "Beni Oku.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "his is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Turkish FileEncryptor Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kirkspock-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-march-17th-2017-revenge-petrwrap-and-captain-kirk/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642239/kirk-ransomware-help-support-topic-kirk-extension-ransom-notetxt/",
+ "http://www.networkworld.com/article/3182415/security/star-trek-themed-kirk-ransomware-has-spock-decryptor-demands-ransom-be-paid-in-monero.html",
+ "http://www.securityweek.com/star-trek-themed-kirk-ransomware-emerges",
+ "https://www.grahamcluley.com/kirk-ransomware-sports-star-trek-themed-decryptor-little-known-crypto-currency/",
+ "https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39a2201a88f10d81b220c973737f0becedab2e73426ab9923880fb0fb990c5cc/analysis/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-USLFJX6OMD4/WMwmKIsJnEI/AAAAAAAAETQ/S8uzyHF5mWQZjra6EGBidZ6wqgzrNqIMgCLcB/s1600/full-ransom-note.png",
+ "!IMPORTANT ! READ CAREFULLY: Your computer has fallen victim to the Kirk malware and important files have been encrypted - locked up so they don't work. This may have broken some software, including games, office suites etc. Here's a list of some the file extensions that were targetted : *** There are an additional 441 file extensions that are targetted\n. They are mostly to do with games. To get your files back, you need to pay. Now. Payments\nrecieved more than 48 hours after the time of infection will be charged double. Further time penalties are listed below. The time of infection has been logged. Any files with the extensions listed above will now have the extra extension '.kirked\n', these files are encrypted using military grade encryption.In the place you ran this program from, you should find a note (named RANSOM_NOTE.txt) similar to this one.\nYou will also find a file named 'pwd' - this is your encrypted password file. Although it was generated by your computer, you have no way of ever decrypting it. This is due to the security of both the way it was generated and the way it was encrypted. Your files were encrypted using this password. SPOCK TO THE RESCUE!\n\"Logic, motherfucker.\" ~ Spock.\nDecrypting your files is easy. Take a deep breath and follow the steps below.1) Make the proper payment. Payments are made in Monero. This is a crypto-currency, like bitcoin. You can buy Monero, and send it, from the same places you can any othercrypto-currency. If you're still unsure, google' bitcoin exchange'. Sign up at one of these exchange sites and send the payment to the address below. Make note of the payment / transaction ID, or make one up if you have the option. Payment Address (Monero Wallet): 3000375 -199390 0 0 4AqSwfTexbNaHcn8giSJw3KPiWYHGBaCF9bdgPxvHbd5A8Q3Fc7n6FQCReEns8uEg8jUo4BeB79rwf4XSfQPVL1SKdVp2jz Prices: Days :Monero: Offer Expires\n 0-2 : 50 : 03/18/17 15:32:14\n 3-7 : 100 : 03/23/17 15:32:14\n 8-14 : 200 : 03/30/17 15:32:14\n 15-30 : 500 : 04/15/17 15:32:14 Note: In 31 days your password decryption key gets permanently deleted. You then have no way to ever retrieve your files. So pay now \n2) Email us Send your pwd file as an email attachment to one of the email addresses below. Include the payment ID from step 1. Active email addresses: kirk.help@scryptmail.com kirk.payments@scryptmail.com \n3) Decrypt your files. You will recieve your decrypted password file and a program called 'Spock'. Download these both to the same place and run Spock. Spock reads in your decrypted password file and uses it to decrypt all of the affected files on your computer. > IMPORTANT ! The password is unique to this infection. Using an old password or one from another machine will result in corrupted files. Corrupted files cannot be retrieved. Don't fuck around. \n4) Breathe. \nLIVE LONG AND PROSPER",
+ "RANSOM_NOTE.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kirked",
+ ".Kirked"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Payments in Monero",
+ "value": "Kirk Ransomware & Spock Decryptor"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/zinocrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335?lang=en",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/842781575410597894"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-t1Q-a7sJlag/WMw8MBNIrkI/AAAAAAAAET4/aycY-m5GXVYQjcbZJ8N0kIfUZ3onYt8AgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "ZINO_NOTE.TXT"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ZINO"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "ZinoCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/crptxxx-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/609690/ultracrypter-cryptxxx-ultradecrypter-ransomware-help-topic-crypt-cryp1/page-84",
+ "http://www.fixinfectedpc.com/uninstall-crptxxx-ransomware-from-pc",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839467168760725508"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-itq9nR2EedY/WM2OPtDKCgI/AAAAAAAAEUI/KcC8vtnmlHENz0CSOvxqoYeZL8qdx1IZgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "HOW_TO_FIX_!.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crptxxx"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Uses @enigma0x3's UAC bypass",
+ "value": "Crptxxx Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/motd-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-of-ransome-hostage/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-ransomware-help-support-topics-motdtxt-and-enc-extension/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-suCNGXgzWuM/WM7HPujx_qI/AAAAAAAAEUk/gIvzbsbB_BUrBmmBsgpb_8w7zjwudu_mACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "motd.txt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "MOTD Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptodevil-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/843527738774507522"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-i5iUwC8XWDo/WM7dSVNQ8UI/AAAAAAAAEVY/uXmUErkLgHcWbfpdw1zGTvwY9DimiAH8wCLcB/s1600/lock-panel.jpg",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9ovaMSUgtFQ/WM7dXo84tlI/AAAAAAAAEVc/_Zx9gZuvHA0tU9-jtzP492bXa5fQiL7kgCLcB/s1600/key-price.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".devil"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoDevil Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/fabsyscrypto-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/837565766073475072"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QuBYcLAKRPU/WLnE3Rn3MhI/AAAAAAAAEH4/WnC5Ke11j4MO7wmnfqBhtA-hpx6YN6TBgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "FabSysCrypto Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/lock2017-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-FllHGqIx_JQ/WL1QF2uMCCI/AAAAAAAAEJQ/Fn-8j2t8dwgSo8YTHM1iOkL-3U_hbcaKwCLcB/s1600/Note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ "[file_name.file_ext].id-[UserID]__contact_me_lock2017@protonmail.com_or_lock2017@unseen.is"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Lock2017 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/redants-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Horas-Bah"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "RedAnts Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/consoleapplication1-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "ConsoleApplication1 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/krider-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/836995570384453632"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kr3"
+ ],
+ "date": "March 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "KRider Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/search?updated-min=2017-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=50"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The following note is what you get if you put in the wrong key code: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qsS0x-tHx00/WLM3kkKWKAI/AAAAAAAAEDg/Zhy3eYf-ek8fY5uM0yHs7E0fEFg2AXG-gCLcB/s1600/failed-key.jpg",
+ "value": "CYR-Locker Ransomware (FAKE)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dotransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DotRansomware Setup Guide \nAttention!!! \nWe recommend you to build your ransomware inside virtual machine! (But it is safe to use builder on your PC, just don't run builded exe file on your PC!) \nRecommendation: If you have got possibility to run ransomware on victim's computer with administrator privileges then do it. Because it will provide better conversion. Recommended decryption price: 0.1 Recommended special decryption prices: FR|0.15|FI|0.15|IE|0.15|IS|0.15|AU|0.15|BE|0.15|CA|0.15|AT|0.15|DK|0.15|SE|0.15|DE|0.15|NL|0.15|SA|0.2|US|0.2|HK|0.2|LU|0.2|CH|0.2|NO|0.2|AE|0.2|SG|0.2|KW|0.2|MO|0.2|QA|0.2 Recommended attacked extensions: *** Recommendation: You need to test builded exe file inside virtual machine, because operability can be broken after crypt/pack of core! \nLinks to website: ***",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-BoKI2-Lhsp8/WLHq34zCtdI/AAAAAAAAECo/YkfIG29vRRsLvdn51ctrMEypptRzZS2IgCLcB/s1600/raas.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "DotRansomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/unlock26-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-raas-portal-preparing-to-spread-unlock26-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-92aP_sumdLo/WLAy3D2kLvI/AAAAAAAAEAQ/FA1j--rOIygsNbDAWqrDqufT7zSwuEnvQCLcB/s1600/note-html_2.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-E1vV0sqaw2o/WLB1OvOLCPI/AAAAAAAAEAg/D4OkAOBT_uM4DeVS1hAu6eBGcmga8CSYwCLcB/s1600/site1.png",
+ "ReadMe-[3_random_chars].html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked-[3_random_chars]"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments.All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Unlock26 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pickles-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/834821166116327425"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_ME_TO_DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".EnCrYpTeD"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
+ "value": "PicklesRansomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vanguard-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/834783231476166657"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "NOT YOUR LANGUAGE? https://translate.google.com Your personal files and documents have been encrypted withAES-256 and RSA-2048! Decrypting your files is only possible with decrypt key stored on our server. Price for key is % bitcoin % BTC (Bitcoin).\n1. Send % bitcoin % BTC to % bitcoinaddress % http://www.coindesk.com/information/how-can-i-buy-bitcoins/ https://www.bitcoin.com/buy-bitcoin \n2. Wait some time for transaction to process \n3. PRIVATE KEY WILL BE DOWNLOADED AND SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATICALLY DECRYPT YOUR FILES! \nIf you do not pay within % hoursvalid % hours key will become DESTROYED and your files LOST forever! Removing this software will make recovering files IMPOSSIBLE! Disable your antivirus for safety."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "ChaCha20 and Poly1305",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses at MSOffice to fool users into opening the infected file. GO Ransomware",
+ "value": "Vanguard Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pyl33t-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/Jan0fficial/status/834706668466405377"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ATTENTION You Have Been Infected With Ransomware. Please Make Note of Your Unique Idenfier : *** "
+ ],
+ "encryption": "ChaCha20 and Poly1305",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".d4nk"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "PyL33T Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-trump-locker-ransomware-is-a-fraud-just-venuslocker-in-disguise/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/trumplocker.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-24th-2017-trump-locker-macos-rw-and-cryptomix/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/986406/Ransomware/TrumpLocker/TrumpLocker-wallpaper.jpg",
+ "What happen to my files.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".trumplockerf",
+ ".TheTrumpLockerf",
+ ".TheTrumpLockerfp"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This is the old VenusLocker in disquise .To delete shadow files use the following commend: C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete&exit https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8qIiBHnE9yU/WK1mZn3LgwI/AAAAAAAAD-M/ZKl7_Iwr1agYtlVO3HXaUrwitcowp5_NQCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg",
+ "value": "TrumpLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/damage-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/damage",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835664067843014656"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "TtWGgOd57SvPlkgZ***\n ==========\n end of secret_key \nTo restore your files - send e-mail to damage@india.com"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128 OR Combination of SHA-1 and Blowfish",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".damage"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written in Delphi",
+ "value": "Damage Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/xyzware-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/833636006721122304"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "All your files has been encrypted with RSA-2048 and AES-128. There is no way to decrypt without private key and decrypt program. You can buy the private key and the decrypt program just for 0.2 BTC (Bitcoin) You have 48 hours to buy it. After that, your private key will gone and we can't guarantee to decrypt.Email me for more information about how to buy it at cyberking@indonesianbacktrack.or.id"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ "your files get marked with: “youarefucked”"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "XYZWare Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.enigmasoftware.com/youarefuckedransomware-removal/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-S0-Bop8XUgk/WLD_RVgldgI/AAAAAAAAEBU/r2LmgjTHUbMTtIKGH2pHdKfFXcUEOQdMgCLcB/s1600/lock-act2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ "your files get marked with: “youarefucked”"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "YouAreFucked Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptconsole-2-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-M2CMU8RPgqw/WLfqOCgNXrI/AAAAAAAAEGA/W-uAf30qQgoZxqRwblUcSKzYrM5QmcLfgCLcB/s1600/note-html_2.png",
+ "How decrypt files.hta"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. ",
+ "value": "CryptConsole 2.0 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BarRaxCrypt Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/barraxcrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/835668540367777792"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".barRex",
+ ".BarRax"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "BarRax Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptolocker-by-ntk-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-hvTBarxSO8Y/WKs5kjdpgDI/AAAAAAAAD9Q/m3louiSE6xY0BcGjnWvg_NNDU6K1ok3ggCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker by NTK Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CzechoSlovak Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/userfileslocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "All of your personal information, unfortunately for you, were encrypted\nStep 1 - PAYMENT\nStep 2 - Tell us\nStep 3 - Data Recovery\nYour data and files were encrypted, unfortunately, you need our key. For the encryption each key is unique AES-256 is created on the computer. At the moment, all the files are already encrypted and the keys securely stored in an encrypted form with RSA-2048. \nOnly one way you can recover your files - make payment in Bitcoins and get our key for decryption. Do not believe in any fairy tales on the Internet, it can be circumvented if it was easy, a lot of things in the world stopped working. \nPay according to the instructions, click through the tabs, and wait for your keys. We value the market professional customer service and reputation, so will try to unlock your files as soon as possible.\nPayment Amount: 0,8 BTC\nPayment Amount: 2.1 BTC (another option)",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0D8XdlTNIsA/WLXFiBWz5II/AAAAAAAAEFQ/Hojw0BHHysUieiCnidoVwTrqXVCckLkSQCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCR"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "UserFilesLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_03_01_archive.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/avastvirusinfo-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".A9v9Ahu4-000"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. PAYING RANSOM IS USELESS, YOUR FILES WILL NOT BE FIXED. THE DAMAGE IS PERMENENT!!!!",
+ "value": "AvastVirusinfo Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/suchsecurity-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OCBIabrrZNg/WLm1RGFVKEI/AAAAAAAAEHY/1MASb-0Y7jsBlE2TzyqgknrfDhuEsNx2gCLcB/s1600/Screenshot_1.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "SuchSecurity Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "VHDLocker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vhd-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-viZiAZr3_ns/WKrIDWEEBXI/AAAAAAAAD8c/8n1RJ9m2Odoe3bvMMmIm421NdxS-OIRzQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "PleaseRead Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/kasiski-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/MarceloRivero/status/832302976744173570",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ehXlWPLxtR8/WKdHF_Y-MeI/AAAAAAAAD5A/KKXO-S9OtMQAcNM-IOV2ees8qKlAJ3pzACLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "INSTRUCCIONES.txt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ "[KASISKI]"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Kasiski Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Locky Impersonator Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-locky-ransomware-encrypts-local-files-and-unmapped-network-shares/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/locky-impersonator.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/locky-ransomware-switches-to-thor-extension-after-being-a-bad-malware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Files has been encrypted with Locky Ransomware, Do not alter your files or you will not be able to recover anything nobody will be able to recover your data since its set to AES-256 and requires our Key Send me 1.0 bitcoins Send payment to this Address: 13DYdAKb8nfo1AYeGpJXwKZYupyeqYu2QZ For Instructions on how to Purchase & send bitcoin refer to this link : *** for support Email: lockyransomware666@sigaint.net After 48 Hours your ransom doubles to 2.0 BTC After 72 Hours we will delete your recovery keys"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Fake Locky Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptoshield-2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptomix-variant-named-cryptoshield-1-0-ransomware-distributed-by-exploit-kits/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "# RESTORING FILES #.txt",
+ "# RESTORING FILES #.html",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-A-N9zQgZrhE/WJHAHzuitvI/AAAAAAAADhI/AHkLaL9blZgqQWc-sTevVRTxVRttbugoQCLcB/s1600/note-2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES(256)/ROT-13",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CRYPTOSHIELD (The name is first changed using ROT-13, and after a new extension is added.)"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoShield 1.0 is a ransomware from the CryptoMix family.",
+ "value": "CryptoShield 1.0 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hermes-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-17th-2017-live-hermes-reversing-and-scada-poc-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642019/hermes-ransomware-help-support-decrypt-informationhtml/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hermes-ransomware-decrypted-in-live-video-by-emsisofts-fabian-wosar/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nzY6thZOXSk/WKbYmWxa0rI/AAAAAAAAD3s/t_3d90FGOe8je8rfeeYLF1jzJinG5JMVgCLcB/s1600/note_2_2.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Yisae5e5Pjs/WKbXmIXU8YI/AAAAAAAAD3g/WZs5XzL4l4snT2j4yfc3CAaF7KonH_DQACLcB/s1600/note_1.png",
+ "DECRYPT_INFORMATION.html",
+ "UNIQUE_ID_DO_NOT_REMOVE"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Filemarker: \"HERMES\"",
+ "value": "Hermes Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/lovelock-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-YdCKWLUFBOo/WKRCD2BLzTI/AAAAAAAAD14/BPtYMLvQpEMAbT-ZdiCVPi_LZCrXYJMhwCLcB/s1600/ReadME%2521.txt.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hasp"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "LoveLock Ransomware or Love2Lock Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/wcry-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iUq492KUatk/WKH-GXnO4-I/AAAAAAAADzw/9uwo1LF5ciIvMJ6jAn3mskSqtdiTkxvlACLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".wcry"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Wcry Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dumb-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/bleepincomputer/status/816053140147597312?lang=en"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_Udncaac_gM/WKROBN00ORI/AAAAAAAAD2U/HsHkEspG85YSfPg-8MbPYYTYmBU4PAJAgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Vx9ZtCODajg/WKiMr2QX5cI/AAAAAAAAD64/QAh37o_CRIImaxUfIhoEh8qE4JLn5HaNwCLcB/s1600/dumb.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "DUMB Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_02_01_archive.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/x-files-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".b0C",
+ ".b0C.x"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "X-Files"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/polski-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ahpZEI1FHQM/WJd7_dpYlyI/AAAAAAAADm8/4-nFXqc9bjEI93VDJRdsLSlBOwQiaM7swCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".aes"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The Ransom is 249$ and the hacker demands that the victim gets in contact through e-mail and a Polish messenger called Gadu-Gadu.",
+ "value": "Polski Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/yourransom-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/yourransom-is-the-latest-in-a-long-line-of-prank-and-educational-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/_ddoxer/status/827555507741274113"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dFQlF_6uTkI/WJYigC5GwiI/AAAAAAAADlk/jm-ZwqJ2mVYd2gtAQgYW_lOd78u5N2x0ACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "README.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".yourransom"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This hacker demands that the victim contacts him through email and decrypts the files for FREE.(moreinfo in the link below)",
+ "value": "YourRansom Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ranion-raas.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ranion-ransomware-as-a-service-available-on-the-dark-web-for-educational-purposes/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ORiqmM6oWXc/WJV7X4IvTWI/AAAAAAAADlE/wXvz5Hsv1gQ-UrLoA1plVjLTVD7iDDxwQCLcB/s1600/buy_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "date": "February 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ranion Raas gives the opportunity to regular people to buy and distribute ransomware for a very cheap price. (More info in the link below). RaaS service",
+ "value": "Ranion RaasRansomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/polato-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to recover my files.txt",
+ "README.png",
+ "README.html",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E9GDxEoz95k/WIop79nWZ2I/AAAAAAAADZU/CnsvOl96yesoH07BZ2Q05Fp40kLcTMmqQCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".potato"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "Wants a ransom to get the victim’s files back . Originated in English. Spread worldwide.",
+ "value": "Potato Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/opentodecrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!!.txt",
+ "1.bmp",
+ "1.jpg",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-RPeHrC9Trqk/WGk1kQlBQQI/AAAAAAAAC6o/FutnWrlUf44hq54_xI_6Uz2migCR0rwlwCLcB/s1600/Note-wallp.jpg",
+ "Your files are encrypted! To decrypt write on email - opentoyou@india.comIdentification key - 5E1C0884"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RC4",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".-opentoyou@india.com"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016/January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This ransomware is originated in English, therefore could be used worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
+ "value": "of Ransomware: OpenToYou (Formerly known as OpenToDecrypt)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-ransomplus-ransomware-virus.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ransomplus-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/825411602535088129"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!!!.txt",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-uIb_TdWTk3Q/WI2qRSlsXJI/AAAAAAAADcE/h92XEY6AraQMUwEIOBZ9moxN1J2So8xpwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!!! To restore (decrypt) them you must:\n1. Pay 0.25 bitcoin (btc) to address 36QLSB*** You can get BTC on this site http://localbitcoins.com \n2. After payment you must send Bitcoin Transacation ID to E-mail: andresaha82@gmail.com Then we will send you decryption tool."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "Author of this ransomware is sergej. Ransom is 0.25 bitcoins for the return of files. Originated in English. Used worldwide. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
+ "value": "RansomPlus"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptconsole-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/638344/cryptconsole-uncrypteoutlookcom-support-topic-how-decrypt-fileshta/",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/824705553201057794"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How decrypt files.hta",
+ "Your files are encrypted! Your personal ID764F6A6664514B414373673170615339554A534A5832546A55487169644B4A35 Discovered a serious vulnerability in your network security. No data was stolen and no one will be able to do it while they are encrypted. For you we have automatic decryptor and instructions for remediation. How to get the automatic decryptor : \n1) Pay 0,25 BTC Buy BTC on one of these sites: https://localbitcoins.com https://www.coinbase.com https://xchange.cc bitcoin adress for pay: 1KG8rWYWRYHfvjVe8ddEyJNCg6HxVWYSQm Send 0,25 BTC \n2) Send screenshot of payment to unCrypte@outlook.com. In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). \n3) You will receive automatic decryptor and all files will be restored \n* To be sure in getting the decryption, you can send one file (less than 10MB) to unCrypte@outlook.com In the letter include your personal ID (look at the beginning of this document). But this action will increase the cost of the automatic decryptor on 0,25 btc... \nAttention! \n• No Payment = No decryption \n• You really get the decryptor after payment \n• Do not attempt to remove the program or run the anti-virus tools \n• Attempts to self-decrypting files will result in the loss of your data \n• Decoders other users are not compatible with your data, because each user's unique encryption key"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".unCrypte@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters> ",
+ ".decipher_ne@outlook.com_<random_numbers_and_upper_alphabetic_characters"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "This ransomware does not actually encrypt your file, but only changes the names of your files, just like Globe Ransomware. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files",
+ "value": "CryptConsole"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/638191/zxz-ransomware-support-help-topic-zxz/?hl=%2Bzxz#entry4168310",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zxz-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zxz"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "Originated in English, could affect users worldwide, however so far only reports from Saudi Arabia. The malware name founded by a windows server tools is called win32/wagcrypt.A",
+ "value": "ZXZ Ramsomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/vxlock-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vxlock"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "Developed in Visual Studios in 2010. Original name is VxCrypt. This ransomware encrypts your files, including photos, music, MS office, Open Office, PDF… etc",
+ "value": "VxLock Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/funfact.html",
+ "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/funfactransomware-removal/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "note.iti",
+ "Important Information!!!! You had bad luck. All your files are encrypted with RSA and AES ciphers. to get your files back read carefully. if you do not understand, Read again. All your documents are recoverable only with our software and key file. To decrypt files you need to contact worldfunfact@sigaint.org or funfacts11@tutanota.com and set your ID as email title and send clsign.dll file from your computer. That is the key file and yes, it’s encrypted. Search your computer for filename “clsign.dll” attach it to email. if you wish we will decrypt one of your encrypted file for free! It’s your guarantee. After you made payment you will receive decryption software with key and necessary instructions. if you don’t contact us within 72 hours we will turn on sanctions. you’ll have to pay more. Recovery is only possible during 7 days. after that don’t contact us. Remember you are just single payment away from all your files If your files are urgent pay exactly requested amount to Bitcoin (BTC) address and send clsign.dll file to us. We will send your decryption software within 24 hours; remember if you contact us first maybe you’ll have to pay less\nUser ID: 658061***\nBTC Address: 1AQrj***\nAmount(BTC): 1.65806\n-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----\nVersion:\nGnuPG\nv2\n*******************************\n-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "Funfact uses an open code for GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG), then asks to email them to find out the amout of bitcoin to send (to receive a decrypt code). Written in English, can attach all over the world. The ransom is 1.22038 BTC, which is 1100USD.",
+ "value": "FunFact Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/06/zekwacrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-zekwacrypt-ransomware-virus.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "encrypted_readme.txt",
+ "__encrypted_readme.txt",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CLo4JTpveKY/WI4sVXEQSPI/AAAAAAAADcU/n8qrwehDEQMlG845cjNow_fC4PDqlvPIQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "WARNING! Your personal files are encrypted! Your most important files on this computer have been encrypted: photos, documents, videos, music, etc. You can verify this by trying to open such files. Encryption was produced using an UNIQUE public RSA-4096 key, specially generated for this computer only, thus making it impossible to decrypt such files without knowing private key and comprehensive decipher software. We have left on our server a copy of the private key, along with all required software for the decryption. To make sure that software is working as intended you have a possibility to decrypt one file for free, see contacts below. The private key will be destroyed after 7 days, afterwards making it impossible to decrypt your files. Encryption date: *** Private key destruction date: *** For obtaining decryption software, please, contact: myserverdoctor@gmail.com or XMPP jabber: doctordisk@jabbim.com"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".<7_random_letters>"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "First spotted in May 2016, however made a big comeback in January 2017. It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.",
+ "value": "ZekwaCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sage-2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Sage+20+Ransomware/21959/",
+ "http://www.securityweek.com/sage-20-ransomware-demands-2000-ransom",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sage-2-0-ransomware-gearing-up-for-possible-greater-distribution/",
+ "https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/27/sage-2.0-comes-with-ip-generation-algorithm-ipga"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-6YhxRaqa_9Q/WISA9dW31bI/AAAAAAAADUE/78mNNKpPMyc2Gzi1N9CooyQp7RNT40NNgCLcB/s1600/note1_2.png",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-_c5vGu4nCvE/WIT_pWP_FSI/AAAAAAAADUs/8hK8a4E48sY3U_aAHC2qNzYDBL0bQcNjgCLcB/s1600/note-wallp111.png",
+ "!Recovery_[3_random_chars].html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sage"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This ransomware attacks your MS Office by offering a Micro to help with your program, but instead incrypts all your files if the used id not protected. Predecessor CryLocker",
+ "value": "Sage 2.0 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cloudsword.html",
+ "http://bestsecuritysearch.com/cloudsword-ransomware-virus-removal-steps-protection-updates/",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822653335681593345"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Warning警告.html",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-OTxFEWf7LiY/WIO0rJmBgJI/AAAAAAAADTQ/U3BLcd2-CPQQ_73eIKIyg28cKFmw4nctgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Window Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the window update process , while turning off the Window Startup Repair and changes the BootStatusPolicy using these commands: bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures",
+ "value": "CloudSword Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/dn-donotopen.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-llR46G5zOBE/WIJuTTHImXI/AAAAAAAADS8/Ww_QU1Z7Q3geZgiSStJB3siO3oQJpIcowCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ilIaUD5qOuk/WIJuV1TuC1I/AAAAAAAADTA/SOj8St_qXMsgDexK1BGgZT0yFDkNDz_7QCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".killedXXX"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Chrome Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the chrome update process ,while encrypting the files. DO NOT pay the ransom, since YOUR COMPUTER WILL NOT BE RESTORED FROM THIS MALWARE!!!!",
+ "value": "DN"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/garryweber.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_OPEN_FILES.html",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-w6lxK0qHj8A/WIO_iAngUzI/AAAAAAAADTk/dLGlrwwOh508AlG2ojLRszpUxL0tHrtSQCLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-_garryweber@protonmail.ch"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is FileSpy and FileSpy Application. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc..",
+ "value": "GarryWeber Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/satan-raas.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/637811/satan-ransomware-help-support-topic-stn-extension-help-decrypt-fileshtml/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-january-20th-2017-satan-raas-spora-locky-and-more/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-satan-ransomware-available-through-a-ransomware-as-a-service-/",
+ "https://twitter.com/Xylit0l/status/821757718885236740"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5BgSHIym-8Y/WIH92q4ymHI/AAAAAAAADSk/MF2T-mmhuY4irQZFqmpGZjmUI2onlNCyACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT_FILES.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".stn"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is RAAS RANSOMWARE. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc.. This ransomware promotes other to download viruses and spread them as ransomware to infect other users and keep 70% of the ransom. (leaving the other 30% to Satan) https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7fwX40eYL18/WH-tfpNjDgI/AAAAAAAADPk/KVP_ji8lR0gENCMYhb324mfzIFFpiaOwACLcB/s1600/site-raas.gif RaaS",
+ "value": "Satan Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HavocCrypt Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/havoc-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Xs7yigomWw8/WH0mqn0QJLI/AAAAAAAADKA/0Fk5QroMsgQ3AsXbHsbVtopcJN4qzDgdACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".HavocCrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures , videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Havoc"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptosweettooth.html",
+ "http://sensorstechforum.com/remove-cryptosweettooth-ransomware-restore-locked-files/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "IMPORTANTE_LEER.html",
+ "RECUPERAR_ARCHIVOS.html",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-KE6dziEK4To/WHnvPzKOs7I/AAAAAAAADHI/KPBjmO9iChgAa12-f1VOxF49Pv27-0XfQCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Its fake name is Bitcoin and maker’s name is Santiago. Work of the encrypted requires the user to have .NET Framework 4.5.2. on his computer.",
+ "value": "CryptoSweetTooth Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RansomTroll Ransomware",
+ "Käändsõna Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/kaandsona-ransomtroll.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/819927858437099520"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-v3jncd77m3U/WHkjPoEusKI/AAAAAAAADGE/xJOIgzm-ST0L4kpNeThKTyfukq3e1Th-QCLcB/s1600/troll-22.png",
+ "You have been struck by the holy Kaandsona ransomware Either you pay 1 BTC in 24 hours or you lose ALL FILES \nbutton 'Show all encrypted files' \nbutton 'PAY'"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kencf"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The word Kaandsona is Estonian, therefore the creator is probably from Estonia. Crashes before it encrypts",
+ "value": "Kaandsona Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/lambdalocker.html",
+ "http://cfoc.org/how-to-restore-files-affected-by-the-lambdalocker-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.hTmL",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-B3o6bGziu_M/WHkyueI902I/AAAAAAAADGw/la7psCE9JEEe17GipFh69xVnIDYGFF38wCLcB/s1600/note-1-2.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lambda_l0cked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English and Chinese speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware",
+ "value": "LambdaLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "HakunaMatataRansomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/hakunamatata.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016_03_01_archive.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Recovers files yako.html",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DUXeyyzqwKs/WHkrGvLyFvI/AAAAAAAADGg/SPfrNMZYGs8edE7X5z-3MBroIqS5GQ8kACLcB/s1600/note_1-str_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".HakunaMatata"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "NMoreia 2.0 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/marlboro.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/marlboro",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/marlboro-ransomware-defeated-in-one-day/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7UmhPM2VSKY/WHe5tDsHfuI/AAAAAAAADFM/FRdUnAyxAggvF0hX0adtrpq48F7HXPbawCLcB/s1600/check-decrypt.png",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MWRTa6aXtdk/WHflJFyb-GI/AAAAAAAADFs/dc-l-RrWSCAPE8akw2SCb1uuj-a-2shiwCLcB/s1600/docm.png",
+ "_HELP_Recover_Files_.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".oops"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is .2 bitcoin, however there is no point of even trying to pay, since this damage is irreversible. Once the ransom is paid the hacker does not return decrypt the files. Another name is DeMarlboro and it is written in language C++. Pretend to encrypt using RSA-2048 and AES-128 (really it’s just XOR)",
+ "value": "Marlboro Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/spora-ransomware.html",
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2017/01/29442-spora-worm-and-ransomware",
+ "http://blog.emsisoft.com/2017/01/10/from-darknet-with-love-meet-spora-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0COE3ADdaYk/WHpnHzuo7OI/AAAAAAAADHY/yfDF3XG720Yyn3xQHwFngt1T99cT-Xt3wCLcB/s1600/rus-note_2.png",
+ "[Infection-ID].HTML"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of a spam email with a viral attachment: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KkJXiHG80S0/WHX4TBpkamI/AAAAAAAADDg/F_bN796ndMYnzfUsgSWMXhRxFf3Ic-HtACLcB/s1600/spam-email.png",
+ "value": "Spora Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptokill-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypto"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files get encrypted, but the decrypt key is not available. NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM, THE FILES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.",
+ "value": "CryptoKill Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/allyourdocuments-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-mwIvQNkFH4g/WKAydZnGn_I/AAAAAAAADxs/6xHgbD3OUFUbebeuNVkI6tp_cMRVUQHtQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ "AES+RSA"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "All_Your_Documents Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serbransom-2017.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ultranationalist-developer-behind-serbransom-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-february-10th-2017-serpent-spora-id-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/830116190873849856"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OY8jgTN5Y9Q/WKAI6a9xfMI/AAAAAAAADwc/ng36hAXsvfYQ5rdkSFeVgEvLY88pJmnWACLcB/s1600/note-html-wallp.jpg",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-DQQ5tk0C9lY/WKALND0dYPI/AAAAAAAADwo/EuKiO_F0Mn0ImrGLVE-Sks-j93pHoTjKACLcB/s1600/konstr.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".velikasrbija"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. The name of the hacker is R4z0rx0r Serbian Hacker.",
+ "value": "SerbRansom 2017 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/fadesoft-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/829768819031805953",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/838700700586684416"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5t-5eBl4Tng/WKARmYV5GVI/AAAAAAAADxA/OuS7Eo__z1sh2tRbBpQIxJQ6IVbSiQakwCLcB/s1600/lock-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 0.33 bitcoins.",
+ "value": "Fadesoft Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hugeme-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.ozbargain.com.au/node/228888?page=3",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/04/magic-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kolk6sABFzQ/WJ95ddcAxNI/AAAAAAAADwI/oP8ZFD7KnqoQWgpfgEHId843x3l0xfhjACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "HugeMe Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DynA CryptoLocker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dyna-crypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dyna-crypt-not-only-encrypts-your-files-but-also-steals-your-info/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Qx8RhielSbI/WJypR9Zw9nI/AAAAAAAADus/Opsfy8FxRIIBmouywdl7uT94ZpfwKr6JACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "DynA-Crypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Serpent Danish Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serpent-danish-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "==== NEED HELP WITH TRANSLATE? USE https://translate.google.com ====\n================ PLEASE READ THIS MESSAGE CAREFULLY ================\n Your documents, photos, videos, databases and other important files have been encrypted! The files have been encrypted using AES256 and RSA2048 encryption (unbreakable) To decrypt your files you need to buy the special software 'SerpentDecrypter'.You can buy this software on one of the websites below. xxxx://vdpbkmwbnp.pw/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 xxxx://hnxrvobhgm.pw/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 If the websites above do not work you can use a special website on the TOR network. Follow the steps below\n1. Download the TOR browser https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en#downloads\n2. Inside the TOR browser brower navigate to : 3o4kqe6khkfgx25g.onion/00000000-00000000-00000000-00000000 \n3. Follow the instructions to buy 'Serpent Decrypter'\n================ PLEASE READ THIS MESSAGE CAREFULLY ================"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Serpent 2017 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/erebus-2017-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/erebus-ransomware-utilizes-a-uac-bypass-and-request-a-90-ransom-payment/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tAp9wE6CJxM/WJrvOOyIfRI/AAAAAAAADts/iMfaiDRyRcQuPXgtQV--qt7q8ZI3ZV0tQCLcB/s1600/note1%252B.jpg",
+ "README.HTML"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "ROT-23",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Erebus 2017 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ransomuhahawhere"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ransomuhahawhere.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-7KRVg6kt418/WJnwxDOV5NI/AAAAAAAADrk/or9DbPMl-7ksN7OwIAH6BMJwE5fGc_BfgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Cyber Drill Exercise "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cancer-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/watch-your-computer-go-bonkers-with-cancer-trollware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ozPs6mwKfEI/WJjTwbrOx9I/AAAAAAAADqE/4gewG-f_dLQQDevajtn8CnX69lvWgCZQACLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cancer"
+ ],
+ "date": "February 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. This is a trollware that does not encrypt your files but makes your computer act crazy (like in the video in the link below). It is meant to be annoying and it is hard to erase from your PC, but possible.",
+ "value": "Cancer Ransomware FAKE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/updatehost-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/Windows_Update_Host-16362.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BOmKmroIvEI/WJn-LAUmyyI/AAAAAAAADsI/W987TEaOnEAd45AOxO1cFyFvxEx_RfehgCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Microsoft Copyright 2017 and requests ransom in bitcoins.",
+ "value": "UpdateHost Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/nemesis-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-dLSbqOiIbLU/WHPh-akYinI/AAAAAAAADC0/6nFQClDBJ5M7ZhrjkhnxfkdboOh7SlE-ACLcB/s1600/v5YZMxt.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".v8dp"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 10 bitcoins.",
+ "value": "Nemesis Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "File0Locked KZ Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/evil-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/evilransomware-removal/",
+ "http://usproins.com/evil-ransomware-is-lurking/",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/818443491713884161",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/826508611878793219"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.TXT",
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-0NFy_yDghZ0/WHO_ClbPdMI/AAAAAAAADCQ/RX2cgYg3z381gro6UUQtAED7JgXHbvGLgCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xxJ9xdRuWis/WHO_FL-hWcI/AAAAAAAADCU/VqI02AhzopQY1WKk-k6QYSdHFWFzg1NcACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".file0locked",
+ ".evillock"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Domain KZ is used, therefore it is assumed that the decrypter is from Kazakhstan. Coded in Javascript",
+ "value": "Evil Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ocelot Locker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ocelot-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817648547231371264"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3iMAtqvAmts/WHEyA_dW5OI/AAAAAAAADAY/tE5FtaVMJcc3aQQvWI4XOdjtvbXufFgywCLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-DMxJm5GT0VY/WHEyEOi_vZI/AAAAAAAADAc/6Zi3IBuBz1I7jdQHcSrzhUGagGCUfs6iACLcB/s1600/lock2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This is a fake ransomware. Your files are not really encrypted, however the attacker does ask for a ransom of .03 bitcoins. It is still dangerous even though it is fake, he still go through to your computer.",
+ "value": "Ocelot Ransomware (FAKE RANSOMWARE)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Blablabla Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/skyname-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817079028725190656"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "INFOK1.txt",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-i4ksJq-UzX8/WHFFXQL5wAI/AAAAAAAADA8/awfsqj1lr7IMBAPtE0tB44PNf1N6zkGDwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-OlKgHvtAUHg/WHFDCx4thaI/AAAAAAAADAw/wzBXV17Xh-saaFGlrxw3CDNhGSTaVe2dQCLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to Czechoslovakianspeaking users. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "SkyName Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Depsex Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/mafiaware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-january-6th-2017-fsociety-mongodb-pseudo-darkleech-and-more/",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817069320937345024"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-BclLp7x1sUM/WG6acqtDBbI/AAAAAAAAC_I/ToVEXx-G2DcKD4d7TZ0RkVqA1wRicxnZQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "READ_ME.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked-by-mafia"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 155$ inbitcoins. Creator of ransomware is called Mafia. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "MafiaWare Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/624518/globe-ransomware-help-and-support-purge-extension-how-to-restore-fileshta/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-globe-ransomware-wants-to-purge-your-files/",
+ "https://decryptors.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/globe3-decrypter.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/globe3"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How To Recover Encrypted Files.hta",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Wk1_IdcEHbk/WG6FVnoaKlI/AAAAAAAAC-4/WeHzJAUJ0goxxuAoGUUebSgzGHrnD6LQQCLcB/s1600/Globe-ransom-note_2.png.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-lYkopoRH0wQ/WHOt1KhhzhI/AAAAAAAADCA/nPdhHK3wEucAK1GHodeh5w3HcpdugzSHwCLcB/s1600/globe3-9-1-17.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA or RC4",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".badnews",
+ ".globe",
+ ".[random].bit",
+ ".[random].encrypted",
+ ".[random].raid10",
+ ".[random].globe",
+ ".[mia.kokers@aol.com]",
+ ".unlockv@india.com",
+ ".rescuers@india.com.3392cYAn548QZeUf.lock",
+ ".locked",
+ ".decrypt2017",
+ ".hnumkhotep"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 3 bitcoins. Extesion depends on the config file. It seems Globe is a ransomware kit.",
+ "value": "Globe3 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FireCrypt Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/bleedgreen-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-np8abNpYeoU/WG1KX4_H0yI/AAAAAAAAC98/gxRJeDb01So5yTboXYP7sZWurJFBbWziACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".firecrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. Requires .NET Framework 4.0. Gets into your startup system and sends you notes like the one below: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xrr6aoB_giw/WG1UrGpmZJI/AAAAAAAAC-Q/KtKdQP6iLY4LHaHgudF5dKs6i1JHQOBmgCLcB/s1600/green1.jpg",
+ "value": "BleedGreen Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/btcamant.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "BTC_DECRYPT_FILES.txt",
+ "BTC_DECRYPT_FILES.html",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-uiHluU553MU/WGzoFpEWkfI/AAAAAAAAC9o/M34ndwHUsoEfZiLJv9j4PCgBImS8oyYaACLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".BTC"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Original name is Mission 1996 or Mission: “Impossible” (1996) (like the movie)",
+ "value": "BTCamant Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/x3m-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-hMAakgAORvg/WG_i-lk09II/AAAAAAAADAI/Uq2iCHC5ngYzeVcuxQF0mcbrLqyOGcA_wCLcB/s1600/note.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ "_x3m",
+ "_r9oj",
+ "_locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. It is also possible to break in using RDP Windows with the help of Pass-the-Hash system, PuTTY, mRemoteNG, TightVNC, Chrome Remote Desktop, modified version of TeamViewer, AnyDesk, AmmyyAdmin, LiteManager, Radmin and others. Ransom is 700$ in Bitcoins.",
+ "value": "X3M Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/gog-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/816112218815266816"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DecryptFile.txt",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cAnilnXjK7k/WG_OHhC_UdI/AAAAAAAAC_4/sdbzTx9hP4sryM7xE59ONdk7Zr8D_m6XwCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-TDK91s7FmNM/WGpcwq5HmwI/AAAAAAAAC8Q/i0Q66vE7m-0kmrKPXWdwnYQg6Eaw2KSDwCLcB/s1600/note-pay_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".LOCKED"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "GOG Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/edgelocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/815392891338194945"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-dNBgohC1UYg/WGnXhem546I/AAAAAAAAC7w/Wv0Jy4173xsBJDZPLMxe6lXBgI5BkY4BgCLcB/s1600/note-lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".edgel"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.1 Bitcoins. Original name is TrojanRansom.",
+ "value": "EdgeLocker"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/red-alert-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815557601312329728"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "MESSAGE.txt",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tDS74fDwB1Q/WGk2D5DcUYI/AAAAAAAAC6s/vahju5JD9B4chwnNDUvDPp4ejZOxnj_awCLcB/s1600/note-wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Fake name: Microsoft Corporation. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "Red Alert"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/first-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-T0PhVuoFSyA/WGk5mYkRFAI/AAAAAAAAC64/j14Pt84YUmQMNa_5LSEn6fZ5CoYqz60swCLcB/s1600/note-lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "First"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/xcrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/825790584971472902"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XZNMg5P75r4/WI985j-EKHI/AAAAAAAADcw/jGdtXoq2pnwjlAbFAJia4UsXuJrV5AU3gCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "Xhelp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Twofish",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written on Delphi. The user requests the victim to get in touch with him through ICQ to get the ransom and return the files.",
+ "value": "XCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/7zipper-ransomware.html",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ClM0LCPjQuk/WI-BgHTpdNI/AAAAAAAADc8/JyEQ8-pcJmsXIntuP-MMdE-pohVncxTXQCLcB/s1600/7-zip-logo.png"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BR0DvtIft7g/WI95IF7IdUI/AAAAAAAADck/gzWAMbpFvaYicHFuMzvlM3YGJpgulMQBQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Twofish",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".7zipper"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "7Zipper Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zyka-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/10899-zyka-ransomware",
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/StupidDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://twitter.com/GrujaRS/status/826153382557712385"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-SF4RsOANlI0/WJBQd4SJv6I/AAAAAAAADdY/hI-Ncw9FoFMi5jvljUftpzTgdykOfR3vgCLcB/s1600/lock-wallp_2.png.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lock",
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 170$ or EUR in Bitcoins.",
+ "value": "Zyka Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sureransom-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/01/27/fake-ransomware-is-tricking-people-into-paying/#777faed0381c"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-zShnOIf3R_E/WJBfhC4CdSI/AAAAAAAADdo/6l4hwSOmI0Evj4W0Esj1S_uNOy5Yq6X0QCLcB/s1600/note1-2-3.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (fake)",
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to strike worldwide. This ransomware does not really encrypt your files. Ransom requested is £50 using credit card.",
+ "value": "SureRansom Ransomeware (Fake)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/netflix-ransomware.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netflix-scam-delivers-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rogue-netflix-app-spreads-netix-ransomware-that-targets-windows-7-and-10-users/",
+ "http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/netflix-scam-spreads-ransomware/d/d-id/1328012",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-bQQ4DTIClvA/WJCIh6Uq2nI/AAAAAAAADfY/hB5HcjuGgh8rRJKeLHo__IRz3Ezth22-wCEw/s1600/form1.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ZnWdPDprJOg/WJCPeCtP4HI/AAAAAAAADfw/kR0ifI1naSwTAwSuOPiw8ZCPr0tSIz1CgCLcB/s1600/netflix-akk.png"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-vODt2aB9Hck/WJCFc3g5eCI/AAAAAAAADe8/OrEVkqUHMU4swRWedoZuBu50AWoKR1FGACLcB/s1600/netflix-note.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-Cw4e1drBKl4/WJCHmgp1vtI/AAAAAAAADfI/QqFxUsuad"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".se"
+ ],
+ "date": "January 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses the known online library as a decoy. It poses as Netflix Code generator for Netflix login, but instead encrypts your files. The ransom is 100$ in Bitcoins.",
+ "value": "Netflix Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Merry X-Mas",
+ "MRCR"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/mrcr1-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-merry-christmas-ransomware-now-steals-user-private-data-via-diamondfox-malware/",
+ "http://www.zdnet.com/article/not-such-a-merry-christmas-the-ransomware-that-also-steals-user-data/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/merry-christmas-ransomware-and-its-dev-comodosecurity-not-bringing-holiday-cheer/",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/mrcr"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_DEAD.HTA",
+ "MERRY_I_LOVE_YOU_BRUCE.HTA",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-3F3QAZnDxsI/WGpvD4wZ2OI/AAAAAAAAC80/-2L6dIPqsgs8hZHOX0T6AFf5LwPwfZ-rwCLcB/s1600/note.png",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_w8peyLMcww/WHNJ1Gb0qeI/AAAAAAAADBw/EVbR-gKipYoNujo-YF6VavafsUfWDANEQCLcB/s1600/8-1-17.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".MRCR1",
+ ".PEGS1",
+ ".RARE1",
+ ".RMCM1",
+ ".MERRY"
+ ],
+ "date": " December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English and Italian speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Most attacks are on organizations and servers. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. They pose as a Consumer complaint notification that’s coming from Federal Trade Commission from USA, with an attached file called “complaint.pdf”. Written in Delphi by hacker MicrRP.",
+ "value": "Merry Christmas"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/seoirse-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".seoire"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Seoirse is how in Ireland people say the name George. Ransom is 0.5 Bitcoins.",
+ "value": "Seoirse Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/killdisk-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/killdisk-ransomware-now-targets-linux-prevents-boot-up-has-faulty-encryption/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/killdisk-disk-wiping-malware-adds-ransomware-component/",
+ "http://www.zdnet.com/article/247000-killdisk-ransomware-demands-a-fortune-forgets-to-unlock-files/",
+ "http://www.securityweek.com/destructive-killdisk-malware-turns-ransomware",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/01/05/killdisk-now-targeting-linux-demands-250k-ransom-cant-decrypt/",
+ "https://cyberx-labs.com/en/blog/new-killdisk-malware-brings-ransomware-into-industrial-domain/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-8MqANWraAgE/WGT7mj-XirI/AAAAAAAAC3g/H_f1hTxa7Sc_DEtllBe-vYaAfY-YqMelgCLcB/s1600/wallp.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "date": "November/December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Every file is encrypted with a personal AES-key, and then AES-key encrypts with a RSA-1028 key. Hacking by TeleBots (Sandworm). Goes under a fake name: Update center or Microsoft Update center.",
+ "value": "KillDisk Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/derialock-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-derialock-ransomware-active-on-christmas-includes-an-unlock-all-command/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9vg_tRPq8rQ/WGOjf4ULuGI/AAAAAAAACzw/d16uRmEOotsCbRM4hwvzQ6bB8xAVNJ7ogCLcB/s1600/DeriaLock.gif",
+ "unlock-everybody.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".deria"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Maker is arizonacode and ransom amount is 20-30$. If the victim decides to pay the ransom, he will have to copy HWID and then speak to the hacker on Skype and forward him the payment.",
+ "value": "DeriaLock Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/badencript-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/813064189719805952"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-hApL-ObdWsk/WGAYUyCzPcI/AAAAAAAACyg/NuL26zNgRGcLnnF2BwgOEn3AYMgVu3gQACLcB/s1600/More-note.png",
+ "More.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".bript"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "BadEncript Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/adamlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9IgXt6L0hLY/WGARdzJgfvI/AAAAAAAACyQ/1bfnX_We65AirDcAFpiG49NPuBMfGH9wwCLcB/s1600/note-adam.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".adam"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the creator is puff69.",
+ "value": "AdamLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/alphabet-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/812331918633172992"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-bFPI3O1BI3s/WGPpvnDvNNI/AAAAAAAAC10/mLUiFOCWnEkjbV91PmUGnc3qsFMv9um8QCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".alphabet"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses as Windows 10 Critical Update Service. Offers you to update your Windows 10, but instead encrypts your files. For successful attack, the victim must have .NET Framework 4.5.2 installed on him computer.",
+ "value": "Alphabet Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "KokoLocker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kokokrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "http://removevirusadware.com/tips-for-removeing-kokokrypt-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-NiQ6rSIprB8/WF-uxTMq6hI/AAAAAAAACyA/tA6qO3aJdGc0Dn_I-IOZOM3IwN5rgq9sACLcB/s1600/note-koko.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kokolocker"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread by its creator in forums. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files and documents and more. The ransom is 0.1 bitcoins within 72 hours. Uses Windows Update as a decoy. Creator: Talnaci Alexandru",
+ "value": "KoKoKrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/l33taf-locker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOU_HAVE_BEEN_HACKED.txt",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-yncl7-Jy198/WGDjdgNKXjI/AAAAAAAACzA/bfkDgwWEGKggUG3E1tgPBAWDXwi-p-7AwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".l33tAF"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.5 bitcoins. The name of the creator is staffttt, he also created Fake CryptoLocker",
+ "value": "L33TAF Locker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PClock SysGop Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/pclock4-sysgop-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T9Mt0pE7kwY/WF7NKAPfv1I/AAAAAAAACxw/gOjxeSR0x7EurKQTI2p6Ym70ViYuYdsvQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam (for example: “you have a criminal case against you”), fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "PClock4 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/guster-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812131324979007492"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-0-kDVCM-kuI/WGVH-d2trGI/AAAAAAAAC4A/4LlxFpwkhEk89QcJ5ZhO1i-T6dQ_RcVegCEw/s1600/guster-note-2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses VBS-script to send a voice message as the first few lines of the note.",
+ "value": "Guster Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/roga-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-ZIWywQMf2mY/WGJD-rqLZYI/AAAAAAAACzQ/p5PWlpWyHjcVHKq74DOsE7yS-ornW48_QCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".madebyadam"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker requests the ransom in Play Store cards. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ClUef8T55f4/WGKb8U4GeaI/AAAAAAAACzg/UFD0X2sORHYTVRNBSoqd5q7TBrOblQHmgCLcB/s1600/site.png",
+ "value": "Roga"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake CryptoLocker"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptolocker3-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-LDSJ7rws1WI/WGDR-oDSshI/AAAAAAAACyw/_Kn0mnjpm2YN5tS9YldEnca-zOLJpXjcACLcB/s1600/crypto1-2.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cryptolocker"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Creator is staffttt and the ransom is 0.5 botcoins.",
+ "value": "CryptoLocker3 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/proposalcrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.archersecuritygroup.com/what-is-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/812002960083394560",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/811613888705859586"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-TkMikT4PA3o/WFrb4it2u9I/AAAAAAAACww/_zZgu9EHBj8Ibar8i5ekwaowGBD8EoOygCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 1.0 bitcoins.",
+ "value": "ProposalCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/manifestus-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-23rd-2016-cryptxxx-koolova-cerber-and-more/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/811587154983981056"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-85wiBKXIqro/WFrFOaNeSsI/AAAAAAAACwA/UyrPc2bKQCcznmtLTFkEfc6lEvhseyRYACLcB/s1600/lock1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker demands 0.2 bitcoins. The ransomware poses as a Window update.",
+ "value": "Manifestus Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "IDRANSOMv3",
+ "Manifestus"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/enkripsipc-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/811343914712100872",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811264254481494016",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/811587154983981056"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-owEtII_eezA/WFmOp0ccjaI/AAAAAAAACvk/gjYcSeflS4AChm5cYO5c3EV4aSmzr14UwCLcB/s1600/enc100.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fucked"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the hacker is humanpuff69 and he requests 0.5 bitcoins. The encryption password is based on the computer name",
+ "value": "EnkripsiPC Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/braincrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-KrKO1vYs-1w/WFlw6bOfI_I/AAAAAAAACug/42w1VSl2GIoxRuA2SPKJr6xYp3c4OBnJQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8bxTSAADM7M/WFmBEu-eUXI/AAAAAAAACvU/xaQBufV5a-4GWEJhXj2VVLqXnTjQJYNrwCLcB/s1600/note-brain2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".braincrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. So far the victims are from Belarus and Germany.",
+ "value": "BrainCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/msn-cryptolocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/810766686005719040"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-R-lKbH_tLvs/WGPRa-hCtqI/AAAAAAAAC1Y/zgKYZmys_jciaYhtTUsVLen5IHX8_LyiACLcB/s1600/note_2.png",
+ "RESTORE_YOUR_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.2 bitcoins.",
+ "value": "MSN CryptoLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptoblock-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/drProct0r/status/810500976415281154"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-4Y7GZEsWh7A/WFfnmQFF7nI/AAAAAAAACsQ/j3rXZmWrDxMM6xhV1s4YVl_WLDe28cpAwCLcB/s1600/001.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is in the amount is 0.3 bitcoins. The ransomware is disguises themselves as Adobe Systems, Incorporated. RaaS",
+ "value": "CryptoBlock Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aes-ni-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!! READ THIS -IMPORTANT !!!.txt",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GdF-kk1j9-8/WFl6NVm3PAI/AAAAAAAACvE/guFIi_FUpgIQNzX-usJ8CpofX45eXPvkQCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (ECB) + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".aes256"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "AES-NI Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/koolova-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/koolova-ransomware-decrypts-for-free-if-you-read-two-articles-about-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-kz7PePfAiLI/WGTpY3us5LI/AAAAAAAAC3A/wu1rkx-BWlMzglJXXmCxeuYzbZKN5FP4gCLcB/s1600/koolova-v2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker of this ransomware tends to make lots of spelling errors in his requests. With Italian text that only targets the Test folder on the user's desktop",
+ "value": "Koolova Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Globe Imposter",
+ "GlobeImposter"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/fake-globe-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-30th-2016-infected-tvs-and-open-source-ransomware-sucks/",
+ "https://twitter.com/fwosar/status/812421183245287424",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/globeimposter",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/809795402421641216"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-F8oAU82KnQ4/WFWgxjZz2vI/AAAAAAAACrI/J76wm21b5K4F9sjLF1VcEGoif3cS-Y-bwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "HOW_OPEN_FILES.hta"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 1bitcoin.",
+ "value": "Fake Globe Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/v8locker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Acmbpw6fEaQ/WFUFKU9V9ZI/AAAAAAAACqc/47AceoWZzOwP9qO8uenjNVOVXeFJf7DywCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".v8"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "value": "V8Locker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptorium-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-I0fsQu2YXMI/WFLb9LPdkFI/AAAAAAAACoY/xqRhgO1o98oruVDMC6rO4RxCk5MFDSTYgCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENC"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc., however your files are not really encrypted, only the names are changed.",
+ "value": "Cryptorium (Fake Ransomware)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antihacker2017-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k7iDPgj17Zo/WFKEfMvR4wI/AAAAAAAACn4/8irB4Tf1x_MjfTmWaAjuae6mFJbva6GcwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".antihacker2017"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to Russian speaking users, there fore is able to infect mosty the old USSR countries. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc … The hacker goes by the nickname Antihacker and requests the victim to send him an email for the decryption. He does not request any money only a warning about looking at porn (gay, incest and rape porn to be specific).",
+ "value": "Antihacker2017 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cia-special-agent-767-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/remove-cia-special-agent-767-screen-locker",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-16th-2016-samas-no-more-ransom-screen-lockers-and-more/",
+ "https://guides.yoosecurity.com/cia-special-agent-767-virus-locks-your-pc-screen-how-to-unlock/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6I7jtsp5Wi4/WFLqnfUvg5I/AAAAAAAACow/BCOv7etYxxwpIERR1Qs5fmJ2wKBx3sqmACLcB/s1600/screen-locker.png"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect users all over the world. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Your files are not really encrypted and nothing actually happens, however the hacker does ask the victim to pay a sum of 100$, after 5 days the sum goes up to 250$ and thereafter to 500$. After the payment is received, the victim gets the following message informing him that he has been fooled and he simply needed to delete the note. https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T8iSbbGOz84/WFGZEbuRfCI/AAAAAAAACm0/SO8Srwx2UIM3FPZcZl7W76oSDCsnq2vfgCPcB/s1600/code2.jpg",
+ "value": "CIA Special Agent 767 Ransomware (FAKE!!!)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/loveserver-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-LY1A0aeA_c0/WFEduvkiNQI/AAAAAAAACjk/B2-nFQoExscMVvZqvCaf9R4z_C6-rSdvACLcB/s1600/note2.png.png"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker request your IP address in return for the decryption.",
+ "value": "LoveServer Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kraken-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-E4brsgJRDHA/WFBU7wPaYLI/AAAAAAAACjU/sLEkzMiWp5wuc8hpFbylC7lLVMhftCLGgCLcB/s1600/111m.png",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-b5caw8XAvIQ/WFBUuOto40I/AAAAAAAACjQ/_yzwIU17BHw4Ke4E3wM_XBI1XfnAvGSZQCLcB/s1600/005.png",
+ "_HELP_YOUR_FILES.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kraken",
+ "[base64].kraken"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The hacker requests 2 bitcoins in return for the files.",
+ "value": "Kraken Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antix-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6iMtvGe3T58/WE8Ftx7zcUI/AAAAAAAACiE/2ISTxSYzgKEgnfQ7FSUWo3BiCeVLHH_uwCLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 0.25 bitcoins and the nickname of the hacker is FRC 2016.",
+ "value": "Antix Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/payday-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/808316635094380544"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MWEyG49z2Qk/WE78wLqCXPI/AAAAAAAAChw/SIlQSe_o_wMars2egfZ7VqKfWuan6ThwQCLcB/s1600/note1.jpg",
+ "!!!!!ATENÇÃO!!!!!.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sexy"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is R$950 which is due in 5 days. (R$ is a Brazilian currency) Based off of Hidden-Tear",
+ "value": "PayDay Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/slimhem-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is NOT spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It simply places a decrypt file on your computer.",
+ "value": "Slimhem Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/m4n1f3sto-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "I want to play a game with you. Let me explain the rules. Your personal files are being deleted. Your photos, videos, documents, etc... But, don't worry! It will only happen if you don't comply. However I've already encrypted your personal files, so you cannot access therm. Every hour I select some of them to delete permanently, therefore I won't be able to access them, either. Are you familiar with the concept of exponential growth? Let me help you out. It starts out slowly then increases rapidly. During the first 24 hour you will only lose a few files, the second day a few hundred, the third day a few thousand, and so on. If you turn off your computer or try to close me, when i start the next time you will het 1000 files deleted as punishment. Yes you will want me to start next time, since I am the only one that is capable to decrypt your personal data for you. Now, let's start and enjoy our little game together! Send 0.3 bitcoins to this adress to unlock your Pc with your email adress Your can purchase bitcoins from localbitcoins",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-9MsC3A3tuUA/WFGZM45Pw5I/AAAAAAAACms/NbDFma30D9MpK2Zc0O6NvDizU8vqUWWlwCLcB/s1600/M4N1F3STO.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… FILES DON’T REALLY GET DELETED NOR DO THEY GET ENCRYPTED!!!!!!!",
+ "value": "M4N1F3STO Ransomware (FAKE!!!!!)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DaleLocker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES+RSA-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".DALE"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… CHIP > DALE",
+ "value": "Dale Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/ultralocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807161652663742465"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-DOjKnuzCMo8/WE1Xd8yksiI/AAAAAAAACfo/d93v2xn857gQDg4o5Rd4oZpP3q-Ipv9xgCLcB/s1600/UltraLocker.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked (added before the ending, not to the ending, for example: file.locked.doc"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
+ "value": "UltraLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aeskeygenassist-ransomware.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/dxxd-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634258/aes-key-gen-assistprotonmailcom-help-support/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6NIoKnSTwcs/WExcV900C_I/AAAAAAAACfI/_Hba3mOwk3UQ0T5rGercOglMsCTjVtCnQCLcB/s1600/note2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 and RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".pre_alpha"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "value": "AES_KEY_GEN_ASSIST Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/code-virus-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Lyd1uRKG-94/WFJ3TbNqWfI/AAAAAAAACnc/4LoazYU0S1s1YRz3Xck3LN1vOm5RwIpugCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-eBeh1lzEYsI/WFJ4l1oJ4fI/AAAAAAAACno/P5inceelNNk-zfkJGhE3XNamOGC8YmBwwCLcB/s1600/str123.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 and RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Code Virus Ransomware "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/flkr-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-Fh2I6542zi4/WEpmphY0i1I/AAAAAAAACe4/FBP3J6UraBMkSMTWx2tm-FRYnmlYLtFWgCLcB/s1600/note2.png.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Blowfish",
+ "extensions": [
+ "_morf56@meta.ua_"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "FLKR Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/popcorntime-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-scheme-spread-popcorn-time-ransomware-get-chance-of-free-decryption-key/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-WxtRn5yVcNw/WEmgAPgO4AI/AAAAAAAACeo/M7iS6L8pSOEr8EUDkCK_g6h0aMKQQXfGwCLcB/s1600/note2.png",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-sLwR-6y2M-I/WEmVIdJuPMI/AAAAAAAACeY/gpQDT-2-d7kkrfTHgiEZCfxViHu7dNE7ACLcB/s1600/med.jpg",
+ "restore_your_files.html",
+ "restore_your_files.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kok",
+ ".filock"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. These hackers claim to be students from Syria. This ransomware poses as the popular torrent movie screener called PopCorn. These criminals give you the chance to retrieve your files “for free” by spreading this virus to others. Like shown in the note bellow: https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/p/Popcorn-time/refer-a-friend.png",
+ "value": "PopCorn Time Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/hackedlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-G-xrI4N08hs/WFJjQgB3ojI/AAAAAAAACnM/DEfy_skSg044UmbBfNodiQY4OaLkkQPOwCLcB/s1600/note-hacked.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hacked"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM—THE HACKER DOES NOT GIVE A DECRYPT AFTERWARDS.",
+ "value": "HackedLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/goldeneye-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-version-continuing-james-bond-theme/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634778/golden-eye-virus/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-qcJxWivTx1w/WEcEW14om5I/AAAAAAAACa4/xLAlsQGZjeg7Zlg3F2fQAcgQ_6b_cNQLACLcB/s1600/goldeneye-1.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-avE8liOWdPY/WEcEbdTxx6I/AAAAAAAACa8/KOKgXzU1h2EJ0tTOKMdQzZ_JdWWNeFMdwCLcB/s1600/goldeneye-1-2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES(CBC)",
+ "extensions": [
+ "."
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "value": "GoldenEye Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sage-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634978/sage-file-sample-extension-sage/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634747/sage-20-ransomware-sage-support-help-topic/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-GasUzax8cco/WEar0U0tPqI/AAAAAAAACZw/6V_1JFxLMH0UnmLa3-WZa_ML9JbxF0JYACEw/s1600/note-txt2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sage"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "value": "Sage Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "VO_ Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sq-vo-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-Lhq40sgYUpI/WEWpGkkWOKI/AAAAAAAACZQ/iOp9g9Ya0Fk9vZrNKwTEMVcEOzKFIwqgACLcB/s1600/english-2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES and RSA-1024",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".VO_"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker requests 4 bitcoins for ransom.",
+ "value": "SQ_ Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Malta Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-december-2nd-2016-screenlockers-kangaroo-the-sfmta-and-more/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/matrix-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/rommeljoven17/status/804251901529231360"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-RGHgroHt5cU/WEUWnFBn2hI/AAAAAAAACYA/zwSf7rmfWdo4ESQ8kjwj6mJrfzL2V22mgCLcB/s1600/note-eng.png",
+ "[5 numbers]-MATRIX-README.RTF"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES and RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".MATRIX"
+ ],
+ "date": "December 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…",
+ "value": "Matrix"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/satan666-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-anaLWyg_iJI/WFaxDs8KI3I/AAAAAAAACro/yGXh3AV-ZpAKmD4fpQbBkAyYXXnkqgR3ACLcB/s1600/note666_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Satan666 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/rip-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/804810315456200704"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-D-j_9_LZen0/WEPq4G5w5FI/AAAAAAAACXs/GTnckI3CGYQxuDMPXBzpGXDtarPK8yJ5wCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "Important!.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".R.i.P"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear",
+ "value": "RIP (Phoenix) Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/novalid-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634754/locked-in-ransomware-help-support-restore-corupted-fileshtml/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/807169774098796544"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-BK_31ORE0ZY/WD284cEVoLI/AAAAAAAACWA/bU0n3MBMD8Mbgzv9bD6VLJb51Q_kr5AJgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "RESTORE_CORUPTED_FILES.HTML"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".novalid"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on RemindMe",
+ "value": "Locked-In Ransomware or NoValid Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chartwig-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Chartwig Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/renlocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-281TI8xvMLo/WDw2Nl72OsI/AAAAAAAACTk/nT_rL0z-Exo93FzoOXnyaFgQ7wPe0r7IgCLcB/s1600/Crypter1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Rename > Ren + Locker",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypter"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files don’t actually get encrypted, their names get changed using this formula: [www-hash-part-]+[number]+[.crypter]",
+ "value": "RenLocker Ransomware (FAKE)"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/thanksgiving-ransomware.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/07/stampado-ransomware-1.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/801486420368093184"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2dC_gQTed4o/WDxRSh_R-MI/AAAAAAAACT4/yWxzCcMqN_8GLjd8dOPf6Mw16mkbfALawCLcB/s1600/lblMain.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Thanksgiving Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cockblocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/801910919739674624"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/--45C2Cr8sXc/WDiWLTvW-ZI/AAAAAAAACSA/JnJNRr8Kti0YqSnfhPQBF2rsFf-au1g9ACLcB/s1600/Cockblocke.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hannah"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CockBlocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/lomix-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/801815087082274816"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-nXv88GxxOvQ/WE1gqeD3ViI/AAAAAAAACf4/wcVwQ9Pi_JEP2iWNHoBGmeXKJFsfwmwtwCLcB/s1600/Lomix.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire",
+ "value": "Lomix Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/ozozalocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/ozozalocker",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/801503401867673603"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-r-vBnl-wLwo/WDg7fHph9BI/AAAAAAAACRc/VuMxWa1nUPIGHCzhCf2AyL_uc7Z9iB6MACLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "HOW TO DECRYPT YOU FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked",
+ ".Locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/--jubfYRaRmw/WDaOyZXkAaI/AAAAAAAACQE/E63a4FnaOfACZ07s1xUiv_haxy8cp5YCACLcB/s1600/ozoza2.png",
+ "value": "OzozaLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "m0on Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypute-ransomware-m0on.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/threat/ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-8-8X7Nd1MYs/WDSZN6NIT1I/AAAAAAAACNg/ltc7ppfZZL0vWn8BV3Mk9BVrdmJbcEnpgCLcB/s1600/222.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".mo0n"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Crypute Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fake Maktub Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/nmoreira-ransomware.html",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-_i9AjhlvjB8/WDVuLKBnmlI/AAAAAAAACOA/xISXMTBLMbEH4PBS35DQ416woPpkuiVvQCLcB/s1600/note-2.PNG",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4HNc9S8SY4I/WBMkpdKyDsI/AAAAAAAAB0I/udESgro7YB4pF98Dv2KrrecyymFGsvV2QCLcB/s1600/note.JPG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".maktub"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "NMoreira Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/vindowslocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://malwarebytes.app.box.com/s/gdu18hr17mwqszj3hjw5m3sw84k8hlph",
+ "https://rol.im/VindowsUnlocker.zip",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/800729944112427008",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/vindowslocker-ransomware-mimics-tech-support-scam-not-the-other-way-around/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-61DcGSFljUk/WDM2UpFZ02I/AAAAAAAACMw/smvauQCvG3IPHOtEjPP4ocGKmBhVRBv-wCLcB/s1600/lock-note.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vindows"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom amount is 349.99$ and the hacker seems to be from India. He disguises himself as Microsoft Support.",
+ "value": "VindowsLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-donald-trump-ransomware-tries-to-build-walls-around-your-files/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-RwJ6R-uvYg0/V-qfeRPz7GI/AAAAAAAABi8/7x4MxRP7Jp8edbTJqz4iuEye0q1u5k3pQCLcB/s1600/donald-trump-ransomware.jpg",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-donald-trump-ransomware-tries-to-build-walls-around-your-files/"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCRYPTED"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Here is the original ransomware under this name: http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html",
+ "value": "Donald Trump 2 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Voldemort Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/nagini-voldemort-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-nagini-ransomware-sics-voldemort-on-your-files/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-qJHhbtoL1Y4/V-lOClxieEI/AAAAAAAABis/IbnVAY8hnmEfU8_iU1CgQ3FWeX4YZOkBACLcB/s1600/Nagini.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Looks for C:\\Temp\\voldemort.horcrux",
+ "value": "Nagini Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/shelllocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/799388289337671680"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0N1ZUh4WcxQ/WDCfENY1eyI/AAAAAAAACKE/_RVIxRCwedMrD0Tj9o6-ew8u3pL0Y5w8QCLcB/s1600/lock-note2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".l0cked",
+ ".L0cker"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "ShellLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ChipLocker Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chip-ransomware.html",
+ "http://malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/11/17/index.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rig-e-exploit-kit-now-distributing-new-chip-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OvB9TMJoimE/WC9QXRPFNwI/AAAAAAAACJU/iYcCC9tKvGIu4jH2bd6xLvmO7KMVVCLdgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "CHIP_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES + RSA-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CHIP",
+ ".DALE"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Chip Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dharma-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kaspersky-releases-decryptor-for-the-dharma-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README.txt",
+ "README.jpg",
+ "Info.hta"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES + RSA-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dharma",
+ ".wallet",
+ ".zzzzz"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CrySiS > Dharma Note: ATTENTION! At the moment, your system is not protected. We can fix it and restore files. To restore the system write to this address: bitcoin143@india.com. CrySiS variant",
+ "value": "Dharma Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/angela-merkel-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798268218364358656"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-QaJ-Z27tL7s/WDCvwYY2UVI/AAAAAAAACKg/swpf1eKf1Y8oYIK5U8gbfi1H9AQ3Q3r8QCLcB/s1600/angela-merkel.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".angelamerkel"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Angela Merkel Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "YafunnLocker"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cryptoluck-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptoluck-ransomware-being-malvertised-via-rig-e-exploit-kits/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwareforme/status/798258032115322880"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-skwh_-RY50s/WDK2XLhtt3I/AAAAAAAACL0/CaZ0A_fl2Zk-YZYU9g4QCQZkODpicbXpQCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tCYSY5fpE5Q/WDLLZssImkI/AAAAAAAACMg/7TmWPW3k4jQuGIYZN_dCxcSGcY_c4po9wCLcB/s1600/note3_2.PNG",
+ "%AppData%\\@WARNING_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.[victim_id].txt."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ "._luck"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoLuck Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Nemesis",
+ "X3M"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypton-ransomware.html",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/crypton",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/crypton-ransomware-is-here-and-its-not-so-bad-/",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/829353444632825856"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2fAMkigwn4E/WCs1vKiB9UI/AAAAAAAACIs/_kgk8U9wfisV0MTYInIbArwL8zgLyBDIgCLcB/s1600/note-eng.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA + SHA-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ "_crypt",
+ ".id-_locked",
+ ".id-_locked_by_krec",
+ ".id-_locked_by_perfect",
+ ".id-_x3m",
+ ".id-_r9oj",
+ ".id-_garryweber@protonmail.ch",
+ ".id-_steaveiwalker@india.com_",
+ ".id-_julia.crown@india.com_",
+ ".id-_tom.cruz@india.com_",
+ ".id-_CarlosBoltehero@india.com_",
+ ".id-_maria.lopez1@india.com_"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Crypton Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/karma-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researcher-finds-the-karma-ransomware-being-distributed-via-pay-per-install-network/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-18th-2016-crysis-cryptoluck-chip-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/k/karma-ransomware/ransom-note.png",
+ "# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html",
+ "# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".karma"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. pretends to be a Windows optimization program called Windows-TuneUp",
+ "value": "Karma Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/wickedlocker-ht-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-CTLT300bjNk/WCg9mrJArSI/AAAAAAAACGk/weWSqTMVS9AXdxJh_SA06SOH4kh2VGW1gCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "WickedLocker HT Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PClock SuppTeam Ransomware",
+ "WinPlock",
+ "CryptoLocker clone"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/old-cryptolocker-copycat-named-pclock-resurfaces-with-new-attacks/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/suppteam-ransomware-sysras.html",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/updated-pclock-ransomware-still-comes-up-short/",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Your files are locked !.txt",
+ "Your files are locked !!.txt",
+ "Your files are locked !!!.txt",
+ "Your files are locked !!!!.txt",
+ "%AppData%\\WinCL\\winclwp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES or XOR",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoLocker Copycat",
+ "value": "PClock3 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Kolobocheg Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.ransomware.wiki/tag/kolobo/",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kolobo-ransomware.html",
+ "https://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=315142"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.ransomware.wiki/tag/kolobo/"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR and RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kolobocheg@aol.com_"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Kolobo Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Paysafecard Generator 2016"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/paysafegen-german-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/796083768155078656"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-r2kaNLjBcEk/WCNCqrpHPZI/AAAAAAAACEE/eFSWuu4mUZoDV5AnduGR4KxHlFM--uIzACLcB/s1600/lock-screen.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry_"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect German speaking users, since the note is written in German. Mostly affects users in German speaking countries. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "PaySafeGen (German) Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/telecrypt-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.securityweek.com/telecrypt-ransomwares-encryption-cracked",
+ "https://malwarebytes.app.box.com/s/kkxwgzbpwe7oh59xqfwcz97uk0q05kp3",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/76558/the-first-cryptor-to-exploit-telegram/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-UFksnOoE4Ss/WCRUNbQuqyI/AAAAAAAACFI/Gs3Gkby335UmiddlYWJDkw8O-BBLt-BlQCLcB/s1600/telegram_rans.gif"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Xcri"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect Russian speaking users, since the note is written in Russian. Therefore, residents of Russian speaking country are affected. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransomware’s authors would request around $75 from their victims to provide them with a decryptor (payments are accepted via Russian payment services Qiwi or Yandex.Money ). Right from the start, however, researchers suggested that TeleCrypt was written by cybercriminals without advanced skills. Telecrypt will generate a random string to encrypt with that is between 10-20 length and only contain the letters vo,pr,bm,xu,zt,dq.",
+ "value": "Telecrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cerbertear-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/795630452128227333"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ftA6aPEXwPM/WCDY3IiSq6I/AAAAAAAACCU/lnH25navXDkNccw5eQL9fkztRAeIqDYdQCLcB/s1600/note111.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cerber"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CerberTear Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/fucksociety-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-4096",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dll"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Hidden Tear >> APT Ransomware + HYPERLINK \"https://id-ransomware.blogspot.ru/2016/05/remindme-ransomware-2.html\" \t \"_blank\" RemindMe > FuckSociety",
+ "value": "FuckSociety Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Serpent Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/paydos-ransomware-serpent.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-goes-retro-with-paydos-and-serpent-written-as-batch-files/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-serpent-ransomware-targets-danish-speakers"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].html",
+ "HOW_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES_[random_3_chars].txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dng",
+ ".serpent"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Batch file; Passcode: AES1014DW256 or RSA1014DJW2048",
+ "value": "PayDOS Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zscreenlocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/november-2016-month-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794077145349967872"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dng"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "zScreenLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/gremit-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794444032286060544",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/11-4-16/CwZubUHW8AAE4qi[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".rnsmwr"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Gremit Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/hollycrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-PdtXGwSTn24/WBxIoomzF4I/AAAAAAAAB-U/lxTwKWc7T9MJhUtcRMh1mn9m_Ftjox9XwCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hollycrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Hollycrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BTC Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/btclocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/--7M0dtKhOio/WBxJx1PflYI/AAAAAAAAB-g/DSdMjLDLnVwwaMBW4H_98SzSJupLYm9WgCLcB/s1600/note_2.PNG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".BTC"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "BTCLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kangaroo-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kangaroo-ransomware-not-only-encrypts-your-data-but-tries-to-lock-you-out-of-windows/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-1jyI1HoqJag/WBzj9SLvipI/AAAAAAAAB_U/_sp8TglWEPQphG8neqrztfUUIjcBbVhDwCLcB/s1600/kangaroo-lock_2.png",
+ "filename.Instructions_Data_Recovery.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted_file"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. From the developer behind the Apocalypse Ransomware, Fabiansomware, and Esmeralda",
+ "value": "Kangaroo Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dummyencrypter-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2rS0Yq27wp0/WBtKfupZ2sI/AAAAAAAAB8I/0MR-9Xx0n-0zV_NBSScDCiYTp1KH-edtACLcB/s1600/Lockscreen_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dCrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "DummyEncrypter Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SFX Monster Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://virusinfo.info/showthread.php?t=201710",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/encryptss77-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED THAT THEIR DECRYPT SEND EMAIL US AT encryptss77@gmail.com IN MESSAGE INDICATE IP ADDRESS OF COMPUTER WHERE YOU SAW THIS MESSAGE YOU CAN FIND IT ON 2IP.RU WE WILL REPLY TO YOU WITHIN 24 HOURS"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dCrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Encryptss77 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/winrarer-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-zb0TP0wza7I/WBpShN0tCMI/AAAAAAAAB64/oTkSFwKFVx8hY1rEs5FQU6F7oaBW-LqHwCLcB/s1600/note_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ace"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "WinRarer Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/russian-globe-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR FILES HAVE BEEN ENCRYPTED! Your personal ID ***** Your file have been encrypted with a powerful strain of a virus called ransomware. Your files are encrypted using the same methods banks and the military use. There is currently no possible way to decrypt files with the private key. Lucky for you, we can help. We are willing to sell you a decryptor UNIQUELY made for your computer (meaning someone else's decryptor will not work for you). Once you pay a small fee, we will instantly send you the software/info necessary to decrypt all your files, quickly and easily."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".blackblock"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Russian Globe Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zerocrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0AGEY4vAlA0/WBi_oChzFNI/AAAAAAAAB4w/8PrPRfFU30YFWCwHzqnsx4bYISVNFyesQCLcB/s1600/note.PNG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zn2016"
+ ],
+ "date": "November 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "ZeroCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/rotorcrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Good day Your files were encrypted/locked As evidence can decrypt file 1 to 3 1-30MB The price of the transcripts of all the files on the server: 7 Bitcoin Recommend to solve the problem quickly and not to delay Also give advice on how to protect Your server against threats from the network (Files sql mdf backup decryption strictly after payment)!"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".c400",
+ ".c300"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "RotorCrypt(RotoCrypt, Tar) Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ishtar-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "FOR FILE DISCRIPTION, PLEASE CONTACT YOU@edtonmail@protonmail.com Or BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standard encryption order: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > A unique AES key is created for each file. > Decryption is impossible without the ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% directory). ----- TO DECRYPT YOUR FILES PLEASE WRITE TO youneedmail@protonmail.com OR TO BM-NBYR3ctSgr67iciT43rRNmHdHPAYBBK7 USING BITMESSAGE DESKTOP OR https://bitmsg.me/ BASIC TECHNICAL DETAILS: > Standart encryption routine: AES 256 + RSA 2048. > Every AES key is unique per file. > Decryption is impossible without ISHTAR.DATA file (see% APPDATA% path)."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ "ISHTAR-. (prefix)"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.",
+ "value": "Ishtar Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/masterbuster-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791943837874651136"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "IMPORTANT!!!! All of your computer files have been encrypted. DO NOT CHANGE ANY FILES! We can restore all the files. How to restore files: - \n1) Follow this link: - http://goo.gl/forms/VftoBRppkJ \n2) Fill out the form above. \n3) For 24 hours on your email + mobile SMS will come instructions for solving the problem. Thank you! DarkWing020",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-gqEyoqXbZnE/WBXoF5bPZZI/AAAAAAAAB2U/YGpgIdjXyQQeDnwc9PlJs37YWtWTnH_wgCLcB/s1600/note.jpg",
+ "CreatesReadThisFileImportant.txt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hcked"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "MasterBuster Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Jack.Pot Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/jackpot-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791639214152617985",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-oaElZvUqbfo/WBUOGdD8unI/AAAAAAAAB1w/Ya1_qq0gfa09AhRddUITQNRxKloXgD_BwCLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".coin"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "JackPot Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/onyx-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791557636164558848",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "All your files are encrypted, but do not worry, they have not been removed. (for now) You have 24 hours to pay $100. Money move to the specified Bitcoin -account. Otherwise, all files will be destroyed. Do not turn off the computer and/or do not attempt to disable me. When disobedience will be deleted 100 files.",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-cukkC4KAhZE/WBY1jJbcQoI/AAAAAAAAB3I/p8p-iNQRnQwnP6c6H77h_SHMQNAlkJ1CgCLcB/s1600/onyx.jpg"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Encryption:"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Georgian ransomware",
+ "value": "ONYX Ransomeware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ifn643-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791576159960072192",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-28-2016-locky-angry-duck-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-JuBZKpEHV0Q/WBYNHFlW7pI/AAAAAAAAB20/z0DPYA_8l6U8tB6pbgo8ZwyIJRcrIVy2ACLcB/s1600/Note1.JPG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".inf643"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "IFN643 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/alcatraz-locker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-november-4th-2016-cerber-paydos-alcatraz-locker-and-more/",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/792796055020642304"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-b0-Uvnz703Q/WBcMGkZqtwI/AAAAAAAAB3Y/a6clIjdp_tI2T-OE_ykyjvB2qNY3gqWdQCLcB/s1600/Screenshot_1.jpg",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-y5a6QnjAiv0/WBcMKV0zDDI/AAAAAAAAB3c/ytOQHJgmy30H_jEWPcfht7RRsh4NhcrvACLcB/s1600/Screenshot_2.jpg",
+ "ransomed.hTmL"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Alcatraz"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Alcatraz Locker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/esmeralda-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/630835/esmeralda-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Windows has encountered a critical problem and needs your immediate action to recover your data. The system access is locked and all the data have been encrypted to avoid the information be published or misused. You will not be able to access to your files and ignoring this message may cause the total loss of the data. We are sorry for the inconvenience. You need to contact the email below to restore the data of your system. Email: esmeraldaencryption@mail.ru You will have to order the Unlock-Password and the Esmeralda Decryption Software. All the instructions will be sent to you by email.",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-vaWu8OjSiXE/WBzkLBdB8DI/AAAAAAAAB_Y/k8vvtYEIdTkFJhruRJ6qDNAujAn4Ph-xACLcB/s1600/esmeralda-lock_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Esmeralda Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/encryptile-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-_jxt6kCRnwM/WBNf7mi92nI/AAAAAAAAB0g/homx8Ly379oUKAOIhZU6MxCiWX1gA_TkACLcB/s1600/wallp.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "EncrypTile Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fileice-ransomware-survey.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-GAPCc3ITdQY/WBMTmJ4NaRI/AAAAAAAABzM/XPbPZvZ8vbUrOWxtwPmfHFJiNT_2gfaOgCLcB/s1600/fileice-source.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of how the hacker tricks the user using the survey method. https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-72ECd1vsUdE/WBMSzPQEgzI/AAAAAAAABzA/i8V-Kg8Gstcn_7-YZK__PDC2VgafWcfDgCLcB/s1600/survey-screen.png The hacker definatly has a sense of humor: https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2AlvtcvdyUY/WBMVptG_V5I/AAAAAAAABzc/1KvAMeDmY2w9BN9vkqZO8LWkBu7T9mvDACLcB/s1600/ThxForYurTyme.JPG",
+ "value": "Fileice Ransomware Survey Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/cryptowire-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/791554654664552448",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/-proof-of-concept-cryptowire-ransomware-spawns-lomix-and-ultralocker-families/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vIMgkn8WVJM/WBJAxkbya7I/AAAAAAAABys/tCpaTOxfGDw8A611gudDh46mhZT70dURwCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-b0QiEQec0Pg/WBMf2HG6hjI/AAAAAAAABz8/BtN2-INZ2KQ4W2_iPqvDZTtlA0Aq_4gVACLcB/s1600/Screenshot_2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "CryptoWire Ransomeware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Hungarian Locky Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/hucky-ransomware-hungarian-locky.html",
+ "https://blog.avast.com/hucky-ransomware-a-hungarian-locky-wannabe",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/846241982347427840"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lLZZBScC27U/WBmkDQzl9FI/AAAAAAAAB5Y/gozOy17Yv0EWNCQVSOXn-PkTccYZuMmPQCLcB/s1600/note-bmp_2.png",
+ "!!! IMPORTANT INFORMATION !!!! All files are encrypted using RSA-3072 and AES128 encryption. You can learn more about RSA and AES ciphers here: Https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA-eljárás Https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard To return files, you need to get a secret key and decryption program. To get the key, please follow these steps: \n1. Send an identification code to the email address locky@mail2tor.com! If you want, send a 1 MB file for decryption. In order to prove that we can recover data. (Please, email must contain only the identification code, as well as the attachment) \n3. Please note, check the mail, we will send you an email within 24 hours! You will receive a decrypted file and decryption program in the attachment. Follow the instructions in the email.!!! Your identification code !!!",
+ "_Adatok_visszaallitasahoz_utasitasok.txt",
+ "_locky_recover_instructions.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128+RSA",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky",
+ "[a-zA-Z0-9+_-]{1,}.[a-z0-9]{3,4}.locky"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on Locky",
+ "value": "Hucky Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/winnix-cryptor-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/811940037638111232"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Your files are encrypted! Your files have been safely encrypted on this PC: photos, documents, databases, etc. Encryption was produced using a unique public key generated for this computer. To decrypt files you need to obtain the private key. The only way to get the private key is to pay 4 BTC. You saved it on qualified system administrator who could make your network safe and secure. In order to decrypt the files send your bitcoins to the following address: 13gYXFxpzm7hAd4esdnJGt9JvYqyD1Y6by After you complete your payment, send an email to 6214ssxpvo@sigaint.org with YOUR ID as subject (ID is in the end of the file) and you'll receive private key, needed software and step by step guide in 1 business day. Offer is valid for 5 business days (expiration date is in the end of the file). AFTER TIME IS UP, PRICE DOUBLES. No discounts, no other payment methods. How to buy bitcoins? \n1. Create a Bitcoin Wallet (we recommend Blockchain.info) \n2. Buy necessary amount of Bitcoins Do not forget about the transaction commission in the Bitcoin network (= 0.0005). Here are our recommendations: LocalBitcoins.com – the fastest and easiest way to buy and sell Bitcoins; CoinCafe.com – the simplest and fastest way to buy, sell and use Bitcoins; BTCDirect.eu – the best for Europe; CEX.IO – Visa / MasterCard; CoinMama.com – Visa / MasterCard; HowToBuyBitcoins.info – discover quickly how to buy and sell bitcoins in your local currency. More questions? Send an email to 6214ssxpvo@sigaint.org ID: *** EXP DATE: Sept. 12 2016 Winnix Cryptor Team",
+ "YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED!.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".wnx"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Winnix Cryptor Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/angryduck-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/790334746488365057"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-k3s85Fx9N_E/WBIfuUNTMmI/AAAAAAAAByM/rQ10tKuXTlEJfLTOoBwJPo7rhhaiK2OoQCLcB/s1600/screen-lock.jpg",
+ "ANGRY DUCK! All your important files have been encrypted using very string cryptography (AES-512 With RSA-64 FIPS grade encryption). To recover your files, send 10 BTC to my private wallet DON'T MESS WITH THE DUCKS!!!"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".adk"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Demands 10 BTC",
+ "value": "AngryDuck Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/lock93-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/789882488365678592"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-WuD2qaaNIb0/WA4_g_FnIfI/AAAAAAAABx4/pn6VNqMXMzI_ryvKUruY3ctYtzomT1I4gCLcB/s1600/note3.jpg",
+ "https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-S6M83oFxSdM/WA4_ak9WATI/AAAAAAAABx0/3FL3q21FdxMQvAgrr2FORQIaNtq2-P2jACLcB/s1600/note2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lock93"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Lock93 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/asn1-encoder-ransomware.html",
+ "https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/02/rig-ek-at-92-53-105-43-drops-asn1-ransomware/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-5gZpxeEWqZg/WBeNnEP9GzI/AAAAAAAAB4g/ELCCp88whLMI6CzpGTjlxbmXBMFIKhwtwCLcB/s1600/onion-site.JPG",
+ "!!!!!readme!!!!!.htm"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-512",
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "ASN1 Encoder Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/click-me-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe30kV4ip8w"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "All right my dear brother!!! Enough free playing. Your files have been encrypted. Pay so much this much money so I can send you the password for your files. I can be paid this much too cause I am very kind. So move on I didn't raise the price."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hacked"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker tries to get the user to play a game and when the user clicks the button, there is no game, just 20 pictures in a .gif below: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-1zgO3-bBazs/WAkPYqXuayI/AAAAAAAABxI/DO3vycRW-TozneSfRTdeKyXGNEtJSMehgCLcB/s1600/all-images.gif",
+ "value": "Click Me Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4HNc9S8SY4I/WBMkpdKyDsI/AAAAAAAAB0I/udESgro7YB4pF98Dv2KrrecyymFGsvV2QCLcB/s1600/note.JPG"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".hacked"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "AiraCrop Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SHC Ransomware",
+ "SHCLocker",
+ "SyNcryption"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/japanlocker-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/japanlocker",
+ "https://github.com/fortiguard-lion/schRansomwareDecryptor/blob/master/schRansomwarev1_decryptor.php",
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/10/19/japanlocker-an-excavation-to-its-indonesian-roots"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-sdlDK4OIuPA/WAehWZYHaMI/AAAAAAAABvc/TcAcLG2lw10aOFY3FbP1A5EuLjL6LR62ACLcB/s1600/note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ "#LOCK#"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Base64 encoding, ROT13, and top-bottom swapping",
+ "value": "JapanLocker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/anubis-ransomware.html",
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/Anubis.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0YMsPH5WuTk/WAepI4BnqZI/AAAAAAAABv0/yXt4tdrmmAIf-N9KUmehY6mK1kTV-eFFQCLcB/s1600/note-wal2.jpg",
+ "Decryption Instructions.txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES(256)",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".coded"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. EDA2",
+ "value": "Anubis Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/xtplocker-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Attention! ! ! All of your copies of your system have been permanently deleted and the data on all partitions and workstations have been encrypted! Stay calm. You can recover all your data by making a payment of 2 BTC (1200 USD) in Bitcoin currency to receive a decryption key. To purchase Bitcions you can use www.coinbase.com After buying BTC send the equivalent of 2 BTC (1200 USD) to our BTC adress : 16jX5RbF2pEcLYHPukazWhDCkxXTs7ZCxB After payment contact us to receive your decryption key. In mail title write your unique ID: {custom id visually resembling a MAC address} Our e-mail: crypt302@gmx.com"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "XTPLocker 5.0 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/eviltwins-exotic-ransomware-targets-executable-files/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/",
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/exotic-ransomware",
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/exotic-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WJYR7LkWHWY/WAaCYScljOI/AAAAAAAABuo/j18AGhzv7WUPb2r4HWkYm4TPgYw9S5PUwCLcB/s1600/note1-1.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-2QxJ3KCRimI/WAaCcWcE2uI/AAAAAAAABus/9SGRY5iQT-ITfG_JrY7mn6-PUpQrSKg7gCLcB/s1600/note1-2.jpg",
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-SMXOoWiGkxw/WAaGOMdecrI/AAAAAAAABu8/S-YjlWlPKbItSN_fe8030tMDHWzouHsIgCLcB/s1600/note2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".exotic",
+ "random.exotic"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Also encrypts executables",
+ "value": "Exotic Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/apt-ransomware-2.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-VTUhk_Py2FA/WAVCO1Yn69I/AAAAAAAABuI/N71wo2ViOE0UjrIdbeulBRTJukHtA2TdACLcB/s1600/ransom-note.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dll"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. NO POINT TO PAY THE RANSOM, THE FILES ARE COMPLETELY DESTROYED",
+ "value": "APT Ransomware v.2"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "WS Go Ransonware",
+ "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ws-go-ransonware.html",
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/apt-ransomware-v2"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-NfRePJbfjbY/WAe5LHFsWaI/AAAAAAAABwE/1Pk116TDqAYEDYvnu2vzim1l-H5seW9mQCLcB/s1600/note.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Windows_Security Ransonware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ncrypt-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-k7T79DnBk8w/WBc67QXyjWI/AAAAAAAAB3w/QbA-E9lYdSMOg3PcG9Vz8fTc_OhmACObACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".NCRYPT",
+ ".ncrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "NCrypt Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/venis-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/Antelox/status/785849412635521024",
+ "http://pastebin.com/HuK99Xmj"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-IFEOWjw-aaQ/WAXTu9oEN4I/AAAAAAAABuY/APqBiaHn3pAX8404Noyuj7tnFJDf2m_XACLcB/s1600/note1.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-2048",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".venis"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. In devVenisRansom@protonmail.com",
+ "value": "Venis Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/enigma-2-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "We encrypt important files on your computer: documents, databases, photos, videos and keys. Files encryption algorithm AES 128 (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) with a private key that only we know. Encrypted files have .1txt extension. It decrypts files without the private key IMPOSSIBLE. \nIf you want to get the files back: \n1) Install the Tor Browser http://www.torproject.org/ \n2) Locate the desktop key to access E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA site (password is encrypted in the key of your files) \n3) Go to the website http://kf2uimw5omtgveu6.onion/ into a torus-browser and log in using E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA \n4) Follow the instructions on the website and download the decoder \nC:\\Documents and Settings\\Администратор\\Рабочийстол\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file on the desktop C:\\DOCUME~1\\9335~1\\LOCALS~1\\Temp\\E_N_I_G_M_A.RSA - The path to the key file in TMP directory"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".1txt"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Enigma 2 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Deadly for a Good Purpose Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/deadly-ransomware.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/785533373007728640"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-XZiiaCYM9Bk/WAUsUkrCJEI/AAAAAAAABtk/z-sMHflz3Q8_aWc-K9PD0N5TGkSGwwQnACLcB/s1600/note-html.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. sample is set to encrypt only in 2017...",
+ "value": "Deadly Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/comrade-circle-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MmzOC__9qPA/V__t2kNX-SI/AAAAAAAABrc/t8ypPa1jCIUbPfvR7UGbdGzdvKrbAv_DgCLcB/s1600/wallpaper.jpg",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-hRoC-UFr-7o/V__tAEFuZWI/AAAAAAAABrQ/xDawlulx8Bg4uEtX4bU2ezPMY-x6iFiuQCLcB/s1600/note-1ch.JPG",
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PdYtm6sRHAI/WAEngHQBg_I/AAAAAAAABsA/nh8m7__b0wgviTEBahyNYK4HFhF1v7rOQCLcB/s1600/icon-stalin-2.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".comrade"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Comrade Circle Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/globe2-ransomware.html",
+ "https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MYI30xhrcZU/V_qcDyASJsI/AAAAAAAABpU/Pej5jDk_baYBByLx1cXwFL8LBiT8Vj3xgCLcB/s1600/note22.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 or Blowfish",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".raid10",
+ ".[random].raid10",
+ ".blt",
+ ".globe",
+ ".[random].blt",
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".[random].globe",
+ ".[random].encrypted",
+ ".mia.kokers@aol.com",
+ ".[mia.kokers@aol.com]",
+ ".lovewindows",
+ ".openforyou@india.com",
+ ".."
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Globe2 Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/kostya-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-E_MI2fT33J0/V_k_9Gjkj4I/AAAAAAAABpA/-30UT5HhPAAR9YtVkFwgrYqLIdWPprZ9gCLcB/s1600/lock-screen.jpg",
+ "https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-4YmIkWfYfRA/V_lAALhfSvI/AAAAAAAABpE/Dj35aroKXSwbLXrSPqGCzbvhsTNHdsbAgCLcB/s1600/kostya.jpg"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".k0stya"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Kostya Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fs0ciety-locker-ransomware.htm"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-nskzYgbg7Ac/V_jpJ3GApqI/AAAAAAAABos/EbG_-BLDPqA9bRVOWdzHjPnDWFiHYlsJwCLcB/s1600/ransom-note.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 CBC",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".comrade"
+ ],
+ "date": "October 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..",
+ "value": "Fs0ciety Locker Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/erebus-ransomware.html"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-E9WbSxLgaYs/WGn8gC6EfvI/AAAAAAAAC8A/bzd7uP9fcxU6Fyq1n6-9ZbUUGWlls9lrwCLcB/s1600/note-txt_2.png"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ecrypt"
+ ],
+ "date": "September 2016"
+ },
+ "description": "It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. After the files are decrypted, the shadow files are deleted using the following command: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet",
+ "value": "Erebus Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "WannaCrypt",
+ "WannaCry",
+ "WanaCrypt0r",
+ "WCrypt",
+ "WCRY"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://gist.github.com/rain-1/989428fa5504f378b993ee6efbc0b168"
+ ],
+ "date": "May 2017"
+ },
+ "description": "According to numerous open-source reports, a widespread ransomware campaign is affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections in as many as 74 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan. The software can run in as many as 27 different languages. The latest version of this ransomware variant, known as WannaCry, WCry, or Wanna Decryptor, was discovered the morning of May 12, 2017, by an independent security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours, with initial reports beginning around 4:00 AM EDT, May 12, 2017. Open-source reporting indicates a requested ransom of .1781 bitcoins, roughly $300 U.S.",
+ "value": "WannaCry"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": ".CryptoHasYou.",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES(256)",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_LOCKED.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/CryptoHasYou.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "777",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sevleg"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".777",
+ "._[timestamp]_$[email]$.777",
+ "e.g. ._14-05-2016-11-59-36_$ninja.gaiver@aol.com$.777"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "read_this_file.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/777"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "7ev3n",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "7ev3n-HONE$T"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".R4A",
+ ".R5A"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "FILES_BACK.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_analysis/tree/master/7ev3n",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDNbH5HDO1E&feature=youtu.be",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/7ev3n-HONE$T.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "8lock8",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".8lock8"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614025/8lock8-help-support-topic-8lock8-read-ittxt/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "AiraCrop",
+ "description": "Ransomware related to TeamXRat",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "._AiraCropEncrypted"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to decrypt your files.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/796079699478900736"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Al-Namrood",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".unavailable",
+ ".disappeared"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Read_Me.Txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/al-namrood"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ALFA Ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware Made by creators of Cerber",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".bin"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README HOW TO DECRYPT YOUR FILES.HTML"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-alfa-or-alpha-ransomware-from-the-same-devs-as-cerber/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Alma Ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "random",
+ "random(x5)"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Unlock_files_randomx5.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://cta-service-cms2.hubspot.com/ctas/v2/public/cs/c/?cta_guid=d4173312-989b-4721-ad00-8308fff353b3&placement_guid=22f2fe97-c748-4d6a-9e1e-ba3fb1060abe&portal_id=326665&redirect_url=APefjpGnqFjmP_xzeUZ1Y55ovglY1y1ch7CgMDLit5GTHcW9N0ztpnIE-ZReqqv8MDj687_4Joou7Cd2rSx8-De8uhFQAD_Len9QpT7Xvu8neW5drkdtTPV7hAaou0osAi2O61dizFXibewmpO60UUCd5OazCGz1V6yT_3UFMgL0x9S1VeOvoL_ucuER8g2H3f1EfbtYBw5QFWeUmrjk-9dGzOGspyn303k9XagBtF3SSX4YWSyuEs03Vq7Fxb04KkyKc4GJx-igK98Qta8iMafUam8ikg8XKPkob0FK6Pe-wRZ0QVWIIkM&hsutk=34612af1cd87864cf7162095872571d1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Finfo.phishlabs.com%2Fblog%2Falma-ransomware-analysis-of-a-new-ransomware-threat-and-a-decrypter&canon=https%3A%2F%2Finfo.phishlabs.com%2Fblog%2Falma-ransomware-analysis-of-a-new-ransomware-threat-and-a-decrypter&__hstc=61627571.34612af1cd87864cf7162095872571d1.1472135921345.1472140656779.1472593507113.3&__hssc=61627571.1.1472593507113&__hsfp=1114323283",
+ "https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/alma-ransomware-analysis-of-a-new-ransomware-threat-and-a-decrypter",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-alma-locker-ransomware-being-distributed-via-the-rig-exploit-kit/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Alpha Ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "AlphaLocker"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Read Me (How Decrypt) !!!!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/AlphaDecrypter.zip",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decrypted-alpha-ransomware-continues-the-trend-of-accepting-amazon-cards/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwarebread/status/804714048499621888"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "AMBA",
+ "description": "Ransomware Websites only amba@riseup.net",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".amba"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ПРОЧТИ_МЕНЯ.txt",
+ "READ_ME.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/benkow_/status/747813034006020096"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "AngleWare",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".AngleWare"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_ME.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844531418474708993"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Anony",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ngocanh"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/842047409446387714"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Apocalypse",
+ "description": "Ransomware decryptionservice@mail.ru recoveryhelp@bk.ru ransomware.attack@list.ru esmeraldaencryption@mail.ru dr.compress@bk.ru",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Fabiansomeware"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".SecureCrypted",
+ ".FuckYourData",
+ ".unavailable",
+ ".bleepYourFiles",
+ ".Where_my_files.txt",
+ "[filename].ID-*8characters+countrycode[cryptservice@inbox.ru].[random7characters]",
+ "*filename*.ID-[A-F0-9]{8}+countrycode[cryptcorp@inbox.ru].[a-z0-9]{13}"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "*.How_To_Decrypt.txt",
+ "*.Contact_Here_To_Recover_Your_Files.txt",
+ "*.Where_my_files.txt",
+ "*.Read_Me.Txt",
+ "*md5*.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/apocalypse",
+ "http://blog.emsisoft.com/2016/06/29/apocalypse-ransomware-which-targets-companies-through-insecure-rdp/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ApocalypseVM",
+ "description": "Ransomware Apocalypse ransomware version which uses VMprotect",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "*.How_To_Get_Back.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://decrypter.emsisoft.com/download/apocalypsevm"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "AutoLocky",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "info.txt",
+ "info.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/autolocky"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Aw3s0m3Sc0t7",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/828902907668000770"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BadBlock",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Help Decrypt.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/badblock",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/BadBlock.html",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/badblock/5.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BaksoCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".adr"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/760482299007922176",
+ "https://0xc1r3ng.wordpress.com/2016/06/24/bakso-crypt-simple-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bandarchor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Rakhni"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-1235240425_help@decryptservice.info",
+ ".id-[ID]_[EMAIL_ADDRESS]"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW TO DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://reaqta.com/2016/03/bandarchor-ransomware-still-active/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-bandarchor-ransomware-variant-spreads-via-malvertising-on-adult-sites/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bart",
+ "description": "Ransomware Possible affiliations with RockLoader, Locky and Dridex",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BaCrypt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".bart.zip",
+ ".bart",
+ ".perl"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "recover.txt",
+ "recover.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://now.avg.com/barts-shenanigans-are-no-match-for-avg/",
+ "http://phishme.com/rockloader-downloading-new-ransomware-bart/",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/New-Bart-Ransomware-from-Threat-Actors-Spreading-Dridex-and-Locky"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BitCryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Has a GUI. CryptoGraphic Locker family. Newer CoinVault variant.",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".clf"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://noransom.kaspersky.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BitStak",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".bitstak"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Base64 + String Replacement",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BitStakDecrypter.zip"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BlackShades Crypter",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SilentShade"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Silent"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Hacked_Read_me_to_decrypt_files.html",
+ "YourID.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/BlackShades.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Blocatto",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".blocatto"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614456/bloccato-ransomware-bloccato-help-support-leggi-questo-filetxt/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Booyah",
+ "description": "Ransomware EXE was replaced to neutralize threat",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Salami"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Brazilian",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".lock"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "MENSAGEM.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/brazilianRansom.html",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/brazilianRansom/0.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Brazilian Globe",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-%ID%_garryweber@protonmail.ch"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_OPEN_FILES.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/821831437884211201"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BrLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Browlock",
+ "description": "Ransomware no local encryption, browser only"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BTCWare Related to / new version of CryptXXX",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".btcware"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "#_HOW_TO_FIX_!.hta"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845199679340011520"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Bucbi",
+ "description": "Ransomware no file name change, no extension",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "GOST",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/unit42-bucbi-ransomware-is-back-with-a-ukrainian-makeover/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "BuyUnlockCode",
+ "description": "Ransomware Does not delete Shadow Copies",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "(.*).encoded.([A-Z0-9]{9})"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "BUYUNLOCKCODE.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Central Security Treatment Organization",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!Recovery_[random_chars].html",
+ "!Recovery_[random_chars].txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/625820/central-security-treatment-organization-ransomware-help-topic-cry-extension/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cerber",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cerber",
+ ".cerber2",
+ ".cerber3"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CRBR ENCRYPTOR"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "# DECRYPT MY FILES #.html",
+ "# DECRYPT MY FILES #.txt",
+ "# DECRYPT MY FILES #.vbs",
+ "# README.hta",
+ "_{RAND}_README.jpg",
+ "_{RAND}_README.hta",
+ "_HELP_DECRYPT_[A-Z0-9]{4-8}_.jpg",
+ "_HELP_DECRYPT_[A-Z0-9]{4-8}_.hta",
+ "_HELP_HELP_HELP_%random%.jpg",
+ "_HELP_HELP_HELP_%random%.hta",
+ "_HOW_TO_DECRYPT_[A-Z0-9]{4-8}_.hta",
+ "_HOW_TO_DECRYPT_[A-Z0-9]{4-8}_.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/03/cerber-ransomware-new-but-mature/",
+ "https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2016/11/04/the-evolution-of-cerber-v410",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cerber-renames-itself-as-crbr-encryptor-to-be-a-pita/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Chimera",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt",
+ "4 random characters, e.g., .PzZs, .MKJL"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.HTML",
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.TXT",
+ ".gif"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chimera-ransomware-decryption-keys-released-by-petya-devs/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2015/12/inside-chimera-ransomware-the-first-doxingware-in-wild/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Clock",
+ "description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt anything",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/794956809866018816"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CoinVault",
+ "description": "Ransomware CryptoGraphic Locker family. Has a GUI. Do not confuse with CrypVault!",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".clf"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "wallpaper.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://noransom.kaspersky.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Coverton",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".coverton",
+ ".enigma",
+ ".czvxce"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!!-WARNING-!!!.html",
+ "!!!-WARNING-!!!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/paying-the-coverton-ransomware-may-not-get-your-data-back/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cryaki",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".{CRYPTENDBLACKDC}"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Crybola",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryFile",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".criptiko",
+ ".criptoko",
+ ".criptokod",
+ ".cripttt",
+ ".aga"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Moves bytes",
+ "refs": [
+ "SHTODELATVAM.txt",
+ "Instructionaga.txt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "http://virusinfo.info/showthread.php?t=185396"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Identifies victim locations w/Google Maps API",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cry",
+ "CSTO",
+ "Central Security Treatment Organization"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!Recovery_[random_chars].html",
+ "!Recovery_[random_chars].txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-crylocker-ransomware-communicates-using-udp-and-stores-data-on-imgur-com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CrypMIC",
+ "description": "Ransomware CryptXXX clone/spinoff",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README.TXT",
+ "README.HTML",
+ "README.BMP"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/crypmic-ransomware-wants-to-follow-cryptxxx/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Crypren",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCRYPTED"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_THIS_TO_DECRYPT.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/pekeinfo/DecryptCrypren",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Crypren.html",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/crypren/0.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Crypt38",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt38"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/Crypt38Keygen.zip",
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/17/buggy-russian-ransomware-inadvertently-allows-free-decryption"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Crypter",
+ "description": "Ransomware Does not actually encrypt the files, but simply renames them",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/802554159564062722"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptFIle2",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".scl",
+ "id[_ID]email_xerx@usa.com.scl"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptInfinite",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crinf"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoBit",
+ "description": "Ransomware sekretzbel0ngt0us.KEY - do not confuse with CryptorBit.",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES + RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "OKSOWATHAPPENDTOYOURFILES.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/panda-security/cryptobit/",
+ "http://news.softpedia.com/news/new-cryptobit-ransomware-could-be-decryptable-503239.shtml"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoDefense",
+ "description": "Ransomware no extension change",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_DECRYPT.TXT",
+ "HOW_DECRYPT.HTML",
+ "HOW_DECRYPT.URL"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoFinancial",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ranscam"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/07/ranscam.html",
+ "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/07/13/ransomware-that-demands-money-and-gives-you-back-nothing/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoFortress",
+ "description": "Ransomware Mimics Torrentlocker. Encrypts only 50% of each file up to 5 MB",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".frtrss"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-1024",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ IF YOU WANT YOUR FILES BACK.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoGraphic Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Has a GUI. Subvariants: CoinVault BitCryptor",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".clf"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "wallpaper.jpg"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoHost",
+ "description": "Ransomware RAR's victim's files has a GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Manamecrypt",
+ "Telograph",
+ "ROI Locker"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 (RAR implementation)",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptohost-decrypted-locks-files-in-a-password-protected-rar-file/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoJoker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crjoker"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README!!!.txt",
+ "GetYouFiles.txt",
+ "crjoker.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware no longer relevant",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".ENC"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2014/08/your-locker-of-information-for-cryptolocker-decryption.html",
+ "https://reaqta.com/2016/04/uncovering-ransomware-distribution-operation-part-2/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoLocker 1.0.0",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839747940122001408"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoLocker 5.1",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782890104947867649"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoMix",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Zeta"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".code",
+ ".scl",
+ ".rmd",
+ ".lesli",
+ ".rdmk",
+ ".CRYPTOSHIELD",
+ ".CRYPTOSHIEL",
+ ".id_(ID_MACHINE)_email_xoomx@dr.com_.code",
+ ".id_*_email_zeta@dr.com",
+ ".id_(ID_MACHINE)_email_anx@dr.com_.scl",
+ ".email[supl0@post.com]id[\\[[a-z0-9]{16}\\]].lesli",
+ "*filename*.email[*email*]_id[*id*].rdmk"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_YOUR_FILES.html (CryptXXX)",
+ "HELP_YOUR_FILES.txt (CryptoWall 3.0, 4.0)",
+ "INSTRUCTION RESTORE FILE.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/CryptoMix.html",
+ "https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/technical-analysis-of-cryptomixcryptfile2-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoRansomeware",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817672617658347521"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoRoger",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crptrgr"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!Where_are_my_files!.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ransomware-called-cryptoroger-that-appends-crptrgr-to-encrypted-files/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoShadow",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".doomed"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "LEER_INMEDIATAMENTE.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/821992610164277248"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoShocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ATTENTION.url"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617601/cryptoshocker-ransomware-help-and-support-topic-locked-attentionurl/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoTorLocker2015",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CryptoTorLocker2015!"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.txt",
+ "%Temp%\\.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/565020/new-cryptotorlocker2015-ransomware-discovered-and-easily-decrypted/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoTrooper",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://news.softpedia.com/news/new-open-source-linux-ransomware-shows-infosec-community-divide-508669.shtml"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoWall 1",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.HTM",
+ "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.TXT",
+ "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.URL",
+ "INSTALL_TOR.URL"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoWall 2",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.TXT",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.PNG",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.URL",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.HTML"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoWall 3",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.TXT",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.PNG",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.URL",
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.HTML"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2015/01/13/crowti-update-cryptowall-3-0/",
+ "https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/45317968759d3e37282ceb75149f627d648534c5b4685f6da3966d8f6fca662d/analysis/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptoWall 4",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "., e.g. ,27p9k967z.x1nep"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
+ "HELP_YOUR_FILES.PNG"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptXXX",
+ "description": "Ransomware Comes with Bedep",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptProjectXXX"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "de_crypt_readme.bmp, .txt, .html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/cryptxxx-ransomware-help-information"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptXXX 2.0",
+ "description": "Ransomware Locks screen. Ransom note names are an ID. Comes with Bedep.",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptProjectXXX"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ ".txt, .html, .bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/cryptxxx2-ransomware-authors-strike-back-against-free-decryption-tool",
+ "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptXXX 3.0",
+ "description": "Ransomware Comes with Bedep",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "UltraDeCrypter",
+ "UltraCrypter"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt",
+ ".cryp1",
+ ".crypz",
+ ".cryptz",
+ "random"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cryptxxx-updated-to-version-3-0-decryptors-no-longer-work/",
+ "http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryptXXX 3.1",
+ "description": "Ransomware StilerX credential stealing",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cryp1"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/cryptxxx-ransomware-learns-samba-other-new-tricks-with-version3100"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CryPy",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_FOR_DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ctb-faker-ransomware-does-a-poor-job-imitating-ctb-locker/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CTB-Faker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Citroni"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ctbl",
+ ".([a-z]{6,7})"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "AllFilesAreLocked .bmp",
+ "DecryptAllFiles .txt",
+ ".html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CTB-Locker WEB",
+ "description": "Ransomware websites only",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://thisissecurity.net/2016/02/26/a-lockpicking-exercise/",
+ "https://github.com/eyecatchup/Critroni-php"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CuteRansomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "my-Little-Ransomware"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".已加密",
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "你的檔案被我們加密啦!!!.txt",
+ "Your files encrypted by our friends !!! txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/aaaddress1/my-Little-Ransomware/tree/master/decryptoTool",
+ "https://github.com/aaaddress1/my-Little-Ransomware"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cyber SpLiTTer Vbs",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CyberSplitter"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/778871886616862720",
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/806758133720698881"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Death Bitches",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815555258478981121"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DeCrypt Protect",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.malwareremovalguides.info/decrypt-files-with-decrypt_mblblock-exe-decrypt-protect/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DEDCryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ded"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617395/dedcryptor-ded-help-support-topic/",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/DEDCryptor.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Demo",
+ "description": "Ransomware only encrypts .jpg files",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_YOUR_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/798573300779745281"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DetoxCrypto",
+ "description": "Ransomware - Based on Detox: Calipso, We are all Pokemons, Nullbyte",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-detoxcrypto-ransomware-pretends-to-be-pokemongo-or-uploads-a-picture-of-your-screen/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Digisom",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Digisom Readme0.txt (0 to 9)"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/829727052316160000"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DirtyDecrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/752586334527709184"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DMALocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware no extension change Encrypted files have prefix: Version 1: ABCXYZ11 - Version 2: !DMALOCK - Version 3: !DMALOCK3.0 - Version 4: !DMALOCK4.0",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 in ECB mode, Version 2-4 also RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "cryptinfo.txt",
+ "decrypting.txt",
+ "start.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/",
+ "https://github.com/hasherezade/dma_unlocker",
+ "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bzb5kQFOXkiSMm94QzdyM3hCdDg",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-a-new-ransomware-but-no-reason-to-panic/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DMALocker 3.0",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + XPTLOCK5.0",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bzb5kQFOXkiSMm94QzdyM3hCdDg",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-strikes-back/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DNRansomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware Code to decrypt: 83KYG9NW-3K39V-2T3HJ-93F3Q-GT",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fucked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822500056511213568"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Domino",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".domino"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_TO_RECURE_YOUR_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Domino.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-curious-case-of-the-domino-ransomware-a-windows-crack-and-a-cow/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DoNotChange",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-7ES642406.cry",
+ ".Do_not_change_the_filename"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW TO DECODE FILES!!!.txt",
+ "КАК РАСШИФРОВАТЬ ФАЙЛЫ!!!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/643330/donotchange-ransomware-id-7es642406cry-do-not-change-the-file-namecryp/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DummyLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dCrypt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/794108322932785158"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "DXXD",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".dxxd"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ReadMe.TxT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/627831/dxxd-ransomware-dxxd-help-support-readmetxt/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-dxxd-ransomware-displays-legal-notice-before-users-login/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HiddenTear",
+ "description": "Ransomware Open sourced C#",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cryptear",
+ "EDA2"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.utkusen.com/blog/dealing-with-script-kiddies-cryptear-b-incident.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "EduCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "EduCrypter"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".isis",
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.filedropper.com/decrypter_1",
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/747031171347910656"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "EiTest",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BroadAnalysis/status/845688819533930497",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845652520202616832"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "El-Polocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Has a GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Los Pollos Hermanos"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ha3"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "qwer.html",
+ "qwer2.html",
+ "locked.bmp"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Encoder.xxxx",
+ "description": "Ransomware Coded in GO",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Trojan.Encoder.6491"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Instructions.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-week-in-ransomware-october-14-2016-exotic-lockydump-comrade-and-more/",
+ "http://vms.drweb.ru/virus/?_is=1&i=8747343"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "encryptoJJS",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to recover.enc"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Enigma",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enigma",
+ ".1txt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "enigma.hta",
+ "enigma_encr.txt",
+ "enigma_info.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-enigma-ransomware-targets-russian-speaking-users/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Enjey",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on RemindMe",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839022018230112256"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fairware",
+ "description": "Ransomware Target Linux O.S.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-fairware-ransomware-targeting-linux-computers/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fakben",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ ME FOR DECRYPT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/post/fakben-team-ransomware-uses-open-source-hidden-tear-code"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FakeCryptoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cryptolocker"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/812312402779836416"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fantom",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Comrad Circle"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fantom",
+ ".comrade"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML",
+ "RESTORE-FILES![id]"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fantom-ransomware-encrypts-your-files-while-pretending-to-be-windows-update/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FenixLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".FenixIloveyou!!"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Help to decrypt.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/fenixlocker",
+ "https://twitter.com/fwosar/status/777197255057084416"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FILE FROZR",
+ "description": "Ransomware RaaS",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/rommeljoven17/status/846973265650335744"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FileLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCR"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/836616468775251968"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FireCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".firecrypt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "[random_chars]-READ_ME.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Flyper",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2 / HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/773771485643149312"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fonco",
+ "description": "Ransomware contact email safefiles32@mail.ru also as prefix in encrypted file contents",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "help-file-decrypt.enc",
+ "/pronk.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FortuneCookie ",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/842302481774321664"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Free-Freedom",
+ "description": "Ransomware Unlock code is: adam or adamdude9",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Roga"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".madebyadam"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812135608374226944"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FSociety",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2 and RemindMe",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fs0ciety",
+ ".dll"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "fs0ciety.html",
+ "DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/628199/fs0ciety-locker-ransomware-help-support-fs0cietyhtml/",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-fsociety-ransomware-pays-homage-to-mr-robot/",
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/795969998707720193"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fury",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "GhostCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Z81928819"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/GhostCryptDecrypter.zip",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614197/ghostcrypt-z81928819-help-support-topic-read-this-filetxt/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Gingerbread",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/ni_fi_70/status/796353782699425792"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Globe v1",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Purge"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".purge"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Blowfish",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to restore files.hta"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-globe-ransomware-wants-to-purge-your-files/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "GNL Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Only encrypts DE or NL country. Variants, from old to latest: Zyklon Locker, WildFire locker, Hades Locker",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked",
+ ".locked, e.g., bill.!ID!8MMnF!ID!.locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "UNLOCK_FILES_INSTRUCTIONS.html and .txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/611342/gnl-locker-support-and-help-topic-locked-and-unlock-files-instructionshtml/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Gomasom",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt",
+ "!___[EMAILADDRESS]_.crypt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Goopic",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Your files have been crypted.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/angler-shift-ek-landscape-new-crytpo-ransomware-activity/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Gopher",
+ "description": "Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Hacked",
+ "description": "Ransomware Jigsaw Ransomware variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".versiegelt",
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".payrmts",
+ ".locked",
+ ".Locked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/806878803507101696"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HappyDayzz",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "3DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, DES, RC2, RC4",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/847114064224497666"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Harasom",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HDDCryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Uses https://diskcryptor.net for full disk encryption",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Mamba"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Custom (net shares), XTS-AES (disk)",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mamba-new-full-disk-encryption-ransomware-family-member-marinho",
+ "blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bksod-by-ransomware-hddcryptor-uses-commercial-tools-to-encrypt-network-shares-and-lock-hdds/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Heimdall",
+ "description": "Ransomware File marker: \"Heimdall---\"",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-128-CBC",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/heimdall-open-source-php-ransomware-targets-web-servers/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Help_dcfile",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".XXX"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "help_dcfile.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Herbst",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".herbst"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/03/cooking-up-autumn-herbst-ransomware"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Hi Buddy!",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cry"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/hibuddy.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Hitler",
+ "description": "Ransomware Deletes files",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "removes extensions"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/development-version-of-the-hitler-ransomware-discovered/",
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/825310545800740864"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HolyCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "(encrypted)"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-python-ransomware-called-holycrypt-discovered/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HTCryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Includes a feature to disable the victim's windows firewall Modified in-dev HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/803288396814839808"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HydraCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware CrypBoss Family",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "hydracrypt_ID_[\\w]{8}"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_DECRYPT_HYRDA_ID_[ID number].txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/",
+ "http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/02/03/index2.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "iLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crime"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817085367144873985"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "iLockLight",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crime"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "International Police Association",
+ "description": "Ransomware CryptoTorLocker2015 variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "<6 random characters>"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "%Temp%\\.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/Nathan/StopPirates_Decrypter.exe"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "iRansom",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Locked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/796134264744083460"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "JagerDecryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Prepends filenames",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "!ENC"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Important_Read_Me.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/757873976047697920"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Jeiphoos",
+ "description": "Ransomware Windows, Linux. Campaign stopped. Actor claimed he deleted the master key.",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Encryptor RaaS",
+ "Sarento"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RC6 (files), RSA 2048 (RC6 key)",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "readme_liesmich_encryptor_raas.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/RaaS.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-rise-and-fall-of-encryptor-raas/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Jhon Woddy",
+ "description": "Ransomware Same codebase as DNRansomware Lock screen password is M3VZ>5BwGGVH",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".killedXXX"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/DoNotOpenDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822509105487245317"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Jigsaw",
+ "description": "Ransomware Has a GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptoHitMan"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".btc",
+ ".kkk",
+ ".fun",
+ ".gws",
+ ".porno",
+ ".payransom",
+ ".payms",
+ ".paymst",
+ ".AFD",
+ ".paybtcs",
+ ".epic",
+ ".xyz",
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".hush",
+ ".paytounlock",
+ ".uk-dealer@sigaint.org",
+ ".gefickt",
+ ".nemo-hacks.at.sigaint.org"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jigsaw-ransomware-decrypted-will-delete-your-files-until-you-pay-the-ransom/",
+ "https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/04/20/jigsaw-crypto-ransomware/",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/795819556166139905"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Job Crypter",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but uses TripleDES, decrypter is PoC",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked",
+ ".css"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "TripleDES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Comment débloquer mes fichiers.txt",
+ "Readme.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/jobcrypter.html",
+ "http://forum.malekal.com/jobcrypter-geniesanstravaille-extension-locked-crypto-ransomware-t54381.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/828914052973858816"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "JohnyCryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KawaiiLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How Decrypt Files.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://safezone.cc/resources/kawaii-decryptor.195/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KeRanger",
+ "description": "Ransomware OS X Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://news.drweb.com/show/?i=9877&lng=en&c=5",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/07/new-mac-ransomware-appears-keranger-spread-via-transmission-app/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KeyBTC",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "keybtc@inbox_com"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.txt",
+ "READ.txt",
+ "readme.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KEYHolder",
+ "description": "Ransomware via remote attacker. tuyuljahat@hotmail.com contact address",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "how_decrypt.gif",
+ "how_decrypt.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/559463/keyholder-ransomware-support-and-help-topic-how-decryptgifhow-decrypthtml"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KillerLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Possibly Portuguese dev",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".rip"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782232299840634881"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KimcilWare",
+ "description": "Ransomware websites only",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kimcilware",
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/post/kimcilware-ransomware-how-to-decrypt-encrypted-files-and-who-is-behind-it",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-kimcilware-ransomware-targets-web-sites-running-the-magento-platform/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Korean",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".암호화됨"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ReadMe.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/koreanRansom.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Kozy.Jozy",
+ "description": "Ransomware Potential Kit selectedkozy.jozy@yahoo.com kozy.jozy@yahoo.com unlock92@india.com",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "QC"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".31392E30362E32303136_[ID-KEY]_LSBJ1",
+ ".([0-9A-Z]{20})_([0-9]{2})_([A-Z0-9]{4,5})"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA-2048",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "w.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/KozyJozy.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617802/kozyjozy-ransomware-help-support-wjpg-31392e30362e32303136-num-lsbj1/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KratosCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware kratosdimetrici@gmail.com",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".kratos"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_ALL.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/746090483722686465"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "KryptoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "KryptoLocker_README.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LanRan",
+ "description": "Ransomware Variant of open-source MyLittleRansomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "@__help__@"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/847689644854595584"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LeChiffre",
+ "description": "Ransomware Encrypts first 0x2000 and last 0x2000 bytes. Via remote attacker",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".LeChiffre"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to decrypt LeChiffre files.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/lechiffre",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/01/lechiffre-a-manually-run-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Lick",
+ "description": "Ransomware Variant of Kirk",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Licked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RANSOM_NOTE.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842404866614038529"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Linux.Encoder",
+ "description": "Ransomware Linux Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Linux.Encoder.{0,3}"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://labs.bitdefender.com/2015/11/linux-ransomware-debut-fails-on-predictable-encryption-key/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LK Encryption",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845183290873044994"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LLTP Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Targeting Spanish speaking victims",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".ENCRYPTED_BY_LLTP",
+ ".ENCRYPTED_BY_LLTPp"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "LEAME.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-lltp-ransomware-appears-to-be-a-rewritten-venus-locker/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware has GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/577246/locker-ransomware-support-and-help-topic/page-32#entry3721545"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LockLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locklock"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_ME.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/626750/locklock-ransomware-locklock-help-support/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Locky",
+ "description": "Ransomware Affiliations with Dridex and Necurs botnets",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky",
+ ".zepto",
+ ".odin",
+ ".shit",
+ ".thor",
+ ".aesir",
+ ".zzzzz",
+ ".osiris",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).locky",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).zepto",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).odin",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).shit",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).thor",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).aesir",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).zzzzz",
+ "([A-F0-9]{32}).osiris"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "_Locky_recover_instructions.txt",
+ "_Locky_recover_instructions.bmp",
+ "_HELP_instructions.txt",
+ "_HELP_instructions.bmp",
+ "_HOWDO_text.html",
+ "_WHAT_is.html",
+ "_INSTRUCTION.html",
+ "DesktopOSIRIS.(bmp|htm)",
+ "OSIRIS-[0-9]{4}.htm"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-locky-version-adds-the-zepto-extension-to-encrypted-files/",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-locky-ransomware-spotted-in-the-brazilian-underground-market-uses-windows-script-files/",
+ "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/06/odin-ransomware-takes-over-from-zepto-and-locky/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/locky-ransomware-switches-to-egyptian-mythology-with-the-osiris-extension/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Lortok",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crime"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "LowLevel04",
+ "description": "Ransomware Prepends filenames",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "oor."
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "M4N1F3STO",
+ "description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt Unlock code=suckmydicknigga",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/808015275367002113"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Mabouia",
+ "description": "Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MacAndChess",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Magic",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".magic"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_ReadMe1.TXT",
+ "DECRYPT_ReadMe.TXT"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MaktubLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "[a-z]{4,6}"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "_DECRYPT_INFO_[extension pattern].html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/03/maktub-locker-beautiful-and-dangerous/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MarsJoke",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".a19",
+ ".ap19"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!! Readme For Decrypt !!!.txt",
+ "ReadMeFilesDecrypt!!!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.ru/blog/issledovaniya/29376/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/MarsJoke-Ransomware-Mimics-CTB-Locker"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Meister",
+ "description": "Ransomware Targeting French victims",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/840913419024945152"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Meteoritan",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "where_are_your_files.txt",
+ "readme_your_files_have_been_encrypted.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844614889620561924"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MIRCOP",
+ "description": "Ransomware Prepends files Demands 48.48 BTC",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Crypt888"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ "Lock."
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/618457/microcop-ransomware-help-support-lock-mircop/",
+ "https://www.avast.com/ransomware-decryption-tools#!",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/instruction-less-ransomware-mircop-channels-guy-fawkes/",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Mircop.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MireWare",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".fucked",
+ ".fuck"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Mischa",
+ "description": "Ransomware Packaged with Petya PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "\"Petya's little brother\""
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".([a-zA-Z0-9]{4})"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.HTML",
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.TXT "
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-is-back-and-with-a-friend-named-mischa-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MM Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Booyah"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransomware-explosion-continues-cryptflle2-brlock-mm-locker-discovered"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Mobef",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Yakes",
+ "CryptoBit"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".KEYZ",
+ ".KEYH0LES"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "4-14-2016-INFECTION.TXT",
+ "IMPORTANT.README"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/Mobef.html",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-cryptobit-another-ransomware-family-gets-an-update/",
+ "http://nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/mobef/0.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Monument",
+ "description": "Ransomware Use the DarkLocker 5 porn screenlocker - Jigsaw variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844826339186135040"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "N-Splitter",
+ "description": "Ransomware Russian Koolova Variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".кибер разветвитель"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/815961663644008448",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAVMgX8Zti4&feature=youtu.be&list=UU_TMZYaLIgjsdJMwurHAi4Q"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "n1n1n1",
+ "description": "Ransomware Filemaker: \"333333333333\"",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "decrypt explanations.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/790608484303712256",
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/831891344897482754"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "NanoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware no extension change, has a GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ATTENTION.RTF"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://github.com/Cyberclues/nanolocker-decryptor"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nemucod",
+ "description": "Ransomware 7zip (a0.exe) variant cannot be decrypted Encrypts the first 2048 Bytes",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypted"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR(255) + 7zip",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Decrypted.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/nemucod",
+ "https://github.com/Antelox/NemucodFR",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decryptor-released-for-the-nemucod-trojans-crypted-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.cisecurity.org/malware-analysis-report-nemucod-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Netix",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RANSOM_NETIX.A"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ "AES-256"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netflix-scam-delivers-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nhtnwcuf",
+ "description": "Ransomware Does not encrypt the files / Files are destroyed",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!_RECOVERY_HELP_!.txt",
+ "HELP_ME_PLEASE.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/839221457360195589"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "NMoreira",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "XRatTeam",
+ "XPan"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".maktub",
+ ".__AiraCropEncrypted!"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "mix of RSA and AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Recupere seus arquivos. Leia-me!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/nmoreira",
+ "https://twitter.com/fwosar/status/803682662481174528"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "NoobCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/757267550346641408",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/noobcrypt-ransomware-dev-shows-noobness-by-using-same-password-for-everyone/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nuke",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".nuclear55"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!_RECOVERY_instructions_!!.html",
+ "!!_RECOVERY_instructions_!!.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Nullbyte",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "_nullbyte"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/NullByteDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-nullbyte-ransomware-pretends-to-be-the-necrobot-pokemon-go-application/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ODCODC",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".odcodc",
+ "C-email-abennaki@india.com-(NOMBRE_ARCHIVO.ext).odcodc"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/BloodDolly/ODCODCDecoder.zip",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/odcodc.html",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/813762510302183424",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/odcodc/1c.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Offline ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware email addresses overlap with .777 addresses",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Vipasana",
+ "Cryakl"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".cbf",
+ "email-[params].cbf"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "desk.bmp",
+ "desk.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547",
+ "http://bartblaze.blogspot.com.co/2016/02/vipasana-ransomware-new-ransom-on-block.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "OMG! Ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GPCode"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".LOL!",
+ ".OMG!"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "how to get data.txt"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Operation Global III",
+ "description": "Ransomware Is a file infector (virus)",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".EXE"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://news.thewindowsclub.com/operation-global-iii-ransomware-decryption-tool-released-70341/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Owl",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptoWire"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ "dummy_file.encrypted",
+ "dummy_file.encrypted.[extension]"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "log.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/842342996775448576"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PadCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware has a live support chat",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".padcrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "IMPORTANT READ ME.txt",
+ "File Decrypt Help.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/padcrypt-the-first-ransomware-with-live-support-chat-and-an-uninstaller/",
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798141978810732544"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Padlock Screenlocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Unlock code is: ajVr/G\\ RJz0R",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811635075158839296"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Patcher",
+ "description": "Ransomware Targeting macOS users",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/02/decrypting-after-a-findzip-ransomware-infection/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-macos-patcher-ransomware-locks-data-for-good-no-way-to-recover-your-files/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Petya",
+ "description": "Ransomware encrypts disk partitions PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Goldeneye"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Modified Salsa20",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES_ARE_ENCRYPTED.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.thewindowsclub.com/petya-ransomware-decrypt-tool-password-generator",
+ "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSqxFjZq_z4",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/petya-ransomware/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-version-continuing-james-bond-theme/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Philadelphia",
+ "description": "Ransomware Coded by \"The_Rainmaker\"",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked",
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/philadelphia",
+ "www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-philadelphia-ransomware-offers-a-mercy-button-for-compassionate-criminals/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PizzaCrypts",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".id-[victim_id]-maestro@pizzacrypts.info"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/BloodDolly/JuicyLemonDecoder.zip"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PokemonGO",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/pokemonGO.html",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pokemongo-ransomware-installs-backdoor-accounts-and-spreads-to-other-drives/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Polyglot",
+ "description": "Ransomware Immitates CTB-Locker",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/8547",
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/76182/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PowerWare",
+ "description": "Ransomware Open-sourced PowerShell",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PoshCoder"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locky"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/powerware/powerware_decrypt.py",
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/PowerLockyDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/25/threat-alert-powerware-new-ransomware-written-in-powershell-targets-organizations-via-microsoft-word/",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-powerware-ransomware-spoofing-locky-malware-family/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PowerWorm",
+ "description": "Ransomware no decryption possible, throws key away, destroys the files",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Princess Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "[a-z]{4,6},[0-9]"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!_HOW_TO_RESTORE_[extension].TXT",
+ "!_HOW_TO_RESTORE_[extension].html",
+ "!_HOW_TO_RESTORE_*id*.txt",
+ ".*id*",
+ "@_USE_TO_FIX_JJnY.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2016/11/17/princess-locker-decryptor/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/introducing-her-royal-highness-the-princess-locker-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/princess-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PRISM",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/prismyourcomputerhasbeenlockedransomware-removal/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ps2exe",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/jiriatvirlab/status/803297700175286273"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "R",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Ransomware.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/846705481741733892"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "R980",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPTION INSTRUCTIONS.txt",
+ "rtext.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/57976b52b900fe01376feb01/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RAA encryptor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Possible affiliation with Pony",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "RAA"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!!README!!![id].rtf"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://reaqta.com/2016/06/raa-ransomware-delivering-pony/",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-new-raa-ransomware-is-created-entirely-using-javascript/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rabion",
+ "description": "Ransomware RaaS Copy of Ranion RaaS",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/CryptoInsane/status/846181140025282561"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Radamant",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".RDM",
+ ".RRK",
+ ".RAD",
+ ".RADAMANT"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "YOUR_FILES.url"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/radamant",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-radamant-ransomware-kit-adds-rdm-extension-to-encrypted-files/",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/radamant.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rakhni",
+ "description": "Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Agent.iih",
+ "Aura",
+ "Autoit",
+ "Pletor",
+ "Rotor",
+ "Lamer",
+ "Isda",
+ "Cryptokluchen",
+ "Bandarchor"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked",
+ ".kraken",
+ ".darkness",
+ ".nochance",
+ ".oshit",
+ ".oplata@qq_com",
+ ".relock@qq_com",
+ ".crypto",
+ ".helpdecrypt@ukr.net",
+ ".pizda@qq_com",
+ ".dyatel@qq_com",
+ "_ryp",
+ ".nalog@qq_com",
+ ".chifrator@qq_com",
+ ".gruzin@qq_com",
+ ".troyancoder@qq_com",
+ ".encrypted",
+ ".cry",
+ ".AES256",
+ ".enc",
+ ".hb15",
+ ".coderksu@gmail_com_id[0-9]{2,3}",
+ ".crypt@india.com.[\\w]{4,12}"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "\\fud.bmp",
+ "\\paycrypt.bmp",
+ "\\strongcrypt.bmp",
+ "\\maxcrypt.bmp",
+ "%APPDATA%\\Roaming\\.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/us/viruses/disinfection/10556"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ramsomeer",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on the DUMB ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rannoh",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "locked-.[a-zA-Z]{4}"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/8547"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RanRan",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zXz"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "VictemKey_0_5",
+ "VictemKey_5_30",
+ "VictemKey_30_100",
+ "VictemKey_100_300",
+ "VictemKey_300_700",
+ "VictemKey_700_2000",
+ "VictemKey_2000_3000",
+ "VictemKey_3000",
+ "zXz.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/tree/master/ranran_decryption",
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-targeted-ransomware-attacks-middle-eastern-government-organizations-political-purposes/",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ranran-ransomware-uses-encryption-tiers-political-messages/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ransoc",
+ "description": "Ransomware Doesn't encrypt user files",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ransoc-desktop-locking-ransomware-ransacks-local-files-social-media-profiles",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransoc-ransomware-extorts-users-who-accessed-questionable-content/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ransom32",
+ "description": "Ransomware no extension change, Javascript Ransomware"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RansomLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware Locks the desktop",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "Asymmetric 1024 ",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-041513-1400-99&tabid=2"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RarVault",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RarVault.htm"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Razy",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".razy",
+ ".fear"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-128",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Razy(German).html",
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/Razy.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rector",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vscrypt",
+ ".infected",
+ ".bloc",
+ ".korrektor"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/4264"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RektLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".rekt"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Readme.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/4264"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RemindMe",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".remind",
+ ".crashed"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "decypt_your_files.html "
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/RemindMe.html",
+ "http://i.imgur.com/gV6i5SN.jpg"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Rokku",
+ "description": "Ransomware possibly related with Chimera",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".rokku"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "Curve25519 + ChaCha",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_HOW_TO_UNLOCK.TXT",
+ "README_HOW_TO_UNLOCK.HTML"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/rokku-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RoshaLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware Stores your files in a password protected RAR file",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/siri_urz/status/842452104279134209"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Runsomewere",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HT/EDA2 Utilizes the Jigsaw Ransomware background",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/801812325657440256"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "RussianRoulette",
+ "description": "Ransomware Variant of the Philadelphia ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/823925410392080385"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SADStory",
+ "description": "Ransomware Variant of CryPy",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845356853039190016"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sage 2.2",
+ "description": "Ransomware Sage 2.2 deletes volume snapshots through vssadmin.exe, disables startup repair, uses process wscript.exe to execute a VBScript, and coordinates the execution of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe.",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sage"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/16/sage-2-2-ransomware-from-good-man-gate",
+ "https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/10/finding-a-good-man/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Samas-Samsam",
+ "description": "Ransomware Targeted attacks -Jexboss -PSExec -Hyena",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "samsam.exe",
+ "MIKOPONI.exe",
+ "RikiRafael.exe",
+ "showmehowto.exe"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encryptedAES",
+ ".encryptedRSA",
+ ".encedRSA",
+ ".justbtcwillhelpyou",
+ ".btcbtcbtc",
+ ".btc-help-you",
+ ".only-we_can-help_you",
+ ".iwanthelpuuu",
+ ".notfoundrans",
+ ".encmywork",
+ ".VforVendetta",
+ ".theworldisyours",
+ ".Whereisyourfiles",
+ ".helpmeencedfiles",
+ ".powerfulldecrypt",
+ ".noproblemwedecfiles",
+ ".weareyourfriends",
+ ".otherinformation",
+ ".letmetrydecfiles",
+ ".encryptedyourfiles",
+ ".weencedufiles",
+ ".iaufkakfhsaraf",
+ ".cifgksaffsfyghd"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES(256) + RSA(2096)",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.html",
+ "###-READ-FOR-HELLPP.html",
+ "000-PLEASE-READ-WE-HELP.html",
+ "CHECK-IT-HELP-FILES.html",
+ "WHERE-YOUR-FILES.html",
+ "HELP-ME-ENCED-FILES.html",
+ "WE-MUST-DEC-FILES.html",
+ "000-No-PROBLEM-WE-DEC-FILES.html",
+ "TRY-READ-ME-TO-DEC.html",
+ "000-IF-YOU-WANT-DEC-FILES.html",
+ "LET-ME-TRY-DEC-FILES.html",
+ "001-READ-FOR-DECRYPT-FILES.html",
+ "READ-READ-READ.html",
+ "IF_WANT_FILES_BACK_PLS_READ.html",
+ "READ_READ_DEC_FILES.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/SamSamStringDecrypter.zip",
+ "http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/03/samsam-ransomware.html",
+ "http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/Analysis_SamSa_Ransomware.pdf"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sanction",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but heavily modified keygen",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sanction"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2096",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES.HTML"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sanctions",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".wallet"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + RSA-2048",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RESTORE_ALL_DATA.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sanctions-ransomware-makes-fun-of-usa-sanctions-against-russia/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sardoninir",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/835955409953357825"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Satana",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "Sarah_G@ausi.com___"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!satana!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/06/satana-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.kaspersky.com/satana-ransomware/12558/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Scraper",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://securelist.com/blog/research/69481/a-flawed-ransomware-encryptor/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Serpico",
+ "description": "Ransomware DetoxCrypto Variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Serpico.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Shark",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Atom"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Readme.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-shark-ransomware-project-allows-to-create-your-own-customized-ransomware/",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shark-ransomware-rebrands-as-atom-for-a-fresh-start/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ShinoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".shino"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/760560147131408384",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-educational-shinolocker-ransomware-project-released/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Shujin",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "KinCrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "文件解密帮助.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/chineseRansom.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chinese-language-ransomware-makes-appearance/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Simple_Encoder",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".~"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS.ini"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-shark-ransomware-project-allows-to-create-your-own-customized-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SkidLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Pompous"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_IT.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pompous-ransomware-dev-gets-defeated-by-backdoor/",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/SkidLocker.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Smash!",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/smash-ransomware-is-cute-rather-than-dangerous/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Smrss32",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".encrypted"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "_HOW_TO_Decrypt.bmp"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SNSLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".RSNSlocked",
+ ".RSplited"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_Me.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://nyxbone.com/malware/SNSLocker.html",
+ "http://nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/snslocker/16.png"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Sport",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sport"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Stampado",
+ "description": "Ransomware Coded by \"The_Rainmaker\" Randomly deletes a file every 6hrs up to 96hrs then deletes decryption key",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Random message includes bitcoin wallet address with instructions"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/stampado-ransomware-campaign-decrypted-before-it-started/",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/stampado",
+ "https://cdn.streamable.com/video/mp4/kfh3.mp4",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-economics-behind-ransomware-prices/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Strictor",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2, shows Guy Fawkes mask",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Strictor.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Surprise",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".surprise",
+ ".tzu"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECRYPTION_HOWTO.Notepad"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Survey",
+ "description": "Ransomware Still in development, shows FileIce survey",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ThxForYurTyme.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/in-dev-ransomware-forces-you-do-to-survey-before-unlocking-computer/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SynoLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Exploited Synology NAS firmware directly over WAN"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SZFLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".szf"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://now.avg.com/dont-pay-the-ransom-avg-releases-six-free-decryption-tools-to-retrieve-your-files/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TeamXrat",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".___xratteamLucked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Como descriptografar os seus arquivos.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0",
+ "description": "Ransomware Factorization",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "AlphaCrypt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vvv",
+ ".ecc",
+ ".exx",
+ ".ezz",
+ ".abc",
+ ".aaa",
+ ".zzz",
+ ".xyz"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt",
+ "Howto_RESTORE_FILES.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
+ "http://www.talosintel.com/teslacrypt_tool/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 3.0+",
+ "description": "Ransomware 4.0+ has no extension",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".micro",
+ ".xxx",
+ ".ttt",
+ ".mp3"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + ECHD + SHA1",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/05/18/eset-releases-decryptor-recent-variants-teslacrypt-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.1A",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "encryption": "AES-256 + ECHD + SHA1",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.html",
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.png",
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.txt",
+ "_how_recover+.txt",
+ "_how_recover+.html",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.html",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.txt",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.BMP",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.txt",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.html",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.png",
+ "Recovery+<5 random chars>.txt, .html, e.g., Recovery+gwote.txt",
+ "RESTORE_FILES_.TXT , e.g. restore_files_kksli.bmp",
+ "HELP_RESTORE_FILES_.TXT , e.g. help_restore_files_kksli.bmp",
+ "HOWTO_RECOVER_FILES_.TXT. e.g. howto_recover_files_xeyye.txt",
+ "HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt",
+ "HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/05/18/eset-releases-decryptor-recent-variants-teslacrypt-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/",
+ "https://www.endgame.com/blog/your-package-has-been-successfully-encrypted-teslacrypt-41a-and-malware-attack-chain"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TeslaCrypt 4.2",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.html",
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.png",
+ "RECOVER<5_chars>.txt",
+ "_how_recover+.txt",
+ "_how_recover+.html",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.BMP",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.html",
+ "help_recover_instructions+.txt",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.txt",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.html",
+ "_H_e_l_p_RECOVER_INSTRUCTIONS+.png",
+ "Recovery+<5 random chars>.txt, .html, e.g., Recovery+gwote.txt",
+ "RESTORE_FILES_.TXT , e.g. restore_files_kksli.bmp",
+ "HELP_RESTORE_FILES_.TXT , e.g. help_restore_files_kksli.bmp",
+ "HOWTO_RECOVER_FILES_.TXT. e.g. howto_recover_files_xeyye.txt",
+ "HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.txt",
+ "HELP_TO_SAVE_FILES.bmp"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/576600/tesladecoder-released-to-decrypt-exx-ezz-ecc-files-encrypted-by-teslacrypt/",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/05/18/eset-releases-decryptor-recent-variants-teslacrypt-ransomware/",
+ "https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/",
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-4-2-released-with-quite-a-few-modifications/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Threat Finder",
+ "description": "Ransomware Files cannot be decrypted Has a GUI",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HELP_DECRYPT.HTML"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TorrentLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Newer variants not decryptable. Only first 2 MB are encrypted",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Crypt0L0cker",
+ "CryptoFortress",
+ "Teerac"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Encrypted",
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256 CBC for files + RSA-1024 for AES key uses LibTomCrypt",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.html",
+ "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html",
+ "DESIFROVANI_POKYNY.html",
+ "INSTRUCCIONES_DESCIFRADO.html",
+ "ISTRUZIONI_DECRITTAZIONE.html",
+ "ENTSCHLUSSELN_HINWEISE.html",
+ "ONTSLEUTELINGS_INSTRUCTIES.html",
+ "INSTRUCTIONS_DE_DECRYPTAGE.html",
+ "SIFRE_COZME_TALIMATI.html",
+ "wie_zum_Wiederherstellen_von_Dateien.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/547708/torrentlocker-ransomware-cracked-and-decrypter-has-been-made/",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/804008236600934403",
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/crypt0l0cker-torrentlocker-old-dog-new.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TowerWeb",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Payment_Instructions.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/618055/towerweb-ransomware-help-support-topic-payment-instructionsjpg/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Toxcrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".toxcrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "tox.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Trojan",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BrainCrypt"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".braincrypt"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "!!! HOW TO DECRYPT FILES !!!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BrainCryptDecrypter.zip",
+ "https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/811249250285842432"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Troldesh orShade, XTBL",
+ "description": "Ransomware May download additional malware after encryption",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".breaking_bad",
+ ".better_call_saul",
+ ".xtbl",
+ ".da_vinci_code",
+ ".windows10",
+ ".no_more_ransom"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README.txt",
+ "nomoreransom_note_original.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.nomoreransom.org/uploads/ShadeDecryptor_how-to_guide.pdf",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Troldesh.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kelihos-botnet-delivering-shade-troldesh-ransomware-with-no-more-ransom-extension/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "TrueCrypter",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".enc"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/truecrypter-ransomware-accepts-payment-in-bitcoins-or-amazon-gift-card/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Turkish",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".sifreli"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/821991600637313024"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Turkish Ransom",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".locked"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DOSYALARINIZA ULAŞMAK İÇİN AÇINIZ.html"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/turkishRansom.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "UmbreCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware CrypBoss Family",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "umbrecrypt_ID_[VICTIMID]"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "README_DECRYPT_UMBRE_ID_[victim_id].jpg",
+ "README_DECRYPT_UMBRE_ID_[victim_id].txt",
+ "default32643264.bmp",
+ "default432643264.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.thewindowsclub.com/emsisoft-decrypter-hydracrypt-umbrecrypt-ransomware"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "UnblockUPC",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Files encrypted.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/627582/unblockupc-ransomware-help-support-topic-files-encryptedtxt/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Ungluk",
+ "description": "Ransomware Ransom note instructs to use Bitmessage to get in contact with attacker - Secretishere.key - SECRETISHIDINGHEREINSIDE.KEY - secret.key",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".H3LL",
+ ".0x0",
+ ".1999"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READTHISNOW!!!.txt",
+ "Hellothere.txt",
+ "YOUGOTHACKED.TXT"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Unlock92 ",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CRRRT",
+ ".CCCRRRPPP"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "READ_ME_!.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839038399944224768"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "VapeLauncher",
+ "description": "Ransomware CryptoWire variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/839771195830648833"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "VaultCrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CrypVault",
+ "Zlader"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vault",
+ ".xort",
+ ".trun"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "uses gpg.exe",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "VAULT.txt",
+ "xort.txt",
+ "trun.txt",
+ ".hta | VAULT.hta"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/russianRansom.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "VBRANSOM 7",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".VBRANSOM"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817851339078336513"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "VenusLocker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Based on EDA2",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Venusf",
+ ".Venusp"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "ReadMe.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/venus-locker-another-net-ransomware/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/venusLocker.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Virlock",
+ "description": "Ransomware Polymorphism / Self-replication",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".exe"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/Virlock.html",
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/12/22/win32virlock-first-self-reproducing-ransomware-also-shape-shifter/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Virus-Encoder",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CrySiS"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CrySiS",
+ ".xtbl",
+ ".crypt",
+ ".DHARMA",
+ ".id-########.decryptformoney@india.com.xtbl",
+ ".[email_address].DHARMA"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES-256",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "How to decrypt your data.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/11/24/new-decryption-tool-crysis-ransomware/",
+ "http://media.kaspersky.com/utilities/VirusUtilities/EN/rakhnidecryptor.zip",
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/virus-encoder.html",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/crysis-targeting-businesses-in-australia-new-zealand-via-brute-forced-rdps/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "WildFire Locker",
+ "description": "Ransomware Zyklon variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Hades Locker"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".wflx"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW_TO_UNLOCK_FILES_README_().txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://labs.opendns.com/2016/07/13/wildfire-ransomware-gaining-momentum/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Xorist",
+ "description": "Ransomware encrypted files will still have the original non-encrypted header of 0x33 bytes length",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".EnCiPhErEd",
+ ".73i87A",
+ ".p5tkjw",
+ ".PoAr2w",
+ ".fileiscryptedhard",
+ ".encoderpass",
+ ".zc3791",
+ ".antihacker2017"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "XOR or TEA",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "HOW TO DECRYPT FILES.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://support.kaspersky.com/viruses/disinfection/2911",
+ "https://decrypter.emsisoft.com/xorist"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "XRTN ",
+ "description": "Ransomware VaultCrypt family",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".xrtn"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "You Have Been Hacked!!!",
+ "description": "Ransomware Attempt to steal passwords",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Locked"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/808280549802418181"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zcrypt",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Zcryptor"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zcrypt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/05/26/link-lnk-to-ransom/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zeta",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "CryptoMix"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".code",
+ ".scl",
+ ".rmd"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "# HELP_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES #.TXT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/804009831518572544"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zimbra",
+ "description": "Ransomware mpritsken@priest.com",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".crypto"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "how.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617874/zimbra-ransomware-written-in-python-help-and-support-topic-crypto-howtotxt/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zlader",
+ "description": "Ransomware VaultCrypt family",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Russian",
+ "VaultCrypt",
+ "CrypVault"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vault"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "RSA",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nyxbone.com/malware/russianRansom.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zorro",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zorro"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "Take_Seriously (Your saving grace).txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844538370323812353"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Zyklon",
+ "description": "Ransomware Hidden Tear family, GNL Locker variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "GNL Locker"
+ ],
+ "extensions": [
+ ".zyklon"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "vxLock",
+ "description": "Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".vxLock"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Jaff",
+ "description": "We recently observed several large scale email campaigns that were attempting to distribute a new variant of ransomware that has been dubbed \"Jaff\". Interestingly we identified several characteristics that we have previously observed being used during Dridex and Locky campaigns. In a short period of time, we observed multiple campaigns featuring high volumes of malicious spam emails being distributed, each using a PDF attachment with an embedded Microsoft Word document functioning as the initial downloader for the Jaff ransomware.",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".jaff"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "AES",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "WallpapeR.bmp",
+ "ReadMe.bmp",
+ "ReadMe.html",
+ "ReadMe.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/jaff-ransomware.html",
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jaff-ransomware-distributed-via-necurs-malspam-and-asking-for-a-3-700-ransom/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Uiwix Ransomware",
+ "description": "Using EternalBlue SMB Exploit To Infect Victims",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ "._[10_digit_victim_id].UIWIX"
+ ],
+ "encryption": "may be a mixture of AES and RC4.",
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "DECODE_FILES.txt"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/uiwix-ransomware-using-eternalblue-smb-exploit-to-infect-victims/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SOREBRECT",
+ "description": "Fileless, Code-injecting Ransomware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".pr0tect"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/files/2017/06/SOREBRECT-3.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/analyzing-fileless-code-injecting-sorebrect-ransomware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cyron",
+ "description": "claims it detected \"Children Pornsites\" in your browser history",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".CYRON"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2017/august/25/DHvA8CDWAAIR5er.jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899524853426008064"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Kappa",
+ "description": "Made with OXAR builder; decryptable",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".OXR"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2017/august/25/DHvDae7XoAE9usO[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899528477824700416"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Trojan Dz",
+ "description": "CyberSplitter variant",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".Isis"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2017/august/25/DHvM552WsAAuDbi[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899537940539478016"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Xolzsec",
+ "description": "ransomware written by self proclaimed script kiddies that should really be considered trollware",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".xolzsec"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/899916577252028416"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "FlatChestWare",
+ "description": "HiddenTear variant; decryptable",
+ "meta": {
+ "extensions": [
+ ".flat"
+ ],
+ "ransomnotes": [
+ "https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/columns/week-in-ransomware/2017/august/25/DH5KChhXsAADOIu[1].jpg"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://twitter.com/struppigel/status/900238572409823232"
+ ]
+ }
}
],
- "source": "https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml"
+ "source": "Various",
+ "uuid": "10cf658b-5d32-4c4b-bb32-61760a640372",
+ "name": "Ransomware",
+ "version": 2,
+ "type": "ransomware",
+ "description": "Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml and http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar"
}
diff --git a/clusters/rat.json b/clusters/rat.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b15930b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clusters/rat.json
@@ -0,0 +1,1166 @@
+{
+ "name": "RAT",
+ "type": "rat",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "authors": [
+ "Various"
+ ],
+ "description": "remote administration tool or remote access tool (RAT), also called sometimes remote access trojan, is a piece of software or programming that allows a remote \"operator\" to control a system as if they have physical access to that system.",
+ "uuid": "312f8714-45cb-11e7-b898-135207cdceb9",
+ "version": 1,
+ "values": [
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.teamviewer.com"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "TeamViewer is a proprietary computer software package for remote control, desktop sharing, online meetings, web conferencing and file transfer between computers.",
+ "value": "TeamViewer"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BO"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.cultdeadcow.com/tools/bo.html",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/warn/backorifice.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Back Orifice (often shortened to BO) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location.",
+ "value": "Back Orifice"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "NetBus"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/warn/backorifice.html",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/netbus.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "NetBus or Netbus is a software program for remotely controlling a Microsoft Windows computer system over a network. It was created in 1998 and has been very controversial for its potential of being used as a backdoor.",
+ "value": "Netbus"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Poison Ivy",
+ "Backdoor.Win32.PoisonIvy",
+ "Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
+ "value": "PoisonIvy"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SubSeven",
+ "Sub7Server"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-020114-5445-99"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Sub7, or SubSeven or Sub7Server, is a Trojan horse program.[1] Its name was derived by spelling NetBus backwards (\"suBteN\") and swapping \"ten\" with \"seven\". Sub7 was created by Mobman. Mobman has not maintained or updated the software since 2004, however an author known as Read101 has carried on the Sub7 legacy.",
+ "value": "Sub7"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beast_(Trojan_horse)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Beast is a Windows-based backdoor trojan horse, more commonly known in the hacking community as a Remote Administration Tool or a \"RAT\". It is capable of infecting versions of Windows from 95 to 10.",
+ "value": "Beast Trojan"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Bifrost%20(trojan%20horse)&item_type=topic",
+ "http://malware-info.blogspot.lu/2008/10/bifrost-trojan.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Bifrost is a discontinued backdoor trojan horse family of more than 10 variants which can infect Windows 95 through Windows 10 (although on modern Windows systems, after Windows XP, its functionality is limited). Bifrost uses the typical server, server builder, and client backdoor program configuration to allow a remote attacker, who uses the client, to execute arbitrary code on the compromised machine (which runs the server whose behavior can be controlled by the server editor).",
+ "value": "Bifrost"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/blackshades-trojan-users-had-it-coming/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Blackshades is the name of a malicious trojan horse used by hackers to control computers remotely. The malware targets computers using Microsoft Windows -based operating systems.[2] According to US officials, over 500,000 computer systems have been infected worldwide with the software.",
+ "value": "Blackshades"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-1-darkcomet/",
+ "https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/darkkomet-rat-spam"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dark Comet"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "DarkComet is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) which was developed by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (known as DarkCoderSc), an independent programmer and computer security coder from the United Kingdom. Although the RAT was developed back in 2008, it began to proliferate at the start of 2012.",
+ "value": "DarkComet"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-121116-0350-99"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor.Lanfiltrator is a backdoor Trojan that gives an attacker unauthorized access to a compromised computer. The detection is used for a family of Trojans that are produced by the Backdoor.Lanfiltrator generator.",
+ "value": "Lanfiltrator"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://lexmarket.su/thread-27692.html",
+ "https://www.nulled.to/topic/129749-win32hsidir-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Win32.HsIdir is an advanced remote administrator tool systems was done by the original author HS32-Idir, it is the development of the release made since 2006 Copyright © 2006-2010 HS32-Idir.",
+ "value": "Win32.HsIdir"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optix_Pro",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-090416-0521-99",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20208"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Optix Pro is a configurable remote access tool or Trojan, similar to SubSeven or BO2K",
+ "value": "Optix Pro"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BO2k"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back_Orifice_2000",
+ "https://home.mcafee.com/VirusInfo/VirusProfile.aspx?key=10229",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2000-121814-5417-99",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/bo2k.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Back Orifice 2000 (often shortened to BO2k) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location. The name is a pun on Microsoft BackOffice Server software. Back Orifice 2000 is a new version of the famous Back Orifice backdoor trojan (hacker's remote access tool). It was created by the Cult of Dead Cow hackers group in July 1999. Originally the BO2K was released as a source code and utilities package on a CD-ROM. There are reports that some files on that CD-ROM were infected with CIH virus, so the people who got that CD might get infected and spread not only the compiled backdoor, but also the CIH virus. ",
+ "value": "Back Orifice 2000"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "VNC Connect",
+ "VNC Viewer"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.realvnc.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The software consists of a server and client application for the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol to control another ",
+ "value": "RealVNC"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "UNRECOM",
+ "UNiversal REmote COntrol Multi-Platform"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/securelist/files/2016/02/KL_AdwindPublicReport_2016.pdf",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_java_adwind.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor:Java/Adwind is a Java archive (.JAR) file that drops a malicious component onto the machines and runs as a backdoor. When active, it is capable of stealing user information and may also be used to distribute other malware. ",
+ "value": "Adwind RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b31812e5b4c63c5b52c9b23e76a5ea9439465ab366a9291c6074bfae5c328e73/analysis/1359376345/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Albertino Advanced RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-112912-5237-99",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/tsunami-warning-leads-to-arcom-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The malware is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), known as Arcom RAT, and it is sold on underground forums for $2000.00.",
+ "value": "Arcom"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-18123?tid=18123&&pq=1"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "BlackNix rat is a rat coded in delphi. ",
+ "value": "BlackNix"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-123872",
+ "https://techanarchy.net/2014/02/blue-banana-rat-config/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Blue Banana is a RAT (Remote Administration Tool) created purely in Java",
+ "value": "Blue Banana"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/10/know-your-enemy-tracking-a-rapidly-evolving-apt-actor.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Bozok, like many other popular RATs, is freely available. The author of the Bozok RAT goes by the moniker “Slayer616” and has created another RAT known as Schwarze Sonne, or “SS-RAT” for short. Both of these RATs are free and easy to find — various APT actors have used both in previous targeted attacks.",
+ "value": "Bozok"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://sinister.ly/Thread-ClientMesh-RAT-In-Built-FUD-Crypter-Stable-DDoSer-No-PortForwading-40-Lifetime",
+ "https://blog.yakuza112.org/2012/clientmesh-rat-v5-cracked-clean/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "ClientMesh is a Remote Administration Application yhich allows a user to control a number of client PCs from around the world.",
+ "value": "ClientMesh"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.hackersthirst.com/2011/03/cybergate-rat-hacking-facebook-twitter.html",
+ "http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41584097/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/cybergate-leaked-e-mails-hint-corporate-hacking-conspiracy/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "CyberGate is a powerful, fully configurable and stable Remote Administration Tool coded in Delphi that is continuously getting developed. Using cybergate you can log the victim's passwords and can also get the screen shots of his computer's screen.",
+ "value": "CyberGate"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://meinblogzumtesten.blogspot.lu/2013/05/dark-ddoser-v56c-cracked.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Dark DDoSeR"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DarkRAT"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/blogs/the-dark-rat/",
+ "http://darkratphp.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "In March 2017, Fujitsu Cyber Threat Intelligence uncovered a newly developed remote access tool referred to by its developer as ‘Dark RAT’ – a tool used to steal sensitive information from victims. Offered as a Fully Undetectable build (FUD) the RAT has a tiered price model including 24/7 support and an Android version. Android malware has seen a significant rise in interest and in 2015 this resulted in the arrests of a number of suspects involved in the infamous DroidJack malware.",
+ "value": "DarkRat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://sites.google.com/site/greymecompany/greame-rat-project"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Greame"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/54837/hacking/one-stop-shop-hacking.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "HawkEye is a popular RAT that can be used as a keylogger, it is also able to identify login events and record the destination, username, and password.",
+ "value": "HawkEye"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/shop/jrat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "jRAT is the cross-platform remote administrator tool that is coded in Java, Because its coded in Java it gives jRAT possibilities to run on all operation systems, Which includes Windows, Mac OSX and Linux distributions.",
+ "value": "jRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-479505"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "jSpy is a Java RAT. ",
+ "value": "jSpy"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-284656"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Just saying that this is a very badly coded RAT by the biggest skid in this world, that is XilluX. The connection is very unstable, the GUI is always flickering because of the bad Multi-Threading and many more bugs.",
+ "value": "LuxNET"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/njrat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "NJRat is a remote access trojan (RAT), first spotted in June 2013 with samples dating back to November 2012. It was developed and is supported by Arabic speakers and mainly used by cybercrime groups against targets in the Middle East. In addition to targeting some governments in the region, the trojan is used to control botnets and conduct other typical cybercrime activity. It infects victims via phishing attacks and drive-by downloads and propagates through infected USB keys or networked drives. It can download and execute additional malware, execute shell commands, read and write registry keys, capture screenshots, log keystrokes, and spy on webcams.",
+ "value": "NJRat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/pandora-rat-2-2/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Remote administrator tool that has been developed for Windows operation system. With advanced features and stable structure, Pandora’s structure is based on advanced client / server architecture. was configured using modern technology.",
+ "value": "Pandora"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "PredatorPain"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/predator-pain-and-limitless-behind-the-fraud/",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-predator-pain-and-limitless.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Unlike Zeus, Predator Pain and Limitless are relatively simple keyloggers. They indiscriminately steal web credentials and mail client credentials, as well as capturing keystrokes and screen captures. The output is human readable, which is good if you are managing a few infected machines only, but the design doesn’t scale well when there are a lot of infected machines and logs involved.",
+ "value": "Predator Pain"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://punisher-rat.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Remote administration tool",
+ "value": "Punisher RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/spygate-rat-3-2/",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp%3Fasid%3D27950",
+ "http://spygate-rat.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This is tool that allow you to control your computer form anywhere in world with full support to unicode language. ",
+ "value": "SpyGate"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SmallNet"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://small-net-rat.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "RAT",
+ "value": "Small-Net"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/vantom-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Vantom is a free RAT with good option and very stable.",
+ "value": "Vantom"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-497480"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Xena RAT is a fully-functional, stable, state-of-the-art RAT, coded in a native language called Delphi, it has almost no dependencies.",
+ "value": "Xena"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/02/xtremerat-nuisance-or-threat.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This malware has been used in targeted attacks as well as traditional cybercrime. During our investigation we found that the majority of XtremeRAT activity is associated with spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware. ",
+ "value": "XtremeRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.secureworks.com/blog/netwire-rat-steals-payment-card-data"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "NetWire has a built-in keylogger that can capture inputs from peripheral devices such as USB card readers.",
+ "value": "Netwire"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/03/23/have-you-been-haunted-by-the-gh0st-rat-today/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Gh0st RAT is a Trojan horse for the Windows platform that the operators of GhostNet used to hack into some of the most sensitive computer networks on Earth. It is a cyber spying computer program. .",
+ "value": "Gh0st RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.zunzutech.com/blog/security/analysis-of-plasma-rats-source-code/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Plasma RAT’s stub is fairly advanced, having many robust features. Some of the features include botkilling, Cryptocurrencies Mining (CPU and GPU), persistence, anti-analysis, torrent seeding, AV killer, 7 DDoS methods and a keylogger. The RAT is coded in VB.Net. There is also a Botnet version of it (Plasma HTTP), which is pretty similar to the RAT version.",
+ "value": "Plasma RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/babylon-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Babylon is a highly advanced remote administration tool with no dependencies. The server is developed in C++ which is an ideal language for high performance and the client is developed in C#(.Net Framework 4.5)",
+ "value": "Babylon"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.imminentmethods.info/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "RAT",
+ "value": "Imminent Monitor"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://droidjack.net/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "DroidJack is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan/Remote Administration Tool) nature of remote accessing, monitoring and managing tool (Java based) for Android mobile OS. You can use it to perform a complete remote control to any Android devices infected with DroidJack through your PC. It comes with powerful function and user-friendly operation – even allows attackers to fully take over the mobile phone and steal, record the victim’s private data wilfully.",
+ "value": "DroidJack"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface",
+ "value": "Quasar RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/qqshow/dendroid",
+ "https://github.com/nyx0/Dendroid"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Dendroid is malware that affects Android OS and targets the mobile platform. It was first discovered in early of 2014 by Symantec and appeared in the underground for sale for $300. Some things were noted in Dendroid, such as being able to hide from emulators at the time. When first discovered in 2014 it was one of the most sophisticated Android remote administration tools known at that time. It was one of the first Trojan applications to get past Google's Bouncer and caused researchers to warn about it being easier to create Android malware due to it. It also seems to have follow in the footsteps of Zeus and SpyEye by having simple-to-use command and control panels. The code appeared to be leaked somewhere around 2014. It was noted that an apk binder was included in the leak, which provided a simple way to bind Dendroid to legitimate applications.",
+ "value": "Dendroid"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/shotskeber/Ratty"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A Java R.A.T. program",
+ "value": "Ratty"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://level23hacktools.com/forum/showthread.php?t=27971",
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-405562?tid=405562&&pq=1"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Java RAT",
+ "value": "RaTRon"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://arabian-attacker.software.informer.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Arabian-Attacker RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://latesthackingnews.com/2015/05/31/how-to-hack-android-phones-with-androrat/",
+ "https://github.com/wszf/androrat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Androrat is a client/server application developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server.",
+ "value": "Androrat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://adzok.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Administrator",
+ "value": "Adzok"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SS-RAT",
+ "Schwarze Sonne"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/mwsrc/Schwarze-Sonne-RAT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Schwarze-Sonne-RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.indetectables.net/viewtopic.php?t=24245"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Cyber Eye RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Batch NET"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-530663"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "RWX RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://spynet-rat-officiel.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Spy-Net is a software that allow you to control any computer in world using Windows Operating System.He is back using new functions and good options to give you full control of your remote computer.Stable and fast, this software offer to you a good interface, creating a easy way to use all his functions",
+ "value": "Spynet"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-559871"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "CTOS"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/mwsrc/Virus-RAT-v8.0-Beta"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Virus RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.atelierweb.com/products/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Atelier Web Remote Commander"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/chrismattmann/drat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A distributed, parallelized (Map Reduce) wrapper around Apache™ RAT to allow it to complete on large code repositories of multiple file types where Apache™ RAT hangs forev",
+ "value": "drat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/mosuck.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "MoSucker is a powerful backdoor - hacker's remote access tool.",
+ "value": "MoSucker"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.grayhatforum.org/thread-4373-post-5213.html#pid5213",
+ "http://www.spy-emergency.com/research/T/Theef_Download_Creator.html",
+ "http://www.spy-emergency.com/research/T/Theef.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Theef"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://prorat.software.informer.com/",
+ "http://malware.wikia.com/wiki/ProRat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "ProRat is a Microsoft Windows based backdoor trojan, more commonly known as a Remote Administration Tool. As with other trojan horses it uses a client and server. ProRat opens a port on the computer which allows the client to perform numerous operations on the server (the machine being controlled). ",
+ "value": "ProRat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://sites.google.com/site/greymecompany/setro-rat-project"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Setro"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/03/indetectables-rat-v.0.5-beta.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Indetectables RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://luminosity.link/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Luminosity Link"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://orcustechnologies.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Orcus"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/10/blizzard-rat-lite-v1.3.1.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Blizzard"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/kazybot-lite-php-rat/",
+ "http://telussecuritylabs.com/threats/show/TSL20150122-06"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Kazybot"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/01/bx-rat-v1.0.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BX"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "death"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://rubear.me/threads/sky-wyder-2016-cracked.127/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Sky Wyder"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/darktrack-4-alien/",
+ "http://news.softpedia.com/news/free-darktrack-rat-has-the-potential-of-being-the-best-rat-on-the-market-508179.shtml"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "DarkTrack"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/c4bbage/xRAT"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Free, Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. xRAT 2.0 is a fast and light-weight Remote Administration Tool coded in C# (using .NET Framework 2.0).",
+ "value": "xRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://sakhackingarticles.blogspot.lu/2014/08/biodox-rat.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Biodox"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-31386?tid=31386&&pq=1"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Offense RAT is a free renote administration tool made in Delphi 9.",
+ "value": "Offence"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-36962"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Apocalypse"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://leakforums.net/thread-363920"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "JCage"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://malware.wikia.com/wiki/Nuclear_RAT",
+ "http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-View/21/Nuclear_RAT_2.1.0/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Nuclear RAT (short for Nuclear Remote Administration Tool) is a backdoor trojan horse that infects Windows NT family systems (Windows 2000, XP, 2003).",
+ "value": "Nuclear RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://ozonercp.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "C++ REMOTE CONTROL PROGRAM",
+ "value": "Ozone"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/alienwithin/xanity-php-rat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Xanity"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dark Moon"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "DarkMoon"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://broad-product.biz/forum/r-a-t-(remote-administration-tools)/xpert-rat-3-0-10-by-abronsius(vb6)/",
+ "https://www.nulled.to/topic/18355-xpert-rat-309/",
+ "https://trickytamilan.blogspot.lu/2016/03/xpert-rat.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Xpert"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/kilerrat-taking-over-where-njrat-remote-access-trojan-left-off"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities ranging from manipulating the registry to opening a reverse shell. From stealing credentials stored in browsers to accessing the victims webcam. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread utilizing physic devices, such as USB drives, but also to use the victim as a pivot point to gain more access laterally throughout the network. This remote access trojan could be classified as a variant of the well known njrat, as they share many similar features such as their display style, several abilities and a general template for communication methods . However, where njrat left off KilerRat has taken over. KilerRat is a very feature rich RAT with an active development force that is rapidly gaining in popularity amongst the middle eastern community and the world.",
+ "value": "Kiler RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Brat"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "MINI-MO"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://lost-door.blogspot.lu/",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/lost-door-rat-accessible-customizable-attack-tool/",
+ "https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/lost-door-rat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Unlike most attack tools that one can only find in cybercriminal underground markets, Lost Door is very easy to obtain. It’s promoted on social media sites like YouTube and Facebook. Its maker, “OussamiO,” even has his own Facebook page where details on his creation can be found. He also has a dedicated blog (hxxp://lost-door[.]blogspot[.]com/) where tutorial videos and instructions on using the RAT is found. Any cybercriminal or threat actor can purchase and use the RAT to launch attacks.",
+ "value": "Lost Door"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/loki-rat-php-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Loki RAT is a php RAT that means no port forwarding is needed for this RAT, If you dont know how to setup this RAT click on tutorial.",
+ "value": "Loki RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/BahNahNah/MLRat"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "MLRat"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://perfect-conexao.blogspot.lu/2014/09/spycronic-1021.html",
+ "http://www.connect-trojan.net/2013/09/spycronic-v1.02.1.html",
+ "https://ranger-exploit.com/spycronic-v1-02-1/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "SpyCronic"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python ",
+ "value": "Pupy"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://novarat.sourceforge.net/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Nova is a proof of concept demonstrating screen sharing over UDP hole punching.",
+ "value": "Nova"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=9401&signatureSubId=2",
+ "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=9401&signatureSubId=0&softwareVersion=6.0&releaseVersion=S177",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20292",
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20264"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Back Door Y3K RAT "
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "BD Y3K RAT "
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://turkojan.blogspot.lu/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Turkojan is a remote administration and spying tool for Microsoft Windows operating systems.",
+ "value": "Turkojan"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://josh.com/tiny/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "TINY is a set of programs that lets you control a DOS computer from any Java-capable machine over a TCP/IP connection. It is comparable to programs like VNC, CarbonCopy, and GotoMyPC except that the host machine is a DOS computer rather than a Windows one.",
+ "value": "TINY"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.security-database.com/toolswatch/SharK-3-Remote-Administration-Tool.html",
+ "http://lpc1.clpccd.cc.ca.us/lpc/mdaoud/CNT7501/NETLABS/Ethical_Hacking_Lab_05.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SHARK",
+ "Shark"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "sharK is an advanced reverse connecting, firewall bypassing remote administration tool written in VB6. With sharK you will be able to administrate every PC (using Windows OS) remotely.",
+ "value": "SharK"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-022018-5040-99"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Backdoor.Blizzard",
+ "Backdoor.Fxdoor",
+ "Backdoor.Snowdoor",
+ "Backdoor:Win32/Snowdoor"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor.Snowdoor is a Backdoor Trojan Horse that allows unauthorized access to an infected computer. It creates an open C drive share with its default settings. By default, the Trojan listens on port 5,328.",
+ "value": "Snowdoor"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.nulled.to/topic/155464-paradox-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Paradox"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.rekings.com/spynote-v4-android-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Android RAT",
+ "value": "SpyNote"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ZOMBIE SLAYER"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "HTTP WEB BACKDOOR"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://networklookout.com/help/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Net Monitor for Employees lets you see what everyone's doing - without leaving your desk. Monitor the activity of all employees. Plus you can share your screen with your employees PCs, making demos and presentations much easier.",
+ "value": "NET-MONITOR PRO"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.dameware.com/dameware-mini-remote-control"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "dameware"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Affordable remote control software for all your customer support and help desk needs.",
+ "value": "DameWare Mini Remote Control"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.remoteutilities.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Utilities is a free remote access program with some really great features. It works by pairing two remote computers together with what they call an \"Internet ID.\" You can control a total of 10 PCs with Remote Utilities.",
+ "value": "Remote Utilities"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://ammyy-admin.soft32.com/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ammyy"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Ammyy Admin is a completely portable remote access program that's extremely simple to setup. It works by connecting one computer to another via an ID supplied by the program.",
+ "value": "Ammyy Admin"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.uvnc.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "UltraVNC works a bit like Remote Utilities, where a server and viewer is installed on two PCs, and the viewer is used to control the server.",
+ "value": "Ultra VNC"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.aeroadmin.com/en/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "AeroAdmin is probably the easiest program to use for free remote access. There are hardly any settings, and everything is quick and to the point, which is perfect for spontaneous support.",
+ "value": "AeroAdmin"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Windows Remote Desktop is the remote access software built into the Windows operating system. No additional download is necessary to use the program.",
+ "value": "Windows Remote Desktop"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.remotepc.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "RemotePC, for good or bad, is a more simple free remote desktop program. You're only allowed one connection (unless you upgrade) but for many of you, that'll be just fine.",
+ "value": "RemotePC"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://seecreen.com/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Firnass"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Seecreen (previously called Firnass) is an extremely tiny (500 KB), yet powerful free remote access program that's absolutely perfect for on-demand, instant support.",
+ "value": "Seecreen"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chrome-remote-desktop/gbchcmhmhahfdphkhkmpfmihenigjmpp?hl=en"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Chrome Remote Desktop is an extension for the Google Chrome web browser that lets you setup a computer for remote access from any other Chrome browser.",
+ "value": "Chrome Remote Desktop"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://anydesk.com/remote-desktop"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "AnyDesk is a remote desktop program that you can run portably or install like a regular program.",
+ "value": "AnyDesk"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.litemanager.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "LiteManager is another remote access program, and it's strikingly similar to Remote Utilities, which I explain on the first page of this list. However, unlike Remote Utilities, which can control a total of only 10 PCs, LiteManager supports up to 30 slots for storing and connecting to remote computers, and also has lots of useful features.",
+ "value": "LiteManager"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.comodo.com/home/download/download.php?prod=comodounite"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Comodo Unite is another free remote access program that creates a secure VPN between multiple computers. Once a VPN is established, you can remotely have access to applications and files through the client software.",
+ "value": "Comodo Unite"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://showmypc.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "ShowMyPC is a portable and free remote access program that's nearly identical to UltraVNC but uses a password to make a connection instead of an IP address.",
+ "value": "ShowMyPC"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.join.me/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "join.me is a remote access program from the producers of LogMeIn that provides quick access to another computer over an internet browser.",
+ "value": "join.me"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nchsoftware.com/remotedesktop/index.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "DesktopNow is a free remote access program from NCH Software. After optionally forwarding the proper port number in your router, and signing up for a free account, you can access your PC from anywhere through a web browser.",
+ "value": "DesktopNow"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.beamyourscreen.com/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Another free and portable remote access program is BeamYourScreen. This program works like some of the others in this list, where the presenter is given an ID number they must share with another user so they can connect to the presenter's screen.",
+ "value": "BeamYourScreen"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Casa RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-View/57/Bandook_RAT_v1.35__NEW_/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Bandook is a FWB#++ reverse connection rat (Remote Administration Tool), with a small size server when packed 30 KB, and a long list of amazing features",
+ "value": "Bandook RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.hacktohell.org/2011/05/setting-up-cerberus-ratremote.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Cerberus RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Syndrome RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.spy-emergency.com/research/S/Snoopy.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Snoopy is a Remote Administration Tool. Software for controlling user computer remotely from other computer on local network or Internet.",
+ "value": "Snoopy"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "5p00f3r.N$ RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "P. Storrie RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "xHacker Pro RAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-021310-3452-99"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor.NetDevil allows a hacker to remotely control an infected computer.",
+ "value": "NetDevil"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.digitrustgroup.com/nanocore-not-your-average-rat/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "In September of 2015, a DigiTrust client visited a web link that was providing an Adobe Flash Player update. The client, an international retail organization, attempted to download and run what appeared to be a regular update. The computer trying to download this update was a back office system that processed end of day credit card transactions. This system also had the capability of connecting to the corporate network which contained company sales reports.\nDigiTrust experts were alerted to something malicious and blocked the download. The investigation found that what appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update, was a Remote Access Trojan called NanoCore. If installation had been successful, customer credit card data, personal information, and internal sales information could have been captured and monetized. During the analysis of NanoCore, our experts found that there was much more to this RAT than simply being another Remote Access Trojan.",
+ "value": "NanoCore"
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/clusters/threat-actor.json b/clusters/threat-actor.json
index 08733cd6..8392d19c 100644
--- a/clusters/threat-actor.json
+++ b/clusters/threat-actor.json
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
"Comment Panda",
"PLA Unit 61398",
"APT 1",
+ "APT1",
"Advanced Persistent Threat 1",
"Byzantine Candor",
"Group 3",
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
},
{
"value": "Nitro",
+ "description": "These attackers were the subject of an extensive report by Symantec in 2011, which termed the attackers Nitro and stated: 'The goal of the attackers appears to be to collect intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes. In addition, the same attackers appear to have a lengthy operation history including attacks on other industries and organizations. Attacks on the chemical industry are merely their latest attack wave. As part of our investigations, we were also able to identify and contact one of the attackers to try and gain insights into the motivations behind these attacks.' Palo Alto Networks reported on continued activity by the attackers in 2014. ",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
@@ -41,10 +43,12 @@
},
{
"value": "Codoso",
+ "description": "The New York Times described Codoso as: 'A collection of hackers for hire that the security industry has been tracking for years. Over the years, the group has breached banks, law firms and tech companies, and once hijacked the Forbes website to try to infect visitors’ computers with malware.'",
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks"
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks",
+ "https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/technology/the-chinese-hackers-in-the-back-office.html"
],
"synonyms": [
"C0d0so",
@@ -138,7 +142,7 @@
"http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf"
]
},
- "description": "The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since 2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486. ",
+ "description": "Putter Panda were the subject of an extensive report by CrowdStrike, which stated: 'The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.'",
"value": "Putter Panda"
},
{
@@ -158,7 +162,8 @@
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
]
},
- "value": "UPS"
+ "value": "UPS",
+ "description": "Symantec described UPS in 2016 report as: 'Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -171,7 +176,8 @@
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2"
]
},
- "value": "DarkHotel"
+ "value": "DarkHotel",
+ "description": "Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: '... DarkHotel drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. Moreover, this crews most unusual characteristic is that for several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel around the world.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -214,10 +220,12 @@
],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
- "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html"
+ "http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/09/operation-deputydog-zero-day-cve-2013-3893-attack-against-japanese-targets.html",
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Aurora Panda"
+ "value": "Aurora Panda",
+ "description": "FireEye described APT17 in a 2015 report as: 'APT17, also known as DeputyDog, is a China based threat group that FireEye Intelligence has observed conducting network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -233,7 +241,8 @@
"https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-out-to-medical-espionage-in-community-health-breach/107828"
]
},
- "value": "Wekby"
+ "value": "Wekby",
+ "description": "Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: 'Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero - day exploit.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -245,7 +254,8 @@
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-operation-tropic-trooper.pdf"
]
},
- "value": "Tropic Trooper"
+ "value": "Tropic Trooper",
+ "description": "TrendMicro described Tropic Trooper in a 2015 report as: 'Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing campaign called Operation TropicTrooper. Active since 2012, the attackers behind the campaign haveset their sights on the Taiwanese government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military agencies.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -258,7 +268,8 @@
"Ragebeast",
"Blackfly",
"Lead",
- "Wicked Spider"
+ "Wicked Spider",
+ "Barium"
],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
@@ -267,7 +278,8 @@
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp"
]
},
- "value": "Axiom"
+ "value": "Axiom",
+ "description": "The Winnti grouping of activity is large and may actually be a number of linked groups rather than a single discrete entity. Kaspersky describe Winnti as: 'The Winnti group has been attacking companies in the online video game industry since 2009 and is currently still active. The groups objectives are stealing digital certificates signed by legitimate software vendors in addition to intellectual property theft, including the source code of online game projects. The majority of the victims are from South East Asia.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -304,7 +316,8 @@
"http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/malware-research/2014/03/spear-phishing-the-news-cycle-apt-actors-leverage-interest-in-the-disappearance-of-malaysian-flight-mh-370.html"
]
},
- "value": "Naikon"
+ "value": "Naikon",
+ "description": "Kaspersky described Naikon in a 2015 report as: 'The Naikon group is mostly active in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, and Nepal, hitting a variety of targets in a very opportunistic way.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -314,7 +327,8 @@
],
"country": "CN",
"refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/"
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/",
+ "https://securelist.com/spring-dragon-updated-activity/79067/"
]
},
"value": "Lotus Blossom"
@@ -365,9 +379,14 @@
"menuPass",
"happyyongzi",
"POTASSIUM",
- "DustStorm"
+ "DustStorm",
+ "Red Apollo",
+ "CVNX"
],
- "country": "CN"
+ "country": "CN",
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malware-new-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/"
+ ]
},
"value": "Stone Panda"
},
@@ -491,15 +510,6 @@
]
}
},
- {
- "meta": {
- "country": "CN",
- "refs": [
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf"
- ]
- },
- "value": "HiddenLynx"
- },
{
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
@@ -740,7 +750,9 @@
"TG-4127",
"Group-4127",
"STRONTIUM",
- "TAG_0700"
+ "TAG_0700",
+ "Swallowtail",
+ "IRON TWILIGHT"
],
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
@@ -774,7 +786,8 @@
"https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/17/the-dukes-7-years-of-russian-cyber-espionage/"
]
},
- "value": "APT 29"
+ "value": "APT 29",
+ "description": "A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering '"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -794,11 +807,13 @@
],
"refs": [
"https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf",
- "https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-25/"
+ "https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-25/",
+ "https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/07/turla-hackers-spying-governments-researcher-kaspersky-symantec"
],
"country": "RU"
},
- "value": "Turla Group"
+ "value": "Turla Group",
+ "description": "A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'"
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -848,11 +863,13 @@
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Carbanak",
- "Carbon Spider"
+ "Carbon Spider",
+ "FIN7"
],
"country": "RU",
"refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbanak"
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbanak",
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/fin7carbanak-threat-actor-unleashes-bateleur-jscript-backdoor"
],
"motive": "Cybercrime"
},
@@ -940,13 +957,16 @@
"meta": {
"country": "KP",
"synonyms": [
- "Operation DarkSeoul"
+ "Operation DarkSeoul",
+ "Hidden Cobra"
],
"refs": [
- "https://threatpost.com/operation-blockbuster-coalition-ties-destructive-attacks-to-lazarus-group/116422/"
+ "https://threatpost.com/operation-blockbuster-coalition-ties-destructive-attacks-to-lazarus-group/116422/",
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A"
]
},
- "value": "Lazarus Group"
+ "value": "Lazarus Group",
+ "description": "Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman."
},
{
"meta": {
@@ -1063,9 +1083,6 @@
{
"meta": {
"country": "CN",
- "synonyms": [
- "Operation C-Major"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf"
]
@@ -1430,16 +1447,6 @@
"value": "Hammer Panda",
"description": "Hammer Panda is a group of suspected Chinese origin targeting organisations in Russia."
},
- {
- "meta": {
- "country": "CHN",
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp"
- ]
- },
- "value": "Barium",
- "description": "Barium is one of the groups using Winnti."
- },
{
"meta": {
"country": "IRN",
@@ -1485,6 +1492,121 @@
},
"value": "Groundbait",
"description": "Groundbait is a group targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics."
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/longhorn-tools-used-cyberespionage-group-linked-vault-7"
+ ],
+ "country": "US"
+ },
+ "value": "Longhorn",
+ "description": "Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker. Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally."
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "Callisto",
+ "description": "The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions."
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "OceanLotus Group",
+ "Ocean Lotus",
+ "APT-32",
+ "APT 32"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "value": "APT32",
+ "description": "Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests."
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "SilverTerrier",
+ "description": "As these tools rise and fall in popularity (and more importantly, as detection rates by antivirus vendors improve), SilverTerrier actors have consistently adopted new malware families and shifted to the latest packing tools available. ",
+ "meta": {
+ "country": "NG",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/silverterrier-next-evolution-in-nigerian-cybercrime.pdf"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "WildNeutron",
+ "description": "A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/butterfly-profiting-high-level-corporate-attacks",
+ "https://securelist.com/71275/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/",
+ "https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2015/11/05/sphinx-moth-expanding-our-knowledge-of-the-wild-neutron-morpho-apt/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Butterfly",
+ "Morpho",
+ "Sphinx Moth"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "PLATINUM",
+ "description": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf",
+ "https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/04/26/digging-deep-for-platinum/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "ELECTRUM",
+ "description": "Dragos, Inc. tracks the adversary group behind CRASHOVERRIDE as ELECTRUM and assesses with high confidence through confidential sources that ELECTRUM has direct ties to the Sandworm team. Our intelligence ICS WorldView customers have received a comprehensive report and this industry report will not get into sensitive technical details but instead focus on information needed for defense and impact awareness.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html",
+ "https://www.root9b.com/sites/default/files/whitepapers/PoS%20Malware%20ShellTea%20PoSlurp.pdf",
+ "http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-254Q5F/0x0x938351/665BA6A3-9573-486C-B96F-80FA35759E8C/FEYE_rpt-mtrends-2017_FINAL2.pdf"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "FIN8 is a financially motivated group targeting the retail, hospitality and entertainment industries. The actor had previously conducted several tailored spearphishing campaigns using the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK.",
+ "value": "FIN8"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "El Machete",
+ "description": "El Machete is one of these threats that was first publicly disclosed and named by Kaspersky here. We’ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in order to evade signature-based detection.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/66108/el-machete/",
+ "https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cobalt",
+ "description": "A criminal group dubbed Cobalt is behind synchronized ATM heists that saw machines across Europe, CIS countries (including Russia), and Malaysia being raided simultaneously, in the span of a few hours. The group has been active since June 2016, and their latest attacks happened in July and August.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/11/22/cobalt-hackers-synchronized-atm-heists/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Cobalt group",
+ "Cobalt gang"
+ ]
+ }
}
],
"name": "Threat actor",
@@ -1499,5 +1621,5 @@
],
"description": "Known or estimated adversary groups targeting organizations and employees. Adversary groups are regularly confused with their initial operation or campaign.",
"uuid": "7cdff317-a673-4474-84ec-4f1754947823",
- "version": 17
+ "version": 25
}
diff --git a/clusters/tool.json b/clusters/tool.json
index cb4e9c82..660ea997 100644
--- a/clusters/tool.json
+++ b/clusters/tool.json
@@ -1,29 +1,39 @@
{
+ "name": "Tool",
+ "type": "tool",
+ "source": "MISP Project",
+ "authors": [
+ "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
+ "Florian Roth",
+ "Timo Steffens",
+ "Christophe Vandeplas"
+ ],
+ "description": "threat-actor-tools is an enumeration of tools used by adversaries. The list includes malware but also common software regularly used by the adversaries.",
+ "uuid": "0d821b68-9d82-4c6d-86a6-1071a9e0f79f",
+ "version": 34,
"values": [
{
- "value": "Tinba",
- "description": "Banking Malware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://thehackernews.com/search/label/Zusy%20Malware",
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-tinbatinybanker-malware/"
+ "type": [
+ "Banking"
],
"synonyms": [
"Hunter",
"Zusy",
"TinyBanker"
],
- "type": [
- "Banking"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://thehackernews.com/search/label/Zusy%20Malware",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-tinbatinybanker-malware/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Banking Malware",
+ "value": "Tinba"
},
{
- "value": "PlugX",
- "description": "Malware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/pulling-the-plug-on-plugx"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.FSZO-5117",
@@ -32,148 +42,149 @@
"Korplug",
"Agent.dhwf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/pulling-the-plug-on-plugx"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Malware",
+ "value": "PlugX"
},
{
- "value": "MSUpdater",
- "description": " Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.zscaler.com/pdf/whitepapers/msupdater_trojan_whitepaper.pdfx"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": " Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
+ "value": "MSUpdater"
},
{
- "value": "Lazagne",
- "description": "A password sthealing tool regularly used by attackers",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne"
- ],
"type": [
"HackTool"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "A password sthealing tool regularly used by attackers",
+ "value": "Lazagne"
},
{
- "value": "Poison Ivy",
- "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
- "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"Backdoor.Win32.PoisonIvy",
"Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf",
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.",
+ "value": "Poison Ivy"
},
{
- "value": "SPIVY",
- "description": "In March 2016, Unit 42 observed this new Poison Ivy variant we’ve named SPIVY being deployed via weaponized documents leveraging CVE-2015-2545.",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-new-poison-ivy-rat-variant-targets-hong-kong-pro-democracy-activists/"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "In March 2016, Unit 42 observed this new Poison Ivy variant we’ve named SPIVY being deployed via weaponized documents leveraging CVE-2015-2545.",
+ "value": "SPIVY"
},
{
- "value": "Torn RAT",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"Anchor Panda"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-anchor-panda/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Torn RAT"
},
{
- "value": "OzoneRAT",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/08/29/german-speakers-targeted-by-spam-leading-to-ozone-rat"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"Ozone RAT",
"ozonercp"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/08/29/german-speakers-targeted-by-spam-leading-to-ozone-rat"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "OzoneRAT"
},
{
- "value": "ZeGhost",
- "description": "ZeGhots is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2014.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fZegost.BW"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"BackDoor-FBZT!52D84425CDF2",
"Trojan.Win32.Staser.ytq",
"Win32/Zegost.BW"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Backdoor%3aWin32%2fZegost.BW"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "ZeGhots is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2014.",
+ "value": "ZeGhost"
},
{
- "value": "Elise Backdoor",
- "description": "Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://thehackernews.com/2015/08/elise-malware-hacking.html"
+ "type": [
+ "dropper",
+ "PWS"
],
"synonyms": [
"Elise"
],
- "type": [
- "dropper",
- "PWS"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://thehackernews.com/2015/08/elise-malware-hacking.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009",
+ "value": "Elise Backdoor"
},
{
- "value": "Trojan.Laziok",
- "description": "A new information stealer, Trojan.Laziok, acts as a reconnaissance tool allowing attackers to gather information and tailor their attack methods for each compromised computer.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-reconnaissance-threat-trojanlaziok-targets-energy-sector"
+ "type": [
+ "PWS",
+ "reco"
],
"synonyms": [
"Laziok"
],
- "type": [
- "PWS",
- "reco"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-reconnaissance-threat-trojanlaziok-targets-energy-sector"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "A new information stealer, Trojan.Laziok, acts as a reconnaissance tool allowing attackers to gather information and tailor their attack methods for each compromised computer.",
+ "value": "Trojan.Laziok"
},
{
- "value": "Slempo",
- "description": "Android-based malware",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://securityintelligence.com/android-malware-about-to-get-worse-gm-bot-source-code-leaked/"
+ "type": [
+ "Spyware",
+ "AndroidOS"
],
"synonyms": [
"GM-Bot",
@@ -181,18 +192,19 @@
"Bankosy",
"Acecard"
],
- "type": [
- "Spyware",
- "AndroidOS"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securityintelligence.com/android-malware-about-to-get-worse-gm-bot-source-code-leaked/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Android-based malware",
+ "value": "Slempo"
},
{
- "value": "PWOBot",
- "description": "We have discovered a malware family named ‘PWOBot’ that is fairly unique because it is written entirely in Python, and compiled via PyInstaller to generate a Microsoft Windows executable. The malware has been witnessed affecting a number of Europe-based organizations, particularly in Poland. Additionally, the malware is delivered via a popular Polish file-sharing web service.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-python-based-pwobot-targets-european-organizations/"
+ "type": [
+ "Dropper",
+ "Miner",
+ "Spyware"
],
"synonyms": [
"PWOLauncher",
@@ -202,124 +214,130 @@
"PWOPyExec",
"PWOQuery"
],
- "type": [
- "Dropper",
- "Miner",
- "Spyware"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/04/unit42-python-based-pwobot-targets-european-organizations/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "We have discovered a malware family named ‘PWOBot’ that is fairly unique because it is written entirely in Python, and compiled via PyInstaller to generate a Microsoft Windows executable. The malware has been witnessed affecting a number of Europe-based organizations, particularly in Poland. Additionally, the malware is delivered via a popular Polish file-sharing web service.",
+ "value": "PWOBot"
},
{
- "value": "Lost Door RAT",
- "description": "We recently came across a cyber attack that used a remote access Trojan (RAT) called Lost Door, a tool currently offered on social media sites. What also struck us the most about this RAT (detected as BKDR_LODORAT.A) is how it abuses the Port Forward feature in routers.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "LostDoor RAT",
- "BKDR_LODORAT"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/lost-door-rat-accessible-customizable-attack-tool/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "LostDoor RAT",
+ "BKDR_LODORAT"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "We recently came across a cyber attack that used a remote access Trojan (RAT) called Lost Door, a tool currently offered on social media sites. What also struck us the most about this RAT (detected as BKDR_LODORAT.A) is how it abuses the Port Forward feature in routers.",
+ "value": "Lost Door RAT"
},
{
- "value": "njRAT",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Bladabindi",
- "Jorik"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.fidelissecurity.com/files/files/FTA_1009-njRAT_Uncovered_rev2.pdf",
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders/blob/master/yaraRules/njRat.yar"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Bladabindi",
+ "Jorik"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "njRAT"
},
{
- "value": "NanoCoreRAT",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "NanoCore",
- "Nancrat",
- "Zurten",
- "Atros2.CKPN"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/nanocore-another-rat-tries-make-it-out-gutter",
"https://nanocore.io/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "NanoCore",
+ "Nancrat",
+ "Zurten",
+ "Atros2.CKPN"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "NanoCoreRAT"
},
{
- "value": "Sakula",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sakurel"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/sakula-malware-family"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sakurel"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Sakula"
},
{
- "value": "Hi-ZOR",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Hi-ZOR"
},
{
- "value": "Derusbi",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TROJ_DLLSERV.BE"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Derusbi.pdf",
"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/hta-w02-dissecting-derusbi.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TROJ_DLLSERV.BE"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Derusbi"
},
{
- "value": "EvilGrab",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "BKDR_HGDER",
- "BKDR_EVILOGE",
- "BKDR_NVICM",
- "Wmonder"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/evilgrab-malware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks-in-asia/",
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-on-president-of-myanmars-website/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "BKDR_HGDER",
+ "BKDR_EVILOGE",
+ "BKDR_NVICM",
+ "Wmonder"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "EvilGrab"
},
{
- "value": "Trojan.Naid",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Dropper"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid",
+ "http://telussecuritylabs.com/threats/show/TSL20120614-05"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Naid",
"Mdmbot.E",
@@ -328,420 +346,416 @@
"AGENT.BMZA",
"MCRAT.A",
"AGENT.ABQMR"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid",
- "http://telussecuritylabs.com/threats/show/TSL20120614-05"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Dropper"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Trojan.Naid"
},
{
- "value": "Moudoor",
- "description": "Backdoor.Moudoor, a customized version of Gh0st RAT",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "SCAR",
- "KillProc.14145"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/elite-chinese-cyberspy-group-behind-bit9-hack/d/d-id/1140495",
"https://securityledger.com/2013/09/apt-for-hire-symantec-outs-hidden-lynx-hacking-crew/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "SCAR",
+ "KillProc.14145"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor.Moudoor, a customized version of Gh0st RAT",
+ "value": "Moudoor"
},
{
- "value": "NetTraveler",
- "description": "APT that infected hundreds of high profile victims in more than 40 countries. Known targets of NetTraveler include Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TravNet",
- "Netfile"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TravNet",
+ "Netfile"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "APT that infected hundreds of high profile victims in more than 40 countries. Known targets of NetTraveler include Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.",
+ "value": "NetTraveler"
},
{
- "value": "Winnti",
- "description": "APT used As part of Operation SMN, Novetta analyzed recent versions of the Winnti malware. The samples, compiled from mid- to late 2014, exhibited minimal functional changes over the previous generations Kaspersky reported in 2013.",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/",
+ "https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/winnti-more-than-just-a-game-130410.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Etso",
"SUQ",
"Agent.ALQHI"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/57455/nettraveler-is-back-the-red-star-apt-returns-with-new-tricks/"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "APT used As part of Operation SMN, Novetta analyzed recent versions of the Winnti malware. The samples, compiled from mid- to late 2014, exhibited minimal functional changes over the previous generations Kaspersky reported in 2013.",
+ "value": "Winnti"
},
{
- "value": "Mimikatz",
- "description": "Ease Credential stealh and replay, A little tool to play with Windows security.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Mikatz"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz"
- ],
"type": [
"HackTool"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz",
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Mikatz"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Ease Credential stealh and replay, A little tool to play with Windows security.",
+ "value": "Mimikatz"
},
{
- "value": "WEBC2",
- "description": "Backdoor attribued to APT1",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/gnaegle/cse4990-practical3",
"https://www.securestate.com/blog/2013/02/20/apt-if-it-aint-broke"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor attribued to APT1",
+ "value": "WEBC2"
},
{
- "value": "Pirpi",
- "description": "Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Badey",
- "EXL"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Badey",
+ "EXL"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails.",
+ "value": "Pirpi"
},
{
- "value": "RARSTONE",
- "description": "RARSTONE is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) discovered early 2013 by TrendMicro, it’s characterized by a great affinity with the other RAT know as Plug is and was used in April for phishing campaigns that followed the dramatic attack to the Boston Marathon.",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bkdr_rarstone-new-rat-to-watch-out-for/"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "RARSTONE is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) discovered early 2013 by TrendMicro, it’s characterized by a great affinity with the other RAT know as Plug is and was used in April for phishing campaigns that followed the dramatic attack to the Boston Marathon.",
+ "value": "RARSTONE"
},
{
- "value": "Backspace",
- "description": "Backspace is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. This malware is reportedly associated with targeted attacks against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (APT30).",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Lecna"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/WEB-2015RPTAPT30.html",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-southeast-asia-threat-landscape.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Lecna"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Backspace is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. This malware is reportedly associated with targeted attacks against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (APT30).",
+ "value": "Backspace"
},
{
- "value": "XSControl",
- "description": "Backdoor user by he Naikon APT group",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/",
"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/securelist/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM.pdf"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor user by he Naikon APT group",
+ "value": "XSControl"
},
{
- "value": "Neteagle",
- "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as Scout and Norton.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"scout",
"norton"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0034",
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-apt30.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as Scout and Norton.",
+ "value": "Neteagle"
},
{
- "value": "Agent.BTZ",
- "description": "In November 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT, the Agent.BTZ successor. We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "ComRat"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/01/23927-evolution-of-sophisticated-spyware-from-agent-btz-to-comrat"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "ComRat"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "In November 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT, the Agent.BTZ successor. We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit.",
+ "value": "Agent.BTZ"
},
{
- "value": "Heseber BOT",
- "description": "RAT bundle with standard VNC (to avoid/limit A/V detection)."
+ "description": "RAT bundle with standard VNC (to avoid/limit A/V detection).",
+ "value": "Heseber BOT"
},
{
"value": "Agent.dne"
},
{
- "value": "Wipbot",
- "description": "Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla)",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Tavdig",
- "Epic Turla",
- "WorldCupSec",
- "TadjMakhal"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/",
"https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/waterbug-attack-group.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Tavdig",
+ "Epic Turla",
+ "WorldCupSec",
+ "TadjMakhal"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla)",
+ "value": "Wipbot"
},
{
- "value": "Turla",
- "description": "Family of related sophisticated backdoor software - Name comes from Microsoft detection signature – anagram of Ultra (Ultra3) was a name of the fake driver).",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Snake",
- "Uroburos",
- "Urouros"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor",
+ "Rootkit"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor",
- "Rootkit"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Snake",
+ "Uroburos",
+ "Urouros"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Family of related sophisticated backdoor software - Name comes from Microsoft detection signature – anagram of Ultra (Ultra3) was a name of the fake driver).",
+ "value": "Turla"
},
{
"value": "Winexe"
},
{
- "value": "Dark Comet",
- "description": "RAT initialy identified in 2011 and still actively used."
+ "description": "RAT initialy identified in 2011 and still actively used.",
+ "value": "Dark Comet"
},
{
- "value": "Cadelspy",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"WinSpy"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Cadelspy"
},
{
- "value": "CMStar",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/digital-quartermaster-scenario-demonstrated-in-attacks-against-the-mongolian-government/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "CMStar"
},
{
- "value": "DHS2015",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "iRAT"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/The-Desert-Falcons-targeted-attacks.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "iRAT"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "DHS2015"
},
{
- "value": "Gh0st Rat",
- "description": "Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by C.Rufus Security Team several years ago.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Gh0stRat, GhostRat"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Gh0stRat, GhostRat"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by C.Rufus Security Team several years ago.",
+ "value": "Gh0st Rat"
},
{
- "value": "Fakem RAT",
- "description": "Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages). ",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "FAKEM"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-fakem-rat.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "FAKEM"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages). ",
+ "value": "Fakem RAT"
},
{
- "value": "MFC Huner",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/japan-us-defense-industries-among-targeted-entities-in-latest-attack/"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Hupigon",
"BKDR_HUPIGON"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/japan-us-defense-industries-among-targeted-entities-in-latest-attack/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "MFC Huner"
},
{
- "value": "Blackshades",
- "description": "Blackshades Remote Access Tool targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. Authors were arrested in 2012 and 2014.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-charge-announce-charges-connection",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.org/intelligence/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-2-blackshades-net/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Blackshades Remote Access Tool targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. Authors were arrested in 2012 and 2014.",
+ "value": "Blackshades"
},
{
- "value": "CHOPSTICK",
- "description": "backdoor used by apt28 ",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
+ "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"webhp",
"SPLM",
"(.v2 fysbis)"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "backdoor used by apt28 ",
+ "value": "CHOPSTICK"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
+ "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "EVILTOSS",
- "description": "backdoor used by apt28",
- "meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Sedreco",
"AZZY",
"ADVSTORESHELL",
"NETUI"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "backdoor used by apt28",
+ "value": "EVILTOSS"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "possible_issues": "Report tells that is could be Xagent alias (Java Rat)",
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "GAMEFISH",
- "description": "backdoor",
- "meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Sednit",
"Seduploader",
"JHUHUGIT",
"Sofacy"
- ],
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "backdoor",
+ "value": "GAMEFISH"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "SOURFACE",
- "description": "downloader - Older version of CORESHELL",
- "meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Sofacy"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "downloader - Older version of CORESHELL",
+ "value": "SOURFACE"
},
{
- "value": "OLDBAIT",
- "description": "credential harvester",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sasfis",
- "BackDoor-FDU",
- "IEChecker"
+ "type": [
+ "PWS"
],
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_sasfis.tl",
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
],
- "type": [
- "PWS"
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sasfis",
+ "BackDoor-FDU",
+ "IEChecker"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "credential harvester",
+ "value": "OLDBAIT"
},
{
- "value": "CORESHELL",
- "description": "downloader - Newer version of SOURFACE",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sofacy"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sofacy"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "downloader - Newer version of SOURFACE",
+ "value": "CORESHELL"
},
{
- "value": "Havex RAT",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Havex"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Havex RAT"
},
{
- "value": "KjW0rm",
- "description": "RAT initially written in VB.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/understanding-kjw0rm-malware-we-dive-in-to-the-tv5-cyber-attack/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "RAT initially written in VB.",
+ "value": "KjW0rm"
},
{
"value": "TinyTyphon"
@@ -774,17 +788,17 @@
"value": "FireMalv"
},
{
- "value": "Regin",
- "description": "Regin (also known as Prax or WarriorPride) is a sophisticated malware toolkit revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. The malware targets specific users of Microsoft Windows-based computers and has been linked to the US intelligence gathering agency NSA and its British counterpart, the GCHQ. The Intercept provided samples of Regin for download including malware discovered at Belgian telecommunications provider, Belgacom. Kaspersky Lab says it first became aware of Regin in spring 2012, but that some of the earliest samples date from 2003. The name Regin is first found on the VirusTotal website on 9 March 2011.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_(malware)"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Prax",
"WarriorPride"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_(malware)"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Regin (also known as Prax or WarriorPride) is a sophisticated malware toolkit revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. The malware targets specific users of Microsoft Windows-based computers and has been linked to the US intelligence gathering agency NSA and its British counterpart, the GCHQ. The Intercept provided samples of Regin for download including malware discovered at Belgian telecommunications provider, Belgacom. Kaspersky Lab says it first became aware of Regin in spring 2012, but that some of the earliest samples date from 2003. The name Regin is first found on the VirusTotal website on 9 March 2011.",
+ "value": "Regin"
},
{
"value": "Duqu"
@@ -838,85 +852,85 @@
"value": "Tdrop2"
},
{
- "value": "ZXShell",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Sensode"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.fireeye.com/blog/uncategorized/2014/02/operation-snowman-deputydog-actor-compromises-us-veterans-of-foreign-wars-website.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Sensode"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "ZXShell"
},
{
- "value": "T9000",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-anti-analysis-techniques/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "T9000"
},
{
- "value": "T5000",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Plat1"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.cylance.com/techblog/Grand-Theft-Auto-Panda.shtml"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Plat1"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "T5000"
},
{
- "value": "Taidoor",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojantaidoor-takes-aim-policy-think-tanks"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Taidoor"
},
{
- "value": "Swisyn",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2013/latest-adobe-pdf-exploit-used-to-target-uyghur-and-tibetan-activists/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Swisyn"
},
{
- "value": "Rekaf",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Rekaf"
},
{
"value": "Scieron"
},
{
- "value": "SkeletonKey",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "SkeletonKey"
},
{
- "value": "Skyipot",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://labs.alienvault.com/labs/index.php/2011/another-sykipot-sample-likely-targeting-us-federal-agencies/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Skyipot"
},
{
- "value": "Spindest",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.threatconnect.com/news/threatconnect-enables-healthy-networking-biomed-life-sciences-industry/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Spindest"
},
{
"value": "Preshin"
@@ -925,111 +939,122 @@
"value": "Oficla"
},
{
- "value": "PCClient RAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/10/new-indicators-compromise-apt-group-nitro-uncovered/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "PCClient RAT"
},
{
"value": "Plexor"
},
{
- "value": "Mongall",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Mongall"
},
{
- "value": "NeD Worm",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.clearskysec.com/dustysky/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "NeD Worm"
},
{
- "value": "NewCT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "NewCT"
},
{
- "value": "Nflog",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Nflog"
},
{
- "value": "Janicab",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.avast.com/2013/07/22/multisystem-trojan-janicab-attacks-windows-and-macosx-via-scripts/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Janicab"
},
{
- "value": "Jripbot",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Jiripbot"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/butterfly-corporate-spies-out-for-financial-gain.pdf"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Jiripbot"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Jripbot"
},
{
- "value": "Jolob",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/10/scanbox-framework-whos-affected-and-whos-using-it-1.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Jolob"
},
{
- "value": "IsSpace",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html"
]
+ },
+ "value": "IsSpace"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Emotet",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69560/the-banking-trojan-emotet-detailed-analysis/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Geodo"
+ ]
}
},
{
- "value": "Hoardy",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Hoarde",
"Phindolp",
"BS2005"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Hoardy"
},
{
- "value": "Htran",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/htran/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Htran"
},
{
- "value": "HTTPBrowser",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "TokenControl"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www.threatstream.com/blog/evasive-maneuvers-the-wekby-group-attempts-to-evade-analysis-via-custom-rop"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TokenControl"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "HTTPBrowser"
},
{
"value": "Disgufa"
@@ -1038,283 +1063,279 @@
"value": "Elirks"
},
{
- "value": "Snifula",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Ursnif"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://www.circl.lu/pub/tr-13/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Ursnif"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Snifula"
},
{
- "value": "Aumlib",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.cybersquared.com/killing-with-a-borrowed-knife-chaining-core-cloud-service-profile-infrastructure-for-cyber-attacks"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Yayih",
"mswab",
"Graftor"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "http://www.cybersquared.com/killing-with-a-borrowed-knife-chaining-core-cloud-service-profile-infrastructure-for-cyber-attacks"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Aumlib"
},
{
- "value": "CTRat",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/threat-intelligence/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "CTRat"
},
{
- "value": "Emdivi",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Newsripper"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/operation-cloudyomega-ichitaro-zero-day-and-ongoing-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-japan"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Newsripper"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Emdivi"
},
{
- "value": "Etumbot",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "www.arbornetworks.com/asert/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"Exploz",
"Specfix",
"RIPTIDE"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "www.arbornetworks.com/asert/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Etumbot"
},
{
- "value": "Fexel",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Loneagent"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Fexel"
},
{
- "value": "Fysbis",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Fysbis"
},
{
- "value": "Hikit",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Hikit"
},
{
- "value": "Hancitor",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Tordal",
- "Chanitor"
+ "Chanitor",
+ "Pony"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Hancitor"
},
{
- "value": "Ruckguv",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Ruckguv"
},
{
- "value": "HerHer Trojan",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "HerHer Trojan"
},
{
- "value": "Helminth backdoor",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Helminth backdoor"
},
{
- "value": "HDRoot",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://williamshowalter.com/a-universal-windows-bootkit/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "HDRoot"
},
{
- "value": "IRONGATE",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/irongate_ics_malware.html"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "IRONGATE"
},
{
- "value": "ShimRAT",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/fox-it_mofang_threatreport_tlp-white.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "ShimRAT"
},
{
- "value": "X-Agent",
- "description": "This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. This component is available for Osx, Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-update-ios-espionage-app-found/",
- "https://app.box.com/s/l7n781ig6n8wlf1aff5hgwbh4qoi5jqq"
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
],
"synonyms": [
"XAgent"
],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-update-ios-espionage-app-found/",
+ "https://app.box.com/s/l7n781ig6n8wlf1aff5hgwbh4qoi5jqq"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. This component is available for Osx, Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems.",
+ "value": "X-Agent"
},
{
- "value": "X-Tunnel",
"meta": {
"synonyms": [
"XTunnel"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "X-Tunnel"
},
{
- "value": "Foozer",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Foozer"
},
{
- "value": "WinIDS",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "WinIDS"
},
{
- "value": "DownRange",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "DownRange"
},
{
- "value": "Mad Max",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/mad-max-dga/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Mad Max"
},
{
- "value": "Crimson",
- "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threat-insight-en.pdf"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims",
+ "value": "Crimson"
},
{
- "value": "Prikormka",
- "description": "Operation Groundbait based on our research into the Prikormka malware family. This includes detailed technical analysis of the Prikormka malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and a description of the most noteworthy attack campaigns.",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Operation Groundbait based on our research into the Prikormka malware family. This includes detailed technical analysis of the Prikormka malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and a description of the most noteworthy attack campaigns.",
+ "value": "Prikormka"
},
{
- "value": "NanHaiShu",
- "description": "This whitepaper details a malicious program we identify as NanHaiShu. Based on our analysis, the threat actor behind this malware targets government and private-sector organizations.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "This whitepaper details a malicious program we identify as NanHaiShu. Based on our analysis, the threat actor behind this malware targets government and private-sector organizations.",
+ "value": "NanHaiShu"
},
{
- "value": "Umbreon",
- "description": "Umbreon (sharing the same name as the Pokémon) targets Linux systems, including systems running both Intel and ARM processors, expanding the scope of this threat to include embedded devices as well.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pokemon-themed-umbreon-linux-rootkit-hits-x86-arm-systems/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Umbreon (sharing the same name as the Pokémon) targets Linux systems, including systems running both Intel and ARM processors, expanding the scope of this threat to include embedded devices as well.",
+ "value": "Umbreon"
},
{
- "value": "Odinaff",
- "description": "Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.",
+ "value": "Odinaff"
},
{
- "value": "Hworm",
- "description": "Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Houdini"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign.",
+ "value": "Hworm"
},
{
- "value": "Backdoor.Dripion",
- "description": "Backdoor.Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Dripion"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Backdoor.Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.",
+ "value": "Backdoor.Dripion"
},
{
- "value": "Adwind",
- "description": "Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. A significant amount of additional functionality can be provided through downloadable plugins, including such things as remote control options and shell command execution.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73660/adwind-faq/"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"AlienSpy",
"Frutas",
@@ -1323,8 +1344,13 @@
"JSocket",
"jRat",
"Backdoor:Java/Adwind"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/blog/research/73660/adwind-faq/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. A significant amount of additional functionality can be provided through downloadable plugins, including such things as remote control options and shell command execution.",
+ "value": "Adwind"
},
{
"value": "Bedep"
@@ -1333,16 +1359,16 @@
"value": "Cromptui"
},
{
- "value": "Dridex",
- "description": "Dridex is a strain of banking malware that leverages macros in Microsoft Office to infect systems. Once a computer has been infected, Dridex attackers can steal banking credentials and other personal information on the system to gain access to the financial records of a user.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dridex-financial-trojan.pdf"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Cridex"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dridex-financial-trojan.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Dridex is a strain of banking malware that leverages macros in Microsoft Office to infect systems. Once a computer has been infected, Dridex attackers can steal banking credentials and other personal information on the system to gain access to the financial records of a user.",
+ "value": "Dridex"
},
{
"value": "Fareit"
@@ -1351,133 +1377,133 @@
"value": "Gafgyt"
},
{
- "value": "Gamarue",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/03/24274-the-andromeda-gamarue-botnet-is-on-the-rise-again"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Andromeda"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/03/24274-the-andromeda-gamarue-botnet-is-on-the-rise-again"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Gamarue"
},
{
- "value": "Necurs",
- "description": "The Necurs botnet is a distributor of many pieces of malware, most notably Locky.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necurs_botnet"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "The Necurs botnet is a distributor of many pieces of malware, most notably Locky.",
+ "value": "Necurs"
},
{
"value": "Palevo"
},
{
- "value": "Akbot",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbot"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Qbot",
"Qakbot",
"PinkSlipBot"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbot"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Akbot"
},
{
- "value": "Upatre",
- "description": "Upatre is a Trojan downloader that is used to set up other threats on the victim's PC. Upatre has been used recently in several high profile Trojan attacks involving the Gameover Trojan. "
+ "description": "Upatre is a Trojan downloader that is used to set up other threats on the victim's PC. Upatre has been used recently in several high profile Trojan attacks involving the Gameover Trojan. ",
+ "value": "Upatre"
},
{
- "value": "Vawtrak",
- "description": "Vawtrak is an information stealing malware family that is primarily used to gain unauthorised access to bank accounts through online banking websites.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.sophos.com/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/sophos-vawtrak-international-crimeware-as-a-service-tpna.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Vawtrak is an information stealing malware family that is primarily used to gain unauthorised access to bank accounts through online banking websites.",
+ "value": "Vawtrak"
},
{
- "value": "Empire",
- "description": "Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/adaptivethreat/Empire"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework",
+ "value": "Empire"
},
{
- "value": "Explosive",
- "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive. ",
+ "value": "Explosive"
},
{
- "value": "KeyBoy",
- "description": "The actors used a new version of “KeyBoy,” a custom backdoor first disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and configuration data",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://citizenlab.org/2016/11/parliament-keyboy/",
"https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2013/06/07/keyboy-targeted-attacks-against-vietnam-and-india"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "The actors used a new version of “KeyBoy,” a custom backdoor first disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and configuration data",
+ "value": "KeyBoy"
},
{
- "value": "Yahoyah",
- "description": "The attacks in this case are associated with a campaign called Tropic Trooper, which has been active since at least 2011 and is known for heavily targeting Taiwan. One of the attacks used their known Yahoyah malware...",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"W32/Seeav"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "Tartine",
- "description": "Delphi RAT used by Sofacy."
- },
- {
- "value": "Mirai",
- "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
- "meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)"
],
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The attacks in this case are associated with a campaign called Tropic Trooper, which has been active since at least 2011 and is known for heavily targeting Taiwan. One of the attacks used their known Yahoyah malware...",
+ "value": "Yahoyah"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Delphi RAT used by Sofacy.",
+ "value": "Tartine"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
"synonyms": [
"Linux/Mirai"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Mirai (Japanese for \"the future\") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled \"bots\", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs's web site, an attack on French web host OVH and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.",
+ "value": "Mirai"
},
{
"value": "BASHLITE"
},
{
- "value": "BlackEnergy",
- "description": "BlackEnergy is a trojan which has undergone significant functional changes since it was first publicly analysed by Arbor Networks in 2007. It has evolved from a relatively simple DDoS trojan into a relatively sophisticated piece of modern malware with a modular architecture, making it a suitable tool for sending spam and for online bank fraud, as well as for targeted attacks. BlackEnergy version 2, which featured rootkit techniques, was documented by SecureWorks in 2010. The targeted attacks recently discovered are proof that the trojan is still alive and kicking in 2014. We provide a technical analysis of the BlackEnergy family, focusing on novel functionality and the differences introduced by new lite variants. We describe the most notable aspects of the malware, including its techniques for bypassing UAC, defeating the signed driver requirement in Windows and a selection of BlackEnergy2 plug-ins used for parasitic file infections, network discovery and remote code execution and data collection.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "BlackEnergy is a trojan which has undergone significant functional changes since it was first publicly analysed by Arbor Networks in 2007. It has evolved from a relatively simple DDoS trojan into a relatively sophisticated piece of modern malware with a modular architecture, making it a suitable tool for sending spam and for online bank fraud, as well as for targeted attacks. BlackEnergy version 2, which featured rootkit techniques, was documented by SecureWorks in 2010. The targeted attacks recently discovered are proof that the trojan is still alive and kicking in 2014. We provide a technical analysis of the BlackEnergy family, focusing on novel functionality and the differences introduced by new lite variants. We describe the most notable aspects of the malware, including its techniques for bypassing UAC, defeating the signed driver requirement in Windows and a selection of BlackEnergy2 plug-ins used for parasitic file infections, network discovery and remote code execution and data collection.",
+ "value": "BlackEnergy"
},
{
- "value": "Trojan.Seaduke",
- "description": "Trojan.Seaduke is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files.",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-031915-4935-99"
- ],
"synonyms": [
"Seaduke"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-031915-4935-99"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Trojan.Seaduke is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files.",
+ "value": "Trojan.Seaduke"
},
{
"value": "Backdoor.Tinybaron"
@@ -1486,578 +1512,1465 @@
"value": "Incognito RAT"
},
{
- "value": "DownRage",
"meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Carberplike"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/",
"https://twitter.com/Timo_Steffens/status/814781584536719360"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Carberplike"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "DownRage"
},
{
- "value": "Chthonic",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/threat-actors-using-legitimate-paypal-accounts-to-distribute-chthonic-banking-trojan"
]
- }
+ },
+ "value": "Chthonic"
},
{
+ "value": "GeminiDuke",
+ "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Software/S0049"
]
- },
- "description": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.",
- "value": "GeminiDuke"
+ }
},
{
+ "value": "Zeus",
+ "description": "Trojan.Zbot, also called Zeus, is a Trojan horse that attempts to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. It may also download configuration files and updates from the Internet. The Trojan is created using a Trojan-building toolkit.",
"meta": {
- "synonyms": [
- "Trojan.Zbot",
- "Zbot"
- ],
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeus_(malware)",
"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011016-3514-99"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Trojan.Zbot",
+ "Zbot"
]
- },
- "description": "Trojan.Zbot, also called Zeus, is a Trojan horse that attempts to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. It may also download configuration files and updates from the Internet. The Trojan is created using a Trojan-building toolkit.",
- "value": "Zeus"
+ }
},
{
+ "value": "Shifu",
+ "description": "Shifu is a Banking Trojan first discovered in 2015. Shifu is based on the Shiz source code which incorporated techniques used by Zeus. Attackers use Shifu to steal credentials for online banking websites around the world, starting in Russia but later including the UK, Italy, and others.",
"meta": {
- "derivated_from": [
- "Shiz"
- ],
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-2016-updates-shifu-banking-trojan/"
+ ],
+ "derivated_from": [
+ "Shiz"
]
- },
- "description": "Shifu is a Banking Trojan first discovered in 2015. Shifu is based on the Shiz source code which incorporated techniques used by Zeus. Attackers use Shifu to steal credentials for online banking websites around the world, starting in Russia but later including the UK, Italy, and others.",
- "value": "Shifu"
+ }
},
{
+ "value": "Shiz",
+ "description": "The new variant of the Shiz Trojan malware targets mission-critical enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications — particularly SAP users. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://securityintelligence.com/tag/shiz-trojan-malware/"
]
- },
- "description": "The new variant of the Shiz Trojan malware targets mission-critical enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications — particularly SAP users. ",
- "value": "Shiz"
+ }
},
{
+ "value": "MM Core",
+ "description": "Also known as “BaneChant”, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number “2.0-LNK” where it used the tag “BaneChant” in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version “2.1-LNK” with the network tag “StrangeLove” was discovered shortly after.",
"meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose"
+ ],
"synonyms": [
"MM Core backdoor",
"BigBoss",
"SillyGoose",
"BaneChant",
"StrangeLove"
- ],
- "refs": [
- "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose"
]
- },
- "description": "Also known as “BaneChant”, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number “2.0-LNK” where it used the tag “BaneChant” in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version “2.1-LNK” with the network tag “StrangeLove” was discovered shortly after.",
- "value": "MM Core"
+ }
},
{
+ "value": "Shamoon",
+ "description": "Shamoon,[a] also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered by Seculert[1] in 2012, targeting recent NT kernel-based versions of Microsoft Windows. The virus has been used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.[2][3][4] Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec,[3] Kaspersky Lab,[5] and Seculert.[6] Similarities have been highlighted by Kaspersky Lab and Seculert between Shamoon and the Flame malware.[5][6]",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamoon"
]
- },
- "description": "Shamoon,[a] also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered by Seculert[1] in 2012, targeting recent NT kernel-based versions of Microsoft Windows. The virus has been used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.[2][3][4] Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec,[3] Kaspersky Lab,[5] and Seculert.[6] Similarities have been highlighted by Kaspersky Lab and Seculert between Shamoon and the Flame malware.[5][6]",
- "value": "Shamoon"
+ }
},
{
- "value": "GhostAdmin",
- "description": "According to MalwareHunterTeam and other researchers that have looked at the malware's source code, GhostAdmin seems to be a reworked version of CrimeScene, another botnet malware family that was active around 3-4 years ago.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-ghostadmin-malware-used-for-data-theft-and-exfiltration/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "According to MalwareHunterTeam and other researchers that have looked at the malware's source code, GhostAdmin seems to be a reworked version of CrimeScene, another botnet malware family that was active around 3-4 years ago.",
+ "value": "GhostAdmin"
},
{
- "value": " EyePyramid Malware",
- "description": "Two Italians referred to as the “Occhionero brothers” have been arrested and accused of using malware and a carefully-prepared spear-phishing scheme to spy on high-profile politicians and businessmen. This case has been called “EyePyramid”, which we first discussed last week. (Conspiracy theories aside, the name came from a domain name and directory path that was found during the research.)",
"meta": {
+ "country": "IT",
"refs": [
"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/uncovering-inner-workings-eyepyramid/"
- ],
- "country": "IT"
- }
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Two Italians referred to as the “Occhionero brothers” have been arrested and accused of using malware and a carefully-prepared spear-phishing scheme to spy on high-profile politicians and businessmen. This case has been called “EyePyramid”, which we first discussed last week. (Conspiracy theories aside, the name came from a domain name and directory path that was found during the research.)",
+ "value": " EyePyramid Malware"
},
{
- "value": "LuminosityLink",
- "description": "LuminosityLink is a malware family costing $40 that purports to be a system administration utility",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-investigating-the-luminositylink-remote-access-trojan-configuration/"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "LuminosityLink is a malware family costing $40 that purports to be a system administration utility",
+ "value": "LuminosityLink"
},
{
- "value": "Flokibot",
- "description": "Floki Bot, described recently by Dr. Peter Stephenson from SC Magazine, is yet another bot based on the leaked Zeus code. However, the author came up with various custom modifications that makes it more interesting.",
"meta": {
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Floki Bot",
+ "Floki"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/flokibot-flock-bots/",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/floki-bot-and-the-stealthy-dropper/"
- ],
- "synonyms": [
- "Floki Bot"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Floki Bot, described recently by Dr. Peter Stephenson from SC Magazine, is yet another bot based on the leaked Zeus code. However, the author came up with various custom modifications that makes it more interesting.",
+ "value": "Flokibot"
},
{
- "value": "ZeroT",
- "description": "Most recently, we have observed the same group targeting military and aerospace interests in Russia and Belarus. Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Most recently, we have observed the same group targeting military and aerospace interests in Russia and Belarus. Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.",
+ "value": "ZeroT"
},
{
- "value": "StreamEx",
- "description": "Cylance dubbed this family of malware StreamEx, based upon a common exported function used across all samples ‘stream’, combined with the dropper functionality to append ‘ex’ to the DLL file name. The StreamEx family has the ability to access and modify the user’s file system, modify the registry, create system services, enumerate process and system information, enumerate network resources and drive types, scan for security tools such as firewall products and antivirus products, change browser security settings, and remotely execute commands. The malware documented in this post was predominantly 64-bit, however, there are 32-bit versions of the malware in the wild. ",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://blog.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Cylance dubbed this family of malware StreamEx, based upon a common exported function used across all samples ‘stream’, combined with the dropper functionality to append ‘ex’ to the DLL file name. The StreamEx family has the ability to access and modify the user’s file system, modify the registry, create system services, enumerate process and system information, enumerate network resources and drive types, scan for security tools such as firewall products and antivirus products, change browser security settings, and remotely execute commands. The malware documented in this post was predominantly 64-bit, however, there are 32-bit versions of the malware in the wild. ",
+ "value": "StreamEx"
},
{
- "value": "adzok",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
- "refs": [
- "https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
"type": [
"Backdoor"
- ]
- }
- },
- {
- "value": "albertino",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
- "meta": {
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "adzok"
},
{
- "value": "arcom",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "albertino"
},
{
- "value": "blacknix",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "arcom"
},
{
- "value": "bluebanana",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "blacknix"
},
{
- "value": "bozok",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "bluebanana"
},
{
- "value": "clientmesh",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "bozok"
},
{
- "value": "cybergate",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "clientmesh"
},
{
- "value": "darkcomet",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "cybergate"
},
{
- "value": "darkrat",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "darkcomet"
},
{
- "value": "gh0st",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "darkrat"
},
{
- "value": "greame",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "gh0st"
},
{
- "value": "hawkeye",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "greame"
},
{
- "value": "javadropper",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "hawkeye"
},
{
- "value": "lostdoor",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "javadropper"
},
{
- "value": "luxnet",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "lostdoor"
},
{
- "value": "pandora",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "luxnet"
},
{
- "value": "poisonivy",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "pandora"
},
{
- "value": "predatorpain",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "poisonivy"
},
{
- "value": "punisher",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "predatorpain"
},
{
- "value": "qrat",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "punisher"
},
{
- "value": "shadowtech",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "qrat"
},
{
- "value": "smallnet",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "shadowtech"
},
{
- "value": "spygate",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "smallnet"
},
{
- "value": "template",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "spygate"
},
{
- "value": "tapaoux",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "template"
},
{
- "value": "vantom",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "tapaoux"
},
{
- "value": "virusrat",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "vantom"
},
{
- "value": "xena",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "virusrat"
},
{
- "value": "xtreme",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "xena"
},
{
- "value": "darkddoser",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "xtreme"
},
{
- "value": "jspy",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "darkddoser"
},
{
- "value": "xrat",
- "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
"meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
"refs": [
"https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
- ],
- "type": [
- "Backdoor"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "jspy"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "Backdoor"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Remote Access Trojan",
+ "value": "xrat"
},
{
- "value": "PupyRAT",
- "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy"
]
- }
+ },
+ "description": "Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python.",
+ "value": "PupyRAT"
},
{
- "value": "ELF_IMEIJ",
- "description": "Linux Arm malware spread via RFIs in cgi-bin scripts. This backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system. It connects to a website to send and receive information.",
"meta": {
"refs": [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/elf_imeij.a"
]
+ },
+ "description": "Linux Arm malware spread via RFIs in cgi-bin scripts. This backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system. It connects to a website to send and receive information.",
+ "value": "ELF_IMEIJ"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/trojanized-adobe-installer-used-install-dragonok%E2%80%99s-new-custom-backdoor"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "KHRAT is a small backdoor that has three exports (functions), namely, K1, K2, and K3. K1 checks if the current user is an administrator. If not, it uninstalls itself by calling the K2 function.",
+ "value": "KHRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://www.enigmasoftware.com/trochilusrat-removal/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The Trochilus RAT is a threatening RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that may evade many anti-virus programs. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used as part of an extended threat campaign in South East Asia. The first appearance of the Trochilus RAT in this campaign, which has been active since August of 2015, was first detected in the summer of 2015. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used against civil society organizations and government computers in the South East Asia region, particularly in attacks directed towards the government of Myanmar.",
+ "value": "Trochilus"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-trochilus-rat-new-moonwind-rat-used-attack-thai-utility-organizations/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The MoonWind sample used for this analysis was compiled with a Chinese compiler known as BlackMoon, the same compiler used for the BlackMoon banking Trojan. While a number of attributes match the BlackMoon banking Trojan, the malware is not the same. Both malware families were simply compiled using the same compiler, and it was the BlackMoon artifacts that resulted in the naming of the BlackMoon banking Trojan. But because this new sample is different from the BlackMoon banking Trojan,",
+ "value": "MoonWind"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Chrysaor is spyware believed to be created by NSO Group Technologies, specializing in the creation and sale of software and infrastructure for targeted attacks. Chrysaor is believed to be related to the Pegasus spyware that was first identified on iOS and analyzed by Citizen Lab and Lookout.",
+ "value": "Chrysaor",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://security.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Pegasus",
+ "Pegasus spyware"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://virusradar.com/en/Win32_Sathurbot.A/description",
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/04/06/sathurbot-distributed-wordpress-password-attack/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The trojan serves as a backdoor. It can be controlled remotely.",
+ "value": "Sathurbot"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The AURIGA malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the BANGAT backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keystroke logging, creating and killing processes, performing file system and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. The AURIGA malware contains a driver component which is used to inject the malware DLL into other processes. This driver can also perform process and IP connection hiding. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the \"Microsoft corp\" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.",
+ "value": "AURIGA"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The BANGAT malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the AURIGA backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keylogging, creating and killing processes, performing filesystem and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. In addition, the malware also implements a custom VNC like protocol which sends screenshots of the desktop to the C2 server and accepts keyboard and mouse input. The malware communicates to its C2 servers using SSL, with self signed SSL certificates. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the \"Microsoft corp\" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.",
+ "value": "BANGAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "BISCUIT provides attackers with full access to an infected host. BISCUIT capabilities include launching an interactive command shell, enumerating servers on a Windows network, enumerating and manipulating process, and transferring files. BISCUIT communicates using a custom protocol, which is then encrypted using SSL. Once installed BISCUIT will attempt to beacon to its command/control servers approximately every 10 or 30 minutes. It will beacon its primary server first, followed by a secondary server. All communication is encrypted with SSL (OpenSSL 0.9.8i).",
+ "value": "BISCUIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "BOUNCER will load an extracted DLL into memory, and then will call the DLL's dump export. The dump export is called with the parameters passed via the command line to the BOUNCER executable. It requires at least two arguments, the IP and port to send the password dump information. It can accept at most five arguments, including a proxy IP, port and an x.509 key for SSL authentication. The DLL backdoor has the capability to execute arbitrary commands, collect database and server information, brute force SQL login credentials, launch arbitrary programs, create processes and threads, delete files, and redirect network traffic.",
+ "value": "BOUNCER"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware uses Google Calendar to retrieve commands and send results. It retrieves event feeds associated with Google Calendar, where each event contains commands from the attacker for the malware to perform. Results are posted back to the event feed. The malware authenticates with Google using the hard coded email address and passwords. The malware uses the deprecated ClientLogin authentication API from Google. The malware is registered as a service dll as a persistence mechanism. Artifacts of this may be found in the registry.",
+ "value": "CALENDAR"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The COMBOS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. The backdoor is capable of file upload, file download, spawning a interactive reverse shell, and terminating its own process. The backdoor may decrypt stored Internet Explorer credentials from the local system and transmit the credentials to the C2 server. The COMBOS malware family does not have any persistence mechanisms built into itself.",
+ "value": "COMBOS"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TROJAN.COOKIES"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "his family of malware is a backdoor capable of file upload and download as well as providing remote interactive shell access to the compromised machine. Communication with the Command & Control (C2) servers uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data in the Cookie and Set-Cookie HTTP header fields. Communication with the C2 servers is over port 80. Some variants install a registry key as means of a persistence mechanism. The hardcoded strings cited include a string of a command in common with several other APT1 families.",
+ "value": "COOKIEBAG"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Members of this malware family are backdoors that provide file downloading, process listing, process killing, and reverse shell capabilities. This malware may also add itself to the Authorized Applications list for the Windows Firewall.",
+ "value": "DAIRY"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Members of this family of malware are utilities designed to extract email messages and attachments from Outlook PST files. One part of this utility set is an executable, one is a dll. The malware may create a registry artifact related to the executable.",
+ "value": "GETMAIL"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware is a utility designed to upload files to Google Docs. Nearly all communications are with docs.google.com are SSL encrypted. The malware does not use Google's published API to interact with their services. The malware does not currently work with Google Docs. It does not detect HTTP 302 redirections and will get caught in an infinite loop attempting to parse results from Google that are not present.",
+ "value": "GDOCUPLOAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TROJAN.GTALK"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "GLOOXMAIL communicates with Google's Jabber/XMPP servers and authenticates with a hard-coded username and password. The malware can accept commands over XMPP that includes file upload and download, provide a remote shell, sending process listings, and terminating specified processes. The malware makes extensive use of the open source gloox library (http://camaya.net/gloox/, version 0.9.9.12) to communicate using the Jabber/XMPP protocol. All communications with the Google XMPP server are encrypted.",
+ "value": "GLOOXMAIL"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TROJAN.FOXY"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A family of downloader malware, that retrieves an encoded payload from a fixed location, usually in the form of a file with the .jpg extension. Some variants have just an .exe that acts as a downloader, others have an .exe launcher that runs as a service and then loads an associated .dll of the same name that acts as the downloader. This IOC is targeted at the downloaders only. After downloading the file, the malware decodes the downloaded payload into an .exe file and launches it. The malware usually stages the files it uses in the %TEMP% directory or the %WINDIR%\\Temp directory.",
+ "value": "GOGGLES"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Members of this family are full featured backdoors that communicates with a Web-based Command & Control (C2) server over SSL. Features include interactive shell, gathering system info, uploading and downloading files, and creating and killing processes, Malware in this family usually communicates with a hard-coded domain using SSL on port 443. Some members of this family rely on launchers to establish persistence mechanism for them. Others contains functionality that allows it to install itself, replacing an existing Windows service, and uninstall itself. Several variants use %SystemRoot%\\Tasks or %WinDir%\\Tasks as working directories, additional malware artifacts may be found there.",
+ "value": "GREENCAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": " This family of malware is a backdoor that provides reverse shell, process creation, system statistics collection, process enumeration, and process termination capabilities. This family is designed to be a service DLL and does not contain an installation mechanism. It usually communicates over port 443. Some variants use their own encryption, others use SSL.",
+ "value": "HACKFASE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": " This family of malware is designed to operate as a service and provides remote command execution and file transfer capabilities to a fixed IP address or domain name. All communication with the C2 server happens over port 443 using SSL. This family can be installed as a service DLL. Some variants allow for uninstallation.",
+ "value": "HELAUTO"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware is a backdoor that tunnels its connection through a preconfigured proxy. The malware communicates with a remote command and control server over HTTPS via the proxy. The malware installs itself as a Windows service with a service name supplied by the attacker but defaults to IPRIP if no service name is provided during install.",
+ "value": "KURTON"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "LIGHTBOLT is a utility with the ability to perform HTTP GET requests for a list of user-specified URLs. The responses of the HTTP requests are then saved as MHTML files, which are added to encrypted RAR files. LIGHTBOLT has the ability to use software certificates for authentication.",
+ "value": "LIGHTBOLT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "LIGHTDART is a tool used to access a pre-configured web page that hosts an interface to query a database or data set. The tool then downloads the results of a query against that web page to an encrypted RAR file. This RAR file (1.rar) is renamed and uploaded to an attacker controlled FTP server, or uploaded via an HTTP POST with a .jpg extension. The malware will execute this search once a day. The target webpage usually contains information useful to the attacker, which is updated on a regular basis. Examples of targeted information include weather information or ship coordinates.",
+ "value": "LIGHTDART"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "LONGRUN is a backdoor designed to communicate with a hard-coded IP address and provide the attackers with a custom interactive shell. It supports file uploads and downloads, and executing arbitrary commands on the compromised machine. When LONGRUN executes, it first loads configuration data stored as an obfuscated string inside the PE resource section. The distinctive string thequickbrownfxjmpsvalzydg is used as part of the input to the decoding algorithm. When the configuration data string is decoded it is parsed and treated as an IP and port number. The malware then connects to the host and begins interacting with it over a custom protocol.",
+ "value": "LONGRUN"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware will beacon out at random intervals to the remote attacker. The attacker can run programs, execute arbitrary commands, and easily upload and download files. This IOC looks for both the dropper file and the backdoor.",
+ "value": "MANITSME"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html",
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/these-days-i-see-spike-in-number-of.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This malware utility is a set of two files that operate in conjunction to extract email messages and attachments from an Exchange server. In order to operate successfully, these programs require authentication credentials for a user on the Exchange server, and must be run from a machine joined to the domain that has Microsoft Outlook installed (or equivalent software that provides the Microsoft 'Messaging API' (MAPI) service).",
+ "value": "MAPIGET"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware consists of backdoors that attempt to fetch encoded commands over HTTP. The malware is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, executing arbitrary shell commands, or sleeping a specified interval.",
+ "value": "MINIASP"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The NEWSREELS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. When first started, NEWSREELS decodes two strings from its resources section. These strings are both used as C2 channels, one URL is used as a beacon URL (transmitting) and the second URL is used to get commands (receiving). The NEWSREELS malware family is capable of performing file uploads, downloads, creating processes or creating an interactive reverse shell.",
+ "value": "NEWSREELS"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The SEASALT malware family communicates via a custom binary protocol. It is capable of gathering some basic system information, file system manipulation, file upload and download, process creation and termination, and spawning an interactive reverse shell. The malware maintains persistence by installing itself as a service.",
+ "value": "SEASALT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "STARSYPOUND provides an interactive remote shell over an obfuscated communications channel. When it is first run, it loads a string (from the executable PE resource section) containing the beacon IP address and port. The malware sends the beacon string \"*(SY)# \" to the remote system, where is the hostname of the victim system. The remote host responds with a packet that also begins with the string \"*(SY)# cmd\". This causes the malware to launch a new cmd.exe child process. Further communications are forwarded to the cmd.exe child process to execute. The commands sent to the shell and their responses are obfuscated when sent over the network.",
+ "value": "STARSYPOUND"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "This family of malware provides a backdoor over the network to the attackers. It is configured to connect to a single host and offers file download over HTTP, program execution, and arbitrary execution of commands through a cmd.exe instance.",
+ "value": "SWORD"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TROJAN LETSGO"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": " This malware family is a full-featured backdoor capable of file uploading and downloading, arbitrary execution of programs, and providing a remote interactive command shell. All communications with the C2 server are sent over HTTP to a static URL, appending various URL parameters to the request. Some variants use a slightly different URL.",
+ "value": "TABMSGSQL"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-ECLIPSE family is distinguished by the presence of 'eclipse' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.",
+ "value": "TARSIP-ECLIPSE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-MOON family is distinguished by the presence of 'moon' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.",
+ "value": "TARSIP-MOON"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WARP malware family is an HTTP based backdoor written in C++, and the majority of its code base is borrowed from source code available in the public domain. Network communications are implemented using the same WWW client library (w3c.cpp) available from www.dankrusi.com/file_69653F3336383837.html. The malware has system survey functionality (collects hostname, current user, system uptime, CPU speed, etc.) taken directly from the BO2K backdoor available from www.bo2k.com. It also contains the hard disk identification code found at www.winsim.com/diskid32/diskid32.cpp. When the WARP executing remote commands, the malware creates a copy of the ?%SYSTEMROOT%\\system32\\cmd.exe? file as '%USERPROFILE%\\Temp\\~ISUN32.EXE'. The version signature information of the duplicate executable is zeroed out. Some WARP variants maintain persistence through the use of DLL search order hijacking.",
+ "value": "WARP"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is capable of downloading and executing a file. All variants represented here are the same file with different MD5 signatures. This malware attempts to contact its C2 once a week (Thursday at 10:00 AM). It looks for commands inside a set of HTML tags, part of which are in the File Strings indicator term below.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-ADSPACE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware family is a only a downloader which operates over the HTTP protocol with a hard-coded URL. If directed, it has the capability to download, decompress, and execute compressed binaries.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-AUSOV"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": " A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is a backdoor capable of downloading files and updating its configuration. Communication with the command and control (C2) server uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data wrapped in standard HTML tags. The malware family installs a registry key as a persistence mechanism.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-BOLID"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The family of malware provides the attacker with an interactive command shell, the ability to upload and download files, execute commands on the system, list processes and DLLs, kill processes, and ping hosts on the local network. Responses to these commands are encrypted and compressed before being POSTed to the server. Some variants copy cmd.exe to Updatasched.exe in a temporary directory, and then may launch that in a process if an interactive shell is called. On initial invocation, the malware also attempts to delete previous copies of the Updatasched.exe file.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-CLOVER"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware act only as downloaders and droppers for other malware. They communicate with a hard-coded C2 server, reading commands embedded in HTML comment fields. Some variants are executables which act upon execution, others are DLLs which can be attached to services or loaded through search order hijacking.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-CSON"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-DIV variant searches for the strings \"div safe:\" and \" balance\" to delimit encoded C2 information. If the decoded string begins with the letter \"J\" the malware will parse additional arguments in the decoded string to specify the sleep interval to use. WEBC2-DIV is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, or sleeping a specified interval.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-DIV"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware is a variant on the GREENCAT family, using a fixed web C2. This family is a full featured backdoor which provides remote command execution, file transfer, process and service enumeration and manipulation. It installs itself persistently through the current user's registry Run key.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-GREENCAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-HEAD variant communicates over HTTPS, using the system's SSL implementation to encrypt all communications with the C2 server. WEBC2-HEAD first issues an HTTP GET to the host, sending the Base64-encoded string containing the name of the compromised machine running the malware.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-HEAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-KT3 variant searches for commands in a specific comment tag. Network traffic starting with *!Kt3+v| may indicate WEBC2-KT3 activity.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-KT3"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-QBP variant will search for two strings in a HTML comment. The first will be \"2010QBP \" followed by \" 2010QBP//--\". Inside these tags will be a DES-encrypted string. ",
+ "value": "WEBC2-QBP"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware will set itself up as a service and connect out to a hardcoded web page and read a modified base64 string from this webpage. The later versions of this malware supports three commands (earlier ones are just downloaders or reverse shells). The first commands will sleep the malware for N number of hours. The second command will download a binary from the encoded HTML comment and execute it on the infected host. The third will spawn an encoded reverse shell to an attacker specified location and port.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-RAVE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-TABLE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-TOCK"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware provide remote command shell and remote file download and execution capabilities. The malware downloads a web page containing a crafted HTML comment that subsequently contains an encoded command. The contents of this command tell the malware whether to download and execute a program, launch a reverse shell to a specific host and port number, or to sleep for a period of time. ",
+ "value": "WEBC2-UGX"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of backdoor malware talk to specific Web-based Command & Control (C2) servers. The backdoor has a limited command set, depending on version. It is primarily a downloader, but it classified as a backdoor because it can accept a limited command set, including changing local directories, downloading and executing additional files, sleeping, and connecting to a specific IP & port not initially included in the instruction set for the malware. Each version of the malware has at least one hardcoded URL to which it connects to receive its initial commands. This family of malware installs itself as a service, with the malware either being the executable run by the service, or the service DLL loaded by a legitimate service. The same core code is seen recompiled on different dates or with different names, but the same functionality. Key signatures include a specific set of functions (some of which can be used with the OS-provided rundll32.exe tool to install the malware as a service), and hardcoded strings used in communication with C2 servers to issue commands to the implant.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-Y21K"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-YAHOO variant enters a loop where every ten minutes it attempts to download a web page that may contain an encoded URL. The encoded URL will be found in the pages returned inside an attribute named 'sb' or 'ex' within a tag named 'yahoo'. The embedded link can direct the malware to download and execute files.",
+ "value": "WEBC2-YAHOO"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string.",
+ "value": "HAYMAKER"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell.",
+ "value": "BUGJUICE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key.",
+ "value": "SNUGRIDE"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "QUASARRAT is an open-source RAT available at https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRat . The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past.",
+ "value": "QUASARRAT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/hacking-team/",
+ "https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/fileid/581640/267803",
+ "https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/31436"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "DaVinci",
+ "Morcut"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Hacking Team’s \"DaVinci\" Remote Control System is able, the company says, to break encryption and allow law enforcement agencies to monitor encrypted files and emails (even ones encrypted with PGP), Skype and other Voice over IP or chat communication. It allows identification of the target’s location and relationships. It can also remotely activate microphones and cameras on a computer and works worldwide. Hacking Team claims that its software is able to monitor hundreds of thousands of computers at once, all over the country. Trojans are available for Windows, Mac, Linux, iOS, Android, Symbian and Blackberry.",
+ "value": "da Vinci RCS"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/latentbot_trace_me.html",
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "LATENTBOT, a new, highly obfuscated BOT that has been in the wild since mid-2013. It has managed to leave hardly any traces on the Internet, is capable of watching its victims without ever being noticed, and can even corrupt a hard disk, thus making a PC useless.",
+ "value": "LATENTBOT"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.",
+ "value": "FINSPY"
+ },
+ {
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group"
+ ]
+ },
+ "description": "HackingTeam Remote Control System (RCS) Galileo hacking platform",
+ "value": "RCS Galileo"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RedHat 7.0 - 7.1 Sendmail 8.11.x exploit",
+ "value": "EARLYSHOVEL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "root RCE via RPC XDR overflow in Solaris 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 (possibly newer) both SPARC and x86",
+ "value": "EBBISLAND (EBBSHAVE)"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "remote Samba 3.0.x Linux exploit",
+ "value": "ECHOWRECKER"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "appears to be an MDaemon email server vulnerability",
+ "value": "EASYBEE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "an IBM Lotus Notes exploit that gets detected as Stuxnet",
+ "value": "EASYPI"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "an exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.5.4 & 7.0.2",
+ "value": "EWOKFRENZY"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "an IIS 6.0 exploit that creates a remote backdoor",
+ "value": "EXPLODINGCAN"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a SMB1 exploit over TCP port 445 which targets XP, 2003, Vista, 7, Windows 8, 2008, 2008 R2, and gives SYSTEM privileges (MS17-010)",
+ "value": "ETERNALROMANCE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a SMB exploit (MS09-050)",
+ "value": "EDUCATEDSCHOLAR"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a SMB exploit for Windows XP and Server 2003 (MS10-061)",
+ "value": "EMERALDTHREAD"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a remote IMAP exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.6.4 to 8.5.2",
+ "value": "EMPHASISMINE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Outlook Exchange WebAccess rules to trigger executable code on the client's side to send an email to other users",
+ "value": "ENGLISHMANSDENTIST"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "0-day exploit (RCE) for Avaya Call Server",
+ "value": "EPICHERO"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SMBv1 exploit targeting Windows XP and Server 2003",
+ "value": "ERRATICGOPHER"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a SMBv3 remote code execution flaw for Windows 8 and Server 2012 SP0 (MS17-010)",
+ "value": "ETERNALSYNERGY"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "SMBv2 exploit for Windows 7 SP1 (MS17-010)",
+ "value": "ETERNALBLUE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "a SMBv1 exploit",
+ "value": "ETERNALCHAMPION"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Kerberos exploit targeting 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2008 R2 domain controllers",
+ "value": "ESKIMOROLL"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RDP exploit and backdoor for Windows Server 2003",
+ "value": "ESTEEMAUDIT"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "RCE exploit for the Server service in Windows Server 2008 and later (MS08-067)",
+ "value": "ECLIPSEDWING"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "exploit for IMail 8.10 to 8.22",
+ "value": "ETRE"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "an exploit framework, similar to MetaSploit",
+ "value": "FUZZBUNCH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "implant builder and C&C server that can deliver exploits for Windows 2000 and later, also not detected by any AV vendors",
+ "value": "ODDJOB"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "utility which Bypasses authentication for Oracle servers",
+ "value": "PASSFREELY"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "check if the target is vulnerable to samba exploits like ETERNALSYNERGY, ETERNALBLUE, ETERNALROMANCE",
+ "value": "SMBTOUCH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Check if the target is running some RPC",
+ "value": "ERRATICGOPHERTOUCH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "check if the running IIS version is vulnerable",
+ "value": "IISTOUCH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "get info about windows via RPC",
+ "value": "RPCOUTCH"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "used to connect to machines exploited by ETERNALCHAMPIONS",
+ "value": "DOPU"
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "covert surveillance tools",
+ "value": "FlexSpy"
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "feodo",
+ "description": "Unfortunately, it is time to meet 'Feodo'. Since august of this year when FireEye's MPS devices detected this malware in the field, we have been monitoring this banking trojan very closely. In many ways, this malware looks similar to other famous banking trojans like Zbot and SpyEye. Although my analysis says that this malware is not a toolkit and is in the hands of a single criminal group.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/10/feodosoff-a-new-botnet-on-the-rise.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Cardinal RAT",
+ "description": "Palo Alto Networks has discovered a previously unknown remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been active for over two years. It has a very low volume in this two-year period, totaling roughly 27 total samples. The malware is delivered via an innovative and unique technique: a downloader we are calling Carp uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# (C Sharp) Programming Language source code into an executable that in turn is run to deploy the Cardinal RAT malware family. These malicious Excel files use a number of different lures, providing evidence of what attackers are using to entice victims into executing them.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "The REDLEAVES implant consists of three parts: an executable, a loader, and the implant shellcode. The REDLEAVES implant is a remote administration Trojan (RAT) that is built in Visual C++ and makes heavy use of thread generation during its execution. The implant contains a number of functions typical of RATs, including system enumeration and creating a remote shell back to the C2.",
+ "value": "REDLEAVES",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Kazuar is a fully featured backdoor written using the .NET Framework and obfuscated using the open source packer called ConfuserEx. Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a backdoor Trojan used in an espionage campaign. The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. During our analysis of this malware we uncovered interesting code paths and other artifacts that may indicate a Mac or Unix variant of this same tool also exists. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver. We suspect the Kazuar tool may be linked to the Turla threat actor group (also known as Uroburos and Snake), who have been reported to have compromised embassies, defense contractors, educational institutions, and research organizations across the globe. A hallmark of Turla operations is iterations of their tools and code lineage in Kazuar can be traced back to at least 2005. If the hypothesis is correct and the Turla threat group is using Kazuar, we believe they may be using it as a replacement for Carbon and its derivatives. Of the myriad of tools observed in use by Turla Carbon and its variants were typically deployed as a second stage backdoor within targeted environments and we believe Kazuar may now hold a similar role for Turla operations.",
+ "value": "Kazuar",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/05/unit42-kazuar-multiplatform-espionage-backdoor-api-access/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Many links indicate, that this bot is another product of the people previously involved in Dyreza. It seems to be rewritten from scratch – however, it contains many similar features and solutions to those we encountered analyzing Dyreza (read more).",
+ "value": "Trick Bot",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/10/trick-bot-dyrezas-successor/",
+ "https://blog.fraudwatchinternational.com/malware/trickbot-malware-works",
+ "https://securityintelligence.com/trickbot-is-hand-picking-private-banks-for-targets-with-redirection-attacks-in-tow/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "TrickBot",
+ "TrickLoader"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Netskope Threat Research Labs recently discovered a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform named Hackshit, that records the credentials of the phished bait victims. The phished bait pages are packaged with base64 encoding and served from secure (HTTPS) websites with “.moe” top level domain (TLD) to evade traditional scanners. “.moe” TLD is intended for the purpose of ‘The marketing of products or services deemed’. The victim’s credentials are sent to the Hackshit PhaaS platform via websockets. The Netskope Active Platform can proactively protect customers by creating custom applications and a policy to block all the activities related to Hackshit PhaaS.",
+ "value": "Hackshit",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://resources.netskope.com/h/i/352356475-phishing-as-a-service-phishing-revamped"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Moneygram Adwind",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/new-guidelines-from-moneygram-malspam-delivers-a-brand-new-java-adwind-version/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": " Banload has been around since the last decade. This malware generally arrives on a victim’s system through a spam email containing an archived file or bundled software as an attachment. In a few cases, this malware may also be dropped by other malware or a drive-by download. When executed, Banload downloads other malware, often banking Trojans, on the victim’s system to carry out further infections.",
+ "value": "Banload",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/03/banload-malware-affecting-brazil-exhibits-unusually-complex-infection-process/",
+ "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/banload",
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/banload-limits-targets-via-security-plugin/",
+ "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/banload-trojan-targets-brazilians-with-malware-downloads/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "This small application is used to download other malware. What makes the bot interesting are various tricks that it uses for deception and self protection.",
+ "value": "Smoke Loader",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/08/smoke-loader-downloader-with-a-smokescreen-still-alive/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Dofoil"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "The analyzed sample has a recent compilation date (2017-06-24) and is available on VirusTotal. It starts out by resolving several Windows functions using API hashing (CRC32 is used as the hashing function).",
+ "value": "LockPoS",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/lockpos-joins-flock/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Win.Worm.Fadok drops several files. %AppData%\\RAC\\mls.exe or %AppData%\\RAC\\svcsc.exe are instances of the malware which are auto-started when Windows starts. Further, the worm drops and opens a Word document. It connects to the domain wxanalytics[.]ru.",
+ "value": "Fadok",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Worm%3AWin32%2FFadok.A",
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/threat-roundup-0602-0609.html"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "Win32/Fadok"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.",
+ "value": "Loki Bot",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://phishme.com/loki-bot-malware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. \nThroughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time. In this article, we will analyse this evolution:",
+ "value": "KONNI",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Recently, Palo Alto Networks researchers discovered an advanced Android malware we’ve named “SpyDealer” which exfiltrates private data from more than 40 apps and steals sensitive messages from communication apps by abusing the Android accessibility service feature. SpyDealer uses exploits from a commercial rooting app to gain root privilege, which enables the subsequent data theft.",
+ "value": "SpyDealer",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "CowerSnail",
+ "description": "CowerSnail was compiled using Qt and linked with various libraries. This framework provides benefits such as cross-platform capability and transferability of the source code between different operating systems. ",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/cowersnail-from-the-creators-of-sambacry/79087/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "In mid-July 2017, we found a new modification of the well-known mobile banking malware family Svpeng – Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae. In this modification, the cybercriminals have added new functionality: it now also works as a keylogger, stealing entered text through the use of accessibility services.",
+ "value": "Svpeng",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://securelist.com/a-new-era-in-mobile-banking-trojans/79198/"
+ ],
+ "synonyms": [
+ "trojan-banker.androidos.svpeng.ae"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "While investigating a recent security incident, Unit 42 found a webshell that we believe was used by the threat actor to remotely access the network of a targeted Middle Eastern organization. The construction of the webshell was interesting by itself, as it was actually two separate webshells: an initial webshell that was responsible for saving and loading the second fully functional webshell. It is this second webshell that enabled the threat actor to run a variety of commands on the compromised server. Due to these two layers, we use the name TwoFace to track this webshell.\nDuring our analysis, we extracted the commands executed by the TwoFace webshell from the server logs on the compromised server. Our analysis shows that the commands issued by the threat actor date back to June 2016; this suggests that the actor had access to this shell for almost an entire year. The commands issued show the actor was interested in gathering credentials from the compromised server using the Mimikatz tool. We also saw the attacker using the TwoFace webshell to move laterally through the network by copying itself and other webshells to other servers.",
+ "value": "TwoFace",
+ "meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "webshell"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Like TwoFace, the IntrudingDivisor webshell requires the threat actor to authenticate before issuing commands. To authenticate, the actor must provide two pieces of information, first an integer that is divisible by 5473 and a string whose MD5 hash is “9A26A0E7B88940DAA84FC4D5E6C61AD0”. Upon successful authentication, the webshell has a command handler that uses integers within the request to determine the command to execute - To complete",
+ "value": "IntrudingDivisor",
+ "meta": {
+ "type": [
+ "webshell"
+ ],
+ "refs": [
+ "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "description": "Attacks that use completely fileless malware are a rare occurrence, so we thought it important to discuss a new trojan known as JS_POWMET (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_POWMET.DE), which arrives via an autostart registry procedure. By utilizing a completely fileless infection chain, the malware will be more difficult to analyze using a sandbox, making it more difficult for anti-malware engineers to examine.",
+ "value": "JS_POWMET",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/look-js_powmet-completely-fileless-malware/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "EngineBox Malware",
+ "description": "The main malware capabilities include a privilege escalation attempt using MS16–032 exploitation; a HTTP Proxy to intercept banking transactions; a backdoor to make it possible for the attacker to issue arbitrary remote commands and a C&C through a IRC channel. As it's being identified as a Generic Trojan by most of VirusTotal (VT) engines, let s name it EngineBox— the core malware class I saw after reverse engineering it.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22736"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Joao",
+ "description": "Spread via hacked Aeria games offered on unofficial websites, the modular malware can download and install virtually any other malicious code on the victim’s computer. To spread their malware, the attackers behind Joao have misused massively-multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) originally published by Aeria Games. At the time of writing this article, the Joao downloader was being distributed via the anime-themed MMORPG Grand Fantasia offered on gf.ignitgames[.]to.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/08/22/gamescom-2017-fun-blackhats/"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "value": "Fireball",
+ "description": "Upon execution, Fireball installs a browser hijacker as well as any number of adware programs. Several different sources have linked different indicators of compromise (IOCs) and varied payloads, but a few details remain the same.",
+ "meta": {
+ "refs": [
+ "https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/threat-spotlight-is-fireball-adware-or-malware.html"
+ ]
}
}
- ],
- "version": 24,
- "uuid": "0d821b68-9d82-4c6d-86a6-1071a9e0f79f",
- "description": "threat-actor-tools is an enumeration of tools used by adversaries. The list includes malware but also common software regularly used by the adversaries.",
- "authors": [
- "Alexandre Dulaunoy",
- "Florian Roth",
- "Timo Steffens",
- "Christophe Vandeplas"
- ],
- "source": "MISP Project",
- "type": "tool",
- "name": "Tool"
+ ]
}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre_attack-pattern.json b/galaxies/mitre_attack-pattern.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9f0009be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/mitre_attack-pattern.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "version": 2,
+ "uuid": "c4e851fa-775f-11e7-8163-b774922098cd",
+ "type": "mitre-attack-pattern",
+ "name": "Attack Pattern",
+ "description": "ATT&CK Tactic"
+}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre_course-of-action.json b/galaxies/mitre_course-of-action.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8adb9b67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/mitre_course-of-action.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "uuid": "6fcb4472-6de4-11e7-b5f7-37771619e14e",
+ "name": "Course of Action",
+ "description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
+ "type": "mitre-course-of-action",
+ "version": 3
+}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre_intrusion-set.json b/galaxies/mitre_intrusion-set.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d3a542c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/mitre_intrusion-set.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "type": "mitre-intrusion-set",
+ "uuid": "1023f364-7831-11e7-8318-43b5531983ab",
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK Group",
+ "version": 3,
+ "name": "Intrusion Set"
+}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre_malware.json b/galaxies/mitre_malware.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..96a626eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/mitre_malware.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "version": 2,
+ "uuid": "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4",
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "name": "Malware",
+ "type": "mitre-malware"
+}
diff --git a/galaxies/mitre_tool.json b/galaxies/mitre_tool.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bf0b7b35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/mitre_tool.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "name": "Tool",
+ "type": "mitre-tool",
+ "description": "Name of ATT&CK software",
+ "uuid": "d5cbd1a2-78f6-11e7-a833-7b9bccca9649",
+ "version": 2
+}
diff --git a/galaxies/rat.json b/galaxies/rat.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..31902285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/galaxies/rat.json
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+ "type": "rat",
+ "name": "RAT",
+ "description": "remote administration tool or remote access tool (RAT), also called sometimes remote access trojan, is a piece of software or programming that allows a remote \"operator\" to control a system as if they have physical access to that system.",
+ "version": 1,
+ "uuid": "06825db6-4797-11e7-ac4d-af25fdcdd299"
+}
diff --git a/schema_clusters.json b/schema_clusters.json
index cf64f74c..9915ef0d 100644
--- a/schema_clusters.json
+++ b/schema_clusters.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/schema#",
- "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies",
- "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema.json",
+ "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies - Clusters",
+ "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema_clusters.json",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
@@ -38,8 +38,36 @@
},
"meta": {
"type": "object",
- "additionalProperties": false,
+ "additionalProperties": true,
"properties": {
+ "type": {
+ "type": "array",
+ "uniqueItems": true,
+ "items": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "complexity": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "effectiveness": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "country": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "possible_issues": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "colour": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "motive": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "impact": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
"refs": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
@@ -64,33 +92,25 @@
"status": {
"type": "string"
},
- "country": {
+ "date": {
"type": "string"
},
- "effectiveness": {
+ "encryption": {
"type": "string"
},
- "complexity": {
- "type": "string"
- },
- "type": {
+ "extensions": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": {
"type": "string"
}
},
- "impact": {
- "type": "string"
- },
- "motive": {
- "type": "string"
- },
- "colour": {
- "type": "string"
- },
- "possible_issues": {
- "type": "string"
+ "ransomnotes": {
+ "type": "array",
+ "uniqueItems": true,
+ "items": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
}
}
}
diff --git a/schema_galaxies.json b/schema_galaxies.json
index 5f4a6293..bfea422c 100644
--- a/schema_galaxies.json
+++ b/schema_galaxies.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/schema#",
- "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies",
- "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema.json",
+ "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies - Galaxies",
+ "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema_galaxies.json",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
diff --git a/schema_misp.json b/schema_misp.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03c4005f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schema_misp.json
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+ "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/schema#",
+ "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies - MISP",
+ "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema_misp.json",
+ "type": "object",
+ "additionalProperties": false,
+ "properties": {
+ "elements_url": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "default_predicate_value_in": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "default_predicate_value": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "cluster_url": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "predicate_in": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "elements_url",
+ "default_predicate_value_in",
+ "default_predicate_value",
+ "cluster_url",
+ "predicate_in"
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/schema_vocabularies.json b/schema_vocabularies.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..664fa033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schema_vocabularies.json
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+{
+ "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/schema#",
+ "title": "Validator for misp-galaxies - Vocabularies",
+ "id": "https://www.github.com/MISP/misp-galaxies/schema_vocabularies.json",
+ "type": "object",
+ "additionalProperties": false,
+ "properties": {
+ "version": {
+ "type": "integer"
+ },
+ "description": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "source": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "author": {
+ "type": "array",
+ "uniqueItems": true,
+ "items": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ },
+ "uuid": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "stix": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "type": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "values": {
+ "type": "array",
+ "uniqueItems": true,
+ "items": {
+ "type": "object",
+ "additionalProperties": false,
+ "properties": {
+ "description": {
+ "type": "string"
+ },
+ "value": {
+ "type": "string"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ "required": [
+ "version",
+ "description",
+ "author",
+ "uuid",
+ "type",
+ "values"
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/tools/adoc_galaxy.py b/tools/adoc_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8d305fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/adoc_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+#
+#
+# A simple converter of MISP galaxy cluster to asciidoctor format
+# Copyright (C) 2017 Alexandre Dulaunoy
+#
+# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
+# published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
+# License, or (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+# along with this program. If not, see .
+
+
+import os
+import json
+import argparse
+
+thisDir = os.path.dirname(__file__)
+
+clusters = []
+
+pathClusters = os.path.join(thisDir, '../clusters')
+
+for f in os.listdir(pathClusters):
+ if '.json' in f:
+ clusters.append(f)
+
+clusters.sort()
+
+argParser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Generate documentation from MISP galaxy clusters', epilog='Available galaxy clusters are {0}'.format(clusters))
+argParser.add_argument('-v', action='store_true', help='Verbose mode')
+args = argParser.parse_args()
+
+def header(adoc=False):
+ if adoc is False:
+ return False
+ doc = adoc
+ doc = doc + ":toc: right\n"
+ doc = doc + ":toclevels: 1\n"
+ doc = doc + ":toc-title: MISP Galaxy Cluster\n"
+ doc = doc + ":icons: font\n"
+ doc = doc + ":sectanchors:\n"
+ doc = doc + ":sectlinks:\n"
+ doc = doc + ":images-cdn: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MISP/MISP/2.4/INSTALL/logos/\n"
+ doc = doc + "\n= MISP Galaxy Clusters\n\n"
+ doc = doc + "Generated from https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy.\n\n"
+ doc = doc + "\nimage::{images-cdn}misp-logo.png[MISP logo]\n"
+ doc = "{}{}".format(doc, "\nMISP galaxy is a simple method to express a large object called cluster that can be attached to MISP events or attributes. A cluster can be composed of one or more elements. Elements are expressed as key-values. There are default vocabularies available in MISP galaxy but those can be overwritten, replaced or updated as you wish. Existing clusters and vocabularies can be used as-is or as a template. MISP distribution can be applied to each cluster to permit a limited or broader distribution scheme.\n")
+ doc = doc + "\n\n"
+
+ return doc
+
+def asciidoc(content=False, adoc=None, t='title',title=''):
+
+ adoc = adoc + "\n"
+ output = ""
+ if t == 'title':
+ output = '== ' + content
+ elif t == 'info':
+ output = "\n{}.\n\n{} {} {}{}.json[*this location*] {}.\n".format(content, 'NOTE: ', title, 'is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy/blob/master/clusters/',title.lower(),' The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in https://www.github.com/MISP/MISP[MISP]')
+ elif t == 'author':
+ output = '\nauthors:: {}\n'.format(' - '.join(content))
+ elif t == 'value':
+ output = '=== ' + content
+ elif t == 'description':
+ output = '\n{}\n'.format(content)
+ elif t == 'meta':
+ if 'synonyms' in content:
+ for s in content['synonyms']:
+ output = "{}\n* {}\n".format(output,s)
+ output = '{} is also known as:\n{}\n'.format(title,output)
+ if 'refs' in content:
+ output = '{}{}'.format(output,'\n.Table References\n|===\n|Links\n')
+ for r in content['refs']:
+ output = '{}|{}[{}]\n'.format(output, r, r)
+ output = '{}{}'.format(output,'|===\n')
+ adoc = adoc + output
+ return adoc
+
+adoc = ""
+print (header(adoc=adoc))
+
+for cluster in clusters:
+ fullPathClusters = os.path.join(pathClusters, cluster)
+ with open(fullPathClusters) as fp:
+ c = json.load(fp)
+ title = c['name']
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=title, adoc=adoc, t='title')
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=c['description'], adoc=adoc, t='info', title=title)
+ if 'authors' in c:
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=c['authors'], adoc=adoc, t='author', title=title)
+ for v in c['values']:
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=v['value'], adoc=adoc, t='value', title=title)
+ if 'description' in v:
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=v['description'], adoc=adoc, t='description')
+ if 'meta' in v:
+ adoc = asciidoc(content=v['meta'], adoc=adoc, t='meta', title=v['value'])
+print (adoc)
diff --git a/tools/gen.sh b/tools/gen.sh
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4ed308a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/gen.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+python3 adoc_galaxy.py >a.txt
+asciidoctor a.txt
+asciidoctor-pdf -a allow-uri-read a.txt
+cp a.html ../../misp-website/galaxy.html
+cp a.pdf ../../misp-website/galaxy.pdf
+scp a.html circl@cpab.circl.lu:/var/www/nwww.circl.lu/doc/misp-galaxy/index.html
+scp a.pdf circl@cpab.circl.lu:/var/www/nwww.circl.lu/doc/misp-galaxy/galaxy.pdf
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/create_attack-pattern_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/create_attack-pattern_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b9fed7d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/create_attack-pattern_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+import json
+import re
+import os
+import argparse
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s attack-patterns\nMust be in the mitre/cti/ATTACK/attack-pattern folder')
+parser.add_argument("-v", "--version", type=int, required=True, help="Version of the galaxy. Please increment the previous one")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+values = []
+
+for element in os.listdir('.'):
+ if element.endswith('.json'):
+ with open(element) as json_data:
+ d = json.load(json_data)
+ json_data.close()
+
+ temp = d['objects'][0]
+
+ value = {}
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
+ value['value'] = temp['name']
+ value['meta'] = {}
+ value['meta']['refs'] = []
+ for reference in temp['external_references']:
+ if 'url' in reference:
+ value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
+ if 'x_mitre_data_sources' in temp:
+ value['meta']['x_mitre_data_sources'] = temp['x_mitre_data_sources']
+ if 'x_mitre_platforms' in temp:
+ value['meta']['x_mitre_platforms'] = temp['x_mitre_platforms']
+ values.append(value)
+ value['meta']['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
+
+galaxy = {}
+galaxy['name'] = "Attack Pattern"
+galaxy['type'] = "mitre-attack-pattern"
+galaxy['description'] = "ATT&CK Tactic"
+galaxy['uuid' ] = "c4e851fa-775f-11e7-8163-b774922098cd"
+galaxy['version'] = args.version
+
+cluster = {}
+cluster['name'] = "Attack Pattern"
+cluster['type'] = "mitre-attack-pattern"
+cluster['description'] = "ATT&CK tactic"
+cluster['version'] = args.version
+cluster['source'] = "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+cluster['uuid' ] = "dcb864dc-775f-11e7-9fbb-1f41b4996683"
+cluster['authors'] = ["MITRE"]
+cluster['values'] = values
+
+with open('generate/galaxies/mitre_attack-pattern.json', 'w') as galaxy_file:
+ json.dump(galaxy, galaxy_file, indent=4)
+
+with open('generate/clusters/mitre_attack-pattern.json', 'w') as cluster_file:
+ json.dump(cluster, cluster_file, indent=4)
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/create_course-of-action_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/create_course-of-action_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..83a5e154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/create_course-of-action_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+import json
+import re
+import os
+import argparse
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s courses-of-action.\nMust be in the mitre/cti/ATTACK/course-of-action folder')
+parser.add_argument("-v", "--version", type=int, required=True, help="Version of the galaxy. Please increment the previous one")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+values = []
+
+for element in os.listdir('.'):
+ if element.endswith('.json'):
+ with open(element) as json_data:
+ d = json.load(json_data)
+ json_data.close()
+
+ temp = d['objects'][0]
+
+ value = {}
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
+ value['value'] = temp['name']
+ value['meta'] = {}
+ value['meta']['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
+ values.append(value)
+
+galaxy = {}
+galaxy['name'] = "Course of Action"
+galaxy['type'] = "mitre-course-of-action"
+galaxy['description'] = "ATT&CK Mitigation"
+galaxy['uuid' ] = "6fcb4472-6de4-11e7-b5f7-37771619e14e"
+galaxy['version'] = args.version
+
+cluster = {}
+cluster['name'] = "Course of Action"
+cluster['type'] = "mitre-course-of-action"
+cluster['description'] = "ATT&CK Mitigation"
+cluster['version'] = args.version
+cluster['source'] = "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+cluster['uuid' ] = "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086"
+cluster['authors'] = ["MITRE"]
+cluster['values'] = values
+
+with open('generate/galaxies/mitre_course-of-action.json', 'w') as galaxy_file:
+ json.dump(galaxy, galaxy_file, indent=4)
+
+with open('generate/clusters/mitre_course-of-action.json', 'w') as cluster_file:
+ json.dump(cluster, cluster_file, indent=4)
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/create_intrusion-set_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/create_intrusion-set_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0ef6f8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/create_intrusion-set_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+import json
+import re
+import os
+import argparse
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s intrusion-sets\nMust be in the mitre/cti/ATTACK/intrusion-set folder')
+parser.add_argument("-v", "--version", type=int, required=True, help="Version of the galaxy. Please increment the previous one")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+values = []
+
+for element in os.listdir('.'):
+ if element.endswith('.json'):
+ with open(element) as json_data:
+ d = json.load(json_data)
+ json_data.close()
+
+ temp = d['objects'][0]
+
+ value = {}
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
+ value['value'] = temp['name']
+ value['meta'] = {}
+ value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['aliases']
+ value['meta']['refs']= []
+ for reference in temp['external_references']:
+ if 'url' in reference:
+ value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
+ value['meta']['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
+ values.append(value)
+
+galaxy = {}
+galaxy['name'] = "Intrusion Set"
+galaxy['type'] = "mitre-intrusion-set"
+galaxy['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK Group"
+galaxy['uuid' ] = "1023f364-7831-11e7-8318-43b5531983ab"
+galaxy['version'] = args.version
+
+cluster = {}
+cluster['name'] = "intrusion Set"
+cluster['type'] = "mitre-intrusion-set"
+cluster['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK Group"
+cluster['version'] = args.version
+cluster['source'] = "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+cluster['uuid' ] = "10df003c-7831-11e7-bdb9-971cdd1218df"
+cluster['authors'] = ["MITRE"]
+cluster['values'] = values
+
+with open('generate/galaxies/mitre_intrusion-set.json', 'w') as galaxy_file:
+ json.dump(galaxy, galaxy_file, indent=4)
+
+with open('generate/clusters/mitre_intrusion-set.json', 'w') as cluster_file:
+ json.dump(cluster, cluster_file, indent=4)
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/create_malware_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/create_malware_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..81721af8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/create_malware_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+import json
+import re
+import os
+import argparse
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s malwares\nMust be in the mitre/cti/ATTACK/malware folder')
+parser.add_argument("-v", "--version", type=int, required=True, help="Version of the galaxy. Please increment the previous one")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+values = []
+
+for element in os.listdir('.'):
+ if element.endswith('.json'):
+ with open(element) as json_data:
+ d = json.load(json_data)
+ json_data.close()
+
+ temp = d['objects'][0]
+
+ value = {}
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
+ value['value'] = temp['name']
+ value['meta'] = {}
+ value['meta']['refs'] = []
+ for reference in temp['external_references']:
+ if 'url' in reference:
+ value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
+ if'x_mitre_aliases' in temp:
+ value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['x_mitre_aliases']
+ value['meta']['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
+ values.append(value)
+
+galaxy = {}
+galaxy['name'] = "Malware"
+galaxy['type'] = "mitre-malware"
+galaxy['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK software"
+galaxy['uuid' ] = "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4"
+galaxy['version'] = args.version
+
+cluster = {}
+cluster['name'] = "Malware"
+cluster['type'] = "mitre-malware"
+cluster['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK software"
+cluster['version'] = args.version
+cluster['source'] = "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+cluster['uuid' ] = "d752161c-78f6-11e7-a0ea-bfa79b407ce4"
+cluster['authors'] = ["MITRE"]
+cluster['values'] = values
+
+with open('generate/galaxies/mitre_malware.json', 'w') as galaxy_file:
+ json.dump(galaxy, galaxy_file, indent=4)
+
+with open('generate/clusters/mitre_malware.json', 'w') as cluster_file:
+ json.dump(cluster, cluster_file, indent=4)
diff --git a/tools/mitre-cti/create_tool_galaxy.py b/tools/mitre-cti/create_tool_galaxy.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..87f54fb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/mitre-cti/create_tool_galaxy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+import json
+import re
+import os
+import argparse
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Create a couple galaxy/cluster with cti\'s tools\nMust be in the mitre/cti/ATTACK/tool folder')
+parser.add_argument("-v", "--version", type=int, required=True, help="Version of the galaxy. Please increment the previous one")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+values = []
+
+for element in os.listdir('.'):
+ if element.endswith('.json'):
+ with open(element) as json_data:
+ d = json.load(json_data)
+ json_data.close()
+
+ temp = d['objects'][0]
+
+ value = {}
+ value['description'] = temp['description']
+ value['value'] = temp['name']
+ value['meta'] = {}
+ value['meta']['refs'] = []
+ for reference in temp['external_references']:
+ if 'url' in reference:
+ value['meta']['refs'].append(reference['url'])
+ if'x_mitre_aliases' in temp:
+ value['meta']['synonyms'] = temp['x_mitre_aliases']
+ value['meta']['uuid'] = re.search('--(.*)$', temp['id']).group(0)[2:]
+ values.append(value)
+
+galaxy = {}
+galaxy['name'] = "Tool"
+galaxy['type'] = "mitre-tool"
+galaxy['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK software"
+galaxy['uuid' ] = "d5cbd1a2-78f6-11e7-a833-7b9bccca9649"
+galaxy['version'] = args.version
+
+cluster = {}
+cluster['name'] = "Tool"
+cluster['type'] = "mitre-tool"
+cluster['description'] = "Name of ATT&CK software"
+cluster['version'] = args.version
+cluster['source'] = "https://github.com/mitre/cti"
+cluster['uuid' ] = "d700dc5c-78f6-11e7-a476-5f748c8e4fe0"
+cluster['authors'] = ["MITRE"]
+cluster['values'] = values
+
+with open('generate/galaxies/mitre_tool.json', 'w') as galaxy_file:
+ json.dump(galaxy, galaxy_file, indent=4)
+
+with open('generate/clusters/mitre_tool.json', 'w') as cluster_file:
+ json.dump(cluster, cluster_file, indent=4)
diff --git a/validate_all.sh b/validate_all.sh
index 31f47d76..25db0704 100755
--- a/validate_all.sh
+++ b/validate_all.sh
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# Check Jsons format, and beautify
./jq_all_the_things.sh
rc=$?
-if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
+if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
exit $rc
fi
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ do
echo -n "${dir}: "
jsonschema -i ${dir} schema_clusters.json
rc=$?
- if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
+ if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
echo "Error on ${dir}"
exit $rc
fi
@@ -42,7 +42,31 @@ do
echo -n "${dir}: "
jsonschema -i ${dir} schema_galaxies.json
rc=$?
- if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
+ if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
+ echo "Error on ${dir}"
+ exit $rc
+ fi
+ echo ''
+done
+
+for dir in misp/*.json
+do
+ echo -n "${dir}: "
+ jsonschema -i ${dir} schema_misp.json
+ rc=$?
+ if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
+ echo "Error on ${dir}"
+ exit $rc
+ fi
+ echo ''
+done
+
+for dir in vocabularies/*/*.json
+do
+ echo -n "${dir}: "
+ jsonschema -i ${dir} schema_vocabularies.json
+ rc=$?
+ if [[ $rc != 0 ]]; then
echo "Error on ${dir}"
exit $rc
fi
diff --git a/vocabularies/threat-actor/intended-effect.json b/vocabularies/threat-actor/intended-effect.json
index da9e5f68..07d922a9 100644
--- a/vocabularies/threat-actor/intended-effect.json
+++ b/vocabularies/threat-actor/intended-effect.json
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@
"value": "Unauthorized Access"
}
],
- "version" : 1,
+ "version" : 2,
"description": "The IntendedEffectVocab is the default STIX vocabulary for expressing the intended effect of a threat actor",
"source": "STIX 1.0",
- "author": "STIX",
+ "author": ["STIX"],
"uuid": "b6975c96-296a-48cf-9006-034ed102bc85",
"stix": "1.2.1",
"type": "threat-actor-intended-effect-vocabulary"
diff --git a/vocabularies/threat-actor/motivation.json b/vocabularies/threat-actor/motivation.json
index 9056883f..ca5dba33 100644
--- a/vocabularies/threat-actor/motivation.json
+++ b/vocabularies/threat-actor/motivation.json
@@ -56,10 +56,10 @@
"description": "The threat actor is motivated by the desire to exercise some political advantage."
}
],
- "version" : 1,
+ "version" : 2,
"description": "The MotivationVocab is the default STIX vocabulary for expressing the motivation of a threat actor.",
"source": "STIX 1.0",
- "author": "STIX",
+ "author": ["STIX"],
"uuid": "74183277-5ee6-436a-9859-cb16fb3f21e2",
"stix": "1.2.1",
"type": "threat-actor-motivation-vocabulary"
diff --git a/vocabularies/threat-actor/planning-and-operational-support.json b/vocabularies/threat-actor/planning-and-operational-support.json
index b9f1c3eb..72bc9c1f 100644
--- a/vocabularies/threat-actor/planning-and-operational-support.json
+++ b/vocabularies/threat-actor/planning-and-operational-support.json
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@
"value": "Skill Development / Recruitment - University Programs"
}
],
- "version" : 1,
+ "version" : 2,
"description": "The PlanningAndOperationalSupportVocab is the default STIX vocabulary for expressing the planning and operational support functions available to a threat actor.",
- "author": "STIX",
+ "author": ["STIX"],
"source": "STIX 1.0",
"stix": "1.0.1",
"uuid": "f91f69d2-fcd0-45f2-baeb-4f79f9458da7",
diff --git a/vocabularies/threat-actor/sophistication.json b/vocabularies/threat-actor/sophistication.json
index 30dad11f..386a3c3b 100644
--- a/vocabularies/threat-actor/sophistication.json
+++ b/vocabularies/threat-actor/sophistication.json
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
"description": "Demonstrates a nascent capability. A novice has basic computer skills and likely requires the assistance of a Practitioner or higher to engage in hacking activity. He uses existing and frequently well known and easy-to-find techniques and programs or scripts to search for and exploit weaknesses in other computers on the Internet and lacks the ability to conduct his own reconnaissance and targeting research."
}
],
- "version" : 1,
+ "version" : 2,
"description": "The ThreatActorSophisticationVocab enumeration is used to define the default STIX vocabulary for expressing the subjective level of sophistication of a threat actor.",
- "author": "STIX",
+ "author": ["STIX"],
"uuid": "fcaf1309-28c4-4d09-b56f-84d6cf6afbb3",
"stix": "1.0",
"type": "threat-actor-sophistication-vocabulary"
diff --git a/vocabularies/threat-actor/type.json b/vocabularies/threat-actor/type.json
index 8ce82f67..790a93d2 100644
--- a/vocabularies/threat-actor/type.json
+++ b/vocabularies/threat-actor/type.json
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@
"value": "Disgruntled Customer / User"
}
],
- "version": 1,
+ "version": 2,
"uuid": "3d7dc2ee-ca54-4a5e-96a3-2e7cba0ffe95",
"description": "The ThreatActorTypeVocab enumeration is used to define the default STIX vocabulary for expressing the subjective type of a threat actor.",
- "author": "STIX",
+ "author": ["STIX"],
"source": "STIX 1.0",
"stix": "1.0",
"type": "threat-actor-type-vocabulary"