Some keys are stored in the synapse database with a null valid_until_ms
which caused an exception to be thrown when using that key. We fix this
by treating nulls as zeroes, i.e. they keys will match verification
requests with a minimum_valid_until_ms of zero (i.e. don't validate ts)
but will not match requests with a non-zero minimum_valid_until_ms.
Fixes#5391.
Sends password reset emails from the homeserver instead of proxying to the identity server. This is now the default behaviour for security reasons. If you wish to continue proxying password reset requests to the identity server you must now enable the email.trust_identity_server_for_password_resets option.
This PR is a culmination of 3 smaller PRs which have each been separately reviewed:
* #5308
* #5345
* #5368
There are a few changes going on here:
* We make checking the signature on a key server response optional: if no
verify_keys are specified, we trust to TLS to validate the connection.
* We change the default config so that it does not require responses to be
signed by the old key.
* We replace the old 'perspectives' config with 'trusted_key_servers', which
is also formatted slightly differently.
* We emit a warning to the logs every time we trust a key server response
signed by the old key.
* Fix background updates to handle redactions/rejections
In background updates based on current state delta stream we need to
handle that we may not have all the events (or at least that
`get_events` may raise an exception).
Also:
* rename VerifyKeyRequest->VerifyJsonRequest
* calculate key_ids on VerifyJsonRequest construction
* refactor things to pass around VerifyJsonRequests instead of 4-tuples
FederationClient.get_pdu is called in a loop to fetch a batch of PDUs. A
failure to fetch one should not result in a failure of the whole batch. Add the
missing `continue`.
We have too many things called get_event, and it's hard to figure out what we
mean. Also remove some unused params from the signature, and add some logging.
It takes at least 20 minutes to work through the long_retries schedule (11
attempts, each with a 60 second timeout, and 60 seconds between each request),
so if the notary server isn't returning within the timeout, we'll just end up
blocking whatever request is happening for 20 minutes.
Ain't nobody got time for that.
Erik Johnston