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{
"authors": [
"MITRE"
],
"category": "course-of-action",
"description": "ATT&CK Mitigation",
"name": "Course of Action",
"source": "https://github.com/mitre/cti",
"type": "mitre-course-of-action",
"uuid": "a8825ae8-6dea-11e7-8d57-7728f3cfe086",
"values": [
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1060",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8b36d944-f274-4d46-9acd-dbba6927ce7a",
"value": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Mitigation - T1060"
},
{
"description": "Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1041",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "92c28497-2820-445e-9f3e-a03dd77dc0c8",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041"
},
{
"description": "Ensure host-based sensors maintain visibility into usage of all network adapters and prevent the creation of new ones where possible. (Citation: Microsoft GPO Bluetooth FEB 2009) (Citation: TechRepublic Wireless GPO FEB 2009)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1011",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1011",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd252791.aspx",
"https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/data-center/configuring-wireless-settings-via-group-policy/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a98be93b-a75b-4dd4-8a72-4dfd0b5e25bb",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Mitigation - T1011"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1039",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ae676644-d2d2-41b7-af7e-9bed1b55898c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d9727aee-48b8-4fdb-89e2-4c49746ba4dd",
"value": "Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039"
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1084",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259",
"value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1094",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1094",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f72eb8a8-cd4c-461d-a814-3f862befbf00",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f3d0c735-330f-43c2-8e8e-51bcfa51e8c3",
"value": "Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1183",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183",
"https://answers.microsoft.com/windows/forum/windows_10-security/part-of-windows-10-or-really-malware/af715663-a34a-423c-850d-2a46f369a54c",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9",
"value": "Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nConsider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nRestrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\\Windows, rather than user directories.\n\nEnable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1198",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198",
"https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee",
"value": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1095",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "399d9038-b100-43ef-b28d-a5065106b935",
"value": "Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1140",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0",
"value": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140"
},
{
"description": "A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1010",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1010"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cf2cccb1-cab8-431a-8ecf-f7874d05f433",
"value": "Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - M1010"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1030",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ba06d68a-4891-4eb5-b634-152e05ec60ee",
"value": "Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1005",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7ee0879d-ce4f-4f54-a96b-c532dfb98ffd",
"value": "Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1006",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "902286b2-96cc-4dd7-931f-e7340c9961da",
"value": "File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006"
},
{
"description": "Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.\n\nAdditionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1007",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1007"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e944670c-d03a-4e93-a21c-b3d4c53ec4c9",
"value": "Caution with Device Administrator Access - M1007"
},
{
"description": "Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1070",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "6cac62ce-550b-4793-8ee6-6a1b8836edb0",
"value": "Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070"
},
{
"description": "Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.\n\nUpdate software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1210",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9db0cf3a-a3c9-4012-8268-123b9db6fd82",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "14b63e6b-7531-4476-9e60-02cc5db48b62",
"value": "Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1016",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "684feec3-f9ba-4049-9d8f-52d52f3e0e40",
"value": "System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1071",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "addb3703-5a59-4461-9bcd-7e2b5d4e92a0",
"value": "Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1091",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091",
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e",
"value": "Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091"
},
{
"description": "Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1203",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203",
"https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2017/03/23/strengthening-microsoft-edge-sandbox/",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "be2dcee9-a7a7-4e38-afd6-21b31ecc3d63",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f2dcee22-c275-405e-87fd-48630a19dfba",
"value": "Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203"
},
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1042",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc144156.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d7c49196-b40e-42bc-8eed-b803113692ed",
"value": "Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1025",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1025",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "39706d54-0d06-4a25-816a-78cc43455100",
"value": "Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1052",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1052",
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e547ed6a-f1ca-40df-8613-2ce27927f145",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052"
},
{
"description": "Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)\n\nMitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1027",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027",
"https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2015/06/09/windows-10-to-offer-application-developers-new-malware-defenses/?source=mmpc"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a09375e5-63d2-4b65-8b0d-1cfe3e6304ca",
"value": "Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027"
},
{
"description": "Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1092",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1092",
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "b8d57b16-d8e2-428c-a645-1083795b3445",
"value": "Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092"
},
{
"description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1083",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1",
"value": "File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083"
},
{
"description": "Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm\n\nEnable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. <code>%SYSTEMROOT%</code>)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDLLSearchMode</code> (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)\n\nUse auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1038",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038",
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586",
"http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "96913243-2b5e-4483-a65c-bb152ddd2f04",
"value": "DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038"
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nTurn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users <code>[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System]</code>to automatically deny elevation requests, add: <code>\"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser\"=dword:00000000</code> (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: <code>\"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000001</code>. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: <code>\"EnableInstallerDetection\"=dword:00000000</code>. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1044",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1044",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/34"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1022138b-497c-40e6-b53a-13351cbd4090",
"value": "File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044"
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1048",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700828.aspx",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0e5bdf42-a7f7-4d16-a074-4915bd262f80",
"value": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1049",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c1676218-c16a-41c9-8f7a-023779916e39",
"value": "System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1058",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9378f139-10ef-4e4b-b679-2255a0818902",
"value": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1066",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1066",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4b998a71-7b8f-4dcc-8f3f-277f2e740271",
"value": "Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1068",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b21c3b2d-02e6-45b1-980b-e69051040839",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "92e6d080-ca3f-4f95-bc45-172a32c4e502",
"value": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068"
},
{
"description": "Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). \n\nCheck for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1088",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088",
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "beb45abb-11e8-4aef-9778-1f9ac249784f",
"value": "Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1211",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "fe926152-f431-4baf-956c-4ad3cb0bf23b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "37a3f3f5-76e6-43fe-b935-f1f494c95725",
"value": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1181",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1181",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440",
"value": "Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1212",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31",
"value": "Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212"
},
{
"description": "Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1122",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e",
"value": "Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122"
},
{
"description": "To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:\n\n* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored\n* Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization\n* Enforce the principle of least-privilege\n* Periodic privilege review of accounts\n* Mitigate access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that may be used to access repositories",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1213",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d28ef391-8ed4-45dc-bc4a-2f43abf54416",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "13cad982-35e3-4340-9095-7124b653df4b",
"value": "Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213"
},
{
"description": "Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.\n\nLKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.\n\nApplication whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1215",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215",
"https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8754821/",
"http://rkhunter.sourceforge.net",
"http://www.chkrootkit.org/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "44155d14-ca75-4fdf-b033-ab3d732e2884",
"value": "Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215"
},
{
"description": "Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077). \n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1126",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "94e95eeb-7cdb-4bd7-afba-f32fda303dbb",
"value": "Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126"
},
{
"description": "Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1216",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "51048ba0-a5aa-41e7-bf5d-993cd217dfb2",
"value": "Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216"
},
{
"description": "Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these binaries if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. If these binaries are required for use, then restrict execution of them to privileged accounts or groups that need to use them to lessen the opportunities for malicious use.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1218",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "28c0f30c-32c3-4c6c-a474-74820e55854f",
"value": "Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218"
},
{
"description": "Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1129",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cfd2cd3b-93e7-4b3e-ab46-f8bcafdbdfcf",
"value": "Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129"
},
{
"description": "Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID}</code> associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)\n\nModify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole</code> associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM ACL)\n\nConsider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)\n\nEnable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.\n\nEnsure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1175",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1175",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms687317(v=vs.85).aspx",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694331(v=vs.85).aspx",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/com/dcom-security-enhancements-in-windows-xp-service-pack-2-and-windows-server-2003-service-pack-1",
"https://support.office.com/en-us/article/What-is-Protected-View-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc771387.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "772bc7a8-a157-42cc-8728-d648e25c7fe7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "910482b1-6749-4934-abcb-3e34d58294fc",
"value": "Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175"
},
{
"description": "Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique. \n\nClose all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1185",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "94f6b4f5-b528-4f50-91d5-f66457c2f8f7",
"value": "Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1158",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "84d633a4-dd93-40ca-8510-40238c021931",
"value": "Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158"
},
{
"description": "Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for regularly taking and testing data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP)\n\nIn some cases, the means to decrypt files affected by a ransomware campaign is released to the public. Research trusted sources for public releases of decryptor tools/keys to reverse the effects of ransomware.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1486",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486",
"https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/IT",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "429a5c0c-e132-45c0-a4aa-c1f736c92a1c",
"value": "Data Encrypted for Impact Mitigation - T1486"
},
{
"description": "When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017)\n\nDepending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017)\n\nAs immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1498",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498",
"http://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_DDoS_17-003.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "654addf1-47ab-410a-8578-e1a0dc2a49b8",
"value": "Network Denial of Service Mitigation - T1498"
},
{
"description": "Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.(Citation: CERT-EU DDoS March 2017) Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. To defend against SYN floods, enable SYN Cookies.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1499",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499",
"http://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_DDoS_17-003.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "82c21600-ccb6-4232-8c04-ef3792b56628",
"value": "Endpoint Denial of Service Mitigation - T1499"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android's KeyStore or iOS's KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1008",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1008"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d2a199d2-dfea-4d0c-987d-6195ed17be9c",
"value": "Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - M1008"
},
{
"description": "Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications.\n\nSegment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.\n\nUse secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.\n\nRegularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1190",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3f886f2a-874f-4333-b794-aa6075009b1c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "65da1eb6-d35d-4853-b280-98a76c0aef53",
"value": "Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190"
},
{
"description": "Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1111",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782",
"value": "Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111"
},
{
"description": "Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1156",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4f170666-7edb-4489-85c2-9affa28a72e0",
"value": ".bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1482",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "16f144e4-c780-4ed2-98b4-55d14e2dfa44",
"value": "System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1482"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1010",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b",
"value": "Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010"
},
{
"description": "Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1004",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "313c8b20-4d49-40c1-9ac0-4c573aca28f3",
"value": "Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004"
},
{
"description": "New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1006",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006"
]
},
"related": [
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"tags": [
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{
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{
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{
"dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
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},
{
"dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
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{
"dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
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{
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],
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{
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],
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],
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"tags": [
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{
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"tags": [
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{
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{
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{
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{
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],
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{
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],
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{
"dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
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{
"dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
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{
"dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0beabf44-e8d8-4ae4-9122-ef56369a2564",
"value": "Use Recent OS Version - M1006"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1007",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d8787791-d22e-45bb-a9a8-251d8d0a1ff2",
"value": "System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007"
},
{
"description": "Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1080",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018",
"value": "Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080"
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1101",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101",
"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9e57c770-5a39-49a2-bb91-253ba629e3ac",
"value": "Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1120",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1120",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1881da33-fdf2-4eea-afd0-e04caf9c000f",
"value": "Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1201",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/password-must-meet-complexity-requirements"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "49961e75-b493-423a-9ec7-ac2d6f55384a",
"value": "Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201"
},
{
"description": "HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the <code>Flags</code> value of <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots</code> can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1130",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning",
"https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c",
"value": "Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130"
},
{
"description": "Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1031",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
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"dest-uuid": "62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "fe0aeb41-1a51-4152-8467-628256ea6adf",
"value": "Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1105",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
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"dest-uuid": "e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add",
"tags": [
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],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cdecc44a-1dbf-4c1f-881c-f21e3f47272a",
"value": "Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1106",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
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"dest-uuid": "391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "56db6ccc-433d-4411-8383-c3fd7053e2c8",
"value": "Execution through API Mitigation - T1106"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1061",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a6525aec-acc4-47fe-92f9-b9b4de4b9228",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "aaa92b37-f96c-4a0a-859c-b1cb6faeb13d",
"value": "Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061"
},
{
"description": "Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1017",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1017"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c88151a5-fe3f-4773-8147-d801587065a4",
"value": "Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017"
},
{
"description": "Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1081",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081",
"http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2962486"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0472af99-f25c-4abe-9fce-010fa3450e72",
"value": "Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1018",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9a902722-cecd-4fbe-a6c9-49333aa0f8c2",
"value": "Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018"
},
{
"description": "Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities and file types/locations used to invoke malicious execution.(Citation: SpectorOPs SettingContent-ms Jun 2018)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1202",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1e614ba5-2fc5-4464-b512-2ceafb14d76d",
"value": "Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202"
},
{
"description": "[Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and/or msxsl.exe may or may not be used within a given environment. Disabling WMI may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. If msxsl.exe is unnecessary, then block its execution to prevent abuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1220",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7708ac15-4beb-4863-a1a5-da2d63fb8a3c",
"value": "XSL Script Processing Mitigation - T1220"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1032",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1032",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a766ce73-5583-48f3-b7c0-0bb43c6ef8c7",
"value": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1024",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1024",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a569295c-a093-4db4-9fb4-7105edef85ad",
"value": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024"
},
{
"description": "This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, blocking all file compilation may have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate OS frameworks and code development mechanisms from operating properly. Consider removing compilers if not needed, otherwise efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to decrypt, deobfuscate, decode, and compile files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1502",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1502",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "cf7b3a06-8b42-4c33-bbe9-012120027925",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ae56a49d-5281-45c5-ab95-70a1439c338e",
"value": "Compile After Delivery Mitigation - T1502"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1082",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c620e3a1-fff5-424f-abea-d2b0f3616f67",
"value": "System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082"
},
{
"description": "Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1028",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "3e9f8875-d2f7-4380-a578-84393bd3b025",
"value": "Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1043",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f879d51c-5476-431c-aedf-f14d207e4d1e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7c1796c7-9fc3-4c3e-9416-527295bf5d95",
"value": "Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1063",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "bd2554b8-634f-4434-a986-9b49c29da2ae",
"value": "Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063"
},
{
"description": "Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1046",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3",
"value": "Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046"
},
{
"description": "Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1047",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047",
"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ba2ec548-fb75-4b8c-88d6-d91a77a943cf",
"value": "Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047"
},
{
"description": "Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. \n\nConsider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1490",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490",
"https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/IT",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "bb25b897-bfc7-4128-839d-52e9764dbfa6",
"value": "Inhibit System Recovery Mitigation - T1490"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports. \n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1065",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a0d8db1d-a731-4428-8209-c07175f4b1fe",
"value": "Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065"
},
{
"description": "Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</code> Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1075",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075",
"https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/blob/master/Windows/Group%20Policy%20Templates/en-US/SecGuide.adml"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e",
"value": "Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075"
},
{
"description": "Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1076",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076",
"https://security.berkeley.edu/node/94",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754272(v=ws.11).aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "53b3b027-bed3-480c-9101-1247047d0fe6",
"value": "Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076"
},
{
"description": "It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nConsider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1096",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://blog.stealthbits.com/attack-step-3-persistence-ntfs-extended-attributes-file-system-attacks",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ac008435-af58-4f77-988a-c9b96c5920f5",
"value": "NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1069",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "dd9a85ad-6a92-4986-a215-b01d0ce7b987",
"value": "Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069"
},
{
"description": "Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1077",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "308855d1-078b-47ad-8d2a-8f9b2713ffb5",
"value": "Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077"
},
{
"description": "Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nFor containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\n\nAttempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1097",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=556",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "3a476d83-43eb-4fad-9b75-b1febd834e3d",
"value": "Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1089",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "388606d3-f38f-45bf-885d-a9dc9df3c8a8",
"value": "Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089"
},
{
"description": "Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1151",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "02f0f92a-0a51-4c94-9bda-6437b9a93f22",
"value": "Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151"
},
{
"description": "Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1214",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4490fee2-5c70-4db3-8db5-8d88767dbd55",
"value": "Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214"
},
{
"description": "Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1124",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "82d8e990-c901-4aed-8596-cc002e7eb307",
"value": "System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124"
},
{
"description": "File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1217",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1c0b39f9-a0c5-42b2-abd8-dc8f1eb74e67",
"value": "Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217"
},
{
"description": "MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.\n\nUse application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1127",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127",
"http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/09/using-device-guard-to-mitigate-against.html",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/DeviceGuardBypassMitigationRules",
"https://github.com/Microsoft/windows-itpro-docs/blob/master/windows/device-security/device-guard/deploy-code-integrity-policies-steps.md"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "823fbfe9-b015-4bf3-9e67-d340c7373ca0",
"value": "Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1128",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "624d063d-cda8-4616-b4e4-54c04e427aec",
"value": "Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128"
},
{
"description": "Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.\n\nUse application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1219",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "af093bc8-7b59-4e2a-9da8-8e839b4c50c6",
"value": "Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219"
},
{
"description": "Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028) can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Two-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1133",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d4fd04e0-d1a4-4b5a-a5bb-16683cdbcce2",
"value": "External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133"
},
{
"description": "Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.\n\nAny user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)\n\nAlso limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1134",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/create-a-token-object",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/security-policy-settings/replace-a-process-level-token"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c61fee9f-16fb-4f8c-bbf0-869093fcd4a6",
"value": "Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1135",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21",
"value": "Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135"
},
{
"description": "Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)\n\nFor the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to \"Read Control\" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)\n\nDisable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nFor the Outlook methods, blocking macros may be ineffective as the Visual Basic engine used for these features is separate from the macro scripting engine.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) Microsoft has released patches to try to address each issue. Ensure KB3191938 which blocks Outlook Visual Basic and displays a malicious code warning, KB4011091 which disables custom forms by default, and KB4011162 which removes the legacy Home Page feature, are applied to systems.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1137",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-block-macros-and-help-prevent-infection/",
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/07/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/",
"https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/",
"https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/",
"https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8ca6a5e0-aae5-49bc-8d07-f888c7dba9ea",
"value": "Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137"
},
{
"description": "Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created, and enabled by default, Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)\n\nEnsure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)\n\nOn Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1173",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440",
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/",
"https://gist.github.com/wdormann/732bb88d9b5dd5a66c9f1e1498f31a1b",
"https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021",
"https://support.office.com/en-us/article/What-is-Protected-View-d6f09ac7-e6b9-4495-8e43-2bbcdbcb6653",
"https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "80c91478-ac87-434f-bee7-11f37aec4d74",
"value": "Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173"
},
{
"description": "Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their <code>~/.bash_history</code> files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1146",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146",
"http://www.akyl.net/securing-bashhistory-file-make-sure-your-linux-system-users-won%E2%80%99t-hide-or-delete-their-bashhistory"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483",
"value": "Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146"
},
{
"description": "Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (<code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code> by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1174",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms721766.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "00d7d21b-69d6-4797-88a2-c86f3fc97651",
"value": "Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174"
},
{
"description": "Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n\nBecause this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1194",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1194"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c861bcb1-946f-450d-ab75-d4e3c1103a56",
"value": "Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194"
},
{
"description": "Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.\n\nLeverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): \n\n* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors\n* Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain\n* Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data\n* Share Information within Strict Limits\n* Perform SCRM Awareness and Training\n* Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes\n* Perform Continuous Integrator Review\n* Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms\n* Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes\n* Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle\n\nA patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well. (Citation: OWASP Top 10 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1195",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195",
"https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/se-guide-book-interactive.pdf",
"http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7622",
"https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "97d8eadb-0459-4c1d-bf1a-e053bd75df61",
"value": "Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195"
},
{
"description": "Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised. Additionally, the number of programs with setuid or setgid bits set should be minimized across a system.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1166",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "073cc04d-ac46-4f5a-85d7-83a91ecd6a19",
"value": "Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1168",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c47a9b55-8f61-4b82-b833-1db6242c754e",
"value": "Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nRestrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as <code>C:\\Windows</code>, rather than user directories.\n\nIndex known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.\n\nConsider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1196",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dn742497.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "3a41b366-cfd6-4af2-a6e7-3c6e3c4ebcef",
"value": "Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196"
},
{
"description": "This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1222",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a222db25-cafb-44b1-a64a-20eab050514c",
"value": "File Permissions Modification Mitigation - T1222"
},
{
"description": "Consider blocking download/transfer and execution of potentially uncommon file types known to be used in adversary campaigns, such as CHM files. (Citation: PaloAlto Preventing Opportunistic Attacks Apr 2016) Also consider using application whitelisting to prevent execution of hh.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1223",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223",
"https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Ignite-2016-Blog/Breakout-Recap-Cybersecurity-Best-Practices-Part-1-Preventing/ba-p/75913"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "08e02f67-ea09-4f77-a70b-414963c29fc2",
"value": "Compiled HTML File Mitigation - T1223"
},
{
"description": "Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum. Employ network segmentation for sensitive domains.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1482",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482",
"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/ "
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "159b4ee4-8fa1-44a5-b095-2973f3c7e25e",
"value": "Domain Trust Discovery Mitigation - T1482"
},
{
"description": "Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure the data related to those processes against tampering. least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. Consider encrypting important information to reduce an adversaries ability to perform tailor data modifications. Where applicable, examine using file monitoring software to check integrity on important files and directories as well as take corrective actions when unauthorized changes are detected. \n\nConsider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and manipulate backups.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1492",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1492",
"https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/IT"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0bf78622-e8d2-41da-a857-731472d61a92",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e9362d25-4427-446b-99e8-b8f0c3b86615",
"value": "Stored Data Manipulation Mitigation - T1492"
},
{
"description": "This technique may be difficult to mitigate since the domains can be registered just before they are used, and disposed shortly after. Malware researchers can reverse-engineer malware variants that use DGAs and determine future domains that the malware will attempt to contact, but this is a time and resource intensive effort.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA Brute Force) Malware is also increasingly incorporating seed values that can be unique for each instance, which would then need to be determined to extract future generated domains. In some cases, the seed that a particular sample uses can be extracted from DNS traffic.(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) Even so, there can be thousands of possible domains generated per day; this makes it impractical for defenders to preemptively register all possible C2 domains due to the cost. In some cases a local DNS sinkhole may be used to help prevent DGA-based command and control at a reduced cost.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1483",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1483",
"http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf",
"https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2015/02/18/at-high-noon-algorithms-do-battle/",
"https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "54456690-84de-4538-9101-643e26437e09",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "3bd2cf87-1ceb-4317-9aee-3e7dc713261b",
"value": "Domain Generation Algorithms Mitigation - T1483"
},
{
"description": "Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure communications related to those processes against tampering. Encrypt all important data flows to reduce the impact of tailored modifications on data in transit.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1493",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "cc1e737c-236c-4e3b-83ba-32039a626ef8",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "245075bc-f992-4d89-af8c-834c53d403f4",
"value": "Transmitted Data Manipulation Mitigation - T1493"
},
{
"description": "Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound).\n\nConsider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1484",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484",
"https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound",
"https://wald0.com/?p=179",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askds/2008/09/11/fun-with-wmi-filters-in-group-policy/",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/Policy/filtering-the-scope-of-a-gpo"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2108b914-eee1-45cc-8840-36272b19596a",
"value": "Group Policy Modification Mitigation - T1484"
},
{
"description": "Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure those systems against tampering. Prevent critical business and system processes from being replaced, overwritten, or reconfigured to load potentially malicious code. Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1494",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1494",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ca205a36-c1ad-488b-aa6c-ab34bdd3a36b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "337172b1-b003-4034-8a3f-1d89a71da628",
"value": "Runtime Data Manipulation Mitigation - T1494"
},
{
"description": "Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)\n\nUse host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic. Enabling SMB Signing can stop NTLMv2 relay attacks.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)(Citation: Microsoft SMB Packet Signing)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1171",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=3299",
"https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html",
"https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/system-center/operations-manager-2005/cc180803(v=technet.10)"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "54246e2e-683f-4bf2-be4c-d7d5a60e7d22",
"value": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171"
},
{
"description": "Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1104",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1104",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "84e02621-8fdf-470f-bd58-993bb6a89d91",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "514e7371-a344-4de7-8ec3-3aa42b801d52",
"value": "Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104"
},
{
"description": "Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.\n\nGrant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068). \n\nIf the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1072",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "160af6af-e733-4b6a-a04a-71c620ac0930",
"value": "Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072"
},
{
"description": "Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1073",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7a14d974-f3d9-4e4e-9b7d-980385762908",
"value": "DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073"
},
{
"description": "Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1059",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f28a20fd-d173-4603-807e-2cb3f51bdf04",
"value": "Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059"
},
{
"description": "Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: <code>defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no</code>.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1164",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164",
"https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "61d02387-351a-453e-a575-160a9abc3e04",
"value": "Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164"
},
{
"description": "Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.\n\nConsider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filtering ensures that any authentication requests over a trust only contain SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain (i.e. preventing the trusted domain from claiming a user has membership in groups outside of the domain).\n\nSID Filtering of forest trusts is enabled by default, but may have been disabled in some cases to allow a child domain to transitively access forest trusts. SID Filtering of external trusts is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009) However note that SID Filtering is not automatically applied to legacy trusts or may have been deliberately disabled to allow inter-domain access to resources.\n\nSID Filtering can be applied by: (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012)\n\n* Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts using the netdom tool (<code>netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /EnableSIDHistory:no</code> on the domain controller). \n* Applying SID Filter Quarantining to external trusts using the netdom tool (<code>netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /quarantine:yes</code> on the domain controller)\nApplying SID Filtering to domain trusts within a single forest is not recommended as it is an unsupported configuration and can cause breaking changes. (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) (Citation: AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015) If a domain within a forest is untrustworthy then it should not be a member of the forest. In this situation it is necessary to first split the trusted and untrusted domains into separate forests where SID Filtering can be applied to an interforest trust.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1178",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc794757.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc835085.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc755321.aspx",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "b91c2f9e-c1a0-44df-95f0-9e7c9d1d5e55",
"value": "SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178"
},
{
"description": "Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like [Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1188",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1188"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "752db800-ea54-4e7a-b4c1-2a0292350ea7",
"value": "Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188"
},
{
"description": "Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.\n\nFor malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.\n\nBrowser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nOther types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1189",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189",
"https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2017/03/23/strengthening-microsoft-edge-sandbox/",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/",
"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2017/08/09/moving-beyond-emet-ii-windows-defender-exploit-guard/",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d742a578-d70e-4d0e-96a6-02a9c30204e6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7a4d0054-53cd-476f-88af-955dddc80ee0",
"value": "Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of this technique with preventative controls may impact the adversary's decision process depending on what they're looking for, how they use the information, and what their objectives are. Since it may be difficult to mitigate all aspects of information that could be gathered, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior if compromised.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1497",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c4585911-6ecf-47b6-aa6b-a2bae30fd3f7",
"value": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Mitigation - T1497"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1001",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e",
"value": "Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages. \n\nAudit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1100",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "bcc91b8c-f104-4710-964e-1d5409666736",
"value": "Web Shell Mitigation - T1100"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1020",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294",
"value": "Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020"
},
{
"description": "Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems. \n\nBlock unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1200",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.1X"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d40239b3-05ff-46d8-9bdd-b46d13463ef9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "54e8722d-2faf-4b1b-93b6-6cbf9551669f",
"value": "Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIf network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1002",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33",
"value": "Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002"
},
{
"description": "### Windows\nMonitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)\n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nWith Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)\n\nManage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)\n\nConsider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)\n\n### Linux\nScraping the passwords from memory requires root privileges. Follow best practices in restricting access to escalated privileges to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive regions of memory.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/credential-guard",
"https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/Credential%20Guard",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729",
"https://support.microsoft.com/help/303972/how-to-grant-the-replicating-directory-changes-permission-for-the-micr",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj865668.aspx",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material#a-nameesaebmaesae-administrative-forest-design-approach"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "aeff5887-8f9e-48d5-a523-9b395e2ce80a",
"value": "Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1004",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1004"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7b1cf46f-784b-405a-a8dd-4624c19d8321",
"value": "System Partition Integrity - M1004"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1040",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4",
"value": "Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1050",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "b7b2c89c-09c1-4b71-ae7c-000ec2893aab",
"value": "New Service Mitigation - T1050"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1008",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f24faf46-3b26-4dbb-98f2-63460498e433",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "515f6584-fa98-44fe-a4e8-e428c7188514",
"value": "Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1009",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "16a8ac85-a06f-460f-ad22-910167bd7332",
"value": "Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1090",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d75a3d1b-b536-4f15-a23c-f4bcc17837b8",
"value": "Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090"
},
{
"description": "Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.\n\niOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.\n\nAndroid's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).\n\nUse of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1009",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1009",
"https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/apple-will-require-https-connections-for-ios-apps-by-the-end-of-2016/",
"https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-config.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "393e8c12-a416-4575-ba90-19cc85656796",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "a5de0540-73e7-4c67-96da-4143afedc7ed",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "f58cd69a-e548-478b-9248-8a9af881dc34",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8220b57e-c400-4525-bf69-f8edc6b389a8",
"value": "Encrypt Network Traffic - M1009"
},
{
"description": "Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. \nToo strict a policy can create a denial of service condition and render environments un-usable, with all accounts being locked-out permanently. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)\n\nRefer to NIST guidelines when creating passwords.(Citation: NIST 800-63-3)\n\nWhere possible, also enable multi factor authentication on external facing services.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1110",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110",
"https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4a99fecc-680b-448e-8fe7-8144c60d272c",
"value": "Brute Force Mitigation - T1110"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1012",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0640214c-95af-4c04-a574-2a1ba6dda00b",
"value": "Query Registry Mitigation - T1012"
},
{
"description": "Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that can be used by existing services.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1021",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "979e6485-7a2f-42bd-ae96-4e622c3cd173",
"value": "Remote Services Mitigation - T1021"
},
{
"description": "Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1102",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4689b9fb-dca4-473e-831b-34717ad50c97",
"value": "Web Service Mitigation - T1102"
},
{
"description": "This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1013",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "25dc1ce8-eb55-4333-ae30-a7cb4f5894a1",
"value": "Application Developer Guidance - M1013"
},
{
"description": "Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1103",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "10571bf2-8073-4edf-a71c-23bad225532e",
"value": "AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1013",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1013",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1c6bc7f3-d517-4971-aed4-8f939090846b",
"value": "Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013"
},
{
"description": "To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1015",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732713.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc731150.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8",
"value": "Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015"
},
{
"description": "Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1150",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2d704e56-e689-4011-b989-bf4e025a8727",
"value": "Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150"
},
{
"description": "The creation and modification of systemd service unit files is generally reserved for administrators such as the Linux root user and other users with superuser privileges. Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need. Restrict read/write access to systemd unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. Additionally, the installation of software commonly adds and changes systemd service unit files. Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. Utilize malicious code protection and application whitelisting to mitigate the ability of malware to create or modify systemd services. ",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1501",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0fff2797-19cb-41ea-a5f1-8a9303b8158e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "83130e62-bca6-4a81-bd4b-8e233bd49db6",
"value": "Systemd Service Mitigation - T1501"
},
{
"description": "Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.\n\nEnsure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems. (Citation: acunetix Server Secuirty) (Citation: NIST Server Security July 2008)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1051",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1051",
"https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/webserver-security/",
"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-123.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "804c042c-cfe6-449e-bc1a-ba0a998a70db",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "43b366a4-b5ff-4d4e-8a3b-f09a9d2faff5",
"value": "Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1160",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "402e92cd-5608-4f4b-9a34-a2c962e4bcd7",
"value": "Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1107",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "34efb2fd-4dc2-40d4-a564-0c147c85034d",
"value": "File Deletion Mitigation - T1107"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nNetwork intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1108",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f9b3e5d9-7454-4b7d-bce6-27620e19924e",
"value": "Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique.\n\nConsider removing and replacing system components suspected of being compromised.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1109",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "676975b9-7e8e-463d-a31e-4ed2ecbfed81",
"value": "Component Firmware Mitigation - T1109"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1019",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019",
"http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6",
"value": "System Firmware Mitigation - T1019"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1022",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b",
"value": "Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022"
},
{
"description": "Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)\n\nIdentify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1023",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/windows_server_2008_r2_member_server/2015-06-25/finding/V-26482"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a13e35cc-8c90-4d77-a965-5461042c1612",
"value": "Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023"
},
{
"description": "Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).\n\nIf a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1204",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "548bf7ad-e19c-4d74-84bf-84ac4e57f505",
"value": "User Execution Mitigation - T1204"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1205",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f6b7c116-0821-4eb7-9b24-62bd09b3e575",
"value": "Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1026",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1026",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "da987565-27b6-4b31-bbcd-74b909847116",
"value": "Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026"
},
{
"description": "Setting the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> to 0 will require the user to input their password every time <code>sudo</code> is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the <code>tty_tickets</code> setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1206",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "dbf0186e-722d-4a0a-af6a-b3460f162f84",
"value": "Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.\n\nConsider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1209",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1209",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a1482e43-f3ff-4fbd-94de-ad1244738166",
"value": "Time Providers Mitigation - T1209"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1029",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1c0711c8-2a73-48a1-893d-ff88bcd23824",
"value": "Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029"
},
{
"description": "Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.\n\nPeriodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel). \n\nRequire that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory <code>C:</code> and system directories, such as <code>C:\\Windows\\</code>, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1034",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1034",
"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919712.aspx",
"https://skanthak.homepage.t-online.de/sentinel.html",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c4ad009b-6e13-4419-8d21-918a1652de02",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e0703d4f-3972-424a-8277-84004817e024",
"value": "Path Interception Mitigation - T1034"
},
{
"description": "Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1035",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d5dce4b9-f1fa-4c03-aff9-ce177246cb64",
"value": "Service Execution Mitigation - T1035"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)\n\nConfigure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\SubmitControl</code>. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)\n\nConfigure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1053",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/jj852168.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn221960.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f2cb6ce2-188d-4162-8feb-594f949b13dd",
"value": "Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053"
},
{
"description": "Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1037",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9ab7de33-99b2-4d8d-8cf3-182fa0015cc2",
"value": "Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. \n\nAlthough process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1093",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7c39ebbf-244e-4d1c-b0ac-b282453ece43",
"value": "Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093"
},
{
"description": "Ensure event tracers/forwarders (Citation: Microsoft ETW May 2018), firewall policies, and other associated mechanisms are secured with appropriate permissions and access controls. Consider automatically relaunching forwarding mechanisms at recurring intervals (ex: temporal, on-logon, etc.) as well as applying appropriate change management to firewall rules and other related system configurations.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1054",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1054",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/etw/event-tracing-portal"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ec42d8be-f762-4127-80f4-f079ea6d7135",
"value": "Indicator Blocking Mitigation - T1054"
},
{
"description": "Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.\n\nIdentify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1045",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1045",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c95c8b5c-b431-43c9-9557-f494805e2502",
"value": "Software Packing Mitigation - T1045"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1074",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "4320b080-9ae9-4541-9b8b-bcd0961dbbbd",
"value": "Data Staged Mitigation - T1074"
},
{
"description": "This technique likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior if compromised.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1480",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c61e2da1-f51f-424c-b152-dc930d4f2e70",
"value": "Environmental Keying Mitigation - T1480"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)\n\nIdentify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nUtilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1055",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2017/9/5/linux-based-inter-process-code-injection-without-ptrace2.html",
"https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt",
"https://selinuxproject.org/page/Main_Page",
"https://grsecurity.net/",
"http://wiki.apparmor.net/index.php/Main_Page"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "74febc44-8955-4e4d-aca0-d4dad2f967d7",
"value": "Process Injection Mitigation - T1055"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1056",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996",
"value": "Input Capture Mitigation - T1056"
},
{
"description": "Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1057",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f6469191-1814-4dbe-a081-2a6daf83a10b",
"value": "Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057"
},
{
"description": "Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located <code>HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators</code>. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1087",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx",
"https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/microsoft_windows_server_2012_member_server/2013-07-25/finding/WN12-CC-000077"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97",
"value": "Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087"
},
{
"description": "Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056). Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. \n\nFollow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access) \n\nAudit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege) These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. \n\nApplications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet) When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured. ",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1078",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/securing-privileged-access/securing-privileged-access-reference-material#a-nameesaebmaesae-administrative-forest-design-approach",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487450.aspx",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d45f03a8-790a-4f90-b956-cd7e5b8886bf",
"value": "Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1079",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1079",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "24478001-2eb3-4b06-a02e-96b3d61d27ec",
"value": "Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079"
},
{
"description": "Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1098",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "fdb1ae84-7b00-4d3d-b7dc-c774beef6425",
"value": "Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098"
},
{
"description": "Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through [Service Registry Permissions Weakness](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058). Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.\n\nIdentify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1112",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc",
"value": "Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112"
},
{
"description": "Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1131",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1131",
"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "943d370b-2054-44df-8be2-ab4139bde1c5",
"value": "Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131"
},
{
"description": "Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1113",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "51b37302-b844-4c08-ac98-ae6955ed1f55",
"value": "Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113"
},
{
"description": "Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.\n\nUse of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1114",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "383caaa3-c46a-4f61-b2e3-653eb132f0e7",
"value": "Email Collection Mitigation - T1114"
},
{
"description": "This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to mitigate. Use user training as a way to bring awareness and raise suspicion for potentially malicious events (ex: Office documents prompting for credentials).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1141",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8a61f6b9-6b7a-4cf2-8e08-f1e26434f6df",
"value": "Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141"
},
{
"description": "Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1115",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "19edfa02-1a5f-47e4-ad82-3288f57f64cf",
"value": "Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115"
},
{
"description": "Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1161",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1161"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "77fd4d73-6b79-4593-82e7-e4a439cc7604",
"value": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161"
},
{
"description": "Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1116",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116",
"https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc733026.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "82fbc58b-171d-4a2d-9a20-c6b2a716bd08",
"value": "Code Signing Mitigation - T1116"
},
{
"description": "Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) techniques.\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1119",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8bd1ae32-a686-48f4-a6f8-470287f76152",
"value": "Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119"
},
{
"description": "Consider disabling Microsoft Office macros/active content to prevent the execution of malicious payloads in documents (Citation: Microsoft Disable Macros), though this setting may not mitigate the [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) use for this technique.\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations including training users to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1221",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221",
"https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104",
"https://support.office.com/article/enable-or-disable-macros-in-office-files-12b036fd-d140-4e74-b45e-16fed1a7e5c6"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dc31fe1e-d722-49da-8f5f-92c7b5aff534",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c7e49501-6021-414f-bfa1-94519d8ec314",
"value": "Template Injection Mitigation - T1221"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1123",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "16dd03c6-0dfb-4d77-89cd-9ff3ee6e533d",
"value": "Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1132",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132",
"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "fcbe8424-eb3e-4794-b76d-e743f5a49b8b",
"value": "Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132"
},
{
"description": "Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1125",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d9f4b5fa-2a39-4bdf-b40a-ea998933cd6d",
"value": "Video Capture Mitigation - T1125"
},
{
"description": "Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1162",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162",
"https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885",
"value": "Login Item Mitigation - T1162"
},
{
"description": "If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.\n\nIn order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1172",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172",
"http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewDunwoody1/no-easy-breach-derby-con-2016",
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "62ae52c9-7197-4f5b-be1d-10d2e1df2c96",
"value": "Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172"
},
{
"description": "Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1182",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1182",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "95c29444-49f9-49f7-8b20-bcd68d8fcaa6",
"value": "AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182"
},
{
"description": "Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1192",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "20138b9d-1aac-4a26-8654-a36b6bbf2bba",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ad7f983d-d5a8-4fce-a38c-b68eda61bf4e",
"value": "Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192"
},
{
"description": "Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1143",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1143"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a",
"value": "Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143"
},
{
"description": "Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.\n\nAdversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.\n\nProtect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1136",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9a5b7194-88e0-4579-b82f-e3c27b8cca80",
"value": "Create Account Mitigation - T1136"
},
{
"description": "There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the \"auto-elevate\" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. \n\nChanging UAC settings to \"Always Notify\" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1138",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f",
"value": "Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138"
},
{
"description": "Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\n\nBlock unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).\n\nBecause this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1193",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8f6b5ca6-263a-4ea9-98f3-afd2a3cd8119",
"value": "Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193"
},
{
"description": "There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:\n<code>set +o history</code> and <code>set -o history</code> to start logging again;\n<code>unset HISTFILE</code> being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and\n<code>ln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history</code> to write commands to <code>/dev/null</code>instead.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1139",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ace4daee-f914-4707-be75-843f16da2edf",
"value": "Bash History Mitigation - T1139"
},
{
"description": "Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1144",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1a7f5bd3-f6ee-4bd7-b949-2f3632ad6158",
"value": "Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144"
},
{
"description": "Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1145",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e",
"value": "Private Keys Mitigation - T1145"
},
{
"description": "If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> <code>Hide500Users</code> value will force all users to be visible.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1147",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "12cba7de-0a22-4a56-b51e-c514c67c3b43",
"value": "Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147"
},
{
"description": "Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1184",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/ssh-and-ssh-agent"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "41cff8e9-fd05-408e-b3d5-d98c54c20bcf",
"value": "SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184"
},
{
"description": "Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1149",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1149"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "6e7db820-9735-4545-bc64-039bc4ce354b",
"value": "LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149"
},
{
"description": "Implementing best practices for websites such as defending against [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) (Citation: OWASP Top 10 2017). Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. (Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1491",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491",
"https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "5909f20f-3c39-4795-be06-ef1ea40d350b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "5d8507c4-603e-4fe1-8a4a-b8241f58734b",
"value": "Defacement Mitigation - T1491"
},
{
"description": "Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1165",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "94927849-03e3-4a07-8f4c-9ee21b626719",
"value": "Startup Items Mitigation - T1165"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1157",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1157"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "dc43c2fe-355e-4a79-9570-3267b0992784",
"value": "Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157"
},
{
"description": "Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1159",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "121b2863-5b97-4538-acb3-f8aae070ec13",
"value": "Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159"
},
{
"description": "Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.\n\nBrowser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)\n\nChange settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.\n\nClose out all browser sessions when finished using them.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1176",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176",
"http://www.technospot.net/blogs/block-chrome-extensions-using-google-chrome-group-policy-settings/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "b52f41b9-ccf6-4da7-a6c0-167eeb71fbd8",
"value": "Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1186",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31",
"value": "Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186"
},
{
"description": "On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL</code> to <code>dword:00000001</code>. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.\n\nOn Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)\n\nEnsure safe DLL search mode is enabled <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\SafeDllSearchMode</code> to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1177",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1177",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage",
"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/access-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-how-it-works",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7a6e5ca3-562f-4185-a323-f3b62b5b2e6b",
"value": "LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177"
},
{
"description": "Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1187",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2017/01/16/SMB-Security-Best-Practices",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765",
"value": "Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)\n\nModify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.\n\nConsider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)\n\nConsider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the <code>JobInactivityTimeout</code> and <code>MaxDownloadTime</code> Registry values in <code> HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\BITS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1197",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197",
"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/",
"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "cb825b86-3f3b-4686-ba99-44878f5d3173",
"value": "BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197"
},
{
"description": "Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1199",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9fa07bef-9c81-421e-a8e5-ad4366c5a925",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "797312d4-8a84-4daf-9c56-57da4133c322",
"value": "Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS and device firmware to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and other firmware as necessary to prevent successful use of known vulnerabilities. ",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1495",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f5bb433e-bdf6-4781-84bc-35e97e43be89",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "70886857-0f19-4caa-b081-548354a8a994",
"value": "Firmware Corruption Mitigation - T1495"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1496",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "46acc565-11aa-40ba-b629-33ba0ab9b07b",
"value": "Resource Hijacking Mitigation - T1496"
},
{
"description": "Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1488",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488",
"https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/IT",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "2e114e45-2c50-404c-804a-3af9564d240e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "b82f7d37-b826-4ec9-9391-8e121c78aed7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "0b3ee33e-430b-476f-9525-72d120c90f8d",
"value": "Data Destruction Mitigation - T1488"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to inhibit adversaries from disabling or interfering with critical services. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Harden systems used to serve critical network, business, and communications functions. Operate intrusion detection, analysis, and response systems on a separate network from the production environment to lessen the chances that an adversary can see and interfere with critical response functions.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1489",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "417fed8c-bd76-48b5-90a2-a88882a95241",
"value": "Service Stop Mitigation - T1489"
},
{
"description": "Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1163",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "c3cf2312-3aab-4aaf-86e6-ab3505430482",
"value": "Rc.common Mitigation - T1163"
},
{
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1121",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a90da496-b460-47e8-92e7-cc36eb00bd9a",
"value": "Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121"
},
{
"description": "Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nPurchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.\n\nDecommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.\n\nLimit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates.\n\nOn Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device's security patch level. On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1001",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1001"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f296fc9c-2ff5-43ee-941e-6b49c438270a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "f1c3d071-0c24-483d-aca0-e8b8496ce468",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "2d646840-f6f5-4619-a5a8-29c8316bbac5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "b332a960-3c04-495a-827f-f17a5daed3a6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "fd339382-bfec-4bf0-8d47-1caedc9e7e57",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "88932a8c-3a17-406f-9431-1da3ff19f6d6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "bcecd036-f40e-4916-9f8e-fd0ccf0ece8d",
"value": "Security Updates - M1001"
},
{
"description": "On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1003",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1003"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "c5089859-b21f-40a3-8be4-63e381b8b1c0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8ccd428d-39da-4e8f-a55b-d48ea1d56e58",
"value": "Lock Bootloader - M1003"
},
{
"description": "Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.\n\nEnterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.\n\nApplication Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as [Detect App Analysis Environment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1440) exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1005",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1005"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "d13fa042-8f26-44e1-a2a8-af0bf8e2ac9a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "79eec66a-9bd0-4a3f-ac82-19159e94bd44",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "bd4d32f5-eed4-4018-a649-40b229dd1d69",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "198ce408-1470-45ee-b47f-7056050d4fc2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d4536441-1bcc-49fa-80ae-a596ed3f7ffd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "89fcd02f-62dc-40b9-a54b-9ac4b1baef05",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "351c0927-2fc1-4a2c-ad84-cbbee7eb8172",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d731c21e-f27d-4756-b418-0e2aaabd6d63",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "6683aa0c-d98a-4f5b-ac57-ca7e9934a760",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "62adb627-f647-498e-b4cc-41499361bacb",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "82f04b1e-5371-4a6f-be06-411f0f43b483",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "e8b4e1ec-8e3b-484c-9038-4459b1ed8060",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "ef771e03-e080-43b4-a619-ac6f84899884",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "8f142a25-f6c3-4520-bd50-2ae3ab50ed3e",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "4e6620ac-c30c-4f6d-918e-fa20cae7c1ce",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "8e27551a-5080-4148-a584-c64348212e4f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "29e07491-8947-43a3-8d4e-9a787c45f3d3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "9d7c32f4-ab39-49dc-8055-8106bc2294a1",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
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},
{
"dest-uuid": "8f0e39c6-82c9-41ec-9f93-5696c0f2e274",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "3dd58c80-4c2e-458c-9503-1b2cd273c4d2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "2204c371-6100-4ae0-82f3-25c07c29772a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
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},
{
"dest-uuid": "702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "77e30eee-fd48-40b4-99ec-73e97c158b58",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "6c49d50f-494d-4150-b774-a655022d20a6",
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"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "f981d199-2720-467e-9dc9-eea04dbe05cf",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "3b0b604f-10db-41a0-b54c-493124d455b9",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "c4b96c0b-cb58-497a-a1c2-bb447d79d692",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1553b156-6767-47f7-9eb4-2a692505666d",
"value": "Application Vetting - M1005"
},
{
"description": "Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1011",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1011"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a0464539-e1b7-4455-a355-12495987c300",
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],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "6f86d346-f092-4abc-80df-8558a90c426a",
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],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "a93ccb8f-3996-42e2-b7c7-bb599d4e205f",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "a8c31121-852b-46bd-9ba4-674ae5afe7ad",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
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{
"dest-uuid": "0c71033e-401e-4b97-9309-7a7c95e43a5d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "cde2cb84-455e-410c-8aa9-086f2788bcd2",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "d9db3d46-66ca-44b4-9daa-1ef97cb7465a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "537ea573-8a1c-468c-956b-d16d2ed9d067",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "653492e3-27be-4a0e-b08c-938dd2b7e0e1",
"value": "User Guidance - M1011"
},
{
"description": "An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1012",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1012"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "51aedbd6-2837-4d15-aeb0-cb09f2bf22ac",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "53263a67-075e-48fa-974b-91c5b5445db7",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "667e5707-3843-4da8-bd34-88b922526f0d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "633baf01-6de4-4963-bb54-ff6c6357bed3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "649f7268-4c12-483b-ac84-4b7bca9fe2ee",
"value": "Enterprise Policy - M1012"
},
{
"description": "In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1014",
"https://www.fcc.gov/files/csric5-wg10-finalreport031517pdf"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "fb3fa94a-3aee-4ab0-b7e7-abdf0a51286d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
},
{
"dest-uuid": "52651225-0b3a-482d-aa7e-10618fd063b5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e829ee51-1caf-4665-ba15-7f8979634124",
"value": "Interconnection Filtering - M1014"
},
{
"description": "Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1014",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "95ddb356-7ba0-4bd9-a889-247262b8946f",
"value": "Rootkit Mitigation - T1014"
},
{
"description": "Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer that have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1170",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2",
"value": "Mshta Mitigation - T1170"
},
{
"description": "Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1180",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc938799.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3",
"value": "Screensaver Mitigation - T1180"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1085",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085",
"https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/EMET"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "8c918d8a-11c5-4ffd-af10-e74bc06bdfae",
"value": "Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085"
},
{
"description": "Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1062",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739",
"value": "Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1207",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "b70627f7-3b43-4c6f-8fc0-c918c41f8f72",
"value": "DCShadow Mitigation - T1207"
},
{
"description": "Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nLimit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)\n\nEnable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1208",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208",
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2293"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b39d03cb-7b98-41c4-a878-c40c1a913dc0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "a3e12b04-8598-4909-8855-2c97c1e7d549",
"value": "Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208"
},
{
"description": "When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1036",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae",
"value": "Masquerading Mitigation - T1036"
},
{
"description": "Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.\n\nConfigure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1064",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064",
"https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/microsoftsecure/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-block-macros-and-help-prevent-infection/",
"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "57019a80-8523-46b6-be7d-f763a15a2cc6",
"value": "Scripting Mitigation - T1064"
},
{
"description": "Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1067",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1067",
"http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/dn168167.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "96150c35-466f-4f0a-97a9-ae87ee27f751",
"value": "Bootkit Mitigation - T1067"
},
{
"description": "It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1086",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086",
"https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2",
"value": "PowerShell Mitigation - T1086"
},
{
"description": "Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1099",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099",
"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599",
"http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html",
"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm",
"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx",
"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488",
"value": "Timestomp Mitigation - T1099"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1117",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117",
"https://github.com/iadgov/Secure-Host-Baseline/tree/master/EMET"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432",
"value": "Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117"
},
{
"description": "InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1118",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362",
"value": "InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118"
},
{
"description": "CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1191",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191",
"https://msitpros.com/?p=3960"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "91816292-3686-4a6e-83c4-4c08513b9b57",
"value": "CMSTP Mitigation - T1191"
},
{
"description": "The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1142",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "56648de3-8947-4559-90c4-eda10acc0f5a",
"value": "Keychain Mitigation - T1142"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1152",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "e333cf16-5bfa-453e-8e6a-3a4c63d6bfcc",
"value": "Launchctl Mitigation - T1152"
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1153",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "5391ece4-8866-415d-9b5e-8dc5944f612a",
"value": "Source Mitigation - T1153"
},
{
"description": "Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1154",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "809b79cd-be78-4597-88d1-5496d1d9993a",
"value": "Trap Mitigation - T1154"
},
{
"description": "Prevent users from changing the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1148",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148",
"http://www.akyl.net/securing-bashhistory-file-make-sure-your-linux-system-users-won%E2%80%99t-hide-or-delete-their-bashhistory"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "03c0c586-50ed-45a7-95f4-f496d7eb5330",
"value": "HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148"
},
{
"description": "Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing (Citation: applescript signing). This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1155",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155",
"https://www.engadget.com/2013/10/23/applescript-and-automator-gain-new-features-in-os-x-mavericks/"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "1e4ef2c7-ee96-4484-9baa-3b5777561301",
"value": "AppleScript Mitigation - T1155"
},
{
"description": "The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1169",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "23bff3ce-021c-4e7a-9aee-60fd40bc7c6c",
"value": "Sudo Mitigation - T1169"
},
{
"description": "This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "T1179",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "7aee8ea0-0baa-4232-b379-5d9ce98352cf",
"value": "Hooking Mitigation - T1179"
},
{
"description": "Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.",
"meta": {
"external_id": "M1002",
"refs": [
"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1002"
]
},
"related": [
{
"dest-uuid": "46d818a5-67fa-4585-a7fc-ecf15376c8d5",
"tags": [
"estimative-language:likelihood-probability=\"almost-certain\""
],
"type": "mitigates"
}
],
"uuid": "ff4821f6-5afb-481b-8c0f-26c28c0d666c",
"value": "Attestation - M1002"
}
],
"version": 12
}
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