chg: [workshop] ecryption 101 - attackers model
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@ -64,8 +64,7 @@
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\item {\bf Confidentiality }: Ensure the secrecy of the message except for
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the {\bf intended } recipient,
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\item {\bf Authentication }: Proving a party's identity,
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\item {\bf Integrity }: Verifying that data transmitted were not altered in
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the process,
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\item {\bf Integrity }: Verifying that data transmitted were not altered,
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\item {\bf Non-repudiation }: Proving that the sender sent a given message.
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\end{itemize}
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@ -76,40 +75,79 @@
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\begin{itemize}
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\item {\bf In-transit encryption}: protects data while it is
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transfered from one machine to another,
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transferred from one machine to another,
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\item {\bf At-rest encryption}: protects data stored on one machine.
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{Attack Models}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{Kerckhoffs's Principle}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{quote}
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It [cipher] should not require secrecy, and it should not be a problem if it falls into enemy hands.
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\end{quote}
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\vspace{10 mm}
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{ \bf There is no security in obscurity.}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}
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\frametitle{Security Notions}
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\begin{frame}[allowframebreaks]
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\frametitle{Attackers model}
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Black Box - Attackers may only see inputs / outputs:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item
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\item {\bf Ciphertext-Only Attackers (COA) :} see only the ciphertext,
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\item {\bf Known-Plaintext Attackers (KPA):} see ciphertext and plaintext,
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\item {\bf Chosen-Plaintext Attacker (CPA):} encrypt plaintext, and
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see ciphertext,
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\item {\bf Chosen-Ciphertext Attakers (CCA):} encrypt plaintext,
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decrypt ciphertext.
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\end{itemize}
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\framebreak
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Grey Box - Attackers see cipher's implementation:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item {\bf Side-Channel Attacks:} study the behavior of the implementation (eg. tpm-fail\cite{244048}),
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\vspace{10 mm}
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\begin{figure}[h!]
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\includegraphics[width=200px]{./tpmfail.png}
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\end{figure}
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\framebreak
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\item {\bf Invasive Attacks:}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item injecting faults\cite{Matsuda2018},
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\vspace{10 mm}
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\begin{figure}[h!]
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\includegraphics[width=200px]{./faultInjection.png}
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\end{figure}
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\framebreak
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\item decapping chips\footnote{https://siliconpr0n.org/wiki/doku.php?id=decap:start}, reverse engineering\footnote{http://siliconzoo.org}\footnote{http://degate.org}, etc.
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{figure}[h!]
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\includegraphics[width=.49\textwidth]{./decaping.jpg}%
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\hfill
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\includegraphics[width=.49\textwidth]{./degate.png}
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\end{figure}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}
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@ -172,9 +210,9 @@
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\item client (ja3),
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\item server (ja3s),
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{displayquote}
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\begin{quote}
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``JA3 is a method for creating SSL/TLS client fingerprints that should be easy to produce on any platform and can be easily shared for threat intelligence.''\footnote{https://github.com/salesforce/ja3}
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\end{displayquote}
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\end{quote}
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{\bf Pivot} on additional data points during Incident Response
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\end{frame}
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@ -7,4 +7,59 @@
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author = {Jean-Philippe Aumasson},
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}
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@Book{Menezes:1996:HAC:548089,
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title = {Handbook of Applied Cryptography},
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publisher = {CRC Press, Inc.},
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year = {1996},
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author = {Menezes, Alfred J. and Vanstone, Scott A. and Oorschot, Paul C. Van},
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address = {Boca Raton, FL, USA},
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edition = {1st},
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isbn = {0849385237},
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}
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@Book{Anderson:2008:SEG:1373319,
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title = {Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems},
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publisher = {Wiley Publishing},
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year = {2008},
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author = {Anderson, Ross J.},
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edition = {2},
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isbn = {9780470068526},
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}
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@Book{DBLP:books/daglib/0025849,
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title = {Computer Security {(3.} ed.)},
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publisher = {Wiley},
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year = {2011},
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author = {Dieter Gollmann},
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isbn = {978-0-470-74115-3},
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bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org},
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biburl = {https://dblp.org/rec/bib/books/daglib/0025849},
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timestamp = {Mon, 13 Mar 2017 16:08:10 +0100},
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url = {http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118801326.html},
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}
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@Article{Matsuda2018,
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author = {Kohei Matsuda and Tatsuya Fujii and Natsu Shoji and Takeshi Sugawara and Kazuo Sakiyama and Yu-Ichi Hayashi and Makoto Nagata and Noriyuki Miura},
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title = {A 286 F2/Cell Distributed Bulk-Current Sensor and Secure Flush Code Eraser Against Laser Fault Injection Attack on Cryptographic Processor},
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journal = {{IEEE} Journal of Solid-State Circuits},
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year = {2018},
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volume = {53},
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number = {11},
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pages = {3174--3182},
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month = nov,
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doi = {10.1109/jssc.2018.2869142},
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publisher = {Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ({IEEE})},
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url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/jssc.2018.2869142},
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}
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@InProceedings{244048,
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title = {TPM-FAIL: {TPM} meets Timing and Lattice Attacks},
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booktitle = {29th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 20)},
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year = {2020},
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address = {Boston, MA},
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month = aug,
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publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
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url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi},
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}
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@Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:bibtex;}
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