MISP query format
draft-dulaunoy-misp-core-format

Abstract

This document describes the MISP query format used to search MISP (Malware Information and threat Sharing Platform) [MISP-P] threat intelligence instances. MISP query format is a simple format used to query MISP instances over a REST (Representational State Transfer ) interface. The query format includes the JSON format to describe the query and the minimal API access to perform the query. The JSON format includes the overall structure along with the semantic associated for each respective key. The goal of the format is to query MISP threat intelligence instances can feed and integrate with network security devices (such as firewall, network intrusion detection system, routers, SIEMs), endpoint security devices or monitoring devices.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2019.

Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

• 1. Introduction
• 1.1. Conventions and Terminology
• 2. Format
• 2.1. Overview
• 2.2. query format criteria
• 2.2.1. returnFormat
• 2.2.2. limit
• 2.2.3. page
• 2.2.4. value
• 2.2.5. type
• 2.2.6. category
• 3. Security Considerations
• 4. Acknowledgements
• 5. References
• 5.1. Normative References
• 5.2. Informative References
• Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

Sharing threat information became a fundamental requirements in the Internet, security and intelligence community at large. Threat information can include indicators of compromise, malicious file indicators, financial fraud indicators or even detailed information about a threat actor. MISP [MISP-P] started as an open source project in late 2011 and the MISP format started to be widely used as an exchange format within the community in the past years. The core format is described in an Internet-Draft as misp-core-format [MISP-C] and contain the standard MISP JSON format used for threat intelligence.

The aim of this document is to describe the specification of the MISP query format and how the query can be perform against a REST interface.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Format

2.1. Overview

The MISP query format is in the JSON [RFC4627] format.

2.2. query format criteria

2.2.1. returnFormat

returnFormat MUST be present. returnFormat sets the type of output format. MISP allows multiple format (depending of the configuration):

2.2.2. limit

2.2.3. page

2.2.4. value

2.2.5. type

2.2.6. category

3. Security Considerations

MISP threat intelligence instances might contain sensitive or confidential information. Adequate access control and encryption measures shall be implemented to ensure the confidentiality of the threat intelligence.

Adversaries might include malicious content in MISP queries. Implementation MUST consider the input of malicious inputs beside the standard threat information that might already include malicious intended inputs.

4. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank all the MISP community who are supporting the creation of open standards in threat intelligence sharing. A special thank to all the committees which triggered us to come with better and flexible format.

5. References

5.1. Normative References

5.2. Informative References

Authors' Addresses