diff --git a/changelog.d/11427.doc b/changelog.d/11427.doc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01cdfcf2b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/changelog.d/11427.doc @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Document the usage of refresh tokens. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/SUMMARY.md b/docs/SUMMARY.md index b05af6d690..11f597b3ed 100644 --- a/docs/SUMMARY.md +++ b/docs/SUMMARY.md @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ - [SSO Mapping Providers](sso_mapping_providers.md) - [Password Auth Providers](password_auth_providers.md) - [JSON Web Tokens](jwt.md) + - [Refresh Tokens](usage/configuration/user_authentication/refresh_tokens.md) - [Registration Captcha](CAPTCHA_SETUP.md) - [Application Services](application_services.md) - [Server Notices](server_notices.md) diff --git a/docs/usage/configuration/user_authentication/refresh_tokens.md b/docs/usage/configuration/user_authentication/refresh_tokens.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23b3cddae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/usage/configuration/user_authentication/refresh_tokens.md @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +# Refresh Tokens + +Synapse supports refresh tokens since version 1.49 (some earlier versions had support for an earlier, experimental draft of [MSC2918] which is not compatible). + + +[MSC2918]: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/main/proposals/2918-refreshtokens.md#msc2918-refresh-tokens + + +## Background and motivation + +Synapse users' sessions are identified by **access tokens**; access tokens are +issued to users on login. Each session gets a unique access token which identifies +it; the access token must be kept secret as it grants access to the user's account. + +Traditionally, these access tokens were eternally valid (at least until the user +explicitly chose to log out). + +In some cases, it may be desirable for these access tokens to expire so that the +potential damage caused by leaking an access token is reduced. +On the other hand, forcing a user to re-authenticate (log in again) often might +be too much of an inconvenience. + +**Refresh tokens** are a mechanism to avoid some of this inconvenience whilst +still getting most of the benefits of short access token lifetimes. +Refresh tokens are also a concept present in OAuth 2 — further reading is available +[here](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-1.5). + +When refresh tokens are in use, both an access token and a refresh token will be +issued to users on login. The access token will expire after a predetermined amount +of time, but otherwise works in the same way as before. When the access token is +close to expiring (or has expired), the user's client should present the homeserver +(Synapse) with the refresh token. + +The homeserver will then generate a new access token and refresh token for the user +and return them. The old refresh token is invalidated and can not be used again*. + +Finally, refresh tokens also make it possible for sessions to be logged out if they +are inactive for too long, before the session naturally ends; see the configuration +guide below. + + +*To prevent issues if clients lose connection half-way through refreshing a token, +the refresh token is only invalidated once the new access token has been used at +least once. For all intents and purposes, the above simplification is sufficient. + + +## Caveats + +There are some caveats: + +* If a third party gets both your access token and refresh token, they will be able to + continue to enjoy access to your session. + * This is still an improvement because you (the user) will notice when *your* + session expires and you're not able to use your refresh token. + That would be a giveaway that someone else has compromised your session. + You would be able to log in again and terminate that session. + Previously (with long-lived access tokens), a third party that has your access + token could go undetected for a very long time. +* Clients need to implement support for refresh tokens in order for them to be a + useful mechanism. + * It is up to homeserver administrators if they want to issue long-lived access + tokens to clients not implementing refresh tokens. + * For compatibility, it is likely that they should, at least until client support + is widespread. + * Users with clients that support refresh tokens will still benefit from the + added security; it's not possible to downgrade a session to using long-lived + access tokens so this effectively gives users the choice. + * In a closed environment where all users use known clients, this may not be + an issue as the homeserver administrator can know if the clients have refresh + token support. In that case, the non-refreshable access token lifetime + may be set to a short duration so that a similar level of security is provided. + + +## Configuration Guide + +The following configuration options, in the `registration` section, are related: + +* `session_lifetime`: maximum length of a session, even if it's refreshed. + In other words, the client must log in again after this time period. + In most cases, this can be unset (infinite) or set to a long time (years or months). +* `refreshable_access_token_lifetime`: lifetime of access tokens that are created + by clients supporting refresh tokens. + This should be short; a good value might be 5 minutes (`5m`). +* `nonrefreshable_access_token_lifetime`: lifetime of access tokens that are created + by clients which don't support refresh tokens. + Make this short if you want to effectively force use of refresh tokens. + Make this long if you don't want to inconvenience users of clients which don't + support refresh tokens (by forcing them to frequently re-authenticate using + login credentials). +* `refresh_token_lifetime`: lifetime of refresh tokens. + In other words, the client must refresh within this time period to maintain its session. + Unless you want to log inactive sessions out, it is often fine to use a long + value here or even leave it unset (infinite). + Beware that making it too short will inconvenience clients that do not connect + very often, including mobile clients and clients of infrequent users (by making + it more difficult for them to refresh in time, which may force them to need to + re-authenticate using login credentials). + +**Note:** All four options above only apply when tokens are created (by logging in or refreshing). +Changes to these settings do not apply retroactively. + + +### Using refresh token expiry to log out inactive sessions + +If you'd like to force sessions to be logged out upon inactivity, you can enable +refreshable access token expiry and refresh token expiry. + +This works because a client must refresh at least once within a period of +`refresh_token_lifetime` in order to maintain valid credentials to access the +account. + +(It's suggested that `refresh_token_lifetime` should be longer than +`refreshable_access_token_lifetime` and this section assumes that to be the case +for simplicity.) + +Note: this will only affect sessions using refresh tokens. You may wish to +set a short `nonrefreshable_access_token_lifetime` to prevent this being bypassed +by clients that do not support refresh tokens. + + +#### Choosing values that guarantee permitting some inactivity + +It may be desirable to permit some short periods of inactivity, for example to +accommodate brief outages in client connectivity. + +The following model aims to provide guidance for choosing `refresh_token_lifetime` +and `refreshable_access_token_lifetime` to satisfy requirements of the form: + +1. inactivity longer than `L` **MUST** cause the session to be logged out; and +2. inactivity shorter than `S` **MUST NOT** cause the session to be logged out. + +This model makes the weakest assumption that all active clients will refresh as +needed to maintain an active access token, but no sooner. +*In reality, clients may refresh more often than this model assumes, but the +above requirements will still hold.* + +To satisfy the above model, +* `refresh_token_lifetime` should be set to `L`; and +* `refreshable_access_token_lifetime` should be set to `L - S`.