1143 lines
		
	
	
		
			42 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			1143 lines
		
	
	
		
			42 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
| # -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
 | |
| # Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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| #
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| # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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| # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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| # You may obtain a copy of the License at
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| #
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| #     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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| #
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| # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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| # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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| # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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| # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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| # limitations under the License.
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| 
 | |
| import logging
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| 
 | |
| import pymacaroons
 | |
| from canonicaljson import encode_canonical_json
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| from signedjson.key import decode_verify_key_bytes
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| from signedjson.sign import verify_signed_json, SignatureVerifyException
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| from twisted.internet import defer
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| from unpaddedbase64 import decode_base64
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| 
 | |
| import synapse.types
 | |
| from synapse.api.constants import EventTypes, Membership, JoinRules
 | |
| from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, Codes, SynapseError, EventSizeError
 | |
| from synapse.types import UserID, get_domain_from_id
 | |
| from synapse.util.logcontext import preserve_context_over_fn
 | |
| from synapse.util.logutils import log_function
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| from synapse.util.metrics import Measure
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| 
 | |
| logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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| 
 | |
| 
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| AuthEventTypes = (
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|     EventTypes.Create, EventTypes.Member, EventTypes.PowerLevels,
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|     EventTypes.JoinRules, EventTypes.RoomHistoryVisibility,
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|     EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite,
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| )
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| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| class Auth(object):
 | |
|     """
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|     FIXME: This class contains a mix of functions for authenticating users
 | |
|     of our client-server API and authenticating events added to room graphs.
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|     """
 | |
|     def __init__(self, hs):
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|         self.hs = hs
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|         self.clock = hs.get_clock()
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|         self.store = hs.get_datastore()
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|         self.state = hs.get_state_handler()
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|         self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS = 401
 | |
|         # Docs for these currently lives at
 | |
|         # github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/master/drafts/macaroons_caveats.rst
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|         # In addition, we have type == delete_pusher which grants access only to
 | |
|         # delete pushers.
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|         self._KNOWN_CAVEAT_PREFIXES = set([
 | |
|             "gen = ",
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|             "guest = ",
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|             "type = ",
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|             "time < ",
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|             "user_id = ",
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|         ])
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| 
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|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def check_from_context(self, event, context, do_sig_check=True):
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|         auth_events_ids = yield self.compute_auth_events(
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|             event, context.current_state_ids, for_verification=True,
 | |
|         )
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|         auth_events = yield self.store.get_events(auth_events_ids)
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|         auth_events = {
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|             (e.type, e.state_key): e for e in auth_events.values()
 | |
|         }
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|         self.check(event, auth_events=auth_events, do_sig_check=False)
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| 
 | |
|     def check(self, event, auth_events, do_sig_check=True):
 | |
|         """ Checks if this event is correctly authed.
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| 
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|         Args:
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|             event: the event being checked.
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|             auth_events (dict: event-key -> event): the existing room state.
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| 
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| 
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|         Returns:
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|             True if the auth checks pass.
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|         """
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|         with Measure(self.clock, "auth.check"):
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|             self.check_size_limits(event)
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| 
 | |
|             if not hasattr(event, "room_id"):
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|                 raise AuthError(500, "Event has no room_id: %s" % event)
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| 
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|             sender_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender)
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| 
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|             # Check the sender's domain has signed the event
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|             if do_sig_check and not event.signatures.get(sender_domain):
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|                 raise AuthError(403, "Event not signed by sending server")
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| 
 | |
|             if auth_events is None:
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|                 # Oh, we don't know what the state of the room was, so we
 | |
|                 # are trusting that this is allowed (at least for now)
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|                 logger.warn("Trusting event: %s", event.event_id)
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|                 return True
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| 
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.Create:
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|                 room_id_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id)
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|                 if room_id_domain != sender_domain:
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|                     raise AuthError(
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|                         403,
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|                         "Creation event's room_id domain does not match sender's"
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|                     )
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|                 # FIXME
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|                 return True
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| 
 | |
|             creation_event = auth_events.get((EventTypes.Create, ""), None)
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| 
 | |
|             if not creation_event:
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|                 raise SynapseError(
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|                     403,
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|                     "Room %r does not exist" % (event.room_id,)
 | |
|                 )
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| 
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|             creating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id)
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|             originating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender)
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|             if creating_domain != originating_domain:
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|                 if not self.can_federate(event, auth_events):
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
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|                         403,
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|                         "This room has been marked as unfederatable."
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|                     )
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| 
 | |
|             # FIXME: Temp hack
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.Aliases:
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|                 if not event.is_state():
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|                     raise AuthError(
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|                         403,
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|                         "Alias event must be a state event",
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|                     )
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|                 if not event.state_key:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
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|                         403,
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|                         "Alias event must have non-empty state_key"
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|                     )
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|                 sender_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.sender)
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|                 if event.state_key != sender_domain:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         403,
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|                         "Alias event's state_key does not match sender's domain"
 | |
|                     )
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|                 return True
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| 
 | |
|             logger.debug(
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|                 "Auth events: %s",
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|                 [a.event_id for a in auth_events.values()]
 | |
|             )
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| 
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.Member:
 | |
|                 allowed = self.is_membership_change_allowed(
 | |
|                     event, auth_events
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|                 )
 | |
|                 if allowed:
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|                     logger.debug("Allowing! %s", event)
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|                 else:
 | |
|                     logger.debug("Denying! %s", event)
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|                 return allowed
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| 
 | |
|             self.check_event_sender_in_room(event, auth_events)
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| 
 | |
|             # Special case to allow m.room.third_party_invite events wherever
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|             # a user is allowed to issue invites.  Fixes
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|             # https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/1208 hopefully
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite:
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|                 user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events)
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|                 invite_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "invite", 0)
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| 
 | |
|                 if user_level < invite_level:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
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|                         403, (
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|                             "You cannot issue a third party invite for %s." %
 | |
|                             (event.content.display_name,)
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|                         )
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|                 else:
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|                     return True
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| 
 | |
|             self._can_send_event(event, auth_events)
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| 
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.PowerLevels:
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|                 self._check_power_levels(event, auth_events)
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| 
 | |
|             if event.type == EventTypes.Redaction:
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|                 self.check_redaction(event, auth_events)
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| 
 | |
|             logger.debug("Allowing! %s", event)
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| 
 | |
|     def check_size_limits(self, event):
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|         def too_big(field):
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|             raise EventSizeError("%s too large" % (field,))
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| 
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|         if len(event.user_id) > 255:
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|             too_big("user_id")
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|         if len(event.room_id) > 255:
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|             too_big("room_id")
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|         if event.is_state() and len(event.state_key) > 255:
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|             too_big("state_key")
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|         if len(event.type) > 255:
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|             too_big("type")
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|         if len(event.event_id) > 255:
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|             too_big("event_id")
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|         if len(encode_canonical_json(event.get_pdu_json())) > 65536:
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|             too_big("event")
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| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def check_joined_room(self, room_id, user_id, current_state=None):
 | |
|         """Check if the user is currently joined in the room
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|         Args:
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|             room_id(str): The room to check.
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|             user_id(str): The user to check.
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|             current_state(dict): Optional map of the current state of the room.
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|                 If provided then that map is used to check whether they are a
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|                 member of the room. Otherwise the current membership is
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|                 loaded from the database.
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|         Raises:
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|             AuthError if the user is not in the room.
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|         Returns:
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|             A deferred membership event for the user if the user is in
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|             the room.
 | |
|         """
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|         if current_state:
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|             member = current_state.get(
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|                 (EventTypes.Member, user_id),
 | |
|                 None
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|             )
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|         else:
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|             member = yield self.state.get_current_state(
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|                 room_id=room_id,
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|                 event_type=EventTypes.Member,
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|                 state_key=user_id
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|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         self._check_joined_room(member, user_id, room_id)
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(member)
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| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def check_user_was_in_room(self, room_id, user_id):
 | |
|         """Check if the user was in the room at some point.
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             room_id(str): The room to check.
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|             user_id(str): The user to check.
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|         Raises:
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|             AuthError if the user was never in the room.
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|         Returns:
 | |
|             A deferred membership event for the user if the user was in the
 | |
|             room. This will be the join event if they are currently joined to
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|             the room. This will be the leave event if they have left the room.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         member = yield self.state.get_current_state(
 | |
|             room_id=room_id,
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|             event_type=EventTypes.Member,
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|             state_key=user_id
 | |
|         )
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|         membership = member.membership if member else None
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if membership not in (Membership.JOIN, Membership.LEAVE):
 | |
|             raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s" % (
 | |
|                 user_id, room_id
 | |
|             ))
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| 
 | |
|         if membership == Membership.LEAVE:
 | |
|             forgot = yield self.store.did_forget(user_id, room_id)
 | |
|             if forgot:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s" % (
 | |
|                     user_id, room_id
 | |
|                 ))
 | |
| 
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(member)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def check_host_in_room(self, room_id, host):
 | |
|         with Measure(self.clock, "check_host_in_room"):
 | |
|             latest_event_ids = yield self.store.get_latest_event_ids_in_room(room_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             group, curr_state_ids = yield self.state.resolve_state_groups(
 | |
|                 room_id, latest_event_ids
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|             ret = yield self.store.is_host_joined(room_id, host, group, curr_state_ids)
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(ret)
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| 
 | |
|     def check_event_sender_in_room(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.Member, event.user_id, )
 | |
|         member_event = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         return self._check_joined_room(
 | |
|             member_event,
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|             event.user_id,
 | |
|             event.room_id
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _check_joined_room(self, member, user_id, room_id):
 | |
|         if not member or member.membership != Membership.JOIN:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(403, "User %s not in room %s (%s)" % (
 | |
|                 user_id, room_id, repr(member)
 | |
|             ))
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def can_federate(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         creation_event = auth_events.get((EventTypes.Create, ""))
 | |
| 
 | |
|         return creation_event.content.get("m.federate", True) is True
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @log_function
 | |
|     def is_membership_change_allowed(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         membership = event.content["membership"]
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # Check if this is the room creator joining:
 | |
|         if len(event.prev_events) == 1 and Membership.JOIN == membership:
 | |
|             # Get room creation event:
 | |
|             key = (EventTypes.Create, "", )
 | |
|             create = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
|             if create and event.prev_events[0][0] == create.event_id:
 | |
|                 if create.content["creator"] == event.state_key:
 | |
|                     return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|         target_user_id = event.state_key
 | |
| 
 | |
|         creating_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.room_id)
 | |
|         target_domain = get_domain_from_id(target_user_id)
 | |
|         if creating_domain != target_domain:
 | |
|             if not self.can_federate(event, auth_events):
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403,
 | |
|                     "This room has been marked as unfederatable."
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # get info about the caller
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.Member, event.user_id, )
 | |
|         caller = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         caller_in_room = caller and caller.membership == Membership.JOIN
 | |
|         caller_invited = caller and caller.membership == Membership.INVITE
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # get info about the target
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.Member, target_user_id, )
 | |
|         target = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         target_in_room = target and target.membership == Membership.JOIN
 | |
|         target_banned = target and target.membership == Membership.BAN
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.JoinRules, "", )
 | |
|         join_rule_event = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
|         if join_rule_event:
 | |
|             join_rule = join_rule_event.content.get(
 | |
|                 "join_rule", JoinRules.INVITE
 | |
|             )
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             join_rule = JoinRules.INVITE
 | |
| 
 | |
|         user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events)
 | |
|         target_level = self._get_user_power_level(
 | |
|             target_user_id, auth_events
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # FIXME (erikj): What should we do here as the default?
 | |
|         ban_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "ban", 50)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         logger.debug(
 | |
|             "is_membership_change_allowed: %s",
 | |
|             {
 | |
|                 "caller_in_room": caller_in_room,
 | |
|                 "caller_invited": caller_invited,
 | |
|                 "target_banned": target_banned,
 | |
|                 "target_in_room": target_in_room,
 | |
|                 "membership": membership,
 | |
|                 "join_rule": join_rule,
 | |
|                 "target_user_id": target_user_id,
 | |
|                 "event.user_id": event.user_id,
 | |
|             }
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if Membership.INVITE == membership and "third_party_invite" in event.content:
 | |
|             if not self._verify_third_party_invite(event, auth_events):
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "You are not invited to this room.")
 | |
|             if target_banned:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403, "%s is banned from the room" % (target_user_id,)
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|             return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if Membership.JOIN != membership:
 | |
|             if (caller_invited
 | |
|                     and Membership.LEAVE == membership
 | |
|                     and target_user_id == event.user_id):
 | |
|                 return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if not caller_in_room:  # caller isn't joined
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403,
 | |
|                     "%s not in room %s." % (event.user_id, event.room_id,)
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if Membership.INVITE == membership:
 | |
|             # TODO (erikj): We should probably handle this more intelligently
 | |
|             # PRIVATE join rules.
 | |
| 
 | |
|             # Invites are valid iff caller is in the room and target isn't.
 | |
|             if target_banned:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403, "%s is banned from the room" % (target_user_id,)
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|             elif target_in_room:  # the target is already in the room.
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "%s is already in the room." %
 | |
|                                      target_user_id)
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 invite_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "invite", 0)
 | |
| 
 | |
|                 if user_level < invite_level:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         403, "You cannot invite user %s." % target_user_id
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|         elif Membership.JOIN == membership:
 | |
|             # Joins are valid iff caller == target and they were:
 | |
|             # invited: They are accepting the invitation
 | |
|             # joined: It's a NOOP
 | |
|             if event.user_id != target_user_id:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "Cannot force another user to join.")
 | |
|             elif target_banned:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "You are banned from this room")
 | |
|             elif join_rule == JoinRules.PUBLIC:
 | |
|                 pass
 | |
|             elif join_rule == JoinRules.INVITE:
 | |
|                 if not caller_in_room and not caller_invited:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(403, "You are not invited to this room.")
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 # TODO (erikj): may_join list
 | |
|                 # TODO (erikj): private rooms
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "You are not allowed to join this room")
 | |
|         elif Membership.LEAVE == membership:
 | |
|             # TODO (erikj): Implement kicks.
 | |
|             if target_banned and user_level < ban_level:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403, "You cannot unban user &s." % (target_user_id,)
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|             elif target_user_id != event.user_id:
 | |
|                 kick_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "kick", 50)
 | |
| 
 | |
|                 if user_level < kick_level or user_level <= target_level:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         403, "You cannot kick user %s." % target_user_id
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|         elif Membership.BAN == membership:
 | |
|             if user_level < ban_level or user_level <= target_level:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(403, "You don't have permission to ban")
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(500, "Unknown membership %s" % membership)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _verify_third_party_invite(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         Validates that the invite event is authorized by a previous third-party invite.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Checks that the public key, and keyserver, match those in the third party invite,
 | |
|         and that the invite event has a signature issued using that public key.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             event: The m.room.member join event being validated.
 | |
|             auth_events: All relevant previous context events which may be used
 | |
|                 for authorization decisions.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Return:
 | |
|             True if the event fulfills the expectations of a previous third party
 | |
|             invite event.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         if "third_party_invite" not in event.content:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         if "signed" not in event.content["third_party_invite"]:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         signed = event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"]
 | |
|         for key in {"mxid", "token"}:
 | |
|             if key not in signed:
 | |
|                 return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         token = signed["token"]
 | |
| 
 | |
|         invite_event = auth_events.get(
 | |
|             (EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite, token,)
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         if not invite_event:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if event.user_id != invite_event.user_id:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if signed["mxid"] != event.state_key:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         if signed["token"] != token:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         for public_key_object in self.get_public_keys(invite_event):
 | |
|             public_key = public_key_object["public_key"]
 | |
|             try:
 | |
|                 for server, signature_block in signed["signatures"].items():
 | |
|                     for key_name, encoded_signature in signature_block.items():
 | |
|                         if not key_name.startswith("ed25519:"):
 | |
|                             continue
 | |
|                         verify_key = decode_verify_key_bytes(
 | |
|                             key_name,
 | |
|                             decode_base64(public_key)
 | |
|                         )
 | |
|                         verify_signed_json(signed, server, verify_key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|                         # We got the public key from the invite, so we know that the
 | |
|                         # correct server signed the signed bundle.
 | |
|                         # The caller is responsible for checking that the signing
 | |
|                         # server has not revoked that public key.
 | |
|                         return True
 | |
|             except (KeyError, SignatureVerifyException,):
 | |
|                 continue
 | |
|         return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def get_public_keys(self, invite_event):
 | |
|         public_keys = []
 | |
|         if "public_key" in invite_event.content:
 | |
|             o = {
 | |
|                 "public_key": invite_event.content["public_key"],
 | |
|             }
 | |
|             if "key_validity_url" in invite_event.content:
 | |
|                 o["key_validity_url"] = invite_event.content["key_validity_url"]
 | |
|             public_keys.append(o)
 | |
|         public_keys.extend(invite_event.content.get("public_keys", []))
 | |
|         return public_keys
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_power_level_event(self, auth_events):
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", )
 | |
|         return auth_events.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_user_power_level(self, user_id, auth_events):
 | |
|         power_level_event = self._get_power_level_event(auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if power_level_event:
 | |
|             level = power_level_event.content.get("users", {}).get(user_id)
 | |
|             if not level:
 | |
|                 level = power_level_event.content.get("users_default", 0)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if level is None:
 | |
|                 return 0
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 return int(level)
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             key = (EventTypes.Create, "", )
 | |
|             create_event = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
|             if (create_event is not None and
 | |
|                     create_event.content["creator"] == user_id):
 | |
|                 return 100
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 return 0
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_named_level(self, auth_events, name, default):
 | |
|         power_level_event = self._get_power_level_event(auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if not power_level_event:
 | |
|             return default
 | |
| 
 | |
|         level = power_level_event.content.get(name, None)
 | |
|         if level is not None:
 | |
|             return int(level)
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             return default
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def get_user_by_req(self, request, allow_guest=False, rights="access"):
 | |
|         """ Get a registered user's ID.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             request - An HTTP request with an access_token query parameter.
 | |
|         Returns:
 | |
|             defer.Deferred: resolves to a ``synapse.types.Requester`` object
 | |
|         Raises:
 | |
|             AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         # Can optionally look elsewhere in the request (e.g. headers)
 | |
|         try:
 | |
|             user_id = yield self._get_appservice_user_id(request.args)
 | |
|             if user_id:
 | |
|                 request.authenticated_entity = user_id
 | |
|                 defer.returnValue(synapse.types.create_requester(user_id))
 | |
| 
 | |
|             access_token = request.args["access_token"][0]
 | |
|             user_info = yield self.get_user_by_access_token(access_token, rights)
 | |
|             user = user_info["user"]
 | |
|             token_id = user_info["token_id"]
 | |
|             is_guest = user_info["is_guest"]
 | |
| 
 | |
|             # device_id may not be present if get_user_by_access_token has been
 | |
|             # stubbed out.
 | |
|             device_id = user_info.get("device_id")
 | |
| 
 | |
|             ip_addr = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
 | |
|             user_agent = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders(
 | |
|                 "User-Agent",
 | |
|                 default=[""]
 | |
|             )[0]
 | |
|             if user and access_token and ip_addr:
 | |
|                 preserve_context_over_fn(
 | |
|                     self.store.insert_client_ip,
 | |
|                     user=user,
 | |
|                     access_token=access_token,
 | |
|                     ip=ip_addr,
 | |
|                     user_agent=user_agent,
 | |
|                     device_id=device_id,
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if is_guest and not allow_guest:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403, "Guest access not allowed", errcode=Codes.GUEST_ACCESS_FORBIDDEN
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|             request.authenticated_entity = user.to_string()
 | |
| 
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(synapse.types.create_requester(
 | |
|                 user, token_id, is_guest, device_id))
 | |
|         except KeyError:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token.",
 | |
|                 errcode=Codes.MISSING_TOKEN
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def _get_appservice_user_id(self, request_args):
 | |
|         app_service = yield self.store.get_app_service_by_token(
 | |
|             request_args["access_token"][0]
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         if app_service is None:
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(None)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if "user_id" not in request_args:
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(app_service.sender)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         user_id = request_args["user_id"][0]
 | |
|         if app_service.sender == user_id:
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(app_service.sender)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if not app_service.is_interested_in_user(user_id):
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 403,
 | |
|                 "Application service cannot masquerade as this user."
 | |
|             )
 | |
|         if not (yield self.store.get_user_by_id(user_id)):
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 403,
 | |
|                 "Application service has not registered this user"
 | |
|             )
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(user_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def get_user_by_access_token(self, token, rights="access"):
 | |
|         """ Get a registered user's ID.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             token (str): The access token to get the user by.
 | |
|         Returns:
 | |
|             dict : dict that includes the user and the ID of their access token.
 | |
|         Raises:
 | |
|             AuthError if no user by that token exists or the token is invalid.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         try:
 | |
|             ret = yield self.get_user_from_macaroon(token, rights)
 | |
|         except AuthError:
 | |
|             # TODO(daniel): Remove this fallback when all existing access tokens
 | |
|             # have been re-issued as macaroons.
 | |
|             if self.hs.config.expire_access_token:
 | |
|                 raise
 | |
|             ret = yield self._look_up_user_by_access_token(token)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(ret)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def get_user_from_macaroon(self, macaroon_str, rights="access"):
 | |
|         try:
 | |
|             macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(macaroon_str)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             user_id = self.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
 | |
|             user = UserID.from_string(user_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             self.validate_macaroon(
 | |
|                 macaroon, rights, self.hs.config.expire_access_token,
 | |
|                 user_id=user_id,
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|             guest = False
 | |
|             for caveat in macaroon.caveats:
 | |
|                 if caveat.caveat_id == "guest = true":
 | |
|                     guest = True
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if guest:
 | |
|                 ret = {
 | |
|                     "user": user,
 | |
|                     "is_guest": True,
 | |
|                     "token_id": None,
 | |
|                     "device_id": None,
 | |
|                 }
 | |
|             elif rights == "delete_pusher":
 | |
|                 # We don't store these tokens in the database
 | |
|                 ret = {
 | |
|                     "user": user,
 | |
|                     "is_guest": False,
 | |
|                     "token_id": None,
 | |
|                     "device_id": None,
 | |
|                 }
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 # This codepath exists for several reasons:
 | |
|                 #   * so that we can actually return a token ID, which is used
 | |
|                 #     in some parts of the schema (where we probably ought to
 | |
|                 #     use device IDs instead)
 | |
|                 #   * the only way we currently have to invalidate an
 | |
|                 #     access_token is by removing it from the database, so we
 | |
|                 #     have to check here that it is still in the db
 | |
|                 #   * some attributes (notably device_id) aren't stored in the
 | |
|                 #     macaroon. They probably should be.
 | |
|                 # TODO: build the dictionary from the macaroon once the
 | |
|                 # above are fixed
 | |
|                 ret = yield self._look_up_user_by_access_token(macaroon_str)
 | |
|                 if ret["user"] != user:
 | |
|                     logger.error(
 | |
|                         "Macaroon user (%s) != DB user (%s)",
 | |
|                         user,
 | |
|                         ret["user"]
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
 | |
|                         "User mismatch in macaroon",
 | |
|                         errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(ret)
 | |
|         except (pymacaroons.exceptions.MacaroonException, TypeError, ValueError):
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Invalid macaroon passed.",
 | |
|                 errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def get_user_id_from_macaroon(self, macaroon):
 | |
|         """Retrieve the user_id given by the caveats on the macaroon.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Does *not* validate the macaroon.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             macaroon (pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Returns:
 | |
|             (str) user id
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Raises:
 | |
|             AuthError if there is no user_id caveat in the macaroon
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         user_prefix = "user_id = "
 | |
|         for caveat in macaroon.caveats:
 | |
|             if caveat.caveat_id.startswith(user_prefix):
 | |
|                 return caveat.caveat_id[len(user_prefix):]
 | |
|         raise AuthError(
 | |
|             self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "No user caveat in macaroon",
 | |
|             errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def validate_macaroon(self, macaroon, type_string, verify_expiry, user_id):
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         validate that a Macaroon is understood by and was signed by this server.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             macaroon(pymacaroons.Macaroon): The macaroon to validate
 | |
|             type_string(str): The kind of token required (e.g. "access", "refresh",
 | |
|                               "delete_pusher")
 | |
|             verify_expiry(bool): Whether to verify whether the macaroon has expired.
 | |
|                 This should really always be True, but no clients currently implement
 | |
|                 token refresh, so we can't enforce expiry yet.
 | |
|             user_id (str): The user_id required
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         v = pymacaroons.Verifier()
 | |
|         v.satisfy_exact("gen = 1")
 | |
|         v.satisfy_exact("type = " + type_string)
 | |
|         v.satisfy_exact("user_id = %s" % user_id)
 | |
|         v.satisfy_exact("guest = true")
 | |
|         if verify_expiry:
 | |
|             v.satisfy_general(self._verify_expiry)
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             v.satisfy_general(lambda c: c.startswith("time < "))
 | |
| 
 | |
|         v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         v = pymacaroons.Verifier()
 | |
|         v.satisfy_general(self._verify_recognizes_caveats)
 | |
|         v.verify(macaroon, self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _verify_expiry(self, caveat):
 | |
|         prefix = "time < "
 | |
|         if not caveat.startswith(prefix):
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         expiry = int(caveat[len(prefix):])
 | |
|         now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
 | |
|         return now < expiry
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _verify_recognizes_caveats(self, caveat):
 | |
|         first_space = caveat.find(" ")
 | |
|         if first_space < 0:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         second_space = caveat.find(" ", first_space + 1)
 | |
|         if second_space < 0:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
|         return caveat[:second_space + 1] in self._KNOWN_CAVEAT_PREFIXES
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def _look_up_user_by_access_token(self, token):
 | |
|         ret = yield self.store.get_user_by_access_token(token)
 | |
|         if not ret:
 | |
|             logger.warn("Unrecognised access token - not in store: %s" % (token,))
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Unrecognised access token.",
 | |
|                 errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
 | |
|             )
 | |
|         # we use ret.get() below because *lots* of unit tests stub out
 | |
|         # get_user_by_access_token in a way where it only returns a couple of
 | |
|         # the fields.
 | |
|         user_info = {
 | |
|             "user": UserID.from_string(ret.get("name")),
 | |
|             "token_id": ret.get("token_id", None),
 | |
|             "is_guest": False,
 | |
|             "device_id": ret.get("device_id"),
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(user_info)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def get_appservice_by_req(self, request):
 | |
|         try:
 | |
|             token = request.args["access_token"][0]
 | |
|             service = yield self.store.get_app_service_by_token(token)
 | |
|             if not service:
 | |
|                 logger.warn("Unrecognised appservice access token: %s" % (token,))
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS,
 | |
|                     "Unrecognised access token.",
 | |
|                     errcode=Codes.UNKNOWN_TOKEN
 | |
|                 )
 | |
|             request.authenticated_entity = service.sender
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(service)
 | |
|         except KeyError:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 self.TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS, "Missing access token."
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def is_server_admin(self, user):
 | |
|         return self.store.is_server_admin(user)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def add_auth_events(self, builder, context):
 | |
|         auth_ids = yield self.compute_auth_events(builder, context.current_state_ids)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         auth_events_entries = yield self.store.add_event_hashes(
 | |
|             auth_ids
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         builder.auth_events = auth_events_entries
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def compute_auth_events(self, event, current_state_ids, for_verification=False):
 | |
|         if event.type == EventTypes.Create:
 | |
|             defer.returnValue([])
 | |
| 
 | |
|         auth_ids = []
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", )
 | |
|         power_level_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if power_level_event_id:
 | |
|             auth_ids.append(power_level_event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.JoinRules, "", )
 | |
|         join_rule_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.Member, event.user_id, )
 | |
|         member_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.Create, "", )
 | |
|         create_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
|         if create_event_id:
 | |
|             auth_ids.append(create_event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if join_rule_event_id:
 | |
|             join_rule_event = yield self.store.get_event(join_rule_event_id)
 | |
|             join_rule = join_rule_event.content.get("join_rule")
 | |
|             is_public = join_rule == JoinRules.PUBLIC if join_rule else False
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             is_public = False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if event.type == EventTypes.Member:
 | |
|             e_type = event.content["membership"]
 | |
|             if e_type in [Membership.JOIN, Membership.INVITE]:
 | |
|                 if join_rule_event_id:
 | |
|                     auth_ids.append(join_rule_event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if e_type == Membership.JOIN:
 | |
|                 if member_event_id and not is_public:
 | |
|                     auth_ids.append(member_event_id)
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 if member_event_id:
 | |
|                     auth_ids.append(member_event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|                 if for_verification:
 | |
|                     key = (EventTypes.Member, event.state_key, )
 | |
|                     existing_event_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
|                     if existing_event_id:
 | |
|                         auth_ids.append(existing_event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if e_type == Membership.INVITE:
 | |
|                 if "third_party_invite" in event.content:
 | |
|                     key = (
 | |
|                         EventTypes.ThirdPartyInvite,
 | |
|                         event.content["third_party_invite"]["signed"]["token"]
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|                     third_party_invite_id = current_state_ids.get(key)
 | |
|                     if third_party_invite_id:
 | |
|                         auth_ids.append(third_party_invite_id)
 | |
|         elif member_event_id:
 | |
|             member_event = yield self.store.get_event(member_event_id)
 | |
|             if member_event.content["membership"] == Membership.JOIN:
 | |
|                 auth_ids.append(member_event.event_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         defer.returnValue(auth_ids)
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _get_send_level(self, etype, state_key, auth_events):
 | |
|         key = (EventTypes.PowerLevels, "", )
 | |
|         send_level_event = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
|         send_level = None
 | |
|         if send_level_event:
 | |
|             send_level = send_level_event.content.get("events", {}).get(
 | |
|                 etype
 | |
|             )
 | |
|             if send_level is None:
 | |
|                 if state_key is not None:
 | |
|                     send_level = send_level_event.content.get(
 | |
|                         "state_default", 50
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|                 else:
 | |
|                     send_level = send_level_event.content.get(
 | |
|                         "events_default", 0
 | |
|                     )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if send_level:
 | |
|             send_level = int(send_level)
 | |
|         else:
 | |
|             send_level = 0
 | |
| 
 | |
|         return send_level
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @log_function
 | |
|     def _can_send_event(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         send_level = self._get_send_level(
 | |
|             event.type, event.get("state_key", None), auth_events
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if user_level < send_level:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 403,
 | |
|                 "You don't have permission to post that to the room. " +
 | |
|                 "user_level (%d) < send_level (%d)" % (user_level, send_level)
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # Check state_key
 | |
|         if hasattr(event, "state_key"):
 | |
|             if event.state_key.startswith("@"):
 | |
|                 if event.state_key != event.user_id:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         403,
 | |
|                         "You are not allowed to set others state"
 | |
|                     )
 | |
|                 else:
 | |
|                     sender_domain = UserID.from_string(
 | |
|                         event.user_id
 | |
|                     ).domain
 | |
| 
 | |
|                     if sender_domain != event.state_key:
 | |
|                         raise AuthError(
 | |
|                             403,
 | |
|                             "You are not allowed to set others state"
 | |
|                         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def check_redaction(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         """Check whether the event sender is allowed to redact the target event.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Returns:
 | |
|             True if the the sender is allowed to redact the target event if the
 | |
|             target event was created by them.
 | |
|             False if the sender is allowed to redact the target event with no
 | |
|             further checks.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Raises:
 | |
|             AuthError if the event sender is definitely not allowed to redact
 | |
|             the target event.
 | |
|         """
 | |
|         user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         redact_level = self._get_named_level(auth_events, "redact", 50)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if user_level >= redact_level:
 | |
|             return False
 | |
| 
 | |
|         redacter_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.event_id)
 | |
|         redactee_domain = get_domain_from_id(event.redacts)
 | |
|         if redacter_domain == redactee_domain:
 | |
|             return True
 | |
| 
 | |
|         raise AuthError(
 | |
|             403,
 | |
|             "You don't have permission to redact events"
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     def _check_power_levels(self, event, auth_events):
 | |
|         user_list = event.content.get("users", {})
 | |
|         # Validate users
 | |
|         for k, v in user_list.items():
 | |
|             try:
 | |
|                 UserID.from_string(k)
 | |
|             except:
 | |
|                 raise SynapseError(400, "Not a valid user_id: %s" % (k,))
 | |
| 
 | |
|             try:
 | |
|                 int(v)
 | |
|             except:
 | |
|                 raise SynapseError(400, "Not a valid power level: %s" % (v,))
 | |
| 
 | |
|         key = (event.type, event.state_key, )
 | |
|         current_state = auth_events.get(key)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if not current_state:
 | |
|             return
 | |
| 
 | |
|         user_level = self._get_user_power_level(event.user_id, auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # Check other levels:
 | |
|         levels_to_check = [
 | |
|             ("users_default", None),
 | |
|             ("events_default", None),
 | |
|             ("state_default", None),
 | |
|             ("ban", None),
 | |
|             ("redact", None),
 | |
|             ("kick", None),
 | |
|             ("invite", None),
 | |
|         ]
 | |
| 
 | |
|         old_list = current_state.content.get("users")
 | |
|         for user in set(old_list.keys() + user_list.keys()):
 | |
|             levels_to_check.append(
 | |
|                 (user, "users")
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         old_list = current_state.content.get("events")
 | |
|         new_list = event.content.get("events")
 | |
|         for ev_id in set(old_list.keys() + new_list.keys()):
 | |
|             levels_to_check.append(
 | |
|                 (ev_id, "events")
 | |
|             )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         old_state = current_state.content
 | |
|         new_state = event.content
 | |
| 
 | |
|         for level_to_check, dir in levels_to_check:
 | |
|             old_loc = old_state
 | |
|             new_loc = new_state
 | |
|             if dir:
 | |
|                 old_loc = old_loc.get(dir, {})
 | |
|                 new_loc = new_loc.get(dir, {})
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if level_to_check in old_loc:
 | |
|                 old_level = int(old_loc[level_to_check])
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 old_level = None
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if level_to_check in new_loc:
 | |
|                 new_level = int(new_loc[level_to_check])
 | |
|             else:
 | |
|                 new_level = None
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if new_level is not None and old_level is not None:
 | |
|                 if new_level == old_level:
 | |
|                     continue
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if dir == "users" and level_to_check != event.user_id:
 | |
|                 if old_level == user_level:
 | |
|                     raise AuthError(
 | |
|                         403,
 | |
|                         "You don't have permission to remove ops level equal "
 | |
|                         "to your own"
 | |
|                     )
 | |
| 
 | |
|             if old_level > user_level or new_level > user_level:
 | |
|                 raise AuthError(
 | |
|                     403,
 | |
|                     "You don't have permission to add ops level greater "
 | |
|                     "than your own"
 | |
|                 )
 | |
| 
 | |
|     @defer.inlineCallbacks
 | |
|     def check_can_change_room_list(self, room_id, user):
 | |
|         """Check if the user is allowed to edit the room's entry in the
 | |
|         published room list.
 | |
| 
 | |
|         Args:
 | |
|             room_id (str)
 | |
|             user (UserID)
 | |
|         """
 | |
| 
 | |
|         is_admin = yield self.is_server_admin(user)
 | |
|         if is_admin:
 | |
|             defer.returnValue(True)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         user_id = user.to_string()
 | |
|         yield self.check_joined_room(room_id, user_id)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         # We currently require the user is a "moderator" in the room. We do this
 | |
|         # by checking if they would (theoretically) be able to change the
 | |
|         # m.room.aliases events
 | |
|         power_level_event = yield self.state.get_current_state(
 | |
|             room_id, EventTypes.PowerLevels, ""
 | |
|         )
 | |
| 
 | |
|         auth_events = {}
 | |
|         if power_level_event:
 | |
|             auth_events[(EventTypes.PowerLevels, "")] = power_level_event
 | |
| 
 | |
|         send_level = self._get_send_level(
 | |
|             EventTypes.Aliases, "", auth_events
 | |
|         )
 | |
|         user_level = self._get_user_power_level(user_id, auth_events)
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if user_level < send_level:
 | |
|             raise AuthError(
 | |
|                 403,
 | |
|                 "This server requires you to be a moderator in the room to"
 | |
|                 " edit its room list entry"
 | |
|             )
 |