Thank you
You may now close this window and return to the application
"""
class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer):
"""
super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs)
self.checkers = {} # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker]
for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS:
inst = auth_checker_class(hs)
if inst.is_enabled():
self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore
self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
# This is not a cache per se, but a store of all current sessions that
# expire after N hours
self.sessions = ExpiringCache(
cache_name="register_sessions",
clock=hs.get_clock(),
expiry_ms=self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS,
reset_expiry_on_get=True,
)
account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self)
self.password_providers = [
module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler)
for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
]
logger.info("Extra password_providers: %r", self.password_providers)
self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled
self._sso_enabled = hs.config.saml2_enabled or hs.config.cas_enabled
# we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can
# keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first
# type in the list. (NB that the spec doesn't require us to do so and
# clients which favour types that they don't understand over those that
# they do are technically broken)
login_types = []
if self._password_enabled:
login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD)
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types"):
for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
if t not in login_types:
login_types.append(t)
self._supported_login_types = login_types
# Login types and UI Auth types have a heavy overlap, but are not
# necessarily identical. Login types have SSO (and other login types)
# added in the rest layer, see synapse.rest.client.v1.login.LoginRestServerlet.on_GET.
ui_auth_types = login_types.copy()
if self._sso_enabled:
ui_auth_types.append(LoginType.SSO)
self._supported_ui_auth_types = ui_auth_types
# Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config
# as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`.
self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter()
self._clock = self.hs.get_clock()
# Load the SSO HTML templates.
# The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO,
# after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client.
# It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account
# to the client.
self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates(
hs.config.sso_redirect_confirm_template_dir, ["sso_redirect_confirm.html"],
)[0]
# The following template is shown during user interactive authentication
# in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are
# authenticating for an operation to occur on their account.
self._sso_auth_confirm_template = load_jinja2_templates(
hs.config.sso_redirect_confirm_template_dir, ["sso_auth_confirm.html"],
)[0]
self._server_name = hs.config.server_name
# cast to tuple for use with str.startswith
self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_user_via_ui_auth(
self,
requester: Requester,
request: SynapseRequest,
request_body: Dict[str, Any],
clientip: str,
description: str,
):
"""
Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where
the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check
that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
Args:
requester: The user, as given by the access token
request: The request sent by the client.
request_body: The body of the request sent by the client
clientip: The IP address of the client.
description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
describes the operation happening on their account.
Returns:
defer.Deferred[dict]: the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
any of the permitted login flows
AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives
a different user to `requester`
LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this
user is too high to proceed
"""
user_id = requester.user.to_string()
# Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts
self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
user_id,
time_now_s=self._clock.time(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
update=False,
)
# build a list of supported flows
flows = [[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types]
try:
result, params, _ = yield self.check_auth(
flows, request, request_body, clientip, description
)
except LoginError:
# Update the ratelimite to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise).
self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
user_id,
time_now_s=self._clock.time(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
update=True,
)
raise
# find the completed login type
for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types:
if login_type not in result:
continue
user_id = result[login_type]
break
else:
# this can't happen
raise Exception("check_auth returned True but no successful login type")
# check that the UI auth matched the access token
if user_id != requester.user.to_string():
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth")
return params
def get_enabled_auth_types(self):
"""Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types
Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current
config.
"""
return self.checkers.keys()
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_auth(
self,
flows: List[List[str]],
request: SynapseRequest,
clientdict: Dict[str, Any],
clientip: str,
description: str,
):
"""
Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
As a side effect, this function fills in the 'creds' key on the user's
session with a map, which maps each auth-type (str) to the relevant
identity authenticated by that auth-type (mostly str, but for captcha, bool).
If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use
synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a
decorator.
Args:
flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
strings representing auth-types. At least one full
flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
request: The request sent by the client.
clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
clientip: The IP address of the client.
description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
describes the operation happening on their account.
Returns:
defer.Deferred[dict, dict, str]: a deferred tuple of
(creds, params, session_id).
'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
client or assigned by this call
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
all the stages in any of the permitted flows.
"""
authdict = None
sid = None # type: Optional[str]
if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
authdict = clientdict["auth"]
del clientdict["auth"]
if "session" in authdict:
sid = authdict["session"]
session = self._get_session_info(sid)
if len(clientdict) > 0:
# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
# on a homeserver.
# Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
# isn't arbintrary.
session["clientdict"] = clientdict
self._save_session(session)
elif "clientdict" in session:
clientdict = session["clientdict"]
# Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of
# the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable
# comparator based on the URI, method, and body (minus the auth dict)
# and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent queries ensure
# that this comparator has not changed.
comparator = (request.uri, request.method, clientdict)
if "ui_auth" not in session:
session["ui_auth"] = comparator
self._save_session(session)
elif session["ui_auth"] != comparator:
raise SynapseError(
403,
"Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.",
)
# Add a human readable description to the session.
if "description" not in session:
session["description"] = description
self._save_session(session)
if not authdict:
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session)
)
if "creds" not in session:
session["creds"] = {}
creds = session["creds"]
# check auth type currently being presented
errordict = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
if "type" in authdict:
login_type = authdict["type"] # type: str
try:
result = yield self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
if result:
creds[login_type] = result
self._save_session(session)
except LoginError as e:
if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY:
# riot used to have a bug where it would request a new
# validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it
# got a 401 with a 'flows' field.
# (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447).
#
# Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid
# breaking old riot deployments.
raise
# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
# so that the client can have another go.
errordict = e.error_dict()
for f in flows:
if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0:
# it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can
# include the password in the case of registering, so only log
# the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password
# param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth
# and is not sensitive).
logger.info(
"Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r",
creds,
list(clientdict),
)
return creds, clientdict, session["id"]
ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session)
ret["completed"] = list(creds)
ret.update(errordict)
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(ret)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str):
"""
Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
"""
if stagetype not in self.checkers:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
if "session" not in authdict:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
sess = self._get_session_info(authdict["session"])
if "creds" not in sess:
sess["creds"] = {}
creds = sess["creds"]
result = yield self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip)
if result:
creds[stagetype] = result
self._save_session(sess)
return True
return False
def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
Args:
clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
Returns:
The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
not send a session ID, returns None.
"""
sid = None
if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
authdict = clientdict["auth"]
if "session" in authdict:
sid = authdict["session"]
return sid
def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None:
"""
Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
the client.
Args:
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key: The key to store the data under
value: The data to store
"""
sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
sess.setdefault("serverdict", {})[key] = value
self._save_session(sess)
def get_session_data(
self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None
) -> Any:
"""
Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
Args:
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key: The key to store the data under
default: Value to return if the key has not been set
"""
sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
return sess.setdefault("serverdict", {}).get(key, default)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str):
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
Args:
authdict: auth dict provided by the client
clientip: IP address of the client
Returns:
Deferred: result of the stage verification.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
login_type = authdict["type"]
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
if checker is not None:
res = yield checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip)
return res
# build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the
# v1 code
user_id = authdict.get("user")
if user_id is None:
raise SynapseError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
(canonical_id, callback) = yield self.validate_login(user_id, authdict)
return canonical_id
def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict:
return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict:
return {
"policies": {
"privacy_policy": {
"version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
"en": {
"name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name,
"url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s"
% (
self.hs.config.public_baseurl,
self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
),
},
}
}
}
def _auth_dict_for_flows(
self, flows: List[List[str]], session: Dict[str, Any]
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
public_flows = []
for f in flows:
public_flows.append(f)
get_params = {
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
}
params = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
for f in public_flows:
for stage in f:
if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
return {
"session": session["id"],
"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
"params": params,
}
def _get_session_info(self, session_id: Optional[str]) -> dict:
"""
Gets or creates a session given a session ID.
The session can be used to track data across multiple requests, e.g. for
interactive authentication.
"""
if session_id not in self.sessions:
session_id = None
if not session_id:
# create a new session
while session_id is None or session_id in self.sessions:
session_id = stringutils.random_string(24)
self.sessions[session_id] = {"id": session_id}
return self.sessions[session_id]
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_access_token_for_user_id(
self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], valid_until_ms: Optional[int]
):
"""
Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
Args:
user_id: canonical User ID
device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens.
None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
we should always have a device ID)
valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for
no expiry.
Returns:
The access token for the user's session.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
"""
fmt_expiry = ""
if valid_until_ms is not None:
fmt_expiry = time.strftime(
" until %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(valid_until_ms / 1000.0)
)
logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry)
yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id)
yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user(
user_id, access_token, device_id, valid_until_ms
)
# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
# device, so we double-check it here.
if device_id is not None:
try:
yield self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id)
except StoreError:
yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion")
return access_token
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str):
"""
Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
Args:
user_id: complete @user:id
Returns:
defer.Deferred: (unicode) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or
multiple matches
Raises:
UserDeactivatedError if a user is found but is deactivated.
"""
res = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if res is not None:
return res[0]
return None
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id: str):
"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
matches.
Returns:
tuple: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)`
None: if there is not exactly one match
"""
user_infos = yield self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
result = None
if not user_infos:
logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
elif len(user_infos) == 1:
# a single match (possibly not exact)
result = user_infos.popitem()
elif user_id in user_infos:
# multiple matches, but one is exact
result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
else:
# multiple matches, none of them exact
logger.warning(
"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
"inexactly: %r",
user_id,
user_infos.keys(),
)
return result
def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]:
"""Get a the login types supported for the /login API
By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide
other login types.
Returns:
login types
"""
return self._supported_login_types
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_login(self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any]):
"""Authenticates the user for the /login API
Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate
m.login.password auth types.
Args:
username: username supplied by the user
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
Returns:
Deferred[str, func]: canonical user id, and optional callback
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
if username.startswith("@"):
qualified_user_id = username
else:
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
known_login_type = False
# special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface
# for the auth providers
password = login_submission.get("password")
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
if not self._password_enabled:
raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.")
if not password:
raise SynapseError(400, "Missing parameter: password")
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "check_password") and login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
known_login_type = True
is_valid = yield provider.check_password(qualified_user_id, password)
if is_valid:
return qualified_user_id, None
if not hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types") or not hasattr(
provider, "check_auth"
):
# this password provider doesn't understand custom login types
continue
supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types()
if login_type not in supported_login_types:
# this password provider doesn't understand this login type
continue
known_login_type = True
login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type]
missing_fields = []
login_dict = {}
for f in login_fields:
if f not in login_submission:
missing_fields.append(f)
else:
login_dict[f] = login_submission[f]
if missing_fields:
raise SynapseError(
400,
"Missing parameters for login type %s: %s"
% (login_type, missing_fields),
)
result = yield provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict)
if result:
if isinstance(result, str):
result = (result, None)
return result
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self.hs.config.password_localdb_enabled:
known_login_type = True
canonical_user_id = yield self._check_local_password(
qualified_user_id, password
)
if canonical_user_id:
return canonical_user_id, None
if not known_login_type:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type)
# We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive
# login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway.
raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_password_provider_3pid(self, medium: str, address: str, password: str):
"""Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
Args:
medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
password: The password of the user.
Returns:
Deferred[(str|None, func|None)]: A tuple of `(user_id,
callback)`. If authentication is successful, `user_id` is a `str`
containing the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is
then either a function to be later run after the server has
completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was
unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`.
"""
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "check_3pid_auth"):
# This function is able to return a deferred that either
# resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon
# success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of
# (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run
# after we've finished everything else
result = yield provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password)
if result:
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
if isinstance(result, str):
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
result = (result, None)
return result
return None, None
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str):
"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
multiple inexact matches.
Args:
user_id: complete @user:id
password: the provided password
Returns:
Deferred[unicode] the canonical_user_id, or Deferred[None] if
unknown user/bad password
"""
lookupres = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if not lookupres:
return None
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
# If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated
if not password_hash:
deactivated = yield self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id)
if deactivated:
raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated")
result = yield self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
if not result:
logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
return None
return user_id
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str):
auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
user_id = None
try:
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token)
user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", user_id)
except Exception:
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
return user_id
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str):
"""Invalidate a single access token
Args:
access_token: access token to be deleted
Returns:
Deferred
"""
user_info = yield self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token)
yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
yield provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=str(user_info["user"]),
device_id=user_info["device_id"],
access_token=access_token,
)
# delete pushers associated with this access token
if user_info["token_id"] is not None:
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
str(user_info["user"]), (user_info["token_id"],)
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_access_tokens_for_user(
self,
user_id: str,
except_token_id: Optional[str] = None,
device_id: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
Args:
user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to
except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted
device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with.
If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
be deleted
Returns:
Deferred
"""
tokens_and_devices = yield self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id
)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices:
yield provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token
)
# delete pushers associated with the access tokens
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices)
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def add_threepid(self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int):
# check if medium has a valid value
if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]:
raise SynapseError(
code=400,
msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)),
errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM,
)
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
# We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
# for the presence of an email address during password reset was
# case sensitive).
if medium == "email":
address = address.lower()
yield self.store.user_add_threepid(
user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_threepid(
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
from the local database.
Args:
user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from.
medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn".
address: The 3pid address to remove.
id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding
any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
identity server specified when binding (if known).
Returns:
Deferred[bool]: Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
unbind API.
"""
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above
if medium == "email":
address = address.lower()
identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
result = yield identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid(
user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server}
)
yield self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address)
return result
def _save_session(self, session: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Update the last used time on the session to now and add it back to the session store."""
# TODO: Persistent storage
logger.debug("Saving session %s", session)
session["last_used"] = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
self.sessions[session["id"]] = session
def hash(self, password: str):
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
Args:
password: Password to hash.
Returns:
Deferred(unicode): Hashed password.
"""
def _do_hash():
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.hashpw(
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds),
).decode("ascii")
return defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
def validate_hash(self, password: str, stored_hash: bytes):
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
Args:
password: Password to hash.
stored_hash: Expected hash value.
Returns:
Deferred(bool): Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
"""
def _do_validate_hash():
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.checkpw(
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
stored_hash,
)
if stored_hash:
if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes):
stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii")
return defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash)
else:
return defer.succeed(False)
def start_sso_ui_auth(self, redirect_url: str, session_id: str) -> str:
"""
Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page.
Args:
redirect_url: The URL to redirect to the SSO provider.
session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID.
Returns:
The HTML to render.
"""
session = self._get_session_info(session_id)
# Get the human readable operation of what is occurring, falling back to
# a generic message if it isn't available for some reason.
description = session.get("description", "modify your account")
return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render(
description=description, redirect_url=redirect_url,
)
def complete_sso_ui_auth(
self, registered_user_id: str, session_id: str, request: SynapseRequest,
):
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
Args:
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
request: The request to complete.
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
process.
"""
# Mark the stage of the authentication as successful.
sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
if "creds" not in sess:
sess["creds"] = {}
creds = sess["creds"]
# Save the user who authenticated with SSO, this will be used to ensure
# that the account be modified is also the person who logged in.
creds[LoginType.SSO] = registered_user_id
self._save_session(sess)
# Render the HTML and return.
html_bytes = SUCCESS_TEMPLATE.encode("utf8")
request.setResponseCode(200)
request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8")
request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(html_bytes),))
request.write(html_bytes)
finish_request(request)
def complete_sso_login(
self,
registered_user_id: str,
request: SynapseRequest,
client_redirect_url: str,
):
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
Args:
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
request: The request to complete.
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
process.
"""
# Create a login token
login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token(
registered_user_id
)
# Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query
# parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to
# redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link.
redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url(
client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token
)
# if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it
if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients):
request.redirect(redirect_url)
finish_request(request)
return
# Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page.
# Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of
# it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the
# URL we redirect users to.
redirect_url_no_params = client_redirect_url.split("?")[0]
html = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render(
display_url=redirect_url_no_params,
redirect_url=redirect_url,
server_name=self._server_name,
).encode("utf-8")
request.setResponseCode(200)
request.setHeader(b"Content-Type", b"text/html; charset=utf-8")
request.setHeader(b"Content-Length", b"%d" % (len(html),))
request.write(html)
finish_request(request)
@staticmethod
def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any):
url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url))
query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4]))
query.update({param_name: param})
url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts)
@attr.s
class MacaroonGenerator(object):
hs = attr.ib()
def generate_access_token(
self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None
) -> str:
extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
# Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different
# access token.
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(
"nonce = %s" % (stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),)
)
for caveat in extra_caveats:
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
return macaroon.serialize()
def generate_short_term_login_token(
self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000)
) -> str:
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
return macaroon.serialize()
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
return macaroon.serialize()
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon:
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
identifier="key",
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key,
)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
return macaroon