# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd # Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. import inspect import logging import time import unicodedata import urllib.parse from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple, Union import attr import bcrypt # type: ignore[import] import pymacaroons from synapse.api.constants import LoginType from synapse.api.errors import ( AuthError, Codes, InteractiveAuthIncompleteError, LoginError, StoreError, SynapseError, UserDeactivatedError, ) from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter from synapse.handlers.ui_auth import INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS from synapse.handlers.ui_auth.checkers import UserInteractiveAuthChecker from synapse.http.server import finish_request, respond_with_html from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi from synapse.push.mailer import load_jinja2_templates from synapse.types import Requester, UserID from synapse.util import stringutils as stringutils from synapse.util.threepids import canonicalise_email from ._base import BaseHandler logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) class AuthHandler(BaseHandler): SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000 def __init__(self, hs): """ Args: hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): """ super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs) self.checkers = {} # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker] for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS: inst = auth_checker_class(hs) if inst.is_enabled(): self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self) self.password_providers = [ module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler) for module, config in hs.config.password_providers ] logger.info("Extra password_providers: %r", self.password_providers) self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later? self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator() self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled self._sso_enabled = ( hs.config.cas_enabled or hs.config.saml2_enabled or hs.config.oidc_enabled ) # we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can # keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first # type in the list. (NB that the spec doesn't require us to do so and # clients which favour types that they don't understand over those that # they do are technically broken) login_types = [] if self._password_enabled: login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD) for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types"): for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys(): if t not in login_types: login_types.append(t) self._supported_login_types = login_types # Login types and UI Auth types have a heavy overlap, but are not # necessarily identical. Login types have SSO (and other login types) # added in the rest layer, see synapse.rest.client.v1.login.LoginRestServerlet.on_GET. ui_auth_types = login_types.copy() if self._sso_enabled: ui_auth_types.append(LoginType.SSO) self._supported_ui_auth_types = ui_auth_types # Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config # as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`. self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter( clock=self.clock, rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second, burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count, ) self._clock = self.hs.get_clock() # Expire old UI auth sessions after a period of time. if hs.config.worker_app is None: self._clock.looping_call( run_as_background_process, 5 * 60 * 1000, "expire_old_sessions", self._expire_old_sessions, ) # Load the SSO HTML templates. # The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO, # after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client. # It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account # to the client. self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates( hs.config.sso_template_dir, ["sso_redirect_confirm.html"], )[0] # The following template is shown during user interactive authentication # in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are # authenticating for an operation to occur on their account. self._sso_auth_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates( hs.config.sso_template_dir, ["sso_auth_confirm.html"], )[0] # The following template is shown after a successful user interactive # authentication session. It tells the user they can close the window. self._sso_auth_success_template = hs.config.sso_auth_success_template # The following template is shown during the SSO authentication process if # the account is deactivated. self._sso_account_deactivated_template = ( hs.config.sso_account_deactivated_template ) self._server_name = hs.config.server_name # cast to tuple for use with str.startswith self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist) async def validate_user_via_ui_auth( self, requester: Requester, request: SynapseRequest, request_body: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str, description: str, ) -> dict: """ Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth. This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them. Args: requester: The user, as given by the access token request: The request sent by the client. request_body: The body of the request sent by the client clientip: The IP address of the client. description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that describes the operation happening on their account. Returns: The parameters for this request (which may have been given only in a previous call). Raises: InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed any of the permitted login flows AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives a different user to `requester` LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this user is too high to proceed """ user_id = requester.user.to_string() # Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(user_id, update=False) # build a list of supported flows flows = [[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types] try: result, params, _ = await self.check_auth( flows, request, request_body, clientip, description ) except LoginError: # Update the ratelimiter to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise). self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(user_id) raise # find the completed login type for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types: if login_type not in result: continue user_id = result[login_type] break else: # this can't happen raise Exception("check_auth returned True but no successful login type") # check that the UI auth matched the access token if user_id != requester.user.to_string(): raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth") return params def get_enabled_auth_types(self): """Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current config. """ return self.checkers.keys() async def check_auth( self, flows: List[List[str]], request: SynapseRequest, clientdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str, description: str, ) -> Tuple[dict, dict, str]: """ Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow. If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a decorator. Args: flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of strings representing auth-types. At least one full flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful. request: The request sent by the client. clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the 'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent. clientip: The IP address of the client. description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that describes the operation happening on their account. Returns: A tuple of (creds, params, session_id). 'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage. 'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may have been given only in a previous call). 'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the client or assigned by this call Raises: InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed all the stages in any of the permitted flows. """ authdict = None sid = None # type: Optional[str] if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict: authdict = clientdict["auth"] del clientdict["auth"] if "session" in authdict: sid = authdict["session"] # Convert the URI and method to strings. uri = request.uri.decode("utf-8") method = request.method.decode("utf-8") # If there's no session ID, create a new session. if not sid: session = await self.store.create_ui_auth_session( clientdict, uri, method, description ) else: try: session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(sid) except StoreError: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (sid,)) # If the client provides parameters, update what is persisted, # otherwise use whatever was last provided. # # This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters # and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split # auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you # could continue registration from your phone having clicked the # email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse # because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects # on a homeserver. # # Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data # isn't arbitrary. # # Note that the registration endpoint explicitly removes the # "initial_device_display_name" parameter if it is provided # without a "password" parameter. See the changes to # synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha.register.RegisterRestServlet.on_POST # in commit 544722bad23fc31056b9240189c3cbbbf0ffd3f9. if not clientdict: clientdict = session.clientdict # Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of # the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable # comparator and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent # queries ensure that this comparator has not changed. # # The comparator is based on the requested URI and HTTP method. The # client dict (minus the auth dict) should also be checked, but some # clients are not spec compliant, just warn for now if the client # dict changes. if (session.uri, session.method) != (uri, method): raise SynapseError( 403, "Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.", ) if session.clientdict != clientdict: logger.warning( "Requested operation has changed during the UI " "authentication session. A future version of Synapse " "will remove this capability." ) # For backwards compatibility, changes to the client dict are # persisted as clients modify them throughout their user interactive # authentication flow. await self.store.set_ui_auth_clientdict(sid, clientdict) if not authdict: raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError( self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id) ) # check auth type currently being presented errordict = {} # type: Dict[str, Any] if "type" in authdict: login_type = authdict["type"] # type: str try: result = await self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip) if result: await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( session.session_id, login_type, result ) except LoginError as e: if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: # riot used to have a bug where it would request a new # validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it # got a 401 with a 'flows' field. # (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447). # # Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid # breaking old riot deployments. raise # this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response # so that the client can have another go. errordict = e.error_dict() creds = await self.store.get_completed_ui_auth_stages(session.session_id) for f in flows: if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0: # it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can # include the password in the case of registering, so only log # the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password # param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth # and is not sensitive). logger.info( "Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r", creds, list(clientdict), ) return creds, clientdict, session.session_id ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id) ret["completed"] = list(creds) ret.update(errordict) raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(ret) async def add_oob_auth( self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str ) -> bool: """ Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth. """ if stagetype not in self.checkers: raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) if "session" not in authdict: raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) result = await self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip) if result: await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( authdict["session"], stagetype, result ) return True return False def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]: """ Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary Args: clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request Returns: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did not send a session ID, returns None. """ sid = None if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict: authdict = clientdict["auth"] if "session" in authdict: sid = authdict["session"] return sid async def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None: """ Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by the client. Args: session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth key: The key to store the data under value: The data to store """ try: await self.store.set_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, value) except StoreError: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) async def get_session_data( self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None ) -> Any: """ Retrieve data stored with set_session_data Args: session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth key: The key to store the data under default: Value to return if the key has not been set """ try: return await self.store.get_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, default) except StoreError: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) async def _expire_old_sessions(self): """ Invalidate any user interactive authentication sessions that have expired. """ now = self._clock.time_msec() expiration_time = now - self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS await self.store.delete_old_ui_auth_sessions(expiration_time) async def _check_auth_dict( self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str ) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]: """Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client Args: authdict: auth dict provided by the client clientip: IP address of the client Returns: Result of the stage verification. Raises: StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database SynapseError if there was a problem with the request LoginError if there was an authentication problem. """ login_type = authdict["type"] checker = self.checkers.get(login_type) if checker is not None: res = await checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip) return res # build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the # v1 code user_id = authdict.get("user") if user_id is None: raise SynapseError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM) (canonical_id, callback) = await self.validate_login(user_id, authdict) return canonical_id def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict: return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key} def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict: return { "policies": { "privacy_policy": { "version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version, "en": { "name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name, "url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s" % ( self.hs.config.public_baseurl, self.hs.config.user_consent_version, ), }, } } } def _auth_dict_for_flows( self, flows: List[List[str]], session_id: str, ) -> Dict[str, Any]: public_flows = [] for f in flows: public_flows.append(f) get_params = { LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha, LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms, } params = {} # type: Dict[str, Any] for f in public_flows: for stage in f: if stage in get_params and stage not in params: params[stage] = get_params[stage]() return { "session": session_id, "flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows], "params": params, } async def get_access_token_for_user_id( self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], valid_until_ms: Optional[int] ): """ Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID. The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case. The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already. Args: user_id: canonical User ID device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens. None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated: we should always have a device ID) valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for no expiry. Returns: The access token for the user's session. Raises: StoreError if there was a problem storing the token. """ fmt_expiry = "" if valid_until_ms is not None: fmt_expiry = time.strftime( " until %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(valid_until_ms / 1000.0) ) logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry) await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id) await self.store.add_access_token_to_user( user_id, access_token, device_id, valid_until_ms ) # the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however, # it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we # really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the # device, so we double-check it here. if device_id is not None: try: await self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id) except StoreError: await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion") return access_token async def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]: """ Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Args: user_id: complete @user:id Returns: The canonical_user_id, or None if zero or multiple matches """ res = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) if res is not None: return res[0] return None async def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash( self, user_id: str ) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]: """Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Returns: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` or `None` if there is not exactly one match """ user_infos = await self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id) result = None if not user_infos: logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id) elif len(user_infos) == 1: # a single match (possibly not exact) result = user_infos.popitem() elif user_id in user_infos: # multiple matches, but one is exact result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id]) else: # multiple matches, none of them exact logger.warning( "Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user " "inexactly: %r", user_id, user_infos.keys(), ) return result def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]: """Get a the login types supported for the /login API By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide other login types. Returns: login types """ return self._supported_login_types async def validate_login( self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any] ) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]: """Authenticates the user for the /login API Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate m.login.password auth types. Args: username: username supplied by the user login_submission: the whole of the login submission (including 'type' and other relevant fields) Returns: A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback to be called once the access token and device id are issued Raises: StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database SynapseError if there was a problem with the request LoginError if there was an authentication problem. """ if username.startswith("@"): qualified_user_id = username else: qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string() login_type = login_submission.get("type") known_login_type = False # special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface # for the auth providers password = login_submission.get("password") if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD: if not self._password_enabled: raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.") if not password: raise SynapseError(400, "Missing parameter: password") for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "check_password") and login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD: known_login_type = True is_valid = await provider.check_password(qualified_user_id, password) if is_valid: return qualified_user_id, None if not hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types") or not hasattr( provider, "check_auth" ): # this password provider doesn't understand custom login types continue supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types() if login_type not in supported_login_types: # this password provider doesn't understand this login type continue known_login_type = True login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type] missing_fields = [] login_dict = {} for f in login_fields: if f not in login_submission: missing_fields.append(f) else: login_dict[f] = login_submission[f] if missing_fields: raise SynapseError( 400, "Missing parameters for login type %s: %s" % (login_type, missing_fields), ) result = await provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict) if result: if isinstance(result, str): result = (result, None) return result if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self.hs.config.password_localdb_enabled: known_login_type = True canonical_user_id = await self._check_local_password( qualified_user_id, password # type: ignore ) if canonical_user_id: return canonical_user_id, None if not known_login_type: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type) # We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive # login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway. raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) async def check_password_provider_3pid( self, medium: str, address: str, password: str ) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]: """Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login Args: medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email). address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com). password: The password of the user. Returns: A tuple of `(user_id, callback)`. If authentication is successful, `user_id`is the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is then either a function to be later run after the server has completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`. """ for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "check_3pid_auth"): # This function is able to return a deferred that either # resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon # success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of # (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run # after we've finished everything else result = await provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password) if result: # Check if the return value is a str or a tuple if isinstance(result, str): # If it's a str, set callback function to None result = (result, None) return result return None, None async def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str) -> Optional[str]: """Authenticate a user against the local password database. user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact matches. Args: user_id: complete @user:id password: the provided password Returns: The canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user/bad password """ lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id) if not lookupres: return None (user_id, password_hash) = lookupres # If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated if not password_hash: deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id) if deactivated: raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated") result = await self.validate_hash(password, password_hash) if not result: logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id) return None return user_id async def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str): auth_api = self.hs.get_auth() user_id = None try: macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token) user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon) auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", user_id) except Exception: raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN) await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id) return user_id async def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str): """Invalidate a single access token Args: access_token: access token to be deleted """ user_info = await self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token) await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token) # see if any of our auth providers want to know about this for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"): # This might return an awaitable, if it does block the log out # until it completes. result = provider.on_logged_out( user_id=str(user_info["user"]), device_id=user_info["device_id"], access_token=access_token, ) if inspect.isawaitable(result): await result # delete pushers associated with this access token if user_info["token_id"] is not None: await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( str(user_info["user"]), (user_info["token_id"],) ) async def delete_access_tokens_for_user( self, user_id: str, except_token_id: Optional[str] = None, device_id: Optional[str] = None, ): """Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user Args: user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with. If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will be deleted """ tokens_and_devices = await self.store.user_delete_access_tokens( user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id ) # see if any of our auth providers want to know about this for provider in self.password_providers: if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"): for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices: await provider.on_logged_out( user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token ) # delete pushers associated with the access tokens await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token( user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices) ) async def add_threepid( self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int ): # check if medium has a valid value if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]: raise SynapseError( code=400, msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)), errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM, ) # 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case. # We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that # is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords # on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific # types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing # infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge # of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking # for the presence of an email address during password reset was # case sensitive). if medium == "email": address = canonicalise_email(address) await self.store.user_add_threepid( user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() ) async def delete_threepid( self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None ) -> bool: """Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it from the local database. Args: user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from. medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn". address: The 3pid address to remove. id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the identity server specified when binding (if known). Returns: Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the unbind API. """ # 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above if medium == "email": address = canonicalise_email(address) identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler result = await identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid( user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server} ) await self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address) return result async def hash(self, password: str) -> str: """Computes a secure hash of password. Args: password: Password to hash. Returns: Hashed password. """ def _do_hash(): # Normalise the Unicode in the password pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password) return bcrypt.hashpw( pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"), bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds), ).decode("ascii") return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash) async def validate_hash( self, password: str, stored_hash: Union[bytes, str] ) -> bool: """Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash. Args: password: Password to hash. stored_hash: Expected hash value. Returns: Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash. """ def _do_validate_hash(): # Normalise the Unicode in the password pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password) return bcrypt.checkpw( pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"), stored_hash, ) if stored_hash: if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes): stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii") return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash) else: return False async def start_sso_ui_auth(self, redirect_url: str, session_id: str) -> str: """ Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page. Args: redirect_url: The URL to redirect to the SSO provider. session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID. Returns: The HTML to render. """ try: session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(session_id) except StoreError: raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,)) return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render( description=session.description, redirect_url=redirect_url, ) async def complete_sso_ui_auth( self, registered_user_id: str, session_id: str, request: SynapseRequest, ): """Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request Args: registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for. request: The request to complete. client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the process. """ # Mark the stage of the authentication as successful. # Save the user who authenticated with SSO, this will be used to ensure # that the account be modified is also the person who logged in. await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete( session_id, LoginType.SSO, registered_user_id ) # Render the HTML and return. html = self._sso_auth_success_template respond_with_html(request, 200, html) async def complete_sso_login( self, registered_user_id: str, request: SynapseRequest, client_redirect_url: str, ): """Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request Args: registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for. request: The request to complete. client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the process. """ # If the account has been deactivated, do not proceed with the login # flow. deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(registered_user_id) if deactivated: respond_with_html(request, 403, self._sso_account_deactivated_template) return self._complete_sso_login(registered_user_id, request, client_redirect_url) def _complete_sso_login( self, registered_user_id: str, request: SynapseRequest, client_redirect_url: str, ): """ The synchronous portion of complete_sso_login. This exists purely for backwards compatibility of synapse.module_api.ModuleApi. """ # Create a login token login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token( registered_user_id ) # Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query # parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to # redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link. redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url( client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token ) # if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients): request.redirect(redirect_url) finish_request(request) return # Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page. # Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of # it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the # URL we redirect users to. redirect_url_no_params = client_redirect_url.split("?")[0] html = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render( display_url=redirect_url_no_params, redirect_url=redirect_url, server_name=self._server_name, ) respond_with_html(request, 200, html) @staticmethod def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any): url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url)) query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4])) query.update({param_name: param}) url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query) return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts) @attr.s class MacaroonGenerator(object): hs = attr.ib() def generate_access_token( self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None ) -> str: extra_caveats = extra_caveats or [] macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access") # Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different # access token. macaroon.add_first_party_caveat( "nonce = %s" % (stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),) ) for caveat in extra_caveats: macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat) return macaroon.serialize() def generate_short_term_login_token( self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000) ) -> str: macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login") now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec() expiry = now + duration_in_ms macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,)) return macaroon.serialize() def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str: macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher") return macaroon.serialize() def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon: macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon( location=self.hs.config.server_name, identifier="key", key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key, ) macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1") macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,)) return macaroon