# Copyright 2015, 2016 OpenMarket Ltd # Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. import logging from collections import namedtuple from synapse.api.constants import MAX_DEPTH, EventTypes, Membership from synapse.api.errors import Codes, SynapseError from synapse.api.room_versions import EventFormatVersions, RoomVersion from synapse.crypto.event_signing import check_event_content_hash from synapse.crypto.keyring import Keyring from synapse.events import EventBase, make_event_from_dict from synapse.events.utils import prune_event, validate_canonicaljson from synapse.http.servlet import assert_params_in_dict from synapse.types import JsonDict, get_domain_from_id logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) class FederationBase: def __init__(self, hs): self.hs = hs self.server_name = hs.hostname self.keyring = hs.get_keyring() self.spam_checker = hs.get_spam_checker() self.store = hs.get_datastore() self._clock = hs.get_clock() async def _check_sigs_and_hash( self, room_version: RoomVersion, pdu: EventBase ) -> EventBase: """Checks that event is correctly signed by the sending server. Args: room_version: The room version of the PDU pdu: the event to be checked Returns: * the original event if the checks pass * a redacted version of the event (if the signature matched but the hash did not) * throws a SynapseError if the signature check failed.""" try: await _check_sigs_on_pdu(self.keyring, room_version, pdu) except SynapseError as e: logger.warning( "Signature check failed for %s: %s", pdu.event_id, e, ) raise if not check_event_content_hash(pdu): # let's try to distinguish between failures because the event was # redacted (which are somewhat expected) vs actual ball-tampering # incidents. # # This is just a heuristic, so we just assume that if the keys are # about the same between the redacted and received events, then the # received event was probably a redacted copy (but we then use our # *actual* redacted copy to be on the safe side.) redacted_event = prune_event(pdu) if set(redacted_event.keys()) == set(pdu.keys()) and set( redacted_event.content.keys() ) == set(pdu.content.keys()): logger.info( "Event %s seems to have been redacted; using our redacted copy", pdu.event_id, ) else: logger.warning( "Event %s content has been tampered, redacting", pdu.event_id, ) return redacted_event result = await self.spam_checker.check_event_for_spam(pdu) if result: logger.warning("Event contains spam, soft-failing %s", pdu.event_id) # we redact (to save disk space) as well as soft-failing (to stop # using the event in prev_events). redacted_event = prune_event(pdu) redacted_event.internal_metadata.soft_failed = True return redacted_event return pdu class PduToCheckSig(namedtuple("PduToCheckSig", ["pdu", "sender_domain", "deferreds"])): pass async def _check_sigs_on_pdu( keyring: Keyring, room_version: RoomVersion, pdu: EventBase ) -> None: """Check that the given events are correctly signed Raise a SynapseError if the event wasn't correctly signed. Args: keyring: keyring object to do the checks room_version: the room version of the PDUs pdus: the events to be checked """ # we want to check that the event is signed by: # # (a) the sender's server # # - except in the case of invites created from a 3pid invite, which are exempt # from this check, because the sender has to match that of the original 3pid # invite, but the event may come from a different HS, for reasons that I don't # entirely grok (why do the senders have to match? and if they do, why doesn't the # joining server ask the inviting server to do the switcheroo with # exchange_third_party_invite?). # # That's pretty awful, since redacting such an invite will render it invalid # (because it will then look like a regular invite without a valid signature), # and signatures are *supposed* to be valid whether or not an event has been # redacted. But this isn't the worst of the ways that 3pid invites are broken. # # (b) for V1 and V2 rooms, the server which created the event_id # # let's start by getting the domain for each pdu, and flattening the event back # to JSON. # First we check that the sender event is signed by the sender's domain # (except if its a 3pid invite, in which case it may be sent by any server) if not _is_invite_via_3pid(pdu): try: await keyring.verify_event_for_server( get_domain_from_id(pdu.sender), pdu, pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0, ) except Exception as e: errmsg = "event id %s: unable to verify signature for sender %s: %s" % ( pdu.event_id, get_domain_from_id(pdu.sender), e, ) raise SynapseError(403, errmsg, Codes.FORBIDDEN) # now let's look for events where the sender's domain is different to the # event id's domain (normally only the case for joins/leaves), and add additional # checks. Only do this if the room version has a concept of event ID domain # (ie, the room version uses old-style non-hash event IDs). if room_version.event_format == EventFormatVersions.V1 and get_domain_from_id( pdu.event_id ) != get_domain_from_id(pdu.sender): try: await keyring.verify_event_for_server( get_domain_from_id(pdu.event_id), pdu, pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0, ) except Exception as e: errmsg = ( "event id %s: unable to verify signature for event id domain %s: %s" % ( pdu.event_id, get_domain_from_id(pdu.event_id), e, ) ) raise SynapseError(403, errmsg, Codes.FORBIDDEN) # If this is a join event for a restricted room it may have been authorised # via a different server from the sending server. Check those signatures. if ( room_version.msc3083_join_rules and pdu.type == EventTypes.Member and pdu.membership == Membership.JOIN and "join_authorised_via_users_server" in pdu.content ): authorising_server = get_domain_from_id( pdu.content["join_authorised_via_users_server"] ) try: await keyring.verify_event_for_server( authorising_server, pdu, pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0, ) except Exception as e: errmsg = ( "event id %s: unable to verify signature for authorising server %s: %s" % ( pdu.event_id, authorising_server, e, ) ) raise SynapseError(403, errmsg, Codes.FORBIDDEN) def _is_invite_via_3pid(event: EventBase) -> bool: return ( event.type == EventTypes.Member and event.membership == Membership.INVITE and "third_party_invite" in event.content ) def event_from_pdu_json( pdu_json: JsonDict, room_version: RoomVersion, outlier: bool = False ) -> EventBase: """Construct an EventBase from an event json received over federation Args: pdu_json: pdu as received over federation room_version: The version of the room this event belongs to outlier: True to mark this event as an outlier Raises: SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields or is otherwise not a valid matrix event """ # we could probably enforce a bunch of other fields here (room_id, sender, # origin, etc etc) assert_params_in_dict(pdu_json, ("type", "depth")) depth = pdu_json["depth"] if not isinstance(depth, int): raise SynapseError(400, "Depth %r not an intger" % (depth,), Codes.BAD_JSON) if depth < 0: raise SynapseError(400, "Depth too small", Codes.BAD_JSON) elif depth > MAX_DEPTH: raise SynapseError(400, "Depth too large", Codes.BAD_JSON) # Validate that the JSON conforms to the specification. if room_version.strict_canonicaljson: validate_canonicaljson(pdu_json) event = make_event_from_dict(pdu_json, room_version) event.internal_metadata.outlier = outlier return event