228 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
228 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Three, Issue 26, File 5 of 11
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COSMOS
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COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS
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Part One
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by King Arthur
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Introduction
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%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Throughout the last decade, computers have played an ever growing role in
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information storage and retrieval. In most companies, computerized databases
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have replaced a majority of all paper records. Where in the past it would take
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10 minutes for someone to search through stacks of paper for some data, the
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same information can now be retrieved from a computer in a fraction of a
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second.
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Previously, proprietary information could be considered "safe" in a file
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cabinet; the only way to see the data would be to have physical access to the
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files. Now, somebody with a computer terminal and a modem can make a quick
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phone call and access private records. It's unfortunate that there are
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"hackers" who try to gain unauthorized access to computers. Yet, it is just as
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unfortunate that most reported computer break-ins could have been prevented if
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more thought and common sense went into protecting computers.
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Hackers
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%%%%%%%
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There have been many cases of computer crime reported by the Bell
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Operating Companies (BOCs), but it is hard to say how many actual break-ins
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there are. Keep in mind that the only reported cases are those which are
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detected. In an interview with an anonymous hacker, I was told of one of the
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break-ins that may not have ever been reported. "My friend got the number when
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he misdialed his business office -- that's how we knew that it was the phone
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company's. It seems this Unix was part of some real big Bellcore computer
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network," says the hacker.
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The hacker explains that this system was one of many systems used by the
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various BOCs to allow large Centrex customers to rearrange their Centrex
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groups. It seems he found a text file on the system with telephone numbers and
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passwords for some of Bellcore's development systems. "On this Bellcore system
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in Jersey, called CCRS, we found a list of 20 some-odd COSMOS systems....
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Numbers, passwords, and wire centers from all over the country!" He adds,
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"Five states to be exact."
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The hacker was able to gain access to the original Unix system because, as
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he says, "Those guys left all the default passwords working." He was able to
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login with a user name of "games" with the password being "games." "Once we
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were on we found that a large number of accounts didn't have passwords. Mary,
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John, test, banana, and system were some, to name a few." From there he was
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able to eventually access several COSMOS database systems -- with access to ALL
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system files and resources.
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COSMOS
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%%%%%%
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COSMOS, an acronym for the COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS, is a
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database package currently supported by Bellcore. COSMOS is presently being
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used by every BOC, as well as by Cincinnati Bell and Rochester Telephone.
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COSMOS replaces paper record-keeping and other mechanized record systems for
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plant administration. COSMOS' original purpose was to alleviate congestion in
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the Main Distributing Frame (MDF) by maintaining the shortest jumpers.
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It can now maintain load balance in a switch and assign office equipment,
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tie pairs, bridge lifters and the like. Additional applications allow COSMOS
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to aid in "cutting-over" a new switch, or even generate recent change messages
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to be input into electronic switches. COSMOS is most often used for
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provisioning new service and maintaining existing service, by the following
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departments: The frame room (MDF), the Loop Assignment Center (LAC), the
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Recent Change Memory Assistance Center (RCMAC), the network administration
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center, and the repair service.
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Next year COSMOS will celebrate its 15th birthday, which is quite an
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accomplishment for a computer program. The first version or "generic" of
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COSMOS was released by Bell Laboratories in 1974. In March 1974, New Jersey
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Bell was the first company to run COSMOS, in Passaic, New Jersey. Pacific
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Telesis, NYNEX, Southern Bell, and many of the other BOCs adopted COSMOS soon
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after. Whereas Southwestern Bell waited until 1977, the Passaic, NJ Wire
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Center is still running COSMOS today.
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Originally COSMOS ran on the DEC PDP 11/45 minicomputer. The package was
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written in Fortran, and ran the COSNIX operating system. Later it was adapted
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to run on the DEC PDP 11/70, a larger machine. Beverly Cruse, member of
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Technical Staff, COSMOS system design at Bellcore, says, "COSNIX is a
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derivation of Unix 1.0, it started out from the original Unix, but it was
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adapted for use on the COSMOS project. It bears many similarities to Unix, but
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more to the early versions of Unix than the current... The COSMOS application
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now runs on other hardware understandard Unix."
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"The newest version of COSMOS runs on the standard Unix System V operating
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system. We will certify it for use on particular processors, based on the
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needs of our clients," says Ed Pinnes, the District Manager of COSMOS system
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design at Bellcore. This Unix version of COSMOS was written in C language.
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Currently, COSMOS is available for use on the AT&T 3B20 supermini computer,
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running under the Unix System V operating system. "There are over 700 COSMOS
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systems total, of which a vast majority are DEC PDP 11/70's. The number
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fluctuates all the time, as companies are starting to replace 11/70's with the
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other machines," says Cruse.
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In 1981 Bell Laboratories introduced an integrated systems package for
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telephone companies called the Facility Assignment Control System (FACS). FACS
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is a network of systems that exchanges information on a regular basis. These
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are: COSMOS, Loop Facilities Assignment and Control System (LFACS), Service
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Order Analysis and Control (SOAC), and Work Manager (WM). A service order from
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the business office is input in to SOAC. SOAC analyzes the order and then
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sends an assignment request, via the WM, to LFACS. WM acts as a packet switch,
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sending messages between the other components of FACS. LFACS assigns
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distribution plant facilities (cables, terminals, etc.) and sends the order
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back to SOAC. After SOAC receives the information form LFACS, it sends an
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assignment request to COSMOS. COSMOS responds with data for assigning central
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office equipment: Switching equipment, transmission equipment, bridge lifters,
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and the like. SOAC takes all the information from LFACS and COSMOS and appends
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it to the service order, and sends the service order on its way.
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Computer Security
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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Telephone companies seem to take the brunt of unauthorized access
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attempts. The sheer number of employees and size of most telephone companies
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makes it very difficult to keep tabs on everyone and everything. While
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researching computer security, it has become evident that COSMOS is a large
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target for hackers. "The number of COSMOS systems around, with dial-ups on
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most of the machines... makes for a lot of possible break-ins," says Cruse.
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This is why it's all the more important for companies to learn how to protect
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themselves.
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"COSMOS is power, the whole thing is a big power trip, man. It's like Big
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Brother -- you see the number of some dude you don't like in the computer. You
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make a service order to disconnect it; COSMOS is too stupid to tell you from a
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real telco dude," says one hacker. "I think they get what they deserve:
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There's a serious dearth of security out there. If kids like us can get access
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this easily, think about the real enemy -- the Russians," jokes another.
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A majority of unauthorized access attempts can be traced back to an
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oversight on the part of the system operators; and just as many are the fault
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of the systems' users. If you can keep one step ahead of the hackers,
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recognize these problems now, and keep an eye out for similar weaknesses, you
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can save your company a lot of trouble.
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A hacker says, "In California, a friend of mine used to be able to find
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passwords in the garbage. The computer was supposed to print some garbled
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characters on top of the password. Instead the password would print out AFTER
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the garbled characters." Some COSMOS users have half duplex printing
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terminals. At the password prompt COSMOS is supposed to print a series of
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characters and then send backspaces. Then the user would enter his or her
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password. When the password is printed on top of the other characters, you
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can't see what it is. If the password is being printed after the other
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characters, then the printing terminal is not receiving the back space
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characters properly.
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Another big problem is lack of password security. As mentioned before,
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regarding CCRS, many accounts on some systems will lack passwords. "On COSMOS
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there are these standardized account names. It makes it easier for system
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operators to keep track of who's using the system. For instance: all accounts
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that belong to the frame room will have an MF in them. Like MF01, you can tell
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it belongs to the frame room. (MF stands for Main Frame.) Most of these names
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seem to be common to most COSMOS systems everywhere. In one city, none of
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these user accounts have passwords. All you need is the name of the account
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and you're in. In another city, which will remain unnamed, the passwords are
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the SAME AS THE DAMN NAMES! Like, MF01 has a password of MF01. These guys
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must not be very serious about security."
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One of the biggest and in my eyes one of the scariest problems around is
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what hackers refer to as "social engineering". Social engineering is basically
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the act of impersonating somebody else for the sake of gaining proprietary
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information. "I know this guy. He can trick anybody, does the best BS job
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I've ever seen. He'll call up a telco office, like the repair service bureau,
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that uses COSMOS. We found that most clerks at the repair service aren't too
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sharp." The hacker said the conversation would usually take the following
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course:
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Hacker: Hi, this is Frank, from the COSMOS computer center. We've had a
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problem with our records, and I'm wondering if you could help me?
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Telco: Oh, what seems to be the problem?
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H: We seem to have lost some user data. Hopefully, if I can correct the
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problem, you people won't lose any access time today. Could you tell me
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what your system login name is?
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T: Well, the one I use is RS01.
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H: Hmm, this could present a problem. Can you tell me what password and wire
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center you use that with?
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T: Well, I just type s-u-c-k-e-r for my password, and my wire centers are: TK,
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KL, GL, and PK.
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H: Do you call into the system, or do you only have direct connect terminals?
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T: Well, when I turn on my machine I get a direct hook up. It just tells me
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to login. But I know in the back they have to dial something. Hold on,
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let me check. (3 Minutes later...) Well, she says all she does is call
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555-1212.
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H: OK, I think I have everything taken care of. Thanks, have a nice day.
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T: Good, so I'm not gonna have any problems?
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H: No, but if you do just give the computer center a call, and we'll take care
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of it.
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T: Oh, thank you honey. Have a nice day now.
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"It doesn't work all the time, but we get away with it a good part of the
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time. I guess they just don't expect a call from someone who isn't really part
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of their company," says the hacker. "I once social engineered the COSMOS
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control center. They gave me dial-ups for several systems, and even gave me
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one password. I told them I was calling from the RCMAC and I was having
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trouble logging into COSMOS," says another.
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This last problem illustrates a perfect example of what I mean when I say
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these problems can be prevented if more care and common sense went into
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computer security. "Sometimes, if we want to get in to COSMOS, but we don't
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have the password, we call a COSMOS dial-up at about 5 o'clock. To logoff of
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COSMOS you have to hit a CONTROL-Y. If you don't, the next person who calls
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will resume where you left off. A lot of the time, people forget to logoff.
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They just turn their terminals off, in the rush of going home."
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The past examples do not comprise the only way hackers get into systems,
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but most of the problems shown here can exist regardless of what types of
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systems your company has. The second article deals with solutions to these
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problems.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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