A simple ReST server to lookup threat actors (by name, synonym or UUID) and returning the corresponding MISP galaxy information about the known threat actors.
The API is simple and can be queried on the `/query` entry point by POSTing a simple query in JSON format. The query format is
composed of an `name` as key or an `uuid` as key. The output format is a JSON in the [MISP standard galaxy format](https://www.misp-standard.org/rfc/misp-standard-galaxy-format.txt).
- [https://www.misp-project.org/tai/get/103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c](https://www.misp-project.org/tai/get/103ebfd8-4280-4027-b61a-69bd9967ad6c) which returns the entries for a specific threat-actor.
A public API is available at the following url `https://www.misp-project.org/tai/` and can be queried to gather the latest information about threat-actors.
"description": "Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.",
"description": "In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions were developed as far back as 2007.",
"description": "We have investigated their intrusions since 2013 and have been battling them nonstop over the last year at several large telecommunications and technology companies. The determination of this China-based adversary is truly impressive: they are like a dog with a bone.\nHURRICANE PANDA’s preferred initial vector of compromise and persistence is a China Chopper webshell – a tiny and easily obfuscated 70 byte text file that consists of an ‘eval()’ command, which is then used to provide full command execution and file upload/download capabilities to the attackers. This script is typically uploaded to a web server via a SQL injection or WebDAV vulnerability, which is often trivial to uncover in a company with a large external web presence.\nOnce inside, the adversary immediately moves on to execution of a credential theft tool such as Mimikatz (repacked to avoid AV detection). If they are lucky to have caught an administrator who might be logged into that web server at the time, they will have gained domain administrator credentials and can now roam your network at will via ‘net use’ and ‘wmic’ commands executed through the webshell terminal.",
We welcome contributions. Every contributors will be added in the [AUTHORS file](./AUTHORS) and collectively own this open source software. The contributors acknowledge the [Developer Certificate of Origin](https://developercertificate.org/).
If you want to contribute threat-actor information, we welcome you to make a pull-request on the [misp-galaxy repository](https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy/blob/master/clusters/threat-actor.json).
