misp-rfc/threat-actor-naming/threat-actor-naming.txt

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Network Working Group A. Dulaunoy
Internet-Draft P. Bourmeau
Expires: December 11, 2020 CIRCL
June 9, 2020
Recommendations on naming threat actors
Abstract
This document provides advice on the naming of threat actors (also
known as malicious actors). The objective is to provide practical
advices for organisations such as security vendors or organisations
attributing incidents to a group of threat actor. It also discusses
the implication of naming a threat actor towards intelligence
analysts and threat intelligence platforms such as MISP [MISP-P]].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Reusing threat actor naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.4. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming . . . . . 4
2.6. Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
In threat intelligence, a name can be assigned to a threat actor
without specific guidelines. This leads to issues such as a:
o A proliferation of threat actor names generating overlaps or
different names for similar threat actors (e.g. some threat actors
have more than 10 synonyms)
o Ambiguity in the words used to name the threat actor in different
contexts (e.g. using common words)
o No clearly defined text format to describe the same threat actor
(e.g. Is the threat actor name case sensitive? Is there a dash
or a space between the two words?)
o Confusion between techniques/tools used by a threat actor versus
its name (e.g. naming a threat actor after a specific malware
used)
o Lack of source and list from vendors to describe their threat
actor names and the reasoning behind the naming (e.g. did they
name the threat actor after a specific set of campaigns? or
specific set of targets?)
o Lack of time-based information about the threat actor name, such
as date of naming or and UUID.
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o Lack of open mirrored "registry" of reference, accessible to all,
where to register a new threat actor name, or to access all
already named threat actors. The "registry" can contain the time-
based information mentionned above, it is a tool.
This document proposes a set of guidelines to name threat actors.
The goal is to reduce the above mentioned issues.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Recommendations
The recommendations listed below provide a minimal set of guidelines
while assigning a new name to a threat actor.
2.1. Reusing threat actor naming
Before creating a new threat actor name, you MUST consider a review
of existing threat actor names from databases such as the threat
actor MISP galaxy [MISP-G]. Proliferation of threat actor names is a
significant challenge for the day-to-day analyst work. If your
threat actor defined an existing threat actor, you MUST reuse an
existing threat actor name. If there is no specific threat actor
name, you SHALL create a new threat actor following the best
practices defined in this document.
2.2. Uniqueness
When choosing a threat actor name, uniqueness is a critical property.
The threat actor name MUST be unique and not existing in different
contexts. The name MUST not be a word from a dictionary which can be
used in other contexts.
2.3. Format
The name of the threat actor SHALL be composed of a single word. If
there is multiple part like a decimal value such as a counter, the
values MUST be separated with a dash. Single words are preferred to
ease the search of keywords by analysts in public sources.
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2.4. Encoding
The name of the threat actor MUST be expressed in ASCII 7-bit.
Assigning a localized name to a threat actor MAY create a set of
ambiguity about different localized version of the same threat actor.
2.5. Don't confuse actor naming with malware naming
The name of the threat actor MUST NOT be assigned based on the tools,
techniques or patterns used by the threat actor. A notorious example
in the threat intelligence community is Turla which can name a threat
actor but also a malware used by this group or other groups.
2.6. Directory
3. Examples
Some known examples are included below and serve as reference for
good practices in naming threat actors. The below threat actor names
can be considered good example:
o APT-1
o TA-505
The below threat actor names can be considered as example to not
follow:
o GIF89a (Word also used for the GIF header)
o ShadyRAT (Confusion between the name and the tool)
o Group 3 (Common name used for other use-cases)
o ZooPark (Name is used to describe something else)
4. Security Considerations
Naming a threat actor could include specific sensitive reference to a
case or an incident. Before releasing the naming, the creator MUST
review the name to ensure no sensitive information is included in the
threat actor name.
5. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank all contributors who provided feedback via
Twitter.
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6. References
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[MISP-G] Community, M., "MISP Galaxy - Public repository",
<https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
7.2. Informative References
[MISP-P] Community, M., "MISP Project - Open Source Threat
Intelligence Platform and Open Standards For Threat
Information Sharing", <https://github.com/MISP>.
Authors' Addresses
Alexandre Dulaunoy
Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg
16, bd d'Avranches
Luxembourg L-1160
Luxembourg
Phone: +352 247 88444
Email: alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu
Pauline Bourmeau
Corexalys
26 Rue de la Bienfaisance
Paris 75008
France
Email: info@corexalys.com
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