1643 lines
63 KiB
Python
1643 lines
63 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
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# Copyright 2019 - 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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import inspect
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import logging
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import time
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import unicodedata
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import urllib.parse
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from typing import (
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TYPE_CHECKING,
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Any,
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Callable,
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Dict,
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Iterable,
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List,
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Mapping,
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Optional,
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Tuple,
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Union,
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)
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import attr
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import bcrypt
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import pymacaroons
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from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
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from synapse.api.errors import (
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AuthError,
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Codes,
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError,
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LoginError,
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StoreError,
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SynapseError,
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UserDeactivatedError,
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)
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from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter
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from synapse.handlers.ui_auth import INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS
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from synapse.handlers.ui_auth.checkers import UserInteractiveAuthChecker
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from synapse.http.server import finish_request, respond_with_html
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from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
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from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread
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from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process
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from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
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from synapse.types import JsonDict, Requester, UserID
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from synapse.util import stringutils as stringutils
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from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
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from synapse.util.threepids import canonicalise_email
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from ._base import BaseHandler
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from synapse.app.homeserver import HomeServer
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def convert_client_dict_legacy_fields_to_identifier(
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submission: JsonDict,
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) -> Dict[str, str]:
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"""
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Convert a legacy-formatted login submission to an identifier dict.
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Legacy login submissions (used in both login and user-interactive authentication)
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provide user-identifying information at the top-level instead.
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These are now deprecated and replaced with identifiers:
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https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#identifier-types
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Args:
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submission: The client dict to convert
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Returns:
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The matching identifier dict
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Raises:
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SynapseError: If the format of the client dict is invalid
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"""
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identifier = submission.get("identifier", {})
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# Generate an m.id.user identifier if "user" parameter is present
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user = submission.get("user")
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if user:
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identifier = {"type": "m.id.user", "user": user}
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# Generate an m.id.thirdparty identifier if "medium" and "address" parameters are present
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medium = submission.get("medium")
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address = submission.get("address")
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if medium and address:
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identifier = {
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"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
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"medium": medium,
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"address": address,
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}
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# We've converted valid, legacy login submissions to an identifier. If the
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# submission still doesn't have an identifier, it's invalid
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if not identifier:
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raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid login submission", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
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# Ensure the identifier has a type
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if "type" not in identifier:
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raise SynapseError(
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400, "'identifier' dict has no key 'type'", errcode=Codes.MISSING_PARAM,
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)
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return identifier
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def login_id_phone_to_thirdparty(identifier: JsonDict) -> Dict[str, str]:
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"""
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Convert a phone login identifier type to a generic threepid identifier.
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Args:
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identifier: Login identifier dict of type 'm.id.phone'
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Returns:
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An equivalent m.id.thirdparty identifier dict
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"""
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if "country" not in identifier or (
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# The specification requires a "phone" field, while Synapse used to require a "number"
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# field. Accept both for backwards compatibility.
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"phone" not in identifier
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and "number" not in identifier
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):
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raise SynapseError(
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400, "Invalid phone-type identifier", errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM
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)
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# Accept both "phone" and "number" as valid keys in m.id.phone
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phone_number = identifier.get("phone", identifier["number"])
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# Convert user-provided phone number to a consistent representation
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msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(identifier["country"], phone_number)
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return {
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"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
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"medium": "msisdn",
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"address": msisdn,
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}
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@attr.s(slots=True)
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class SsoLoginExtraAttributes:
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"""Data we track about SAML2 sessions"""
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# time the session was created, in milliseconds
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creation_time = attr.ib(type=int)
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extra_attributes = attr.ib(type=JsonDict)
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class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
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SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"):
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super().__init__(hs)
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self.checkers = {} # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker]
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for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS:
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inst = auth_checker_class(hs)
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if inst.is_enabled():
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self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore
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self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
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# we can't use hs.get_module_api() here, because to do so will create an
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# import loop.
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#
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# TODO: refactor this class to separate the lower-level stuff that
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# ModuleApi can use from the higher-level stuff that uses ModuleApi, as
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# better way to break the loop
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account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self)
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self.password_providers = [
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PasswordProvider.load(module, config, account_handler)
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for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
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]
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logger.info("Extra password_providers: %s", self.password_providers)
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self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
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self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
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self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled
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self._password_localdb_enabled = hs.config.password_localdb_enabled
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# we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can
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# keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first
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# type in the list. (NB that the spec doesn't require us to do so and
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# clients which favour types that they don't understand over those that
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# they do are technically broken)
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# start out by assuming PASSWORD is enabled; we will remove it later if not.
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login_types = []
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if self._password_localdb_enabled:
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login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD)
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for provider in self.password_providers:
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if hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types"):
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for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
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if t not in login_types:
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login_types.append(t)
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if not self._password_enabled:
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login_types.remove(LoginType.PASSWORD)
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self._supported_login_types = login_types
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# Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config
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# as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`.
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter(
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clock=self.clock,
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rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
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burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
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)
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# Ratelimitier for failed /login attempts
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self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter(
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clock=hs.get_clock(),
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rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
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burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
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)
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self._clock = self.hs.get_clock()
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# Expire old UI auth sessions after a period of time.
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if hs.config.run_background_tasks:
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self._clock.looping_call(
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run_as_background_process,
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5 * 60 * 1000,
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"expire_old_sessions",
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self._expire_old_sessions,
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)
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# Load the SSO HTML templates.
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# The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO,
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# after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client.
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# It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account
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# to the client.
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self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_redirect_confirm_template
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# The following template is shown during user interactive authentication
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# in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are
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# authenticating for an operation to occur on their account.
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self._sso_auth_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_auth_confirm_template
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# The following template is shown after a successful user interactive
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# authentication session. It tells the user they can close the window.
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self._sso_auth_success_template = hs.config.sso_auth_success_template
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# The following template is shown during the SSO authentication process if
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# the account is deactivated.
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self._sso_account_deactivated_template = (
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hs.config.sso_account_deactivated_template
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)
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self._server_name = hs.config.server_name
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# cast to tuple for use with str.startswith
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self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist)
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# A mapping of user ID to extra attributes to include in the login
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# response.
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self._extra_attributes = {} # type: Dict[str, SsoLoginExtraAttributes]
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async def validate_user_via_ui_auth(
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self,
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requester: Requester,
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request: SynapseRequest,
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request_body: Dict[str, Any],
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clientip: str,
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description: str,
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) -> Tuple[dict, str]:
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"""
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Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
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This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where
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the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check
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that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
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Args:
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requester: The user, as given by the access token
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request: The request sent by the client.
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request_body: The body of the request sent by the client
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clientip: The IP address of the client.
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description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
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describes the operation happening on their account.
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Returns:
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A tuple of (params, session_id).
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'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
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have been given only in a previous call).
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'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
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client or assigned by this call
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Raises:
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
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any of the permitted login flows
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AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives
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a different user to `requester`
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LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this
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user is too high to proceed
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"""
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user_id = requester.user.to_string()
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# Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(user_id, update=False)
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# build a list of supported flows
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supported_ui_auth_types = await self._get_available_ui_auth_types(
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requester.user
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)
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flows = [[login_type] for login_type in supported_ui_auth_types]
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try:
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result, params, session_id = await self.check_ui_auth(
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flows, request, request_body, clientip, description
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)
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except LoginError:
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# Update the ratelimiter to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise).
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(user_id)
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raise
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# find the completed login type
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for login_type in supported_ui_auth_types:
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if login_type not in result:
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continue
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user_id = result[login_type]
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break
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else:
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# this can't happen
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raise Exception("check_auth returned True but no successful login type")
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# check that the UI auth matched the access token
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if user_id != requester.user.to_string():
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raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth")
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return params, session_id
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async def _get_available_ui_auth_types(self, user: UserID) -> Iterable[str]:
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"""Get a list of the authentication types this user can use
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"""
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ui_auth_types = set()
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# if the HS supports password auth, and the user has a non-null password, we
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# support password auth
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if self._password_localdb_enabled and self._password_enabled:
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lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user.to_string())
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if lookupres:
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_, password_hash = lookupres
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if password_hash:
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ui_auth_types.add(LoginType.PASSWORD)
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# also allow auth from password providers
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for provider in self.password_providers:
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for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
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if t == LoginType.PASSWORD and not self._password_enabled:
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continue
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ui_auth_types.add(t)
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# if sso is enabled, allow the user to log in via SSO iff they have a mapping
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# from sso to mxid.
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if self.hs.config.saml2.saml2_enabled or self.hs.config.oidc.oidc_enabled:
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if await self.store.get_external_ids_by_user(user.to_string()):
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ui_auth_types.add(LoginType.SSO)
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# Our CAS impl does not (yet) correctly register users in user_external_ids,
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# so always offer that if it's available.
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if self.hs.config.cas.cas_enabled:
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ui_auth_types.add(LoginType.SSO)
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return ui_auth_types
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def get_enabled_auth_types(self):
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"""Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types
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Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current
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config.
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"""
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return self.checkers.keys()
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async def check_ui_auth(
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self,
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flows: List[List[str]],
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request: SynapseRequest,
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clientdict: Dict[str, Any],
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clientip: str,
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description: str,
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) -> Tuple[dict, dict, str]:
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"""
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Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
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protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
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If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use
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synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a
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decorator.
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Args:
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flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
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strings representing auth-types. At least one full
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flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
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request: The request sent by the client.
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clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
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'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
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clientip: The IP address of the client.
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description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
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describes the operation happening on their account.
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Returns:
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A tuple of (creds, params, session_id).
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|
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'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
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'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
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have been given only in a previous call).
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'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
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client or assigned by this call
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Raises:
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
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all the stages in any of the permitted flows.
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"""
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authdict = None
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sid = None # type: Optional[str]
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if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
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authdict = clientdict["auth"]
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del clientdict["auth"]
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if "session" in authdict:
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sid = authdict["session"]
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# Convert the URI and method to strings.
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uri = request.uri.decode("utf-8")
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method = request.method.decode("utf-8")
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# If there's no session ID, create a new session.
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if not sid:
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session = await self.store.create_ui_auth_session(
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clientdict, uri, method, description
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)
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else:
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try:
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session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(sid)
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except StoreError:
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raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (sid,))
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# If the client provides parameters, update what is persisted,
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# otherwise use whatever was last provided.
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#
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# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
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# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
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# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
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# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
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# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
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# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
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# on a homeserver.
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#
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# Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
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# isn't arbitrary.
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#
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# Note that the registration endpoint explicitly removes the
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# "initial_device_display_name" parameter if it is provided
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|
# without a "password" parameter. See the changes to
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|
# synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha.register.RegisterRestServlet.on_POST
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|
# in commit 544722bad23fc31056b9240189c3cbbbf0ffd3f9.
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|
if not clientdict:
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clientdict = session.clientdict
|
|
|
|
# Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of
|
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# the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable
|
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# comparator and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent
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# queries ensure that this comparator has not changed.
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#
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|
# The comparator is based on the requested URI and HTTP method. The
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# client dict (minus the auth dict) should also be checked, but some
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# clients are not spec compliant, just warn for now if the client
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# dict changes.
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if (session.uri, session.method) != (uri, method):
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raise SynapseError(
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403,
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"Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.",
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)
|
|
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if session.clientdict != clientdict:
|
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logger.warning(
|
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"Requested operation has changed during the UI "
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"authentication session. A future version of Synapse "
|
|
"will remove this capability."
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)
|
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|
|
# For backwards compatibility, changes to the client dict are
|
|
# persisted as clients modify them throughout their user interactive
|
|
# authentication flow.
|
|
await self.store.set_ui_auth_clientdict(sid, clientdict)
|
|
|
|
user_agent = request.get_user_agent("")
|
|
|
|
await self.store.add_user_agent_ip_to_ui_auth_session(
|
|
session.session_id, user_agent, clientip
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if not authdict:
|
|
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
|
|
session.session_id, self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# check auth type currently being presented
|
|
errordict = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
|
|
if "type" in authdict:
|
|
login_type = authdict["type"] # type: str
|
|
try:
|
|
result = await self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
|
|
if result:
|
|
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
|
|
session.session_id, login_type, result
|
|
)
|
|
except LoginError as e:
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY:
|
|
# riot used to have a bug where it would request a new
|
|
# validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it
|
|
# got a 401 with a 'flows' field.
|
|
# (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447).
|
|
#
|
|
# Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid
|
|
# breaking old riot deployments.
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
|
|
# so that the client can have another go.
|
|
errordict = e.error_dict()
|
|
|
|
creds = await self.store.get_completed_ui_auth_stages(session.session_id)
|
|
for f in flows:
|
|
if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0:
|
|
# it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can
|
|
# include the password in the case of registering, so only log
|
|
# the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password
|
|
# param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth
|
|
# and is not sensitive).
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r",
|
|
creds,
|
|
list(clientdict),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return creds, clientdict, session.session_id
|
|
|
|
ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
|
|
ret["completed"] = list(creds)
|
|
ret.update(errordict)
|
|
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(session.session_id, ret)
|
|
|
|
async def add_oob_auth(
|
|
self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""
|
|
Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
|
|
session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
|
|
"""
|
|
if stagetype not in self.checkers:
|
|
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
|
|
if "session" not in authdict:
|
|
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
|
|
|
|
result = await self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip)
|
|
if result:
|
|
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
|
|
authdict["session"], stagetype, result
|
|
)
|
|
return True
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""
|
|
Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
|
|
not send a session ID, returns None.
|
|
"""
|
|
sid = None
|
|
if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
|
|
authdict = clientdict["auth"]
|
|
if "session" in authdict:
|
|
sid = authdict["session"]
|
|
return sid
|
|
|
|
async def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None:
|
|
"""
|
|
Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
|
|
request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
|
|
the client.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
|
|
key: The key to store the data under
|
|
value: The data to store
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.store.set_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, value)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
|
|
async def get_session_data(
|
|
self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None
|
|
) -> Any:
|
|
"""
|
|
Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
|
|
key: The key to store the data under
|
|
default: Value to return if the key has not been set
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
return await self.store.get_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, default)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
|
|
async def _expire_old_sessions(self):
|
|
"""
|
|
Invalidate any user interactive authentication sessions that have expired.
|
|
"""
|
|
now = self._clock.time_msec()
|
|
expiration_time = now - self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS
|
|
await self.store.delete_old_ui_auth_sessions(expiration_time)
|
|
|
|
async def _check_auth_dict(
|
|
self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
|
|
) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]:
|
|
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
authdict: auth dict provided by the client
|
|
clientip: IP address of the client
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Result of the stage verification.
|
|
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
|
|
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
|
|
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
|
|
"""
|
|
login_type = authdict["type"]
|
|
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
|
|
if checker is not None:
|
|
res = await checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip)
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
# fall back to the v1 login flow
|
|
canonical_id, _ = await self.validate_login(authdict)
|
|
return canonical_id
|
|
|
|
def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict:
|
|
return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
|
|
|
|
def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict:
|
|
return {
|
|
"policies": {
|
|
"privacy_policy": {
|
|
"version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
|
|
"en": {
|
|
"name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name,
|
|
"url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s"
|
|
% (
|
|
self.hs.config.public_baseurl,
|
|
self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
def _auth_dict_for_flows(
|
|
self, flows: List[List[str]], session_id: str,
|
|
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
public_flows = []
|
|
for f in flows:
|
|
public_flows.append(f)
|
|
|
|
get_params = {
|
|
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
|
|
LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
params = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
|
|
|
|
for f in public_flows:
|
|
for stage in f:
|
|
if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
|
|
params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
"session": session_id,
|
|
"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
|
|
"params": params,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async def get_access_token_for_user_id(
|
|
self,
|
|
user_id: str,
|
|
device_id: Optional[str],
|
|
valid_until_ms: Optional[int],
|
|
puppets_user_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
"""
|
|
Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
|
|
|
|
The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
|
|
mechanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
|
|
|
|
The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: canonical User ID
|
|
device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens.
|
|
None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
|
|
we should always have a device ID)
|
|
valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for
|
|
no expiry.
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The access token for the user's session.
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
|
|
"""
|
|
fmt_expiry = ""
|
|
if valid_until_ms is not None:
|
|
fmt_expiry = time.strftime(
|
|
" until %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(valid_until_ms / 1000.0)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if puppets_user_id:
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Logging in user %s as %s%s", user_id, puppets_user_id, fmt_expiry
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
logger.info(
|
|
"Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
|
|
|
|
access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id)
|
|
await self.store.add_access_token_to_user(
|
|
user_id=user_id,
|
|
token=access_token,
|
|
device_id=device_id,
|
|
valid_until_ms=valid_until_ms,
|
|
puppets_user_id=puppets_user_id,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
|
|
# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
|
|
# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
|
|
# device, so we double-check it here.
|
|
if device_id is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
|
|
raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion")
|
|
|
|
return access_token
|
|
|
|
async def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""
|
|
Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
|
|
insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: complete @user:id
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The canonical_user_id, or None if zero or multiple matches
|
|
"""
|
|
res = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
|
|
if res is not None:
|
|
return res[0]
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
async def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(
|
|
self, user_id: str
|
|
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]:
|
|
"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
|
|
insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
|
|
matches.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` or `None`
|
|
if there is not exactly one match
|
|
"""
|
|
user_infos = await self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
|
|
|
|
result = None
|
|
if not user_infos:
|
|
logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
|
|
elif len(user_infos) == 1:
|
|
# a single match (possibly not exact)
|
|
result = user_infos.popitem()
|
|
elif user_id in user_infos:
|
|
# multiple matches, but one is exact
|
|
result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
|
|
else:
|
|
# multiple matches, none of them exact
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
|
|
"inexactly: %r",
|
|
user_id,
|
|
user_infos.keys(),
|
|
)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]:
|
|
"""Get a the login types supported for the /login API
|
|
|
|
By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
|
|
False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide
|
|
other login types.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
login types
|
|
"""
|
|
return self._supported_login_types
|
|
|
|
async def validate_login(
|
|
self, login_submission: Dict[str, Any], ratelimit: bool = False,
|
|
) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]:
|
|
"""Authenticates the user for the /login API
|
|
|
|
Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate auth types which don't
|
|
have an explicit UIA handler, including m.password.auth.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
|
|
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
|
|
ratelimit: whether to apply the failed_login_attempt ratelimiter
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback
|
|
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
|
|
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
|
|
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
|
|
"""
|
|
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
|
|
if not isinstance(login_type, str):
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Bad parameter: type", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
|
|
|
|
# ideally, we wouldn't be checking the identifier unless we know we have a login
|
|
# method which uses it (https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/8836)
|
|
#
|
|
# But the auth providers' check_auth interface requires a username, so in
|
|
# practice we can only support login methods which we can map to a username
|
|
# anyway.
|
|
|
|
# special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface
|
|
# for the auth providers
|
|
password = login_submission.get("password")
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
|
|
if not self._password_enabled:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.")
|
|
if not isinstance(password, str):
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Bad parameter: password", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
|
|
|
|
# map old-school login fields into new-school "identifier" fields.
|
|
identifier_dict = convert_client_dict_legacy_fields_to_identifier(
|
|
login_submission
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# convert phone type identifiers to generic threepids
|
|
if identifier_dict["type"] == "m.id.phone":
|
|
identifier_dict = login_id_phone_to_thirdparty(identifier_dict)
|
|
|
|
# convert threepid identifiers to user IDs
|
|
if identifier_dict["type"] == "m.id.thirdparty":
|
|
address = identifier_dict.get("address")
|
|
medium = identifier_dict.get("medium")
|
|
|
|
if medium is None or address is None:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid thirdparty identifier")
|
|
|
|
# For emails, canonicalise the address.
|
|
# We store all email addresses canonicalised in the DB.
|
|
# (See add_threepid in synapse/handlers/auth.py)
|
|
if medium == "email":
|
|
try:
|
|
address = canonicalise_email(address)
|
|
except ValueError as e:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, str(e))
|
|
|
|
# We also apply account rate limiting using the 3PID as a key, as
|
|
# otherwise using 3PID bypasses the ratelimiting based on user ID.
|
|
if ratelimit:
|
|
self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
|
|
(medium, address), update=False
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Check for login providers that support 3pid login types
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
|
|
# we've already checked that there is a (valid) password field
|
|
assert isinstance(password, str)
|
|
(
|
|
canonical_user_id,
|
|
callback_3pid,
|
|
) = await self.check_password_provider_3pid(medium, address, password)
|
|
if canonical_user_id:
|
|
# Authentication through password provider and 3pid succeeded
|
|
return canonical_user_id, callback_3pid
|
|
|
|
# No password providers were able to handle this 3pid
|
|
# Check local store
|
|
user_id = await self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
|
|
medium, address
|
|
)
|
|
if not user_id:
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"unknown 3pid identifier medium %s, address %r", medium, address
|
|
)
|
|
# We mark that we've failed to log in here, as
|
|
# `check_password_provider_3pid` might have returned `None` due
|
|
# to an incorrect password, rather than the account not
|
|
# existing.
|
|
#
|
|
# If it returned None but the 3PID was bound then we won't hit
|
|
# this code path, which is fine as then the per-user ratelimit
|
|
# will kick in below.
|
|
if ratelimit:
|
|
self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
|
|
(medium, address)
|
|
)
|
|
raise LoginError(403, "", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
identifier_dict = {"type": "m.id.user", "user": user_id}
|
|
|
|
# by this point, the identifier should be an m.id.user: if it's anything
|
|
# else, we haven't understood it.
|
|
if identifier_dict["type"] != "m.id.user":
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login identifier type")
|
|
|
|
username = identifier_dict.get("user")
|
|
if not username:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "User identifier is missing 'user' key")
|
|
|
|
if username.startswith("@"):
|
|
qualified_user_id = username
|
|
else:
|
|
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
|
|
|
|
# Check if we've hit the failed ratelimit (but don't update it)
|
|
if ratelimit:
|
|
self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
|
|
qualified_user_id.lower(), update=False
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
return await self._validate_userid_login(username, login_submission)
|
|
except LoginError:
|
|
# The user has failed to log in, so we need to update the rate
|
|
# limiter. Using `can_do_action` avoids us raising a ratelimit
|
|
# exception and masking the LoginError. The actual ratelimiting
|
|
# should have happened above.
|
|
if ratelimit:
|
|
self._failed_login_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(
|
|
qualified_user_id.lower()
|
|
)
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
async def _validate_userid_login(
|
|
self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any],
|
|
) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]:
|
|
"""Helper for validate_login
|
|
|
|
Handles login, once we've mapped 3pids onto userids
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
username: the username, from the identifier dict
|
|
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
|
|
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback
|
|
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
|
|
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
|
|
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
|
|
"""
|
|
if username.startswith("@"):
|
|
qualified_user_id = username
|
|
else:
|
|
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
|
|
|
|
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
|
|
# we already checked that we have a valid login type
|
|
assert isinstance(login_type, str)
|
|
|
|
known_login_type = False
|
|
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types()
|
|
if login_type not in supported_login_types:
|
|
# this password provider doesn't understand this login type
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
known_login_type = True
|
|
login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type]
|
|
|
|
missing_fields = []
|
|
login_dict = {}
|
|
for f in login_fields:
|
|
if f not in login_submission:
|
|
missing_fields.append(f)
|
|
else:
|
|
login_dict[f] = login_submission[f]
|
|
if missing_fields:
|
|
raise SynapseError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"Missing parameters for login type %s: %s"
|
|
% (login_type, missing_fields),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
result = await provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict)
|
|
if result:
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self._password_localdb_enabled:
|
|
known_login_type = True
|
|
|
|
# we've already checked that there is a (valid) password field
|
|
password = login_submission["password"]
|
|
assert isinstance(password, str)
|
|
|
|
canonical_user_id = await self._check_local_password(
|
|
qualified_user_id, password
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if canonical_user_id:
|
|
return canonical_user_id, None
|
|
|
|
if not known_login_type:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type)
|
|
|
|
# We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive
|
|
# login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway.
|
|
raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
async def check_password_provider_3pid(
|
|
self, medium: str, address: str, password: str
|
|
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]:
|
|
"""Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
|
|
address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
|
|
password: The password of the user.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A tuple of `(user_id, callback)`. If authentication is successful,
|
|
`user_id`is the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is
|
|
then either a function to be later run after the server has
|
|
completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was
|
|
unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`.
|
|
"""
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
result = await provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password)
|
|
if result:
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
return None, None
|
|
|
|
async def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
|
|
|
|
user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
|
|
multiple inexact matches.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: complete @user:id
|
|
password: the provided password
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user/bad password
|
|
"""
|
|
lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
|
|
if not lookupres:
|
|
return None
|
|
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
|
|
|
|
# If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated
|
|
if not password_hash:
|
|
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id)
|
|
if deactivated:
|
|
raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated")
|
|
|
|
result = await self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
|
|
if not result:
|
|
logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
|
|
return None
|
|
return user_id
|
|
|
|
async def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str):
|
|
auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
|
|
user_id = None
|
|
try:
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token)
|
|
user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
|
|
auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", user_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
|
|
return user_id
|
|
|
|
async def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str):
|
|
"""Invalidate a single access token
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
access_token: access token to be deleted
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
user_info = await self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token)
|
|
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
|
|
|
|
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
await provider.on_logged_out(
|
|
user_id=user_info.user_id,
|
|
device_id=user_info.device_id,
|
|
access_token=access_token,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# delete pushers associated with this access token
|
|
if user_info.token_id is not None:
|
|
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
|
|
user_info.user_id, (user_info.token_id,)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def delete_access_tokens_for_user(
|
|
self,
|
|
user_id: str,
|
|
except_token_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
device_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to
|
|
except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted
|
|
device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with.
|
|
If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
|
|
be deleted
|
|
"""
|
|
tokens_and_devices = await self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
|
|
user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices:
|
|
await provider.on_logged_out(
|
|
user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# delete pushers associated with the access tokens
|
|
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
|
|
user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def add_threepid(
|
|
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int
|
|
):
|
|
# check if medium has a valid value
|
|
if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]:
|
|
raise SynapseError(
|
|
code=400,
|
|
msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)),
|
|
errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
|
|
# We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that
|
|
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
|
|
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
|
|
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
|
|
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
|
|
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
|
|
# for the presence of an email address during password reset was
|
|
# case sensitive).
|
|
if medium == "email":
|
|
address = canonicalise_email(address)
|
|
|
|
await self.store.user_add_threepid(
|
|
user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def delete_threepid(
|
|
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
|
|
from the local database.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from.
|
|
medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn".
|
|
address: The 3pid address to remove.
|
|
id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding
|
|
any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
|
|
identity server specified when binding (if known).
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
|
|
the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
|
|
unbind API.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above
|
|
if medium == "email":
|
|
address = canonicalise_email(address)
|
|
|
|
identity_handler = self.hs.get_identity_handler()
|
|
result = await identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid(
|
|
user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
await self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
async def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password: Password to hash.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Hashed password.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def _do_hash():
|
|
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
|
|
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
|
|
|
|
return bcrypt.hashpw(
|
|
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
|
|
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds),
|
|
).decode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
|
|
|
|
async def validate_hash(
|
|
self, password: str, stored_hash: Union[bytes, str]
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password: Password to hash.
|
|
stored_hash: Expected hash value.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def _do_validate_hash(checked_hash: bytes):
|
|
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
|
|
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
|
|
|
|
return bcrypt.checkpw(
|
|
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
|
|
checked_hash,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if stored_hash:
|
|
if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes):
|
|
stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
return await defer_to_thread(
|
|
self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash, stored_hash
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
async def start_sso_ui_auth(self, redirect_url: str, session_id: str) -> str:
|
|
"""
|
|
Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
redirect_url: The URL to redirect to the SSO provider.
|
|
session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The HTML to render.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(session_id)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render(
|
|
description=session.description, redirect_url=redirect_url,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def complete_sso_ui_auth(
|
|
self, registered_user_id: str, session_id: str, request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
|
|
request: The request to complete.
|
|
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
|
|
process.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Mark the stage of the authentication as successful.
|
|
# Save the user who authenticated with SSO, this will be used to ensure
|
|
# that the account be modified is also the person who logged in.
|
|
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
|
|
session_id, LoginType.SSO, registered_user_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Render the HTML and return.
|
|
html = self._sso_auth_success_template
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 200, html)
|
|
|
|
async def complete_sso_login(
|
|
self,
|
|
registered_user_id: str,
|
|
request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
client_redirect_url: str,
|
|
extra_attributes: Optional[JsonDict] = None,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
|
|
request: The request to complete.
|
|
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
|
|
process.
|
|
extra_attributes: Extra attributes which will be passed to the client
|
|
during successful login. Must be JSON serializable.
|
|
"""
|
|
# If the account has been deactivated, do not proceed with the login
|
|
# flow.
|
|
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(registered_user_id)
|
|
if deactivated:
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 403, self._sso_account_deactivated_template)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
self._complete_sso_login(
|
|
registered_user_id, request, client_redirect_url, extra_attributes
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def _complete_sso_login(
|
|
self,
|
|
registered_user_id: str,
|
|
request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
client_redirect_url: str,
|
|
extra_attributes: Optional[JsonDict] = None,
|
|
):
|
|
"""
|
|
The synchronous portion of complete_sso_login.
|
|
|
|
This exists purely for backwards compatibility of synapse.module_api.ModuleApi.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Store any extra attributes which will be passed in the login response.
|
|
# Note that this is per-user so it may overwrite a previous value, this
|
|
# is considered OK since the newest SSO attributes should be most valid.
|
|
if extra_attributes:
|
|
self._extra_attributes[registered_user_id] = SsoLoginExtraAttributes(
|
|
self._clock.time_msec(), extra_attributes,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Create a login token
|
|
login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token(
|
|
registered_user_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query
|
|
# parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to
|
|
# redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link.
|
|
redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url(
|
|
client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it
|
|
if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients):
|
|
request.redirect(redirect_url)
|
|
finish_request(request)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page.
|
|
|
|
# Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of
|
|
# it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the
|
|
# URL we redirect users to.
|
|
redirect_url_no_params = client_redirect_url.split("?")[0]
|
|
|
|
html = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render(
|
|
display_url=redirect_url_no_params,
|
|
redirect_url=redirect_url,
|
|
server_name=self._server_name,
|
|
)
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 200, html)
|
|
|
|
async def _sso_login_callback(self, login_result: JsonDict) -> None:
|
|
"""
|
|
A login callback which might add additional attributes to the login response.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
login_result: The data to be sent to the client. Includes the user
|
|
ID and access token.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Expire attributes before processing. Note that there shouldn't be any
|
|
# valid logins that still have extra attributes.
|
|
self._expire_sso_extra_attributes()
|
|
|
|
extra_attributes = self._extra_attributes.get(login_result["user_id"])
|
|
if extra_attributes:
|
|
login_result.update(extra_attributes.extra_attributes)
|
|
|
|
def _expire_sso_extra_attributes(self) -> None:
|
|
"""
|
|
Iterate through the mapping of user IDs to extra attributes and remove any that are no longer valid.
|
|
"""
|
|
# TODO This should match the amount of time the macaroon is valid for.
|
|
LOGIN_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_TIME = 2 * 60 * 1000
|
|
expire_before = self._clock.time_msec() - LOGIN_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_TIME
|
|
to_expire = set()
|
|
for user_id, data in self._extra_attributes.items():
|
|
if data.creation_time < expire_before:
|
|
to_expire.add(user_id)
|
|
for user_id in to_expire:
|
|
logger.debug("Expiring extra attributes for user %s", user_id)
|
|
del self._extra_attributes[user_id]
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any):
|
|
url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url))
|
|
query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4]))
|
|
query.update({param_name: param})
|
|
url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
|
|
return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@attr.s(slots=True)
|
|
class MacaroonGenerator:
|
|
|
|
hs = attr.ib()
|
|
|
|
def generate_access_token(
|
|
self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
|
|
# Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different
|
|
# access token.
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(
|
|
"nonce = %s" % (stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),)
|
|
)
|
|
for caveat in extra_caveats:
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_short_term_login_token(
|
|
self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000)
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
|
|
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon:
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
|
|
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
|
|
identifier="key",
|
|
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key,
|
|
)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
|
|
return macaroon
|
|
|
|
|
|
class PasswordProvider:
|
|
"""Wrapper for a password auth provider module
|
|
|
|
This class abstracts out all of the backwards-compatibility hacks for
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password providers, to provide a consistent interface.
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"""
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@classmethod
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def load(cls, module, config, module_api: ModuleApi) -> "PasswordProvider":
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try:
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pp = module(config=config, account_handler=module_api)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error("Error while initializing %r: %s", module, e)
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raise
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return cls(pp, module_api)
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def __init__(self, pp, module_api: ModuleApi):
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self._pp = pp
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self._module_api = module_api
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self._supported_login_types = {}
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# grandfather in check_password support
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if hasattr(self._pp, "check_password"):
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self._supported_login_types[LoginType.PASSWORD] = ("password",)
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|
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g = getattr(self._pp, "get_supported_login_types", None)
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if g:
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self._supported_login_types.update(g())
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|
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def __str__(self):
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return str(self._pp)
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def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Mapping[str, Iterable[str]]:
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"""Get the login types supported by this password provider
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|
|
|
Returns a map from a login type identifier (such as m.login.password) to an
|
|
iterable giving the fields which must be provided by the user in the submission
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|
to the /login API.
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|
|
|
This wrapper adds m.login.password to the list if the underlying password
|
|
provider supports the check_password() api.
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|
"""
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|
return self._supported_login_types
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|
|
|
async def check_auth(
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|
self, username: str, login_type: str, login_dict: JsonDict
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|
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, Optional[Callable]]]:
|
|
"""Check if the user has presented valid login credentials
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|
|
|
This wrapper also calls check_password() if the underlying password provider
|
|
supports the check_password() api and the login type is m.login.password.
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|
|
|
Args:
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|
username: user id presented by the client. Either an MXID or an unqualified
|
|
username.
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|
|
|
login_type: the login type being attempted - one of the types returned by
|
|
get_supported_login_types()
|
|
|
|
login_dict: the dictionary of login secrets passed by the client.
|
|
|
|
Returns: (user_id, callback) where `user_id` is the fully-qualified mxid of the
|
|
user, and `callback` is an optional callback which will be called with the
|
|
result from the /login call (including access_token, device_id, etc.)
|
|
"""
|
|
# first grandfather in a call to check_password
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
|
|
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_password", None)
|
|
if g:
|
|
qualified_user_id = self._module_api.get_qualified_user_id(username)
|
|
is_valid = await self._pp.check_password(
|
|
qualified_user_id, login_dict["password"]
|
|
)
|
|
if is_valid:
|
|
return qualified_user_id, None
|
|
|
|
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_auth", None)
|
|
if not g:
|
|
return None
|
|
result = await g(username, login_type, login_dict)
|
|
|
|
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
|
|
if isinstance(result, str):
|
|
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
|
|
return result, None
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
async def check_3pid_auth(
|
|
self, medium: str, address: str, password: str
|
|
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, Optional[Callable]]]:
|
|
g = getattr(self._pp, "check_3pid_auth", None)
|
|
if not g:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
# This function is able to return a deferred that either
|
|
# resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon
|
|
# success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of
|
|
# (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run
|
|
# after we've finished everything else
|
|
result = await g(medium, address, password)
|
|
|
|
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
|
|
if isinstance(result, str):
|
|
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
|
|
return result, None
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
async def on_logged_out(
|
|
self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], access_token: str
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
g = getattr(self._pp, "on_logged_out", None)
|
|
if not g:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# This might return an awaitable, if it does block the log out
|
|
# until it completes.
|
|
result = g(user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=access_token,)
|
|
if inspect.isawaitable(result):
|
|
await result
|