mirror of https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy
Feeding with Cutting Edge, Part 4 data
Delta-Sierra
parent
c953d8ee5d
commit
ad5992ff3d
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@ -384,7 +384,111 @@
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},
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"uuid": "14504cbe-8423-47aa-a947-a3ab5549a068",
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"value": "ZIPLINE"
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},
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{
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"description": "SPAWNSNAIL is a backdoor that listens on localhost. It is designed to run by injecting into the dsmdm process (process responsible for supporting mobile device management features). It creates a backdoor by exposing a limited SSH server on localhost port 8300. We assess that the attacker uses the SPAWNMOLE tunneler to interact with SPAWNSNAIL.\n\nSPAWNSNAIL's second purpose is to inject SPAWNSLOTH into dslogserver, a process supporting event logging on Connect Secure.",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "used-by"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "e6cf28a6-94a9-4aab-b919-ad2f6a7e3b87",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "preceded-by"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "6c89c51f-1b97-4966-abc1-9cf526bb2892",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "interacts-with"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "2c237974-edc2-460a-90b5-20f699560da3",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "injects"
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}
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],
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"version": 18
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"uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
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"value": "SPAWNSNAIL"
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},
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{
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"description": "BRICKSTORM is a Go backdoor targeting VMware vCenter servers. It supports the ability to set itself up as a web server, perform file system and directory manipulation, perform file operations such as upload/download, run shell commands, and perform SOCKS relaying. BRICKSTORM communicates over WebSockets to a hard-coded C2.",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "f288f686-b5b3-4c86-9960-5f8fb18709a3",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "used-by"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "64a0e3ab-e201-4fdc-9836-85365dfa84bb",
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"value": "BRICKSTORM"
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},
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{
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"description": "PHANTOMNET is a modular backdoor that communicates using a custom communication protocol over TCP. PHANTOMNET's core functionality involves expanding its capabilities through a plugin management system. The downloaded plugins are mapped directly into memory and executed.",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "c5ea778c-df2f-4c63-b401-dded9cb2419c",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "is-deployed-by"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "540b3e66-edbf-40ee-ae05-474b27c1ff40",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "executed-by"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "f97ea150-a727-4d47-823a-41de07a43ea9",
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"value": "PHANTOMNET"
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},
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{
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"description": "TERRIBLETEA is a Go backdoor that communicates over HTTP using XXTEA for encrypted communications. It is built using multiple open-source Go modules and has a multitude of capabilities including Command execution, Keystroke logging, SOCKS5 proxy, Port scanning, File system interaction, SQL query execution, Screen captures, Ability to open a new SSH session, execute commands, and upload files to a remote server. ",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "083a637b-c58c-4ccb-ab59-81d783873e80",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "is-deployed-by "
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}
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],
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"uuid": "4838b37b-2d1f-4cb8-945d-7185580f0bff",
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"value": "TERRIBLETEA"
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}
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],
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"version": 19
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}
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@ -295,5 +295,5 @@
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"value": "WARPWIRE"
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}
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],
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"version": 15
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"version": 16
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}
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@ -14406,13 +14406,37 @@
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"https://quointelligence.eu/2024/01/unc5221-unreported-and-undetected-wirefire-web-shell-variant/",
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"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/01/18/ivanti-connect-secure-vpn-exploitation-new-observations/",
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"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/investigating-ivanti-zero-day-exploitation",
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"https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Cyber-Sicherheitslage/Analysen-und-Prognosen/Threat-Intelligence/Aktive_APT-Gruppen/aktive-apt-gruppen_node.html"
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"https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Cyber-Sicherheitslage/Analysen-und-Prognosen/Threat-Intelligence/Aktive_APT-Gruppen/aktive-apt-gruppen_node.html",
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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],
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"synonyms": [
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"UNC5221",
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"Red Dev 61"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "similar"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "69d0512d-c12a-4e17-a335-deba012a8499",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "deploys"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "64a0e3ab-e201-4fdc-9836-85365dfa84bb",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "f288f686-b5b3-4c86-9960-5f8fb18709a3",
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"value": "UTA0178"
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},
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@ -15510,7 +15534,213 @@
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},
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"uuid": "0b158297-ee47-48ef-9346-0cb0f9cb348a",
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"value": "UNC5174"
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},
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{
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"description": "",
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"meta": {
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"refs": []
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "ceee219c-8af2-4cea-8382-6ef6c311eac8",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "similar"
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}
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],
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"version": 305
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"uuid": "e496af6a-1f1b-47fd-b908-fc369e32ffba",
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"value": "Cyber Army of Russia Reborn"
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},
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{
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"description": "",
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"meta": {
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"refs": []
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "e496af6a-1f1b-47fd-b908-fc369e32ffba",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "similar"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "ceee219c-8af2-4cea-8382-6ef6c311eac8",
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"value": "People's Cyber Army of Russia"
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},
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{
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"description": "RGB-TEAM is a previously unknown Russian-speaking threat actor. They describe themselves as “a community of anonymous hacktivists fighting for freedom.” The group stated that it doesn’t have enemies in the U.S., Europe, “in the East, or in the West.”",
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"meta": {
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"cfr-suspected-victims": [
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"Russia"
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],
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"refs": [
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"https://therecord.media/hackers-claim-to-breach-russia-prosecutor-general-database"
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]
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},
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"uuid": "9b670978-f346-48dc-a292-7ae05b6f90a0",
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"value": "RGB-TEAM"
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},
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{
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"description": "Mandiant created UNC5266 to track post-disclosure exploitation leading to deployment of Bishop Fox's SLIVER implant framework, a WARPWIRE variant, and a new malware family that Mandiant has named TERRIBLETEA. At this time, based on observed infrastructure usage similarities, Mandiant suspects with moderate confidence that UNC5266 overlaps in part with UNC3569, a China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments. ",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "84c2d789-64be-429b-aeee-253a4e0e2aff",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "deploys"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "4838b37b-2d1f-4cb8-945d-7185580f0bff",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "deploys"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "083a637b-c58c-4ccb-ab59-81d783873e80",
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"value": "UNC5266"
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},
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{
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"description": "UNC5330 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024. Post-compromise activity by UNC5330 includes deployment of PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM. UNC5330 has employed Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to perform reconnaissance, move laterally, manipulate registry entries, and establish persistence.\nMandiant observed UNC5330 operating a server since Dec. 6, 2021, which the group used as a GOST proxy to help facilitate malicious tool deployment to endpoints. The default certificate for GOST proxy was observed from Sept. 1, 2022 through Jan. 1, 2024. UNC5330 also attempted to download Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) from this server on Feb. 3, 2024, from a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure device. Given the SSH key reuse in conjunction with the temporal proximity of these events, Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence UNC5330 has been operating through this server since at least 2021.",
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"meta": {
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"country": "CN",
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "f97ea150-a727-4d47-823a-41de07a43ea9",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "deploys"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "540b3e66-edbf-40ee-ae05-474b27c1ff40",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "deploys"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "c9f26173-ba82-4ed2-adbd-e2e07f582f31",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "c5ea778c-df2f-4c63-b401-dded9cb2419c",
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"value": "UNC5330"
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},
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{
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"description": "UNC5337 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Jan. 2024. UNC5337 is suspected to exploit CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection) for infecting Ivanti Connect Secure appliances. UNC5337 leveraged multiple custom malware families including the SPAWNSNAIL passive backdoor, SPAWNMOLE tunneler, SPAWNANT installer, and SPAWNSLOTH log tampering utility. Mandiant suspects with medium confidence that UNC5337 is UNC5221.",
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"meta": {
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"country": "CN",
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "f288f686-b5b3-4c86-9960-5f8fb18709a3",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "similar"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "6c89c51f-1b97-4966-abc1-9cf526bb2892",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "e6cf28a6-94a9-4aab-b919-ad2f6a7e3b87",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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},
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{
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"dest-uuid": "2c237974-edc2-460a-90b5-20f699560da3",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "uses"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
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"value": "UNC5337"
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},
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{
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"description": "UNC5291 is a cluster of targeted probing activity that we assess with moderate confidence is associated with UNC3236, also known publicly as Volt Typhoon. Activity for this cluster started in December 2023 focusing on Citrix Netscaler ADC and then shifted to focus on Ivanti Connect Secure devices after details were made public in mid-Jan. 2024. Probing has been observed against the academic, energy, defense, and health sectors, which aligns with past Volt Typhoon interest in critical infrastructure. In Feb. 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an advisory warning that Volt Typhoon was targeting critical infrastructure and was potentially interested in Ivanti Connect Secure devices for initial access.",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "97c6d972-a3af-4a21-94a2-0f5e09c7320e",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "associated-with"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "b2535333-629d-4cd6-a98b-14c86f6a57ee",
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"value": "UNC5291"
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},
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{
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"description": "China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments. ",
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"meta": {
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"country": "CN",
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"uuid": "dd0063e0-2d44-4798-9e6d-ef0eaa2c2508",
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"value": "UNC3569"
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},
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{
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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],
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"synonyms": [
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"Volt Typhoon"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "b2535333-629d-4cd6-a98b-14c86f6a57ee",
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"tags": [
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
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],
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"type": "associated-with"
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}
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],
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"uuid": "97c6d972-a3af-4a21-94a2-0f5e09c7320e",
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"value": "UNC3236"
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}
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],
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"version": 306
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}
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@ -10884,7 +10884,194 @@
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},
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"uuid": "c44c5c54-435a-453a-a128-43ca18b82c37",
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"value": "ENUM4LINUX"
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},
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{
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"description": "SPAWNANT is an installer that leverages a coreboot installer function to establish persistence for the SPAWNMOLE tunneler and SPAWNSNAIL backdoor. It hijacks a legitimate dspkginstall installer process and exports an sprintf function adding a malicious code to it before redirecting a flow back to vsnprintf.",
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"meta": {
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"refs": [
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"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
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]
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},
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"related": [
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{
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"dest-uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
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"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "used-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "6c89c51f-1b97-4966-abc1-9cf526bb2892",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "followed-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "followed-by"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"version": 172
|
||||
"uuid": "e6cf28a6-94a9-4aab-b919-ad2f6a7e3b87",
|
||||
"value": "SPAWNANT"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "SPAWNMOLE is a tunneler that injects into the web process. It hijacks the accept function in the web process to monitor traffic and filter out malicious traffic originating from the attacker. The remainder of the benign traffic is passed unmodified to the legitimate web server functions. The malicious traffic is tunneled to a host provided by an attacker in the buffer. Mandiant assesses the attacker would most likely pass a local port where SPAWNSNAIL is operating to access the backdoor.",
|
||||
"meta": {
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "used-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "e6cf28a6-94a9-4aab-b919-ad2f6a7e3b87",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "preceded-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "interacts-with"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "6c89c51f-1b97-4966-abc1-9cf526bb2892",
|
||||
"value": "SPAWNMOLE"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "SPAWNSLOTH is a log tampering utility injected into the dslogserver process. It can disable logging and disable log forwarding to an external syslog server when the SPAWNSNAIL backdoor is operating.",
|
||||
"meta": {
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "6fcf8d1f-2e68-4982-a579-2ca5595e4990",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "used-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "is-injected-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "de390f3e-c0d1-4c70-b121-a7a98f7326aa",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "communicates-with"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "2c237974-edc2-460a-90b5-20f699560da3",
|
||||
"value": "SPAWNSLOTH"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "ROOTROT is a web shell written in Perl embedded into a legitimate Connect Secure .ttc file located at /data/runtime/tmp/tt/setcookie.thtml.ttc by exploiting CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887. ",
|
||||
"meta": {
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "f288f686-b5b3-4c86-9960-5f8fb18709a3",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "is-deployed-by"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "69d0512d-c12a-4e17-a335-deba012a8499",
|
||||
"value": "ROOTROT"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "TONERJAM is a launcher that decrypts and executes a shellcode payload, in this case PHANTOMNET, stored as an encrypted local file and decrypts it using an AES key derived from a SHA hash of the final 16 bytes of the encrypted payload. TONERJAM maintains persistence via the Run registry key or by hijacking COM objects depending on the permissions granted to it upon execution.",
|
||||
"meta": {
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "c5ea778c-df2f-4c63-b401-dded9cb2419c",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "is-deployed-by"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "f97ea150-a727-4d47-823a-41de07a43ea9",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "executes"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "540b3e66-edbf-40ee-ae05-474b27c1ff40",
|
||||
"value": "TONERJAM"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "A simple security tunnel written in Golang. Features: Listening on multiple ports, Multi-level forward proxy - proxy chain, Standard HTTP/HTTPS/HTTP2/SOCKS4(A)/SOCKS5 proxy protocols support, Probing resistance support for web proxy, Support multiple tunnel types, TLS encryption via negotiation support for SOCKS5 proxy, Tunnel UDP over TCP, TCP/UDP Transparent proxy, Local/remote TCP/UDP port forwarding, Shadowsocks protocol, SNI proxy, Permission control, Load balancing, Routing control, DNS resolver and proxy, TUN/TAP device",
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ivanti-post-exploitation-lateral-movement",
|
||||
"https://github.com/ginuerzh/gost/blob/master/README_en.md",
|
||||
"https://v2.gost.run/en/",
|
||||
"https://gost.run/en/"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "c5ea778c-df2f-4c63-b401-dded9cb2419c",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "used-by"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"synonyms": [
|
||||
"GO Simple Tunnel"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "c9f26173-ba82-4ed2-adbd-e2e07f582f31",
|
||||
"value": "GOST"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"description": "Sliver is an open source cross-platform adversary emulation/red team framework, it can be used by organizations of all sizes to perform security testing. Sliver's implants support C2 over Mutual TLS (mTLS), WireGuard, HTTP(S), and DNS and are dynamically compiled with per-binary asymmetric encryption keys.",
|
||||
"meta": {
|
||||
"refs": [
|
||||
"https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver",
|
||||
"https://bishopfox.com/tools/sliver"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"related": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"dest-uuid": "083a637b-c58c-4ccb-ab59-81d783873e80",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"likely\""
|
||||
],
|
||||
"type": "is-deployed-by "
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"uuid": "84c2d789-64be-429b-aeee-253a4e0e2aff",
|
||||
"value": "SILVER"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"version": 173
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue