Moves the warning about password resets being disabled to the point where a user actually tries to reset their password. Is this an appropriate place for it to happen?
Also removed the disabling of msisdn password resets when you don't have an email config, as that just doesn't make sense.
Also change the error a user receives upon disabled passwords to specify that only email-based password reset is disabled.
If we try and send a transaction with lots of EDUs and we run out of
space, we call get_new_device_msgs_for_remote with a limit of 0, which
then failed.
Some keys are stored in the synapse database with a null valid_until_ms
which caused an exception to be thrown when using that key. We fix this
by treating nulls as zeroes, i.e. they keys will match verification
requests with a minimum_valid_until_ms of zero (i.e. don't validate ts)
but will not match requests with a non-zero minimum_valid_until_ms.
Fixes#5391.
It's not really a problem to trust notary responses signed by the old key so
long as we are also doing TLS validation.
This commit adds a check to the config parsing code at startup to check that
we do not have the insecure matrix.org key without tls validation, and refuses
to start without it.
This allows us to remove the rather alarming-looking warning which happens at
runtime.
Sends password reset emails from the homeserver instead of proxying to the identity server. This is now the default behaviour for security reasons. If you wish to continue proxying password reset requests to the identity server you must now enable the email.trust_identity_server_for_password_resets option.
This PR is a culmination of 3 smaller PRs which have each been separately reviewed:
* #5308
* #5345
* #5368
There are a few changes going on here:
* We make checking the signature on a key server response optional: if no
verify_keys are specified, we trust to TLS to validate the connection.
* We change the default config so that it does not require responses to be
signed by the old key.
* We replace the old 'perspectives' config with 'trusted_key_servers', which
is also formatted slightly differently.
* We emit a warning to the logs every time we trust a key server response
signed by the old key.
* Fix background updates to handle redactions/rejections
In background updates based on current state delta stream we need to
handle that we may not have all the events (or at least that
`get_events` may raise an exception).
Erik Johnston