832 lines
31 KiB
Python
832 lines
31 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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import logging
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from six import itervalues
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import pymacaroons
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from netaddr import IPAddress
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from twisted.internet import defer
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import synapse.types
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from synapse import event_auth
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from synapse.api.constants import EventTypes, JoinRules, Membership
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from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, Codes, ResourceLimitError
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from synapse.config.server import is_threepid_reserved
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from synapse.types import UserID
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from synapse.util.caches import CACHE_SIZE_FACTOR, register_cache
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from synapse.util.caches.lrucache import LruCache
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from synapse.util.metrics import Measure
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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AuthEventTypes = (
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EventTypes.Create, EventTypes.Member, EventTypes.PowerLevels,
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EventTypes.JoinRules, EventTypes.RoomHistoryVisibility,
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EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite,
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)
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# guests always get this device id.
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GUEST_DEVICE_ID = "guest_device"
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class _InvalidMacaroonException(Exception):
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pass
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class Auth(object):
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"""
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FIXME: This class contains a mix of functions for authenticating users
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of our client-server API and authenticating events added to room graphs.
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"""
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def __init__(self, hs):
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self.hs = hs
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self.clock = hs.get_clock()
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self.store = hs.get_datastore()
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self.state = hs.get_state_handler()
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS = 401
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self.token_cache = LruCache(CACHE_SIZE_FACTOR * 10000)
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register_cache("cache", "token_cache", self.token_cache)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_from_context(self, room_version, event, context, do_sig_check=True):
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prev_state_ids = yield context.get_prev_state_ids(self.store)
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auth_events_ids = yield self.compute_auth_events(
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event, prev_state_ids, for_verification=True,
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)
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auth_events = yield self.store.get_events(auth_events_ids)
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auth_events = {
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(e.type, e.state_key): e for e in itervalues(auth_events)
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}
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self.check(
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room_version, event,
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auth_events=auth_events, do_sig_check=do_sig_check,
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)
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def check(self, room_version, event, auth_events, do_sig_check=True):
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""" Checks if this event is correctly authed.
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Args:
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room_version (str): version of the room
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event: the event being checked.
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auth_events (dict: event-key -> event): the existing room state.
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Returns:
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True if the auth checks pass.
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"""
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with Measure(self.clock, "auth.check"):
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event_auth.check(
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room_version, event, auth_events, do_sig_check=do_sig_check
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)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_joined_room(self, room_id, user_id, current_state=None):
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"""Check if the user is currently joined in the room
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Args:
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room_id(str): The room to check.
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user_id(str): The user to check.
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current_state(dict): Optional map of the current state of the room.
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If provided then that map is used to check whether they are a
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member of the room. Otherwise the current membership is
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loaded from the database.
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Raises:
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AuthError if the user is not in the room.
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Returns:
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A deferred membership event for the user if the user is in
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the room.
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"""
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if current_state:
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member = current_state.get(
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(EventTypes.Member, user_id),
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None
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)
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else:
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member = yield self.state.get_current_state(
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room_id=room_id,
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event_type=EventTypes.Member,
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state_key=user_id
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)
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self._check_joined_room(member, user_id, room_id)
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defer.returnValue(member)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_user_was_in_room(self, room_id, user_id):
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"""Check if the user was in the room at some point.
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Args:
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room_id(str): The room to check.
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user_id(str): The user to check.
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Raises:
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AuthError if the user was never in the room.
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Returns:
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A deferred membership event for the user if the user was in the
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room. This will be the join event if they are currently joined to
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the room. This will be the leave event if they have left the room.
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"""
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member = yield self.state.get_current_state(
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room_id=room_id,
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event_type=EventTypes.Member,
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state_key=user_id
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)
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membership = member.membership if member else None
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if membership not in (Membership.JOIN, Membership.LEAVE):
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raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s" % (
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user_id, room_id
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))
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if membership == Membership.LEAVE:
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forgot = yield self.store.did_forget(user_id, room_id)
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if forgot:
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raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s" % (
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user_id, room_id
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))
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defer.returnValue(member)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_host_in_room(self, room_id, host):
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with Measure(self.clock, "check_host_in_room"):
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latest_event_ids = yield self.store.is_host_joined(room_id, host)
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defer.returnValue(latest_event_ids)
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def _check_joined_room(self, member, user_id, room_id):
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if not member or member.membership != Membership.JOIN:
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raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s (%s)" % (
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user_id, room_id, repr(member)
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))
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def can_federate(self, event, auth_events):
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creation_event = auth_events.get((EventTypes.Create, ""))
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return creation_event.content.get("m.federate", True) is True
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def get_public_keys(self, invite_event):
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return event_auth.get_public_keys(invite_event)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def get_user_by_req(self, request, allow_guest=False, rights="access"):
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""" Get a registered user's ID.
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Args:
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request - An HTTP request with an access_token query parameter.
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Returns:
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defer.Deferred: resolves to a ``synapse.types.Requester`` object
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Raises:
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AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid.
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"""
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# Can optionally look elsewhere in the request (e.g. headers)
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try:
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ip_addr = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
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user_agent = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders(
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b"User-Agent",
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default=[b""]
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)[0].decode('ascii', 'surrogateescape')
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access_token = self.get_access_token_from_request(
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request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS
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)
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user_id, app_service = yield self._get_appservice_user_id(request)
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if user_id:
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request.authenticated_entity = user_id
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if ip_addr and self.hs.config.track_appservice_user_ips:
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yield self.store.insert_client_ip(
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user_id=user_id,
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access_token=access_token,
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ip=ip_addr,
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user_agent=user_agent,
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device_id="dummy-device", # stubbed
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)
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defer.returnValue(
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synapse.types.create_requester(user_id, app_service=app_service)
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)
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user_info = yield self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, rights)
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user = user_info["user"]
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token_id = user_info["token_id"]
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is_guest = user_info["is_guest"]
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# device_id may not be present if get_user_by_access_token has been
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# stubbed out.
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device_id = user_info.get("device_id")
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if user and access_token and ip_addr:
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yield self.store.insert_client_ip(
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user_id=user.to_string(),
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access_token=access_token,
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ip=ip_addr,
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user_agent=user_agent,
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device_id=device_id,
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)
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if is_guest and not allow_guest:
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raise AuthError(
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403, "Guest access not allowed", errcode=Codes.GUEST_ACCESS_FORBIDDEN
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)
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request.authenticated_entity = user.to_string()
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defer.returnValue(synapse.types.create_requester(
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user, token_id, is_guest, device_id, app_service=app_service)
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)
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except KeyError:
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token.",
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errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN
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)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request):
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app_service = self.store.get_app_service_by_token(
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self.get_access_token_from_request(
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request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS
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)
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)
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if app_service is None:
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defer.returnValue((None, None))
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if app_service.ip_range_whitelist:
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ip_address = IPAddress(self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request))
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if ip_address not in app_service.ip_range_whitelist:
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defer.returnValue((None, None))
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if b"user_id" not in request.args:
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defer.returnValue((app_service.sender, app_service))
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user_id = request.args[b"user_id"][0].decode('utf8')
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if app_service.sender == user_id:
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defer.returnValue((app_service.sender, app_service))
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if not app_service.is_interested_in_user(user_id):
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raise AuthError(
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403,
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"Application service cannot masquerade as this user."
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)
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if not (yield self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id)):
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raise AuthError(
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403,
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"Application service has not registered this user"
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)
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defer.returnValue((user_id, app_service))
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def get_user_by_access_token(self, token, rights="access"):
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""" Validate access token and get user_id from it
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Args:
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token (str): The access token to get the user by.
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rights (str): The operation being performed; the access token must
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allow this.
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Returns:
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Deferred[dict]: dict that includes:
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`user` (UserID)
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`is_guest` (bool)
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`token_id` (int|None): access token id. May be None if guest
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`device_id` (str|None): device corresponding to access token
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Raises:
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AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid.
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"""
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if rights == "access":
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# first look in the database
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r = yield self._look_up_user_by_access_token(token)
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if r:
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defer.returnValue(r)
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# otherwise it needs to be a valid macaroon
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try:
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user_id, guest = self._parse_and_validate_macaroon(token, rights)
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user = UserID.from_string(user_id)
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if rights == "access":
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if not guest:
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# non-guest access tokens must be in the database
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logger.warning("Unrecognised access token - not in store.")
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
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"Unrecognised access token.",
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN,
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)
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# Guest access tokens are not stored in the database (there can
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# only be one access token per guest, anyway).
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#
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# In order to prevent guest access tokens being used as regular
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# user access tokens (and hence getting around the invalidation
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# process), we look up the user id and check that it is indeed
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# a guest user.
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#
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# It would of course be much easier to store guest access
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# tokens in the database as well, but that would break existing
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# guest tokens.
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stored_user = yield self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id)
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if not stored_user:
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
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"Unknown user_id %s" % user_id,
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
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)
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if not stored_user["is_guest"]:
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
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"Guest access token used for regular user",
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
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)
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ret = {
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"user": user,
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"is_guest": True,
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"token_id": None,
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# all guests get the same device id
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"device_id": GUEST_DEVICE_ID,
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}
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elif rights == "delete_pusher":
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# We don't store these tokens in the database
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ret = {
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"user": user,
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"is_guest": False,
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"token_id": None,
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"device_id": None,
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}
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else:
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raise RuntimeError("Unknown rights setting %s", rights)
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defer.returnValue(ret)
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except (
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_InvalidMacaroonException,
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pymacaroons.exceptions.MacaroonException,
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TypeError,
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ValueError,
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) as e:
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logger.warning("Invalid macaroon in auth: %s %s", type(e), e)
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Invalid macaroon passed.",
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
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)
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def _parse_and_validate_macaroon(self, token, rights="access"):
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"""Takes a macaroon and tries to parse and validate it. This is cached
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if and only if rights == access and there isn't an expiry.
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On invalid macaroon raises _InvalidMacaroonException
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Returns:
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(user_id, is_guest)
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"""
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if rights == "access":
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cached = self.token_cache.get(token, None)
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if cached:
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return cached
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try:
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macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(token)
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except Exception: # deserialize can throw more-or-less anything
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# doesn't look like a macaroon: treat it as an opaque token which
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# must be in the database.
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# TODO: it would be nice to get rid of this, but apparently some
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# people use access tokens which aren't macaroons
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raise _InvalidMacaroonException()
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try:
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user_id = self.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
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has_expiry = False
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guest = False
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for caveat in macaroon.caveats:
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if caveat.caveat_id.startswith("time "):
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has_expiry = True
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elif caveat.caveat_id == "guest = true":
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guest = True
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self.validate_macaroon(
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macaroon, rights, self.hs.config.expire_access_token,
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user_id=user_id,
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)
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except (pymacaroons.exceptions.MacaroonException, TypeError, ValueError):
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Invalid macaroon passed.",
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
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)
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if not has_expiry and rights == "access":
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self.token_cache[token] = (user_id, guest)
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return user_id, guest
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def get_user_id_from_macaroon(self, macaroon):
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"""Retrieve the user_id given by the caveats on the macaroon.
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Does *not* validate the macaroon.
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Args:
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macaroon (pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate
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Returns:
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(str) user id
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Raises:
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AuthError if there is no user_id caveat in the macaroon
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"""
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user_prefix = "user_id = "
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for caveat in macaroon.caveats:
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if caveat.caveat_id.startswith(user_prefix):
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return caveat.caveat_id[len(user_prefix):]
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raise AuthError(
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self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "No user caveat in macaroon",
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errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
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)
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def validate_macaroon(self, macaroon, type_string, verify_expiry, user_id):
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"""
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validate that a Macaroon is understood by and was signed by this server.
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Args:
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macaroon(pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate
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type_string(str): The kind of token required (e.g. "access",
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"delete_pusher")
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verify_expiry(bool): Whether to verify whether the macaroon has expired.
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user_id (str): The user_id required
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"""
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v = pymacaroons.Verifier()
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# the verifier runs a test for every caveat on the macaroon, to check
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# that it is met for the current request. Each caveat must match at
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# least one of the predicates specified by satisfy_exact or
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# specify_general.
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v.satisfy_exact("gen = 1")
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v.satisfy_exact("type = " + type_string)
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v.satisfy_exact("user_id = %s" % user_id)
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v.satisfy_exact("guest = true")
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# verify_expiry should really always be True, but there exist access
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# tokens in the wild which expire when they should not, so we can't
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# enforce expiry yet (so we have to allow any caveat starting with
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# 'time < ' in access tokens).
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#
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# On the other hand, short-term login tokens (as used by CAS login, for
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# example) have an expiry time which we do want to enforce.
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if verify_expiry:
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v.satisfy_general(self._verify_expiry)
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else:
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v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("time < "))
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# access_tokens include a nonce for uniqueness: any value is acceptable
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v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("nonce = "))
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v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key)
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def _verify_expiry(self, caveat):
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prefix = "time < "
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if not caveat.startswith(prefix):
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return False
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expiry = int(caveat[len(prefix):])
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now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
return now < expiry
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def _look_up_user_by_access_token(self, token):
|
|
ret = yield self.store.get_user_by_access_token(token)
|
|
if not ret:
|
|
defer.returnValue(None)
|
|
|
|
# we use ret.get() below because *lots* of unit tests stub out
|
|
# get_user_by_access_token in a way where it only returns a couple of
|
|
# the fields.
|
|
user_info = {
|
|
"user": UserID.from_string(ret.get("name")),
|
|
"token_id": ret.get("token_id", None),
|
|
"is_guest": False,
|
|
"device_id": ret.get("device_id"),
|
|
}
|
|
defer.returnValue(user_info)
|
|
|
|
def get_appservice_by_req(self, request):
|
|
try:
|
|
token = self.get_access_token_from_request(
|
|
request, self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS
|
|
)
|
|
service = self.store.get_app_service_by_token(token)
|
|
if not service:
|
|
logger.warn("Unrecognised appservice access token.")
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
|
|
"Unrecognised access token.",
|
|
errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
|
|
)
|
|
request.authenticated_entity = service.sender
|
|
return defer.succeed(service)
|
|
except KeyError:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def is_server_admin(self, user):
|
|
""" Check if the given user is a local server admin.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user (str): mxid of user to check
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
bool: True if the user is an admin
|
|
"""
|
|
return self.store.is_server_admin(user)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def compute_auth_events(self, event, current_state_ids, for_verification=False):
|
|
if event.type == EventTypes.Create:
|
|
defer.returnValue([])
|
|
|
|
auth_ids = []
|
|
|
|
key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", )
|
|
power_level_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
|
|
if power_level_event_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(power_level_event_id)
|
|
|
|
key = (EventTypes.JoinRules, "", )
|
|
join_rule_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
|
|
key = (EventTypes.Member, event.sender, )
|
|
member_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
|
|
key = (EventTypes.Create, "", )
|
|
create_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
if create_event_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(create_event_id)
|
|
|
|
if join_rule_event_id:
|
|
join_rule_event = yield self.store.get_event(join_rule_event_id)
|
|
join_rule = join_rule_event.content.get("join_rule")
|
|
is_public = join_rule == JoinRules.PUBLIC if join_rule else False
|
|
else:
|
|
is_public = False
|
|
|
|
if event.type == EventTypes.Member:
|
|
e_type = event.content["membership"]
|
|
if e_type in [Membership.JOIN, Membership.INVITE]:
|
|
if join_rule_event_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(join_rule_event_id)
|
|
|
|
if e_type == Membership.JOIN:
|
|
if member_event_id and not is_public:
|
|
auth_ids.append(member_event_id)
|
|
else:
|
|
if member_event_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(member_event_id)
|
|
|
|
if for_verification:
|
|
key = (EventTypes.Member, event.state_key, )
|
|
existing_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
if existing_event_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(existing_event_id)
|
|
|
|
if e_type == Membership.INVITE:
|
|
if "third_party_invite" in event.content:
|
|
key = (
|
|
EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite,
|
|
event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"]["token"]
|
|
)
|
|
third_party_invite_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
|
|
if third_party_invite_id:
|
|
auth_ids.append(third_party_invite_id)
|
|
elif member_event_id:
|
|
member_event = yield self.store.get_event(member_event_id)
|
|
if member_event.content["membership"] == Membership.JOIN:
|
|
auth_ids.append(member_event.event_id)
|
|
|
|
defer.returnValue(auth_ids)
|
|
|
|
def check_redaction(self, room_version, event, auth_events):
|
|
"""Check whether the event sender is allowed to redact the target event.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
True if the the sender is allowed to redact the target event if the
|
|
target event was created by them.
|
|
False if the sender is allowed to redact the target event with no
|
|
further checks.
|
|
|
|
Raises:
|
|
AuthError if the event sender is definitely not allowed to redact
|
|
the target event.
|
|
"""
|
|
return event_auth.check_redaction(room_version, event, auth_events)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def check_can_change_room_list(self, room_id, user):
|
|
"""Check if the user is allowed to edit the room's entry in the
|
|
published room list.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
room_id (str)
|
|
user (UserID)
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
is_admin = yield self.is_server_admin(user)
|
|
if is_admin:
|
|
defer.returnValue(True)
|
|
|
|
user_id = user.to_string()
|
|
yield self.check_joined_room(room_id, user_id)
|
|
|
|
# We currently require the user is a "moderator" in the room. We do this
|
|
# by checking if they would (theoretically) be able to change the
|
|
# m.room.aliases events
|
|
power_level_event = yield self.state.get_current_state(
|
|
room_id, EventTypes.PowerLevels, ""
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
auth_events = {}
|
|
if power_level_event:
|
|
auth_events[(EventTypes.PowerLevels, "")] = power_level_event
|
|
|
|
send_level = event_auth.get_send_level(
|
|
EventTypes.Aliases, "", power_level_event,
|
|
)
|
|
user_level = event_auth.get_user_power_level(user_id, auth_events)
|
|
|
|
if user_level < send_level:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"This server requires you to be a moderator in the room to"
|
|
" edit its room list entry"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def has_access_token(request):
|
|
"""Checks if the request has an access_token.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
bool: False if no access_token was given, True otherwise.
|
|
"""
|
|
query_params = request.args.get(b"access_token")
|
|
auth_headers = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders(b"Authorization")
|
|
return bool(query_params) or bool(auth_headers)
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def get_access_token_from_request(request, token_not_found_http_status=401):
|
|
"""Extracts the access_token from the request.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
request: The http request.
|
|
token_not_found_http_status(int): The HTTP status code to set in the
|
|
AuthError if the token isn't found. This is used in some of the
|
|
legacy APIs to change the status code to 403 from the default of
|
|
401 since some of the old clients depended on auth errors returning
|
|
403.
|
|
Returns:
|
|
unicode: The access_token
|
|
Raises:
|
|
AuthError: If there isn't an access_token in the request.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
auth_headers = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders(b"Authorization")
|
|
query_params = request.args.get(b"access_token")
|
|
if auth_headers:
|
|
# Try the get the access_token from a "Authorization: Bearer"
|
|
# header
|
|
if query_params is not None:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
token_not_found_http_status,
|
|
"Mixing Authorization headers and access_token query parameters.",
|
|
errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN,
|
|
)
|
|
if len(auth_headers) > 1:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
token_not_found_http_status,
|
|
"Too many Authorization headers.",
|
|
errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN,
|
|
)
|
|
parts = auth_headers[0].split(b" ")
|
|
if parts[0] == b"Bearer" and len(parts) == 2:
|
|
return parts[1].decode('ascii')
|
|
else:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
token_not_found_http_status,
|
|
"Invalid Authorization header.",
|
|
errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN,
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
# Try to get the access_token from the query params.
|
|
if not query_params:
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
token_not_found_http_status,
|
|
"Missing access token.",
|
|
errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return query_params[0].decode('ascii')
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def check_in_room_or_world_readable(self, room_id, user_id):
|
|
"""Checks that the user is or was in the room or the room is world
|
|
readable. If it isn't then an exception is raised.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Deferred[tuple[str, str|None]]: Resolves to the current membership of
|
|
the user in the room and the membership event ID of the user. If
|
|
the user is not in the room and never has been, then
|
|
`(Membership.JOIN, None)` is returned.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
# check_user_was_in_room will return the most recent membership
|
|
# event for the user if:
|
|
# * The user is a non-guest user, and was ever in the room
|
|
# * The user is a guest user, and has joined the room
|
|
# else it will throw.
|
|
member_event = yield self.check_user_was_in_room(room_id, user_id)
|
|
defer.returnValue((member_event.membership, member_event.event_id))
|
|
except AuthError:
|
|
visibility = yield self.state.get_current_state(
|
|
room_id, EventTypes.RoomHistoryVisibility, ""
|
|
)
|
|
if (
|
|
visibility and
|
|
visibility.content["history_visibility"] == "world_readable"
|
|
):
|
|
defer.returnValue((Membership.JOIN, None))
|
|
return
|
|
raise AuthError(
|
|
403, "Guest access not allowed", errcode=Codes.GUEST_ACCESS_FORBIDDEN
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def check_auth_blocking(self, user_id=None, threepid=None):
|
|
"""Checks if the user should be rejected for some external reason,
|
|
such as monthly active user limiting or global disable flag
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id(str|None): If present, checks for presence against existing
|
|
MAU cohort
|
|
|
|
threepid(dict|None): If present, checks for presence against configured
|
|
reserved threepid. Used in cases where the user is trying register
|
|
with a MAU blocked server, normally they would be rejected but their
|
|
threepid is on the reserved list. user_id and
|
|
threepid should never be set at the same time.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
# Never fail an auth check for the server notices users or support user
|
|
# This can be a problem where event creation is prohibited due to blocking
|
|
if user_id is not None:
|
|
if user_id == self.hs.config.server_notices_mxid:
|
|
return
|
|
if (yield self.store.is_support_user(user_id)):
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
if self.hs.config.hs_disabled:
|
|
raise ResourceLimitError(
|
|
403, self.hs.config.hs_disabled_message,
|
|
errcode=Codes.RESOURCE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
|
|
admin_contact=self.hs.config.admin_contact,
|
|
limit_type=self.hs.config.hs_disabled_limit_type
|
|
)
|
|
if self.hs.config.limit_usage_by_mau is True:
|
|
assert not (user_id and threepid)
|
|
|
|
# If the user is already part of the MAU cohort or a trial user
|
|
if user_id:
|
|
timestamp = yield self.store.user_last_seen_monthly_active(user_id)
|
|
if timestamp:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
is_trial = yield self.store.is_trial_user(user_id)
|
|
if is_trial:
|
|
return
|
|
elif threepid:
|
|
# If the user does not exist yet, but is signing up with a
|
|
# reserved threepid then pass auth check
|
|
if is_threepid_reserved(
|
|
self.hs.config.mau_limits_reserved_threepids, threepid
|
|
):
|
|
return
|
|
# Else if there is no room in the MAU bucket, bail
|
|
current_mau = yield self.store.get_monthly_active_count()
|
|
if current_mau >= self.hs.config.max_mau_value:
|
|
raise ResourceLimitError(
|
|
403, "Monthly Active User Limit Exceeded",
|
|
admin_contact=self.hs.config.admin_contact,
|
|
errcode=Codes.RESOURCE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED,
|
|
limit_type="monthly_active_user"
|
|
)
|