diff --git a/threat-actor-naming/raw.md b/threat-actor-naming/raw.md
index e9a0903..30cfe1f 100755
--- a/threat-actor-naming/raw.md
+++ b/threat-actor-naming/raw.md
@@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ and threat intelligence platforms such as MISP [@?MISP-P]].
# Introduction
+In threat intelligence, a name can be assigned to a threat actor without specific guidelines. This leads to issues such
+as a:
+
+- A proliferation of threat actor names generating overlaps or different names for similar threat actors (e.g. some threat actors have more than 10 synonyms)
+- Ambiguity in the words used to name the threat actor in different contexts (e.g. using common words)
+- No clearly defined text format to describe the same threat actor (e.g. Is the threat actor name case sensitive? Is there a dash or a space between the two words?)
+- Confusion between techniques/tools used by a threat actor versus its name (e.g. naming a threat actor after a specific malware used)
+- Lack of source and list from vendors to describe their threat actor names and the reasoning behind the naming (e.g. did they name the threat actor after a specific set of campaigns? or specific set of targets?)
+
+This document proposes a set of guidelines to name threat actors. The goal is to reduce the above mentioned issues.
+
+
## Conventions and Terminology
The key words "**MUST**", "**MUST NOT**", "**REQUIRED**", "**SHALL**", "**SHALL NOT**",
@@ -57,6 +69,8 @@ document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [@!RFC2119].
# Recommendations
+The recommendations listed below provide a minimal set of guidelines while assigning a new name to a threat actor.
+
## Reusing threat actor naming
Before creating a new threat actor name, you **MUST** consider a review of existing threat actor names from databases such as the threat actor
@@ -64,16 +78,29 @@ MISP galaxy [@!MISP-G]. Proliferation of threat actor names is a significant cha
reuse an existing threat actor name. If there is no specific threat actor name, you **SHALL** create a new threat actor following the best
practices defined in this document.
-## Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming
+## Uniqueness
+
+When choosing a threat actor name, uniqueness is a critical property. The threat actor name **MUST** be unique and not existing in different contexts.
## Format
## Encoding
+The name of the threat actor **MUST** be expressed in ASCII 7-bit. Assigning a localized name to a threat actor **MAY** create a set of ambiguity about different localized version of the same threat actor.
+
+## Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming
+
+The name of the threat actor **MUST NOT** be assigned based on the tools or techniques used by the threat actor. A notorious example in the threat intelligence community is Turla which can name a threat actor but also a malware used by this group or other groups.
+
## Directory
-
+
# Examples
+Some known examples are included below and serve as reference for good practices in naming threat actors. The below threat actor names can be considered good example :
+
+- APT-1
+- TA-505
+
# Security Considerations
Naming a threat actor could include specific sensitive reference to a case or an incident. Before releasing the naming, the creator
diff --git a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.html b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.html
index ca26c13..5884944 100644
--- a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.html
+++ b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.html
@@ -378,10 +378,11 @@
-
+
-
+
+
@@ -456,13 +457,15 @@
In threat intelligence, a name can be assigned to a threat actor without specific guidelines. This leads to issues such as a:
+
+
+
+
A proliferation of threat actor names generating overlaps or different names for similar threat actors (e.g. some threat actors have more than 10 synonyms)
+
Ambiguity in the words used to name the threat actor in different contexts (e.g. using common words)
+
No clearly defined text format to describe the same threat actor (e.g. Is the threat actor name case sensitive? Is there a dash or a space between the two words?)
+
Confusion between techniques/tools used by a threat actor versus its name (e.g. naming a threat actor after a specific malware used)
+
Lack of source and list from vendors to describe their threat actor names and the reasoning behind the naming (e.g. did they name the threat actor after a specific set of campaigns? or specific set of targets?)
+
+
+
+
This document proposes a set of guidelines to name threat actors. The goal is to reduce the above mentioned issues.
Before creating a new threat actor name, you MUST consider a review of existing threat actor names from databases such as the threat actor MISP galaxy [MISP-G]. Proliferation of threat actor names is a significant challenge for the day-to-day analyst work. If your threat actor defined an existing threat actor, you MUST reuse an existing threat actor name. If there is no specific threat actor name, you SHALL create a new threat actor following the best practices defined in this document.
The name of the threat actor MUST be expressed in ASCII 7-bit. Assigning a localized name to a threat actor MAY create a set of ambiguity about different localized version of the same threat actor.
The name of the threat actor MUST NOT be assigned based on the tools or techniques used by the threat actor. A notorious example in the threat intelligence community is Turla which can name a threat actor but also a malware used by this group or other groups.
Some known examples are included below and serve as reference for good practices in naming threat actors. The below threat actor names can be considered good example :
diff --git a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.txt b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.txt
index c8defbc..efc214d 100644
--- a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.txt
+++ b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.txt
@@ -61,24 +61,59 @@ Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 2. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 2.1. Reusing threat actor naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 2.2. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming . . . . . 2
- 2.3. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
+ 1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2.1. Reusing threat actor naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2.3. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.4. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 2.5. Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 2.5. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming . . . . . 3
+ 2.6. Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
+ 3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
+ Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
+ In threat intelligence, a name can be assigned to a threat actor
+ without specific guidelines. This leads to issues such as a:
+
+ o A proliferation of threat actor names generating overlaps or
+ different names for similar threat actors (e.g. some threat actors
+ have more than 10 synonyms)
+
+ o Ambiguity in the words used to name the threat actor in different
+ contexts (e.g. using common words)
+
+ o No clearly defined text format to describe the same threat actor
+ (e.g. Is the threat actor name case sensitive? Is there a dash
+ or a space between the two words?)
+
+ o Confusion between techniques/tools used by a threat actor versus
+ its name (e.g. naming a threat actor after a specific malware
+ used)
+
+ o Lack of source and list from vendors to describe their threat
+ actor names and the reasoning behind the naming (e.g. did they
+ name the threat actor after a specific set of campaigns? or
+ specific set of targets?)
+
+ This document proposes a set of guidelines to name threat actors.
+ The goal is to reduce the above mentioned issues.
+
+
+
+
+Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 2]
+
+Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
+
+
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
@@ -87,6 +122,9 @@ Table of Contents
2. Recommendations
+ The recommendations listed below provide a minimal set of guidelines
+ while assigning a new name to a threat actor.
+
2.1. Reusing threat actor naming
Before creating a new threat actor name, you MUST consider a review
@@ -98,10 +136,28 @@ Table of Contents
name, you SHALL create a new threat actor following the best
practices defined in this document.
-2.2. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming
+2.2. Uniqueness
+
+ When choosing a threat actor name, uniqueness is a critical property.
+ The threat actor name MUST be unique and not existing in different
+ contexts.
2.3. Format
+2.4. Encoding
+
+ The name of the threat actor MUST be expressed in ASCII 7-bit.
+ Assigning a localized name to a threat actor MAY create a set of
+ ambiguity about different localized version of the same threat actor.
+
+2.5. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming
+
+ The name of the threat actor MUST NOT be assigned based on the tools
+ or techniques used by the threat actor. A notorious example in the
+ threat intelligence community is Turla which can name a threat actor
+ but also a malware used by this group or other groups.
+
+2.6. Directory
@@ -109,17 +165,21 @@ Table of Contents
-Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 2]
+Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
-2.4. Encoding
-
-2.5. Directory
-
3. Examples
+ Some known examples are included below and serve as reference for
+ good practices in naming threat actors. The below threat actor names
+ can be considered good example :
+
+ o APT-1
+
+ o TA-505
+
4. Security Considerations
Naming a threat actor could include specific sensitive reference to a
@@ -154,6 +214,18 @@ Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
Authors' Addresses
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 4]
+
+Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
+
+
Alexandre Dulaunoy
Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg
16, bd d'Avranches
@@ -164,12 +236,6 @@ Authors' Addresses
Email: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu
-
-Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 3]
-
-Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
-
-
Pauline Bourmeau
Corexalys
26 Rue de la Bienfaisance
@@ -211,14 +277,4 @@ Internet-Draft Recommendations on naming threat actors June 2020
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 4]
+Dulaunoy & Bourmeau Expires December 11, 2020 [Page 5]
diff --git a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.xml b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.xml
index 220230d..3cf4722 100644
--- a/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.xml
+++ b/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.xml
@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ and threat intelligence platforms such as MISP ].
+In threat intelligence, a name can be assigned to a threat actor without specific guidelines. This leads to issues such
+as a:
+
+
+A proliferation of threat actor names generating overlaps or different names for similar threat actors (e.g. some threat actors have more than 10 synonyms)
+Ambiguity in the words used to name the threat actor in different contexts (e.g. using common words)
+No clearly defined text format to describe the same threat actor (e.g. Is the threat actor name case sensitive? Is there a dash or a space between the two words?)
+Confusion between techniques/tools used by a threat actor versus its name (e.g. naming a threat actor after a specific malware used)
+Lack of source and list from vendors to describe their threat actor names and the reasoning behind the naming (e.g. did they name the threat actor after a specific set of campaigns? or specific set of targets?)
+
+
+This document proposes a set of guidelines to name threat actors. The goal is to reduce the above mentioned issues.The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
@@ -39,6 +51,7 @@ document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 <
+The recommendations listed below provide a minimal set of guidelines while assigning a new name to a threat actor.Before creating a new threat actor name, you MUST consider a review of existing threat actor names from databases such as the threat actor
@@ -47,13 +60,19 @@ reuse an existing threat actor name. If there is no specific threat actor name,
practices defined in this document.
-
+
+When choosing a threat actor name, uniqueness is a critical property. The threat actor name MUST be unique and not existing in different contexts.
+The name of the threat actor MUST be expressed in ASCII 7-bit. Assigning a localized name to a threat actor MAY create a set of ambiguity about different localized version of the same threat actor.
+
+
+
+The name of the threat actor MUST NOT be assigned based on the tools or techniques used by the threat actor. A notorious example in the threat intelligence community is Turla which can name a threat actor but also a malware used by this group or other groups.
@@ -61,6 +80,13 @@ practices defined in this document.
+Some known examples are included below and serve as reference for good practices in naming threat actors. The below threat actor names can be considered good example :
+
+
+APT-1
+TA-505
+
+
@@ -79,7 +105,6 @@ MUST review the name to ensure no sensitive information is included in the threa
-
MISP Galaxy - Public repository
@@ -87,6 +112,7 @@ MUST review the name to ensure no sensitive information is included in the threa
+