## MISP WORKSHOP

Introduction into Information Sharing using

TEAM CIRCL TLP:WHITE

MISP PROJECT



### PLAN FOR THIS SESSION

- Explanation of the CSIRT use case for information sharing and what CIRCL does
- Building an information sharing community and best practices<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>We published the complete guidelines in https://www.x-isac.org/assets/images/guidelines\_to\_set-up\_an\_ISAC.pdf

- As a CSIRT, CIRCL operates a wide range of communities
- We use it as an internal tool to cover various day-to-day activities
- Whilst being the main driving force behind the development, we're also one of the largest consumers
- Different communities have different needs and restrictions

- Private sector community
  - Our largest sharing community
  - ► Over **1250 organisations**
  - ▶ 3600 users
  - Functions as a central hub for a lot of sharing communities
  - Private organisations, Researchers, Various SoCs, some CSIRTs, etc
- CSIRT community
  - ► Tighter community
  - National CSIRTs, connections to international organisations, etc

- Financial sector community
  - ► Banks, payment processors, etc.
  - ► Sharing of mule accounts and non-cyber threat infomartion
- X-ISAC<sup>2</sup>
  - Bridging the gap between the various sectorial and geographical ISACs
  - ► New, but ambitious initiative
  - Goal is to bootstrap the cross-sectorial sharing along with building the infrastructure to enable sharing when needed

- the ATT&CK EU community<sup>3</sup>
  - Work on attacker modelling
  - ► With the assistance of MITRE themselves
  - Unique opportunity to standardise on TTPs
  - Looking for organisations that want to get involved!

<sup>3</sup>https://www.attack-community.org/

### COMMUNITIES SUPPORTED BY CIRCL

- ISAC / specialised community MISPs
  - Topical or community specific instances hosted or co-managed by CIRCL
  - Examples, GSMA, FIRST.org, CSIRT network, etc
  - Often come with their own taxonomies and domain specific object definitions
- FIRST.org's MISP community
- Telecom and Mobile operators' community
- Various ad-hoc communities for exercises for example
  - ► The ENISA exercise for example
  - Locked Shields exercise

### SHARING SCENARIOS IN MISP

- Sharing can happen for **many different reasons**. Let's see what we believe are the typical CSIRT scenarios
- We can generally split these activities into 4 main groups when we're talking about traditional CSIRT tasks:
  - Core services
  - Proactive services
  - Advanced services
  - Sharing communities managed by CSIRTs for various tasks


#### **CSIRT CORE SERVICES**

- Incident response
  - ► Internal storage of incident response data
  - ► Sharing of indicators derived from incident response
  - Correlating data derived and using the built in analysis tools
  - ► Enrichment services
  - Collaboration with affected parties via MISP during IR
  - ► Co-ordination and collaboration
  - ► Takedown requests
- Alerting of information leaks (integration with AIL<sup>4</sup>)

### **CSIRT PROACTIVE SERVICES**

- Contextualising both internal and external data
- **Collection** and **dissimination** of data from various sources (including OSINT)
- Storing, correlating and sharing own manual research (reversing, behavioural analysis)
- Aggregating automated collection (sandboxing, honeypots, spamtraps, sensors)
  - ► MISP allows for the creation of internal MISP "clouds"
  - Store large specialised datasets (for example honeypot data)
  - ► MISP has **interactions with** a large set of such **tools** (Cuckoo, Mail2MISP, etc)
- **Situational awareness** tools to monitor trends and adversary TTPs within my sector/geographical region (MISP-dashboard, built in statistics)

### CSIRT PROACTIVE SERVICES - MISP DASHBOARD



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### **CSIRT ADVANCED SERVICES**

- Supporting forensic analysts
- Collaboration with law enforcement
- Vulnerability information sharing
  - Notifications to the constituency about relevant vulnerabilities
  - ► Co-ordinating with vendors for notifications (\*)
  - ► Internal / closed community sharing of pentest results
  - We're planning on starting a series of hackathons to find

# CSIRTS' MANAGEMENT OF SHARING COMMUNITIES FOR CONSTITUENT ACTIONS:

- **Reporting** non-identifying information about incidents (such as outlined in NISD)
- **Seeking** and engaging in **collaboration** with CSIRT or other parties during an incident
- Pre-sharing information to request for help / additional information from the community
- Pseudo-anonymised sharing through 3rd parties to avoid attribution of a potential target
- Building processes for other types of sharing to get the community engaged and acquainted with the methodologies of sharing (mule account information, border control, etc)

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### A QUICK NOTE ON COMPLIANCE...

- Collaboration with Deloitte as part of a CEF project for creating compliance documents
  - ► Information sharing and cooperation enabled by GDPR
  - How MISP enables stakeholders identified by the NISD to perform key activities
  - ► AIL and MISP
- For more information: https://github.com/CIRCL/compliance

- We generally all **end up sharing with peers that face similar threats**
- Division is either sectorial or geographical
- So why even bother with trying to bridge these communities?

#### ADVANTAGES OF CROSS SECTORIAL SHARING

- Reuse of TTPs across sectors
- Being hit by something that another sector has faced before
- **Hybrid threats** how seemingly unrelated things may be interesting to correlate
- Prepare other communities for the capability and culture of sharing for when the need arises for them to reach out to CSIRT
- Generally our field is ahead of several other sectors when it comes to information sharing, might as well spread the love



# GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

- Starting a sharing community is both easy and difficult at the same time
- Many moving parts and most importantly, you'll be dealing with a diverse group of people
- Understanding and working with your constituents to help them face their challenges is key

# GETTING STARTED WITH BUILDING YOUR OWN SHARING COMMUNITY

■ When you are starting out - you are in a unique position to drive the community and set best practices...



# RUNNING A SHARING COMMUNITY USING MISP - HOW TO GET GOING?

- Different models for constituents
  - ► Connecting to a MISP instance hosted by a CSIRT
  - ► **Hosting** their own instance and connecting to CSIRT's MISP
  - ► **Becoming member** of a sectorial MISP community that is connected to CSIRT's community
- Planning ahead for future growth
  - ► Estimating requirements
  - Deciding early on common vocabularies
  - ► Offering services through MISP

# RELY ON OUR INSTINCTS TO IMMITATE OVER EXPECTING ADHERENCE TO RULES

- Lead by example the power of immitation
- Encourage improving by doing instead of blocking sharing with unrealistic quality controls
  - What should the information look like?
  - How should it be contextualise
  - ► What do you consider as useful information?
  - What tools did you use to get your conclusions?
- Side effect is that you will end up raising the capabilities of your constituents

### WHAT COUNTS AS VALUABLE DATA?

- Sharing comes in many shapes and sizes
  - ► Sharing results / reports is the classical example
  - Sharing enhancements to existing data
  - ► Validating data / flagging false positives
  - Asking for support from the community
- Embrace all of them. Even the ones that don't make sense right now, you never know when they come handy...

# HOW TO DEAL WITH ORGANISATIONS THAT ONLY "LEECH"?

- From our own communities, only about **30%** of the organisations actively share data
- We have come across some communities with sharing requirements
- In our experience, this sets you up for failure because:
  - Organisations losing access are the ones who would possibily benefit the most from it
  - Organisations that want to stay above the thresholds will start sharing junk / fake data
  - You lose organisations that might turn into valuable contributors in the future

# SO HOW DOES ONE CONVERT THE PASSIVE ORGANISATIONS INTO ACTIVELY SHARING ONES?

- Rely on organic growth
- **Help** them increase their capabilities
- As mentioned before, lead by example
- Rely on the inherent value to one's self when sharing information (validation, enrichments, correlations)
- **Give credit** where credit is due, never steal the contributions of your community (that is incredibly demotivating)

# DISPELLING THE MYTHS AROUND BLOCKERS WHEN IT COMES TO INFORMATION SHARING

- Sharing difficulties are not really technical issues but often it's a matter of **social interactions** (e.g. **trust**).
  - You can play a role here: organise regular workshops, conferences, have face to face meetings
- Legal restrictions
  - ► "Our legal framework doesn't allow us to share information."
  - "Risk of information leak is too high and it's too risky for our organization or partners."
- Practical restrictions
  - ► "We don't have information to share."
  - "We don't have time to process or contribute indicators."
  - "Our model of classification doesn't fit your model."
  - "Tools for sharing information are tied to a specific format, we use a different one."

#### CONTEXTUALISING THE INFORMATION

- Sharing technical information is a great start
- However, to truly create valueable information for your community, always consider the context:
  - Your IDS might not care why it should alert on a rule
  - But your analysts will be interested in the threat landscape and the "big picture"
- Classify data to make sure your partners understand why it is important for you, so they can see why it could be useful to them
- Massively important once an organisation has the maturity to filter the most critical subsets of information for their own defense

### CHOICE OF VOCABULARIES

- MISP has a verify **versatile system** (taxonomies) for classifying and marking data
- However, this includes different vocabularies with obvious overlaps
- MISP allows you to pick and choose vocabularies to use and enforce in a community
- Good idea to start with this process early
- If you don't find what you're looking for:
  - Create your own (JSON format, no coding skills required)
  - If it makes sense, share it with us via a pull request for redistribution

## SHARED LIBRARIES OF META-INFORMATION (GALAXIES)

- The MISPProject in co-operation with partners provides a **curated list of galaxy information**
- Can include information packages of different types, for example:
  - ► Threat actor information
  - Specialised information such as Ransomware, Exploit kits, etc
  - Methodology information such as preventative actions
  - Classification systems for methodologies used by adversaries
     ATT&CK
- Consider improving the default libraries or contributing your own (simple JSON format)
- If there is something you cannot share, run your own galaxies and **share it out of bound** with partners
- Pull requests are always welcome

### FALSE-POSITIVE HANDLING

- You might often fall into the trap of discarding seemingly "junk" data
- Besides volume limitations (which are absolutely valid, fear of false-positives is the most common reason why people discard data) - Our recommendation:
  - Be lenient when considering what to keep
  - ► Be strict when you are feeding tools
- MISP allows you to **filter out the relevant data on demand** when feeding protective tools
- What may seem like junk to you may be absolutely critical to other users

### MANY OBJECTIVES FROM DIFFERENT USER-GROUPS

- Sharing indicators for a **detection** matter.
  - ► 'Do I have infected systems in my infrastructure or the ones I operate?'
- Sharing indicators to **block**.
  - ► 'I use these attributes to block, sinkhole or divert traffic.'
- Sharing indicators to **perform intelligence**.
  - ► 'Gathering information about campaigns and attacks. Are they related? Who is targeting me? Who are the adversaries?'
- lacktriangleright These objectives can be conflicting (e.g. False-positives have different impacts)

### **FALSE-POSITIVE HANDLING**

- Analysts will often be interested in the modus operandi of threat actors over long periods of time
- Even cleaned up infected hosts might become interesting again (embedded in code, recurring reuse)
- Use the tools provided to eliminate obvious false positives instead and limit your data-set to the most relevant sets

### Warning: Potential false positives

List of known IPv4 public DNS resolvers

### MANAGING SUB-COMMUNITIES

- Often within a community smaller bubbles of information sharing will form
- For example: Within a national private sector sharing community, specific community for financial institutions
- Sharing groups serve this purpose mainly
- As a CSIRT running a national community, consider bootstraping these sharing communities
- Organisations can of course self-organise, but you are the ones with the know-how to get them started

### MANAGING SUB-COMMUNITIES

- Consider compartmentalisation does it make sense to move a secret squirrel club to their own sharing hub to avoid accidental leaks?
- Use your **best judgement** to decide which communities should be separated from one another
- Create sharing hubs with manual data transfer if needed
- Some organisations will even have their data air-gapped -Feed system
- Create guidance on what should be shared outside of their bubbles - organisations often lack the insight / experience to decide how to get going. Take the initiative!

### GET IN TOUCH IF YOU NEED SOME HELP TO GET STARTED

- Getting started with building a new community can be daunting. Feel free to get in touch with us if you have any questions!
- Contact: info@circl.lu
- https://www.circl.lu/
- https://github.com/MISP
  https://gitter.im/MISP/MISP
  https://twitter.com/MISPProject