299 lines
		
	
	
		
			11 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			299 lines
		
	
	
		
			11 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Python
		
	
	
# Copyright 2015, 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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# Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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import logging
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
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from synapse.api.constants import MAX_DEPTH, EventContentFields, EventTypes, Membership
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from synapse.api.errors import Codes, SynapseError
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from synapse.api.room_versions import EventFormatVersions, RoomVersion
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from synapse.crypto.event_signing import check_event_content_hash
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from synapse.crypto.keyring import Keyring
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from synapse.events import EventBase, make_event_from_dict
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from synapse.events.utils import prune_event, validate_canonicaljson
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from synapse.http.servlet import assert_params_in_dict
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from synapse.logging.opentracing import log_kv, trace
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from synapse.types import JsonDict, get_domain_from_id
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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    from synapse.server import HomeServer
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class InvalidEventSignatureError(RuntimeError):
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    """Raised when the signature on an event is invalid.
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    The stringification of this exception is just the error message without reference
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    to the event id. The event id is available as a property.
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    """
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    def __init__(self, message: str, event_id: str):
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        super().__init__(message)
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        self.event_id = event_id
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class FederationBase:
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    def __init__(self, hs: "HomeServer"):
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        self.hs = hs
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        self.server_name = hs.hostname
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        self.keyring = hs.get_keyring()
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        self.spam_checker = hs.get_spam_checker()
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        self.store = hs.get_datastores().main
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        self._clock = hs.get_clock()
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        self._storage_controllers = hs.get_storage_controllers()
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    @trace
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    async def _check_sigs_and_hash(
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        self, room_version: RoomVersion, pdu: EventBase
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    ) -> EventBase:
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        """Checks that event is correctly signed by the sending server.
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        Also checks the content hash, and redacts the event if there is a mismatch.
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        Also runs the event through the spam checker; if it fails, redacts the event
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        and flags it as soft-failed.
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        Args:
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            room_version: The room version of the PDU
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            pdu: the event to be checked
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        Returns:
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              * the original event if the checks pass
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              * a redacted version of the event (if the signature
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                matched but the hash did not). In this case a warning will be logged.
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        Raises:
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          InvalidEventSignatureError if the signature check failed. Nothing
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             will be logged in this case.
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        """
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        await _check_sigs_on_pdu(self.keyring, room_version, pdu)
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        if not check_event_content_hash(pdu):
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            # let's try to distinguish between failures because the event was
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            # redacted (which are somewhat expected) vs actual ball-tampering
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            # incidents.
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            #
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            # This is just a heuristic, so we just assume that if the keys are
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            # about the same between the redacted and received events, then the
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            # received event was probably a redacted copy (but we then use our
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            # *actual* redacted copy to be on the safe side.)
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            redacted_event = prune_event(pdu)
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            if set(redacted_event.keys()) == set(pdu.keys()) and set(
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                redacted_event.content.keys()
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            ) == set(pdu.content.keys()):
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                logger.debug(
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                    "Event %s seems to have been redacted; using our redacted copy",
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                    pdu.event_id,
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                )
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                log_kv(
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                    {
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                        "message": "Event seems to have been redacted; using our redacted copy",
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                        "event_id": pdu.event_id,
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                    }
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                )
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            else:
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                logger.warning(
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                    "Event %s content has been tampered, redacting",
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                    pdu.event_id,
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                )
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                log_kv(
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                    {
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                        "message": "Event content has been tampered, redacting",
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                        "event_id": pdu.event_id,
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                    }
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                )
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            return redacted_event
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        spam_check = await self.spam_checker.check_event_for_spam(pdu)
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        if spam_check != self.spam_checker.NOT_SPAM:
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            logger.warning("Event contains spam, soft-failing %s", pdu.event_id)
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            log_kv(
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                {
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                    "message": "Event contains spam, redacting (to save disk space) "
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                    "as well as soft-failing (to stop using the event in prev_events)",
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                    "event_id": pdu.event_id,
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                }
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            )
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            # we redact (to save disk space) as well as soft-failing (to stop
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            # using the event in prev_events).
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            redacted_event = prune_event(pdu)
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            redacted_event.internal_metadata.soft_failed = True
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            return redacted_event
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        return pdu
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@trace
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async def _check_sigs_on_pdu(
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    keyring: Keyring, room_version: RoomVersion, pdu: EventBase
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) -> None:
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    """Check that the given events are correctly signed
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    Args:
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        keyring: keyring object to do the checks
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        room_version: the room version of the PDUs
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        pdus: the events to be checked
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    Raises:
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        InvalidEventSignatureError if the event wasn't correctly signed.
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    """
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    # we want to check that the event is signed by:
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    #
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    # (a) the sender's server
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    #
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    #     - except in the case of invites created from a 3pid invite, which are exempt
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    #     from this check, because the sender has to match that of the original 3pid
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    #     invite, but the event may come from a different HS, for reasons that I don't
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    #     entirely grok (why do the senders have to match? and if they do, why doesn't the
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    #     joining server ask the inviting server to do the switcheroo with
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    #     exchange_third_party_invite?).
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    #
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    #     That's pretty awful, since redacting such an invite will render it invalid
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    #     (because it will then look like a regular invite without a valid signature),
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    #     and signatures are *supposed* to be valid whether or not an event has been
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    #     redacted. But this isn't the worst of the ways that 3pid invites are broken.
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    #
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    # (b) for V1 and V2 rooms, the server which created the event_id
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    #
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    # let's start by getting the domain for each pdu, and flattening the event back
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    # to JSON.
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    # First we check that the sender event is signed by the sender's domain
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    # (except if its a 3pid invite, in which case it may be sent by any server)
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    sender_domain = get_domain_from_id(pdu.sender)
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    if not _is_invite_via_3pid(pdu):
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        try:
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            await keyring.verify_event_for_server(
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                sender_domain,
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                pdu,
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                pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0,
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            )
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        except Exception as e:
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            raise InvalidEventSignatureError(
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                f"unable to verify signature for sender domain {sender_domain}: {e}",
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                pdu.event_id,
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            ) from None
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    # now let's look for events where the sender's domain is different to the
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    # event id's domain (normally only the case for joins/leaves), and add additional
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    # checks. Only do this if the room version has a concept of event ID domain
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    # (ie, the room version uses old-style non-hash event IDs).
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    if room_version.event_format == EventFormatVersions.ROOM_V1_V2:
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        event_domain = get_domain_from_id(pdu.event_id)
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        if event_domain != sender_domain:
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            try:
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                await keyring.verify_event_for_server(
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                    event_domain,
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                    pdu,
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                    pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0,
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                )
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            except Exception as e:
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                raise InvalidEventSignatureError(
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                    f"unable to verify signature for event domain {event_domain}: {e}",
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                    pdu.event_id,
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                ) from None
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    # If this is a join event for a restricted room it may have been authorised
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    # via a different server from the sending server. Check those signatures.
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    if (
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        room_version.msc3083_join_rules
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        and pdu.type == EventTypes.Member
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        and pdu.membership == Membership.JOIN
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        and EventContentFields.AUTHORISING_USER in pdu.content
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    ):
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        authorising_server = get_domain_from_id(
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            pdu.content[EventContentFields.AUTHORISING_USER]
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        )
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        try:
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            await keyring.verify_event_for_server(
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                authorising_server,
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                pdu,
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                pdu.origin_server_ts if room_version.enforce_key_validity else 0,
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            )
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        except Exception as e:
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            raise InvalidEventSignatureError(
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                f"unable to verify signature for authorising serve {authorising_server}: {e}",
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                pdu.event_id,
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            ) from None
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def _is_invite_via_3pid(event: EventBase) -> bool:
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    return (
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        event.type == EventTypes.Member
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        and event.membership == Membership.INVITE
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        and "third_party_invite" in event.content
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    )
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def event_from_pdu_json(pdu_json: JsonDict, room_version: RoomVersion) -> EventBase:
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    """Construct an EventBase from an event json received over federation
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    Args:
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        pdu_json: pdu as received over federation
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        room_version: The version of the room this event belongs to
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    Raises:
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        SynapseError: if the pdu is missing required fields or is otherwise
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            not a valid matrix event
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    """
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    # we could probably enforce a bunch of other fields here (room_id, sender,
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    # origin, etc etc)
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    assert_params_in_dict(pdu_json, ("type", "depth"))
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    # Strip any unauthorized values from "unsigned" if they exist
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    if "unsigned" in pdu_json:
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        _strip_unsigned_values(pdu_json)
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    depth = pdu_json["depth"]
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    if not isinstance(depth, int):
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        raise SynapseError(400, "Depth %r not an intger" % (depth,), Codes.BAD_JSON)
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    if depth < 0:
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        raise SynapseError(400, "Depth too small", Codes.BAD_JSON)
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    elif depth > MAX_DEPTH:
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        raise SynapseError(400, "Depth too large", Codes.BAD_JSON)
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    # Validate that the JSON conforms to the specification.
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    if room_version.strict_canonicaljson:
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        validate_canonicaljson(pdu_json)
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    event = make_event_from_dict(pdu_json, room_version)
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    return event
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def _strip_unsigned_values(pdu_dict: JsonDict) -> None:
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    """
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    Strip any unsigned values unless specifically allowed, as defined by the whitelist.
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    pdu: the json dict to strip values from. Note that the dict is mutated by this
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    function
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    """
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    unsigned = pdu_dict["unsigned"]
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    if not isinstance(unsigned, dict):
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        pdu_dict["unsigned"] = {}
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    if pdu_dict["type"] == "m.room.member":
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        whitelist = ["knock_room_state", "invite_room_state", "age"]
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    else:
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        whitelist = ["age"]
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    filtered_unsigned = {k: v for k, v in unsigned.items() if k in whitelist}
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    pdu_dict["unsigned"] = filtered_unsigned
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