This code brings the SimpleHttpClient into line with the
MatrixFederationHttpClient by having it raise HttpResponseExceptions when a
request fails (rather than trying to parse for matrix errors and maybe raising
MatrixCodeMessageException).
Then, whenever we were checking for MatrixCodeMessageException and turning them
into SynapseErrors, we now need to check for HttpResponseExceptions and call
to_synapse_error.
This commit replaces SynapseError.from_http_response_exception with
HttpResponseException.to_synapse_error.
The new method actually returns a ProxiedRequestError, which allows us to pass
through additional metadata from the API call.
We really shouldn't be sending all CodeMessageExceptions back over the C-S API;
it will include things like 401s which we shouldn't proxy.
That means that we need to explicitly turn a few HttpResponseExceptions into
SynapseErrors in the federation layer.
The effect of the latter is that the matrix errcode will get passed through
correctly to calling clients, which might help with some of the random
M_UNKNOWN errors when trying to join rooms.
* attempt at deduplicating lazy-loaded members
as per the proposal; we can deduplicate redundant lazy-loaded members
which are sent in the same sync sequence. we do this heuristically
rather than requiring the client to somehow tell us which members it
has chosen to cache, by instead caching the last N members sent to
a client, and not sending them again. For now we hardcode N to 100.
Each cache for a given (user,device) tuple is in turn cached for up to
X minutes (to avoid the caches building up). For now we hardcode X to 30.
* add include_redundant_members filter option & make it work
* remove stale todo
* add tests for _get_some_state_from_cache
* incorporate review
Add federation_domain_whitelist
gives a way to restrict which domains your HS is allowed to federate with.
useful mainly for gracefully preventing a private but internet-connected HS from trying to federate to the wider public Matrix network
lets homeservers specify a whitelist for 3PIDs that users are allowed to associate with.
Typically useful for stopping people from registering with non-work emails
This bypasses a bug where using the state groups to figure out if a host
is in a room sometimes errors if the servers isn't in the room. (For
example when the server rejected an invite to a remote room)
When we proxy a media request to a remote server, add a query-param, which will
tell the remote server to 404 if it doesn't recognise the server_name.
This should fix a routing loop where the server keeps forwarding back to
itself.
Also improves the error handling on remote media fetches, so that we don't
always return a rather obscure 502.
We might as well treat all refresh_tokens as invalid. Just return a 403 from
/tokenrefresh, so that we don't have a load of dead, untestable code hanging
around.
Still TODO: removing the table from the schema.
The 'time' caveat on the access tokens was something of a lie, since we weren't
enforcing it; more pertinently its presence stops us ever adding useful time
caveats.
Let's move in the right direction by not lying in our caveats.
This is currently very conservative in that it only does this if there is no
`since` token. This limits the risk to clients likely to be doing one-off
syncs (like bridges), but does mean that normal human clients won't benefit
from the time savings here. If the savings are large enough, I would consider
generalising this to just check the filter.
When a server sends a third party invite another server may be the one
that the inviting user registers with. In this case it is that remote
server that will issue an actual invitation, and wants to do it "in the
name of" the original invitee. However, the new proper invite will not
be signed by the original server, and thus other servers would reject
the invite if it was seen as coming from the original user.
To fix this, a special case has been added to the auth rules whereby
another server can send an invite "in the name of" another server's
user, so long as that user had previously issued a third party invite
that is now being accepted.
Clients can continue to supply access tokens as query parameters
or can supply the token as a header:
Authorization: Bearer <access_token_goes_here>
This matches the ouath2 format of
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750#section-2.1
Rather than reimplementing the token parsing in the various places.
This will make it easier to change the token parsing to allow access_tokens
in HTTP headers.
Richard van der Hoff