233 lines
9.7 KiB
Plaintext
233 lines
9.7 KiB
Plaintext
========
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Profiles
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========
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A description of Synapse user profile metadata support.
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Overview
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========
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Internally within Synapse users are referred to by an opaque ID, which consists
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of some opaque localpart combined with the domain name of their home server.
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Obviously this does not yield a very nice user experience; users would like to
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see readable names for other users that are in some way meaningful to them.
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Additionally, users like to be able to publish "profile" details to inform other
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users of other information about them.
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It is also conceivable that since we are attempting to provide a
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worldwide-applicable messaging system, that users may wish to present different
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subsets of information in their profile to different other people, from a
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privacy and permissions perspective.
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A Profile consists of a display name, an (optional?) avatar picture, and a set
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of other metadata fields that the user may wish to publish (email address, phone
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numbers, website URLs, etc...). We put no requirements on the display name other
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than it being a valid Unicode string. Since it is likely that users will end up
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having multiple accounts (perhaps by necessity of being hosted in multiple
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places, perhaps by choice of wanting multiple distinct identifies), it would be
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useful that a metadata field type exists that can refer to another Synapse User
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ID, so that clients and HSes can make use of this information.
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Metadata Fields
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---------------
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[[TODO(paul): Likely this list is incomplete; more fields can be defined as we
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think of them. At the very least, any sort of supported ID for the 3rd Party ID
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servers should be accounted for here.]]
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* Synapse Directory Server username(s)
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* Email address
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* Phone number - classify "home"/"work"/"mobile"/custom?
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* Twitter/Facebook/Google+/... social networks
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* Location - keep this deliberately vague to allow people to choose how
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granular it is
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* "Bio" information - date of birth, etc...
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* Synapse User ID of another account
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* Web URL
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* Freeform description text
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Visibility Permissions
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======================
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A home server implementation could offer the ability to set permissions on
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limited visibility of those fields. When another user requests access to the
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target user's profile, their own identity should form part of that request. The
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HS implementation can then decide which fields to make available to the
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requestor.
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A particular detail of implementation could allow the user to create one or more
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ACLs; where each list is granted permission to see a given set of non-public
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fields (compare to Google+ Circles) and contains a set of other people allowed
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to use it. By giving these ACLs strong identities within the HS, they can be
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referenced in communications with it, granting other users who encounter these
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the "ACL Token" to use the details in that ACL.
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If we further allow an ACL Token to be present on Room join requests or stored
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by 3PID servers, then users of these ACLs gain the extra convenience of not
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having to manually curate people in the access list; anyone in the room or with
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knowledge of the 3rd Party ID is automatically granted access. Every HS and
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client implementation would have to be aware of the existence of these ACL
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Token, and include them in requests if present, but not every HS implementation
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needs to actually provide the full permissions model. This can be used as a
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distinguishing feature among competing implementations. However, servers MUST
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NOT serve profile information from a cache if there is a chance that its limited
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understanding could lead to information leakage.
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Client Concerns of Multiple Accounts
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====================================
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Because a given person may want to have multiple Synapse User accounts, client
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implementations should allow the use of multiple accounts simultaneously
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(especially in the field of mobile phone clients, which generally don't support
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running distinct instances of the same application). Where features like address
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books, presence lists or rooms are presented, the client UI should remember to
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make distinct with user account is in use for each.
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Directory Servers
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=================
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Directory Servers can provide a forward mapping from human-readable names to
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User IDs. These can provide a service similar to giving domain-namespaced names
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for Rooms; in this case they can provide a way for a user to reference their
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User ID in some external form (e.g. that can be printed on a business card).
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The format for Synapse user name will consist of a localpart specific to the
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directory server, and the domain name of that directory server:
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@localname:some.domain.name
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The localname is separated from the domain name using a colon, so as to ensure
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the localname can still contain periods, as users may want this for similarity
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to email addresses or the like, which typically can contain them. The format is
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also visually quite distinct from email addresses, phone numbers, etc... so
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hopefully reasonably "self-describing" when written on e.g. a business card
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without surrounding context.
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[[TODO(paul): we might have to think about this one - too close to email?
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Twitter? Also it suggests a format scheme for room names of
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#localname:domain.name, which I quite like]]
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Directory server administrators should be able to make some kind of policy
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decision on how these are allocated. Servers within some "closed" domain (such
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as company-specific ones) may wish to verify the validity of a mapping using
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their own internal mechanisms; "public" naming servers can operate on a FCFS
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basis. There are overlapping concerns here with the idea of the 3rd party
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identity servers as well, though in this specific case we are creating a new
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namespace to allocate names into.
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It would also be nice from a user experience perspective if the profile that a
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given name links to can also declare that name as part of its metadata.
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Furthermore as a security and consistency perspective it would be nice if each
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end (the directory server and the user's home server) check the validity of the
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mapping in some way. This needs investigation from a security perspective to
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ensure against spoofing.
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One such model may be that the user starts by declaring their intent to use a
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given user name link to their home server, which then contacts the directory
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service. At some point later (maybe immediately for "public open FCFS servers",
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maybe after some kind of human intervention for verification) the DS decides to
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honour this link, and includes it in its served output. It should also tell the
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HS of this fact, so that the HS can present this as fact when requested for the
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profile information. For efficiency, it may further wish to provide the HS with
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a cryptographically-signed certificate as proof, so the HS serving the profile
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can provide that too when asked, avoiding requesting HSes from constantly having
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to contact the DS to verify this mapping. (Note: This is similar to the security
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model often applied in DNS to verify PTR <-> A bidirectional mappings).
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Identity Servers
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================
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The identity servers should support the concept of pointing a 3PID being able to
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store an ACL Token as well as the main User ID. It is however, beyond scope to
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do any kind of verification that any third-party IDs that the profile is
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claiming match up to the 3PID mappings.
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User Interface and Expectations Concerns
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========================================
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Given the weak "security" of some parts of this model as compared to what users
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might expect, some care should be taken on how it is presented to users,
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specifically in the naming or other wording of user interface components.
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Most notably mere knowledge of an ACL Pointer is enough to read the information
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stored in it. It is possible that Home or Identity Servers could leak this
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information, allowing others to see it. This is a security-vs-convenience
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balancing choice on behalf of the user who would choose, or not, to make use of
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such a feature to publish their information.
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Additionally, unless some form of strong end-to-end user-based encryption is
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used, a user of ACLs for information privacy has to trust other home servers not
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to lie about the identify of the user requesting access to the Profile.
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API Requirements
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================
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The data model presented here puts the following requirements on the APIs:
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Client-Server
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-------------
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Requests that a client can make to its Home Server
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* get/set my Display Name
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This should return/take a simple "text/plain" field
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* get/set my Avatar URL
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The avatar image data itself is not stored by this API; we'll just store a
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URL to let the clients fetch it. Optionally HSes could integrate this with
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their generic content attacmhent storage service, allowing a user to set
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upload their profile Avatar and update the URL to point to it.
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* get/add/remove my metadata fields
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Also we need to actually define types of metadata
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* get another user's Display Name / Avatar / metadata fields
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[[TODO(paul): At some later stage we should consider the API for:
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* get/set ACL permissions on my metadata fields
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* manage my ACL tokens
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]]
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Server-Server
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-------------
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Requests that Home Servers make to others
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* get a user's Display Name / Avatar
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* get a user's full profile - name/avatar + MD fields
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This request must allow for specifying the User ID of the requesting user,
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for permissions purposes. It also needs to take into account any ACL Tokens
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the requestor has.
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* push a change of Display Name to observers (overlaps with the presence API)
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Room Event PDU Types
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--------------------
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Events that are pushed from Home Servers to other Home Servers or clients.
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* user Display Name change
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* user Avatar change
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[[TODO(paul): should the avatar image itself be stored in all the room
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histories? maybe this event should just be a hint to clients that they should
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re-fetch the avatar image]]
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