MISP workshop

Introduction into Information Sharing using MISP for CSIRTs

Team CIRCL TLP:WHITE

CIISI-EU



- Explanation of the CSIRT use case for information sharing and what CIRCL does
- Building an information sharing community and best practices¹

¹We published the complete guidelines in https://www.x-isac.org/ assets/images/guidelines_to_set-up_an_ISAC.pdf

- As a CSIRT, CIRCL operates a wide range of communities
- We use it as an internal tool to cover various day-to-day activities
- Whilst being the main driving force behind the development, we're also one of the largest consumers
- Different communities have different needs and restrictions

COMMUNITIES OPERATED BY CIRCL

Private sector community

- Our largest sharing community
- Over 1250 organisations
- 3600 users
- Functions as a central hub for a lot of sharing communities
- Private organisations, Researchers, Various SoCs, some CSIRTs, etc
- CSIRT community
 - Tighter community
 - National CSIRTs, connections to international organisations, etc

Financial sector community

- Banks, payment processors, etc.
- Sharing of mule accounts and non-cyber threat infomartion
- X-ISAC²
 - Bridging the gap between the various sectorial and geographical ISACs
 - New, but ambitious initiative
 - Goal is to bootstrap the cross-sectorial sharing along with building the infrastructure to enable sharing when needed

²https://www.x-isac.org/

the ATT&CK EU community³

- Work on attacker modelling
- With the assistance of MITRE themselves
- Unique opportunity to standardise on TTPs
- Looking for organisations that want to get involved!

³https://www.attack-community.org/

COMMUNITIES SUPPORTED BY CIRCL

■ ISAC / specialised community MISPs

- Topical or community specific instances hosted or co-managed by CIRCL
- Examples, GSMA, FIRST.org, CSIRT network, etc
- Often come with their own taxonomies and domain specific object definitions
- FIRST.org's MISP community
- Telecom and Mobile operators' community
- Various ad-hoc communities for exercises for example
 - The ENISA exercise for example
 - Locked Shields exercise

- Sharing can happen for many different reasons. Let's see what we believe are the typical CSIRT scenarios
- We can generally split these activities into 4 main groups when we're talking about traditional CSIRT tasks:
 - Core services
 - Proactive services
 - Advanced services
 - Sharing communities managed by CSIRTs for various tasks

CSIRT CORE SERVICES


Incident response

- Internal storage of incident response data
- Sharing of indicators derived from incident response
- Correlating data derived and using the built in analysis tools
- Enrichment services
- Collaboration with affected parties via MISP during IR
- **Co-ordination** and collaboration
- Takedown requests
- Alerting of information leaks (integration with **AIL**⁴)


CSIRT PROACTIVE SERVICES

- **Contextualising** both internal and external data
- Collection and dissimination of data from various sources (including OSINT)
- Storing, correlating and sharing own manual research (reversing, behavioural analysis)
- Aggregating automated collection (sandboxing, honeypots, spamtraps, sensors)
 - MISP allows for the creation of internal MISP "clouds"
 - Store large specialised datasets (for example honeypot data)
 - MISP has interactions with a large set of such tools (Cuckoo, Mail2MISP, etc)
- Situational awareness tools to monitor trends and adversary TTPs within my sector/geographical region (MISP-dashboard, built in statistics)

CSIRT PROACTIVE SERVICES - MISP DASHBOARD



CSIRT PROACTIVE SERVICES - MISP DASHBOARD



- Supporting forensic analysts
- Collaboration with law enforcement
- Vulnerability information sharing
 - Notifications to the constituency about relevant vulnerabilities
 - Co-ordinating with vendors for notifications (*)
 - Internal / closed community sharing of pentest results
 - We're planning on starting a series of hackathons to find

CSIRTS' MANAGEMENT OF SHARING COMMUNITIES FOR CONSTITUENT ACTIONS:

- Reporting non-identifying information about incidents (such as outlined in NISD)
- Seeking and engaging in collaboration with CSIRT or other parties during an incident
- Pre-sharing information to request for help / additional information from the community
- Pseudo-anonymised sharing through 3rd parties to avoid attribution of a potential target
- Building processes for other types of sharing to get the community engaged and acquainted with the methodologies of sharing (mule account information, border control, etc)

- Collaboration with Deloitte as part of a CEF project for creating compliance documents
 - Information sharing and cooperation enabled by GDPR
 - How MISP enables stakeholders identified by the NISD to perform key activities
 - AIL and MISP

For more information: https://github.com/CIRCL/compliance

BRINGING DIFFERENT SHARING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER

- We generally all end up sharing with peers that face similar threats
- Division is either sectorial or geographical
- So why even bother with trying to bridge these communities?

ADVANTAGES OF CROSS SECTORIAL SHARING

Reuse of TTPs across sectors

- Being hit by something that **another sector has faced before**
- Hybrid threats how seemingly unrelated things may be interesting to correlate
- Prepare other communities for the capability and culture of sharing for when the need arises for them to reach out to CSIRT
- Generally our field is ahead of several other sectors when it comes to information sharing, might as well **spread the love**



GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

- Starting a sharing community is **both easy and difficult** at the same time
- Many moving parts and most importantly, you'll be dealing with a diverse group of people
- Understanding and working with your constituents to help them face their challenges is key

GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

When you are starting out - you are in a unique position to drive the community and set best practices...



RUNNING A SHARING COMMUNITY USING MISP - HOW TO GET GOING?

Different models for constituents

- Connecting to a MISP instance hosted by a CSIRT
- Hosting their own instance and connecting to CSIRT's MISP
- Becoming member of a sectorial MISP community that is connected to CSIRT's community
- Planning ahead for future growth
 - Estimating requirements
 - Deciding early on common vocabularies
 - Offering services through MISP

Rely on our instincts to immitate over expecting adherence to rules

- **Lead by example** the power of immitation
- Encourage improving by doing instead of blocking sharing with unrealistic quality controls
 - What should the information look like?
 - How should it be contextualise
 - What do you consider as useful information?
 - What tools did you use to get your conclusions?
- Side effect is that you will end up raising the capabilities of your constituents

Sharing comes in many shapes and sizes

- Sharing results / reports is the classical example
- Sharing enhancements to existing data
- Validating data / flagging false positives
- Asking for support from the community

Embrace all of them. Even the ones that don't make sense right now, you never know when they come handy...

HOW TO DEAL WITH ORGANISATIONS THAT ONLY "LEECH"?

- From our own communities, only about 30% of the organisations actively share data
- We have come across some communities with sharing requirements
- In our experience, this sets you up for failure because:
 - Organisations losing access are the ones who would possibily benefit the most from it
 - Organisations that want to stay above the thresholds will start sharing junk / fake data
 - You lose organisations that might turn into valuable contributors in the future

SO HOW DOES ONE CONVERT THE PASSIVE ORGANISA-TIONS INTO ACTIVELY SHARING ONES?

- Rely on organic growth
- **Help** them increase their capabilities
- As mentioned before, lead by example
- Rely on the inherent value to one's self when sharing information (validation, enrichments, correlations)
- Give credit where credit is due, never steal the contributions of your community (that is incredibly demotivating)

DISPELLING THE MYTHS AROUND BLOCKERS WHEN IT COMES TO INFORMATION SHARING

Sharing difficulties are not really technical issues but often it's a matter of **social interactions** (e.g. **trust**).

- You can play a role here: organise regular workshops, conferences, have face to face meetings
- Legal restrictions
 - "Our legal framework doesn't allow us to share information."
 - "Risk of information leak is too high and it's too risky for our organization or partners."

Practical restrictions

- "We don't have information to share."
- "We don't have time to process or contribute indicators."
- "Our model of classification doesn't fit your model."
- "Tools for sharing information are tied to a specific format, we use a different one."

CONTEXTUALISING THE INFORMATION

Sharing technical information is a great start

- However, to truly create valueable information for your community, always consider the context:
 - > Your IDS might not care why it should alert on a rule
 - But your analysts will be interested in the threat landscape and the "big picture"
- Classify data to make sure your partners understand why it is **important for you**, so they can see why it could be **useful to them**
- Massively important once an organisation has the maturity to filter the most critical subsets of information for their own defense

- MISP has a verify versatile system (taxonomies) for classifying and marking data
- However, this includes different vocabularies with obvious overlaps
- MISP allows you to pick and choose vocabularies to use and enforce in a community
- Good idea to start with this process early
- If you don't find what you're looking for:
 - Create your own (JSON format, no coding skills required)
 - If it makes sense, share it with us via a pull request for redistribution

- The MISPProject in co-operation with partners provides a curated list of galaxy information
- Can include information packages of different types, for example:
 - Threat actor information
 - Specialised information such as Ransomware, Exploit kits, etc
 - Methodology information such as preventative actions
 - Classification systems for methodologies used by adversaries
 ATT&CK
- Consider improving the default libraries or contributing your own (simple JSON format)
- If there is something you cannot share, run your own galaxies and share it out of bound with partners
- Pull requests are always welcome

FALSE-POSITIVE HANDLING

- You might often fall into the trap of discarding seemingly "junk" data
- Besides volume limitations (which are absolutely valid, fear of false-positives is the most common reason why people discard data) - Our recommendation:
 - Be lenient when considering what to keep
 - Be strict when you are feeding tools
- MISP allows you to filter out the relevant data on demand when feeding protective tools
- What may seem like junk to you may be absolutely critical to other users

Sharing indicators for a **detection** matter.

- 'Do I have infected systems in my infrastructure or the ones I operate?'
- Sharing indicators to **block**.
 - 'I use these attributes to block, sinkhole or divert traffic.'
- Sharing indicators to **perform intelligence**.
 - 'Gathering information about campaigns and attacks. Are they related? Who is targeting me? Who are the adversaries?'
- $\blacksquare \rightarrow$ These objectives can be conflicting (e.g. False-positives have different impacts)

- Analysts will often be interested in the modus operandi of threat actors over long periods of time
- Even cleaned up infected hosts might become interesting again (embedded in code, recurring reuse)
- Use the tools provided to eliminate obvious false positives instead and limit your data-set to the most relevant sets

Warning: Potential false positives

List of known IPv4 public DNS resolvers

- Often within a community smaller bubbles of information sharing will form
- For example: Within a national private sector sharing community, specific community for financial institutions
- Sharing groups serve this purpose mainly
- As a CSIRT running a national community, consider bootstraping these sharing communities
- Organisations can of course self-organise, but you are the ones with the know-how to get them started

- Consider compartmentalisation does it make sense to move a secret squirrel club to their own sharing hub to avoid accidental leaks?
- Use your **best judgement** to decide which communities should be separated from one another
- Create sharing hubs with manual data transfer if needed
- Some organisations will even have their data air-gapped -Feed system
- Create guidance on what should be shared outside of their bubbles - organisations often lack the insight / experience to decide how to get going. Take the initiative!

- Getting started with building a new community can be daunting. Feel free to get in touch with us if you have any questions!
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- https://www.circl.lu/
- https://github.com/MISP https://gitter.im/MISP/MISP https://twitter.com/MISPProject